From 9eea2904292c2d8fa98df141d3bf7c41ec9dc1b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roberto Sassu Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 17:27:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 01/12] evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded evm_inode_init_security() requires an HMAC key to calculate the HMAC on initial xattrs provided by LSMs. However, it checks generically whether a key has been loaded, including also public keys, which is not correct as public keys are not suitable to calculate the HMAC. Originally, support for signature verification was introduced to verify a possibly immutable initial ram disk, when no new files are created, and to switch to HMAC for the root filesystem. By that time, an HMAC key should have been loaded and usable to calculate HMACs for new files. More recently support for requiring an HMAC key was removed from the kernel, so that signature verification can be used alone. Since this is a legitimate use case, evm_inode_init_security() should not return an error when no HMAC key has been loaded. This patch fixes this problem by replacing the evm_key_loaded() check with a check of the EVM_INIT_HMAC flag in evm_initialized. Fixes: 26ddabfe96b ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5.x Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 0de367aaa2d3..7ac5204c8d1f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) } /* - * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm + * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value */ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, @@ -530,7 +530,8 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; int rc; - if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || + !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) return 0; xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); From aa2ead71d9daa1b6645e1d25b1f14a6286b114d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roberto Sassu Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 17:27:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 02/12] evm: Load EVM key in ima_load_x509() to avoid appraisal The public builtin keys do not need to be appraised by IMA as the restriction on the IMA/EVM trusted keyrings ensures that a key can be loaded only if it is signed with a key on the builtin or secondary keyrings. However, when evm_load_x509() is called, appraisal is already enabled and a valid IMA signature must be added to the EVM key to pass verification. Since the restriction is applied on both IMA and EVM trusted keyrings, it is safe to disable appraisal also when the EVM key is loaded. This patch calls evm_load_x509() inside ima_load_x509() if CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 is enabled, which crosses the normal IMA and EVM boundary. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/iint.c | 4 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index fca8a9409e4a..8638976f7990 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -208,7 +208,9 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, void __init integrity_load_keys(void) { ima_load_x509(); - evm_load_x509(); + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509)) + evm_load_x509(); } static int __init integrity_fs_init(void) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 6e8742916d1d..5076a7d9d23e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -108,6 +108,10 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void) ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags; integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH); + + /* load also EVM key to avoid appraisal */ + evm_load_x509(); + ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags; } #endif From 9acc89d31f0c94c8e573ed61f3e4340bbd526d0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roberto Sassu Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 17:27:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 03/12] evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loaded EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is an EVM initialization flag that can be set to temporarily disable metadata verification until all xattrs/attrs necessary to verify an EVM portable signature are copied to the file. This flag is cleared when EVM is initialized with an HMAC key, to avoid that the HMAC is calculated on unverified xattrs/attrs. Currently EVM unnecessarily denies setting this flag if EVM is initialized with a public key, which is not a concern as it cannot be used to trust xattrs/attrs updates. This patch removes this limitation. Fixes: ae1ba1676b88e ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16.x Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- Documentation/ABI/testing/evm | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm index 3c477ba48a31..2243b72e4110 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm @@ -49,8 +49,30 @@ Description: modification of EVM-protected metadata and disable all further modification of policy - Note that once a key has been loaded, it will no longer be - possible to enable metadata modification. + Echoing a value is additive, the new value is added to the + existing initialization flags. + + For example, after:: + + echo 2 >/evm + + another echo can be performed:: + + echo 1 >/evm + + and the resulting value will be 3. + + Note that once an HMAC key has been loaded, it will no longer + be possible to enable metadata modification. Signaling that an + HMAC key has been loaded will clear the corresponding flag. + For example, if the current value is 6 (2 and 4 set):: + + echo 1 >/evm + + will set the new value to 3 (4 cleared). + + Loading an HMAC key is the only way to disable metadata + modification. Until key loading has been signaled EVM can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index 0007d3362754..5f0da41bccd0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -81,12 +81,12 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (!i || (i & ~EVM_INIT_MASK) != 0) return -EINVAL; - /* Don't allow a request to freshly enable metadata writes if - * keys are loaded. + /* + * Don't allow a request to enable metadata writes if + * an HMAC key is loaded. */ if ((i & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) && - ((evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK) != 0) && - !(evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)) + (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) != 0) return -EPERM; if (i & EVM_INIT_HMAC) { From e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roberto Sassu Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 17:27:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 04/12] evm: Introduce evm_revalidate_status() When EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is set, EVM allows any operation on metadata. Its main purpose is to allow users to freely set metadata when it is protected by a portable signature, until an HMAC key is loaded. However, callers of evm_verifyxattr() are not notified about metadata changes and continue to rely on the last status returned by the function. For example IMA, since it caches the appraisal result, will not call again evm_verifyxattr() until the appraisal flags are cleared, and will grant access to the file even if there was a metadata operation that made the portable signature invalid. This patch introduces evm_revalidate_status(), which callers of evm_verifyxattr() can use in their xattr hooks to determine whether re-validation is necessary and to do the proper actions. IMA calls it in its xattr hooks to reset the appraisal flags, so that the EVM status is re-evaluated after a metadata operation. Lastly, this patch also adds a call to evm_reset_status() in evm_inode_post_setattr() to invalidate the cached EVM status after a setattr operation. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/evm.h | 6 ++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 15 ++++++---- 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index 8302bc29bb35..39bb17a8236b 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr_array, struct xattr *evm); +extern bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name); #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL extern int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattrname); #else @@ -104,5 +105,10 @@ static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, return 0; } +static inline bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) +{ + return false; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_EVM */ #endif /* LINUX_EVM_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 7ac5204c8d1f..782915117175 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -425,6 +425,31 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } +/** + * evm_revalidate_status - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary + * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name + * + * Report whether callers of evm_verifyxattr() should re-validate the + * EVM status. + * + * Return true if re-validation is necessary, false otherwise. + */ +bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) +{ + if (!evm_key_loaded()) + return false; + + /* evm_inode_post_setattr() passes NULL */ + if (!xattr_name) + return true; + + if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name) && + strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM)) + return false; + + return true; +} + /** * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry @@ -441,12 +466,14 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { - if (!evm_key_loaded() || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) - && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))) + if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); + if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM)) + return; + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } @@ -462,11 +489,14 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, */ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { - if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) + if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); + if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM)) + return; + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } @@ -513,9 +543,11 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) */ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { - if (!evm_key_loaded()) + if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL)) return; + evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); + if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 4e5eb0236278..03894769dffa 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -570,6 +570,7 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value; + int digsig = 0; int result; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, @@ -577,9 +578,12 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (result == 1) { if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) return -EINVAL; - ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), - xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); - result = 0; + digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); + } + if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); + if (result == 1) + result = 0; } return result; } @@ -589,9 +593,10 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) int result; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); - if (result == 1) { + if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); - result = 0; + if (result == 1) + result = 0; } return result; } From 4a804b8a4572dfc81c3a59709d49ae206e4370ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roberto Sassu Date: Thu, 20 May 2021 10:48:31 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 05/12] evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors When a file is being created, LSMs can set the initial label with the inode_init_security hook. If no HMAC key is loaded, the new file will have LSM xattrs but not the HMAC. It is also possible that the file remains without protected xattrs after creation if no active LSM provided it, or because the filesystem does not support them. Unfortunately, EVM will deny any further metadata operation on new files, as evm_protect_xattr() will return the INTEGRITY_NOLABEL error if protected xattrs exist without security.evm, INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS if no protected xattrs exist or INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN if xattrs are not supported. This would limit the usability of EVM when only a public key is loaded, as commands such as cp or tar with the option to preserve xattrs won't work. This patch introduces the evm_hmac_disabled() function to determine whether or not it is safe to ignore verification errors, based on the ability of EVM to calculate HMACs. If the HMAC key is not loaded, and it cannot be loaded in the future due to the EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag, allowing an operation despite the attrs/xattrs being found invalid will not make them valid. Since the post hooks can be executed even when the HMAC key is not loaded, this patch also ensures that the EVM_INIT_HMAC initialization flag is set before the post hooks call evm_update_evmxattr(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar (for ensuring EVM_INIT_HMAC is set) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 782915117175..4206c7e492ae 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -90,6 +90,24 @@ static bool evm_key_loaded(void) return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK); } +/* + * This function determines whether or not it is safe to ignore verification + * errors, based on the ability of EVM to calculate HMACs. If the HMAC key + * is not loaded, and it cannot be loaded in the future due to the + * EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag, allowing an operation despite the + * attrs/xattrs being found invalid will not make them valid. + */ +static bool evm_hmac_disabled(void) +{ + if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) + return false; + + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE)) + return false; + + return true; +} + static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); @@ -338,6 +356,10 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + /* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */ + if (evm_hmac_disabled()) + return 0; + iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry)); if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) return 0; @@ -354,6 +376,10 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, -EPERM, 0); } out: + /* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */ + if (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL || + evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) + return 0; if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", @@ -474,6 +500,9 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM)) return; + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) + return; + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } @@ -497,6 +526,9 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM)) return; + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) + return; + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } @@ -522,7 +554,9 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || - (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) || + (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL || + evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))) return 0; integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", @@ -548,6 +582,9 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) + return; + if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); } From cdef685be5b4ae55c3959289e72d520402839c29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roberto Sassu Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 17:27:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 06/12] evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures If files with portable signatures are copied from one location to another or are extracted from an archive, verification can temporarily fail until all xattrs/attrs are set in the destination. Only portable signatures may be moved or copied from one file to another, as they don't depend on system-specific information such as the inode generation. Instead portable signatures must include security.ima. Unlike other security.evm types, EVM portable signatures are also immutable. Thus, it wouldn't be a problem to allow xattr/attr operations when verification fails, as portable signatures will never be replaced with the HMAC on possibly corrupted xattrs/attrs. This patch first introduces a new integrity status called INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE, that allows callers of evm_verify_current_integrity() to detect that a portable signature didn't pass verification and then adds an exception in evm_protect_xattr() and evm_inode_setattr() for this status and returns 0 instead of -EPERM. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/integrity.h | 1 + security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h index 2271939c5c31..2ea0f2f65ab6 100644 --- a/include/linux/integrity.h +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ enum integrity_status { INTEGRITY_PASS = 0, INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE, INTEGRITY_FAIL, + INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE, INTEGRITY_NOLABEL, INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS, INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN, diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 4206c7e492ae..333524e879b5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ int evm_initialized; static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = { - "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown" + "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "fail_immutable", "no_label", + "no_xattrs", "unknown" }; int evm_hmac_attrs; @@ -155,7 +156,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; struct evm_digest digest; struct inode *inode; - int rc, xattr_len; + int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0; if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS || iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)) @@ -200,8 +201,10 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, if (rc) rc = -EINVAL; break; - case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG: + evm_immutable = 1; + fallthrough; + case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: /* accept xattr with non-empty signature field */ if (xattr_len <= sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; @@ -238,9 +241,14 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, break; } - if (rc) - evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) ? - INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL; + if (rc) { + if (rc == -ENODATA) + evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; + else if (evm_immutable) + evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE; + else + evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + } out: if (iint) iint->evm_status = evm_status; @@ -380,6 +388,14 @@ out: if (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL || evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) return 0; + + /* + * Writing other xattrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable + * signatures are immutable and can never be updated. + */ + if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) + return 0; + if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", @@ -553,8 +569,13 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))) return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); + /* + * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures + * are immutable and can never be updated. + */ if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) || + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) || (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL || evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))) return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 03894769dffa..9bb351b933fb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -416,6 +416,8 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: /* No security.evm xattr. */ cause = "missing-HMAC"; goto out; + case INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE: + fallthrough; case INTEGRITY_FAIL: /* Invalid HMAC/signature. */ cause = "invalid-HMAC"; goto out; From 7e135dc725417ecc0629afb4b3b24457d2a4869d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roberto Sassu Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 17:27:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 07/12] evm: Pass user namespace to set/remove xattr hooks In preparation for 'evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata', this patch passes mnt_userns to the inode set/remove xattr hooks so that the GID of the inode on an idmapped mount is correctly determined by posix_acl_update_mode(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/evm.h | 12 ++++++++---- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 17 +++++++++++------ security/security.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index 39bb17a8236b..31ef1dbbb3ac 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -23,13 +23,15 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint); extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid); -extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, +extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size); extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len); -extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); +extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, @@ -72,7 +74,8 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) return; } -static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, +static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size) { return 0; @@ -86,7 +89,8 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, return; } -static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, +static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 333524e879b5..300df6906e05 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -342,7 +342,8 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry) * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently * doesn't exist, to be updated unless the EVM signature is immutable. */ -static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, +static int evm_protect_xattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { enum integrity_status evm_status; @@ -406,6 +407,7 @@ out: /** * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute + * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value @@ -417,8 +419,9 @@ out: * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. */ -int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, - const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +int evm_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, + size_t xattr_value_len) { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; @@ -435,19 +438,21 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) return -EPERM; } - return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + return evm_protect_xattr(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } /** * evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute + * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that * the current value is valid. */ -int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) +int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though * there's no HMAC key loaded @@ -455,7 +460,7 @@ int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) return 0; - return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); + return evm_protect_xattr(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index b38155b2de83..e9f8010a2341 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); if (ret) return ret; - return evm_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); + return evm_inode_setxattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name, value, size); } void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, @@ -1399,7 +1399,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); if (ret) return ret; - return evm_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); + return evm_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name); } int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) From 1886ab01a3fb98ee7f7739ae50eb9492f5df3641 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roberto Sassu Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 17:27:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 08/12] evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata With the patch to allow xattr/attr operations if a portable signature verification fails, cp and tar can copy all xattrs/attrs so that at the end of the process verification succeeds. However, it might happen that the xattrs/attrs are already set to the correct value (taken at signing time) and signature verification succeeds before the copy has completed. For example, an archive might contains files owned by root and the archive is extracted by root. Then, since portable signatures are immutable, all subsequent operations fail (e.g. fchown()), even if the operation is legitimate (does not alter the current value). This patch avoids this problem by reporting successful operation to user space when that operation does not alter the current value of xattrs/attrs. With this patch, the one that introduces evm_hmac_disabled() and the one that allows a metadata operation on the INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE error, EVM portable signatures can be used without disabling metadata verification (by setting EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES). Due to keeping metadata verification enabled, altering immutable metadata protected with a portable signature that was successfully verified will be denied (existing behavior). Reported-by: kernel test robot [implicit declaration of function] Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 112 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 300df6906e05..0196168aeb7d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -330,6 +331,92 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry) return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); } +/* + * evm_xattr_acl_change - check if passed ACL changes the inode mode + * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @xattr_name: requested xattr + * @xattr_value: requested xattr value + * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length + * + * Check if passed ACL changes the inode mode, which is protected by EVM. + * + * Returns 1 if passed ACL causes inode mode change, 0 otherwise. + */ +static int evm_xattr_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL + umode_t mode; + struct posix_acl *acl = NULL, *acl_res; + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); + int rc; + + /* + * user_ns is not relevant here, ACL_USER/ACL_GROUP don't have impact + * on the inode mode (see posix_acl_equiv_mode()). + */ + acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acl)) + return 1; + + acl_res = acl; + /* + * Passing mnt_userns is necessary to correctly determine the GID in + * an idmapped mount, as the GID is used to clear the setgid bit in + * the inode mode. + */ + rc = posix_acl_update_mode(mnt_userns, inode, &mode, &acl_res); + + posix_acl_release(acl); + + if (rc) + return 1; + + if (inode->i_mode != mode) + return 1; +#endif + return 0; +} + +/* + * evm_xattr_change - check if passed xattr value differs from current value + * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @xattr_name: requested xattr + * @xattr_value: requested xattr value + * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length + * + * Check if passed xattr value differs from current value. + * + * Returns 1 if passed xattr value differs from current value, 0 otherwise. + */ +static int evm_xattr_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +{ + char *xattr_data = NULL; + int rc = 0; + + if (posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)) + return evm_xattr_acl_change(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, + xattr_value, xattr_value_len); + + rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_data, + 0, GFP_NOFS); + if (rc < 0) + return 1; + + if (rc == xattr_value_len) + rc = !!memcmp(xattr_value, xattr_data, rc); + else + rc = 1; + + kfree(xattr_data); + return rc; +} + /* * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute * @@ -397,7 +484,13 @@ out: if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) return 0; - if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) + if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && + !evm_xattr_change(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len)) + return 0; + + if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS && + evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", integrity_status_msg[evm_status], @@ -553,6 +646,19 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } +static int evm_attr_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +{ + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); + unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; + + if ((!(ia_valid & ATTR_UID) || uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) && + (!(ia_valid & ATTR_GID) || gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid)) && + (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) || attr->ia_mode == inode->i_mode)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + /** * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry @@ -584,6 +690,11 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL || evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))) return 0; + + if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && + !evm_attr_change(dentry, attr)) + return 0; + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0); From 1434c6a1d32a3a1a77f58a03197b802b1724c740 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roberto Sassu Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 17:27:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/12] evm: Deprecate EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES This patch deprecates the usage of EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES, as it is no longer necessary. All the issues that prevent the usage of EVM portable signatures just with a public key loaded have been solved. This flag will remain available for a short time to ensure that users are able to use EVM without it. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- Documentation/ABI/testing/evm | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm index 2243b72e4110..553fd8a33e56 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Description: 1 Enable digital signature validation 2 Permit modification of EVM-protected metadata at runtime. Not supported if HMAC validation and - creation is enabled. + creation is enabled (deprecated). 31 Disable further runtime modification of EVM policy === ================================================== @@ -47,7 +47,13 @@ Description: will enable digital signature validation, permit modification of EVM-protected metadata and - disable all further modification of policy + disable all further modification of policy. This option is now + deprecated in favor of:: + + echo 0x80000002 >/evm + + as the outstanding issues that prevent the usage of EVM portable + signatures have been solved. Echoing a value is additive, the new value is added to the existing initialization flags. From 7aa5783d95646f924b99d245338d5b7aa7a2b3c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roberto Sassu Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 17:27:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 10/12] ima: Allow imasig requirement to be satisfied by EVM portable signatures System administrators can require that all accessed files have a signature by specifying appraise_type=imasig in a policy rule. Currently, IMA signatures satisfy this requirement. Appended signatures may also satisfy this requirement, but are not applicable as IMA signatures. IMA/appended signatures ensure data source authentication for file content and prevent any change. EVM signatures instead ensure data source authentication for file metadata. Given that the digest or signature of the file content must be included in the metadata, EVM signatures provide the same file data guarantees of IMA signatures, as well as providing file metadata guarantees. This patch lets systems protected with EVM signatures pass appraisal verification if the appraise_type=imasig requirement is specified in the policy. This facilitates deployment in the scenarios where only EVM signatures are available. The patch makes the following changes: file xattr types: security.ima: IMA_XATTR_DIGEST/IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG security.evm: EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG execve(), mmap(), open() behavior (with appraise_type=imasig): before: denied (file without IMA signature, imasig requirement not met) after: allowed (file with EVM portable signature, imasig requirement met) open(O_WRONLY) behavior (without appraise_type=imasig): before: allowed (file without IMA signature, not immutable) after: denied (file with EVM portable signature, immutable) In addition, similarly to IMA signatures, this patch temporarily allows new files without or with incomplete metadata to be opened so that content can be written. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 9bb351b933fb..d9a627de3930 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -242,12 +242,16 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, hash_start = 1; fallthrough; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: - if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { - *cause = "IMA-signature-required"; - *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; - break; + if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) { + if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { + *cause = "IMA-signature-required"; + *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + break; + } + clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); + } else { + set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); } - clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >= iint->ima_hash->length) /* @@ -417,6 +421,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, cause = "missing-HMAC"; goto out; case INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE: + set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); fallthrough; case INTEGRITY_FAIL: /* Invalid HMAC/signature. */ cause = "invalid-HMAC"; @@ -461,9 +466,12 @@ out: status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } - /* Permit new files with file signatures, but without data. */ + /* + * Permit new files with file/EVM portable signatures, but + * without data. + */ if (inode->i_size == 0 && iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE && - xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) { + test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags)) { status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } @@ -581,6 +589,8 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) return -EINVAL; digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); + } else if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) && xattr_value_len > 0) { + digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG); } if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); From 026d7fc92a9d629630779c999fe49ecae93f9d63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roberto Sassu Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 17:27:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 11/12] ima: Introduce template field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback With the patch to accept EVM portable signatures when the appraise_type=imasig requirement is specified in the policy, appraisal can be successfully done even if the file does not have an IMA signature. However, remote attestation would not see that a different signature type was used, as only IMA signatures can be included in the measurement list. This patch solves the issue by introducing the new template field 'evmsig' to show EVM portable signatures and by including its value in the existing field 'sig' if the IMA signature is not found. Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 4 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst index c5a8432972ef..9f3e86ab028a 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst @@ -70,9 +70,11 @@ descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5); - 'd-modsig': the digest of the event without the appended modsig; - 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations; - - 'sig': the file signature; + - 'sig': the file signature, or the EVM portable signature if the file + signature is not found; - 'modsig' the appended file signature; - 'buf': the buffer data that was used to generate the hash without size limitations; + - 'evmsig': the EVM portable signature; Below, there is the list of defined template descriptors: diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index 4e081e650047..7a60848c04a5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = { .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng}, {.field_id = "modsig", .field_init = ima_eventmodsig_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, + {.field_id = "evmsig", .field_init = ima_eventevmsig_init, + .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, }; /* diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index c022ee9e2a4e..4314d9a3514c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ */ #include "ima_template_lib.h" +#include static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo) { @@ -438,7 +439,7 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value; if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) - return 0; + return ima_eventevmsig_init(event_data, field_data); return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len, DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data); @@ -484,3 +485,33 @@ int ima_eventmodsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, return ima_write_template_field_data(data, data_len, DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data); } + +/* + * ima_eventevmsig_init - include the EVM portable signature as part of the + * template data + */ +int ima_eventevmsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, + struct ima_field_data *field_data) +{ + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; + int rc = 0; + + if (!event_data->file) + return 0; + + rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, file_dentry(event_data->file), + XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0, + GFP_NOFS); + if (rc <= 0) + return 0; + + if (xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { + kfree(xattr_data); + return 0; + } + + rc = ima_write_template_field_data((char *)xattr_data, rc, DATA_FMT_HEX, + field_data); + kfree(xattr_data); + return rc; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h index 6b3b880637a0..f4b2a2056d1d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h @@ -46,4 +46,6 @@ int ima_eventbuf_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); int ima_eventmodsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); +int ima_eventevmsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, + struct ima_field_data *field_data); #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */ From ed1b472fc15aeaa20ddeeb93fd25190014e50d17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roberto Sassu Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 17:27:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 12/12] ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised Files might come from a remote source and might have xattrs, including security.ima. It should not be IMA task to decide whether security.ima should be kept or not. This patch removes the removexattr() system call in ima_inode_post_setattr(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index d9a627de3930..940695e7b535 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -532,8 +532,6 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, return; action = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR); - if (!action) - __vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA); iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (iint) { set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);