From d74a350d7035b4711d3d76447e986446bb9e96f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hannes Reinecke Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2017 16:26:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 01/43] scsi: scsi_devinfo: fixup string compare commit b8018b973c7cefa5eb386540130fa47315b8e337 upstream. When checking the model and vendor string we need to use the minimum value of either string, otherwise we'll miss out on wildcard matches. And we should take care when matching with zero size strings; results might be unpredictable. With this patch the rules for matching devinfo strings are as follows: - Vendor strings must match exactly - Empty Model strings will only match if the devinfo model is also empty - Model strings shorter than the devinfo model string will not match Fixes: 5e7ff2c ("SCSI: fix new bug in scsi_dev_info_list string matching") Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke Reviewed-by: Alan Stern Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Cc: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c | 23 +++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c index 9d555b63d2e2..d596b76eea64 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c @@ -394,8 +394,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(scsi_dev_info_list_add_keyed); /** * scsi_dev_info_list_find - find a matching dev_info list entry. - * @vendor: vendor string - * @model: model (product) string + * @vendor: full vendor string + * @model: full model (product) string * @key: specify list to use * * Description: @@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static struct scsi_dev_info_list *scsi_dev_info_list_find(const char *vendor, struct scsi_dev_info_list *devinfo; struct scsi_dev_info_list_table *devinfo_table = scsi_devinfo_lookup_by_key(key); - size_t vmax, mmax; + size_t vmax, mmax, mlen; const char *vskip, *mskip; if (IS_ERR(devinfo_table)) @@ -449,15 +449,18 @@ static struct scsi_dev_info_list *scsi_dev_info_list_find(const char *vendor, dev_info_list) { if (devinfo->compatible) { /* - * Behave like the older version of get_device_flags. + * vendor strings must be an exact match */ - if (memcmp(devinfo->vendor, vskip, vmax) || - (vmax < sizeof(devinfo->vendor) && - devinfo->vendor[vmax])) + if (vmax != strlen(devinfo->vendor) || + memcmp(devinfo->vendor, vskip, vmax)) continue; - if (memcmp(devinfo->model, mskip, mmax) || - (mmax < sizeof(devinfo->model) && - devinfo->model[mmax])) + + /* + * @model specifies the full string, and + * must be larger or equal to devinfo->model + */ + mlen = strlen(devinfo->model); + if (mmax < mlen || memcmp(devinfo->model, mskip, mlen)) continue; return devinfo; } else { From a7add20ecdbb2e1ccbe51c98610b8078062e6f79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eugeniu Rosca Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2018 17:22:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 02/43] usb: gadget: f_uac2: fix error handling in afunc_bind (again) commit e87581fe0509020f77ebf0b7c4c1c338c6a4bcf6 upstream. If usb_ep_autoconfig() fails (i.e. returns a null endpoint descriptor), we expect afunc_bind() to fail (i.e. return a negative error code). However, due to v4.10-rc1 commit f1d3861d63a5 ("usb: gadget: f_uac2: fix error handling at afunc_bind"), afunc_bind() returns zero, telling the caller that it succeeded. This then generates NULL pointer dereference in below scenario on Rcar H3-ES20-Salvator-X target: rcar-gen3:/home/root# modprobe g_audio [ 626.521155] g_audio gadget: afunc_bind:565 Error! [ 626.526319] g_audio gadget: Linux USB Audio Gadget, version: Feb 2, 2012 [ 626.533405] g_audio gadget: g_audio ready rcar-gen3:/home/root# rcar-gen3:/home/root# modprobe -r g_audio [ 728.256707] ================================================================== [ 728.264293] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in u_audio_stop_capture+0x70/0x268 [u_audio] [ 728.272244] Read of size 8 at addr 00000000000000a0 by task modprobe/2545 [ 728.279309] [ 728.280849] CPU: 0 PID: 2545 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G WC 4.14.47+ #152 [ 728.288778] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X board based on r8a7795 ES2.0+ (DT) [ 728.296454] Call trace: [ 728.299151] [] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x364 [ 728.304808] [] show_stack+0x14/0x1c [ 728.310081] [] dump_stack+0x108/0x174 [ 728.315522] [] kasan_report+0x1fc/0x354 [ 728.321134] [] __asan_load8+0x24/0x94 [ 728.326600] [] u_audio_stop_capture+0x70/0x268 [u_audio] [ 728.333735] [] afunc_disable+0x44/0x60 [usb_f_uac2] [ 728.340503] [] usb_remove_function+0x9c/0x210 [libcomposite] [ 728.348060] [] remove_config.isra.2+0x1d8/0x218 [libcomposite] [ 728.355788] [] __composite_unbind+0x104/0x1f8 [libcomposite] [ 728.363339] [] composite_unbind+0x10/0x18 [libcomposite] [ 728.370536] [] usb_gadget_remove_driver+0xc0/0x170 [udc_core] [ 728.378172] [] usb_gadget_unregister_driver+0x1cc/0x258 [udc_core] [ 728.386274] [] usb_composite_unregister+0x10/0x18 [libcomposite] [ 728.394116] [] audio_driver_exit+0x14/0x28 [g_audio] [ 728.400878] [] SyS_delete_module+0x288/0x32c [ 728.406935] Exception stack(0xffff8006cf6c7ec0 to 0xffff8006cf6c8000) [ 728.413624] 7ec0: 0000000006136428 0000000000000800 0000000000000000 0000ffffd706efe8 [ 728.421718] 7ee0: 0000ffffd706efe9 000000000000000a 1999999999999999 0000000000000000 [ 728.429792] 7f00: 000000000000006a 000000000042c078 0000000000000000 0000000000000005 [ 728.437870] 7f20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 [ 728.445952] 7f40: 000000000042bfc8 0000ffffbc7c8f40 0000000000000000 00000000061363c0 [ 728.454035] 7f60: 0000000006136428 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000006136428 [ 728.462114] 7f80: 000000000042c000 0000ffffd7071448 000000000042c000 0000000000000000 [ 728.470190] 7fa0: 00000000061350c0 0000ffffd7070010 000000000041129c 0000ffffd7070010 [ 728.478281] 7fc0: 0000ffffbc7c8f48 0000000060000000 0000000006136428 000000000000006a [ 728.486351] 7fe0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 728.494434] [] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38 [ 728.499957] ================================================================== [ 728.507801] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000a0 [ 728.517742] Mem abort info: [ 728.520993] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 728.527375] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 728.530731] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 728.534361] Data abort info: [ 728.537650] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006 [ 728.541863] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 728.545167] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgd = ffff8006c6100000 [ 728.552156] [00000000000000a0] *pgd=0000000716a8d003 [ 728.557519] , *pud=00000007116fc003 [ 728.561259] , *pmd=0000000000000000 [ 728.564985] Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 728.570815] Modules linked in: [ 728.574023] usb_f_uac2 [ 728.576560] u_audio [ 728.578827] g_audio(-) [ 728.581361] libcomposite [ 728.584071] configfs [ 728.586428] aes_ce_blk [ 728.588960] sata_rcar [ 728.591421] crypto_simd [ 728.594039] cryptd [ 728.596217] libata [ 728.598396] aes_ce_cipher [ 728.601188] crc32_ce [ 728.603542] ghash_ce [ 728.605896] gf128mul [ 728.608250] aes_arm64 [ 728.610692] scsi_mod [ 728.613046] sha2_ce [ 728.615313] xhci_plat_hcd [ 728.618106] sha256_arm64 [ 728.620811] sha1_ce [ 728.623077] renesas_usbhs [ 728.625869] xhci_hcd [ 728.628243] renesas_usb3 [ 728.630948] sha1_generic [ 728.633670] ravb_streaming(C) [ 728.636814] udc_core [ 728.639168] cpufreq_dt [ 728.641697] rcar_gen3_thermal [ 728.644840] usb_dmac [ 728.647194] pwm_rcar [ 728.649548] thermal_sys [ 728.652165] virt_dma [ 728.654519] mch_core(C) [ 728.657137] pwm_bl [ 728.659315] snd_soc_rcar [ 728.662020] snd_aloop [ 728.664462] snd_soc_generic_card [ 728.667869] snd_soc_ak4613 [ 728.670749] ipv6 [ 728.672768] autofs4 [ 728.675052] CPU: 0 PID: 2545 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B WC 4.14.47+ #152 [ 728.682973] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X board based on r8a7795 ES2.0+ (DT) [ 728.690637] task: ffff8006ced38000 task.stack: ffff8006cf6c0000 [ 728.696814] PC is at u_audio_stop_capture+0x70/0x268 [u_audio] [ 728.702896] LR is at u_audio_stop_capture+0x70/0x268 [u_audio] [ 728.708964] pc : [] lr : [] pstate: 60000145 [ 728.716620] sp : ffff8006cf6c7a50 [ 728.720154] x29: ffff8006cf6c7a50 [ 728.723760] x28: ffff8006ced38000 [ 728.727272] x27: ffff200008fd7000 [ 728.730857] x26: ffff2000021d2340 [ 728.734361] x25: 0000000000000000 [ 728.737948] x24: ffff200009e94b08 [ 728.741452] x23: 00000000000000a0 [ 728.745052] x22: 00000000000000a8 [ 728.748558] x21: 1ffff000d9ed8f7c [ 728.752142] x20: ffff8006d671a800 [ 728.755646] x19: 0000000000000000 [ 728.759231] x18: 0000000000000000 [ 728.762736] x17: 0000ffffbc7c8f40 [ 728.766320] x16: ffff200008213c4c [ 728.769823] x15: 0000000000000000 [ 728.773408] x14: 0720072007200720 [ 728.776912] x13: 0720072007200720 [ 728.780497] x12: ffffffffffffffff [ 728.784001] x11: 0000000000000040 [ 728.787598] x10: 0000000000001600 [ 728.791103] x9 : ffff8006cf6c77a0 [ 728.794689] x8 : ffff8006ced39660 [ 728.798193] x7 : ffff20000811c738 [ 728.801794] x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 728.805299] x5 : dfff200000000000 [ 728.808885] x4 : ffff8006ced38000 [ 728.812390] x3 : ffff200008fb46e8 [ 728.815976] x2 : 0000000000000007 [ 728.819480] x1 : 3ba68643e7431500 [ 728.823066] x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 728.826574] Process modprobe (pid: 2545, stack limit = 0xffff8006cf6c0000) [ 728.833704] Call trace: [ 728.836292] Exception stack(0xffff8006cf6c7910 to 0xffff8006cf6c7a50) [ 728.842987] 7900: 0000000000000000 3ba68643e7431500 [ 728.851084] 7920: 0000000000000007 ffff200008fb46e8 ffff8006ced38000 dfff200000000000 [ 728.859173] 7940: 0000000000000000 ffff20000811c738 ffff8006ced39660 ffff8006cf6c77a0 [ 728.867248] 7960: 0000000000001600 0000000000000040 ffffffffffffffff 0720072007200720 [ 728.875323] 7980: 0720072007200720 0000000000000000 ffff200008213c4c 0000ffffbc7c8f40 [ 728.883412] 79a0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8006d671a800 1ffff000d9ed8f7c [ 728.891485] 79c0: 00000000000000a8 00000000000000a0 ffff200009e94b08 0000000000000000 [ 728.899561] 79e0: ffff2000021d2340 ffff200008fd7000 ffff8006ced38000 ffff8006cf6c7a50 [ 728.907636] 7a00: ffff2000021e1618 ffff8006cf6c7a50 ffff2000021e1618 0000000060000145 [ 728.915710] 7a20: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 0000ffffffffffff 3ba68643e7431500 [ 728.923780] 7a40: ffff8006cf6c7a50 ffff2000021e1618 [ 728.928880] [] u_audio_stop_capture+0x70/0x268 [u_audio] [ 728.936032] [] afunc_disable+0x44/0x60 [usb_f_uac2] [ 728.942822] [] usb_remove_function+0x9c/0x210 [libcomposite] [ 728.950385] [] remove_config.isra.2+0x1d8/0x218 [libcomposite] [ 728.958134] [] __composite_unbind+0x104/0x1f8 [libcomposite] [ 728.965689] [] composite_unbind+0x10/0x18 [libcomposite] [ 728.972882] [] usb_gadget_remove_driver+0xc0/0x170 [udc_core] [ 728.980522] [] usb_gadget_unregister_driver+0x1cc/0x258 [udc_core] [ 728.988638] [] usb_composite_unregister+0x10/0x18 [libcomposite] [ 728.996472] [] audio_driver_exit+0x14/0x28 [g_audio] [ 729.003231] [] SyS_delete_module+0x288/0x32c [ 729.009278] Exception stack(0xffff8006cf6c7ec0 to 0xffff8006cf6c8000) [ 729.015946] 7ec0: 0000000006136428 0000000000000800 0000000000000000 0000ffffd706efe8 [ 729.024022] 7ee0: 0000ffffd706efe9 000000000000000a 1999999999999999 0000000000000000 [ 729.032099] 7f00: 000000000000006a 000000000042c078 0000000000000000 0000000000000005 [ 729.040172] 7f20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 [ 729.048263] 7f40: 000000000042bfc8 0000ffffbc7c8f40 0000000000000000 00000000061363c0 [ 729.056337] 7f60: 0000000006136428 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000006136428 [ 729.064411] 7f80: 000000000042c000 0000ffffd7071448 000000000042c000 0000000000000000 [ 729.072484] 7fa0: 00000000061350c0 0000ffffd7070010 000000000041129c 0000ffffd7070010 [ 729.080563] 7fc0: 0000ffffbc7c8f48 0000000060000000 0000000006136428 000000000000006a [ 729.088636] 7fe0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 729.096733] [] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38 [ 729.102259] Code: 9597d1b3 aa1703e0 9102a276 958792b9 (f9405275) [ 729.108617] ---[ end trace 7560c5fa3d100243 ]--- After this patch is applied, the issue is fixed: rcar-gen3:/home/root# modprobe g_audio [ 59.217127] g_audio gadget: afunc_bind:565 Error! [ 59.222329] g_audio ee020000.usb: failed to start g_audio: -19 modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'g_audio': No such device rcar-gen3:/home/root# modprobe -r g_audio rcar-gen3:/home/root# Fixes: f1d3861d63a5 ("usb: gadget: f_uac2: fix error handling at afunc_bind") Signed-off-by: Eugeniu Rosca Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi Cc: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c index f4bd08cfac11..a631975e050d 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c @@ -1069,13 +1069,13 @@ afunc_bind(struct usb_configuration *cfg, struct usb_function *fn) agdev->out_ep = usb_ep_autoconfig(gadget, &fs_epout_desc); if (!agdev->out_ep) { dev_err(dev, "%s:%d Error!\n", __func__, __LINE__); - return ret; + return -ENODEV; } agdev->in_ep = usb_ep_autoconfig(gadget, &fs_epin_desc); if (!agdev->in_ep) { dev_err(dev, "%s:%d Error!\n", __func__, __LINE__); - return ret; + return -ENODEV; } uac2->p_prm.uac2 = uac2; From 7aebadb465fe3d7798a42d3de6907da7ac78419d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhen Lei Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2018 11:49:28 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 03/43] esp6: fix memleak on error path in esp6_input commit 7284fdf39a912322ce97de2d30def3c6068a418c upstream. This ought to be an omission in e6194923237 ("esp: Fix memleaks on error paths."). The memleak on error path in esp6_input is similar to esp_input of esp4. Fixes: e6194923237 ("esp: Fix memleaks on error paths.") Fixes: 3f29770723f ("ipsec: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always") Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Cc: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/esp6.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c index 6a924be66e37..da158a3acac4 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c @@ -426,8 +426,10 @@ static int esp6_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) sg_init_table(sg, nfrags); ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); - if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) { + kfree(tmp); goto out; + } aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, elen + ivlen, iv); aead_request_set_ad(req, assoclen); From 5720901bcfcf35f57defba352111f40ffecbb30e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xinwei Kong Date: Fri, 3 Jan 2020 10:52:10 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 04/43] spi: dw: use "smp_mb()" to avoid sending spi data error [ Upstream commit bfda044533b213985bc62bd7ca96f2b984d21b80 ] Because of out-of-order execution about some CPU architecture, In this debug stage we find Completing spi interrupt enable -> prodrucing TXEI interrupt -> running "interrupt_transfer" function will prior to set "dw->rx and dws->rx_end" data, so this patch add memory barrier to enable dw->rx and dw->rx_end to be visible and solve to send SPI data error. eg: it will fix to this following low possibility error in testing environment which using SPI control to connect TPM Modules kernel: tpm tpm0: Operation Timed out kernel: tpm tpm0: tpm_relinquish_locality: : error -1 Signed-off-by: fengsheng Signed-off-by: Xinwei Kong Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1578019930-55858-1-git-send-email-kong.kongxinwei@hisilicon.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/spi/spi-dw.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c b/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c index 16f0def9df82..babf0a337e96 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c @@ -305,6 +305,9 @@ static int dw_spi_transfer_one(struct spi_master *master, dws->len = transfer->len; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dws->buf_lock, flags); + /* Ensure dw->rx and dw->rx_end are visible */ + smp_mb(); + spi_enable_chip(dws, 0); /* Handle per transfer options for bpw and speed */ From 4237e949fc8bb7c8518a3e8352f12883f061a336 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vasily Gorbik Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2019 13:50:23 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 05/43] s390/ftrace: save traced function caller [ Upstream commit b4adfe55915d8363e244e42386d69567db1719b9 ] A typical backtrace acquired from ftraced function currently looks like the following (e.g. for "path_openat"): arch_stack_walk+0x15c/0x2d8 stack_trace_save+0x50/0x68 stack_trace_call+0x15a/0x3b8 ftrace_graph_caller+0x0/0x1c 0x3e0007e3c98 <- ftraced function caller (should be do_filp_open+0x7c/0xe8) do_open_execat+0x70/0x1b8 __do_execve_file.isra.0+0x7d8/0x860 __s390x_sys_execve+0x56/0x68 system_call+0xdc/0x2d8 Note random "0x3e0007e3c98" stack value as ftraced function caller. This value causes either imprecise unwinder result or unwinding failure. That "0x3e0007e3c98" comes from r14 of ftraced function stack frame, which it haven't had a chance to initialize since the very first instruction calls ftrace code ("ftrace_caller"). (ftraced function might never save r14 as well). Nevertheless according to s390 ABI any function is called with stack frame allocated for it and r14 contains return address. "ftrace_caller" itself is called with "brasl %r0,ftrace_caller". So, to fix this issue simply always save traced function caller onto ftraced function stack frame. Reported-by: Sven Schnelle Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S b/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S index 802a4ded9a62..e9df35249f9f 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(_mcount) ENTRY(ftrace_caller) .globl ftrace_regs_caller .set ftrace_regs_caller,ftrace_caller + stg %r14,(__SF_GPRS+8*8)(%r15) # save traced function caller lgr %r1,%r15 #ifndef CC_USING_HOTPATCH aghi %r0,MCOUNT_RETURN_FIXUP From d710605701d32cf465624c3d907894b0fe616ca6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eugeniy Paltsev Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2020 20:54:28 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 06/43] ARC: Fix ICCM & DCCM runtime size checks [ Upstream commit 43900edf67d7ef3ac8909854d75b8a1fba2d570c ] As of today the ICCM and DCCM size checks are incorrectly using mismatched units (KiB checked against bytes). The CONFIG_ARC_DCCM_SZ and CONFIG_ARC_ICCM_SZ are in KiB, but the size calculated in runtime and stored in cpu->dccm.sz and cpu->iccm.sz is in bytes. Fix that. Reported-by: Paul Greco Signed-off-by: Eugeniy Paltsev Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arc/kernel/setup.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c b/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c index 9f96120eee6e..82464fae7772 100644 --- a/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -333,12 +334,12 @@ static void arc_chk_core_config(void) if ((unsigned int)__arc_dccm_base != cpu->dccm.base_addr) panic("Linux built with incorrect DCCM Base address\n"); - if (CONFIG_ARC_DCCM_SZ != cpu->dccm.sz) + if (CONFIG_ARC_DCCM_SZ * SZ_1K != cpu->dccm.sz) panic("Linux built with incorrect DCCM Size\n"); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARC_HAS_ICCM - if (CONFIG_ARC_ICCM_SZ != cpu->iccm.sz) + if (CONFIG_ARC_ICCM_SZ * SZ_1K != cpu->iccm.sz) panic("Linux built with incorrect ICCM Size\n"); #endif From c4400d9d7fa008bcec403fbca397f00b6fe81aaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nathan Chancellor Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2020 13:53:23 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 07/43] x86/mmiotrace: Use cpumask_available() for cpumask_var_t variables [ Upstream commit d7110a26e5905ec2fe3fc88bc6a538901accb72b ] When building with Clang + -Wtautological-compare and CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK unset: arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c:375:6: warning: comparison of array 'downed_cpus' equal to a null pointer is always false [-Wtautological-pointer-compare] if (downed_cpus == NULL && ^~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c:405:6: warning: comparison of array 'downed_cpus' equal to a null pointer is always false [-Wtautological-pointer-compare] if (downed_cpus == NULL || cpumask_weight(downed_cpus) == 0) ^~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ 2 warnings generated. Commit f7e30f01a9e2 ("cpumask: Add helper cpumask_available()") added cpumask_available() to fix warnings of this nature. Use that here so that clang does not warn regardless of CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK's value. Reported-by: Sedat Dilek Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/982 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200408205323.44490-1-natechancellor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c index bef36622e408..abd4fa587ca4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c @@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ static void enter_uniprocessor(void) int cpu; int err; - if (downed_cpus == NULL && + if (!cpumask_available(downed_cpus) && !alloc_cpumask_var(&downed_cpus, GFP_KERNEL)) { pr_notice("Failed to allocate mask\n"); goto out; @@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ static void leave_uniprocessor(void) int cpu; int err; - if (downed_cpus == NULL || cpumask_weight(downed_cpus) == 0) + if (!cpumask_available(downed_cpus) || cpumask_weight(downed_cpus) == 0) return; pr_notice("Re-enabling CPUs...\n"); for_each_cpu(cpu, downed_cpus) { From 9849292d6fd76d393970cb9a3911732131e4af2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Kerr Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 09:05:58 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 08/43] net: bmac: Fix read of MAC address from ROM [ Upstream commit ef01cee2ee1b369c57a936166483d40942bcc3e3 ] In bmac_get_station_address, We're reading two bytes at a time from ROM, but we do that six times, resulting in 12 bytes of read & writes. This means we will write off the end of the six-byte destination buffer. This change fixes the for-loop to only read/write six bytes. Based on a proposed fix from Finn Thain . Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr Reported-by: Stan Johnson Tested-by: Stan Johnson Reported-by: Finn Thain Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/apple/bmac.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/apple/bmac.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/apple/bmac.c index a65d7a60f116..ffa7e7e6d18d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/apple/bmac.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/apple/bmac.c @@ -1187,7 +1187,7 @@ bmac_get_station_address(struct net_device *dev, unsigned char *ea) int i; unsigned short data; - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { reset_and_select_srom(dev); data = read_srom(dev, i + EnetAddressOffset/2, SROMAddressBits); From dee26e8809495f47349d9210bfa37bd9eb40491d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valentin Longchamp Date: Wed, 20 May 2020 17:53:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/43] net/ethernet/freescale: rework quiesce/activate for ucc_geth [ Upstream commit 79dde73cf9bcf1dd317a2667f78b758e9fe139ed ] ugeth_quiesce/activate are used to halt the controller when there is a link change that requires to reconfigure the mac. The previous implementation called netif_device_detach(). This however causes the initial activation of the netdevice to fail precisely because it's detached. For details, see [1]. A possible workaround was the revert of commit net: linkwatch: add check for netdevice being present to linkwatch_do_dev However, the check introduced in the above commit is correct and shall be kept. The netif_device_detach() is thus replaced with netif_tx_stop_all_queues() that prevents any tranmission. This allows to perform mac config change required by the link change, without detaching the corresponding netdevice and thus not preventing its initial activation. [1] https://lists.openwall.net/netdev/2020/01/08/201 Signed-off-by: Valentin Longchamp Acked-by: Matteo Ghidoni Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth.c index 714593023bbc..af922bac19ae 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "ucc_geth.h" @@ -1551,11 +1552,8 @@ static int ugeth_disable(struct ucc_geth_private *ugeth, enum comm_dir mode) static void ugeth_quiesce(struct ucc_geth_private *ugeth) { - /* Prevent any further xmits, plus detach the device. */ - netif_device_detach(ugeth->ndev); - - /* Wait for any current xmits to finish. */ - netif_tx_disable(ugeth->ndev); + /* Prevent any further xmits */ + netif_tx_stop_all_queues(ugeth->ndev); /* Disable the interrupt to avoid NAPI rescheduling. */ disable_irq(ugeth->ug_info->uf_info.irq); @@ -1568,7 +1566,10 @@ static void ugeth_activate(struct ucc_geth_private *ugeth) { napi_enable(&ugeth->napi); enable_irq(ugeth->ug_info->uf_info.irq); - netif_device_attach(ugeth->ndev); + + /* allow to xmit again */ + netif_tx_wake_all_queues(ugeth->ndev); + __netdev_watchdog_up(ugeth->ndev); } /* Called every time the controller might need to be made From 7b880cc0206603b35175061da9d2c1830c9d12a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan McDowell Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 12:49:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 10/43] net: ethernet: stmmac: Enable interface clocks on probe for IPQ806x [ Upstream commit a96ac8a0045e3cbe3e5af6d1b3c78c6c2065dec5 ] The ipq806x_gmac_probe() function enables the PTP clock but not the appropriate interface clocks. This means that if the bootloader hasn't done so attempting to bring up the interface will fail with an error like: [ 59.028131] ipq806x-gmac-dwmac 37600000.ethernet: Failed to reset the dma [ 59.028196] ipq806x-gmac-dwmac 37600000.ethernet eth1: stmmac_hw_setup: DMA engine initialization failed [ 59.034056] ipq806x-gmac-dwmac 37600000.ethernet eth1: stmmac_open: Hw setup failed This patch, a slightly cleaned up version of one posted by Sergey Sergeev in: https://forum.openwrt.org/t/support-for-mikrotik-rb3011uias-rm/4064/257 correctly enables the clock; we have already configured the source just before this. Tested on a MikroTik RB3011. Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ipq806x.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ipq806x.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ipq806x.c index 11a4a81b0397..bcc5d1e16ce2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ipq806x.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ipq806x.c @@ -330,6 +330,19 @@ static int ipq806x_gmac_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) /* Enable PTP clock */ regmap_read(gmac->nss_common, NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE, &val); val |= NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE_PTP_EN(gmac->id); + switch (gmac->phy_mode) { + case PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII: + val |= NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE_RGMII_RX_EN(gmac->id) | + NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE_RGMII_TX_EN(gmac->id); + break; + case PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_SGMII: + val |= NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE_GMII_RX_EN(gmac->id) | + NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE_GMII_TX_EN(gmac->id); + break; + default: + /* We don't get here; the switch above will have errored out */ + unreachable(); + } regmap_write(gmac->nss_common, NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE, val); if (gmac->phy_mode == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_SGMII) { From 0e7767215f6888575a5bffbd12506935943ec6f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dinghao Liu Date: Sat, 23 May 2020 16:08:20 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 11/43] net: smsc911x: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error [ Upstream commit 539d39ad0c61b35f69565a037d7586deaf6d6166 ] Remove runtime PM usage counter decrement when the increment function has not been called to keep the counter balanced. Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/smsc/smsc911x.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/smsc/smsc911x.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/smsc/smsc911x.c index 4143659615e1..264136dba674 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/smsc/smsc911x.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/smsc/smsc911x.c @@ -2506,20 +2506,20 @@ static int smsc911x_drv_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) retval = smsc911x_init(dev); if (retval < 0) - goto out_disable_resources; + goto out_init_fail; netif_carrier_off(dev); retval = smsc911x_mii_init(pdev, dev); if (retval) { SMSC_WARN(pdata, probe, "Error %i initialising mii", retval); - goto out_disable_resources; + goto out_init_fail; } retval = register_netdev(dev); if (retval) { SMSC_WARN(pdata, probe, "Error %i registering device", retval); - goto out_disable_resources; + goto out_init_fail; } else { SMSC_TRACE(pdata, probe, "Network interface: \"%s\"", dev->name); @@ -2560,9 +2560,10 @@ static int smsc911x_drv_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return 0; -out_disable_resources: +out_init_fail: pm_runtime_put(&pdev->dev); pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev); +out_disable_resources: (void)smsc911x_disable_resources(pdev); out_enable_resources_fail: smsc911x_free_resources(pdev); From b1fa53f2bc3b99760ab94fe1455b41ec8bb06de9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 12:15:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 12/43] pppoe: only process PADT targeted at local interfaces MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit We don't want to disconnect a session because of a stray PADT arriving while the interface is in promiscuous mode. Furthermore, multicast and broadcast packets make no sense here, so only PACKET_HOST is accepted. Reported-by: David Balažic Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c index fa8f7c40a384..804c52c35f07 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c +++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c @@ -494,6 +494,9 @@ static int pppoe_disc_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, if (!skb) goto out; + if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST) + goto abort; + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct pppoe_hdr))) goto abort; From c915cffda0a4329ee454646138fe2b11c5ba3cd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fan Yang Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 18:22:07 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 13/43] mm: Fix mremap not considering huge pmd devmap commit 5bfea2d9b17f1034a68147a8b03b9789af5700f9 upstream. The original code in mm/mremap.c checks huge pmd by: if (is_swap_pmd(*old_pmd) || pmd_trans_huge(*old_pmd)) { However, a DAX mapped nvdimm is mapped as huge page (by default) but it is not transparent huge page (_PAGE_PSE | PAGE_DEVMAP). This commit changes the condition to include the case. This addresses CVE-2020-10757. Fixes: 5c7fb56e5e3f ("mm, dax: dax-pmd vs thp-pmd vs hugetlbfs-pmd") Cc: Reported-by: Fan Yang Signed-off-by: Fan Yang Tested-by: Fan Yang Tested-by: Dan Williams Reviewed-by: Dan Williams Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 1 + mm/mremap.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h index 5736306bdaab..e638e3bc3cb8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ static inline int pmd_large(pmd_t pte) } #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE +/* NOTE: when predicate huge page, consider also pmd_devmap, or use pmd_large */ static inline int pmd_trans_huge(pmd_t pmd) { return (pmd_val(pmd) & (_PAGE_PSE|_PAGE_DEVMAP)) == _PAGE_PSE; diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c index 9e6035969d7b..b5d8d25173c6 100644 --- a/mm/mremap.c +++ b/mm/mremap.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ unsigned long move_page_tables(struct vm_area_struct *vma, new_pmd = alloc_new_pmd(vma->vm_mm, vma, new_addr); if (!new_pmd) break; - if (pmd_trans_huge(*old_pmd)) { + if (pmd_trans_huge(*old_pmd) || pmd_devmap(*old_pmd)) { if (extent == HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) { bool moved; /* See comment in move_ptes() */ From 80581e21f6af43e3ae44c7f5dd935e5097edd380 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian Sax Date: Tue, 5 May 2020 17:10:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 14/43] HID: i2c-hid: add Schneider SCL142ALM to descriptor override commit 6507ef10660efdfee93f0f3b9fac24b5e4d83e56 upstream. This device uses the SIPODEV SP1064 touchpad, which does not supply descriptors, so it has to be added to the override list. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Julian Sax Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-dmi-quirks.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-dmi-quirks.c b/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-dmi-quirks.c index 95052373a828..681ac9bc68b3 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-dmi-quirks.c +++ b/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-dmi-quirks.c @@ -381,6 +381,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id i2c_hid_dmi_desc_override_table[] = { }, .driver_data = (void *)&sipodev_desc }, + { + .ident = "Schneider SCL142ALM", + .matches = { + DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SCHNEIDER"), + DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "SCL142ALM"), + }, + .driver_data = (void *)&sipodev_desc + }, { } /* Terminate list */ }; From 5ac8ff17970490105f23f32074306518beab67b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Giuseppe Marco Randazzo Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2020 00:06:59 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 15/43] p54usb: add AirVasT USB stick device-id commit 63e49a9fdac1b4e97ac26cb3fe953f210d83bc53 upstream. This patch adds the AirVasT USB wireless devices 124a:4026 to the list of supported devices. It's using the ISL3886 usb firmware. Without this modification, the wiki adapter is not recognized. Cc: Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Marco Randazzo Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter [formatted, reworded] Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200405220659.45621-1-chunkeey@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c index 4a197a32d78c..979fcef1d848 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ static struct usb_device_id p54u_table[] = { {USB_DEVICE(0x0db0, 0x6826)}, /* MSI UB54G (MS-6826) */ {USB_DEVICE(0x107b, 0x55f2)}, /* Gateway WGU-210 (Gemtek) */ {USB_DEVICE(0x124a, 0x4023)}, /* Shuttle PN15, Airvast WM168g, IOGear GWU513 */ + {USB_DEVICE(0x124a, 0x4026)}, /* AirVasT USB wireless device */ {USB_DEVICE(0x1435, 0x0210)}, /* Inventel UR054G */ {USB_DEVICE(0x15a9, 0x0002)}, /* Gemtek WUBI-100GW 802.11g */ {USB_DEVICE(0x1630, 0x0005)}, /* 2Wire 802.11g USB (v1) / Z-Com */ From d1774b0459875e2bf3e93b86294296e5494fd0b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Axtens Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 16:51:27 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 16/43] kernel/relay.c: handle alloc_percpu returning NULL in relay_open commit 54e200ab40fc14c863bcc80a51e20b7906608fce upstream. alloc_percpu() may return NULL, which means chan->buf may be set to NULL. In that case, when we do *per_cpu_ptr(chan->buf, ...), we dereference an invalid pointer: BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access at 0x7dae0000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000003f3fec ... NIP relay_open+0x29c/0x600 LR relay_open+0x270/0x600 Call Trace: relay_open+0x264/0x600 (unreliable) __blk_trace_setup+0x254/0x600 blk_trace_setup+0x68/0xa0 sg_ioctl+0x7bc/0x2e80 do_vfs_ioctl+0x13c/0x1300 ksys_ioctl+0x94/0x130 sys_ioctl+0x48/0xb0 system_call+0x5c/0x68 Check if alloc_percpu returns NULL. This was found by syzkaller both on x86 and powerpc, and the reproducer it found on powerpc is capable of hitting the issue as an unprivileged user. Fixes: 017c59c042d0 ("relay: Use per CPU constructs for the relay channel buffer pointers") Reported-by: syzbot+1e925b4b836afe85a1c6@syzkaller-ppc64.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+587b2421926808309d21@syzkaller-ppc64.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+58320b7171734bf79d26@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d6074fb08bdb2e010520@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Reviewed-by: Michael Ellerman Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan Acked-by: David Rientjes Cc: Akash Goel Cc: Andrew Donnellan Cc: Guenter Roeck Cc: Salvatore Bonaccorso Cc: [4.10+] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191219121256.26480-1-dja@axtens.net Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/relay.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/relay.c b/kernel/relay.c index 91e8fbf8aff3..5034cb3a339f 100644 --- a/kernel/relay.c +++ b/kernel/relay.c @@ -578,6 +578,11 @@ struct rchan *relay_open(const char *base_filename, return NULL; chan->buf = alloc_percpu(struct rchan_buf *); + if (!chan->buf) { + kfree(chan); + return NULL; + } + chan->version = RELAYFS_CHANNEL_VERSION; chan->n_subbufs = n_subbufs; chan->subbuf_size = subbuf_size; From a7481f5f1abeb1e5ed51b2f755eb75f2aa7f4741 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A9r=C3=B4me=20Pouiller?= Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 18:19:02 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 17/43] mmc: fix compilation of user API MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 83fc5dd57f86c3ec7d6d22565a6ff6c948853b64 upstream. The definitions of MMC_IOC_CMD and of MMC_IOC_MULTI_CMD rely on MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR: #define MMC_IOC_CMD _IOWR(MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR, 0, struct mmc_ioc_cmd) #define MMC_IOC_MULTI_CMD _IOWR(MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR, 1, struct mmc_ioc_multi_cmd) However, MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR is defined in linux/major.h and linux/mmc/ioctl.h did not include it. Signed-off-by: Jérôme Pouiller Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200511161902.191405-1-Jerome.Pouiller@silabs.com Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/uapi/linux/mmc/ioctl.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/mmc/ioctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/mmc/ioctl.h index 7e385b83b9d8..fe4b6b69d79a 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/mmc/ioctl.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/mmc/ioctl.h @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #define LINUX_MMC_IOCTL_H #include +#include struct mmc_ioc_cmd { /* Implies direction of data. true = write, false = read */ From f8535892e13ea72d3a1dedc7f171854fc765fcc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Hutchings Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 18:54:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 18/43] slcan: Fix double-free on slcan_open() error path Commit 9ebd796e2400 ("can: slcan: Fix use-after-free Read in slcan_open") was incorrectly backported to 4.4 and 4.9 stable branches. Since they do not have commit cf124db566e6 ("net: Fix inconsistent teardown and release of private netdev state."), the destructor function slc_free_netdev() is already responsible for calling free_netdev() and slcan_open() must not call both of them. yangerkun previously fixed the same bug in slip. Fixes: ce624b2089ea ("can: slcan: Fix use-after-free Read in slcan_open") # 4.4 Fixes: f59604a80fa4 ("slcan: not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock ...") # 4.4 Fixes: 56635a1e6ffb ("can: slcan: Fix use-after-free Read in slcan_open") # 4.9 Fixes: a1c9b23142ac ("slcan: not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock ...") # 4.9 Cc: yangerkun Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/can/slcan.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/slcan.c b/drivers/net/can/slcan.c index d0435c7631ff..9c938f9892b2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/slcan.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/slcan.c @@ -618,10 +618,9 @@ err_free_chan: sl->tty = NULL; tty->disc_data = NULL; clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags); - slc_free_netdev(sl->dev); /* do not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock */ rtnl_unlock(); - free_netdev(sl->dev); + slc_free_netdev(sl->dev); return err; err_exit: From 3f491c622996cbd5a0d0768c383843cc7f7538d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yangerkun Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2020 11:54:35 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 19/43] slip: not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock in slip_open commit f596c87005f7b1baeb7d62d9a9e25d68c3dfae10 upstream. As the description before netdev_run_todo, we cannot call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock, fix it by reorder the code. Signed-off-by: yangerkun Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp Signed-off-by: David S. Miller [bwh: Backported to <4.11: free_netdev() is called through sl_free_netdev()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/slip/slip.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/slip/slip.c b/drivers/net/slip/slip.c index cc841126147e..f870396e05e1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/slip/slip.c +++ b/drivers/net/slip/slip.c @@ -867,7 +867,10 @@ err_free_chan: sl->tty = NULL; tty->disc_data = NULL; clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags); + /* do not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock */ + rtnl_unlock(); sl_free_netdev(sl->dev); + return err; err_exit: rtnl_unlock(); From ffa5baf3150a3e4afcf5630a1715c39b1af2c619 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Can Guo Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 02:14:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 20/43] scsi: ufs: Release clock if DMA map fails commit 17c7d35f141ef6158076adf3338f115f64fcf760 upstream. In queuecommand path, if DMA map fails, it bails out with clock held. In this case, release the clock to keep its usage paired. [mkp: applied by hand] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0101016ed3d66395-1b7e7fce-b74d-42ca-a88a-4db78b795d3b-000000@us-west-2.amazonses.com Reviewed-by: Bean Huo Signed-off-by: Can Guo Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen [EB: resolved cherry-pick conflict caused by newer kernels not having the clear_bit_unlock() line] Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c index 50d15748084a..af4b0a2021d6 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c @@ -1512,6 +1512,7 @@ static int ufshcd_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *cmd) err = ufshcd_map_sg(hba, lrbp); if (err) { + ufshcd_release(hba); lrbp->cmd = NULL; clear_bit_unlock(tag, &hba->lrb_in_use); goto out; From b925f159f3f08a5040cf65d182da941bb26c56da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 21:48:30 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 21/43] airo: Fix read overflows sending packets commit 11e7a91994c29da96d847f676be023da6a2c1359 upstream. The problem is that we always copy a minimum of ETH_ZLEN (60) bytes from skb->data even when skb->len is less than ETH_ZLEN so it leads to a read overflow. The fix is to pad skb->data to at least ETH_ZLEN bytes. Cc: Reported-by: Hu Jiahui Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200527184830.GA1164846@mwanda Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/cisco/airo.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/cisco/airo.c b/drivers/net/wireless/cisco/airo.c index a8d470010f5e..ea609dc7f081 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/cisco/airo.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/cisco/airo.c @@ -1928,6 +1928,10 @@ static netdev_tx_t mpi_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, airo_print_err(dev->name, "%s: skb == NULL!",__func__); return NETDEV_TX_OK; } + if (skb_padto(skb, ETH_ZLEN)) { + dev->stats.tx_dropped++; + return NETDEV_TX_OK; + } npacks = skb_queue_len (&ai->txq); if (npacks >= MAXTXQ - 1) { @@ -2130,6 +2134,10 @@ static netdev_tx_t airo_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, airo_print_err(dev->name, "%s: skb == NULL!", __func__); return NETDEV_TX_OK; } + if (skb_padto(skb, ETH_ZLEN)) { + dev->stats.tx_dropped++; + return NETDEV_TX_OK; + } /* Find a vacant FID */ for( i = 0; i < MAX_FIDS / 2 && (fids[i] & 0xffff0000); i++ ); @@ -2204,6 +2212,10 @@ static netdev_tx_t airo_start_xmit11(struct sk_buff *skb, airo_print_err(dev->name, "%s: skb == NULL!", __func__); return NETDEV_TX_OK; } + if (skb_padto(skb, ETH_ZLEN)) { + dev->stats.tx_dropped++; + return NETDEV_TX_OK; + } /* Find a vacant FID */ for( i = MAX_FIDS / 2; i < MAX_FIDS && (fids[i] & 0xffff0000); i++ ); From d2d51114811a6d5ba397fd9e543937161cd84bda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yang Yingliang Date: Sat, 30 May 2020 11:34:33 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 22/43] devinet: fix memleak in inetdev_init() [ Upstream commit 1b49cd71b52403822731dc9f283185d1da355f97 ] When devinet_sysctl_register() failed, the memory allocated in neigh_parms_alloc() should be freed. Fixes: 20e61da7ffcf ("ipv4: fail early when creating netdev named all or default") Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang Acked-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/devinet.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c index af3363f4543f..6f3c52943186 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c @@ -262,6 +262,7 @@ static struct in_device *inetdev_init(struct net_device *dev) err = devinet_sysctl_register(in_dev); if (err) { in_dev->dead = 1; + neigh_parms_release(&arp_tbl, in_dev->arp_parms); in_dev_put(in_dev); in_dev = NULL; goto out; From 78320d3098edc4c8ef3fcbef52a4602aeeca37ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 11:20:53 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 23/43] l2tp: do not use inet_hash()/inet_unhash() [ Upstream commit 02c71b144c811bcdd865e0a1226d0407d11357e8 ] syzbot recently found a way to crash the kernel [1] Issue here is that inet_hash() & inet_unhash() are currently only meant to be used by TCP & DCCP, since only these protocols provide the needed hashinfo pointer. L2TP uses a single list (instead of a hash table) This old bug became an issue after commit 610236587600 ("bpf: Add new cgroup attach type to enable sock modifications") since after this commit, sk_common_release() can be called while the L2TP socket is still considered 'hashed'. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 PID: 7063 Comm: syz-executor654 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:inet_unhash+0x11f/0x770 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:600 Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e dd 04 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 44 8b 73 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 55 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 14 4c 8b 6d 08 48 b8 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001777d30 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88809a6df940 RCX: ffffffff8697c242 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8697c251 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88809f3ae1c0 R09: fffffbfff1514cc1 R10: ffffffff8a8a6607 R11: fffffbfff1514cc0 R12: ffff88809a6df9b0 R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff873a4d00 FS: 0000000001d2b880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000006cd090 CR3: 000000009403a000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: sk_common_release+0xba/0x370 net/core/sock.c:3210 inet_create net/ipv4/af_inet.c:390 [inline] inet_create+0x966/0xe00 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:248 __sock_create+0x3cb/0x730 net/socket.c:1428 sock_create net/socket.c:1479 [inline] __sys_socket+0xef/0x200 net/socket.c:1521 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1530 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1528 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1528 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 RIP: 0033:0x441e29 Code: e8 fc b3 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb 08 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffdce184148 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000029 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000441e29 RDX: 0000000000000073 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000402c30 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 23b6578228ce553e ]--- RIP: 0010:inet_unhash+0x11f/0x770 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:600 Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e dd 04 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 44 8b 73 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 55 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 14 4c 8b 6d 08 48 b8 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001777d30 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88809a6df940 RCX: ffffffff8697c242 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8697c251 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88809f3ae1c0 R09: fffffbfff1514cc1 R10: ffffffff8a8a6607 R11: fffffbfff1514cc0 R12: ffff88809a6df9b0 R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff873a4d00 FS: 0000000001d2b880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000006cd090 CR3: 000000009403a000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: 0d76751fad77 ("l2tp: Add L2TPv3 IP encapsulation (no UDP) support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: James Chapman Cc: Andrii Nakryiko Reported-by: syzbot+3610d489778b57cc8031@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c index 4a88c4eb2301..3817c3554641 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -208,15 +207,31 @@ discard: return 0; } +static int l2tp_ip_hash(struct sock *sk) +{ + if (sk_unhashed(sk)) { + write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock); + sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip_table); + write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock); + } + return 0; +} + +static void l2tp_ip_unhash(struct sock *sk) +{ + if (sk_unhashed(sk)) + return; + write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock); + sk_del_node_init(sk); + write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock); +} + static int l2tp_ip_open(struct sock *sk) { /* Prevent autobind. We don't have ports. */ inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = IPPROTO_L2TP; - write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock); - sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip_table); - write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock); - + l2tp_ip_hash(sk); return 0; } @@ -598,8 +613,8 @@ static struct proto l2tp_ip_prot = { .sendmsg = l2tp_ip_sendmsg, .recvmsg = l2tp_ip_recvmsg, .backlog_rcv = l2tp_ip_backlog_recv, - .hash = inet_hash, - .unhash = inet_unhash, + .hash = l2tp_ip_hash, + .unhash = l2tp_ip_unhash, .obj_size = sizeof(struct l2tp_ip_sock), #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT .compat_setsockopt = compat_ip_setsockopt, diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c index 28274f397c55..76ef758db112 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c @@ -24,8 +24,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include -#include #include #include #include @@ -221,15 +219,31 @@ discard: return 0; } +static int l2tp_ip6_hash(struct sock *sk) +{ + if (sk_unhashed(sk)) { + write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock); + sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip6_table); + write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock); + } + return 0; +} + +static void l2tp_ip6_unhash(struct sock *sk) +{ + if (sk_unhashed(sk)) + return; + write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock); + sk_del_node_init(sk); + write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock); +} + static int l2tp_ip6_open(struct sock *sk) { /* Prevent autobind. We don't have ports. */ inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = IPPROTO_L2TP; - write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock); - sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip6_table); - write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock); - + l2tp_ip6_hash(sk); return 0; } @@ -732,8 +746,8 @@ static struct proto l2tp_ip6_prot = { .sendmsg = l2tp_ip6_sendmsg, .recvmsg = l2tp_ip6_recvmsg, .backlog_rcv = l2tp_ip6_backlog_recv, - .hash = inet6_hash, - .unhash = inet_unhash, + .hash = l2tp_ip6_hash, + .unhash = l2tp_ip6_unhash, .obj_size = sizeof(struct l2tp_ip6_sock), #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT .compat_setsockopt = compat_ipv6_setsockopt, From 1331f667aa08246f06f43a9fbe0eee4a6763583e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniele Palmas Date: Mon, 25 May 2020 23:25:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 24/43] net: usb: qmi_wwan: add Telit LE910C1-EUX composition MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 591612aa578cd7148b7b9d74869ef40118978389 ] Add support for Telit LE910C1-EUX composition 0x1031: tty, tty, tty, rmnet Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas Acked-by: Bjørn Mork Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c index 5755eec00d7f..9a873616dd27 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -921,6 +921,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = { {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bbb, 0x0203, 2)}, /* Alcatel L800MA */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2357, 0x0201, 4)}, /* TP-LINK HSUPA Modem MA180 */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2357, 0x9000, 4)}, /* TP-LINK MA260 */ + {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1031, 3)}, /* Telit LE910C1-EUX */ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1040, 2)}, /* Telit LE922A */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1100, 3)}, /* Telit ME910 */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1101, 3)}, /* Telit ME910 dual modem */ From 990c16edd260d4f4ddbf55c2ef9158fdb118d360 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuhong Yuan Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 18:20:37 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 25/43] NFC: st21nfca: add missed kfree_skb() in an error path [ Upstream commit 3decabdc714ca56c944f4669b4cdec5c2c1cea23 ] st21nfca_tm_send_atr_res() misses to call kfree_skb() in an error path. Add the missed function call to fix it. Fixes: 1892bf844ea0 ("NFC: st21nfca: Adding P2P support to st21nfca in Initiator & Target mode") Signed-off-by: Chuhong Yuan Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c index 798a32bbac5d..e023a679bdea 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c @@ -184,8 +184,10 @@ static int st21nfca_tm_send_atr_res(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev, memcpy(atr_res->gbi, atr_req->gbi, gb_len); r = nfc_set_remote_general_bytes(hdev->ndev, atr_res->gbi, gb_len); - if (r < 0) + if (r < 0) { + kfree_skb(skb); return r; + } } info->dep_info.curr_nfc_dep_pni = 0; From efbdae031219fc5df458de2ff422508619b98f85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefano Garzarella Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 09:56:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 26/43] vsock: fix timeout in vsock_accept() [ Upstream commit 7e0afbdfd13d1e708fe96e31c46c4897101a6a43 ] The accept(2) is an "input" socket interface, so we should use SO_RCVTIMEO instead of SO_SNDTIMEO to set the timeout. So this patch replace sock_sndtimeo() with sock_rcvtimeo() to use the right timeout in the vsock_accept(). Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets") Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella Reviewed-by: Jorgen Hansen Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c index 18f377306884..d6473b8d9a81 100644 --- a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c +++ b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c @@ -1296,7 +1296,7 @@ static int vsock_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock, int flags) /* Wait for children sockets to appear; these are the new sockets * created upon connection establishment. */ - timeout = sock_sndtimeo(listener, flags & O_NONBLOCK); + timeout = sock_rcvtimeo(listener, flags & O_NONBLOCK); prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(listener), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); while ((connected = vsock_dequeue_accept(listener)) == NULL && From eeced742e76d3ef8b968e7a6e4655f7fef52053d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 11:32:25 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 27/43] l2tp: add sk_family checks to l2tp_validate_socket [ Upstream commit d9a81a225277686eb629938986d97629ea102633 ] syzbot was able to trigger a crash after using an ISDN socket and fool l2tp. Fix this by making sure the UDP socket is of the proper family. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x465/0x540 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:78 Write of size 1 at addr ffff88808ed0c590 by task syz-executor.5/3018 CPU: 0 PID: 3018 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x188/0x20d lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd3/0x413 mm/kasan/report.c:382 __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38 mm/kasan/report.c:511 kasan_report+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:625 setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x465/0x540 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:78 l2tp_tunnel_register+0xb15/0xdd0 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1523 l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create+0x4b2/0xa60 net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:249 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:673 [inline] genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:718 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x627/0xdf0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:735 netlink_rcv_skb+0x15a/0x410 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2469 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:746 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x537/0x740 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e6/0x810 net/socket.c:2352 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2406 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2439 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 RIP: 0033:0x45ca29 Code: 0d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 db b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007effe76edc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004fe1c0 RCX: 000000000045ca29 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 000000000078bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 000000000000094e R14: 00000000004d5d00 R15: 00007effe76ee6d4 Allocated by task 3018: save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:49 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:495 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:468 __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3656 [inline] __kmalloc+0x161/0x7a0 mm/slab.c:3665 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:560 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0x223/0x2f0 net/core/sock.c:1612 sk_alloc+0x36/0x1100 net/core/sock.c:1666 data_sock_create drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c:600 [inline] mISDN_sock_create+0x272/0x400 drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c:796 __sock_create+0x3cb/0x730 net/socket.c:1428 sock_create net/socket.c:1479 [inline] __sys_socket+0xef/0x200 net/socket.c:1521 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1530 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1528 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1528 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 Freed by task 2484: save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:49 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline] kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:317 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140 mm/kasan/common.c:456 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline] kfree+0x109/0x2b0 mm/slab.c:3757 kvfree+0x42/0x50 mm/util.c:603 __free_fdtable+0x2d/0x70 fs/file.c:31 put_files_struct fs/file.c:420 [inline] put_files_struct+0x248/0x2e0 fs/file.c:413 exit_files+0x7e/0xa0 fs/file.c:445 do_exit+0xb04/0x2dd0 kernel/exit.c:791 do_group_exit+0x125/0x340 kernel/exit.c:894 get_signal+0x47b/0x24e0 kernel/signal.c:2739 do_signal+0x81/0x2240 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:784 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x26c/0x360 arch/x86/entry/common.c:161 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline] syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:279 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x6b1/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808ed0c000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 1424 bytes inside of 2048-byte region [ffff88808ed0c000, ffff88808ed0c800) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00023b4300 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab) raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea0002838208 ffffea00015ba288 ffff8880aa000e00 raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88808ed0c000 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808ed0c480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808ed0c500: 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88808ed0c580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff88808ed0c600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88808ed0c680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fixes: 6b9f34239b00 ("l2tp: fix races in tunnel creation") Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: James Chapman Cc: Guillaume Nault Reported-by: syzbot Acked-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c index 36c7f616294a..fdc1de1cb4fa 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c @@ -1568,6 +1568,8 @@ int l2tp_tunnel_create(struct net *net, int fd, int version, u32 tunnel_id, u32 tunnel_id, fd); goto err; } + if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6) + goto err; switch (encap) { case L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP: if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) { From 3a0808691d40b27b1d1e6f09a8a0a0c9fc17e4bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Jolly Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 10:43:58 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 28/43] USB: serial: qcserial: add DW5816e QDL support commit 3429444abdd9dbd5faebd9bee552ec6162b17ad6 upstream. Add support for Dell Wireless 5816e Download Mode (AKA boot & hold mode / QDL download mode) to drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c This is required to update device firmware. Signed-off-by: Matt Jolly Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c b/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c index 06916ddc3159..c59e6d4a8a61 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c @@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = { {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b3)}, /* Dell Wireless 5809e Gobi(TM) 4G LTE Mobile Broadband Card (rev3) */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b5)}, /* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b6)}, /* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */ + {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cb)}, /* Dell Wireless 5816e QDL */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cc)}, /* Dell Wireless 5816e */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cf)}, /* Dell Wireless 5819 */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81d0)}, /* Dell Wireless 5819 */ From 337741cd29da175a3d3f0194eedb183fa30330f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bin Liu Date: Wed, 13 May 2020 16:36:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 29/43] USB: serial: usb_wwan: do not resubmit rx urb on fatal errors commit 986c1748c84d7727defeaeca74a73b37f7d5cce1 upstream. usb_wwan_indat_callback() shouldn't resubmit rx urb if the previous urb status is a fatal error. Or the usb controller would keep processing the new urbs then run into interrupt storm, and has no chance to recover. Fixes: 6c1ee66a0b2b ("USB-Serial: Fix error handling of usb_wwan") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bin Liu Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c b/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c index 93c696e2131f..0fbb34fcbddf 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c @@ -305,6 +305,10 @@ static void usb_wwan_indat_callback(struct urb *urb) if (status) { dev_dbg(dev, "%s: nonzero status: %d on endpoint %02x.\n", __func__, status, endpoint); + + /* don't resubmit on fatal errors */ + if (status == -ESHUTDOWN || status == -ENOENT) + return; } else { if (urb->actual_length) { tty_insert_flip_string(&port->port, data, From a75aba90967252f2b23515021b4f11d5bd1706e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniele Palmas Date: Mon, 25 May 2020 23:11:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 30/43] USB: serial: option: add Telit LE910C1-EUX compositions commit 399ad9477c523f721f8e51d4f824bdf7267f120c upstream. Add Telit LE910C1-EUX compositions: 0x1031: tty, tty, tty, rmnet 0x1033: tty, tty, tty, ecm Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525211106.27338-1-dnlplm@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c index 737b6652a0b5..326e7109b8f8 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c @@ -1146,6 +1146,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = { { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_CC864_SINGLE) }, { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_DE910_DUAL) }, { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_UE910_V2) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1031, 0xff), /* Telit LE910C1-EUX */ + .driver_info = NCTRL(0) | RSVD(3) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1033, 0xff), /* Telit LE910C1-EUX (ECM) */ + .driver_info = NCTRL(0) }, { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_LE922_USBCFG0), .driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(1) | NCTRL(2) | RSVD(3) }, { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_LE922_USBCFG1), From 74d904c16dfe2583fc578cc3b0ada8ce395a3714 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dinghao Liu Date: Sun, 24 May 2020 21:50:49 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 31/43] usb: musb: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error commit e4befc121df03dc8ed2ac1031c98f9538e244bae upstream. When copy_from_user() returns an error code, there is a runtime PM usage counter imbalance. Fix this by moving copy_from_user() to the beginning of this function. Fixes: 7b6c1b4c0e1e ("usb: musb: fix runtime PM in debugfs") Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bin Liu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525025049.3400-7-b-liu@ti.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c b/drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c index 534a3f6fa89c..474bb13b7dbb 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c +++ b/drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c @@ -200,6 +200,11 @@ static ssize_t musb_test_mode_write(struct file *file, u8 test; char buf[18]; + memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf)); + + if (copy_from_user(buf, ubuf, min_t(size_t, sizeof(buf) - 1, count))) + return -EFAULT; + pm_runtime_get_sync(musb->controller); test = musb_readb(musb->mregs, MUSB_TESTMODE); if (test) { @@ -208,11 +213,6 @@ static ssize_t musb_test_mode_write(struct file *file, goto ret; } - memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf)); - - if (copy_from_user(buf, ubuf, min_t(size_t, sizeof(buf) - 1, count))) - return -EFAULT; - if (strstarts(buf, "force host")) test = MUSB_TEST_FORCE_HOST; From adf823fa2a53db5d119d90817778f263a3a47608 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Torokhov Date: Mon, 25 May 2020 16:27:40 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 32/43] vt: keyboard: avoid signed integer overflow in k_ascii commit b86dab054059b970111b5516ae548efaae5b3aae upstream. When k_ascii is invoked several times in a row there is a potential for signed integer overflow: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:888:19 signed integer overflow: 10 * 1111111111 cannot be represented in type 'int' CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.11 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xce/0x128 lib/dump_stack.c:118 ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x30 lib/ubsan.c:154 handle_overflow+0xdc/0xf0 lib/ubsan.c:184 __ubsan_handle_mul_overflow+0x2a/0x40 lib/ubsan.c:205 k_ascii+0xbf/0xd0 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:888 kbd_keycode drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1477 [inline] kbd_event+0x888/0x3be0 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1495 While it can be worked around by using check_mul_overflow()/ check_add_overflow(), it is better to introduce a separate flag to signal that number pad is being used to compose a symbol, and change type of the accumulator from signed to unsigned, thus avoiding undefined behavior when it overflows. Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Cc: stable Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525232740.GA262061@dtor-ws Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c b/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c index b4e7a7317713..d9eba7938917 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c +++ b/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c @@ -125,7 +125,11 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(func_buf_lock); /* guard 'func_buf' and friends */ static unsigned long key_down[BITS_TO_LONGS(KEY_CNT)]; /* keyboard key bitmap */ static unsigned char shift_down[NR_SHIFT]; /* shift state counters.. */ static bool dead_key_next; -static int npadch = -1; /* -1 or number assembled on pad */ + +/* Handles a number being assembled on the number pad */ +static bool npadch_active; +static unsigned int npadch_value; + static unsigned int diacr; static char rep; /* flag telling character repeat */ @@ -815,12 +819,12 @@ static void k_shift(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag) shift_state &= ~(1 << value); /* kludge */ - if (up_flag && shift_state != old_state && npadch != -1) { + if (up_flag && shift_state != old_state && npadch_active) { if (kbd->kbdmode == VC_UNICODE) - to_utf8(vc, npadch); + to_utf8(vc, npadch_value); else - put_queue(vc, npadch & 0xff); - npadch = -1; + put_queue(vc, npadch_value & 0xff); + npadch_active = false; } } @@ -838,7 +842,7 @@ static void k_meta(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag) static void k_ascii(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag) { - int base; + unsigned int base; if (up_flag) return; @@ -852,10 +856,12 @@ static void k_ascii(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag) base = 16; } - if (npadch == -1) - npadch = value; - else - npadch = npadch * base + value; + if (!npadch_active) { + npadch_value = 0; + npadch_active = true; + } + + npadch_value = npadch_value * base + value; } static void k_lock(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag) From 2b37e4f0ef5c8cd1d3de19d364dfcbefcc5114b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Slaby Date: Tue, 26 May 2020 16:56:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 33/43] tty: hvc_console, fix crashes on parallel open/close commit 24eb2377f977fe06d84fca558f891f95bc28a449 upstream. hvc_open sets tty->driver_data to NULL when open fails at some point. Typically, the failure happens in hp->ops->notifier_add(). If there is a racing process which tries to open such mangled tty, which was not closed yet, the process will crash in hvc_open as tty->driver_data is NULL. All this happens because close wants to know whether open failed or not. But ->open should not NULL this and other tty fields for ->close to be happy. ->open should call tty_port_set_initialized(true) and close should check by tty_port_initialized() instead. So do this properly in this driver. So this patch removes these from ->open: * tty_port_tty_set(&hp->port, NULL). This happens on last close. * tty->driver_data = NULL. Dtto. * tty_port_put(&hp->port). This happens in shutdown and until now, this must have been causing a reference underflow, if I am not missing something. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby Cc: stable Reported-and-tested-by: Raghavendra Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200526145632.13879-1-jslaby@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c | 23 ++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c index f8964247c4c3..985f49a65906 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c +++ b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c @@ -358,15 +358,14 @@ static int hvc_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp) * tty fields and return the kref reference. */ if (rc) { - tty_port_tty_set(&hp->port, NULL); - tty->driver_data = NULL; - tty_port_put(&hp->port); printk(KERN_ERR "hvc_open: request_irq failed with rc %d.\n", rc); - } else + } else { /* We are ready... raise DTR/RTS */ if (C_BAUD(tty)) if (hp->ops->dtr_rts) hp->ops->dtr_rts(hp, 1); + tty_port_set_initialized(&hp->port, true); + } /* Force wakeup of the polling thread */ hvc_kick(); @@ -376,22 +375,12 @@ static int hvc_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp) static void hvc_close(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp) { - struct hvc_struct *hp; + struct hvc_struct *hp = tty->driver_data; unsigned long flags; if (tty_hung_up_p(filp)) return; - /* - * No driver_data means that this close was issued after a failed - * hvc_open by the tty layer's release_dev() function and we can just - * exit cleanly because the kref reference wasn't made. - */ - if (!tty->driver_data) - return; - - hp = tty->driver_data; - spin_lock_irqsave(&hp->port.lock, flags); if (--hp->port.count == 0) { @@ -399,6 +388,9 @@ static void hvc_close(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp) /* We are done with the tty pointer now. */ tty_port_tty_set(&hp->port, NULL); + if (!tty_port_initialized(&hp->port)) + return; + if (C_HUPCL(tty)) if (hp->ops->dtr_rts) hp->ops->dtr_rts(hp, 0); @@ -415,6 +407,7 @@ static void hvc_close(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp) * waking periodically to check chars_in_buffer(). */ tty_wait_until_sent(tty, HVC_CLOSE_WAIT); + tty_port_set_initialized(&hp->port, false); } else { if (hp->port.count < 0) printk(KERN_ERR "hvc_close %X: oops, count is %d\n", From ed9a878378533250b0290e32ff4361ce420690c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Terjan Date: Sat, 23 May 2020 22:12:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 34/43] staging: rtl8712: Fix IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK commit 15ea976a1f12b5fd76b1bd6ff3eb5132fd28047f upstream. The value in shared headers was fixed 9 years ago in commit 8d661f1e462d ("ieee80211: correct IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK macro") and while looking at using shared headers for other duplicated constants I noticed this driver uses the old value. The macros are also defined twice in this file so I am deleting the second definition. Signed-off-by: Pascal Terjan Cc: stable Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200523211247.23262-1-pterjan@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h index b8af9656e6da..f97275b90177 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h @@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ static inline unsigned char *get_hdr_bssid(unsigned char *pframe) /* block-ack parameters */ #define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_POLICY_MASK 0x0002 #define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0x003C -#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFA0 +#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFC0 #define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0xF000 #define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_INITIATOR_MASK 0x0800 @@ -565,13 +565,6 @@ struct ieee80211_ht_addt_info { #define IEEE80211_HT_IE_NON_GF_STA_PRSNT 0x0004 #define IEEE80211_HT_IE_NON_HT_STA_PRSNT 0x0010 -/* block-ack parameters */ -#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_POLICY_MASK 0x0002 -#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0x003C -#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFA0 -#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0xF000 -#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_INITIATOR_MASK 0x0800 - /* * A-PMDU buffer sizes * According to IEEE802.11n spec size varies from 8K to 64K (in powers of 2) From 10873fe64e9d7181c3576134341b6f4d24b32048 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Srinivas Kandagatla Date: Fri, 22 May 2020 12:33:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 35/43] nvmem: qfprom: remove incorrect write support commit 8d9eb0d6d59a5d7028c80a30831143d3e75515a7 upstream. qfprom has different address spaces for read and write. Reads are always done from corrected address space, where as writes are done on raw address space. Writing to corrected address space is invalid and ignored, so it does not make sense to have this support in the driver which only supports corrected address space regions at the moment. Fixes: 4ab11996b489 ("nvmem: qfprom: Add Qualcomm QFPROM support.") Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson Cc: stable Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200522113341.7728-1-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c | 14 -------------- 1 file changed, 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c b/drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c index b5305f08b184..05b1c4f36b7b 100644 --- a/drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c +++ b/drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c @@ -30,19 +30,6 @@ static int qfprom_reg_read(void *context, return 0; } -static int qfprom_reg_write(void *context, - unsigned int reg, void *_val, size_t bytes) -{ - void __iomem *base = context; - u32 *val = _val; - int i = 0, words = bytes / 4; - - while (words--) - writel(*val++, base + reg + (i++ * 4)); - - return 0; -} - static int qfprom_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct nvmem_device *nvmem = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); @@ -56,7 +43,6 @@ static struct nvmem_config econfig = { .stride = 4, .word_size = 1, .reg_read = qfprom_reg_read, - .reg_write = qfprom_reg_write, }; static int qfprom_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) From 5f8f40583aad4aa3c0fc8a9adaa9f1c988fa8e9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Gross Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 21:17:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 36/43] x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id commit e9d7144597b10ff13ff2264c059f7d4a7fbc89ac upstream Intel uses the same family/model for several CPUs. Sometimes the stepping must be checked to tell them apart. On x86 there can be at most 16 steppings. Add a steppings bitmask to x86_cpu_id and a X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAMILY_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE macro and support for matching against family/model/stepping. [ bp: Massage. tglx: Lightweight variant for backporting ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Tony Luck Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c | 7 ++++++- include/linux/mod_devicetable.h | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h index ff501e511d91..b9473858c6b6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h @@ -8,6 +8,33 @@ #include +#define X86_STEPPINGS(mins, maxs) GENMASK(maxs, mins) + +/** + * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching + * @_vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY + * The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@_vendor + * @_family: The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY + * @_model: The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY + * @_steppings: Bitmask for steppings, stepping constant or X86_STEPPING_ANY + * @_feature: A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY + * @_data: Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage + * format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer + * etc. is casted to unsigned long internally. + * + * Backport version to keep the SRBDS pile consistant. No shorter variants + * required for this. + */ +#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model, \ + _steppings, _feature, _data) { \ + .vendor = X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, \ + .family = _family, \ + .model = _model, \ + .steppings = _steppings, \ + .feature = _feature, \ + .driver_data = (unsigned long) _data \ +} + extern const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match); #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c index e42117d5f4d7..f46ffb3b295f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c @@ -33,13 +33,18 @@ const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match) const struct x86_cpu_id *m; struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data; - for (m = match; m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->feature; m++) { + for (m = match; + m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->steppings | m->feature; + m++) { if (m->vendor != X86_VENDOR_ANY && c->x86_vendor != m->vendor) continue; if (m->family != X86_FAMILY_ANY && c->x86 != m->family) continue; if (m->model != X86_MODEL_ANY && c->x86_model != m->model) continue; + if (m->steppings != X86_STEPPING_ANY && + !(BIT(c->x86_stepping) & m->steppings)) + continue; if (m->feature != X86_FEATURE_ANY && !cpu_has(c, m->feature)) continue; return m; diff --git a/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h b/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h index 1abfe37314a0..df841a72b804 100644 --- a/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h +++ b/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h @@ -572,6 +572,10 @@ struct mips_cdmm_device_id { /* * MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE expects this struct to be called x86cpu_device_id. * Although gcc seems to ignore this error, clang fails without this define. + * + * Note: The ordering of the struct is different from upstream because the + * static initializers in kernels < 5.7 still use C89 style while upstream + * has been converted to proper C99 initializers. */ #define x86cpu_device_id x86_cpu_id struct x86_cpu_id { @@ -580,6 +584,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id { __u16 model; __u16 feature; /* bit index */ kernel_ulong_t driver_data; + __u16 steppings; }; #define X86_FEATURE_MATCH(x) \ @@ -588,6 +593,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id { #define X86_VENDOR_ANY 0xffff #define X86_FAMILY_ANY 0 #define X86_MODEL_ANY 0 +#define X86_STEPPING_ANY 0 #define X86_FEATURE_ANY 0 /* Same as FPU, you can't test for that */ /* From 15cf7ca9f59ff911cd5582969377bbf8c2ecab8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Gross Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 21:17:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 37/43] x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches() commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument. [ bp: Flip arguments order. ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 23 +++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index f490a4fab2f7..078ad5da2e1f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -956,9 +956,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { {} }; -static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which) +static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which) { - const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist); + const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table); return m && !!(m->driver_data & which); } @@ -978,29 +978,32 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); /* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */ - if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO)) + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && + !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT); - if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION)) + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION)) return; setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); - if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) && + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) && + !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS); if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED); - if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) { + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) && + !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) { setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS); - if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY)) + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY); } - if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS)) + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS); /* @@ -1018,7 +1021,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA); - if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN)) + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; /* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */ @@ -1027,7 +1030,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN); - if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF)) + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF)) return; setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF); From 2f93f8d6891c2bd3963e1c68ad3eabf4dd6a55af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Gross Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 21:17:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 38/43] x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation commit 7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb upstream SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for reuse. While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL. The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom. * Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using either mitigations=off or srbds=off. * Export vulnerability status via sysfs * Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations. [ bp: Massage, - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g, - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in, - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level, - reflow comments. jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Tony Luck Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 + Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 20 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 30 ++--- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 31 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 1 + drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 ++ 8 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu index b41046b5713b..a5225df4a070 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu @@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit Date: January 2018 diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index e05d65d6fcb6..40602517ca52 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4262,6 +4262,26 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. spia_pedr= spia_peddr= + srbds= [X86,INTEL] + Control the Special Register Buffer Data Sampling + (SRBDS) mitigation. + + Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an MDS-like + exploit which can leak bits from the random + number generator. + + By default, this issue is mitigated by + microcode. However, the microcode fix can cause + the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions to become + much slower. Among other effects, this will + result in reduced throughput from /dev/urandom. + + The microcode mitigation can be disabled with + the following option: + + off: Disable mitigation and remove + performance impact to RDRAND and RDSEED + ssbd= [ARM64,HW] Speculative Store Bypass Disable control diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index fb457ba8ccc6..2cd5d12a842c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL (18*32+ 9) /* "" SRBDS mitigation MSR available */ #define X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT (18*32+13) /* "" TSX_FORCE_ABORT */ #define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR (18*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */ #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG (18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */ @@ -346,19 +347,20 @@ */ #define X86_BUG_ESPFIX X86_BUG(9) /* "" IRET to 16-bit SS corrupts ESP/RSP high bits */ #endif -#define X86_BUG_NULL_SEG X86_BUG(10) /* Nulling a selector preserves the base */ -#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */ -#define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */ -#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */ -#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */ -#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */ -#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */ -#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */ -#define X86_BUG_L1TF X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */ -#define X86_BUG_MDS X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */ -#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */ -#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */ -#define X86_BUG_TAA X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */ -#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */ +#define X86_BUG_NULL_SEG X86_BUG(10) /* Nulling a selector preserves the base */ +#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */ +#define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */ +#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */ +#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */ +#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */ +#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */ +#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */ +#define X86_BUG_L1TF X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */ +#define X86_BUG_MDS X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */ +#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */ +#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */ +#define X86_BUG_TAA X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */ +#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */ +#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 8d162e0f2881..b12b0a50ad1f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -103,6 +103,10 @@ #define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE BIT(0) /* Disable RTM feature */ #define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR BIT(1) /* Disable TSX enumeration */ +/* SRBDS support */ +#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123 +#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0) + #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP 0x00000176 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 24307d5bb4b8..5ef0a2b34261 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void); static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; @@ -107,6 +108,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) l1tf_select_mitigation(); mds_select_mitigation(); taa_select_mitigation(); + srbds_select_mitigation(); /* * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS @@ -389,6 +391,97 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline); +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SRBDS: " fmt + +enum srbds_mitigations { + SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF, + SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED, + SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL, + SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF, + SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR, +}; + +static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL; + +static const char * const srbds_strings[] = { + [SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable", + [SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode", + [SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode", + [SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF] = "Mitigation: TSX disabled", + [SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status", +}; + +static bool srbds_off; + +void update_srbds_msr(void) +{ + u64 mcu_ctrl; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS)) + return; + + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) + return; + + if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED) + return; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); + + switch (srbds_mitigation) { + case SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF: + case SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF: + mcu_ctrl |= RNGDS_MITG_DIS; + break; + case SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL: + mcu_ctrl &= ~RNGDS_MITG_DIS; + break; + default: + break; + } + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); +} + +static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void) +{ + u64 ia32_cap; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS)) + return; + + /* + * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting + * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled. + */ + ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); + if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) + srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF; + else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) + srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR; + else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL)) + srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; + else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off) + srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF; + + update_srbds_msr(); + pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]); +} + +static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS)) + return 0; + + srbds_off = !strcmp(str, "off"); + return 0; +} +early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline); + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt @@ -1501,6 +1594,11 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void) return ""; } +static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) +{ + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]); +} + static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf, unsigned int bug) { @@ -1542,6 +1640,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT: return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf); + case X86_BUG_SRBDS: + return srbds_show_state(buf); + default: break; } @@ -1588,4 +1689,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr { return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS); +} #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 078ad5da2e1f..b16b6176738b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -956,6 +956,27 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { {} }; +#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \ + X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \ + INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \ + X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues) + +#define SRBDS BIT(0) + +static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_ULT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_GT3E, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_GT3E, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC), SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD), SRBDS), + {} +}; + static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which) { const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table); @@ -1021,6 +1042,15 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA); + /* + * SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed + * in the vulnerability blacklist. + */ + if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) && + cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; @@ -1453,6 +1483,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) mtrr_ap_init(); validate_apic_and_package_id(c); x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(); + update_srbds_msr(); } struct msr_range { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h index 4350f50b5deb..fdeeab6b158c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ extern int detect_extended_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern int detect_ht_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void); +extern void update_srbds_msr(void); extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void); diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c index 677c5f36674b..100850398dd3 100644 --- a/drivers/base/cpu.c +++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c @@ -550,6 +550,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); } +ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); +} + static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL); @@ -558,6 +564,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL); +static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL); static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_meltdown.attr, @@ -568,6 +575,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_mds.attr, &dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr, &dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr, + &dev_attr_srbds.attr, NULL }; From 2808035ba55eb8aaaf5eb37421dbfff37c1f25a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Gross Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 21:17:16 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 39/43] x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation commit 7222a1b5b87417f22265c92deea76a6aecd0fb0f upstream Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation. [ bp: Massage. jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Tony Luck Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst | 3 +- .../special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 148 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst diff --git a/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst index 24f53c501366..b5fbc6ae9d5f 100644 --- a/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst @@ -12,4 +12,5 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. l1tf mds tsx_async_abort - multihit.rst + multihit + special-register-buffer-data-sampling diff --git a/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst b/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6a473da80b62 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +SRBDS - Special Register Buffer Data Sampling +============================================= + +SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS :doc:`mds` techniques to +infer values returned from special register accesses. Special register +accesses are accesses to off core registers. According to Intel's evaluation, +the special register reads that have a security expectation of privacy are +RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY. + +When RDRAND, RDSEED and EGETKEY instructions are used, the data is moved +to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible +to MDS attacks. + +Affected processors +-------------------- +Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may +be affected. + +A processor is affected by SRBDS if its Family_Model and stepping is +in the following list, with the exception of the listed processors +exporting MDS_NO while Intel TSX is available yet not enabled. The +latter class of processors are only affected when Intel TSX is enabled +by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected. + + ============= ============ ======== + common name Family_Model Stepping + ============= ============ ======== + Haswell 06_3CH All + Haswell_L 06_45H All + Haswell_G 06_46H All + + Broadwell_G 06_47H All + Broadwell 06_3DH All + + Skylake_L 06_4EH All + Skylake 06_5EH All + + Kabylake_L 06_8EH <=0xC + + Kabylake 06_9EH <=0xD + ============= ============ ======== + +Related CVEs +------------ + +The following CVE entry is related to this SRBDS issue: + + ============== ===== ===================================== + CVE-2020-0543 SRBDS Special Register Buffer Data Sampling + ============== ===== ===================================== + +Attack scenarios +---------------- +An unprivileged user can extract values returned from RDRAND and RDSEED +executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques. + + +Mitigation mechanism +------------------- +Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and +EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared +staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical +processor. + +During execution of the RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions, off-core +accesses from other logical processors will be delayed until the special +register read is complete and the secret data in the shared staging buffer is +overwritten. + +This has three effects on performance: + +#. RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions have higher latency. + +#. Executing RDRAND at the same time on multiple logical processors will be + serialized, resulting in an overall reduction in the maximum RDRAND + bandwidth. + +#. Executing RDRAND, RDSEED or EGETKEY will delay memory accesses from other + logical processors that miss their core caches, with an impact similar to + legacy locked cache-line-split accesses. + +The microcode updates provide an opt-out mechanism (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to disable +the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions executed outside of Intel +Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) enclaves. On logical processors that +disable the mitigation using this opt-out mechanism, RDRAND and RDSEED do not +take longer to execute and do not impact performance of sibling logical +processors memory accesses. The opt-out mechanism does not affect Intel SGX +enclaves (including execution of RDRAND or RDSEED inside an enclave, as well +as EGETKEY execution). + +IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR Definition +-------------------------------- +Along with the mitigation for this issue, Intel added a new thread-scope +IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR, (address 0x123). The presence of this MSR and +RNGDS_MITG_DIS (bit 0) is enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0).EDX[SRBDS_CTRL = +9]==1. This MSR is introduced through the microcode update. + +Setting IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[0] (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to 1 for a logical processor +disables the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED executed outside of an Intel SGX +enclave on that logical processor. Opting out of the mitigation for a +particular logical processor does not affect the RDRAND and RDSEED mitigations +for other logical processors. + +Note that inside of an Intel SGX enclave, the mitigation is applied regardless +of the value of RNGDS_MITG_DS. + +Mitigation control on the kernel command line +--------------------------------------------- +The kernel command line allows control over the SRBDS mitigation at boot time +with the option "srbds=". The option for this is: + + ============= ============================================================= + off This option disables SRBDS mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED on + affected platforms. + ============= ============================================================= + +SRBDS System Information +----------------------- +The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For +SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file: +/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds + +The possible values contained in this file are: + + ============================== ============================================= + Not affected Processor not vulnerable + Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled + Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing + mitigation + Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in + effect. + Mitigation: TSX disabled Processor is only vulnerable when TSX is + enabled while this system was booted with TSX + disabled. + Unknown: Dependent on + hypervisor status Running on virtual guest processor that is + affected but with no way to know if host + processor is mitigated or vulnerable. + ============================== ============================================= + +SRBDS Default mitigation +------------------------ +This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND, +RDSEED ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for +reuse. Use the "srbds=off" kernel command line to disable the mitigation for +RDRAND and RDSEED. From 4798f72395eb523d251f18226527329debe353e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 20:46:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 40/43] x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected list commit 3798cc4d106e91382bfe016caa2edada27c2bb3f upstream Make the docs match the code. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst b/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst index 6a473da80b62..47b1b3afac99 100644 --- a/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst +++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected. ============= ============ ======== common name Family_Model Stepping ============= ============ ======== + IvyBridge 06_3AH All + Haswell 06_3CH All Haswell_L 06_45H All Haswell_G 06_46H All @@ -37,9 +39,8 @@ by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected. Skylake_L 06_4EH All Skylake 06_5EH All - Kabylake_L 06_8EH <=0xC - - Kabylake 06_9EH <=0xD + Kabylake_L 06_8EH <= 0xC + Kabylake 06_9EH <= 0xD ============= ============ ======== Related CVEs From 259108a77baa0fd4f0541d68a494070e3f06ec5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Othacehe Date: Sun, 3 May 2020 11:29:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 41/43] iio: vcnl4000: Fix i2c swapped word reading. [ Upstream commit 18dfb5326370991c81a6d1ed6d1aeee055cb8c05 ] The bytes returned by the i2c reading need to be swapped unconditionally. Otherwise, on be16 platforms, an incorrect value will be returned. Taking the slow path via next merge window as its been around a while and we have a patch set dependent on this which would be held up. Fixes: 62a1efb9f868 ("iio: add vcnl4000 combined ALS and proximity sensor") Signed-off-by: Mathieu Othacehe Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c b/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c index 360b6e98137a..5a3a532937ba 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c @@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ static int vcnl4000_measure(struct vcnl4000_data *data, u8 req_mask, u8 rdy_mask, u8 data_reg, int *val) { int tries = 20; - __be16 buf; int ret; mutex_lock(&data->lock); @@ -88,13 +87,12 @@ static int vcnl4000_measure(struct vcnl4000_data *data, u8 req_mask, goto fail; } - ret = i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data(data->client, - data_reg, sizeof(buf), (u8 *) &buf); + ret = i2c_smbus_read_word_swapped(data->client, data_reg); if (ret < 0) goto fail; mutex_unlock(&data->lock); - *val = be16_to_cpu(buf); + *val = ret; return 0; From 5ec850f0f15dd128c0d584234cdcade9ddf9bb0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 18:47:25 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 42/43] uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned commit 013b2deba9a6b80ca02f4fafd7dedf875e9b4450 upstream. uprobe_write_opcode() must not cross page boundary; prepare_uprobe() relies on arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() which should validate "vaddr" but some architectures (csky, s390, and sparc) don't do this. We can remove the BUG_ON() check in prepare_uprobe() and validate the offset early in __uprobe_register(). The new IS_ALIGNED() check matches the alignment check in arch_prepare_kprobe() on supported architectures, so I think that all insns must be aligned to UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE. Another problem is __update_ref_ctr() which was wrong from the very beginning, it can read/write outside of kmap'ed page unless "vaddr" is aligned to sizeof(short), __uprobe_register() should check this too. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger Tested-by: Sven Schnelle Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds [ check for ref_ctr_offset removed for backport - gregkh ] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/events/uprobes.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c index 8ddd29476c0d..1fcaa174ed32 100644 --- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c +++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c @@ -604,10 +604,6 @@ static int prepare_uprobe(struct uprobe *uprobe, struct file *file, if (ret) goto out; - /* uprobe_write_opcode() assumes we don't cross page boundary */ - BUG_ON((uprobe->offset & ~PAGE_MASK) + - UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE); - smp_wmb(); /* pairs with the smp_rmb() in handle_swbp() */ set_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags); @@ -886,6 +882,13 @@ int uprobe_register(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, struct uprobe_consumer * if (offset > i_size_read(inode)) return -EINVAL; + /* + * This ensures that copy_from_page() and copy_to_page() + * can't cross page boundary. + */ + if (!IS_ALIGNED(offset, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + retry: uprobe = alloc_uprobe(inode, offset); if (!uprobe) @@ -1696,6 +1699,9 @@ static int is_trap_at_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vaddr) uprobe_opcode_t opcode; int result; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE))) + return -EINVAL; + pagefault_disable(); result = __get_user(opcode, (uprobe_opcode_t __user *)vaddr); pagefault_enable(); From e0799bae56744764303252ac8d52ddb5774bcb4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2020 09:22:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 43/43] Linux 4.9.227 --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index b0e1162fddfa..6c3c6e193621 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 9 -SUBLEVEL = 226 +SUBLEVEL = 227 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Roaring Lionus