From 850bb481890fa830f17e9e38db792931e0b147e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiubo Li Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2024 13:14:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 01/56] ceph: switch to corrected encoding of max_xattr_size in mdsmap [ Upstream commit 51d31149a88b5c5a8d2d33f06df93f6187a25b4c ] The addition of bal_rank_mask with encoding version 17 was merged into ceph.git in Oct 2022 and made it into v18.2.0 release normally. A few months later, the much delayed addition of max_xattr_size got merged, also with encoding version 17, placed before bal_rank_mask in the encoding -- but it didn't make v18.2.0 release. The way this ended up being resolved on the MDS side is that bal_rank_mask will continue to be encoded in version 17 while max_xattr_size is now encoded in version 18. This does mean that older kernels will misdecode version 17, but this is also true for v18.2.0 and v18.2.1 clients in userspace. The best we can do is backport this adjustment -- see ceph.git commit 78abfeaff27fee343fb664db633de5b221699a73 for details. [ idryomov: changelog ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/64440 Fixes: d93231a6bc8a ("ceph: prevent a client from exceeding the MDS maximum xattr size") Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Patrick Donnelly Reviewed-by: Venky Shankar Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/ceph/mdsmap.c | 7 ++++--- include/linux/ceph/mdsmap.h | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c b/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c index 3fbabc98e1f7..4a089d70ebd0 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c @@ -379,10 +379,11 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap *ceph_mdsmap_decode(void **p, void *end, bool msgr2) ceph_decode_skip_8(p, end, bad_ext); /* required_client_features */ ceph_decode_skip_set(p, end, 64, bad_ext); + /* bal_rank_mask */ + ceph_decode_skip_string(p, end, bad_ext); + } + if (mdsmap_ev >= 18) { ceph_decode_64_safe(p, end, m->m_max_xattr_size, bad_ext); - } else { - /* This forces the usage of the (sync) SETXATTR Op */ - m->m_max_xattr_size = 0; } bad_ext: dout("mdsmap_decode m_enabled: %d, m_damaged: %d, m_num_laggy: %d\n", diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/mdsmap.h b/include/linux/ceph/mdsmap.h index 4c3e0648dc27..fcc95bff72a5 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/mdsmap.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/mdsmap.h @@ -25,7 +25,11 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap { u32 m_session_timeout; /* seconds */ u32 m_session_autoclose; /* seconds */ u64 m_max_file_size; - u64 m_max_xattr_size; /* maximum size for xattrs blob */ + /* + * maximum size for xattrs blob. + * Zeroed by default to force the usage of the (sync) SETXATTR Op. + */ + u64 m_max_xattr_size; u32 m_max_mds; /* expected up:active mds number */ u32 m_num_active_mds; /* actual up:active mds number */ u32 possible_max_rank; /* possible max rank index */ From ea2a1052f23c5c113be7e46444984d96d4bf2687 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleksij Rempel Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 13:45:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 02/56] net: lan78xx: fix runtime PM count underflow on link stop [ Upstream commit 1eecc7ab82c42133b748e1895275942a054a7f67 ] Current driver has some asymmetry in the runtime PM calls. On lan78xx_open() it will call usb_autopm_get() and unconditionally usb_autopm_put(). And on lan78xx_stop() it will call only usb_autopm_put(). So far, it was working only because this driver do not activate autosuspend by default, so it was visible only by warning "Runtime PM usage count underflow!". Since, with current driver, we can't use runtime PM with active link, execute lan78xx_open()->usb_autopm_put() only in error case. Otherwise, keep ref counting high as long as interface is open. Fixes: 55d7de9de6c3 ("Microchip's LAN7800 family USB 2/3 to 10/100/1000 Ethernet device driver") Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c index 4fd456381129..366e83ed0a97 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c @@ -3137,7 +3137,8 @@ static int lan78xx_open(struct net_device *net) done: mutex_unlock(&dev->dev_mutex); - usb_autopm_put_interface(dev->intf); + if (ret < 0) + usb_autopm_put_interface(dev->intf); return ret; } From 6632e19acbdcf16603fdd632fcf20f3126d390a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maciej Fijalkowski Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 22:45:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 03/56] ixgbe: {dis, en}able irqs in ixgbe_txrx_ring_{dis, en}able [ Upstream commit cbf996f52c4e658b3fb4349a869a62fd2d4c3c1c ] Currently routines that are supposed to toggle state of ring pair do not take care of associated interrupt with queue vector that these rings belong to. This causes funky issues such as dead interface due to irq misconfiguration, as per Pavel's report from Closes: tag. Add a function responsible for disabling single IRQ in EIMC register and call this as a very first thing when disabling ring pair during xsk_pool setup. For enable let's reuse ixgbe_irq_enable_queues(). Besides this, disable/enable NAPI as first/last thing when dealing with closing or opening ring pair that xsk_pool is being configured on. Reported-by: Pavel Vazharov Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAJEV1ijxNyPTwASJER1bcZzS9nMoZJqfR86nu_3jFFVXzZQ4NA@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: 024aa5800f32 ("ixgbe: added Rx/Tx ring disable/enable functions") Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout (A Contingent Worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c index 6dc554e810a1..086cc2573033 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c @@ -2947,8 +2947,8 @@ static void ixgbe_check_lsc(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter) static inline void ixgbe_irq_enable_queues(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, u64 qmask) { - u32 mask; struct ixgbe_hw *hw = &adapter->hw; + u32 mask; switch (hw->mac.type) { case ixgbe_mac_82598EB: @@ -10543,6 +10543,44 @@ static void ixgbe_reset_rxr_stats(struct ixgbe_ring *rx_ring) memset(&rx_ring->rx_stats, 0, sizeof(rx_ring->rx_stats)); } +/** + * ixgbe_irq_disable_single - Disable single IRQ vector + * @adapter: adapter structure + * @ring: ring index + **/ +static void ixgbe_irq_disable_single(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, u32 ring) +{ + struct ixgbe_hw *hw = &adapter->hw; + u64 qmask = BIT_ULL(ring); + u32 mask; + + switch (adapter->hw.mac.type) { + case ixgbe_mac_82598EB: + mask = qmask & IXGBE_EIMC_RTX_QUEUE; + IXGBE_WRITE_REG(&adapter->hw, IXGBE_EIMC, mask); + break; + case ixgbe_mac_82599EB: + case ixgbe_mac_X540: + case ixgbe_mac_X550: + case ixgbe_mac_X550EM_x: + case ixgbe_mac_x550em_a: + mask = (qmask & 0xFFFFFFFF); + if (mask) + IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_EIMS_EX(0), mask); + mask = (qmask >> 32); + if (mask) + IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_EIMS_EX(1), mask); + break; + default: + break; + } + IXGBE_WRITE_FLUSH(&adapter->hw); + if (adapter->flags & IXGBE_FLAG_MSIX_ENABLED) + synchronize_irq(adapter->msix_entries[ring].vector); + else + synchronize_irq(adapter->pdev->irq); +} + /** * ixgbe_txrx_ring_disable - Disable Rx/Tx/XDP Tx rings * @adapter: adapter structure @@ -10559,6 +10597,11 @@ void ixgbe_txrx_ring_disable(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, int ring) tx_ring = adapter->tx_ring[ring]; xdp_ring = adapter->xdp_ring[ring]; + ixgbe_irq_disable_single(adapter, ring); + + /* Rx/Tx/XDP Tx share the same napi context. */ + napi_disable(&rx_ring->q_vector->napi); + ixgbe_disable_txr(adapter, tx_ring); if (xdp_ring) ixgbe_disable_txr(adapter, xdp_ring); @@ -10567,9 +10610,6 @@ void ixgbe_txrx_ring_disable(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, int ring) if (xdp_ring) synchronize_rcu(); - /* Rx/Tx/XDP Tx share the same napi context. */ - napi_disable(&rx_ring->q_vector->napi); - ixgbe_clean_tx_ring(tx_ring); if (xdp_ring) ixgbe_clean_tx_ring(xdp_ring); @@ -10597,9 +10637,6 @@ void ixgbe_txrx_ring_enable(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, int ring) tx_ring = adapter->tx_ring[ring]; xdp_ring = adapter->xdp_ring[ring]; - /* Rx/Tx/XDP Tx share the same napi context. */ - napi_enable(&rx_ring->q_vector->napi); - ixgbe_configure_tx_ring(adapter, tx_ring); if (xdp_ring) ixgbe_configure_tx_ring(adapter, xdp_ring); @@ -10608,6 +10645,11 @@ void ixgbe_txrx_ring_enable(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, int ring) clear_bit(__IXGBE_TX_DISABLED, &tx_ring->state); if (xdp_ring) clear_bit(__IXGBE_TX_DISABLED, &xdp_ring->state); + + /* Rx/Tx/XDP Tx share the same napi context. */ + napi_enable(&rx_ring->q_vector->napi); + ixgbe_irq_enable_queues(adapter, BIT_ULL(ring)); + IXGBE_WRITE_FLUSH(&adapter->hw); } /** From 8e23edc54a5cb3d4ea881e424673c824255a3422 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maciej Fijalkowski Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 22:45:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 04/56] i40e: disable NAPI right after disabling irqs when handling xsk_pool [ Upstream commit d562b11c1eac7d73f4c778b4cbe5468f86b1f20d ] Disable NAPI before shutting down queues that this particular NAPI contains so that the order of actions in i40e_queue_pair_disable() mirrors what we do in i40e_queue_pair_enable(). Fixes: 123cecd427b6 ("i40e: added queue pair disable/enable functions") Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout (A Contingent Worker at Intel) Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c index 76455405a6d8..d8a7fb21b7b7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c @@ -13569,9 +13569,9 @@ int i40e_queue_pair_disable(struct i40e_vsi *vsi, int queue_pair) return err; i40e_queue_pair_disable_irq(vsi, queue_pair); + i40e_queue_pair_toggle_napi(vsi, queue_pair, false /* off */); err = i40e_queue_pair_toggle_rings(vsi, queue_pair, false /* off */); i40e_clean_rx_ring(vsi->rx_rings[queue_pair]); - i40e_queue_pair_toggle_napi(vsi, queue_pair, false /* off */); i40e_queue_pair_clean_rings(vsi, queue_pair); i40e_queue_pair_reset_stats(vsi, queue_pair); From 5822c02707dac0a995437ef27ba1c441aaca0e1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maciej Fijalkowski Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 22:45:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 05/56] ice: reorder disabling IRQ and NAPI in ice_qp_dis [ Upstream commit 99099c6bc75a30b76bb5d6774a0509ab6f06af05 ] ice_qp_dis() currently does things in very mixed way. Tx is stopped before disabling IRQ on related queue vector, then it takes care of disabling Rx and finally NAPI is disabled. Let us start with disabling IRQs in the first place followed by turning off NAPI. Then it is safe to handle queues. One subtle change on top of that is that even though ice_qp_ena() looks more sane, clear ICE_CFG_BUSY as the last thing there. Fixes: 2d4238f55697 ("ice: Add support for AF_XDP") Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout (A Contingent Worker at Intel) Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c index 41ee081eb887..48cf24709fe3 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c @@ -171,6 +171,10 @@ static int ice_qp_dis(struct ice_vsi *vsi, u16 q_idx) return -EBUSY; usleep_range(1000, 2000); } + + ice_qvec_dis_irq(vsi, rx_ring, q_vector); + ice_qvec_toggle_napi(vsi, q_vector, false); + netif_tx_stop_queue(netdev_get_tx_queue(vsi->netdev, q_idx)); ice_fill_txq_meta(vsi, tx_ring, &txq_meta); @@ -187,13 +191,10 @@ static int ice_qp_dis(struct ice_vsi *vsi, u16 q_idx) if (err) return err; } - ice_qvec_dis_irq(vsi, rx_ring, q_vector); - err = ice_vsi_ctrl_one_rx_ring(vsi, false, q_idx, true); if (err) return err; - ice_qvec_toggle_napi(vsi, q_vector, false); ice_qp_clean_rings(vsi, q_idx); ice_qp_reset_stats(vsi, q_idx); @@ -256,11 +257,11 @@ static int ice_qp_ena(struct ice_vsi *vsi, u16 q_idx) if (err) goto free_buf; - clear_bit(ICE_CFG_BUSY, vsi->state); ice_qvec_toggle_napi(vsi, q_vector, true); ice_qvec_ena_irq(vsi, q_vector); netif_tx_start_queue(netdev_get_tx_queue(vsi->netdev, q_idx)); + clear_bit(ICE_CFG_BUSY, vsi->state); free_buf: kfree(qg_buf); return err; From 44faf8a48294fcb8c93daa7840249c2c4cd6e68e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" Date: Thu, 29 Feb 2024 14:34:44 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 06/56] tracing/net_sched: Fix tracepoints that save qdisc_dev() as a string MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 51270d573a8d9dd5afdc7934de97d66c0e14b5fd ] I'm updating __assign_str() and will be removing the second parameter. To make sure that it does not break anything, I make sure that it matches the __string() field, as that is where the string is actually going to be saved in. To make sure there's nothing that breaks, I added a WARN_ON() to make sure that what was used in __string() is the same that is used in __assign_str(). In doing this change, an error was triggered as __assign_str() now expects the string passed in to be a char * value. I instead had the following warning: include/trace/events/qdisc.h: In function ‘trace_event_raw_event_qdisc_reset’: include/trace/events/qdisc.h:91:35: error: passing argument 1 of 'strcmp' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types] 91 | __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q)); That's because the qdisc_enqueue() and qdisc_reset() pass in qdisc_dev(q) to __assign_str() and to __string(). But that function returns a pointer to struct net_device and not a string. It appears that these events are just saving the pointer as a string and then reading it as a string as well. Use qdisc_dev(q)->name to save the device instead. Fixes: a34dac0b90552 ("net_sched: add tracepoints for qdisc_reset() and qdisc_destroy()") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/trace/events/qdisc.h | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/trace/events/qdisc.h b/include/trace/events/qdisc.h index a3995925cb05..1f4258308b96 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/qdisc.h +++ b/include/trace/events/qdisc.h @@ -81,14 +81,14 @@ TRACE_EVENT(qdisc_reset, TP_ARGS(q), TP_STRUCT__entry( - __string( dev, qdisc_dev(q) ) - __string( kind, q->ops->id ) - __field( u32, parent ) - __field( u32, handle ) + __string( dev, qdisc_dev(q)->name ) + __string( kind, q->ops->id ) + __field( u32, parent ) + __field( u32, handle ) ), TP_fast_assign( - __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q)); + __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q)->name); __assign_str(kind, q->ops->id); __entry->parent = q->parent; __entry->handle = q->handle; @@ -106,14 +106,14 @@ TRACE_EVENT(qdisc_destroy, TP_ARGS(q), TP_STRUCT__entry( - __string( dev, qdisc_dev(q) ) - __string( kind, q->ops->id ) - __field( u32, parent ) - __field( u32, handle ) + __string( dev, qdisc_dev(q)->name ) + __string( kind, q->ops->id ) + __field( u32, parent ) + __field( u32, handle ) ), TP_fast_assign( - __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q)); + __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q)->name); __assign_str(kind, q->ops->id); __entry->parent = q->parent; __entry->handle = q->handle; From c0b22568a9d8384fd000cc49acb8f74bde40d1b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 29 Feb 2024 13:11:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 07/56] geneve: make sure to pull inner header in geneve_rx() [ Upstream commit 1ca1ba465e55b9460e4e75dec9fff31e708fec74 ] syzbot triggered a bug in geneve_rx() [1] Issue is similar to the one I fixed in commit 8d975c15c0cd ("ip6_tunnel: make sure to pull inner header in __ip6_tnl_rcv()") We have to save skb->network_header in a temporary variable in order to be able to recompute the network_header pointer after a pskb_inet_may_pull() call. pskb_inet_may_pull() makes sure the needed headers are in skb->head. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:302 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_rx drivers/net/geneve.c:279 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_udp_encap_recv+0x36f9/0x3c10 drivers/net/geneve.c:391 IP_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:302 [inline] geneve_rx drivers/net/geneve.c:279 [inline] geneve_udp_encap_recv+0x36f9/0x3c10 drivers/net/geneve.c:391 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x1d39/0x1f20 net/ipv4/udp.c:2108 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x6ae/0x6e0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2186 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x184/0x4b0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2346 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x1c6b/0x3010 net/ipv4/udp.c:2422 udp_rcv+0x7d/0xa0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2604 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x264/0x1300 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2b8/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x21f/0x490 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254 dst_input include/net/dst.h:461 [inline] ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] ip_rcv+0x46f/0x760 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5534 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5648 process_backlog+0x480/0x8b0 net/core/dev.c:5976 __napi_poll+0xe3/0x980 net/core/dev.c:6576 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6645 [inline] net_rx_action+0x8b8/0x1870 net/core/dev.c:6778 __do_softirq+0x1b7/0x7c5 kernel/softirq.c:553 do_softirq+0x9a/0xf0 kernel/softirq.c:454 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x9b/0xa0 kernel/softirq.c:381 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline] rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:820 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x2768/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4378 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3819 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5cb/0xbc0 mm/slub.c:3903 kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:560 __alloc_skb+0x352/0x790 net/core/skbuff.c:651 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1296 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbd0 net/core/skbuff.c:6394 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa80/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2783 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2930 [inline] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3024 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x70c2/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Fixes: 2d07dc79fe04 ("geneve: add initial netdev driver for GENEVE tunnels") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6a1423ff3f97159aae64@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/geneve.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/geneve.c b/drivers/net/geneve.c index f393e454f45c..3f8da6f0b25c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/geneve.c +++ b/drivers/net/geneve.c @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static void geneve_rx(struct geneve_dev *geneve, struct geneve_sock *gs, struct genevehdr *gnvh = geneve_hdr(skb); struct metadata_dst *tun_dst = NULL; unsigned int len; - int err = 0; + int nh, err = 0; void *oiph; if (ip_tunnel_collect_metadata() || gs->collect_md) { @@ -272,9 +272,23 @@ static void geneve_rx(struct geneve_dev *geneve, struct geneve_sock *gs, skb->pkt_type = PACKET_HOST; } - oiph = skb_network_header(skb); + /* Save offset of outer header relative to skb->head, + * because we are going to reset the network header to the inner header + * and might change skb->head. + */ + nh = skb_network_header(skb) - skb->head; + skb_reset_network_header(skb); + if (!pskb_inet_may_pull(skb)) { + DEV_STATS_INC(geneve->dev, rx_length_errors); + DEV_STATS_INC(geneve->dev, rx_errors); + goto drop; + } + + /* Get the outer header. */ + oiph = skb->head + nh; + if (geneve_get_sk_family(gs) == AF_INET) err = IP_ECN_decapsulate(oiph, skb); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) From 0de693d68b0a18d5e256556c7c62d92cca35ad52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Horatiu Vultur Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2024 09:06:08 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 08/56] net: sparx5: Fix use after free inside sparx5_del_mact_entry [ Upstream commit 89d72d4125e94aa3c2140fedd97ce07ba9e37674 ] Based on the static analyzis of the code it looks like when an entry from the MAC table was removed, the entry was still used after being freed. More precise the vid of the mac_entry was used after calling devm_kfree on the mac_entry. The fix consists in first using the vid of the mac_entry to delete the entry from the HW and after that to free it. Fixes: b37a1bae742f ("net: sparx5: add mactable support") Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240301080608.3053468-1-horatiu.vultur@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c index 4af285918ea2..75868b3f548e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c @@ -347,10 +347,10 @@ int sparx5_del_mact_entry(struct sparx5 *sparx5, list) { if ((vid == 0 || mact_entry->vid == vid) && ether_addr_equal(addr, mact_entry->mac)) { + sparx5_mact_forget(sparx5, addr, mact_entry->vid); + list_del(&mact_entry->list); devm_kfree(sparx5->dev, mact_entry); - - sparx5_mact_forget(sparx5, addr, mact_entry->vid); } } mutex_unlock(&sparx5->mact_lock); From 6293ff942e9ce72ae9fced8c277f078e97843dd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jacob Keller Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 13:51:58 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 09/56] ice: virtchnl: stop pretending to support RSS over AQ or registers [ Upstream commit 2652b99e43403dc464f3648483ffb38e48872fe4 ] The E800 series hardware uses the same iAVF driver as older devices, including the virtchnl negotiation scheme. This negotiation scheme includes a mechanism to determine what type of RSS should be supported, including RSS over PF virtchnl messages, RSS over firmware AdminQ messages, and RSS via direct register access. The PF driver will always prefer VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_PF if its supported by the VF driver. However, if an older VF driver is loaded, it may request only VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_REG or VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_AQ. The ice driver happily agrees to support these methods. Unfortunately, the underlying hardware does not support these mechanisms. The E800 series VFs don't have the appropriate registers for RSS_REG. The mailbox queue used by VFs for VF to PF communication blocks messages which do not have the VF-to-PF opcode. Stop lying to the VF that it could support RSS over AdminQ or registers, as these interfaces do not work when the hardware is operating on an E800 series device. In practice this is unlikely to be hit by any normal user. The iAVF driver has supported RSS over PF virtchnl commands since 2016, and always defaults to using RSS_PF if possible. In principle, nothing actually stops the existing VF from attempting to access the registers or send an AQ command. However a properly coded VF will check the capability flags and will report a more useful error if it detects a case where the driver does not support the RSS offloads that it does. Fixes: 1071a8358a28 ("ice: Implement virtchnl commands for AVF support") Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller Reviewed-by: Alan Brady Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c | 9 +-------- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c | 2 -- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c index 6c03ebf81ffd..4b71392f60df 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c @@ -440,7 +440,6 @@ static int ice_vc_get_vf_res_msg(struct ice_vf *vf, u8 *msg) vf->driver_caps = *(u32 *)msg; else vf->driver_caps = VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_L2 | - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_REG | VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_VLAN; vfres->vf_cap_flags = VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_L2; @@ -453,14 +452,8 @@ static int ice_vc_get_vf_res_msg(struct ice_vf *vf, u8 *msg) vfres->vf_cap_flags |= ice_vc_get_vlan_caps(hw, vf, vsi, vf->driver_caps); - if (vf->driver_caps & VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_PF) { + if (vf->driver_caps & VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_PF) vfres->vf_cap_flags |= VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_PF; - } else { - if (vf->driver_caps & VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_AQ) - vfres->vf_cap_flags |= VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_AQ; - else - vfres->vf_cap_flags |= VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_REG; - } if (vf->driver_caps & VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_FDIR_PF) vfres->vf_cap_flags |= VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_FDIR_PF; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c index 5a82216e7d03..63e83e8b97e5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c @@ -13,8 +13,6 @@ * - opcodes needed by VF when caps are activated * * Caps that don't use new opcodes (no opcodes should be allowed): - * - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_AQ - * - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_REG * - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_WB_ON_ITR * - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_CRC * - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RX_POLLING From afdd29726a6de4ba27cd15590661424c888dc596 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rand Deeb Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 18:54:48 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 10/56] net: ice: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference in ice_bridge_setlink() [ Upstream commit 06e456a05d669ca30b224b8ed962421770c1496c ] The function ice_bridge_setlink() may encounter a NULL pointer dereference if nlmsg_find_attr() returns NULL and br_spec is dereferenced subsequently in nla_for_each_nested(). To address this issue, add a check to ensure that br_spec is not NULL before proceeding with the nested attribute iteration. Fixes: b1edc14a3fbf ("ice: Implement ice_bridge_getlink and ice_bridge_setlink") Signed-off-by: Rand Deeb Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c index ab46cfca4028..3117f65253b3 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c @@ -7681,6 +7681,8 @@ ice_bridge_setlink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, pf_sw = pf->first_sw; /* find the attribute in the netlink message */ br_spec = nlmsg_find_attr(nlh, sizeof(struct ifinfomsg), IFLA_AF_SPEC); + if (!br_spec) + return -EINVAL; nla_for_each_nested(attr, br_spec, rem) { __u16 mode; From 63a3c1f3c9ecc654d851e7906d05334cd0c236e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Kauer Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2024 10:08:43 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 11/56] igc: avoid returning frame twice in XDP_REDIRECT [ Upstream commit ef27f655b438bed4c83680e4f01e1cde2739854b ] When a frame can not be transmitted in XDP_REDIRECT (e.g. due to a full queue), it is necessary to free it by calling xdp_return_frame_rx_napi. However, this is the responsibility of the caller of the ndo_xdp_xmit (see for example bq_xmit_all in kernel/bpf/devmap.c) and thus calling it inside igc_xdp_xmit (which is the ndo_xdp_xmit of the igc driver) as well will lead to memory corruption. In fact, bq_xmit_all expects that it can return all frames after the last successfully transmitted one. Therefore, break for the first not transmitted frame, but do not call xdp_return_frame_rx_napi in igc_xdp_xmit. This is equally implemented in other Intel drivers such as the igb. There are two alternatives to this that were rejected: 1. Return num_frames as all the frames would have been transmitted and release them inside igc_xdp_xmit. While it might work technically, it is not what the return value is meant to represent (i.e. the number of SUCCESSFULLY transmitted packets). 2. Rework kernel/bpf/devmap.c and all drivers to support non-consecutively dropped packets. Besides being complex, it likely has a negative performance impact without a significant gain since it is anyway unlikely that the next frame can be transmitted if the previous one was dropped. The memory corruption can be reproduced with the following script which leads to a kernel panic after a few seconds. It basically generates more traffic than a i225 NIC can transmit and pushes it via XDP_REDIRECT from a virtual interface to the physical interface where frames get dropped. #!/bin/bash INTERFACE=enp4s0 INTERFACE_IDX=`cat /sys/class/net/$INTERFACE/ifindex` sudo ip link add dev veth1 type veth peer name veth2 sudo ip link set up $INTERFACE sudo ip link set up veth1 sudo ip link set up veth2 cat << EOF > redirect.bpf.c SEC("prog") int redirect(struct xdp_md *ctx) { return bpf_redirect($INTERFACE_IDX, 0); } char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; EOF clang -O2 -g -Wall -target bpf -c redirect.bpf.c -o redirect.bpf.o sudo ip link set veth2 xdp obj redirect.bpf.o cat << EOF > pass.bpf.c SEC("prog") int pass(struct xdp_md *ctx) { return XDP_PASS; } char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; EOF clang -O2 -g -Wall -target bpf -c pass.bpf.c -o pass.bpf.o sudo ip link set $INTERFACE xdp obj pass.bpf.o cat << EOF > trafgen.cfg { /* Ethernet Header */ 0xe8, 0x6a, 0x64, 0x41, 0xbf, 0x46, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, const16(ETH_P_IP), /* IPv4 Header */ 0b01000101, 0, # IPv4 version, IHL, TOS const16(1028), # IPv4 total length (UDP length + 20 bytes (IP header)) const16(2), # IPv4 ident 0b01000000, 0, # IPv4 flags, fragmentation off 64, # IPv4 TTL 17, # Protocol UDP csumip(14, 33), # IPv4 checksum /* UDP Header */ 10, 0, 1, 1, # IP Src - adapt as needed 10, 0, 1, 2, # IP Dest - adapt as needed const16(6666), # UDP Src Port const16(6666), # UDP Dest Port const16(1008), # UDP length (UDP header 8 bytes + payload length) csumudp(14, 34), # UDP checksum /* Payload */ fill('W', 1000), } EOF sudo trafgen -i trafgen.cfg -b3000MB -o veth1 --cpp Fixes: 4ff320361092 ("igc: Add support for XDP_REDIRECT action") Signed-off-by: Florian Kauer Reviewed-by: Maciej Fijalkowski Tested-by: Naama Meir Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c index 4b6f882b380d..e052f49cc08d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c @@ -6330,7 +6330,7 @@ static int igc_xdp_xmit(struct net_device *dev, int num_frames, int cpu = smp_processor_id(); struct netdev_queue *nq; struct igc_ring *ring; - int i, drops; + int i, nxmit; if (unlikely(!netif_carrier_ok(dev))) return -ENETDOWN; @@ -6346,16 +6346,15 @@ static int igc_xdp_xmit(struct net_device *dev, int num_frames, /* Avoid transmit queue timeout since we share it with the slow path */ txq_trans_cond_update(nq); - drops = 0; + nxmit = 0; for (i = 0; i < num_frames; i++) { int err; struct xdp_frame *xdpf = frames[i]; err = igc_xdp_init_tx_descriptor(ring, xdpf); - if (err) { - xdp_return_frame_rx_napi(xdpf); - drops++; - } + if (err) + break; + nxmit++; } if (flags & XDP_XMIT_FLUSH) @@ -6363,7 +6362,7 @@ static int igc_xdp_xmit(struct net_device *dev, int num_frames, __netif_tx_unlock(nq); - return num_frames - drops; + return nxmit; } static void igc_trigger_rxtxq_interrupt(struct igc_adapter *adapter, From 394334fe2ae3b9f1e2332b873857e84cb28aac18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Sun, 3 Mar 2024 14:48:00 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 12/56] net/ipv6: avoid possible UAF in ip6_route_mpath_notify() [ Upstream commit 685f7d531264599b3f167f1e94bbd22f120e5fab ] syzbot found another use-after-free in ip6_route_mpath_notify() [1] Commit f7225172f25a ("net/ipv6: prevent use after free in ip6_route_mpath_notify") was not able to fix the root cause. We need to defer the fib6_info_release() calls after ip6_route_mpath_notify(), in the cleanup phase. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt6_fill_node+0x1460/0x1ac0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88809a07fc64 by task syz-executor.2/23037 CPU: 0 PID: 23037 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-01035-gea7f3cfaa588 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2e0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x167/0x540 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x142/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 rt6_fill_node+0x1460/0x1ac0 inet6_rt_notify+0x13b/0x290 net/ipv6/route.c:6184 ip6_route_mpath_notify net/ipv6/route.c:5198 [inline] ip6_route_multipath_add net/ipv6/route.c:5404 [inline] inet6_rtm_newroute+0x1d0f/0x2300 net/ipv6/route.c:5517 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x885/0x1040 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6597 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367 netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 RIP: 0033:0x7f73dd87dda9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f73de6550c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f73dd9ac050 RCX: 00007f73dd87dda9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f73dd8ca47a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007f73dd9ac050 R15: 00007ffdbdeb7858 Allocated by task 23037: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:372 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:389 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3981 [inline] __kmalloc+0x22e/0x490 mm/slub.c:3994 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:594 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:711 [inline] fib6_info_alloc+0x2e/0xf0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:155 ip6_route_info_create+0x445/0x12b0 net/ipv6/route.c:3758 ip6_route_multipath_add net/ipv6/route.c:5298 [inline] inet6_rtm_newroute+0x744/0x2300 net/ipv6/route.c:5517 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x885/0x1040 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6597 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367 netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 Freed by task 16: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x4e/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:640 poison_slab_object+0xa6/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:241 __kasan_slab_free+0x34/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:257 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4299 [inline] kfree+0x14a/0x380 mm/slub.c:4409 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2190 [inline] rcu_core+0xd76/0x1810 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2465 __do_softirq+0x2bb/0x942 kernel/softirq.c:553 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3f/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xae/0x100 mm/kasan/generic.c:586 __call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:2715 [inline] call_rcu+0x167/0xa80 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2829 fib6_info_release include/net/ip6_fib.h:341 [inline] ip6_route_multipath_add net/ipv6/route.c:5344 [inline] inet6_rtm_newroute+0x114d/0x2300 net/ipv6/route.c:5517 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x885/0x1040 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6597 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367 netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88809a07fc00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 The buggy address is located 100 bytes inside of freed 512-byte region [ffff88809a07fc00, ffff88809a07fe00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0002681f00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9a07c head:ffffea0002681f00 order:2 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0xfff00000000840(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 00fff00000000840 ffff888014c41c80 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x1d20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL), pid 23028, tgid 23027 (syz-executor.4), ts 2340253595219, free_ts 2339107097036 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1ea/0x210 mm/page_alloc.c:1533 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1540 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x33ea/0x3580 mm/page_alloc.c:3311 __alloc_pages+0x255/0x680 mm/page_alloc.c:4567 __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline] alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline] alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x160 mm/slub.c:2190 allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2354 [inline] new_slab+0x84/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2407 ___slab_alloc+0xd17/0x13e0 mm/slub.c:3540 __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3625 [inline] __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3678 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3850 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline] __kmalloc+0x2e0/0x490 mm/slub.c:3994 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:594 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:711 [inline] new_dir fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:956 [inline] get_subdir fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1000 [inline] sysctl_mkdir_p fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1295 [inline] __register_sysctl_table+0xb30/0x1440 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1376 neigh_sysctl_register+0x416/0x500 net/core/neighbour.c:3859 devinet_sysctl_register+0xaf/0x1f0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:2644 inetdev_init+0x296/0x4d0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:286 inetdev_event+0x338/0x15c0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1555 notifier_call_chain+0x18f/0x3b0 kernel/notifier.c:93 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1987 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2001 [inline] register_netdevice+0x15b2/0x1a20 net/core/dev.c:10340 br_dev_newlink+0x27/0x100 net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1563 rtnl_newlink_create net/core/rtnetlink.c:3497 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3717 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x158f/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3730 page last free pid 11583 tgid 11583 stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1140 [inline] free_unref_page_prepare+0x968/0xa90 mm/page_alloc.c:2346 free_unref_page+0x37/0x3f0 mm/page_alloc.c:2486 kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte+0x74/0x90 mm/kasan/shadow.c:415 apply_to_pte_range mm/memory.c:2619 [inline] apply_to_pmd_range mm/memory.c:2663 [inline] apply_to_pud_range mm/memory.c:2699 [inline] apply_to_p4d_range mm/memory.c:2735 [inline] __apply_to_page_range+0x8ec/0xe40 mm/memory.c:2769 kasan_release_vmalloc+0x9a/0xb0 mm/kasan/shadow.c:532 __purge_vmap_area_lazy+0x163f/0x1a10 mm/vmalloc.c:1770 drain_vmap_area_work+0x40/0xd0 mm/vmalloc.c:1804 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x913/0x1420 kernel/workqueue.c:2706 worker_thread+0xa5f/0x1000 kernel/workqueue.c:2787 kthread+0x2ef/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88809a07fb00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88809a07fb80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88809a07fc00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88809a07fc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88809a07fd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: 3b1137fe7482 ("net: ipv6: Change notifications for multipath add to RTA_MULTIPATH") Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: David Ahern Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240303144801.702646-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv6/route.c | 21 +++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index 7f65dc750feb..887599d351b8 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -5335,19 +5335,7 @@ static int ip6_route_multipath_add(struct fib6_config *cfg, err_nh = NULL; list_for_each_entry(nh, &rt6_nh_list, next) { err = __ip6_ins_rt(nh->fib6_info, info, extack); - fib6_info_release(nh->fib6_info); - if (!err) { - /* save reference to last route successfully inserted */ - rt_last = nh->fib6_info; - - /* save reference to first route for notification */ - if (!rt_notif) - rt_notif = nh->fib6_info; - } - - /* nh->fib6_info is used or freed at this point, reset to NULL*/ - nh->fib6_info = NULL; if (err) { if (replace && nhn) NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, @@ -5355,6 +5343,12 @@ static int ip6_route_multipath_add(struct fib6_config *cfg, err_nh = nh; goto add_errout; } + /* save reference to last route successfully inserted */ + rt_last = nh->fib6_info; + + /* save reference to first route for notification */ + if (!rt_notif) + rt_notif = nh->fib6_info; /* Because each route is added like a single route we remove * these flags after the first nexthop: if there is a collision, @@ -5415,8 +5409,7 @@ add_errout: cleanup: list_for_each_entry_safe(nh, nh_safe, &rt6_nh_list, next) { - if (nh->fib6_info) - fib6_info_release(nh->fib6_info); + fib6_info_release(nh->fib6_info); list_del(&nh->next); kfree(nh); } From 3420b3ff1ff489c177ea1cb7bd9fbbc4e9a0be95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Toke=20H=C3=B8iland-J=C3=B8rgensen?= Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 22:31:32 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 13/56] cpumap: Zero-initialise xdp_rxq_info struct before running XDP program MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 2487007aa3b9fafbd2cb14068f49791ce1d7ede5 ] When running an XDP program that is attached to a cpumap entry, we don't initialise the xdp_rxq_info data structure being used in the xdp_buff that backs the XDP program invocation. Tobias noticed that this leads to random values being returned as the xdp_md->rx_queue_index value for XDP programs running in a cpumap. This means we're basically returning the contents of the uninitialised memory, which is bad. Fix this by zero-initialising the rxq data structure before running the XDP program. Fixes: 9216477449f3 ("bpf: cpumap: Add the possibility to attach an eBPF program to cpumap") Reported-by: Tobias Böhm Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240305213132.11955-1-toke@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/bpf/cpumap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c index 08a8e8102728..050893704813 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static int cpu_map_bpf_prog_run_xdp(struct bpf_cpu_map_entry *rcpu, void **frames, int n, struct xdp_cpumap_stats *stats) { - struct xdp_rxq_info rxq; + struct xdp_rxq_info rxq = {}; struct xdp_buff xdp; int i, nframes = 0; From 7faff12e828d9c643028259c0f7a2b411cd96607 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Tobias Jakobi (Compleo)" Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 16:41:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 14/56] net: dsa: microchip: fix register write order in ksz8_ind_write8() [ Upstream commit b7fb7729c94fb2d23c79ff44f7a2da089c92d81c ] This bug was noticed while re-implementing parts of the kernel driver in userspace using spidev. The goal was to enable some of the errata workarounds that Microchip describes in their errata sheet [1]. Both the errata sheet and the regular datasheet of e.g. the KSZ8795 imply that you need to do this for indirect register accesses: - write a 16-bit value to a control register pair (this value consists of the indirect register table, and the offset inside the table) - either read or write an 8-bit value from the data storage register (indicated by REG_IND_BYTE in the kernel) The current implementation has the order swapped. It can be proven, by reading back some indirect register with known content (the EEE register modified in ksz8_handle_global_errata() is one of these), that this implementation does not work. Private discussion with Oleksij Rempel of Pengutronix has revealed that the workaround was apparantly never tested on actual hardware. [1] https://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/aemDocuments/documents/OTH/ProductDocuments/Errata/KSZ87xx-Errata-DS80000687C.pdf Signed-off-by: Tobias Jakobi (Compleo) Reviewed-by: Oleksij Rempel Fixes: 7b6e6235b664 ("net: dsa: microchip: ksz8795: handle eee specif erratum") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240304154135.161332-1-tobias.jakobi.compleo@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz8795.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz8795.c b/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz8795.c index c63e082dc57d..934600eccbaf 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz8795.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz8795.c @@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ static int ksz8_ind_write8(struct ksz_device *dev, u8 table, u16 addr, u8 data) mutex_lock(&dev->alu_mutex); ctrl_addr = IND_ACC_TABLE(table) | addr; - ret = ksz_write8(dev, regs[REG_IND_BYTE], data); + ret = ksz_write16(dev, regs[REG_IND_CTRL_0], ctrl_addr); if (!ret) - ret = ksz_write16(dev, regs[REG_IND_CTRL_0], ctrl_addr); + ret = ksz_write8(dev, regs[REG_IND_BYTE], data); mutex_unlock(&dev->alu_mutex); From 998fd719e6d6468b930ac0c44552ea9ff8b07b80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Edward Adam Davis Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 08:13:08 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 15/56] net/rds: fix WARNING in rds_conn_connect_if_down [ Upstream commit c055fc00c07be1f0df7375ab0036cebd1106ed38 ] If connection isn't established yet, get_mr() will fail, trigger connection after get_mr(). Fixes: 584a8279a44a ("RDS: RDMA: return appropriate error on rdma map failures") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+d4faee732755bba9838e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/rds/rdma.c | 3 +++ net/rds/send.c | 6 +----- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/rds/rdma.c b/net/rds/rdma.c index fba82d36593a..a4e3c5de998b 100644 --- a/net/rds/rdma.c +++ b/net/rds/rdma.c @@ -301,6 +301,9 @@ static int __rds_rdma_map(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_get_mr_args *args, kfree(sg); } ret = PTR_ERR(trans_private); + /* Trigger connection so that its ready for the next retry */ + if (ret == -ENODEV) + rds_conn_connect_if_down(cp->cp_conn); goto out; } diff --git a/net/rds/send.c b/net/rds/send.c index 0c5504068e3c..a4ba45c430d8 100644 --- a/net/rds/send.c +++ b/net/rds/send.c @@ -1314,12 +1314,8 @@ int rds_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t payload_len) /* Parse any control messages the user may have included. */ ret = rds_cmsg_send(rs, rm, msg, &allocated_mr, &vct); - if (ret) { - /* Trigger connection so that its ready for the next retry */ - if (ret == -EAGAIN) - rds_conn_connect_if_down(conn); + if (ret) goto out; - } if (rm->rdma.op_active && !conn->c_trans->xmit_rdma) { printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE "rdma_op %p conn xmit_rdma %p\n", From bce83144ba7ec7dd231c13aa065bc6900efe34f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2024 13:38:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 16/56] netfilter: nft_ct: fix l3num expectations with inet pseudo family [ Upstream commit 99993789966a6eb4f1295193dc543686899892d3 ] Following is rejected but should be allowed: table inet t { ct expectation exp1 { [..] l3proto ip Valid combos are: table ip t, l3proto ip table ip6 t, l3proto ip6 table inet t, l3proto ip OR l3proto ip6 Disallow inet pseudeo family, the l3num must be a on-wire protocol known to conntrack. Retain NFPROTO_INET case to make it clear its rejected intentionally rather as oversight. Fixes: 8059918a1377 ("netfilter: nft_ct: sanitize layer 3 and 4 protocol number in custom expectations") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 11 +++++------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c index 8df7564f0611..2bfe3cdfbd58 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c @@ -1237,14 +1237,13 @@ static int nft_ct_expect_obj_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, switch (priv->l3num) { case NFPROTO_IPV4: case NFPROTO_IPV6: - if (priv->l3num != ctx->family) - return -EINVAL; + if (priv->l3num == ctx->family || ctx->family == NFPROTO_INET) + break; - fallthrough; - case NFPROTO_INET: - break; + return -EINVAL; + case NFPROTO_INET: /* tuple.src.l3num supports NFPROTO_IPV4/6 only */ default: - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return -EAFNOSUPPORT; } priv->l4proto = nla_get_u8(tb[NFTA_CT_EXPECT_L4PROTO]); From 39001e3c42000e7c2038717af0d33c32319ad591 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lena Wang Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 11:38:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 17/56] netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: Add protection for bmp length out of range [ Upstream commit 767146637efc528b5e3d31297df115e85a2fd362 ] UBSAN load reports an exception of BRK#5515 SHIFT_ISSUE:Bitwise shifts that are out of bounds for their data type. vmlinux get_bitmap(b=75) + 712 vmlinux decode_seq(bs=0xFFFFFFD008037000, f=0xFFFFFFD008037018, level=134443100) + 1956 vmlinux decode_choice(base=0xFFFFFFD0080370F0, level=23843636) + 1216 vmlinux decode_seq(f=0xFFFFFFD0080371A8, level=134443500) + 812 vmlinux decode_choice(base=0xFFFFFFD008037280, level=0) + 1216 vmlinux DecodeRasMessage() + 304 vmlinux ras_help() + 684 vmlinux nf_confirm() + 188 Due to abnormal data in skb->data, the extension bitmap length exceeds 32 when decoding ras message then uses the length to make a shift operation. It will change into negative after several loop. UBSAN load could detect a negative shift as an undefined behaviour and reports exception. So we add the protection to avoid the length exceeding 32. Or else it will return out of range error and stop decoding. Fixes: 5e35941d9901 ("[NETFILTER]: Add H.323 conntrack/NAT helper") Signed-off-by: Lena Wang Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c index e697a824b001..540d97715bd2 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c @@ -533,6 +533,8 @@ static int decode_seq(struct bitstr *bs, const struct field_t *f, /* Get fields bitmap */ if (nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, 0, f->sz)) return H323_ERROR_BOUND; + if (f->sz > 32) + return H323_ERROR_RANGE; bmp = get_bitmap(bs, f->sz); if (base) *(unsigned int *)base = bmp; @@ -589,6 +591,8 @@ static int decode_seq(struct bitstr *bs, const struct field_t *f, bmp2_len = get_bits(bs, 7) + 1; if (nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, 0, bmp2_len)) return H323_ERROR_BOUND; + if (bmp2_len > 32) + return H323_ERROR_RANGE; bmp2 = get_bitmap(bs, bmp2_len); bmp |= bmp2 >> f->sz; if (base) From 6e49f3ac43e293f86dc0c630de2354a73eec914e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gao Xiang Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 13:31:38 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 18/56] erofs: apply proper VMA alignment for memory mapped files on THP [ Upstream commit 4127caee89612a84adedd78c9453089138cd5afe ] There are mainly two reasons that thp_get_unmapped_area() should be used for EROFS as other filesystems: - It's needed to enable PMD mappings as a FSDAX filesystem, see commit 74d2fad1334d ("thp, dax: add thp_get_unmapped_area for pmd mappings"); - It's useful together with large folios and CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS which enable THPs for mmapped files (e.g. shared libraries) even without FSDAX. See commit 1854bc6e2420 ("mm/readahead: Align file mappings for non-DAX"). Fixes: 06252e9ce05b ("erofs: dax support for non-tailpacking regular file") Fixes: ce529cc25b18 ("erofs: enable large folios for iomap mode") Fixes: e6687b89225e ("erofs: enable large folios for fscache mode") Reviewed-by: Jingbo Xu Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240306053138.2240206-1-hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/erofs/data.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/erofs/data.c b/fs/erofs/data.c index b32801d716f8..9d20e5d23ae0 100644 --- a/fs/erofs/data.c +++ b/fs/erofs/data.c @@ -440,4 +440,5 @@ const struct file_operations erofs_file_fops = { .read_iter = erofs_file_read_iter, .mmap = erofs_file_mmap, .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read, + .get_unmapped_area = thp_get_unmapped_area, }; From dec82a8fc45c6ce494c2cb31f001a2aadb132b57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Xing Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 16:20:35 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 19/56] netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_default_path_quality [ Upstream commit 958d6145a6d9ba9e075c921aead8753fb91c9101 ] We need to protect the reader reading sysctl_netrom_default_path_quality because the value can be changed concurrently. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netrom/nr_route.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c index baea3cbd76ca..6f709fdffc11 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static int __must_check nr_add_node(ax25_address *nr, const char *mnemonic, nr_neigh->digipeat = NULL; nr_neigh->ax25 = NULL; nr_neigh->dev = dev; - nr_neigh->quality = sysctl_netrom_default_path_quality; + nr_neigh->quality = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_default_path_quality); nr_neigh->locked = 0; nr_neigh->count = 0; nr_neigh->number = nr_neigh_no++; From e439607291c082332e1e35baf8faf8552e6bcb4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Xing Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 16:20:36 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 20/56] netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_obsolescence_count_initialiser [ Upstream commit cfd9f4a740f772298308b2e6070d2c744fb5cf79 ] We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netrom/nr_route.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c index 6f709fdffc11..b8ddd8048f35 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c @@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ int nr_route_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, ax25_cb *ax25) if (ax25 != NULL) { ret = nr_add_node(nr_src, "", &ax25->dest_addr, ax25->digipeat, ax25->ax25_dev->dev, 0, - sysctl_netrom_obsolescence_count_initialiser); + READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_obsolescence_count_initialiser)); if (ret) return ret; } From a47d68d777b41862757b7e3051f2d46d6e25f87b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Xing Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 16:20:37 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 21/56] netrom: Fix data-races around sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser [ Upstream commit 119cae5ea3f9e35cdada8e572cc067f072fa825a ] We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netrom/nr_dev.c | 2 +- net/netrom/nr_out.c | 2 +- net/netrom/nr_subr.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_dev.c b/net/netrom/nr_dev.c index 3aaac4a22b38..2c34389c3ce6 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_dev.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_dev.c @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static int nr_header(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, buff[6] |= AX25_SSSID_SPARE; buff += AX25_ADDR_LEN; - *buff++ = sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser; + *buff++ = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser); *buff++ = NR_PROTO_IP; *buff++ = NR_PROTO_IP; diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_out.c b/net/netrom/nr_out.c index 44929657f5b7..5e531394a724 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_out.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_out.c @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ void nr_transmit_buffer(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) dptr[6] |= AX25_SSSID_SPARE; dptr += AX25_ADDR_LEN; - *dptr++ = sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser; + *dptr++ = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser); if (!nr_route_frame(skb, NULL)) { kfree_skb(skb); diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_subr.c b/net/netrom/nr_subr.c index e2d2af924cff..c3bbd5880850 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_subr.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_subr.c @@ -182,7 +182,8 @@ void nr_write_internal(struct sock *sk, int frametype) *dptr++ = nr->my_id; *dptr++ = frametype; *dptr++ = nr->window; - if (nr->bpqext) *dptr++ = sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser; + if (nr->bpqext) + *dptr++ = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser); break; case NR_DISCREQ: @@ -236,7 +237,7 @@ void __nr_transmit_reply(struct sk_buff *skb, int mine, unsigned char cmdflags) dptr[6] |= AX25_SSSID_SPARE; dptr += AX25_ADDR_LEN; - *dptr++ = sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser; + *dptr++ = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser); if (mine) { *dptr++ = 0; From fed835d415766a94fc0246dcebc3af4c03fe9941 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Xing Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 16:20:38 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 22/56] netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_transport_timeout [ Upstream commit 60a7a152abd494ed4f69098cf0f322e6bb140612 ] We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c index ec5747969f96..3c6567af2ba4 100644 --- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c +++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c @@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, nr_init_timers(sk); nr->t1 = - msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_timeout); + msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_timeout)); nr->t2 = msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_acknowledge_delay); nr->n2 = From d28fa5f0e6c1554e2829f73a6a276c9a49689d04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Xing Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 16:20:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 23/56] netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries [ Upstream commit e799299aafed417cc1f32adccb2a0e5268b3f6d5 ] We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c index 3c6567af2ba4..be404ace9878 100644 --- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c +++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c @@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, nr->t2 = msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_acknowledge_delay); nr->n2 = - msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries); + msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries)); nr->t4 = msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay); nr->idle = From 5deaef2bf56456c71b841e0dfde1bee2fd88c4eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Xing Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 16:20:40 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 24/56] netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_transport_acknowledge_delay [ Upstream commit 806f462ba9029d41aadf8ec93f2f99c5305deada ] We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c index be404ace9878..7428ea436e31 100644 --- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c +++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c @@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, nr->t1 = msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_timeout)); nr->t2 = - msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_acknowledge_delay); + msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_acknowledge_delay)); nr->n2 = msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries)); nr->t4 = From 5ac337138272d26d6d3d4f71bc5b1a87adf8b24d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Xing Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 16:20:41 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 25/56] netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay [ Upstream commit 43547d8699439a67b78d6bb39015113f7aa360fd ] We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c index 7428ea436e31..ee6621c0d2e4 100644 --- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c +++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c @@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, nr->n2 = msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries)); nr->t4 = - msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay); + msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay)); nr->idle = msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_no_activity_timeout); nr->window = sysctl_netrom_transport_requested_window_size; From 46803b776d869b0c36041828a83c4f7da2dfa03b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Xing Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 16:20:42 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 26/56] netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_transport_requested_window_size [ Upstream commit a2e706841488f474c06e9b33f71afc947fb3bf56 ] We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c index ee6621c0d2e4..88941b66631f 100644 --- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c +++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c @@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay)); nr->idle = msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_no_activity_timeout); - nr->window = sysctl_netrom_transport_requested_window_size; + nr->window = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_requested_window_size); nr->bpqext = 1; nr->state = NR_STATE_0; From 498f1d6da11ed6d736d655a2db14ee2d9569eecb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Xing Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 16:20:43 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 27/56] netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_transport_no_activity_timeout [ Upstream commit f99b494b40431f0ca416859f2345746199398e2b ] We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c index 88941b66631f..5472e79cde83 100644 --- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c +++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c @@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, nr->t4 = msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay)); nr->idle = - msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_no_activity_timeout); + msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_no_activity_timeout)); nr->window = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_requested_window_size); nr->bpqext = 1; From 4c02b9ccbb11862ee39850b2b285664cd579b039 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Xing Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 16:20:44 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 28/56] netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_routing_control [ Upstream commit b5dffcb8f71bdd02a4e5799985b51b12f4eeaf76 ] We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netrom/nr_route.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c index b8ddd8048f35..89e12e6eea2e 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c @@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ int nr_route_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, ax25_cb *ax25) return ret; } - if (!sysctl_netrom_routing_control && ax25 != NULL) + if (!READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_routing_control) && ax25 != NULL) return 0; /* Its Time-To-Live has expired */ From cfedde3058bf976f2f292c0a236edd43afcdab57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Xing Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 16:20:45 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 29/56] netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_link_fails_count [ Upstream commit bc76645ebdd01be9b9994dac39685a3d0f6f7985 ] We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netrom/nr_route.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c index 89e12e6eea2e..70480869ad1c 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c @@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ void nr_link_failed(ax25_cb *ax25, int reason) nr_neigh->ax25 = NULL; ax25_cb_put(ax25); - if (++nr_neigh->failed < sysctl_netrom_link_fails_count) { + if (++nr_neigh->failed < READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_link_fails_count)) { nr_neigh_put(nr_neigh); return; } From 43464808669ba9d23996f0b6d875450191687caf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Xing Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 16:20:46 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 30/56] netrom: Fix data-races around sysctl_net_busy_read [ Upstream commit d380ce70058a4ccddc3e5f5c2063165dc07672c6 ] We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +- net/netrom/nr_in.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c index 5472e79cde83..f0879295de11 100644 --- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c +++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c @@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ int nr_rx_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) * G8PZT's Xrouter which is sending packets with command type 7 * as an extension of the protocol. */ - if (sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit && + if (READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit) && (frametype != NR_RESET || flags != 0)) nr_transmit_reset(skb, 1); diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_in.c b/net/netrom/nr_in.c index 2f084b6f69d7..97944db6b5ac 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_in.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_in.c @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int nr_state1_machine(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, break; case NR_RESET: - if (sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit) + if (READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit)) nr_disconnect(sk, ECONNRESET); break; @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static int nr_state2_machine(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, break; case NR_RESET: - if (sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit) + if (READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit)) nr_disconnect(sk, ECONNRESET); break; @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static int nr_state3_machine(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int frametype break; case NR_RESET: - if (sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit) + if (READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit)) nr_disconnect(sk, ECONNRESET); break; From 51c4435688ebedb498dbbf0732a9d5dff18d908d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nico Boehr Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2023 11:32:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 31/56] KVM: s390: add stat counter for shadow gmap events [ Upstream commit c3235e2dd6956448a562d6b1112205eeebc8ab43 ] The shadow gmap tracks memory of nested guests (guest-3). In certain scenarios, the shadow gmap needs to be rebuilt, which is a costly operation since it involves a SIE exit into guest-1 for every entry in the respective shadow level. Add kvm stat counters when new shadow structures are created at various levels. Also add a counter gmap_shadow_create when a completely fresh shadow gmap is created as well as a counter gmap_shadow_reuse when an existing gmap is being reused. Note that when several levels are shadowed at once, counters on all affected levels will be increased. Also note that not all page table levels need to be present and a ASCE can directly point to e.g. a segment table. In this case, a new segment table will always be equivalent to a new shadow gmap and hence will be counted as gmap_shadow_create and not as gmap_shadow_segment. Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231009093304.2555344-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20231009093304.2555344-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com> Stable-dep-of: fe752331d4b3 ("KVM: s390: vsie: fix race during shadow creation") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 7 +++++++ arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c | 7 +++++++ arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 9 ++++++++- arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 5 ++++- 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h index b1e98a9ed152..09abf000359f 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -777,6 +777,13 @@ struct kvm_vm_stat { u64 inject_service_signal; u64 inject_virtio; u64 aen_forward; + u64 gmap_shadow_create; + u64 gmap_shadow_reuse; + u64 gmap_shadow_r1_entry; + u64 gmap_shadow_r2_entry; + u64 gmap_shadow_r3_entry; + u64 gmap_shadow_sg_entry; + u64 gmap_shadow_pg_entry; }; struct kvm_arch_memory_slot { diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c index 0243b6e38d36..3beceff5f1c0 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c @@ -1273,6 +1273,7 @@ static int kvm_s390_shadow_tables(struct gmap *sg, unsigned long saddr, unsigned long *pgt, int *dat_protection, int *fake) { + struct kvm *kvm; struct gmap *parent; union asce asce; union vaddress vaddr; @@ -1281,6 +1282,7 @@ static int kvm_s390_shadow_tables(struct gmap *sg, unsigned long saddr, *fake = 0; *dat_protection = 0; + kvm = sg->private; parent = sg->parent; vaddr.addr = saddr; asce.val = sg->orig_asce; @@ -1341,6 +1343,7 @@ shadow_r2t: rc = gmap_shadow_r2t(sg, saddr, rfte.val, *fake); if (rc) return rc; + kvm->stat.gmap_shadow_r1_entry++; } fallthrough; case ASCE_TYPE_REGION2: { @@ -1369,6 +1372,7 @@ shadow_r3t: rc = gmap_shadow_r3t(sg, saddr, rste.val, *fake); if (rc) return rc; + kvm->stat.gmap_shadow_r2_entry++; } fallthrough; case ASCE_TYPE_REGION3: { @@ -1406,6 +1410,7 @@ shadow_sgt: rc = gmap_shadow_sgt(sg, saddr, rtte.val, *fake); if (rc) return rc; + kvm->stat.gmap_shadow_r3_entry++; } fallthrough; case ASCE_TYPE_SEGMENT: { @@ -1439,6 +1444,7 @@ shadow_pgt: rc = gmap_shadow_pgt(sg, saddr, ste.val, *fake); if (rc) return rc; + kvm->stat.gmap_shadow_sg_entry++; } } /* Return the parent address of the page table */ @@ -1509,6 +1515,7 @@ shadow_page: pte.p |= dat_protection; if (!rc) rc = gmap_shadow_page(sg, saddr, __pte(pte.val)); + vcpu->kvm->stat.gmap_shadow_pg_entry++; ipte_unlock(vcpu->kvm); mmap_read_unlock(sg->mm); return rc; diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c index f604946ab2c8..348d49268a7e 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c @@ -66,7 +66,14 @@ const struct _kvm_stats_desc kvm_vm_stats_desc[] = { STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, inject_pfault_done), STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, inject_service_signal), STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, inject_virtio), - STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, aen_forward) + STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, aen_forward), + STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, gmap_shadow_reuse), + STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, gmap_shadow_create), + STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, gmap_shadow_r1_entry), + STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, gmap_shadow_r2_entry), + STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, gmap_shadow_r3_entry), + STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, gmap_shadow_sg_entry), + STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, gmap_shadow_pg_entry), }; const struct kvm_stats_header kvm_vm_stats_header = { diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c index 740f8b56e63f..b2dbf08a961e 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c @@ -1206,8 +1206,10 @@ static int acquire_gmap_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, * we're holding has been unshadowed. If the gmap is still valid, * we can safely reuse it. */ - if (vsie_page->gmap && gmap_shadow_valid(vsie_page->gmap, asce, edat)) + if (vsie_page->gmap && gmap_shadow_valid(vsie_page->gmap, asce, edat)) { + vcpu->kvm->stat.gmap_shadow_reuse++; return 0; + } /* release the old shadow - if any, and mark the prefix as unmapped */ release_gmap_shadow(vsie_page); @@ -1215,6 +1217,7 @@ static int acquire_gmap_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, if (IS_ERR(gmap)) return PTR_ERR(gmap); gmap->private = vcpu->kvm; + vcpu->kvm->stat.gmap_shadow_create++; WRITE_ONCE(vsie_page->gmap, gmap); return 0; } From 5df3b81a567eb565029563f26f374ae3803a1dfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christian Borntraeger Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 13:53:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 32/56] KVM: s390: vsie: fix race during shadow creation [ Upstream commit fe752331d4b361d43cfd0b89534b4b2176057c32 ] Right now it is possible to see gmap->private being zero in kvm_s390_vsie_gmap_notifier resulting in a crash. This is due to the fact that we add gmap->private == kvm after creation: static int acquire_gmap_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) { [...] gmap = gmap_shadow(vcpu->arch.gmap, asce, edat); if (IS_ERR(gmap)) return PTR_ERR(gmap); gmap->private = vcpu->kvm; Let children inherit the private field of the parent. Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer Fixes: a3508fbe9dc6 ("KVM: s390: vsie: initial support for nested virtualization") Cc: Cc: David Hildenbrand Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231220125317.4258-1-borntraeger@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 1 - arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c index b2dbf08a961e..d90c818a9ae7 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c @@ -1216,7 +1216,6 @@ static int acquire_gmap_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gmap = gmap_shadow(vcpu->arch.gmap, asce, edat); if (IS_ERR(gmap)) return PTR_ERR(gmap); - gmap->private = vcpu->kvm; vcpu->kvm->stat.gmap_shadow_create++; WRITE_ONCE(vsie_page->gmap, gmap); return 0; diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c index 243f673fa651..662cf23a1b44 100644 --- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c +++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c @@ -1675,6 +1675,7 @@ struct gmap *gmap_shadow(struct gmap *parent, unsigned long asce, return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); new->mm = parent->mm; new->parent = gmap_get(parent); + new->private = parent->private; new->orig_asce = asce; new->edat_level = edat_level; new->initialized = false; From 35a0d43cee095e590982c290fde6dabef0623769 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 10:11:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 33/56] ASoC: codecs: wcd938x: fix headphones volume controls [ Upstream commit 4d0e8bdfa4a57099dc7230952a460903f2e2f8de ] The lowest headphones volume setting does not mute so the leave the TLV mute flag unset. This is specifically needed to let the sound server use the lowest gain setting. Fixes: c03226ba15fe ("ASoC: codecs: wcd938x: fix dB range for HPHL and HPHR") Cc: # 6.5 Cc: Srinivas Kandagatla Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Link: https://msgid.link/r/20240122091130.27463-1-johan+linaro@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/wcd938x.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wcd938x.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wcd938x.c index e80be4e4fa8b..555b74e7172d 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/wcd938x.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wcd938x.c @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ struct wcd938x_priv { }; static const SNDRV_CTL_TLVD_DECLARE_DB_MINMAX(ear_pa_gain, 600, -1800); -static const DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(line_gain, -3000, 150, -3000); +static const DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(line_gain, -3000, 150, 0); static const SNDRV_CTL_TLVD_DECLARE_DB_MINMAX(analog_gain, 0, 3000); struct wcd938x_mbhc_zdet_param { From 66d663da8654099591a3aa78cf92d48410e930f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Srinivasan Shanmugam Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 08:41:52 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 34/56] drm/amd/display: Fix uninitialized variable usage in core_link_ 'read_dpcd() & write_dpcd()' functions [ Upstream commit a58371d632ebab9ea63f10893a6b6731196b6f8d ] The 'status' variable in 'core_link_read_dpcd()' & 'core_link_write_dpcd()' was uninitialized. Thus, initializing 'status' variable to 'DC_ERROR_UNEXPECTED' by default. Fixes the below: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/link/protocols/link_dpcd.c:226 core_link_read_dpcd() error: uninitialized symbol 'status'. drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/link/protocols/link_dpcd.c:248 core_link_write_dpcd() error: uninitialized symbol 'status'. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jerry Zuo Cc: Jun Lei Cc: Wayne Lin Cc: Aurabindo Pillai Cc: Rodrigo Siqueira Cc: Hamza Mahfooz Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Siqueira Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link_dpcd.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link_dpcd.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link_dpcd.c index af110bf9470f..aefca9756dbe 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link_dpcd.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link_dpcd.c @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ enum dc_status core_link_read_dpcd( uint32_t extended_size; /* size of the remaining partitioned address space */ uint32_t size_left_to_read; - enum dc_status status; + enum dc_status status = DC_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; /* size of the next partition to be read from */ uint32_t partition_size; uint32_t data_index = 0; @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ enum dc_status core_link_write_dpcd( { uint32_t partition_size; uint32_t data_index = 0; - enum dc_status status; + enum dc_status status = DC_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; while (size) { partition_size = dpcd_get_next_partition_size(address, size); From 4e2f0cae0bfe60d99e733cddf98de017a482975f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wentao Jia Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2023 08:36:08 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 35/56] nfp: flower: add goto_chain_index for ct entry [ Upstream commit 3e44d19934b92398785b3ffc2353b9eba264140e ] The chain_index has different means in pre ct entry and post ct entry. In pre ct entry, it means chain index, but in post ct entry, it means goto chain index, it is confused. chain_index and goto_chain_index may be present in one flow rule, It cannot be distinguished by one field chain_index, both chain_index and goto_chain_index are required in the follow-up patch to support multiple ct zones Another field goto_chain_index is added to record the goto chain index. If no goto action in post ct entry, goto_chain_index is 0. Signed-off-by: Wentao Jia Acked-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: Louis Peens Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Stable-dep-of: cefa98e806fd ("nfp: flower: add hardware offload check for post ct entry") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/conntrack.c | 8 ++++++-- drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/conntrack.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/conntrack.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/conntrack.c index 7af03b45555d..da7a47416a20 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/conntrack.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/conntrack.c @@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@ static int nfp_ct_do_tc_merge(struct nfp_fl_ct_zone_entry *zt, /* Checks that the chain_index of the filter matches the * chain_index of the GOTO action. */ - if (post_ct_entry->chain_index != pre_ct_entry->chain_index) + if (post_ct_entry->chain_index != pre_ct_entry->goto_chain_index) return -EINVAL; err = nfp_ct_merge_check(pre_ct_entry, post_ct_entry); @@ -1776,7 +1776,8 @@ int nfp_fl_ct_handle_pre_ct(struct nfp_flower_priv *priv, if (IS_ERR(ct_entry)) return PTR_ERR(ct_entry); ct_entry->type = CT_TYPE_PRE_CT; - ct_entry->chain_index = ct_goto->chain_index; + ct_entry->chain_index = flow->common.chain_index; + ct_entry->goto_chain_index = ct_goto->chain_index; list_add(&ct_entry->list_node, &zt->pre_ct_list); zt->pre_ct_count++; @@ -1799,6 +1800,7 @@ int nfp_fl_ct_handle_post_ct(struct nfp_flower_priv *priv, struct nfp_fl_ct_zone_entry *zt; bool wildcarded = false; struct flow_match_ct ct; + struct flow_action_entry *ct_goto; flow_rule_match_ct(rule, &ct); if (!ct.mask->ct_zone) { @@ -1823,6 +1825,8 @@ int nfp_fl_ct_handle_post_ct(struct nfp_flower_priv *priv, ct_entry->type = CT_TYPE_POST_CT; ct_entry->chain_index = flow->common.chain_index; + ct_goto = get_flow_act(flow->rule, FLOW_ACTION_GOTO); + ct_entry->goto_chain_index = ct_goto ? ct_goto->chain_index : 0; list_add(&ct_entry->list_node, &zt->post_ct_list); zt->post_ct_count++; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/conntrack.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/conntrack.h index 762c0b36e269..9440ab776ece 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/conntrack.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/conntrack.h @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ enum nfp_nfp_layer_name { * @cookie: Flow cookie, same as original TC flow, used as key * @list_node: Used by the list * @chain_index: Chain index of the original flow + * @goto_chain_index: goto chain index of the flow * @netdev: netdev structure. * @type: Type of pre-entry from enum ct_entry_type * @zt: Reference to the zone table this belongs to @@ -125,6 +126,7 @@ struct nfp_fl_ct_flow_entry { unsigned long cookie; struct list_head list_node; u32 chain_index; + u32 goto_chain_index; enum ct_entry_type type; struct net_device *netdev; struct nfp_fl_ct_zone_entry *zt; From b0b89b470a863fb84360a89365ee69612d2863b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hui Zhou Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 17:19:08 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 36/56] nfp: flower: add hardware offload check for post ct entry [ Upstream commit cefa98e806fd4e2a5e2047457a11ae5f17b8f621 ] The nfp offload flow pay will not allocate a mask id when the out port is openvswitch internal port. This is because these flows are used to configure the pre_tun table and are never actually send to the firmware as an add-flow message. When a tc rule which action contains ct and the post ct entry's out port is openvswitch internal port, the merge offload flow pay with the wrong mask id of 0 will be send to the firmware. Actually, the nfp can not support hardware offload for this situation, so return EOPNOTSUPP. Fixes: bd0fe7f96a3c ("nfp: flower-ct: add zone table entry when handling pre/post_ct flows") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14+ Signed-off-by: Hui Zhou Signed-off-by: Louis Peens Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124151909.31603-2-louis.peens@corigine.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- .../ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/conntrack.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/conntrack.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/conntrack.c index da7a47416a20..497766ecdd91 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/conntrack.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/conntrack.c @@ -1797,10 +1797,30 @@ int nfp_fl_ct_handle_post_ct(struct nfp_flower_priv *priv, { struct flow_rule *rule = flow_cls_offload_flow_rule(flow); struct nfp_fl_ct_flow_entry *ct_entry; + struct flow_action_entry *ct_goto; struct nfp_fl_ct_zone_entry *zt; + struct flow_action_entry *act; bool wildcarded = false; struct flow_match_ct ct; - struct flow_action_entry *ct_goto; + int i; + + flow_action_for_each(i, act, &rule->action) { + switch (act->id) { + case FLOW_ACTION_REDIRECT: + case FLOW_ACTION_REDIRECT_INGRESS: + case FLOW_ACTION_MIRRED: + case FLOW_ACTION_MIRRED_INGRESS: + if (act->dev->rtnl_link_ops && + !strcmp(act->dev->rtnl_link_ops->kind, "openvswitch")) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, + "unsupported offload: out port is openvswitch internal port"); + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } + break; + default: + break; + } + } flow_rule_match_ct(rule, &ct); if (!ct.mask->ct_zone) { From f0c349708290f2632d3103b687c7998945ed4dff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 09:58:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 37/56] readahead: avoid multiple marked readahead pages [ Upstream commit ab4443fe3ca6298663a55c4a70efc6c3ce913ca6 ] ra_alloc_folio() marks a page that should trigger next round of async readahead. However it rounds up computed index to the order of page being allocated. This can however lead to multiple consecutive pages being marked with readahead flag. Consider situation with index == 1, mark == 1, order == 0. We insert order 0 page at index 1 and mark it. Then we bump order to 1, index to 2, mark (still == 1) is rounded up to 2 so page at index 2 is marked as well. Then we bump order to 2, index is incremented to 4, mark gets rounded to 4 so page at index 4 is marked as well. The fact that multiple pages get marked within a single readahead window confuses the readahead logic and results in readahead window being trimmed back to 1. This situation is triggered in particular when maximum readahead window size is not a power of two (in the observed case it was 768 KB) and as a result sequential read throughput suffers. Fix the problem by rounding 'mark' down instead of up. Because the index is naturally aligned to 'order', we are guaranteed 'rounded mark' == index iff 'mark' is within the page we are allocating at 'index' and thus exactly one page is marked with readahead flag as required by the readahead code and sequential read performance is restored. This effectively reverts part of commit b9ff43dd2743 ("mm/readahead: Fix readahead with large folios"). The commit changed the rounding with the rationale: "... we were setting the readahead flag on the folio which contains the last byte read from the block. This is wrong because we will trigger readahead at the end of the read without waiting to see if a subsequent read is going to use the pages we just read." Although this is true, the fact is this was always the case with read sizes not aligned to folio boundaries and large folios in the page cache just make the situation more obvious (and frequent). Also for sequential read workloads it is better to trigger the readahead earlier rather than later. It is true that the difference in the rounding and thus earlier triggering of the readahead can result in reading more for semi-random workloads. However workloads really suffering from this seem to be rare. In particular I have verified that the workload described in commit b9ff43dd2743 ("mm/readahead: Fix readahead with large folios") of reading random 100k blocks from a file like: [reader] bs=100k rw=randread numjobs=1 size=64g runtime=60s is not impacted by the rounding change and achieves ~70MB/s in both cases. [jack@suse.cz: fix one more place where mark rounding was done as well] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240123153254.5206-1-jack@suse.cz Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240104085839.21029-1-jack@suse.cz Fixes: b9ff43dd2743 ("mm/readahead: Fix readahead with large folios") Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Guo Xuenan Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- mm/readahead.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/readahead.c b/mm/readahead.c index ba43428043a3..e4b772bb70e6 100644 --- a/mm/readahead.c +++ b/mm/readahead.c @@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ static inline int ra_alloc_folio(struct readahead_control *ractl, pgoff_t index, if (!folio) return -ENOMEM; - mark = round_up(mark, 1UL << order); + mark = round_down(mark, 1UL << order); if (index == mark) folio_set_readahead(folio); err = filemap_add_folio(ractl->mapping, folio, index, gfp); @@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ static void ondemand_readahead(struct readahead_control *ractl, * It's the expected callback index, assume sequential access. * Ramp up sizes, and push forward the readahead window. */ - expected = round_up(ra->start + ra->size - ra->async_size, + expected = round_down(ra->start + ra->size - ra->async_size, 1UL << order); if (index == expected || index == (ra->start + ra->size)) { ra->start += ra->size; From 02e16a41e5439e447052c3f9a66489caf8bb4007 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muhammad Usama Anjum Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 14:04:54 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 38/56] selftests/mm: switch to bash from sh [ Upstream commit bc29036e1da1cf66e5f8312649aeec2d51ea3d86 ] Running charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh generates errors if sh is set to dash: ./charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh: 9: [[: not found ./charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh: 19: [[: not found ./charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh: 27: [[: not found ./charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh: 37: [[: not found ./charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh: 45: Syntax error: "(" unexpected Switch to using /bin/bash instead of /bin/sh. Make the switch for write_hugetlb_memory.sh as well which is called from charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240116090455.3407378-1-usama.anjum@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: David Laight Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/testing/selftests/vm/charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/vm/write_hugetlb_memory.sh | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh index 0899019a7fcb..e14bdd4455f2 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -#!/bin/sh +#!/bin/bash # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # Kselftest framework requirement - SKIP code is 4. diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/write_hugetlb_memory.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/write_hugetlb_memory.sh index 70a02301f4c2..3d2d2eb9d6ff 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/write_hugetlb_memory.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/write_hugetlb_memory.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -#!/bin/sh +#!/bin/bash # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 set -e From a584c7734a4dd050451fcdd65c66317e15660e81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nico Pache Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 06:14:29 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 39/56] selftests: mm: fix map_hugetlb failure on 64K page size systems [ Upstream commit 91b80cc5b39f00399e8e2d17527cad2c7fa535e2 ] On systems with 64k page size and 512M huge page sizes, the allocation and test succeeds but errors out at the munmap. As the comment states, munmap will failure if its not HUGEPAGE aligned. This is due to the length of the mapping being 1/2 the size of the hugepage causing the munmap to not be hugepage aligned. Fix this by making the mapping length the full hugepage if the hugepage is larger than the length of the mapping. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240119131429.172448-1-npache@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Nico Pache Cc: Donet Tom Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Christophe Leroy Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/testing/selftests/vm/map_hugetlb.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/map_hugetlb.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/map_hugetlb.c index 312889edb84a..c65c55b7a789 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/map_hugetlb.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/map_hugetlb.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include "vm_util.h" #define LENGTH (256UL*1024*1024) #define PROTECTION (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE) @@ -70,10 +71,16 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { void *addr; int ret; + size_t hugepage_size; size_t length = LENGTH; int flags = FLAGS; int shift = 0; + hugepage_size = default_huge_page_size(); + /* munmap with fail if the length is not page aligned */ + if (hugepage_size > length) + length = hugepage_size; + if (argc > 1) length = atol(argv[1]) << 20; if (argc > 2) { From 9158ea9395c12b5623b569916b6fba0171595542 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathias Nyman Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 17:27:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 40/56] xhci: process isoc TD properly when there was a transaction error mid TD. MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 5372c65e1311a16351ef03dd096ff576e6477674 ] The last TRB of a isoc TD might not trigger an event if there was an error event for a TRB mid TD. This is seen on a NEC Corporation uPD720200 USB 3.0 Host After an error mid a multi-TRB TD the xHC should according to xhci 4.9.1 generate events for passed TRBs with IOC flag set if it proceeds to the next TD. This event is either a copy of the original error, or a "success" transfer event. If that event is missing then the driver and xHC host get out of sync as the driver is still expecting a transfer event for that first TD, while xHC host is already sending events for the next TD in the list. This leads to "Transfer event TRB DMA ptr not part of current TD" messages. As a solution we tag the isoc TDs that get error events mid TD. If an event doesn't match the first TD, then check if the tag is set, and event points to the next TD. In that case give back the fist TD and process the next TD normally Make sure TD status and transferred length stay valid in both cases with and without final TD completion event. Reported-by: Michał Pecio Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/20240112235205.1259f60c@foxbook/ Tested-by: Michał Pecio Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240125152737.2983959-4-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- drivers/usb/host/xhci.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c index 1239e06dfe41..e4441a71368e 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c @@ -2363,6 +2363,9 @@ static int process_isoc_td(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, struct xhci_virt_ep *ep, /* handle completion code */ switch (trb_comp_code) { case COMP_SUCCESS: + /* Don't overwrite status if TD had an error, see xHCI 4.9.1 */ + if (td->error_mid_td) + break; if (remaining) { frame->status = short_framestatus; if (xhci->quirks & XHCI_TRUST_TX_LENGTH) @@ -2388,8 +2391,9 @@ static int process_isoc_td(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, struct xhci_virt_ep *ep, break; case COMP_USB_TRANSACTION_ERROR: frame->status = -EPROTO; + sum_trbs_for_length = true; if (ep_trb != td->last_trb) - return 0; + td->error_mid_td = true; break; case COMP_STOPPED: sum_trbs_for_length = true; @@ -2409,6 +2413,9 @@ static int process_isoc_td(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, struct xhci_virt_ep *ep, break; } + if (td->urb_length_set) + goto finish_td; + if (sum_trbs_for_length) frame->actual_length = sum_trb_lengths(xhci, ep->ring, ep_trb) + ep_trb_len - remaining; @@ -2417,6 +2424,14 @@ static int process_isoc_td(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, struct xhci_virt_ep *ep, td->urb->actual_length += frame->actual_length; +finish_td: + /* Don't give back TD yet if we encountered an error mid TD */ + if (td->error_mid_td && ep_trb != td->last_trb) { + xhci_dbg(xhci, "Error mid isoc TD, wait for final completion event\n"); + td->urb_length_set = true; + return 0; + } + return finish_td(xhci, ep, ep_ring, td, trb_comp_code); } @@ -2801,17 +2816,51 @@ static int handle_tx_event(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, } if (!ep_seg) { - if (!ep->skip || - !usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc(&td->urb->ep->desc)) { - /* Some host controllers give a spurious - * successful event after a short transfer. - * Ignore it. - */ - if ((xhci->quirks & XHCI_SPURIOUS_SUCCESS) && - ep_ring->last_td_was_short) { - ep_ring->last_td_was_short = false; - goto cleanup; + + if (ep->skip && usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc(&td->urb->ep->desc)) { + skip_isoc_td(xhci, td, ep, status); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Some hosts give a spurious success event after a short + * transfer. Ignore it. + */ + if ((xhci->quirks & XHCI_SPURIOUS_SUCCESS) && + ep_ring->last_td_was_short) { + ep_ring->last_td_was_short = false; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * xhci 4.10.2 states isoc endpoints should continue + * processing the next TD if there was an error mid TD. + * So host like NEC don't generate an event for the last + * isoc TRB even if the IOC flag is set. + * xhci 4.9.1 states that if there are errors in mult-TRB + * TDs xHC should generate an error for that TRB, and if xHC + * proceeds to the next TD it should genete an event for + * any TRB with IOC flag on the way. Other host follow this. + * So this event might be for the next TD. + */ + if (td->error_mid_td && + !list_is_last(&td->td_list, &ep_ring->td_list)) { + struct xhci_td *td_next = list_next_entry(td, td_list); + + ep_seg = trb_in_td(xhci, td_next->start_seg, td_next->first_trb, + td_next->last_trb, ep_trb_dma, false); + if (ep_seg) { + /* give back previous TD, start handling new */ + xhci_dbg(xhci, "Missing TD completion event after mid TD error\n"); + ep_ring->dequeue = td->last_trb; + ep_ring->deq_seg = td->last_trb_seg; + inc_deq(xhci, ep_ring); + xhci_td_cleanup(xhci, td, ep_ring, td->status); + td = td_next; } + } + + if (!ep_seg) { /* HC is busted, give up! */ xhci_err(xhci, "ERROR Transfer event TRB DMA ptr not " @@ -2823,9 +2872,6 @@ static int handle_tx_event(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, ep_trb_dma, true); return -ESHUTDOWN; } - - skip_isoc_td(xhci, td, ep, status); - goto cleanup; } if (trb_comp_code == COMP_SHORT_PACKET) ep_ring->last_td_was_short = true; diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h index 1354310cb37b..fc25a5b09710 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h @@ -1570,6 +1570,7 @@ struct xhci_td { struct xhci_segment *bounce_seg; /* actual_length of the URB has already been set */ bool urb_length_set; + bool error_mid_td; unsigned int num_trbs; }; From 2e3ec80ea7ba58bbb210e83b5a0afefee7c171d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Pecio Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 17:27:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 41/56] xhci: handle isoc Babble and Buffer Overrun events properly [ Upstream commit 7c4650ded49e5b88929ecbbb631efb8b0838e811 ] xHCI 4.9 explicitly forbids assuming that the xHC has released its ownership of a multi-TRB TD when it reports an error on one of the early TRBs. Yet the driver makes such assumption and releases the TD, allowing the remaining TRBs to be freed or overwritten by new TDs. The xHC should also report completion of the final TRB due to its IOC flag being set by us, regardless of prior errors. This event cannot be recognized if the TD has already been freed earlier, resulting in "Transfer event TRB DMA ptr not part of current TD" error message. Fix this by reusing the logic for processing isoc Transaction Errors. This also handles hosts which fail to report the final completion. Fix transfer length reporting on Babble errors. They may be caused by device malfunction, no guarantee that the buffer has been filled. Signed-off-by: Michal Pecio Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240125152737.2983959-5-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c index e4441a71368e..239b5edee326 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c @@ -2381,9 +2381,13 @@ static int process_isoc_td(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, struct xhci_virt_ep *ep, case COMP_BANDWIDTH_OVERRUN_ERROR: frame->status = -ECOMM; break; - case COMP_ISOCH_BUFFER_OVERRUN: case COMP_BABBLE_DETECTED_ERROR: + sum_trbs_for_length = true; + fallthrough; + case COMP_ISOCH_BUFFER_OVERRUN: frame->status = -EOVERFLOW; + if (ep_trb != td->last_trb) + td->error_mid_td = true; break; case COMP_INCOMPATIBLE_DEVICE_ERROR: case COMP_STALL_ERROR: From a28f4d1e0bed85943d309ac243fd1c200f8af9a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Friedrich Vock Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 12:52:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 42/56] drm/amdgpu: Reset IH OVERFLOW_CLEAR bit MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 7330256268664ea0a7dd5b07a3fed363093477dd ] Allows us to detect subsequent IH ring buffer overflows as well. Cc: Joshua Ashton Cc: Alex Deucher Cc: Christian König Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Friedrich Vock Reviewed-by: Christian König Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/cik_ih.c | 6 ++++++ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/cz_ih.c | 5 +++++ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/iceland_ih.c | 5 +++++ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/ih_v6_0.c | 6 ++++++ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/navi10_ih.c | 6 ++++++ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/si_ih.c | 6 ++++++ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/tonga_ih.c | 6 ++++++ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vega10_ih.c | 6 ++++++ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vega20_ih.c | 6 ++++++ 9 files changed, 52 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/cik_ih.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/cik_ih.c index df385ffc9768..6578ca1b90af 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/cik_ih.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/cik_ih.c @@ -204,6 +204,12 @@ static u32 cik_ih_get_wptr(struct amdgpu_device *adev, tmp = RREG32(mmIH_RB_CNTL); tmp |= IH_RB_CNTL__WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR_MASK; WREG32(mmIH_RB_CNTL, tmp); + + /* Unset the CLEAR_OVERFLOW bit immediately so new overflows + * can be detected. + */ + tmp &= ~IH_RB_CNTL__WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR_MASK; + WREG32(mmIH_RB_CNTL, tmp); } return (wptr & ih->ptr_mask); } diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/cz_ih.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/cz_ih.c index b8c47e0cf37a..c19681492efa 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/cz_ih.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/cz_ih.c @@ -216,6 +216,11 @@ static u32 cz_ih_get_wptr(struct amdgpu_device *adev, tmp = REG_SET_FIELD(tmp, IH_RB_CNTL, WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR, 1); WREG32(mmIH_RB_CNTL, tmp); + /* Unset the CLEAR_OVERFLOW bit immediately so new overflows + * can be detected. + */ + tmp = REG_SET_FIELD(tmp, IH_RB_CNTL, WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR, 0); + WREG32(mmIH_RB_CNTL, tmp); out: return (wptr & ih->ptr_mask); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/iceland_ih.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/iceland_ih.c index aecad530b10a..2c02ae69883d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/iceland_ih.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/iceland_ih.c @@ -215,6 +215,11 @@ static u32 iceland_ih_get_wptr(struct amdgpu_device *adev, tmp = REG_SET_FIELD(tmp, IH_RB_CNTL, WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR, 1); WREG32(mmIH_RB_CNTL, tmp); + /* Unset the CLEAR_OVERFLOW bit immediately so new overflows + * can be detected. + */ + tmp = REG_SET_FIELD(tmp, IH_RB_CNTL, WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR, 0); + WREG32(mmIH_RB_CNTL, tmp); out: return (wptr & ih->ptr_mask); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/ih_v6_0.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/ih_v6_0.c index 7cd79a3844b2..657e4ca6f9dd 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/ih_v6_0.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/ih_v6_0.c @@ -417,6 +417,12 @@ static u32 ih_v6_0_get_wptr(struct amdgpu_device *adev, tmp = RREG32_NO_KIQ(ih_regs->ih_rb_cntl); tmp = REG_SET_FIELD(tmp, IH_RB_CNTL, WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR, 1); WREG32_NO_KIQ(ih_regs->ih_rb_cntl, tmp); + + /* Unset the CLEAR_OVERFLOW bit immediately so new overflows + * can be detected. + */ + tmp = REG_SET_FIELD(tmp, IH_RB_CNTL, WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR, 0); + WREG32_NO_KIQ(ih_regs->ih_rb_cntl, tmp); out: return (wptr & ih->ptr_mask); } diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/navi10_ih.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/navi10_ih.c index eec13cb5bf75..84e8e8b008ef 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/navi10_ih.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/navi10_ih.c @@ -442,6 +442,12 @@ static u32 navi10_ih_get_wptr(struct amdgpu_device *adev, tmp = RREG32_NO_KIQ(ih_regs->ih_rb_cntl); tmp = REG_SET_FIELD(tmp, IH_RB_CNTL, WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR, 1); WREG32_NO_KIQ(ih_regs->ih_rb_cntl, tmp); + + /* Unset the CLEAR_OVERFLOW bit immediately so new overflows + * can be detected. + */ + tmp = REG_SET_FIELD(tmp, IH_RB_CNTL, WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR, 0); + WREG32_NO_KIQ(ih_regs->ih_rb_cntl, tmp); out: return (wptr & ih->ptr_mask); } diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/si_ih.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/si_ih.c index 9a24f17a5750..cada9f300a7f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/si_ih.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/si_ih.c @@ -119,6 +119,12 @@ static u32 si_ih_get_wptr(struct amdgpu_device *adev, tmp = RREG32(IH_RB_CNTL); tmp |= IH_RB_CNTL__WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR_MASK; WREG32(IH_RB_CNTL, tmp); + + /* Unset the CLEAR_OVERFLOW bit immediately so new overflows + * can be detected. + */ + tmp &= ~IH_RB_CNTL__WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR_MASK; + WREG32(IH_RB_CNTL, tmp); } return (wptr & ih->ptr_mask); } diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/tonga_ih.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/tonga_ih.c index b08905d1c00f..07a5d95be07f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/tonga_ih.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/tonga_ih.c @@ -219,6 +219,12 @@ static u32 tonga_ih_get_wptr(struct amdgpu_device *adev, tmp = REG_SET_FIELD(tmp, IH_RB_CNTL, WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR, 1); WREG32(mmIH_RB_CNTL, tmp); + /* Unset the CLEAR_OVERFLOW bit immediately so new overflows + * can be detected. + */ + tmp = REG_SET_FIELD(tmp, IH_RB_CNTL, WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR, 0); + WREG32(mmIH_RB_CNTL, tmp); + out: return (wptr & ih->ptr_mask); } diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vega10_ih.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vega10_ih.c index 1e83db0c5438..74c94df42345 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vega10_ih.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vega10_ih.c @@ -373,6 +373,12 @@ static u32 vega10_ih_get_wptr(struct amdgpu_device *adev, tmp = REG_SET_FIELD(tmp, IH_RB_CNTL, WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR, 1); WREG32_NO_KIQ(ih_regs->ih_rb_cntl, tmp); + /* Unset the CLEAR_OVERFLOW bit immediately so new overflows + * can be detected. + */ + tmp = REG_SET_FIELD(tmp, IH_RB_CNTL, WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR, 0); + WREG32_NO_KIQ(ih_regs->ih_rb_cntl, tmp); + out: return (wptr & ih->ptr_mask); } diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vega20_ih.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vega20_ih.c index 59dfca093155..f1ba76c35cd6 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vega20_ih.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vega20_ih.c @@ -424,6 +424,12 @@ static u32 vega20_ih_get_wptr(struct amdgpu_device *adev, tmp = REG_SET_FIELD(tmp, IH_RB_CNTL, WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR, 1); WREG32_NO_KIQ(ih_regs->ih_rb_cntl, tmp); + /* Unset the CLEAR_OVERFLOW bit immediately so new overflows + * can be detected. + */ + tmp = REG_SET_FIELD(tmp, IH_RB_CNTL, WPTR_OVERFLOW_CLEAR, 0); + WREG32_NO_KIQ(ih_regs->ih_rb_cntl, tmp); + out: return (wptr & ih->ptr_mask); } From 8b5760939db9c49c03b9e19f6c485a8812f48d83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 12:29:43 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 43/56] x86/mmio: Disable KVM mitigation when X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is set commit e95df4ec0c0c9791941f112db699fae794b9862a upstream. Currently MMIO Stale Data mitigation for CPUs not affected by MDS/TAA is to only deploy VERW at VMentry by enabling mmio_stale_data_clear static branch. No mitigation is needed for kernel->user transitions. If such CPUs are also affected by RFDS, its mitigation may set X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF to deploy VERW at kernel->user and VMentry. This could result in duplicate VERW at VMentry. Fix this by disabling mmio_stale_data_clear static branch when X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is enabled. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index d1895930e6eb..c66f6eb40afb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -421,6 +421,13 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void) if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF); + + /* + * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF could be enabled by other VERW based + * mitigations, disable KVM-only mitigation in that case. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF)) + static_branch_disable(&mmio_stale_data_clear); else static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear); @@ -497,8 +504,11 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void) taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW; taa_select_mitigation(); } - if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF && - boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) { + /* + * MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF is not checked here so that mmio_stale_data_clear + * gets updated correctly as per X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF state. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) { mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW; mmio_select_mitigation(); } From 29476fac750dddeabc3503bf9b13e05b949d7adb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 12:29:43 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 44/56] Documentation/hw-vuln: Add documentation for RFDS commit 4e42765d1be01111df0c0275bbaf1db1acef346e upstream. Add the documentation for transient execution vulnerability Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) that affects Intel Atom CPUs. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 + .../hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst | 104 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 105 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst index 6828102baaa7..3e4a14e38b49 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst @@ -21,3 +21,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. cross-thread-rsb.rst gather_data_sampling.rst srso + reg-file-data-sampling diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0585d02b9a6c --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +================================== +Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) +================================== + +Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) is a microarchitectural vulnerability that +only affects Intel Atom parts(also branded as E-cores). RFDS may allow +a malicious actor to infer data values previously used in floating point +registers, vector registers, or integer registers. RFDS does not provide the +ability to choose which data is inferred. CVE-2023-28746 is assigned to RFDS. + +Affected Processors +=================== +Below is the list of affected Intel processors [#f1]_: + + =================== ============ + Common name Family_Model + =================== ============ + ATOM_GOLDMONT 06_5CH + ATOM_GOLDMONT_D 06_5FH + ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS 06_7AH + ATOM_TREMONT_D 06_86H + ATOM_TREMONT 06_96H + ALDERLAKE 06_97H + ALDERLAKE_L 06_9AH + ATOM_TREMONT_L 06_9CH + RAPTORLAKE 06_B7H + RAPTORLAKE_P 06_BAH + ATOM_GRACEMONT 06_BEH + RAPTORLAKE_S 06_BFH + =================== ============ + +As an exception to this table, Intel Xeon E family parts ALDERLAKE(06_97H) and +RAPTORLAKE(06_B7H) codenamed Catlow are not affected. They are reported as +vulnerable in Linux because they share the same family/model with an affected +part. Unlike their affected counterparts, they do not enumerate RFDS_CLEAR or +CPUID.HYBRID. This information could be used to distinguish between the +affected and unaffected parts, but it is deemed not worth adding complexity as +the reporting is fixed automatically when these parts enumerate RFDS_NO. + +Mitigation +========== +Intel released a microcode update that enables software to clear sensitive +information using the VERW instruction. Like MDS, RFDS deploys the same +mitigation strategy to force the CPU to clear the affected buffers before an +attacker can extract the secrets. This is achieved by using the otherwise +unused and obsolete VERW instruction in combination with a microcode update. +The microcode clears the affected CPU buffers when the VERW instruction is +executed. + +Mitigation points +----------------- +VERW is executed by the kernel before returning to user space, and by KVM +before VMentry. None of the affected cores support SMT, so VERW is not required +at C-state transitions. + +New bits in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES +---------------------------------- +Newer processors and microcode update on existing affected processors added new +bits to IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. These bits can be used to enumerate +vulnerability and mitigation capability: + +- Bit 27 - RFDS_NO - When set, processor is not affected by RFDS. +- Bit 28 - RFDS_CLEAR - When set, processor is affected by RFDS, and has the + microcode that clears the affected buffers on VERW execution. + +Mitigation control on the kernel command line +--------------------------------------------- +The kernel command line allows to control RFDS mitigation at boot time with the +parameter "reg_file_data_sampling=". The valid arguments are: + + ========== ================================================================= + on If the CPU is vulnerable, enable mitigation; CPU buffer clearing + on exit to userspace and before entering a VM. + off Disables mitigation. + ========== ================================================================= + +Mitigation default is selected by CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS. + +Mitigation status information +----------------------------- +The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current +vulnerability status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and +which mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is: + + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/reg_file_data_sampling + +The possible values in this file are: + + .. list-table:: + + * - 'Not affected' + - The processor is not vulnerable + * - 'Vulnerable' + - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled + * - 'Vulnerable: No microcode' + - The processor is vulnerable but microcode is not updated. + * - 'Mitigation: Clear Register File' + - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is + enabled. + +References +---------- +.. [#f1] Affected Processors + https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html From d405b9c03f06b1b5e73ebc4f34452687022f7029 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 12:29:43 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 45/56] x86/rfds: Mitigate Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) commit 8076fcde016c9c0e0660543e67bff86cb48a7c9c upstream. RFDS is a CPU vulnerability that may allow userspace to infer kernel stale data previously used in floating point registers, vector registers and integer registers. RFDS only affects certain Intel Atom processors. Intel released a microcode update that uses VERW instruction to clear the affected CPU buffers. Unlike MDS, none of the affected cores support SMT. Add RFDS bug infrastructure and enable the VERW based mitigation by default, that clears the affected buffers just before exiting to userspace. Also add sysfs reporting and cmdline parameter "reg_file_data_sampling" to control the mitigation. For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 + .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 21 +++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 11 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 8 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 38 ++++++++- drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 ++ include/linux/cpu.h | 2 + 9 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu index 13c01b641dc7..78c26280c473 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu @@ -519,6 +519,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/reg_file_data_sampling /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 4ad60e127e04..2dfe75104e7d 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1107,6 +1107,26 @@ The filter can be disabled or changed to another driver later using sysfs. + reg_file_data_sampling= + [X86] Controls mitigation for Register File Data + Sampling (RFDS) vulnerability. RFDS is a CPU + vulnerability which may allow userspace to infer + kernel data values previously stored in floating point + registers, vector registers, or integer registers. + RFDS only affects Intel Atom processors. + + on: Turns ON the mitigation. + off: Turns OFF the mitigation. + + This parameter overrides the compile time default set + by CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS. Mitigation cannot be + disabled when other VERW based mitigations (like MDS) + are enabled. In order to disable RFDS mitigation all + VERW based mitigations need to be disabled. + + For details see: + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst + driver_async_probe= [KNL] List of driver names to be probed asynchronously. * matches with all driver names. If * is specified, the @@ -3262,6 +3282,7 @@ nospectre_bhb [ARM64] nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC] nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] + reg_file_data_sampling=off [X86] retbleed=off [X86] spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC] spectre_v2_user=off [X86] diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 2f7af61b49b6..5caa023e9839 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2565,6 +2565,17 @@ config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION If in doubt, say N. +config MITIGATION_RFDS + bool "RFDS Mitigation" + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL + default y + help + Enable mitigation for Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) by default. + RFDS is a hardware vulnerability which affects Intel Atom CPUs. It + allows unprivileged speculative access to stale data previously + stored in floating point, vector and integer registers. + See also + endif config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index b60f24b30cb9..b97a70aa4de9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -477,4 +477,5 @@ /* BUG word 2 */ #define X86_BUG_SRSO X86_BUG(1*32 + 0) /* AMD SRSO bug */ #define X86_BUG_DIV0 X86_BUG(1*32 + 1) /* AMD DIV0 speculation bug */ +#define X86_BUG_RFDS X86_BUG(1*32 + 2) /* CPU is vulnerable to Register File Data Sampling */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index ec955ab2ff03..005e41dc7ee5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -168,6 +168,14 @@ * CPU is not vulnerable to Gather * Data Sampling (GDS). */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO BIT(27) /* + * Not susceptible to Register + * File Data Sampling. + */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR BIT(28) /* + * VERW clears CPU Register + * File. + */ #define ARCH_CAP_XAPIC_DISABLE BIT(21) /* * IA32_XAPIC_DISABLE_STATUS MSR diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index c66f6eb40afb..c68789fdc123 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -479,6 +479,57 @@ static int __init mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline); +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Register File Data Sampling: " fmt + +enum rfds_mitigations { + RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF, + RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW, + RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED, +}; + +/* Default mitigation for Register File Data Sampling */ +static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init = + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF; + +static const char * const rfds_strings[] = { + [RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable", + [RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear Register File", + [RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode", +}; + +static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) { + rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF; + return; + } + if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF) + return; + + if (x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF); + else + rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; +} + +static __init int rfds_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS)) + return 0; + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) + rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF; + else if (!strcmp(str, "on")) + rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW; + + return 0; +} +early_param("reg_file_data_sampling", rfds_parse_cmdline); + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "" fmt @@ -512,6 +563,11 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void) mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW; mmio_select_mitigation(); } + if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF && + boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS)) { + rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW; + rfds_select_mitigation(); + } out: if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]); @@ -521,6 +577,8 @@ out: pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]); else if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN)) pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: Unknown: No mitigations\n"); + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS)) + pr_info("Register File Data Sampling: %s\n", rfds_strings[rfds_mitigation]); } static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void) @@ -528,11 +586,12 @@ static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void) mds_select_mitigation(); taa_select_mitigation(); mmio_select_mitigation(); + rfds_select_mitigation(); /* - * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update - * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data - * mitigation selection is done. + * As these mitigations are inter-related and rely on VERW instruction + * to clear the microarchitural buffers, update and print their status + * after mitigation selection is done for each of these vulnerabilities. */ md_clear_update_mitigation(); } @@ -2596,6 +2655,11 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf) sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled"); } +static ssize_t rfds_show_state(char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", rfds_strings[rfds_mitigation]); +} + static char *stibp_state(void) { if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) @@ -2757,6 +2821,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr case X86_BUG_SRSO: return srso_show_state(buf); + case X86_BUG_RFDS: + return rfds_show_state(buf); + default: break; } @@ -2831,4 +2898,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev, struct device_attribut { return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRSO); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RFDS); +} #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 454cdf341862..758938c94b41 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1248,6 +1248,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { #define SRSO BIT(5) /* CPU is affected by GDS */ #define GDS BIT(6) +/* CPU is affected by Register File Data Sampling */ +#define RFDS BIT(7) static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), @@ -1275,9 +1277,18 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE_P, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE_S, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE_N, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GOLDMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED), VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED), @@ -1311,6 +1322,24 @@ static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap) ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO); } +static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 ia32_cap) +{ + /* The "immunity" bit trumps everything else: */ + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO) + return false; + + /* + * VMMs set ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR for processors not in the blacklist to + * indicate that mitigation is needed because guest is running on a + * vulnerable hardware or may migrate to such hardware: + */ + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR) + return true; + + /* Only consult the blacklist when there is no enumeration: */ + return cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RFDS); +} + static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); @@ -1419,6 +1448,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO); } + if (vulnerable_to_rfds(ia32_cap)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c index dab70a65377c..31da94afe4f3 100644 --- a/drivers/base/cpu.c +++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c @@ -589,6 +589,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev, return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); } +ssize_t __weak cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); +} + static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL); @@ -602,6 +608,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(gather_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_gds, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_rstack_overflow, 0444, cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow, NULL); +static DEVICE_ATTR(reg_file_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling, NULL); static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_meltdown.attr, @@ -617,6 +624,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_retbleed.attr, &dev_attr_gather_data_sampling.attr, &dev_attr_spec_rstack_overflow.attr, + &dev_attr_reg_file_data_sampling.attr, NULL }; diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h index 008bfa68cfab..4b06b1f1e267 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpu.h +++ b/include/linux/cpu.h @@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); +extern ssize_t cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern __printf(4, 5) struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata, From b2e92ab17e440a97c716b701ecd897eebca11ac0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 12:29:43 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 46/56] KVM/x86: Export RFDS_NO and RFDS_CLEAR to guests commit 2a0180129d726a4b953232175857d442651b55a0 upstream. Mitigation for RFDS requires RFDS_CLEAR capability which is enumerated by MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bit 27. If the host has it set, export it to guests so that they can deploy the mitigation. RFDS_NO indicates that the system is not vulnerable to RFDS, export it to guests so that they don't deploy the mitigation unnecessarily. When the host is not affected by X86_BUG_RFDS, but has RFDS_NO=0, synthesize RFDS_NO to the guest. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 7144e5166813..688bc7b72eb6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1613,7 +1613,8 @@ static unsigned int num_msr_based_features; ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH | ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO | \ ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR | ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | \ ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO | \ - ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) + ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO | \ + ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO | ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR) static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void) { @@ -1650,6 +1651,8 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void) data |= ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO; if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO; + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS)) + data |= ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO; if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) { /* From 92cdc9d71ab084788afd1fcefa315dd33deba068 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 22:49:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 47/56] selftests: mptcp: decrease BW in simult flows [ Upstream commit 5e2f3c65af47e527ccac54060cf909e3306652ff ] When running the simult_flow selftest in slow environments -- e.g. QEmu without KVM support --, the results can be unstable. This selftest checks if the aggregated bandwidth is (almost) fully used as expected. To help improving the stability while still keeping the same validation in place, the BW and the delay are reduced to lower the pressure on the CPU. Fixes: 1a418cb8e888 ("mptcp: simult flow self-tests") Fixes: 219d04992b68 ("mptcp: push pending frames when subflow has free space") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240131-upstream-net-20240131-mptcp-ci-issues-v1-6-4c1c11e571ff@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh index 4a417f9d51d6..06ad0510469e 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh @@ -301,10 +301,10 @@ done setup run_test 10 10 0 0 "balanced bwidth" -run_test 10 10 1 50 "balanced bwidth with unbalanced delay" +run_test 10 10 1 25 "balanced bwidth with unbalanced delay" # we still need some additional infrastructure to pass the following test-cases -run_test 30 10 0 0 "unbalanced bwidth" -run_test 30 10 1 50 "unbalanced bwidth with unbalanced delay" -run_test 30 10 50 1 "unbalanced bwidth with opposed, unbalanced delay" +run_test 10 3 0 0 "unbalanced bwidth" +run_test 10 3 1 25 "unbalanced bwidth with unbalanced delay" +run_test 10 3 25 1 "unbalanced bwidth with opposed, unbalanced delay" exit $ret From f0b6dc034e1797b0bc91558c0c2f90c8a12b5533 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ma Hanghong Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2022 11:46:56 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 48/56] drm/amd/display: Wrong colorimetry workaround [ Upstream commit b1a98cf89a695d36c414653634ea7ba91b6e701f ] [Why] For FreeSync HDR, native color space flag in AMD VSIF(BT.709) should be used when intepreting content and color space flag in VSC or AVI infoFrame should be ignored. However, it turned out some userspace application still use color flag in VSC or AVI infoFrame which is incorrect. [How] Transfer function is used when building the VSC and AVI infoFrame. Set colorimetry to BT.709 when all the following match: 1. Pixel format is YCbCr; 2. In FreeSync 2 HDR, color is COLOR_SPACE_2020_YCBCR; 3. Transfer function is TRANSFER_FUNC_GAMMA_22; Tested-by: Mark Broadworth Reviewed-by: Krunoslav Kovac Acked-by: Rodrigo Siqueira Signed-off-by: Ma Hanghong Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Stable-dep-of: e6a7df96facd ("drm/amd/display: Fix MST Null Ptr for RV") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c | 5 ++++- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_resource.c | 6 ++++++ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/inc/mod_info_packet.h | 3 ++- .../gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/info_packet/info_packet.c | 6 +++++- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c index da16048bf100..bea49befdcac 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c @@ -5938,6 +5938,7 @@ create_stream_for_sink(struct amdgpu_dm_connector *aconnector, bool scale = dm_state ? (dm_state->scaling != RMX_OFF) : false; int mode_refresh; int preferred_refresh = 0; + enum color_transfer_func tf = TRANSFER_FUNC_UNKNOWN; #if defined(CONFIG_DRM_AMD_DC_DCN) struct dsc_dec_dpcd_caps dsc_caps; #endif @@ -6071,7 +6072,9 @@ create_stream_for_sink(struct amdgpu_dm_connector *aconnector, if (stream->link->dpcd_caps.dprx_feature.bits.VSC_SDP_COLORIMETRY_SUPPORTED) stream->use_vsc_sdp_for_colorimetry = true; } - mod_build_vsc_infopacket(stream, &stream->vsc_infopacket, stream->output_color_space); + if (stream->out_transfer_func->tf == TRANSFER_FUNCTION_GAMMA22) + tf = TRANSFER_FUNC_GAMMA_22; + mod_build_vsc_infopacket(stream, &stream->vsc_infopacket, stream->output_color_space, tf); aconnector->psr_skip_count = AMDGPU_DM_PSR_ENTRY_DELAY; } diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_resource.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_resource.c index 66923f51037a..e2f80cd0ca8c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_resource.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_resource.c @@ -3038,6 +3038,12 @@ static void set_avi_info_frame( hdmi_info.bits.C0_C1 = COLORIMETRY_EXTENDED; } + if (pixel_encoding && color_space == COLOR_SPACE_2020_YCBCR && + stream->out_transfer_func->tf == TRANSFER_FUNCTION_GAMMA22) { + hdmi_info.bits.EC0_EC2 = 0; + hdmi_info.bits.C0_C1 = COLORIMETRY_ITU709; + } + /* TODO: un-hardcode aspect ratio */ aspect = stream->timing.aspect_ratio; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/inc/mod_info_packet.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/inc/mod_info_packet.h index 1d8b746b02f2..edf5845f6a1f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/inc/mod_info_packet.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/inc/mod_info_packet.h @@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ struct mod_vrr_params; void mod_build_vsc_infopacket(const struct dc_stream_state *stream, struct dc_info_packet *info_packet, - enum dc_color_space cs); + enum dc_color_space cs, + enum color_transfer_func tf); void mod_build_hf_vsif_infopacket(const struct dc_stream_state *stream, struct dc_info_packet *info_packet); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/info_packet/info_packet.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/info_packet/info_packet.c index 27ceba9d6d65..69691058ab89 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/info_packet/info_packet.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/info_packet/info_packet.c @@ -132,7 +132,8 @@ enum ColorimetryYCCDP { void mod_build_vsc_infopacket(const struct dc_stream_state *stream, struct dc_info_packet *info_packet, - enum dc_color_space cs) + enum dc_color_space cs, + enum color_transfer_func tf) { unsigned int vsc_packet_revision = vsc_packet_undefined; unsigned int i; @@ -382,6 +383,9 @@ void mod_build_vsc_infopacket(const struct dc_stream_state *stream, colorimetryFormat = ColorimetryYCC_DP_AdobeYCC; else if (cs == COLOR_SPACE_2020_YCBCR) colorimetryFormat = ColorimetryYCC_DP_ITU2020YCbCr; + + if (cs == COLOR_SPACE_2020_YCBCR && tf == TRANSFER_FUNC_GAMMA_22) + colorimetryFormat = ColorimetryYCC_DP_ITU709; break; default: From 01d992088dce3945f70f49f34b0b911c5213c238 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fangzhi Zuo Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 13:43:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 49/56] drm/amd/display: Fix MST Null Ptr for RV [ Upstream commit e6a7df96facdcf5b1f71eb3ec26f2f9f6ad61e57 ] The change try to fix below error specific to RV platform: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 917 Comm: sway Not tainted 6.3.9-arch1-1 #1 124dc55df4f5272ccb409f39ef4872fc2b3376a2 Hardware name: LENOVO 20NKS01Y00/20NKS01Y00, BIOS R12ET61W(1.31 ) 07/28/2022 RIP: 0010:drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper] Code: 01 00 00 48 8b 85 60 05 00 00 48 63 80 88 00 00 00 3b 43 28 0f 8d 2e 01 00 00 48 8b 53 30 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 40 18 <48> 8> RSP: 0018:ffff960cc2df77d8 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8afb87e81280 RCX: 0000000000000224 RDX: ffff8afb9ee37c00 RSI: ffff8afb8da1a578 RDI: ffff8afb87e81280 RBP: ffff8afb83d67000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8afb9652f850 R10: ffff960cc2df7908 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8afb8d7688a0 R14: ffff8afb8da1a578 R15: 0000000000000224 FS: 00007f4dac35ce00(0000) GS:ffff8afe30b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000010ddc6000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 Call Trace: ? __die+0x23/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0 ? plist_add+0xbe/0x100 ? exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper 0e67723696438d8e02b741593dd50d80b44c2026] ? drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x28/0x260 [drm_display_helper 0e67723696438d8e02b741593dd50d80b44c2026] compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_link+0x2ff/0xa40 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054] ? fill_plane_buffer_attributes+0x419/0x510 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054] compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_state+0x1e1/0x250 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054] amdgpu_dm_atomic_check+0xecd/0x1190 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054] drm_atomic_check_only+0x5c5/0xa40 drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x76e/0xbc0 ? _copy_to_user+0x25/0x30 ? drm_ioctl+0x296/0x4b0 ? __pfx_drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x10/0x10 drm_ioctl_kernel+0xcd/0x170 drm_ioctl+0x26d/0x4b0 ? __pfx_drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x10/0x10 amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x4e/0x90 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x94/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7f4dad17f76f Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <89> c> RSP: 002b:00007ffd9ae859f0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e255a55900 RCX: 00007f4dad17f76f RDX: 00007ffd9ae85a90 RSI: 00000000c03864bc RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 00007ffd9ae85a90 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000003 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000c03864bc R13: 000000000000000b R14: 000055e255a7fc60 R15: 000055e255a01eb0 Modules linked in: rfcomm snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq snd_seq_device ccm cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg joydev mousedev bnep > typec libphy k10temp ipmi_msghandler roles i2c_scmi acpi_cpufreq mac_hid nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_mas> CR2: 0000000000000008 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper] Code: 01 00 00 48 8b 85 60 05 00 00 48 63 80 88 00 00 00 3b 43 28 0f 8d 2e 01 00 00 48 8b 53 30 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 40 18 <48> 8> RSP: 0018:ffff960cc2df77d8 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8afb87e81280 RCX: 0000000000000224 RDX: ffff8afb9ee37c00 RSI: ffff8afb8da1a578 RDI: ffff8afb87e81280 RBP: ffff8afb83d67000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8afb9652f850 R10: ffff960cc2df7908 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8afb8d7688a0 R14: ffff8afb8da1a578 R15: 0000000000000224 FS: 00007f4dac35ce00(0000) GS:ffff8afe30b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000010ddc6000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 With a second DP monitor connected, drm_atomic_state in dm atomic check sequence does not include the connector state for the old/existing/first DP monitor. In such case, dsc determination policy would hit a null ptr when it tries to iterate the old/existing stream that does not have a valid connector state attached to it. When that happens, dm atomic check should call drm_atomic_get_connector_state for a new connector state. Existing dm has already done that, except for RV due to it does not have official support of dsc where .num_dsc is not defined in dcn10 resource cap, that prevent from getting drm_atomic_get_connector_state called. So, skip dsc determination policy for ASICs that don't have DSC support. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/2314 Reviewed-by: Wayne Lin Acked-by: Hamza Mahfooz Signed-off-by: Fangzhi Zuo Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c index bea49befdcac..a6c6f286a598 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c @@ -10123,11 +10123,13 @@ static int amdgpu_dm_atomic_check(struct drm_device *dev, } #if defined(CONFIG_DRM_AMD_DC_DCN) - ret = compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_state(state, dm_state->context, vars); - if (ret) { - DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_state() failed\n"); - ret = -EINVAL; - goto fail; + if (dc_resource_is_dsc_encoding_supported(dc)) { + ret = compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_state(state, dm_state->context, vars); + if (ret) { + DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_state() failed\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto fail; + } } ret = dm_update_mst_vcpi_slots_for_dsc(state, dm_state->context, vars); From eba76e4808c9ad2c41ec5652a9335a8b5c03a709 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2023 19:25:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 50/56] getrusage: add the "signal_struct *sig" local variable [ Upstream commit c7ac8231ace9b07306d0299969e42073b189c70a ] No functional changes, cleanup/preparation. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230909172554.GA20441@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Eric W. Biederman Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Stable-dep-of: daa694e41375 ("getrusage: move thread_group_cputime_adjusted() outside of lock_task_sighand()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/sys.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index c85e1abf7b7c..177155ba50cd 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -1779,6 +1779,7 @@ void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) unsigned long flags; u64 tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime; unsigned long maxrss = 0; + struct signal_struct *sig = p->signal; memset((char *)r, 0, sizeof (*r)); utime = stime = 0; @@ -1786,7 +1787,7 @@ void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) { task_cputime_adjusted(current, &utime, &stime); accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r); - maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; + maxrss = sig->maxrss; goto out; } @@ -1796,15 +1797,15 @@ void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) switch (who) { case RUSAGE_BOTH: case RUSAGE_CHILDREN: - utime = p->signal->cutime; - stime = p->signal->cstime; - r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw; - r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw; - r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt; - r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt; - r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock; - r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock; - maxrss = p->signal->cmaxrss; + utime = sig->cutime; + stime = sig->cstime; + r->ru_nvcsw = sig->cnvcsw; + r->ru_nivcsw = sig->cnivcsw; + r->ru_minflt = sig->cmin_flt; + r->ru_majflt = sig->cmaj_flt; + r->ru_inblock = sig->cinblock; + r->ru_oublock = sig->coublock; + maxrss = sig->cmaxrss; if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN) break; @@ -1814,14 +1815,14 @@ void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime); utime += tgutime; stime += tgstime; - r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw; - r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw; - r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt; - r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt; - r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock; - r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock; - if (maxrss < p->signal->maxrss) - maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; + r->ru_nvcsw += sig->nvcsw; + r->ru_nivcsw += sig->nivcsw; + r->ru_minflt += sig->min_flt; + r->ru_majflt += sig->maj_flt; + r->ru_inblock += sig->inblock; + r->ru_oublock += sig->oublock; + if (maxrss < sig->maxrss) + maxrss = sig->maxrss; t = p; do { accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r); From d9fe6ef245766d4f4d0494aafc7d5b2189b9b94c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 16:50:50 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 51/56] getrusage: move thread_group_cputime_adjusted() outside of lock_task_sighand() [ Upstream commit daa694e4137571b4ebec330f9a9b4d54aa8b8089 ] Patch series "getrusage: use sig->stats_lock", v2. This patch (of 2): thread_group_cputime() does its own locking, we can safely shift thread_group_cputime_adjusted() which does another for_each_thread loop outside of ->siglock protected section. This is also preparation for the next patch which changes getrusage() to use stats_lock instead of siglock, thread_group_cputime() takes the same lock. With the current implementation recursive read_seqbegin_or_lock() is fine, thread_group_cputime() can't enter the slow mode if the caller holds stats_lock, yet this looks more safe and better performance-wise. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240122155023.GA26169@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240122155050.GA26205@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Reported-by: Dylan Hatch Tested-by: Dylan Hatch Cc: Eric W. Biederman Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/sys.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 177155ba50cd..2646047fe551 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -1778,17 +1778,19 @@ void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) struct task_struct *t; unsigned long flags; u64 tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime; - unsigned long maxrss = 0; + unsigned long maxrss; + struct mm_struct *mm; struct signal_struct *sig = p->signal; - memset((char *)r, 0, sizeof (*r)); + memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r)); utime = stime = 0; + maxrss = 0; if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) { task_cputime_adjusted(current, &utime, &stime); accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r); maxrss = sig->maxrss; - goto out; + goto out_thread; } if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) @@ -1812,9 +1814,6 @@ void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) fallthrough; case RUSAGE_SELF: - thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime); - utime += tgutime; - stime += tgstime; r->ru_nvcsw += sig->nvcsw; r->ru_nivcsw += sig->nivcsw; r->ru_minflt += sig->min_flt; @@ -1834,19 +1833,24 @@ void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) } unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags); -out: + if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN) + goto out_children; + + thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime); + utime += tgutime; + stime += tgstime; + +out_thread: + mm = get_task_mm(p); + if (mm) { + setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss, mm); + mmput(mm); + } + +out_children: + r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* convert pages to KBs */ r->ru_utime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(utime); r->ru_stime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(stime); - - if (who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN) { - struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(p); - - if (mm) { - setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss, mm); - mmput(mm); - } - } - r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* convert pages to KBs */ } SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru) From 2a304d8c922f2d13d6b95457022950350c23103b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2023 19:26:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 52/56] getrusage: use __for_each_thread() [ Upstream commit 13b7bc60b5353371460a203df6c38ccd38ad7a3a ] do/while_each_thread should be avoided when possible. Plus this change allows to avoid lock_task_sighand(), we can use rcu and/or sig->stats_lock instead. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230909172629.GA20454@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Eric W. Biederman Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Stable-dep-of: f7ec1cd5cc7e ("getrusage: use sig->stats_lock rather than lock_task_sighand()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/sys.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 2646047fe551..04102538cf43 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -1822,10 +1822,8 @@ void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) r->ru_oublock += sig->oublock; if (maxrss < sig->maxrss) maxrss = sig->maxrss; - t = p; - do { + __for_each_thread(sig, t) accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r); - } while_each_thread(p, t); break; default: From 9793a3bb531c5b747bb726d7611b81abe32f6401 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 16:50:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 53/56] getrusage: use sig->stats_lock rather than lock_task_sighand() [ Upstream commit f7ec1cd5cc7ef3ad964b677ba82b8b77f1c93009 ] lock_task_sighand() can trigger a hard lockup. If NR_CPUS threads call getrusage() at the same time and the process has NR_THREADS, spin_lock_irq will spin with irqs disabled O(NR_CPUS * NR_THREADS) time. Change getrusage() to use sig->stats_lock, it was specifically designed for this type of use. This way it runs lockless in the likely case. TODO: - Change do_task_stat() to use sig->stats_lock too, then we can remove spin_lock_irq(siglock) in wait_task_zombie(). - Turn sig->stats_lock into seqcount_rwlock_t, this way the readers in the slow mode won't exclude each other. See https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230913154907.GA26210@redhat.com/ - stats_lock has to disable irqs because ->siglock can be taken in irq context, it would be very nice to change __exit_signal() to avoid the siglock->stats_lock dependency. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240122155053.GA26214@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Reported-by: Dylan Hatch Tested-by: Dylan Hatch Cc: Eric W. Biederman Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/sys.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 04102538cf43..d06eda1387b6 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -1781,7 +1781,9 @@ void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) unsigned long maxrss; struct mm_struct *mm; struct signal_struct *sig = p->signal; + unsigned int seq = 0; +retry: memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r)); utime = stime = 0; maxrss = 0; @@ -1793,8 +1795,7 @@ void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) goto out_thread; } - if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) - return; + flags = read_seqbegin_or_lock_irqsave(&sig->stats_lock, &seq); switch (who) { case RUSAGE_BOTH: @@ -1822,14 +1823,23 @@ void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) r->ru_oublock += sig->oublock; if (maxrss < sig->maxrss) maxrss = sig->maxrss; + + rcu_read_lock(); __for_each_thread(sig, t) accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r); + rcu_read_unlock(); + break; default: BUG(); } - unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags); + + if (need_seqretry(&sig->stats_lock, seq)) { + seq = 1; + goto retry; + } + done_seqretry_irqrestore(&sig->stats_lock, seq, flags); if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN) goto out_children; From d95ef75162f4722af4b74d847173747930962405 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2023 18:45:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 54/56] fs/proc: do_task_stat: use __for_each_thread() [ Upstream commit 7904e53ed5a20fc678c01d5d1b07ec486425bb6a ] do/while_each_thread should be avoided when possible. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230909164501.GA11581@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Eric W. Biederman Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Stable-dep-of: 7601df8031fd ("fs/proc: do_task_stat: use sig->stats_lock to gather the threads/children stats") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/proc/array.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index 1b0d78dfd20f..bcb645627991 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -526,12 +526,13 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, /* add up live thread stats at the group level */ if (whole) { - struct task_struct *t = task; - do { + struct task_struct *t; + + __for_each_thread(sig, t) { min_flt += t->min_flt; maj_flt += t->maj_flt; gtime += task_gtime(t); - } while_each_thread(task, t); + } min_flt += sig->min_flt; maj_flt += sig->maj_flt; From cf4b8c39b9a0bd81c47afc7ef62914a62dd5ec4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 16:33:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 55/56] fs/proc: do_task_stat: use sig->stats_lock to gather the threads/children stats [ Upstream commit 7601df8031fd67310af891897ef6cc0df4209305 ] lock_task_sighand() can trigger a hard lockup. If NR_CPUS threads call do_task_stat() at the same time and the process has NR_THREADS, it will spin with irqs disabled O(NR_CPUS * NR_THREADS) time. Change do_task_stat() to use sig->stats_lock to gather the statistics outside of ->siglock protected section, in the likely case this code will run lockless. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240123153357.GA21857@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Signed-off-by: Dylan Hatch Cc: Eric W. Biederman Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/proc/array.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index bcb645627991..d210b2f8b7ed 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -467,13 +467,13 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, int permitted; struct mm_struct *mm; unsigned long long start_time; - unsigned long cmin_flt = 0, cmaj_flt = 0; - unsigned long min_flt = 0, maj_flt = 0; - u64 cutime, cstime, utime, stime; - u64 cgtime, gtime; + unsigned long cmin_flt, cmaj_flt, min_flt, maj_flt; + u64 cutime, cstime, cgtime, utime, stime, gtime; unsigned long rsslim = 0; unsigned long flags; int exit_code = task->exit_code; + struct signal_struct *sig = task->signal; + unsigned int seq = 1; state = *get_task_state(task); vsize = eip = esp = 0; @@ -501,12 +501,8 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, sigemptyset(&sigign); sigemptyset(&sigcatch); - cutime = cstime = 0; - cgtime = gtime = 0; if (lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) { - struct signal_struct *sig = task->signal; - if (sig->tty) { struct pid *pgrp = tty_get_pgrp(sig->tty); tty_pgrp = pid_nr_ns(pgrp, ns); @@ -517,27 +513,9 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, num_threads = get_nr_threads(task); collect_sigign_sigcatch(task, &sigign, &sigcatch); - cmin_flt = sig->cmin_flt; - cmaj_flt = sig->cmaj_flt; - cutime = sig->cutime; - cstime = sig->cstime; - cgtime = sig->cgtime; rsslim = READ_ONCE(sig->rlim[RLIMIT_RSS].rlim_cur); - /* add up live thread stats at the group level */ if (whole) { - struct task_struct *t; - - __for_each_thread(sig, t) { - min_flt += t->min_flt; - maj_flt += t->maj_flt; - gtime += task_gtime(t); - } - - min_flt += sig->min_flt; - maj_flt += sig->maj_flt; - gtime += sig->gtime; - if (sig->flags & (SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT | SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED)) exit_code = sig->group_exit_code; } @@ -552,6 +530,34 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, if (permitted && (!whole || num_threads < 2)) wchan = !task_is_running(task); + do { + seq++; /* 2 on the 1st/lockless path, otherwise odd */ + flags = read_seqbegin_or_lock_irqsave(&sig->stats_lock, &seq); + + cmin_flt = sig->cmin_flt; + cmaj_flt = sig->cmaj_flt; + cutime = sig->cutime; + cstime = sig->cstime; + cgtime = sig->cgtime; + + if (whole) { + struct task_struct *t; + + min_flt = sig->min_flt; + maj_flt = sig->maj_flt; + gtime = sig->gtime; + + rcu_read_lock(); + __for_each_thread(sig, t) { + min_flt += t->min_flt; + maj_flt += t->maj_flt; + gtime += task_gtime(t); + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + } + } while (need_seqretry(&sig->stats_lock, seq)); + done_seqretry_irqrestore(&sig->stats_lock, seq, flags); + if (whole) { thread_group_cputime_adjusted(task, &utime, &stime); } else { From d7543167affd372819a94879b8b1e8b9b12547d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sasha Levin Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2024 07:42:17 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 56/56] Linux 6.1.82 Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Mark Brown Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) Tested-by: kernelci.org bot Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index e13df565a1cb..c5345f3ebed0 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 6 PATCHLEVEL = 1 -SUBLEVEL = 81 +SUBLEVEL = 82 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Curry Ramen