From 45f5d5a9e34d3fe4140a9a3b5f7ebe86c252440a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Geert Uytterhoeven Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2019 09:48:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 01/57] arm64: dts: renesas: r8a77995: draak: Fix backlight regulator name Currently there are two nodes named "regulator1" in the Draak DTS: a 3.3V regulator for the eMMC and the LVDS decoder, and a 12V regulator for the backlight. This causes the former to be overwritten by the latter. Fix this by renaming all regulators with numerical suffixes to use named suffixes, which are less likely to conflict. Fixes: 4fbd4158fe8967e9 ("arm64: dts: renesas: r8a77995: draak: Add backlight") Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Signed-off-by: Simon Horman --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/r8a77995-draak.dts | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/r8a77995-draak.dts b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/r8a77995-draak.dts index 0711170b26b1..3aa2564dfdc2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/r8a77995-draak.dts +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/r8a77995-draak.dts @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ reg = <0x0 0x48000000 0x0 0x18000000>; }; - reg_1p8v: regulator0 { + reg_1p8v: regulator-1p8v { compatible = "regulator-fixed"; regulator-name = "fixed-1.8V"; regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>; @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ regulator-always-on; }; - reg_3p3v: regulator1 { + reg_3p3v: regulator-3p3v { compatible = "regulator-fixed"; regulator-name = "fixed-3.3V"; regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>; @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ regulator-always-on; }; - reg_12p0v: regulator1 { + reg_12p0v: regulator-12p0v { compatible = "regulator-fixed"; regulator-name = "D12.0V"; regulator-min-microvolt = <12000000>; From b9ee5e04fd77898208c51b1395fa0b5e8536f9b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Leroy Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2019 12:48:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 02/57] powerpc/64e: Drop stale call to smp_processor_id() which hangs SMP startup Commit ebb9d30a6a74 ("powerpc/mm: any thread in one core can be the first to setup TLB1") removed the need to know the cpu_id in early_init_this_mmu(), but the call to smp_processor_id() which was marked __maybe_used remained. Since commit ed1cd6deb013 ("powerpc: Activate CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK") thread_info cannot be reached before MMU is properly set up. Drop this stale call to smp_processor_id() which makes SMP hang when CONFIG_PREEMPT is set. Fixes: ebb9d30a6a74 ("powerpc/mm: any thread in one core can be the first to setup TLB1") Fixes: ed1cd6deb013 ("powerpc: Activate CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.1+ Reported-by: Chris Packham Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy Tested-by: Chris Packham Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bef479514f4c08329fa649f67735df8918bc0976.1565268248.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr --- arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/tlb.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/tlb.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/tlb.c index d4acf6fa0596..bf60983a58c7 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/tlb.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/tlb.c @@ -630,7 +630,6 @@ static void early_init_this_mmu(void) #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_TYPE_FSL_E)) { unsigned int num_cams; - int __maybe_unused cpu = smp_processor_id(); bool map = true; /* use a quarter of the TLBCAM for bolted linear map */ From 2c231c0c1dec42192aca0f87f2dc68b8f0cbc7d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wenwen Wang Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2019 01:48:55 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 03/57] dmaengine: ti: dma-crossbar: Fix a memory leak bug In ti_dra7_xbar_probe(), 'rsv_events' is allocated through kcalloc(). Then of_property_read_u32_array() is invoked to search for the property. However, if this process fails, 'rsv_events' is not deallocated, leading to a memory leak bug. To fix this issue, free 'rsv_events' before returning the error. Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang Acked-by: Peter Ujfalusi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1565938136-7249-1-git-send-email-wenwen@cs.uga.edu Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c b/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c index ad2f0a4cd6a4..f255056696ee 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c +++ b/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c @@ -391,8 +391,10 @@ static int ti_dra7_xbar_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) ret = of_property_read_u32_array(node, pname, (u32 *)rsv_events, nelm * 2); - if (ret) + if (ret) { + kfree(rsv_events); return ret; + } for (i = 0; i < nelm; i++) { ti_dra7_xbar_reserve(rsv_events[i][0], rsv_events[i][1], From 962411b05a6d3342aa649e39cda1704c1fc042c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wenwen Wang Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2019 01:56:08 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 04/57] dmaengine: ti: omap-dma: Add cleanup in omap_dma_probe() If devm_request_irq() fails to disable all interrupts, no cleanup is performed before retuning the error. To fix this issue, invoke omap_dma_free() to do the cleanup. Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang Acked-by: Peter Ujfalusi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1565938570-7528-1-git-send-email-wenwen@cs.uga.edu Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/ti/omap-dma.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/ti/omap-dma.c b/drivers/dma/ti/omap-dma.c index ba27802efcd0..d07c0d5de7a2 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/ti/omap-dma.c +++ b/drivers/dma/ti/omap-dma.c @@ -1540,8 +1540,10 @@ static int omap_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) rc = devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, irq, omap_dma_irq, IRQF_SHARED, "omap-dma-engine", od); - if (rc) + if (rc) { + omap_dma_free(od); return rc; + } } if (omap_dma_glbl_read(od, CAPS_0) & CAPS_0_SUPPORT_LL123) From bc624a06f0c5190bc37fec7d22cd82b43a579698 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Jander Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 06:46:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 05/57] gpio: pca953x: correct type of reg_direction The type of reg_direction needs to match the type of the regmap, which is u8. Fixes: 0f25fda840a9 ("gpio: pca953x: Zap ad-hoc reg_direction cache") Cc: Cc: Signed-off-by: David Jander Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski --- drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c index 378b206d2dc9..30072a570bc2 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c @@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ static void pca953x_irq_bus_sync_unlock(struct irq_data *d) u8 new_irqs; int level, i; u8 invert_irq_mask[MAX_BANK]; - int reg_direction[MAX_BANK]; + u8 reg_direction[MAX_BANK]; regmap_bulk_read(chip->regmap, chip->regs->direction, reg_direction, NBANK(chip)); @@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ static bool pca953x_irq_pending(struct pca953x_chip *chip, u8 *pending) bool pending_seen = false; bool trigger_seen = false; u8 trigger[MAX_BANK]; - int reg_direction[MAX_BANK]; + u8 reg_direction[MAX_BANK]; int ret, i; if (chip->driver_data & PCA_PCAL) { @@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ static int pca953x_irq_setup(struct pca953x_chip *chip, { struct i2c_client *client = chip->client; struct irq_chip *irq_chip = &chip->irq_chip; - int reg_direction[MAX_BANK]; + u8 reg_direction[MAX_BANK]; int ret, i; if (!client->irq) From 438b6c20e6161a1a7542490baa093c86732f77d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Jander Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 06:46:29 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 06/57] gpio: pca953x: use pca953x_read_regs instead of regmap_bulk_read The register number needs to be translated for chips with more than 8 ports. This patch fixes a bug causing all chips with more than 8 GPIO pins to not work correctly. Fixes: 0f25fda840a9 ("gpio: pca953x: Zap ad-hoc reg_direction cache") Cc: Cc: Signed-off-by: David Jander Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski --- drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c index 30072a570bc2..48fea4c68e8d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c @@ -606,8 +606,7 @@ static void pca953x_irq_bus_sync_unlock(struct irq_data *d) u8 invert_irq_mask[MAX_BANK]; u8 reg_direction[MAX_BANK]; - regmap_bulk_read(chip->regmap, chip->regs->direction, reg_direction, - NBANK(chip)); + pca953x_read_regs(chip, chip->regs->direction, reg_direction); if (chip->driver_data & PCA_PCAL) { /* Enable latch on interrupt-enabled inputs */ @@ -710,8 +709,7 @@ static bool pca953x_irq_pending(struct pca953x_chip *chip, u8 *pending) return false; /* Remove output pins from the equation */ - regmap_bulk_read(chip->regmap, chip->regs->direction, reg_direction, - NBANK(chip)); + pca953x_read_regs(chip, chip->regs->direction, reg_direction); for (i = 0; i < NBANK(chip); i++) cur_stat[i] &= reg_direction[i]; @@ -789,8 +787,7 @@ static int pca953x_irq_setup(struct pca953x_chip *chip, * interrupt. We have to rely on the previous read for * this purpose. */ - regmap_bulk_read(chip->regmap, chip->regs->direction, reg_direction, - NBANK(chip)); + pca953x_read_regs(chip, chip->regs->direction, reg_direction); for (i = 0; i < NBANK(chip); i++) chip->irq_stat[i] &= reg_direction[i]; mutex_init(&chip->irq_lock); From 274b924088e93593c76fb122d24bc0ef18d0ddf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Moyer Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2019 11:49:46 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 07/57] libnvdimm/pfn: Fix namespace creation on misaligned addresses Yi reported[1] that after commit a3619190d62e ("libnvdimm/pfn: stop padding pmem namespaces to section alignment"), it was no longer possible to create a device dax namespace with a 1G alignment. The reason was that the pmem region was not itself 1G-aligned. The code happily skips past the first 512M, but fails to account for a now misaligned end offset (since space was allocated starting at that misaligned address, and extending for size GBs). Reintroduce end_trunc, so that the code correctly handles the misaligned end address. This results in the same behavior as before the introduction of the offending commit. [1] https://lists.01.org/pipermail/linux-nvdimm/2019-July/022813.html Fixes: a3619190d62e ("libnvdimm/pfn: stop padding pmem namespaces ...") Reported-and-tested-by: Yi Zhang Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/x49ftll8f39.fsf@segfault.boston.devel.redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams --- drivers/nvdimm/pfn_devs.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/pfn_devs.c b/drivers/nvdimm/pfn_devs.c index 3e7b11cf1aae..cb98b8fe786e 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/pfn_devs.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/pfn_devs.c @@ -655,6 +655,7 @@ static int nd_pfn_init(struct nd_pfn *nd_pfn) resource_size_t start, size; struct nd_region *nd_region; unsigned long npfns, align; + u32 end_trunc; struct nd_pfn_sb *pfn_sb; phys_addr_t offset; const char *sig; @@ -696,6 +697,7 @@ static int nd_pfn_init(struct nd_pfn *nd_pfn) size = resource_size(&nsio->res); npfns = PHYS_PFN(size - SZ_8K); align = max(nd_pfn->align, (1UL << SUBSECTION_SHIFT)); + end_trunc = start + size - ALIGN_DOWN(start + size, align); if (nd_pfn->mode == PFN_MODE_PMEM) { /* * The altmap should be padded out to the block size used @@ -714,7 +716,7 @@ static int nd_pfn_init(struct nd_pfn *nd_pfn) return -ENXIO; } - npfns = PHYS_PFN(size - offset); + npfns = PHYS_PFN(size - offset - end_trunc); pfn_sb->mode = cpu_to_le32(nd_pfn->mode); pfn_sb->dataoff = cpu_to_le64(offset); pfn_sb->npfns = cpu_to_le64(npfns); @@ -723,6 +725,7 @@ static int nd_pfn_init(struct nd_pfn *nd_pfn) memcpy(pfn_sb->parent_uuid, nd_dev_to_uuid(&ndns->dev), 16); pfn_sb->version_major = cpu_to_le16(1); pfn_sb->version_minor = cpu_to_le16(3); + pfn_sb->end_trunc = cpu_to_le32(end_trunc); pfn_sb->align = cpu_to_le32(nd_pfn->align); checksum = nd_sb_checksum((struct nd_gen_sb *) pfn_sb); pfn_sb->checksum = cpu_to_le64(checksum); From 807f6c8472da716e29744e1fa35480b08af3e4bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Laurent Pinchart Date: Sat, 24 Aug 2019 00:23:53 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 08/57] drm/ingenic: Hardcode panel type to DPI The ingenic driver supports DPI panels only at the moment, so hardcode their type to DPI instead of Unknown. Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart Signed-off-by: Paul Cercueil Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190823212353.29369-1-laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com # *** extracted tags *** Reviewed-by: Sam Ravnborg --- drivers/gpu/drm/ingenic/ingenic-drm.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/ingenic/ingenic-drm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/ingenic/ingenic-drm.c index e9f9e9fb9b17..6381652a8829 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/ingenic/ingenic-drm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/ingenic/ingenic-drm.c @@ -656,10 +656,9 @@ static int ingenic_drm_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return ret; } - if (panel) { + if (panel) bridge = devm_drm_panel_bridge_add(dev, panel, - DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_Unknown); - } + DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DPI); priv->dma_hwdesc = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, sizeof(*priv->dma_hwdesc), &priv->dma_hwdesc_phys, From 333f31436d3db19f4286f8862a00ea1d8d8420a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 09:52:02 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/57] ALSA: hda - Fix potential endless loop at applying quirks Since the chained quirks via chained_before flag is applied before the depth check, it may lead to the endless recursive calls, when the chain were set up incorrectly. Fix it by moving the depth check at the beginning of the loop. Fixes: 1f57825077dc ("ALSA: hda - Add chained_before flag to the fixup entry") Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai --- sound/pci/hda/hda_auto_parser.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/hda_auto_parser.c b/sound/pci/hda/hda_auto_parser.c index 92390d457567..18e6546b4467 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_auto_parser.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_auto_parser.c @@ -824,6 +824,8 @@ static void apply_fixup(struct hda_codec *codec, int id, int action, int depth) while (id >= 0) { const struct hda_fixup *fix = codec->fixup_list + id; + if (++depth > 10) + break; if (fix->chained_before) apply_fixup(codec, fix->chain_id, action, depth + 1); @@ -863,8 +865,6 @@ static void apply_fixup(struct hda_codec *codec, int id, int action, int depth) } if (!fix->chained || fix->chained_before) break; - if (++depth > 10) - break; id = fix->chain_id; } } From 0622800d2ebccead42b3a85e255f7d473a36ec99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Smart Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 14:28:23 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 10/57] scsi: lpfc: Raise config max for lpfc_fcp_mq_threshold variable Raise the config max for lpfc_fcp_mq_threshold variable to 256. Signed-off-by: Dick Kennedy Signed-off-by: James Smart CC: Hannes Reinecke Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen --- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_attr.c | 2 +- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli4.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_attr.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_attr.c index 8d8c495b5b60..d65558619ab0 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_attr.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_attr.c @@ -5715,7 +5715,7 @@ LPFC_ATTR_RW(nvme_embed_cmd, 1, 0, 2, * 0 = Set nr_hw_queues by the number of CPUs or HW queues. * 1,128 = Manually specify the maximum nr_hw_queue value to be set, * - * Value range is [0,128]. Default value is 8. + * Value range is [0,256]. Default value is 8. */ LPFC_ATTR_R(fcp_mq_threshold, LPFC_FCP_MQ_THRESHOLD_DEF, LPFC_FCP_MQ_THRESHOLD_MIN, LPFC_FCP_MQ_THRESHOLD_MAX, diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli4.h b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli4.h index 329f7aa7e169..a81ef0293696 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli4.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli4.h @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ /* FCP MQ queue count limiting */ #define LPFC_FCP_MQ_THRESHOLD_MIN 0 -#define LPFC_FCP_MQ_THRESHOLD_MAX 128 +#define LPFC_FCP_MQ_THRESHOLD_MAX 256 #define LPFC_FCP_MQ_THRESHOLD_DEF 8 /* Common buffer size to accomidate SCSI and NVME IO buffers */ From 325d0ab3a1d1ad8b8c4f9f03fd866e55b0e24254 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxime Ripard Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 13:58:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 11/57] drm/modes: Add a switch to differentiate free standing options Some extra command line options can be either specified without anything else on the command line (basically all the force connection options), but some other are only relevant when matched with a resolution (margin and interlace). Let's add a switch to restrict if needed the available option set. Fixes: e08ab74bd4c7 ("drm/modes: Rewrite the command line parser") Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard Tested-by: Thomas Graichen Reviewed-by: Jernej Skrabec Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190827115850.25731-1-mripard@kernel.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c index b0369e690f36..3d10425f6b18 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c @@ -1454,6 +1454,7 @@ static int drm_mode_parse_cmdline_refresh(const char *str, char **end_ptr, } static int drm_mode_parse_cmdline_extra(const char *str, int length, + bool freestanding, const struct drm_connector *connector, struct drm_cmdline_mode *mode) { @@ -1462,9 +1463,15 @@ static int drm_mode_parse_cmdline_extra(const char *str, int length, for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { switch (str[i]) { case 'i': + if (freestanding) + return -EINVAL; + mode->interlace = true; break; case 'm': + if (freestanding) + return -EINVAL; + mode->margins = true; break; case 'D': @@ -1542,6 +1549,7 @@ static int drm_mode_parse_cmdline_res_mode(const char *str, unsigned int length, if (extras) { int ret = drm_mode_parse_cmdline_extra(end_ptr + i, 1, + false, connector, mode); if (ret) @@ -1811,7 +1819,7 @@ bool drm_mode_parse_command_line_for_connector(const char *mode_option, extra_ptr != options_ptr) { int len = strlen(name) - (extra_ptr - name); - ret = drm_mode_parse_cmdline_extra(extra_ptr, len, + ret = drm_mode_parse_cmdline_extra(extra_ptr, len, false, connector, mode); if (ret) return false; From 728a257f652aee5dd03ecde90b11f414a255e08b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxime Ripard Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 13:58:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 12/57] drm/modes: Fix the command line parser to take force options into account MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The command line parser when it has been rewritten introduced a regression when the only thing on the command line is an option to force the detection of a connector (such as video=HDMI-A-1:d), which are completely valid. It's been further broken by the support for the named modes which take anything that is not a resolution as a named mode. Let's fix this by running the extra command line option parser on the named modes if they only take a single character. Fixes: e08ab74bd4c7 ("drm/modes: Rewrite the command line parser") Reported-by: Jernej Škrabec Reported-by: Thomas Graichen Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard Tested-by: Thomas Graichen Reviewed-by: Jernej Skrabec Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190827115850.25731-2-mripard@kernel.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c index 3d10425f6b18..27fe410bba5c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c @@ -1733,16 +1733,30 @@ bool drm_mode_parse_command_line_for_connector(const char *mode_option, * bunch of things: * - We need to make sure that the first character (which * would be our resolution in X) is a digit. - * - However, if the X resolution is missing, then we end up - * with something like x, with our first character - * being an alpha-numerical character, which would be - * considered a named mode. + * - If not, then it's either a named mode or a force on/off. + * To distinguish between the two, we need to run the + * extra parsing function, and if not, then we consider it + * a named mode. * * If this isn't enough, we should add more heuristics here, * and matching unit-tests. */ - if (!isdigit(name[0]) && name[0] != 'x') + if (!isdigit(name[0]) && name[0] != 'x') { + unsigned int namelen = strlen(name); + + /* + * Only the force on/off options can be in that case, + * and they all take a single character. + */ + if (namelen == 1) { + ret = drm_mode_parse_cmdline_extra(name, namelen, true, + connector, mode); + if (!ret) + return true; + } + named_mode = true; + } /* Try to locate the bpp and refresh specifiers, if any */ bpp_ptr = strchr(name, '-'); From 3764137906a5acece8b5546873a70b1e6263a1a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxime Ripard Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 13:58:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 13/57] drm/modes: Introduce a whitelist for the named modes The named modes support has introduced a number of glitches that were in part due to the fact that the parser will take any string as a named mode. Since we shouldn't have a lot of options there (and they should be pretty standard), let's introduce a whitelist of the available named modes so that the kernel can differentiate between a poorly formed command line and a named mode. Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard Tested-by: Thomas Graichen Reviewed-by: Jernej Skrabec Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190827115850.25731-3-mripard@kernel.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c index 27fe410bba5c..0d23bf729e9f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c @@ -1677,6 +1677,22 @@ static int drm_mode_parse_cmdline_options(char *str, size_t len, return 0; } +static const char *drm_named_modes_whitelist[] = { + "NTSC", + "PAL", +}; + +static bool drm_named_mode_is_in_whitelist(const char *mode, unsigned int size) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(drm_named_modes_whitelist); i++) + if (!strncmp(mode, drm_named_modes_whitelist[i], size)) + return true; + + return false; +} + /** * drm_mode_parse_command_line_for_connector - parse command line modeline for connector * @mode_option: optional per connector mode option @@ -1794,6 +1810,10 @@ bool drm_mode_parse_command_line_for_connector(const char *mode_option, if (named_mode) { if (mode_end + 1 > DRM_DISPLAY_MODE_LEN) return false; + + if (!drm_named_mode_is_in_whitelist(name, mode_end)) + return false; + strscpy(mode->name, name, mode_end + 1); } else { ret = drm_mode_parse_cmdline_res_mode(name, mode_end, From 424c38a4e32509ae82dc9d7300432295806cb911 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxime Ripard Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 13:58:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 14/57] drm/selftests: modes: Add more unit tests for the cmdline parser Let's add some unit tests for the recent bugs we just fixed. Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard Tested-by: Thomas Graichen Reviewed-by: Jernej Skrabec Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190827115850.25731-4-mripard@kernel.org --- .../gpu/drm/selftests/drm_cmdline_selftests.h | 7 + .../drm/selftests/test-drm_cmdline_parser.c | 130 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 137 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/selftests/drm_cmdline_selftests.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/selftests/drm_cmdline_selftests.h index b45824ec7c8f..6d61a0eb5d64 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/selftests/drm_cmdline_selftests.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/selftests/drm_cmdline_selftests.h @@ -9,6 +9,13 @@ #define cmdline_test(test) selftest(test, test) +cmdline_test(drm_cmdline_test_force_d_only) +cmdline_test(drm_cmdline_test_force_D_only_dvi) +cmdline_test(drm_cmdline_test_force_D_only_hdmi) +cmdline_test(drm_cmdline_test_force_D_only_not_digital) +cmdline_test(drm_cmdline_test_force_e_only) +cmdline_test(drm_cmdline_test_margin_only) +cmdline_test(drm_cmdline_test_interlace_only) cmdline_test(drm_cmdline_test_res) cmdline_test(drm_cmdline_test_res_missing_x) cmdline_test(drm_cmdline_test_res_missing_y) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/selftests/test-drm_cmdline_parser.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/selftests/test-drm_cmdline_parser.c index 14c96edb13df..013de9d27c35 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/selftests/test-drm_cmdline_parser.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/selftests/test-drm_cmdline_parser.c @@ -17,6 +17,136 @@ static const struct drm_connector no_connector = {}; +static int drm_cmdline_test_force_e_only(void *ignored) +{ + struct drm_cmdline_mode mode = { }; + + FAIL_ON(!drm_mode_parse_command_line_for_connector("e", + &no_connector, + &mode)); + FAIL_ON(mode.specified); + FAIL_ON(mode.refresh_specified); + FAIL_ON(mode.bpp_specified); + + FAIL_ON(mode.rb); + FAIL_ON(mode.cvt); + FAIL_ON(mode.interlace); + FAIL_ON(mode.margins); + FAIL_ON(mode.force != DRM_FORCE_ON); + + return 0; +} + +static int drm_cmdline_test_force_D_only_not_digital(void *ignored) +{ + struct drm_cmdline_mode mode = { }; + + FAIL_ON(!drm_mode_parse_command_line_for_connector("D", + &no_connector, + &mode)); + FAIL_ON(mode.specified); + FAIL_ON(mode.refresh_specified); + FAIL_ON(mode.bpp_specified); + + FAIL_ON(mode.rb); + FAIL_ON(mode.cvt); + FAIL_ON(mode.interlace); + FAIL_ON(mode.margins); + FAIL_ON(mode.force != DRM_FORCE_ON); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct drm_connector connector_hdmi = { + .connector_type = DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_HDMIB, +}; + +static int drm_cmdline_test_force_D_only_hdmi(void *ignored) +{ + struct drm_cmdline_mode mode = { }; + + FAIL_ON(!drm_mode_parse_command_line_for_connector("D", + &connector_hdmi, + &mode)); + FAIL_ON(mode.specified); + FAIL_ON(mode.refresh_specified); + FAIL_ON(mode.bpp_specified); + + FAIL_ON(mode.rb); + FAIL_ON(mode.cvt); + FAIL_ON(mode.interlace); + FAIL_ON(mode.margins); + FAIL_ON(mode.force != DRM_FORCE_ON_DIGITAL); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct drm_connector connector_dvi = { + .connector_type = DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DVII, +}; + +static int drm_cmdline_test_force_D_only_dvi(void *ignored) +{ + struct drm_cmdline_mode mode = { }; + + FAIL_ON(!drm_mode_parse_command_line_for_connector("D", + &connector_dvi, + &mode)); + FAIL_ON(mode.specified); + FAIL_ON(mode.refresh_specified); + FAIL_ON(mode.bpp_specified); + + FAIL_ON(mode.rb); + FAIL_ON(mode.cvt); + FAIL_ON(mode.interlace); + FAIL_ON(mode.margins); + FAIL_ON(mode.force != DRM_FORCE_ON_DIGITAL); + + return 0; +} + +static int drm_cmdline_test_force_d_only(void *ignored) +{ + struct drm_cmdline_mode mode = { }; + + FAIL_ON(!drm_mode_parse_command_line_for_connector("d", + &no_connector, + &mode)); + FAIL_ON(mode.specified); + FAIL_ON(mode.refresh_specified); + FAIL_ON(mode.bpp_specified); + + FAIL_ON(mode.rb); + FAIL_ON(mode.cvt); + FAIL_ON(mode.interlace); + FAIL_ON(mode.margins); + FAIL_ON(mode.force != DRM_FORCE_OFF); + + return 0; +} + +static int drm_cmdline_test_margin_only(void *ignored) +{ + struct drm_cmdline_mode mode = { }; + + FAIL_ON(drm_mode_parse_command_line_for_connector("m", + &no_connector, + &mode)); + + return 0; +} + +static int drm_cmdline_test_interlace_only(void *ignored) +{ + struct drm_cmdline_mode mode = { }; + + FAIL_ON(drm_mode_parse_command_line_for_connector("i", + &no_connector, + &mode)); + + return 0; +} + static int drm_cmdline_test_res(void *ignored) { struct drm_cmdline_mode mode = { }; From 89781d0806c2c4f29072d3f00cb2dd4274aabc3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 12:03:38 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 15/57] ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix overridden device-specific initialization The recent change to shuffle the codec initialization procedure for Realtek via commit 607ca3bd220f ("ALSA: hda/realtek - EAPD turn on later") caused the silent output on some machines. This change was supposed to be safe, but it isn't actually; some devices have quirk setups to override the EAPD via COEF or BTL in the additional verb table, which is applied at the beginning of snd_hda_gen_init(). And this EAPD setup is again overridden in alc_auto_init_amp(). For recovering from the regression, tell snd_hda_gen_init() not to apply the verbs there by a new flag, then apply the verbs in alc_init(). BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204727 Fixes: 607ca3bd220f ("ALSA: hda/realtek - EAPD turn on later") Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai --- sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.c | 3 ++- sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.h | 1 + sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.c b/sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.c index 5bf24fb819d2..10d502328b76 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.c @@ -6009,7 +6009,8 @@ int snd_hda_gen_init(struct hda_codec *codec) if (spec->init_hook) spec->init_hook(codec); - snd_hda_apply_verbs(codec); + if (!spec->skip_verbs) + snd_hda_apply_verbs(codec); init_multi_out(codec); init_extra_out(codec); diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.h b/sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.h index 5f199dcb0d18..fb9f1a90238b 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.h +++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.h @@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ struct hda_gen_spec { unsigned int indep_hp_enabled:1; /* independent HP enabled */ unsigned int have_aamix_ctl:1; unsigned int hp_mic_jack_modes:1; + unsigned int skip_verbs:1; /* don't apply verbs at snd_hda_gen_init() */ /* additional mute flags (only effective with auto_mute_via_amp=1) */ u64 mute_bits; diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index e333b3e30e31..03f903f9247d 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -837,9 +837,11 @@ static int alc_init(struct hda_codec *codec) if (spec->init_hook) spec->init_hook(codec); + spec->gen.skip_verbs = 1; /* applied in below */ snd_hda_gen_init(codec); alc_fix_pll(codec); alc_auto_init_amp(codec, spec->init_amp); + snd_hda_apply_verbs(codec); /* apply verbs here after own init */ snd_hda_apply_fixup(codec, HDA_FIXUP_ACT_INIT); From 0ce4a85f4f015d13a6a6b4954f4e8e63cd83f7b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lu Baolu Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2019 16:50:56 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 16/57] Revert "iommu/vt-d: Avoid duplicated pci dma alias consideration" This reverts commit 557529494d79f3f1fadd486dd18d2de0b19be4da. Commit 557529494d79f ("iommu/vt-d: Avoid duplicated pci dma alias consideration") aimed to address a NULL pointer deference issue happened when a thunderbolt device driver returned unexpectedly. Unfortunately, this change breaks a previous pci quirk added by commit cc346a4714a59 ("PCI: Add function 1 DMA alias quirk for Marvell devices"), as the result, devices like Marvell 88SE9128 SATA controller doesn't work anymore. We will continue to try to find the real culprit mentioned in 557529494d79f, but for now we should revert it to fix current breakage. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204627 Cc: Stijn Tintel Cc: Petr Vandrovec Reported-by: Stijn Tintel Reported-by: Petr Vandrovec Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel --- drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c index 12d094d08c0a..c4e0e4a9ee9e 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c @@ -339,6 +339,8 @@ static void domain_exit(struct dmar_domain *domain); static void domain_remove_dev_info(struct dmar_domain *domain); static void dmar_remove_one_dev_info(struct device *dev); static void __dmar_remove_one_dev_info(struct device_domain_info *info); +static void domain_context_clear(struct intel_iommu *iommu, + struct device *dev); static int domain_detach_iommu(struct dmar_domain *domain, struct intel_iommu *iommu); static bool device_is_rmrr_locked(struct device *dev); @@ -2105,9 +2107,26 @@ out_unlock: return ret; } +struct domain_context_mapping_data { + struct dmar_domain *domain; + struct intel_iommu *iommu; + struct pasid_table *table; +}; + +static int domain_context_mapping_cb(struct pci_dev *pdev, + u16 alias, void *opaque) +{ + struct domain_context_mapping_data *data = opaque; + + return domain_context_mapping_one(data->domain, data->iommu, + data->table, PCI_BUS_NUM(alias), + alias & 0xff); +} + static int domain_context_mapping(struct dmar_domain *domain, struct device *dev) { + struct domain_context_mapping_data data; struct pasid_table *table; struct intel_iommu *iommu; u8 bus, devfn; @@ -2117,7 +2136,17 @@ domain_context_mapping(struct dmar_domain *domain, struct device *dev) return -ENODEV; table = intel_pasid_get_table(dev); - return domain_context_mapping_one(domain, iommu, table, bus, devfn); + + if (!dev_is_pci(dev)) + return domain_context_mapping_one(domain, iommu, table, + bus, devfn); + + data.domain = domain; + data.iommu = iommu; + data.table = table; + + return pci_for_each_dma_alias(to_pci_dev(dev), + &domain_context_mapping_cb, &data); } static int domain_context_mapped_cb(struct pci_dev *pdev, @@ -4759,6 +4788,28 @@ out_free_dmar: return ret; } +static int domain_context_clear_one_cb(struct pci_dev *pdev, u16 alias, void *opaque) +{ + struct intel_iommu *iommu = opaque; + + domain_context_clear_one(iommu, PCI_BUS_NUM(alias), alias & 0xff); + return 0; +} + +/* + * NB - intel-iommu lacks any sort of reference counting for the users of + * dependent devices. If multiple endpoints have intersecting dependent + * devices, unbinding the driver from any one of them will possibly leave + * the others unable to operate. + */ +static void domain_context_clear(struct intel_iommu *iommu, struct device *dev) +{ + if (!iommu || !dev || !dev_is_pci(dev)) + return; + + pci_for_each_dma_alias(to_pci_dev(dev), &domain_context_clear_one_cb, iommu); +} + static void __dmar_remove_one_dev_info(struct device_domain_info *info) { struct dmar_domain *domain; @@ -4779,7 +4830,7 @@ static void __dmar_remove_one_dev_info(struct device_domain_info *info) PASID_RID2PASID); iommu_disable_dev_iotlb(info); - domain_context_clear_one(iommu, info->bus, info->devfn); + domain_context_clear(iommu, info->dev); intel_pasid_free_table(info->dev); } From 52d083472e0b64d1da5b6469ed3defb1ddc45929 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miguel Ojeda Date: Sat, 31 Aug 2019 10:00:11 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 17/57] clang-format: Update with the latest for_each macro list Re-run the shell fragment that generated the original list. Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda --- .clang-format | 17 ++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/.clang-format b/.clang-format index 2ffd69afc1a8..196ca317bd1f 100644 --- a/.clang-format +++ b/.clang-format @@ -107,10 +107,13 @@ ForEachMacros: - 'css_for_each_descendant_post' - 'css_for_each_descendant_pre' - 'device_for_each_child_node' + - 'dma_fence_chain_for_each' - 'drm_atomic_crtc_for_each_plane' - 'drm_atomic_crtc_state_for_each_plane' - 'drm_atomic_crtc_state_for_each_plane_state' - 'drm_atomic_for_each_plane_damage' + - 'drm_client_for_each_connector_iter' + - 'drm_client_for_each_modeset' - 'drm_connector_for_each_possible_encoder' - 'drm_for_each_connector_iter' - 'drm_for_each_crtc' @@ -126,6 +129,7 @@ ForEachMacros: - 'drm_mm_for_each_node_in_range' - 'drm_mm_for_each_node_safe' - 'flow_action_for_each' + - 'for_each_active_dev_scope' - 'for_each_active_drhd_unit' - 'for_each_active_iommu' - 'for_each_available_child_of_node' @@ -153,6 +157,8 @@ ForEachMacros: - 'for_each_cpu_not' - 'for_each_cpu_wrap' - 'for_each_dev_addr' + - 'for_each_dev_scope' + - 'for_each_displayid_db' - 'for_each_dma_cap_mask' - 'for_each_dpcm_be' - 'for_each_dpcm_be_rollback' @@ -169,6 +175,8 @@ ForEachMacros: - 'for_each_evictable_lru' - 'for_each_fib6_node_rt_rcu' - 'for_each_fib6_walker_rt' + - 'for_each_free_mem_pfn_range_in_zone' + - 'for_each_free_mem_pfn_range_in_zone_from' - 'for_each_free_mem_range' - 'for_each_free_mem_range_reverse' - 'for_each_func_rsrc' @@ -178,6 +186,7 @@ ForEachMacros: - 'for_each_ip_tunnel_rcu' - 'for_each_irq_nr' - 'for_each_link_codecs' + - 'for_each_link_platforms' - 'for_each_lru' - 'for_each_matching_node' - 'for_each_matching_node_and_match' @@ -302,7 +311,10 @@ ForEachMacros: - 'ide_port_for_each_present_dev' - 'idr_for_each_entry' - 'idr_for_each_entry_continue' + - 'idr_for_each_entry_continue_ul' - 'idr_for_each_entry_ul' + - 'in_dev_for_each_ifa_rcu' + - 'in_dev_for_each_ifa_rtnl' - 'inet_bind_bucket_for_each' - 'inet_lhash2_for_each_icsk_rcu' - 'key_for_each' @@ -343,8 +355,6 @@ ForEachMacros: - 'media_device_for_each_intf' - 'media_device_for_each_link' - 'media_device_for_each_pad' - - 'mp_bvec_for_each_page' - - 'mp_bvec_for_each_segment' - 'nanddev_io_for_each_page' - 'netdev_for_each_lower_dev' - 'netdev_for_each_lower_private' @@ -381,18 +391,19 @@ ForEachMacros: - 'radix_tree_for_each_slot' - 'radix_tree_for_each_tagged' - 'rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe' + - 'rdma_for_each_block' - 'rdma_for_each_port' - 'resource_list_for_each_entry' - 'resource_list_for_each_entry_safe' - 'rhl_for_each_entry_rcu' - 'rhl_for_each_rcu' - 'rht_for_each' - - 'rht_for_each_from' - 'rht_for_each_entry' - 'rht_for_each_entry_from' - 'rht_for_each_entry_rcu' - 'rht_for_each_entry_rcu_from' - 'rht_for_each_entry_safe' + - 'rht_for_each_from' - 'rht_for_each_rcu' - 'rht_for_each_rcu_from' - '__rq_for_each_bio' From ae688e1720fd387de34f2140a735917411672bf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabrizio Castro Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 14:15:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 18/57] arm64: dts: renesas: hihope-common: Fix eMMC status SDHI3 got accidentally disabled while adding USB 2.0 support, this patch fixes it. Fixes: 734d277f412a ("arm64: dts: renesas: hihope-common: Add USB 2.0 support") Signed-off-by: Fabrizio Castro Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Signed-off-by: Simon Horman --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/hihope-common.dtsi | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/hihope-common.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/hihope-common.dtsi index 3311a982fff8..23fd0224ca90 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/hihope-common.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/hihope-common.dtsi @@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ mmc-hs200-1_8v; non-removable; fixed-emmc-driver-type = <1>; + status = "okay"; }; &usb_extal_clk { From 55f7e5c364dce20e691fda329fb2a6cc3cbb63b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Skeggs Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2019 16:33:22 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 19/57] drm/nouveau/sec2/gp102: add missing MODULE_FIRMWAREs Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [v5.2+] --- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/secboot/gp102.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/secboot/gp102.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/secboot/gp102.c index 84a2f243ed9b..4695f1c8e33f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/secboot/gp102.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/secboot/gp102.c @@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp102/nvdec/scrubber.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp102/sec2/desc.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp102/sec2/image.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp102/sec2/sig.bin"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp102/sec2/desc-1.bin"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp102/sec2/image-1.bin"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp102/sec2/sig-1.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp104/acr/bl.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp104/acr/unload_bl.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp104/acr/ucode_load.bin"); @@ -210,6 +213,9 @@ MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp104/nvdec/scrubber.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp104/sec2/desc.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp104/sec2/image.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp104/sec2/sig.bin"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp104/sec2/desc-1.bin"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp104/sec2/image-1.bin"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp104/sec2/sig-1.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp106/acr/bl.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp106/acr/unload_bl.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp106/acr/ucode_load.bin"); @@ -230,6 +236,9 @@ MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp106/nvdec/scrubber.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp106/sec2/desc.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp106/sec2/image.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp106/sec2/sig.bin"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp106/sec2/desc-1.bin"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp106/sec2/image-1.bin"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp106/sec2/sig-1.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp107/acr/bl.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp107/acr/unload_bl.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp107/acr/ucode_load.bin"); @@ -250,3 +259,6 @@ MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp107/nvdec/scrubber.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp107/sec2/desc.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp107/sec2/image.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp107/sec2/sig.bin"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp107/sec2/desc-1.bin"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp107/sec2/image-1.bin"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("nvidia/gp107/sec2/sig-1.bin"); From 29d9a0b50736768f042752070e5cdf4e4d4c00df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "John S. Gruber" Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2019 00:00:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 20/57] x86/boot: Preserve boot_params.secure_boot from sanitizing Commit a90118c445cc ("x86/boot: Save fields explicitly, zero out everything else") now zeroes the secure boot setting information (enabled/disabled/...) passed by the boot loader or by the kernel's EFI handover mechanism. The problem manifests itself with signed kernels using the EFI handoff protocol with grub and the kernel loses the information whether secure boot is enabled in the firmware, i.e., the log message "Secure boot enabled" becomes "Secure boot could not be determined". efi_main() arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c sets this field early but it is subsequently zeroed by the above referenced commit. Include boot_params.secure_boot in the preserve field list. [ bp: restructure commit message and massage. ] Fixes: a90118c445cc ("x86/boot: Save fields explicitly, zero out everything else") Signed-off-by: John S. Gruber Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: John Hubbard Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Juergen Gross Cc: Mark Brown Cc: stable Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: x86-ml Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAPotdmSPExAuQcy9iAHqX3js_fc4mMLQOTr5RBGvizyCOPcTQQ@mail.gmail.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h index 9e5f3c722c33..981fe923a59f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ static void sanitize_boot_params(struct boot_params *boot_params) BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(eddbuf_entries), BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries), BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(edd_mbr_sig_buffer), + BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(secure_boot), BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(hdr), BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(e820_table), BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(eddbuf), From 9b8bd476e78e89c9ea26c3b435ad0201c3d7dbf5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 10:24:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 21/57] x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flags into __get_user() argument evaluation Identical to __put_user(); the __get_user() argument evalution will too leak UBSAN crud into the __uaccess_begin() / __uaccess_end() region. While uncommon this was observed to happen for: drivers/xen/gntdev.c: if (__get_user(old_status, batch->status[i])) where UBSAN added array bound checking. This complements commit: 6ae865615fc4 ("x86/uaccess: Dont leak the AC flag into __put_user() argument evaluation") Tested-by Sedat Dilek Reported-by: Randy Dunlap Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: broonie@kernel.org Cc: sfr@canb.auug.org.au Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: Randy Dunlap Cc: mhocko@suse.cz Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190829082445.GM2369@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net --- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index 9c4435307ff8..35c225ede0e4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -444,8 +444,10 @@ __pu_label: \ ({ \ int __gu_err; \ __inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \ + __typeof__(ptr) __gu_ptr = (ptr); \ + __typeof__(size) __gu_size = (size); \ __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ - __get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), (size), __gu_err, -EFAULT); \ + __get_user_size(__gu_val, __gu_ptr, __gu_size, __gu_err, -EFAULT); \ __uaccess_end(); \ (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \ __builtin_expect(__gu_err, 0); \ From d33cd42d86671bed870827aa399aeb9f1da74119 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sam Bazley Date: Sun, 1 Sep 2019 03:31:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 22/57] ALSA: hda/realtek - Add quirk for HP Pavilion 15 HP Pavilion 15 (AMD Ryzen-based model) with 103c:84e7 needs the same quirk like HP Envy/Spectre x360 for enabling the mute LED over Mic3 pin. [ rearranged in the SSID number order by tiwai ] Signed-off-by: Sam Bazley Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 03f903f9247d..e47b5d2f694f 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -6981,6 +6981,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x82c0, "HP G3 mini premium", ALC221_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x83b9, "HP Spectre x360", ALC269_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_MIC3), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8497, "HP Envy x360", ALC269_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_MIC3), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x84e7, "HP Pavilion 15", ALC269_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_MIC3), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x103e, "ASUS X540SA", ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x103f, "ASUS TX300", ALC282_FIXUP_ASUS_TX300), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x106d, "Asus K53BE", ALC269_FIXUP_LIMIT_INT_MIC_BOOST), From eb3d8f42231aec65b64b079dd17bd6c008a3fe29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2019 11:26:13 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 23/57] NFS: Fix inode fileid checks in attribute revalidation code We want to throw out the attrbute if it refers to the mounted on fileid, and not the real fileid. However we do not want to block cache consistency updates from NFSv4 writes. Reported-by: Murphy Zhou Fixes: 7e10cc25bfa0 ("NFS: Don't refresh attributes with mounted-on-file...") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfs/inode.c b/fs/nfs/inode.c index c764cfe456e5..2a03bfeec10a 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/nfs/inode.c @@ -1403,11 +1403,12 @@ static int nfs_check_inode_attributes(struct inode *inode, struct nfs_fattr *fat if (NFS_PROTO(inode)->have_delegation(inode, FMODE_READ)) return 0; - /* No fileid? Just exit */ - if (!(fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_FILEID)) - return 0; + if (!(fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_FILEID)) { + /* Only a mounted-on-fileid? Just exit */ + if (fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID) + return 0; /* Has the inode gone and changed behind our back? */ - if (nfsi->fileid != fattr->fileid) { + } else if (nfsi->fileid != fattr->fileid) { /* Is this perhaps the mounted-on fileid? */ if ((fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID) && nfsi->fileid == fattr->mounted_on_fileid) @@ -1807,11 +1808,12 @@ static int nfs_update_inode(struct inode *inode, struct nfs_fattr *fattr) nfs_display_fhandle_hash(NFS_FH(inode)), atomic_read(&inode->i_count), fattr->valid); - /* No fileid? Just exit */ - if (!(fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_FILEID)) - return 0; + if (!(fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_FILEID)) { + /* Only a mounted-on-fileid? Just exit */ + if (fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID) + return 0; /* Has the inode gone and changed behind our back? */ - if (nfsi->fileid != fattr->fileid) { + } else if (nfsi->fileid != fattr->fileid) { /* Is this perhaps the mounted-on fileid? */ if ((fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID) && nfsi->fileid == fattr->mounted_on_fileid) From 4030b4c585c41eeefec7bd20ce3d0e100a0f2e4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tianyu Lan Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2019 20:41:43 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 24/57] x86/hyper-v: Fix overflow bug in fill_gva_list() When the 'start' parameter is >= 0xFF000000 on 32-bit systems, or >= 0xFFFFFFFF'FF000000 on 64-bit systems, fill_gva_list() gets into an infinite loop. With such inputs, 'cur' overflows after adding HV_TLB_FLUSH_UNIT and always compares as less than end. Memory is filled with guest virtual addresses until the system crashes. Fix this by never incrementing 'cur' to be larger than 'end'. Reported-by: Jong Hyun Park Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Fixes: 2ffd9e33ce4a ("x86/hyper-v: Use hypercall for remote TLB flush") Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c index e65d7fe6489f..5208ba49c89a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c @@ -37,12 +37,14 @@ static inline int fill_gva_list(u64 gva_list[], int offset, * Lower 12 bits encode the number of additional * pages to flush (in addition to the 'cur' page). */ - if (diff >= HV_TLB_FLUSH_UNIT) + if (diff >= HV_TLB_FLUSH_UNIT) { gva_list[gva_n] |= ~PAGE_MASK; - else if (diff) + cur += HV_TLB_FLUSH_UNIT; + } else if (diff) { gva_list[gva_n] |= (diff - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + cur = end; + } - cur += HV_TLB_FLUSH_UNIT; gva_n++; } while (cur < end); From ff4dd081977da56566a848f071aed8fa92d604a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 11:30:03 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 25/57] configfs: stash the data we need into configfs_buffer at open time simplifies the ->read()/->write()/->release() instances nicely Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig --- fs/configfs/file.c | 227 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 94 insertions(+), 133 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/configfs/file.c b/fs/configfs/file.c index 61e4db4390a1..eee6281a7b35 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/file.c +++ b/fs/configfs/file.c @@ -39,24 +39,18 @@ struct configfs_buffer { bool write_in_progress; char *bin_buffer; int bin_buffer_size; + int cb_max_size; + struct config_item *item; + struct module *owner; + union { + struct configfs_attribute *attr; + struct configfs_bin_attribute *bin_attr; + }; }; -/** - * fill_read_buffer - allocate and fill buffer from item. - * @dentry: dentry pointer. - * @buffer: data buffer for file. - * - * Allocate @buffer->page, if it hasn't been already, then call the - * config_item's show() method to fill the buffer with this attribute's - * data. - * This is called only once, on the file's first read. - */ -static int fill_read_buffer(struct dentry * dentry, struct configfs_buffer * buffer) +static int fill_read_buffer(struct configfs_buffer * buffer) { - struct configfs_attribute * attr = to_attr(dentry); - struct config_item * item = to_item(dentry->d_parent); - int ret = 0; ssize_t count; if (!buffer->page) @@ -64,15 +58,15 @@ static int fill_read_buffer(struct dentry * dentry, struct configfs_buffer * buf if (!buffer->page) return -ENOMEM; - count = attr->show(item, buffer->page); + count = buffer->attr->show(buffer->item, buffer->page); + if (count < 0) + return count; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(count > (ssize_t)SIMPLE_ATTR_SIZE)) + return -EIO; - BUG_ON(count > (ssize_t)SIMPLE_ATTR_SIZE); - if (count >= 0) { - buffer->needs_read_fill = 0; - buffer->count = count; - } else - ret = count; - return ret; + buffer->needs_read_fill = 0; + buffer->count = count; + return 0; } /** @@ -97,12 +91,13 @@ static int fill_read_buffer(struct dentry * dentry, struct configfs_buffer * buf static ssize_t configfs_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct configfs_buffer * buffer = file->private_data; + struct configfs_buffer *buffer = file->private_data; ssize_t retval = 0; mutex_lock(&buffer->mutex); if (buffer->needs_read_fill) { - if ((retval = fill_read_buffer(file->f_path.dentry,buffer))) + retval = fill_read_buffer(buffer); + if (retval) goto out; } pr_debug("%s: count = %zd, ppos = %lld, buf = %s\n", @@ -139,9 +134,6 @@ configfs_read_bin_file(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { struct configfs_buffer *buffer = file->private_data; - struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; - struct config_item *item = to_item(dentry->d_parent); - struct configfs_bin_attribute *bin_attr = to_bin_attr(dentry); ssize_t retval = 0; ssize_t len = min_t(size_t, count, PAGE_SIZE); @@ -156,14 +148,14 @@ configfs_read_bin_file(struct file *file, char __user *buf, if (buffer->needs_read_fill) { /* perform first read with buf == NULL to get extent */ - len = bin_attr->read(item, NULL, 0); + len = buffer->bin_attr->read(buffer->item, NULL, 0); if (len <= 0) { retval = len; goto out; } /* do not exceed the maximum value */ - if (bin_attr->cb_max_size && len > bin_attr->cb_max_size) { + if (buffer->cb_max_size && len > buffer->cb_max_size) { retval = -EFBIG; goto out; } @@ -176,7 +168,8 @@ configfs_read_bin_file(struct file *file, char __user *buf, buffer->bin_buffer_size = len; /* perform second read to fill buffer */ - len = bin_attr->read(item, buffer->bin_buffer, len); + len = buffer->bin_attr->read(buffer->item, + buffer->bin_buffer, len); if (len < 0) { retval = len; vfree(buffer->bin_buffer); @@ -226,25 +219,10 @@ fill_write_buffer(struct configfs_buffer * buffer, const char __user * buf, size return error ? -EFAULT : count; } - -/** - * flush_write_buffer - push buffer to config_item. - * @dentry: dentry to the attribute - * @buffer: data buffer for file. - * @count: number of bytes - * - * Get the correct pointers for the config_item and the attribute we're - * dealing with, then call the store() method for the attribute, - * passing the buffer that we acquired in fill_write_buffer(). - */ - static int -flush_write_buffer(struct dentry * dentry, struct configfs_buffer * buffer, size_t count) +flush_write_buffer(struct configfs_buffer *buffer, size_t count) { - struct configfs_attribute * attr = to_attr(dentry); - struct config_item * item = to_item(dentry->d_parent); - - return attr->store(item, buffer->page, count); + return buffer->attr->store(buffer->item, buffer->page, count); } @@ -268,13 +246,13 @@ flush_write_buffer(struct dentry * dentry, struct configfs_buffer * buffer, size static ssize_t configfs_write_file(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct configfs_buffer * buffer = file->private_data; + struct configfs_buffer *buffer = file->private_data; ssize_t len; mutex_lock(&buffer->mutex); len = fill_write_buffer(buffer, buf, count); if (len > 0) - len = flush_write_buffer(file->f_path.dentry, buffer, len); + len = flush_write_buffer(buffer, len); if (len > 0) *ppos += len; mutex_unlock(&buffer->mutex); @@ -299,8 +277,6 @@ configfs_write_bin_file(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { struct configfs_buffer *buffer = file->private_data; - struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; - struct configfs_bin_attribute *bin_attr = to_bin_attr(dentry); void *tbuf = NULL; ssize_t len; @@ -316,8 +292,8 @@ configfs_write_bin_file(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, /* buffer grows? */ if (*ppos + count > buffer->bin_buffer_size) { - if (bin_attr->cb_max_size && - *ppos + count > bin_attr->cb_max_size) { + if (buffer->cb_max_size && + *ppos + count > buffer->cb_max_size) { len = -EFBIG; goto out; } @@ -349,31 +325,45 @@ out: return len; } -static int check_perm(struct inode * inode, struct file * file, int type) +static int __configfs_open_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, int type) { - struct config_item *item = configfs_get_config_item(file->f_path.dentry->d_parent); - struct configfs_attribute * attr = to_attr(file->f_path.dentry); - struct configfs_bin_attribute *bin_attr = NULL; - struct configfs_buffer * buffer; - struct configfs_item_operations * ops = NULL; - int error = 0; + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; + struct configfs_attribute *attr; + struct configfs_buffer *buffer; + int error; - if (!item || !attr) - goto Einval; + error = -ENOMEM; + buffer = kzalloc(sizeof(struct configfs_buffer), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buffer) + goto out; - if (type & CONFIGFS_ITEM_BIN_ATTR) - bin_attr = to_bin_attr(file->f_path.dentry); + error = -EINVAL; + buffer->item = configfs_get_config_item(dentry->d_parent); + if (!buffer->item) + goto out_free_buffer; - /* Grab the module reference for this attribute if we have one */ - if (!try_module_get(attr->ca_owner)) { - error = -ENODEV; - goto Done; + attr = to_attr(dentry); + if (!attr) + goto out_put_item; + + if (type & CONFIGFS_ITEM_BIN_ATTR) { + buffer->bin_attr = to_bin_attr(dentry); + buffer->cb_max_size = buffer->bin_attr->cb_max_size; + } else { + buffer->attr = attr; } - if (item->ci_type) - ops = item->ci_type->ct_item_ops; - else - goto Eaccess; + buffer->owner = attr->ca_owner; + /* Grab the module reference for this attribute if we have one */ + error = -ENODEV; + if (!try_module_get(buffer->owner)) + goto out_put_item; + + error = -EACCES; + if (!buffer->item->ci_type) + goto out_put_module; + + buffer->ops = buffer->item->ci_type->ct_item_ops; /* File needs write support. * The inode's perms must say it's ok, @@ -381,13 +371,11 @@ static int check_perm(struct inode * inode, struct file * file, int type) */ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { if (!(inode->i_mode & S_IWUGO)) - goto Eaccess; - + goto out_put_module; if ((type & CONFIGFS_ITEM_ATTR) && !attr->store) - goto Eaccess; - - if ((type & CONFIGFS_ITEM_BIN_ATTR) && !bin_attr->write) - goto Eaccess; + goto out_put_module; + if ((type & CONFIGFS_ITEM_BIN_ATTR) && !buffer->bin_attr->write) + goto out_put_module; } /* File needs read support. @@ -396,90 +384,65 @@ static int check_perm(struct inode * inode, struct file * file, int type) */ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) { if (!(inode->i_mode & S_IRUGO)) - goto Eaccess; - + goto out_put_module; if ((type & CONFIGFS_ITEM_ATTR) && !attr->show) - goto Eaccess; - - if ((type & CONFIGFS_ITEM_BIN_ATTR) && !bin_attr->read) - goto Eaccess; + goto out_put_module; + if ((type & CONFIGFS_ITEM_BIN_ATTR) && !buffer->bin_attr->read) + goto out_put_module; } - /* No error? Great, allocate a buffer for the file, and store it - * it in file->private_data for easy access. - */ - buffer = kzalloc(sizeof(struct configfs_buffer),GFP_KERNEL); - if (!buffer) { - error = -ENOMEM; - goto Enomem; - } mutex_init(&buffer->mutex); buffer->needs_read_fill = 1; buffer->read_in_progress = false; buffer->write_in_progress = false; - buffer->ops = ops; file->private_data = buffer; - goto Done; + return 0; - Einval: - error = -EINVAL; - goto Done; - Eaccess: - error = -EACCES; - Enomem: - module_put(attr->ca_owner); - Done: - if (error && item) - config_item_put(item); +out_put_module: + module_put(buffer->owner); +out_put_item: + config_item_put(buffer->item); +out_free_buffer: + kfree(buffer); +out: return error; } static int configfs_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { - struct config_item * item = to_item(filp->f_path.dentry->d_parent); - struct configfs_attribute * attr = to_attr(filp->f_path.dentry); - struct module * owner = attr->ca_owner; - struct configfs_buffer * buffer = filp->private_data; + struct configfs_buffer *buffer = filp->private_data; - if (item) - config_item_put(item); - /* After this point, attr should not be accessed. */ - module_put(owner); - - if (buffer) { - if (buffer->page) - free_page((unsigned long)buffer->page); - mutex_destroy(&buffer->mutex); - kfree(buffer); - } + if (buffer->item) + config_item_put(buffer->item); + module_put(buffer->owner); + if (buffer->page) + free_page((unsigned long)buffer->page); + mutex_destroy(&buffer->mutex); + kfree(buffer); return 0; } static int configfs_open_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { - return check_perm(inode, filp, CONFIGFS_ITEM_ATTR); + return __configfs_open_file(inode, filp, CONFIGFS_ITEM_ATTR); } static int configfs_open_bin_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { - return check_perm(inode, filp, CONFIGFS_ITEM_BIN_ATTR); + return __configfs_open_file(inode, filp, CONFIGFS_ITEM_BIN_ATTR); } -static int configfs_release_bin_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +static int configfs_release_bin_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { - struct configfs_buffer *buffer = filp->private_data; - struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_path.dentry; - struct config_item *item = to_item(dentry->d_parent); - struct configfs_bin_attribute *bin_attr = to_bin_attr(dentry); - ssize_t len = 0; - int ret; + struct configfs_buffer *buffer = file->private_data; buffer->read_in_progress = false; if (buffer->write_in_progress) { buffer->write_in_progress = false; - len = bin_attr->write(item, buffer->bin_buffer, + /* result of ->release() is ignored */ + buffer->bin_attr->write(buffer->item, buffer->bin_buffer, buffer->bin_buffer_size); /* vfree on NULL is safe */ @@ -489,10 +452,8 @@ static int configfs_release_bin_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) buffer->needs_read_fill = 1; } - ret = configfs_release(inode, filp); - if (len < 0) - return len; - return ret; + configfs_release(inode, file); + return 0; } From f19e4ed1e1edbfa3c9ccb9fed17759b7d6db24c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 23:13:30 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 26/57] configfs_register_group() shouldn't be (and isn't) called in rmdirable parts revert cc57c07343bd "configfs: fix registered group removal" It was an attempt to handle something that fundamentally doesn't work - configfs_register_group() should never be done in a part of tree that can be rmdir'ed. And in mainline it never had been, so let's not borrow trouble; the fix was racy anyway, it would take a lot more to make that work and desired semantics is not clear. Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig --- fs/configfs/dir.c | 11 ----------- 1 file changed, 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/configfs/dir.c b/fs/configfs/dir.c index 92112915de8e..21a795679e20 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/configfs/dir.c @@ -1771,16 +1771,6 @@ void configfs_unregister_group(struct config_group *group) struct dentry *dentry = group->cg_item.ci_dentry; struct dentry *parent = group->cg_item.ci_parent->ci_dentry; - mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex); - if (!group->cg_item.ci_parent->ci_group) { - /* - * The parent has already been unlinked and detached - * due to a rmdir. - */ - goto unlink_group; - } - mutex_unlock(&subsys->su_mutex); - inode_lock_nested(d_inode(parent), I_MUTEX_PARENT); spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock); configfs_detach_prep(dentry, NULL); @@ -1796,7 +1786,6 @@ void configfs_unregister_group(struct config_group *group) dput(dentry); mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex); -unlink_group: unlink_group(group); mutex_unlock(&subsys->su_mutex); } From 47320fbe11a6059ae502c9c16b668022fdb4cf76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2019 19:56:13 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 27/57] configfs: new object reprsenting tree fragments Refcounted, hangs of configfs_dirent, created by operations that add fragments to configfs tree (mkdir and configfs_register_{subsystem,group}). Will be used in the next commit to provide exclusion between fragment removal and ->show/->store calls. Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig --- fs/configfs/configfs_internal.h | 15 ++++- fs/configfs/dir.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- fs/configfs/file.c | 4 +- 3 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/configfs/configfs_internal.h b/fs/configfs/configfs_internal.h index f752d83a9c44..520f1813e789 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/configfs_internal.h +++ b/fs/configfs/configfs_internal.h @@ -20,6 +20,15 @@ #include #include +struct configfs_fragment { + atomic_t frag_count; + struct rw_semaphore frag_sem; + bool frag_dead; +}; + +void put_fragment(struct configfs_fragment *); +struct configfs_fragment *get_fragment(struct configfs_fragment *); + struct configfs_dirent { atomic_t s_count; int s_dependent_count; @@ -34,6 +43,7 @@ struct configfs_dirent { #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP int s_depth; #endif + struct configfs_fragment *s_frag; }; #define CONFIGFS_ROOT 0x0001 @@ -61,8 +71,8 @@ extern int configfs_create(struct dentry *, umode_t mode, void (*init)(struct in extern int configfs_create_file(struct config_item *, const struct configfs_attribute *); extern int configfs_create_bin_file(struct config_item *, const struct configfs_bin_attribute *); -extern int configfs_make_dirent(struct configfs_dirent *, - struct dentry *, void *, umode_t, int); +extern int configfs_make_dirent(struct configfs_dirent *, struct dentry *, + void *, umode_t, int, struct configfs_fragment *); extern int configfs_dirent_is_ready(struct configfs_dirent *); extern void configfs_hash_and_remove(struct dentry * dir, const char * name); @@ -137,6 +147,7 @@ static inline void release_configfs_dirent(struct configfs_dirent * sd) { if (!(sd->s_type & CONFIGFS_ROOT)) { kfree(sd->s_iattr); + put_fragment(sd->s_frag); kmem_cache_free(configfs_dir_cachep, sd); } } diff --git a/fs/configfs/dir.c b/fs/configfs/dir.c index 21a795679e20..1df65c2440da 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/configfs/dir.c @@ -151,11 +151,38 @@ configfs_adjust_dir_dirent_depth_after_populate(struct configfs_dirent *sd) #endif /* CONFIG_LOCKDEP */ +static struct configfs_fragment *new_fragment(void) +{ + struct configfs_fragment *p; + + p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct configfs_fragment), GFP_KERNEL); + if (p) { + atomic_set(&p->frag_count, 1); + init_rwsem(&p->frag_sem); + p->frag_dead = false; + } + return p; +} + +void put_fragment(struct configfs_fragment *frag) +{ + if (frag && atomic_dec_and_test(&frag->frag_count)) + kfree(frag); +} + +struct configfs_fragment *get_fragment(struct configfs_fragment *frag) +{ + if (likely(frag)) + atomic_inc(&frag->frag_count); + return frag; +} + /* * Allocates a new configfs_dirent and links it to the parent configfs_dirent */ static struct configfs_dirent *configfs_new_dirent(struct configfs_dirent *parent_sd, - void *element, int type) + void *element, int type, + struct configfs_fragment *frag) { struct configfs_dirent * sd; @@ -175,6 +202,7 @@ static struct configfs_dirent *configfs_new_dirent(struct configfs_dirent *paren kmem_cache_free(configfs_dir_cachep, sd); return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); } + sd->s_frag = get_fragment(frag); list_add(&sd->s_sibling, &parent_sd->s_children); spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock); @@ -209,11 +237,11 @@ static int configfs_dirent_exists(struct configfs_dirent *parent_sd, int configfs_make_dirent(struct configfs_dirent * parent_sd, struct dentry * dentry, void * element, - umode_t mode, int type) + umode_t mode, int type, struct configfs_fragment *frag) { struct configfs_dirent * sd; - sd = configfs_new_dirent(parent_sd, element, type); + sd = configfs_new_dirent(parent_sd, element, type, frag); if (IS_ERR(sd)) return PTR_ERR(sd); @@ -260,7 +288,8 @@ static void init_symlink(struct inode * inode) * until it is validated by configfs_dir_set_ready() */ -static int configfs_create_dir(struct config_item *item, struct dentry *dentry) +static int configfs_create_dir(struct config_item *item, struct dentry *dentry, + struct configfs_fragment *frag) { int error; umode_t mode = S_IFDIR| S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO; @@ -273,7 +302,8 @@ static int configfs_create_dir(struct config_item *item, struct dentry *dentry) return error; error = configfs_make_dirent(p->d_fsdata, dentry, item, mode, - CONFIGFS_DIR | CONFIGFS_USET_CREATING); + CONFIGFS_DIR | CONFIGFS_USET_CREATING, + frag); if (unlikely(error)) return error; @@ -338,9 +368,10 @@ int configfs_create_link(struct configfs_symlink *sl, { int err = 0; umode_t mode = S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO; + struct configfs_dirent *p = parent->d_fsdata; - err = configfs_make_dirent(parent->d_fsdata, dentry, sl, mode, - CONFIGFS_ITEM_LINK); + err = configfs_make_dirent(p, dentry, sl, mode, + CONFIGFS_ITEM_LINK, p->s_frag); if (!err) { err = configfs_create(dentry, mode, init_symlink); if (err) { @@ -599,7 +630,8 @@ static int populate_attrs(struct config_item *item) static int configfs_attach_group(struct config_item *parent_item, struct config_item *item, - struct dentry *dentry); + struct dentry *dentry, + struct configfs_fragment *frag); static void configfs_detach_group(struct config_item *item); static void detach_groups(struct config_group *group) @@ -647,7 +679,8 @@ static void detach_groups(struct config_group *group) * try using vfs_mkdir. Just a thought. */ static int create_default_group(struct config_group *parent_group, - struct config_group *group) + struct config_group *group, + struct configfs_fragment *frag) { int ret; struct configfs_dirent *sd; @@ -663,7 +696,7 @@ static int create_default_group(struct config_group *parent_group, d_add(child, NULL); ret = configfs_attach_group(&parent_group->cg_item, - &group->cg_item, child); + &group->cg_item, child, frag); if (!ret) { sd = child->d_fsdata; sd->s_type |= CONFIGFS_USET_DEFAULT; @@ -677,13 +710,14 @@ static int create_default_group(struct config_group *parent_group, return ret; } -static int populate_groups(struct config_group *group) +static int populate_groups(struct config_group *group, + struct configfs_fragment *frag) { struct config_group *new_group; int ret = 0; list_for_each_entry(new_group, &group->default_groups, group_entry) { - ret = create_default_group(group, new_group); + ret = create_default_group(group, new_group, frag); if (ret) { detach_groups(group); break; @@ -797,11 +831,12 @@ static void link_group(struct config_group *parent_group, struct config_group *g */ static int configfs_attach_item(struct config_item *parent_item, struct config_item *item, - struct dentry *dentry) + struct dentry *dentry, + struct configfs_fragment *frag) { int ret; - ret = configfs_create_dir(item, dentry); + ret = configfs_create_dir(item, dentry, frag); if (!ret) { ret = populate_attrs(item); if (ret) { @@ -831,12 +866,13 @@ static void configfs_detach_item(struct config_item *item) static int configfs_attach_group(struct config_item *parent_item, struct config_item *item, - struct dentry *dentry) + struct dentry *dentry, + struct configfs_fragment *frag) { int ret; struct configfs_dirent *sd; - ret = configfs_attach_item(parent_item, item, dentry); + ret = configfs_attach_item(parent_item, item, dentry, frag); if (!ret) { sd = dentry->d_fsdata; sd->s_type |= CONFIGFS_USET_DIR; @@ -852,7 +888,7 @@ static int configfs_attach_group(struct config_item *parent_item, */ inode_lock_nested(d_inode(dentry), I_MUTEX_CHILD); configfs_adjust_dir_dirent_depth_before_populate(sd); - ret = populate_groups(to_config_group(item)); + ret = populate_groups(to_config_group(item), frag); if (ret) { configfs_detach_item(item); d_inode(dentry)->i_flags |= S_DEAD; @@ -1247,6 +1283,7 @@ static int configfs_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode struct configfs_dirent *sd; const struct config_item_type *type; struct module *subsys_owner = NULL, *new_item_owner = NULL; + struct configfs_fragment *frag; char *name; sd = dentry->d_parent->d_fsdata; @@ -1265,6 +1302,12 @@ static int configfs_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode goto out; } + frag = new_fragment(); + if (!frag) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + /* Get a working ref for the duration of this function */ parent_item = configfs_get_config_item(dentry->d_parent); type = parent_item->ci_type; @@ -1367,9 +1410,9 @@ static int configfs_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock); if (group) - ret = configfs_attach_group(parent_item, item, dentry); + ret = configfs_attach_group(parent_item, item, dentry, frag); else - ret = configfs_attach_item(parent_item, item, dentry); + ret = configfs_attach_item(parent_item, item, dentry, frag); spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock); sd->s_type &= ~CONFIGFS_USET_IN_MKDIR; @@ -1406,6 +1449,7 @@ out_put: * reference. */ config_item_put(parent_item); + put_fragment(frag); out: return ret; @@ -1574,7 +1618,7 @@ static int configfs_dir_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) */ err = -ENOENT; if (configfs_dirent_is_ready(parent_sd)) { - file->private_data = configfs_new_dirent(parent_sd, NULL, 0); + file->private_data = configfs_new_dirent(parent_sd, NULL, 0, NULL); if (IS_ERR(file->private_data)) err = PTR_ERR(file->private_data); else @@ -1732,8 +1776,13 @@ int configfs_register_group(struct config_group *parent_group, { struct configfs_subsystem *subsys = parent_group->cg_subsys; struct dentry *parent; + struct configfs_fragment *frag; int ret; + frag = new_fragment(); + if (!frag) + return -ENOMEM; + mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex); link_group(parent_group, group); mutex_unlock(&subsys->su_mutex); @@ -1741,7 +1790,7 @@ int configfs_register_group(struct config_group *parent_group, parent = parent_group->cg_item.ci_dentry; inode_lock_nested(d_inode(parent), I_MUTEX_PARENT); - ret = create_default_group(parent_group, group); + ret = create_default_group(parent_group, group, frag); if (ret) goto err_out; @@ -1749,12 +1798,14 @@ int configfs_register_group(struct config_group *parent_group, configfs_dir_set_ready(group->cg_item.ci_dentry->d_fsdata); spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock); inode_unlock(d_inode(parent)); + put_fragment(frag); return 0; err_out: inode_unlock(d_inode(parent)); mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex); unlink_group(group); mutex_unlock(&subsys->su_mutex); + put_fragment(frag); return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(configfs_register_group); @@ -1842,10 +1893,17 @@ int configfs_register_subsystem(struct configfs_subsystem *subsys) struct dentry *dentry; struct dentry *root; struct configfs_dirent *sd; + struct configfs_fragment *frag; + + frag = new_fragment(); + if (!frag) + return -ENOMEM; root = configfs_pin_fs(); - if (IS_ERR(root)) + if (IS_ERR(root)) { + put_fragment(frag); return PTR_ERR(root); + } if (!group->cg_item.ci_name) group->cg_item.ci_name = group->cg_item.ci_namebuf; @@ -1861,7 +1919,7 @@ int configfs_register_subsystem(struct configfs_subsystem *subsys) d_add(dentry, NULL); err = configfs_attach_group(sd->s_element, &group->cg_item, - dentry); + dentry, frag); if (err) { BUG_ON(d_inode(dentry)); d_drop(dentry); @@ -1879,6 +1937,7 @@ int configfs_register_subsystem(struct configfs_subsystem *subsys) unlink_group(group); configfs_release_fs(); } + put_fragment(frag); return err; } diff --git a/fs/configfs/file.c b/fs/configfs/file.c index eee6281a7b35..9d5e888df60b 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/file.c +++ b/fs/configfs/file.c @@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ int configfs_create_file(struct config_item * item, const struct configfs_attrib inode_lock_nested(d_inode(dir), I_MUTEX_NORMAL); error = configfs_make_dirent(parent_sd, NULL, (void *) attr, mode, - CONFIGFS_ITEM_ATTR); + CONFIGFS_ITEM_ATTR, parent_sd->s_frag); inode_unlock(d_inode(dir)); return error; @@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ int configfs_create_bin_file(struct config_item *item, inode_lock_nested(dir->d_inode, I_MUTEX_NORMAL); error = configfs_make_dirent(parent_sd, NULL, (void *) bin_attr, mode, - CONFIGFS_ITEM_BIN_ATTR); + CONFIGFS_ITEM_BIN_ATTR, parent_sd->s_frag); inode_unlock(dir->d_inode); return error; From 60083f9e94b2f28047d71ed778adf89357c1a8fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jian-Hong Pan Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2019 18:00:56 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 28/57] ALSA: hda/realtek - Enable internal speaker & headset mic of ASUS UX431FL Original pin node values of ASUS UX431FL with ALC294: 0x12 0xb7a60140 0x13 0x40000000 0x14 0x90170110 0x15 0x411111f0 0x16 0x411111f0 0x17 0x90170111 0x18 0x411111f0 0x19 0x411111f0 0x1a 0x411111f0 0x1b 0x411111f0 0x1d 0x4066852d 0x1e 0x411111f0 0x1f 0x411111f0 0x21 0x04211020 1. Has duplicated internal speakers (0x14 & 0x17) which makes the output route become confused. So, the output volume cannot be changed by setting. 2. Misses the headset mic pin node. This patch disables the confusing speaker (NID 0x14) and enables the headset mic (NID 0x19). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190902100054.6941-1-jian-hong@endlessm.com Signed-off-by: Jian-Hong Pan Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index e47b5d2f694f..453e203ac7b9 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -5799,6 +5799,7 @@ enum { ALC286_FIXUP_ACER_AIO_HEADSET_MIC, ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC_NO_PRESENCE, ALC299_FIXUP_PREDATOR_SPK, + ALC294_FIXUP_ASUS_INTSPK_HEADSET_MIC, }; static const struct hda_fixup alc269_fixups[] = { @@ -6839,6 +6840,16 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc269_fixups[] = { { } } }, + [ALC294_FIXUP_ASUS_INTSPK_HEADSET_MIC] = { + .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS, + .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) { + { 0x14, 0x411111f0 }, /* disable confusing internal speaker */ + { 0x19, 0x04a11150 }, /* use as headset mic, without its own jack detect */ + { } + }, + .chained = true, + .chain_id = ALC269_FIXUP_HEADSET_MODE_NO_HP_MIC + }, }; static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { @@ -6998,6 +7009,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x1427, "Asus Zenbook UX31E", ALC269VB_FIXUP_ASUS_ZENBOOK), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x1517, "Asus Zenbook UX31A", ALC269VB_FIXUP_ASUS_ZENBOOK_UX31A), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x16e3, "ASUS UX50", ALC269_FIXUP_STEREO_DMIC), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x17d1, "ASUS UX431FL", ALC294_FIXUP_ASUS_INTSPK_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x1a13, "Asus G73Jw", ALC269_FIXUP_ASUS_G73JW), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x1a30, "ASUS X705UD", ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x1b13, "Asus U41SV", ALC269_FIXUP_INV_DMIC), From 5e2d2cc2588bd3307ce3937acbc2ed03c830a861 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liangyan Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2019 20:16:33 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 29/57] sched/fair: Don't assign runtime for throttled cfs_rq do_sched_cfs_period_timer() will refill cfs_b runtime and call distribute_cfs_runtime to unthrottle cfs_rq, sometimes cfs_b->runtime will allocate all quota to one cfs_rq incorrectly, then other cfs_rqs attached to this cfs_b can't get runtime and will be throttled. We find that one throttled cfs_rq has non-negative cfs_rq->runtime_remaining and cause an unexpetced cast from s64 to u64 in snippet: distribute_cfs_runtime() { runtime = -cfs_rq->runtime_remaining + 1; } The runtime here will change to a large number and consume all cfs_b->runtime in this cfs_b period. According to Ben Segall, the throttled cfs_rq can have account_cfs_rq_runtime called on it because it is throttled before idle_balance, and the idle_balance calls update_rq_clock to add time that is accounted to the task. This commit prevents cfs_rq to be assgined new runtime if it has been throttled until that distribute_cfs_runtime is called. Signed-off-by: Liangyan Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider Reviewed-by: Ben Segall Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: shanpeic@linux.alibaba.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: xlpang@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: d3d9dc330236 ("sched: Throttle entities exceeding their allowed bandwidth") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190826121633.6538-1-liangyan.peng@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- kernel/sched/fair.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c index bc9cfeaac8bd..500f5db0de0b 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/fair.c +++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c @@ -4470,6 +4470,8 @@ static void __account_cfs_rq_runtime(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, u64 delta_exec) if (likely(cfs_rq->runtime_remaining > 0)) return; + if (cfs_rq->throttled) + return; /* * if we're unable to extend our runtime we resched so that the active * hierarchy can be throttled @@ -4673,6 +4675,9 @@ static u64 distribute_cfs_runtime(struct cfs_bandwidth *cfs_b, if (!cfs_rq_throttled(cfs_rq)) goto next; + /* By the above check, this should never be true */ + SCHED_WARN_ON(cfs_rq->runtime_remaining > 0); + runtime = -cfs_rq->runtime_remaining + 1; if (runtime > remaining) runtime = remaining; From 8744daf4b0699b724ee0a56b313a6c0c4ea289e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jacob Pan Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2019 08:53:29 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 30/57] iommu/vt-d: Remove global page flush support Global pages support is removed from VT-d spec 3.0. Since global pages G flag only affects first-level paging structures and because DMA request with PASID are only supported by VT-d spec. 3.0 and onward, we can safely remove global pages support. For kernel shared virtual address IOTLB invalidation, PASID granularity and page selective within PASID will be used. There is no global granularity supported. Without this fix, IOTLB invalidation will cause invalid descriptor error in the queued invalidation (QI) interface. Fixes: 1c4f88b7f1f9 ("iommu/vt-d: Shared virtual address in scalable mode") Reported-by: Sanjay K Kumar Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel --- drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c | 36 +++++++++++++++--------------------- include/linux/intel-iommu.h | 3 --- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c index 780de0caafe8..9b159132405d 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c @@ -100,24 +100,19 @@ int intel_svm_finish_prq(struct intel_iommu *iommu) } static void intel_flush_svm_range_dev (struct intel_svm *svm, struct intel_svm_dev *sdev, - unsigned long address, unsigned long pages, int ih, int gl) + unsigned long address, unsigned long pages, int ih) { struct qi_desc desc; - if (pages == -1) { - /* For global kernel pages we have to flush them in *all* PASIDs - * because that's the only option the hardware gives us. Despite - * the fact that they are actually only accessible through one. */ - if (gl) - desc.qw0 = QI_EIOTLB_PASID(svm->pasid) | - QI_EIOTLB_DID(sdev->did) | - QI_EIOTLB_GRAN(QI_GRAN_ALL_ALL) | - QI_EIOTLB_TYPE; - else - desc.qw0 = QI_EIOTLB_PASID(svm->pasid) | - QI_EIOTLB_DID(sdev->did) | - QI_EIOTLB_GRAN(QI_GRAN_NONG_PASID) | - QI_EIOTLB_TYPE; + /* + * Do PASID granu IOTLB invalidation if page selective capability is + * not available. + */ + if (pages == -1 || !cap_pgsel_inv(svm->iommu->cap)) { + desc.qw0 = QI_EIOTLB_PASID(svm->pasid) | + QI_EIOTLB_DID(sdev->did) | + QI_EIOTLB_GRAN(QI_GRAN_NONG_PASID) | + QI_EIOTLB_TYPE; desc.qw1 = 0; } else { int mask = ilog2(__roundup_pow_of_two(pages)); @@ -127,7 +122,6 @@ static void intel_flush_svm_range_dev (struct intel_svm *svm, struct intel_svm_d QI_EIOTLB_GRAN(QI_GRAN_PSI_PASID) | QI_EIOTLB_TYPE; desc.qw1 = QI_EIOTLB_ADDR(address) | - QI_EIOTLB_GL(gl) | QI_EIOTLB_IH(ih) | QI_EIOTLB_AM(mask); } @@ -162,13 +156,13 @@ static void intel_flush_svm_range_dev (struct intel_svm *svm, struct intel_svm_d } static void intel_flush_svm_range(struct intel_svm *svm, unsigned long address, - unsigned long pages, int ih, int gl) + unsigned long pages, int ih) { struct intel_svm_dev *sdev; rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(sdev, &svm->devs, list) - intel_flush_svm_range_dev(svm, sdev, address, pages, ih, gl); + intel_flush_svm_range_dev(svm, sdev, address, pages, ih); rcu_read_unlock(); } @@ -180,7 +174,7 @@ static void intel_invalidate_range(struct mmu_notifier *mn, struct intel_svm *svm = container_of(mn, struct intel_svm, notifier); intel_flush_svm_range(svm, start, - (end - start + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> VTD_PAGE_SHIFT, 0, 0); + (end - start + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> VTD_PAGE_SHIFT, 0); } static void intel_mm_release(struct mmu_notifier *mn, struct mm_struct *mm) @@ -203,7 +197,7 @@ static void intel_mm_release(struct mmu_notifier *mn, struct mm_struct *mm) rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(sdev, &svm->devs, list) { intel_pasid_tear_down_entry(svm->iommu, sdev->dev, svm->pasid); - intel_flush_svm_range_dev(svm, sdev, 0, -1, 0, !svm->mm); + intel_flush_svm_range_dev(svm, sdev, 0, -1, 0); } rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -425,7 +419,7 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_mm(struct device *dev, int pasid) * large and has to be physically contiguous. So it's * hard to be as defensive as we might like. */ intel_pasid_tear_down_entry(iommu, dev, svm->pasid); - intel_flush_svm_range_dev(svm, sdev, 0, -1, 0, !svm->mm); + intel_flush_svm_range_dev(svm, sdev, 0, -1, 0); kfree_rcu(sdev, rcu); if (list_empty(&svm->devs)) { diff --git a/include/linux/intel-iommu.h b/include/linux/intel-iommu.h index f2ae8a006ff8..4fc6454f7ebb 100644 --- a/include/linux/intel-iommu.h +++ b/include/linux/intel-iommu.h @@ -346,7 +346,6 @@ enum { #define QI_PC_PASID_SEL (QI_PC_TYPE | QI_PC_GRAN(1)) #define QI_EIOTLB_ADDR(addr) ((u64)(addr) & VTD_PAGE_MASK) -#define QI_EIOTLB_GL(gl) (((u64)gl) << 7) #define QI_EIOTLB_IH(ih) (((u64)ih) << 6) #define QI_EIOTLB_AM(am) (((u64)am)) #define QI_EIOTLB_PASID(pasid) (((u64)pasid) << 32) @@ -378,8 +377,6 @@ enum { #define QI_RESP_INVALID 0x1 #define QI_RESP_FAILURE 0xf -#define QI_GRAN_ALL_ALL 0 -#define QI_GRAN_NONG_ALL 1 #define QI_GRAN_NONG_PASID 2 #define QI_GRAN_PSI_PASID 3 From 8ad8e02c2fa70cfddc1ded53ba9001c9d444075d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kaisrlik Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2019 13:42:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 31/57] Revert "mmc: core: do not retry CMD6 in __mmc_switch()" Turns out the commit 3a0681c7448b ("mmc: core: do not retry CMD6 in __mmc_switch()") breaks initialization of a Toshiba THGBMNG5 eMMC card, when using the meson-gx-mmc.c driver on a custom board based on Amlogic A113D. The CMD6 that switches the card into HS200 mode is then one that fails and according to the below printed messages from the log: [ 1.648951] mmc0: mmc_select_hs200 failed, error -84 [ 1.648988] mmc0: error -84 whilst initialising MMC card After some analyze, it turns out that adding a delay of ~5ms inside mmc_select_bus_width() but after mmc_compare_ext_csds() has been executed, also fixes the problem. Adding yet some more debug code, trying to figure out if potentially the card could be in a busy state, both by using CMD13 and ->card_busy() ops concluded that this was not the case. Therefore, let's simply revert the commit that dropped support for retrying of CMD6, as this also fixes the problem. Fixes: 3a0681c7448b ("mmc: core: do not retry CMD6 in __mmc_switch()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kaisrlik Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson --- drivers/mmc/core/mmc_ops.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/mmc/core/mmc_ops.c b/drivers/mmc/core/mmc_ops.c index 74e4364bc9fb..09113b9ad679 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/core/mmc_ops.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/core/mmc_ops.c @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ int __mmc_switch(struct mmc_card *card, u8 set, u8 index, u8 value, if (index == EXT_CSD_SANITIZE_START) cmd.sanitize_busy = true; - err = mmc_wait_for_cmd(host, &cmd, 0); + err = mmc_wait_for_cmd(host, &cmd, MMC_CMD_RETRIES); if (err) goto out; From 689379c2f383b1fdfdff03e84cf659daf62f2088 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Baolin Wang Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 15:37:45 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 32/57] dmaengine: sprd: Fix the DMA link-list configuration For the Spreadtrum DMA link-list mode, when the DMA engine got a slave hardware request, which will trigger the DMA engine to load the DMA configuration from the link-list memory automatically. But before the slave hardware request, the slave will get an incorrect residue due to the first node used to trigger the link-list was configured as the last source address and destination address. Thus we should make sure the first node was configured the start source address and destination address, which can fix this issue. Fixes: 4ac695464763 ("dmaengine: sprd: Support DMA link-list mode") Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/77868edb7aff9d5cb12ac3af8827ef2e244441a6.1567150471.git.baolin.wang@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/sprd-dma.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/sprd-dma.c b/drivers/dma/sprd-dma.c index baac476c8622..525dc7338fe3 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/sprd-dma.c +++ b/drivers/dma/sprd-dma.c @@ -908,6 +908,7 @@ sprd_dma_prep_slave_sg(struct dma_chan *chan, struct scatterlist *sgl, struct sprd_dma_chn *schan = to_sprd_dma_chan(chan); struct dma_slave_config *slave_cfg = &schan->slave_cfg; dma_addr_t src = 0, dst = 0; + dma_addr_t start_src = 0, start_dst = 0; struct sprd_dma_desc *sdesc; struct scatterlist *sg; u32 len = 0; @@ -954,6 +955,11 @@ sprd_dma_prep_slave_sg(struct dma_chan *chan, struct scatterlist *sgl, dst = sg_dma_address(sg); } + if (!i) { + start_src = src; + start_dst = dst; + } + /* * The link-list mode needs at least 2 link-list * configurations. If there is only one sg, it doesn't @@ -970,8 +976,8 @@ sprd_dma_prep_slave_sg(struct dma_chan *chan, struct scatterlist *sgl, } } - ret = sprd_dma_fill_desc(chan, &sdesc->chn_hw, 0, 0, src, dst, len, - dir, flags, slave_cfg); + ret = sprd_dma_fill_desc(chan, &sdesc->chn_hw, 0, 0, start_src, + start_dst, len, dir, flags, slave_cfg); if (ret) { kfree(sdesc); return NULL; From cf24aac38698bfa1d021afd3883df3c4c65143a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yoshihiro Shimoda Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2019 20:44:03 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 33/57] dmaengine: rcar-dmac: Fix DMACHCLR handling if iommu is mapped The commit 20c169aceb45 ("dmaengine: rcar-dmac: clear pertinence number of channels") forgets to clear the last channel by DMACHCLR in rcar_dmac_init() (and doesn't need to clear the first channel) if iommu is mapped to the device. So, this patch fixes it by using "channels_mask" bitfield. Note that the hardware and driver don't support more than 32 bits in DMACHCLR register anyway, so this patch should reject more than 32 channels in rcar_dmac_parse_of(). Fixes: 20c169aceb459575 ("dmaengine: rcar-dmac: clear pertinence number of channels") Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1567424643-26629-1-git-send-email-yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/sh/rcar-dmac.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/sh/rcar-dmac.c b/drivers/dma/sh/rcar-dmac.c index 9c41a4e42575..1072c450c37a 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/sh/rcar-dmac.c +++ b/drivers/dma/sh/rcar-dmac.c @@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ struct rcar_dmac_chan { * @iomem: remapped I/O memory base * @n_channels: number of available channels * @channels: array of DMAC channels + * @channels_mask: bitfield of which DMA channels are managed by this driver * @modules: bitmask of client modules in use */ struct rcar_dmac { @@ -202,6 +203,7 @@ struct rcar_dmac { unsigned int n_channels; struct rcar_dmac_chan *channels; + unsigned int channels_mask; DECLARE_BITMAP(modules, 256); }; @@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static int rcar_dmac_init(struct rcar_dmac *dmac) u16 dmaor; /* Clear all channels and enable the DMAC globally. */ - rcar_dmac_write(dmac, RCAR_DMACHCLR, GENMASK(dmac->n_channels - 1, 0)); + rcar_dmac_write(dmac, RCAR_DMACHCLR, dmac->channels_mask); rcar_dmac_write(dmac, RCAR_DMAOR, RCAR_DMAOR_PRI_FIXED | RCAR_DMAOR_DME); @@ -814,6 +816,9 @@ static void rcar_dmac_stop_all_chan(struct rcar_dmac *dmac) for (i = 0; i < dmac->n_channels; ++i) { struct rcar_dmac_chan *chan = &dmac->channels[i]; + if (!(dmac->channels_mask & BIT(i))) + continue; + /* Stop and reinitialize the channel. */ spin_lock_irq(&chan->lock); rcar_dmac_chan_halt(chan); @@ -1776,6 +1781,8 @@ static int rcar_dmac_chan_probe(struct rcar_dmac *dmac, return 0; } +#define RCAR_DMAC_MAX_CHANNELS 32 + static int rcar_dmac_parse_of(struct device *dev, struct rcar_dmac *dmac) { struct device_node *np = dev->of_node; @@ -1787,12 +1794,16 @@ static int rcar_dmac_parse_of(struct device *dev, struct rcar_dmac *dmac) return ret; } - if (dmac->n_channels <= 0 || dmac->n_channels >= 100) { + /* The hardware and driver don't support more than 32 bits in CHCLR */ + if (dmac->n_channels <= 0 || + dmac->n_channels >= RCAR_DMAC_MAX_CHANNELS) { dev_err(dev, "invalid number of channels %u\n", dmac->n_channels); return -EINVAL; } + dmac->channels_mask = GENMASK(dmac->n_channels - 1, 0); + return 0; } @@ -1802,7 +1813,6 @@ static int rcar_dmac_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_2_BYTES | DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES | DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_8_BYTES | DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_16_BYTES | DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_32_BYTES | DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_64_BYTES; - unsigned int channels_offset = 0; struct dma_device *engine; struct rcar_dmac *dmac; struct resource *mem; @@ -1831,10 +1841,8 @@ static int rcar_dmac_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) * level we can't disable it selectively, so ignore channel 0 for now if * the device is part of an IOMMU group. */ - if (device_iommu_mapped(&pdev->dev)) { - dmac->n_channels--; - channels_offset = 1; - } + if (device_iommu_mapped(&pdev->dev)) + dmac->channels_mask &= ~BIT(0); dmac->channels = devm_kcalloc(&pdev->dev, dmac->n_channels, sizeof(*dmac->channels), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1892,8 +1900,10 @@ static int rcar_dmac_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&engine->channels); for (i = 0; i < dmac->n_channels; ++i) { - ret = rcar_dmac_chan_probe(dmac, &dmac->channels[i], - i + channels_offset); + if (!(dmac->channels_mask & BIT(i))) + continue; + + ret = rcar_dmac_chan_probe(dmac, &dmac->channels[i], i); if (ret < 0) goto error; } From 2a36c16efab254dd6017efeb35ad88ecc96f2328 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hui Wang Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2019 13:53:27 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 34/57] ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix the problem of two front mics on a ThinkCentre This ThinkCentre machine has a new realtek codec alc222, it is not in the support list, we add it in the realtek.c then this machine can apply FIXUPs for the realtek codec. And this machine has two front mics which can't be handled by PA so far, it uses the pin 0x18 and 0x19 as the front mics, as a result the existing FIXUP ALC294_FIXUP_LENOVO_MIC_LOCATION doesn't work on this machine. Fortunately another FIXUP ALC283_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC also can change the location for one of the two mics on this machine. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190904055327.9883-1-hui.wang@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Hui Wang Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 453e203ac7b9..c1ddfd2fac52 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -7087,6 +7087,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x312a, "ThinkCentre Station", ALC294_FIXUP_LENOVO_MIC_LOCATION), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x312f, "ThinkCentre Station", ALC294_FIXUP_LENOVO_MIC_LOCATION), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x313c, "ThinkCentre Station", ALC294_FIXUP_LENOVO_MIC_LOCATION), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3151, "ThinkCentre Station", ALC283_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3902, "Lenovo E50-80", ALC269_FIXUP_DMIC_THINKPAD_ACPI), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3977, "IdeaPad S210", ALC283_FIXUP_INT_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3978, "Lenovo B50-70", ALC269_FIXUP_DMIC_THINKPAD_ACPI), @@ -8961,6 +8962,7 @@ static int patch_alc680(struct hda_codec *codec) static const struct hda_device_id snd_hda_id_realtek[] = { HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0215, "ALC215", patch_alc269), HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0221, "ALC221", patch_alc269), + HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0222, "ALC222", patch_alc269), HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0225, "ALC225", patch_alc269), HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0231, "ALC231", patch_alc269), HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0233, "ALC233", patch_alc269), From 93d2c4de8d8129b97ee1e1a222aedb0719d2fcd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tiwei Bie Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2019 13:36:59 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 35/57] vhost/test: fix build for vhost test Since below commit, callers need to specify the iov_limit in vhost_dev_init() explicitly. Fixes: b46a0bf78ad7 ("vhost: fix OOB in get_rx_bufs()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tiwei Bie Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Acked-by: Jason Wang --- drivers/vhost/test.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/vhost/test.c b/drivers/vhost/test.c index 9e90e969af55..ac4f762c4f65 100644 --- a/drivers/vhost/test.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/test.c @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static int vhost_test_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *f) dev = &n->dev; vqs[VHOST_TEST_VQ] = &n->vqs[VHOST_TEST_VQ]; n->vqs[VHOST_TEST_VQ].handle_kick = handle_vq_kick; - vhost_dev_init(dev, vqs, VHOST_TEST_VQ_MAX); + vhost_dev_init(dev, vqs, VHOST_TEST_VQ_MAX, UIO_MAXIOV); f->private_data = n; From 264b563b8675771834419057cbe076c1a41fb666 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tiwei Bie Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2019 13:37:00 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 36/57] vhost/test: fix build for vhost test Since vhost_exceeds_weight() was introduced, callers need to specify the packet weight and byte weight in vhost_dev_init(). Note that, the packet weight isn't counted in this patch to keep the original behavior unchanged. Fixes: e82b9b0727ff ("vhost: introduce vhost_exceeds_weight()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tiwei Bie Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Acked-by: Jason Wang --- drivers/vhost/test.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vhost/test.c b/drivers/vhost/test.c index ac4f762c4f65..7804869c6a31 100644 --- a/drivers/vhost/test.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/test.c @@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ * Using this limit prevents one virtqueue from starving others. */ #define VHOST_TEST_WEIGHT 0x80000 +/* Max number of packets transferred before requeueing the job. + * Using this limit prevents one virtqueue from starving others with + * pkts. + */ +#define VHOST_TEST_PKT_WEIGHT 256 + enum { VHOST_TEST_VQ = 0, VHOST_TEST_VQ_MAX = 1, @@ -80,10 +86,8 @@ static void handle_vq(struct vhost_test *n) } vhost_add_used_and_signal(&n->dev, vq, head, 0); total_len += len; - if (unlikely(total_len >= VHOST_TEST_WEIGHT)) { - vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); + if (unlikely(vhost_exceeds_weight(vq, 0, total_len))) break; - } } mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex); @@ -115,7 +119,8 @@ static int vhost_test_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *f) dev = &n->dev; vqs[VHOST_TEST_VQ] = &n->vqs[VHOST_TEST_VQ]; n->vqs[VHOST_TEST_VQ].handle_kick = handle_vq_kick; - vhost_dev_init(dev, vqs, VHOST_TEST_VQ_MAX, UIO_MAXIOV); + vhost_dev_init(dev, vqs, VHOST_TEST_VQ_MAX, UIO_MAXIOV, + VHOST_TEST_PKT_WEIGHT, VHOST_TEST_WEIGHT); f->private_data = n; From 718be6bab26fb01fa0147a2b614a3eefd96a2957 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ? jiang Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2019 02:51:23 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 37/57] virtio-net: lower min ring num_free for efficiency This change lowers ring buffer reclaim threshold from 1/2*queue to budget for better performance. According to our test with qemu + dpdk, packet dropping happens when the guest is not able to provide free buffer in avail ring timely with default 1/2*queue. The value in the patch has been tested and does show better performance. Test setup: iperf3 to generate packets to guest (total 30mins, pps 400k, UDP) avg packets drop before: 2842 avg packets drop after: 360(-87.3%) Further, current code suffers from a starvation problem: the amount of work done by try_fill_recv is not bounded by the budget parameter, thus (with large queues) once in a while userspace gets blocked for a long time while queue is being refilled. Trigger refills earlier to make sure the amount of work to do is limited. Signed-off-by: jiangkidd Acked-by: Jason Wang Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin --- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index 4f3de0ac8b0b..ba98e0971b84 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c @@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ static int virtnet_receive(struct receive_queue *rq, int budget, } } - if (rq->vq->num_free > virtqueue_get_vring_size(rq->vq) / 2) { + if (rq->vq->num_free > min((unsigned int)budget, virtqueue_get_vring_size(rq->vq)) / 2) { if (!try_fill_recv(vi, rq, GFP_ATOMIC)) schedule_delayed_work(&vi->refill, 0); } From 896fc242bc1d261c1178838487a0a54b260625cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yunsheng Lin Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2019 20:36:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 38/57] vhost: Remove unnecessary variable It is unnecessary to use ret variable to return the error code, just return the error code directly. Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin --- drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c index 0536f8526359..1ac9de250319 100644 --- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c @@ -203,7 +203,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vhost_poll_init); int vhost_poll_start(struct vhost_poll *poll, struct file *file) { __poll_t mask; - int ret = 0; if (poll->wqh) return 0; @@ -213,10 +212,10 @@ int vhost_poll_start(struct vhost_poll *poll, struct file *file) vhost_poll_wakeup(&poll->wait, 0, 0, poll_to_key(mask)); if (mask & EPOLLERR) { vhost_poll_stop(poll); - ret = -EINVAL; + return -EINVAL; } - return ret; + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vhost_poll_start); From 3d2c7d37047557175fb41de044091050b5f0d73b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2019 13:53:21 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 39/57] Revert "vhost: access vq metadata through kernel virtual address" This reverts commit 7f466032dc ("vhost: access vq metadata through kernel virtual address"). The commit caused a bunch of issues, and while commit 73f628ec9e ("vhost: disable metadata prefetch optimization") disabled the optimization it's not nice to keep lots of dead code around. Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin --- drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 515 +----------------------------------------- drivers/vhost/vhost.h | 41 ---- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 553 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c index 1ac9de250319..5dc174ac8cac 100644 --- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c @@ -297,160 +297,6 @@ static void vhost_vq_meta_reset(struct vhost_dev *d) __vhost_vq_meta_reset(d->vqs[i]); } -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS -static void vhost_map_unprefetch(struct vhost_map *map) -{ - kfree(map->pages); - map->pages = NULL; - map->npages = 0; - map->addr = NULL; -} - -static void vhost_uninit_vq_maps(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq) -{ - struct vhost_map *map[VHOST_NUM_ADDRS]; - int i; - - spin_lock(&vq->mmu_lock); - for (i = 0; i < VHOST_NUM_ADDRS; i++) { - map[i] = rcu_dereference_protected(vq->maps[i], - lockdep_is_held(&vq->mmu_lock)); - if (map[i]) - rcu_assign_pointer(vq->maps[i], NULL); - } - spin_unlock(&vq->mmu_lock); - - synchronize_rcu(); - - for (i = 0; i < VHOST_NUM_ADDRS; i++) - if (map[i]) - vhost_map_unprefetch(map[i]); - -} - -static void vhost_reset_vq_maps(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq) -{ - int i; - - vhost_uninit_vq_maps(vq); - for (i = 0; i < VHOST_NUM_ADDRS; i++) - vq->uaddrs[i].size = 0; -} - -static bool vhost_map_range_overlap(struct vhost_uaddr *uaddr, - unsigned long start, - unsigned long end) -{ - if (unlikely(!uaddr->size)) - return false; - - return !(end < uaddr->uaddr || start > uaddr->uaddr - 1 + uaddr->size); -} - -static void vhost_invalidate_vq_start(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, - int index, - unsigned long start, - unsigned long end) -{ - struct vhost_uaddr *uaddr = &vq->uaddrs[index]; - struct vhost_map *map; - int i; - - if (!vhost_map_range_overlap(uaddr, start, end)) - return; - - spin_lock(&vq->mmu_lock); - ++vq->invalidate_count; - - map = rcu_dereference_protected(vq->maps[index], - lockdep_is_held(&vq->mmu_lock)); - if (map) { - if (uaddr->write) { - for (i = 0; i < map->npages; i++) - set_page_dirty(map->pages[i]); - } - rcu_assign_pointer(vq->maps[index], NULL); - } - spin_unlock(&vq->mmu_lock); - - if (map) { - synchronize_rcu(); - vhost_map_unprefetch(map); - } -} - -static void vhost_invalidate_vq_end(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, - int index, - unsigned long start, - unsigned long end) -{ - if (!vhost_map_range_overlap(&vq->uaddrs[index], start, end)) - return; - - spin_lock(&vq->mmu_lock); - --vq->invalidate_count; - spin_unlock(&vq->mmu_lock); -} - -static int vhost_invalidate_range_start(struct mmu_notifier *mn, - const struct mmu_notifier_range *range) -{ - struct vhost_dev *dev = container_of(mn, struct vhost_dev, - mmu_notifier); - int i, j; - - if (!mmu_notifier_range_blockable(range)) - return -EAGAIN; - - for (i = 0; i < dev->nvqs; i++) { - struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = dev->vqs[i]; - - for (j = 0; j < VHOST_NUM_ADDRS; j++) - vhost_invalidate_vq_start(vq, j, - range->start, - range->end); - } - - return 0; -} - -static void vhost_invalidate_range_end(struct mmu_notifier *mn, - const struct mmu_notifier_range *range) -{ - struct vhost_dev *dev = container_of(mn, struct vhost_dev, - mmu_notifier); - int i, j; - - for (i = 0; i < dev->nvqs; i++) { - struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = dev->vqs[i]; - - for (j = 0; j < VHOST_NUM_ADDRS; j++) - vhost_invalidate_vq_end(vq, j, - range->start, - range->end); - } -} - -static const struct mmu_notifier_ops vhost_mmu_notifier_ops = { - .invalidate_range_start = vhost_invalidate_range_start, - .invalidate_range_end = vhost_invalidate_range_end, -}; - -static void vhost_init_maps(struct vhost_dev *dev) -{ - struct vhost_virtqueue *vq; - int i, j; - - dev->mmu_notifier.ops = &vhost_mmu_notifier_ops; - - for (i = 0; i < dev->nvqs; ++i) { - vq = dev->vqs[i]; - for (j = 0; j < VHOST_NUM_ADDRS; j++) - RCU_INIT_POINTER(vq->maps[j], NULL); - } -} -#endif - static void vhost_vq_reset(struct vhost_dev *dev, struct vhost_virtqueue *vq) { @@ -479,11 +325,7 @@ static void vhost_vq_reset(struct vhost_dev *dev, vq->busyloop_timeout = 0; vq->umem = NULL; vq->iotlb = NULL; - vq->invalidate_count = 0; __vhost_vq_meta_reset(vq); -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - vhost_reset_vq_maps(vq); -#endif } static int vhost_worker(void *data) @@ -633,9 +475,7 @@ void vhost_dev_init(struct vhost_dev *dev, INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->read_list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->pending_list); spin_lock_init(&dev->iotlb_lock); -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - vhost_init_maps(dev); -#endif + for (i = 0; i < dev->nvqs; ++i) { vq = dev->vqs[i]; @@ -644,7 +484,6 @@ void vhost_dev_init(struct vhost_dev *dev, vq->heads = NULL; vq->dev = dev; mutex_init(&vq->mutex); - spin_lock_init(&vq->mmu_lock); vhost_vq_reset(dev, vq); if (vq->handle_kick) vhost_poll_init(&vq->poll, vq->handle_kick, @@ -724,18 +563,7 @@ long vhost_dev_set_owner(struct vhost_dev *dev) if (err) goto err_cgroup; -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - err = mmu_notifier_register(&dev->mmu_notifier, dev->mm); - if (err) - goto err_mmu_notifier; -#endif - return 0; - -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS -err_mmu_notifier: - vhost_dev_free_iovecs(dev); -#endif err_cgroup: kthread_stop(worker); dev->worker = NULL; @@ -826,107 +654,6 @@ static void vhost_clear_msg(struct vhost_dev *dev) spin_unlock(&dev->iotlb_lock); } -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS -static void vhost_setup_uaddr(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, - int index, unsigned long uaddr, - size_t size, bool write) -{ - struct vhost_uaddr *addr = &vq->uaddrs[index]; - - addr->uaddr = uaddr; - addr->size = size; - addr->write = write; -} - -static void vhost_setup_vq_uaddr(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq) -{ - vhost_setup_uaddr(vq, VHOST_ADDR_DESC, - (unsigned long)vq->desc, - vhost_get_desc_size(vq, vq->num), - false); - vhost_setup_uaddr(vq, VHOST_ADDR_AVAIL, - (unsigned long)vq->avail, - vhost_get_avail_size(vq, vq->num), - false); - vhost_setup_uaddr(vq, VHOST_ADDR_USED, - (unsigned long)vq->used, - vhost_get_used_size(vq, vq->num), - true); -} - -static int vhost_map_prefetch(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, - int index) -{ - struct vhost_map *map; - struct vhost_uaddr *uaddr = &vq->uaddrs[index]; - struct page **pages; - int npages = DIV_ROUND_UP(uaddr->size, PAGE_SIZE); - int npinned; - void *vaddr, *v; - int err; - int i; - - spin_lock(&vq->mmu_lock); - - err = -EFAULT; - if (vq->invalidate_count) - goto err; - - err = -ENOMEM; - map = kmalloc(sizeof(*map), GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!map) - goto err; - - pages = kmalloc_array(npages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!pages) - goto err_pages; - - err = EFAULT; - npinned = __get_user_pages_fast(uaddr->uaddr, npages, - uaddr->write, pages); - if (npinned > 0) - release_pages(pages, npinned); - if (npinned != npages) - goto err_gup; - - for (i = 0; i < npinned; i++) - if (PageHighMem(pages[i])) - goto err_gup; - - vaddr = v = page_address(pages[0]); - - /* For simplicity, fallback to userspace address if VA is not - * contigious. - */ - for (i = 1; i < npinned; i++) { - v += PAGE_SIZE; - if (v != page_address(pages[i])) - goto err_gup; - } - - map->addr = vaddr + (uaddr->uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)); - map->npages = npages; - map->pages = pages; - - rcu_assign_pointer(vq->maps[index], map); - /* No need for a synchronize_rcu(). This function should be - * called by dev->worker so we are serialized with all - * readers. - */ - spin_unlock(&vq->mmu_lock); - - return 0; - -err_gup: - kfree(pages); -err_pages: - kfree(map); -err: - spin_unlock(&vq->mmu_lock); - return err; -} -#endif - void vhost_dev_cleanup(struct vhost_dev *dev) { int i; @@ -956,16 +683,8 @@ void vhost_dev_cleanup(struct vhost_dev *dev) kthread_stop(dev->worker); dev->worker = NULL; } - if (dev->mm) { -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - mmu_notifier_unregister(&dev->mmu_notifier, dev->mm); -#endif + if (dev->mm) mmput(dev->mm); - } -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - for (i = 0; i < dev->nvqs; i++) - vhost_uninit_vq_maps(dev->vqs[i]); -#endif dev->mm = NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vhost_dev_cleanup); @@ -1194,26 +913,6 @@ static inline void __user *__vhost_get_user(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, static inline int vhost_put_avail_event(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq) { -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - struct vhost_map *map; - struct vring_used *used; - - if (!vq->iotlb) { - rcu_read_lock(); - - map = rcu_dereference(vq->maps[VHOST_ADDR_USED]); - if (likely(map)) { - used = map->addr; - *((__virtio16 *)&used->ring[vq->num]) = - cpu_to_vhost16(vq, vq->avail_idx); - rcu_read_unlock(); - return 0; - } - - rcu_read_unlock(); - } -#endif - return vhost_put_user(vq, cpu_to_vhost16(vq, vq->avail_idx), vhost_avail_event(vq)); } @@ -1222,27 +921,6 @@ static inline int vhost_put_used(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, struct vring_used_elem *head, int idx, int count) { -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - struct vhost_map *map; - struct vring_used *used; - size_t size; - - if (!vq->iotlb) { - rcu_read_lock(); - - map = rcu_dereference(vq->maps[VHOST_ADDR_USED]); - if (likely(map)) { - used = map->addr; - size = count * sizeof(*head); - memcpy(used->ring + idx, head, size); - rcu_read_unlock(); - return 0; - } - - rcu_read_unlock(); - } -#endif - return vhost_copy_to_user(vq, vq->used->ring + idx, head, count * sizeof(*head)); } @@ -1250,25 +928,6 @@ static inline int vhost_put_used(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, static inline int vhost_put_used_flags(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq) { -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - struct vhost_map *map; - struct vring_used *used; - - if (!vq->iotlb) { - rcu_read_lock(); - - map = rcu_dereference(vq->maps[VHOST_ADDR_USED]); - if (likely(map)) { - used = map->addr; - used->flags = cpu_to_vhost16(vq, vq->used_flags); - rcu_read_unlock(); - return 0; - } - - rcu_read_unlock(); - } -#endif - return vhost_put_user(vq, cpu_to_vhost16(vq, vq->used_flags), &vq->used->flags); } @@ -1276,25 +935,6 @@ static inline int vhost_put_used_flags(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq) static inline int vhost_put_used_idx(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq) { -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - struct vhost_map *map; - struct vring_used *used; - - if (!vq->iotlb) { - rcu_read_lock(); - - map = rcu_dereference(vq->maps[VHOST_ADDR_USED]); - if (likely(map)) { - used = map->addr; - used->idx = cpu_to_vhost16(vq, vq->last_used_idx); - rcu_read_unlock(); - return 0; - } - - rcu_read_unlock(); - } -#endif - return vhost_put_user(vq, cpu_to_vhost16(vq, vq->last_used_idx), &vq->used->idx); } @@ -1340,50 +980,12 @@ static void vhost_dev_unlock_vqs(struct vhost_dev *d) static inline int vhost_get_avail_idx(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, __virtio16 *idx) { -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - struct vhost_map *map; - struct vring_avail *avail; - - if (!vq->iotlb) { - rcu_read_lock(); - - map = rcu_dereference(vq->maps[VHOST_ADDR_AVAIL]); - if (likely(map)) { - avail = map->addr; - *idx = avail->idx; - rcu_read_unlock(); - return 0; - } - - rcu_read_unlock(); - } -#endif - return vhost_get_avail(vq, *idx, &vq->avail->idx); } static inline int vhost_get_avail_head(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, __virtio16 *head, int idx) { -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - struct vhost_map *map; - struct vring_avail *avail; - - if (!vq->iotlb) { - rcu_read_lock(); - - map = rcu_dereference(vq->maps[VHOST_ADDR_AVAIL]); - if (likely(map)) { - avail = map->addr; - *head = avail->ring[idx & (vq->num - 1)]; - rcu_read_unlock(); - return 0; - } - - rcu_read_unlock(); - } -#endif - return vhost_get_avail(vq, *head, &vq->avail->ring[idx & (vq->num - 1)]); } @@ -1391,98 +993,24 @@ static inline int vhost_get_avail_head(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, static inline int vhost_get_avail_flags(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, __virtio16 *flags) { -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - struct vhost_map *map; - struct vring_avail *avail; - - if (!vq->iotlb) { - rcu_read_lock(); - - map = rcu_dereference(vq->maps[VHOST_ADDR_AVAIL]); - if (likely(map)) { - avail = map->addr; - *flags = avail->flags; - rcu_read_unlock(); - return 0; - } - - rcu_read_unlock(); - } -#endif - return vhost_get_avail(vq, *flags, &vq->avail->flags); } static inline int vhost_get_used_event(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, __virtio16 *event) { -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - struct vhost_map *map; - struct vring_avail *avail; - - if (!vq->iotlb) { - rcu_read_lock(); - map = rcu_dereference(vq->maps[VHOST_ADDR_AVAIL]); - if (likely(map)) { - avail = map->addr; - *event = (__virtio16)avail->ring[vq->num]; - rcu_read_unlock(); - return 0; - } - rcu_read_unlock(); - } -#endif - return vhost_get_avail(vq, *event, vhost_used_event(vq)); } static inline int vhost_get_used_idx(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, __virtio16 *idx) { -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - struct vhost_map *map; - struct vring_used *used; - - if (!vq->iotlb) { - rcu_read_lock(); - - map = rcu_dereference(vq->maps[VHOST_ADDR_USED]); - if (likely(map)) { - used = map->addr; - *idx = used->idx; - rcu_read_unlock(); - return 0; - } - - rcu_read_unlock(); - } -#endif - return vhost_get_used(vq, *idx, &vq->used->idx); } static inline int vhost_get_desc(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, struct vring_desc *desc, int idx) { -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - struct vhost_map *map; - struct vring_desc *d; - - if (!vq->iotlb) { - rcu_read_lock(); - - map = rcu_dereference(vq->maps[VHOST_ADDR_DESC]); - if (likely(map)) { - d = map->addr; - *desc = *(d + idx); - rcu_read_unlock(); - return 0; - } - - rcu_read_unlock(); - } -#endif - return vhost_copy_from_user(vq, desc, vq->desc + idx, sizeof(*desc)); } @@ -1823,32 +1351,12 @@ static bool iotlb_access_ok(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, return true; } -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS -static void vhost_vq_map_prefetch(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq) -{ - struct vhost_map __rcu *map; - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < VHOST_NUM_ADDRS; i++) { - rcu_read_lock(); - map = rcu_dereference(vq->maps[i]); - rcu_read_unlock(); - if (unlikely(!map)) - vhost_map_prefetch(vq, i); - } -} -#endif - int vq_meta_prefetch(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq) { unsigned int num = vq->num; - if (!vq->iotlb) { -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - vhost_vq_map_prefetch(vq); -#endif + if (!vq->iotlb) return 1; - } return iotlb_access_ok(vq, VHOST_ACCESS_RO, (u64)(uintptr_t)vq->desc, vhost_get_desc_size(vq, num), VHOST_ADDR_DESC) && @@ -2059,16 +1567,6 @@ static long vhost_vring_set_num_addr(struct vhost_dev *d, mutex_lock(&vq->mutex); -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - /* Unregister MMU notifer to allow invalidation callback - * can access vq->uaddrs[] without holding a lock. - */ - if (d->mm) - mmu_notifier_unregister(&d->mmu_notifier, d->mm); - - vhost_uninit_vq_maps(vq); -#endif - switch (ioctl) { case VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM: r = vhost_vring_set_num(d, vq, argp); @@ -2080,13 +1578,6 @@ static long vhost_vring_set_num_addr(struct vhost_dev *d, BUG(); } -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - vhost_setup_vq_uaddr(vq); - - if (d->mm) - mmu_notifier_register(&d->mmu_notifier, d->mm); -#endif - mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex); return r; diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vhost.h b/drivers/vhost/vhost.h index 42a8c2a13ab1..e9ed2722b633 100644 --- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.h +++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.h @@ -12,9 +12,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include -#include -#include struct vhost_work; typedef void (*vhost_work_fn_t)(struct vhost_work *work); @@ -83,24 +80,6 @@ enum vhost_uaddr_type { VHOST_NUM_ADDRS = 3, }; -struct vhost_map { - int npages; - void *addr; - struct page **pages; -}; - -struct vhost_uaddr { - unsigned long uaddr; - size_t size; - bool write; -}; - -#if defined(CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER) && ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE == 0 -#define VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS 0 -#else -#define VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS 0 -#endif - /* The virtqueue structure describes a queue attached to a device. */ struct vhost_virtqueue { struct vhost_dev *dev; @@ -111,22 +90,7 @@ struct vhost_virtqueue { struct vring_desc __user *desc; struct vring_avail __user *avail; struct vring_used __user *used; - -#if VHOST_ARCH_CAN_ACCEL_UACCESS - /* Read by memory accessors, modified by meta data - * prefetching, MMU notifier and vring ioctl(). - * Synchonrized through mmu_lock (writers) and RCU (writers - * and readers). - */ - struct vhost_map __rcu *maps[VHOST_NUM_ADDRS]; - /* Read by MMU notifier, modified by vring ioctl(), - * synchronized through MMU notifier - * registering/unregistering. - */ - struct vhost_uaddr uaddrs[VHOST_NUM_ADDRS]; -#endif const struct vhost_umem_node *meta_iotlb[VHOST_NUM_ADDRS]; - struct file *kick; struct eventfd_ctx *call_ctx; struct eventfd_ctx *error_ctx; @@ -181,8 +145,6 @@ struct vhost_virtqueue { bool user_be; #endif u32 busyloop_timeout; - spinlock_t mmu_lock; - int invalidate_count; }; struct vhost_msg_node { @@ -196,9 +158,6 @@ struct vhost_msg_node { struct vhost_dev { struct mm_struct *mm; -#ifdef CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER - struct mmu_notifier mmu_notifier; -#endif struct mutex mutex; struct vhost_virtqueue **vqs; int nvqs; From 02fa5d7b17a761f53ef1eedfc254e1f33bd226b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nadav Amit Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2019 02:16:46 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 40/57] mm/balloon_compaction: suppress allocation warnings There is no reason to print warnings when balloon page allocation fails, as they are expected and can be handled gracefully. Since VMware balloon now uses balloon-compaction infrastructure, and suppressed these warnings before, it is also beneficial to suppress these warnings to keep the same behavior that the balloon had before. Cc: Jason Wang Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand --- mm/balloon_compaction.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/balloon_compaction.c b/mm/balloon_compaction.c index 798275a51887..26de020aae7b 100644 --- a/mm/balloon_compaction.c +++ b/mm/balloon_compaction.c @@ -124,7 +124,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(balloon_page_list_dequeue); struct page *balloon_page_alloc(void) { struct page *page = alloc_page(balloon_mapping_gfp_mask() | - __GFP_NOMEMALLOC | __GFP_NORETRY); + __GFP_NOMEMALLOC | __GFP_NORETRY | + __GFP_NOWARN); return page; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(balloon_page_alloc); From 8205d5d98ef7f155de211f5e2eb6ca03d95a5a60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gustavo Romero Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2019 00:55:27 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 41/57] powerpc/tm: Fix FP/VMX unavailable exceptions inside a transaction When we take an FP unavailable exception in a transaction we have to account for the hardware FP TM checkpointed registers being incorrect. In this case for this process we know the current and checkpointed FP registers must be the same (since FP wasn't used inside the transaction) hence in the thread_struct we copy the current FP registers to the checkpointed ones. This copy is done in tm_reclaim_thread(). We use thread->ckpt_regs.msr to determine if FP was on when in userspace. thread->ckpt_regs.msr represents the state of the MSR when exiting userspace. This is setup by check_if_tm_restore_required(). Unfortunatley there is an optimisation in giveup_all() which returns early if tsk->thread.regs->msr (via local variable `usermsr`) has FP=VEC=VSX=SPE=0. This optimisation means that check_if_tm_restore_required() is not called and hence thread->ckpt_regs.msr is not updated and will contain an old value. This can happen if due to load_fp=255 we start a userspace process with MSR FP=1 and then we are context switched out. In this case thread->ckpt_regs.msr will contain FP=1. If that same process is then context switched in and load_fp overflows, MSR will have FP=0. If that process now enters a transaction and does an FP instruction, the FP unavailable will not update thread->ckpt_regs.msr (the bug) and MSR FP=1 will be retained in thread->ckpt_regs.msr. tm_reclaim_thread() will then not perform the required memcpy and the checkpointed FP regs in the thread struct will contain the wrong values. The code path for this happening is: Userspace: Kernel Start userspace with MSR FP/VEC/VSX/SPE=0 TM=1 < ----- ... tbegin bne fp instruction FP unavailable ---- > fp_unavailable_tm() tm_reclaim_current() tm_reclaim_thread() giveup_all() return early since FP/VMX/VSX=0 /* ckpt MSR not updated (Incorrect) */ tm_reclaim() /* thread_struct ckpt FP regs contain junk (OK) */ /* Sees ckpt MSR FP=1 (Incorrect) */ no memcpy() performed /* thread_struct ckpt FP regs not fixed (Incorrect) */ tm_recheckpoint() /* Put junk in hardware checkpoint FP regs */ .... < ----- Return to userspace with MSR TM=1 FP=1 with junk in the FP TM checkpoint TM rollback reads FP junk This is a data integrity problem for the current process as the FP registers are corrupted. It's also a security problem as the FP registers from one process may be leaked to another. This patch moves up check_if_tm_restore_required() in giveup_all() to ensure thread->ckpt_regs.msr is updated correctly. A simple testcase to replicate this will be posted to tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c Similarly for VMX. This fixes CVE-2019-15030. Fixes: f48e91e87e67 ("powerpc/tm: Fix FP and VMX register corruption") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.12+ Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190904045529.23002-1-gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com --- arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c index 8fc4de0d22b4..437b57068cf8 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c @@ -497,13 +497,14 @@ void giveup_all(struct task_struct *tsk) if (!tsk->thread.regs) return; + check_if_tm_restore_required(tsk); + usermsr = tsk->thread.regs->msr; if ((usermsr & msr_all_available) == 0) return; msr_check_and_set(msr_all_available); - check_if_tm_restore_required(tsk); WARN_ON((usermsr & MSR_VSX) && !((usermsr & MSR_FP) && (usermsr & MSR_VEC))); From a8318c13e79badb92bc6640704a64cc022a6eb97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gustavo Romero Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2019 00:55:28 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 42/57] powerpc/tm: Fix restoring FP/VMX facility incorrectly on interrupts When in userspace and MSR FP=0 the hardware FP state is unrelated to the current process. This is extended for transactions where if tbegin is run with FP=0, the hardware checkpoint FP state will also be unrelated to the current process. Due to this, we need to ensure this hardware checkpoint is updated with the correct state before we enable FP for this process. Unfortunately we get this wrong when returning to a process from a hardware interrupt. A process that starts a transaction with FP=0 can take an interrupt. When the kernel returns back to that process, we change to FP=1 but with hardware checkpoint FP state not updated. If this transaction is then rolled back, the FP registers now contain the wrong state. The process looks like this: Userspace: Kernel Start userspace with MSR FP=0 TM=1 < ----- ... tbegin bne Hardware interrupt ---- > .... ret_from_except restore_math() /* sees FP=0 */ restore_fp() tm_active_with_fp() /* sees FP=1 (Incorrect) */ load_fp_state() FP = 0 -> 1 < ----- Return to userspace with MSR TM=1 FP=1 with junk in the FP TM checkpoint TM rollback reads FP junk When returning from the hardware exception, tm_active_with_fp() is incorrectly making restore_fp() call load_fp_state() which is setting FP=1. The fix is to remove tm_active_with_fp(). tm_active_with_fp() is attempting to handle the case where FP state has been changed inside a transaction. In this case the checkpointed and transactional FP state is different and hence we must restore the FP state (ie. we can't do lazy FP restore inside a transaction that's used FP). It's safe to remove tm_active_with_fp() as this case is handled by restore_tm_state(). restore_tm_state() detects if FP has been using inside a transaction and will set load_fp and call restore_math() to ensure the FP state (checkpoint and transaction) is restored. This is a data integrity problem for the current process as the FP registers are corrupted. It's also a security problem as the FP registers from one process may be leaked to another. Similarly for VMX. A simple testcase to replicate this will be posted to tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c This fixes CVE-2019-15031. Fixes: a7771176b439 ("powerpc: Don't enable FP/Altivec if not checkpointed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.15+ Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190904045529.23002-2-gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com --- arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 18 ++---------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c index 437b57068cf8..7a84c9f1778e 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c @@ -101,21 +101,8 @@ static void check_if_tm_restore_required(struct task_struct *tsk) } } -static bool tm_active_with_fp(struct task_struct *tsk) -{ - return MSR_TM_ACTIVE(tsk->thread.regs->msr) && - (tsk->thread.ckpt_regs.msr & MSR_FP); -} - -static bool tm_active_with_altivec(struct task_struct *tsk) -{ - return MSR_TM_ACTIVE(tsk->thread.regs->msr) && - (tsk->thread.ckpt_regs.msr & MSR_VEC); -} #else static inline void check_if_tm_restore_required(struct task_struct *tsk) { } -static inline bool tm_active_with_fp(struct task_struct *tsk) { return false; } -static inline bool tm_active_with_altivec(struct task_struct *tsk) { return false; } #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM */ bool strict_msr_control; @@ -252,7 +239,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(enable_kernel_fp); static int restore_fp(struct task_struct *tsk) { - if (tsk->thread.load_fp || tm_active_with_fp(tsk)) { + if (tsk->thread.load_fp) { load_fp_state(¤t->thread.fp_state); current->thread.load_fp++; return 1; @@ -334,8 +321,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(flush_altivec_to_thread); static int restore_altivec(struct task_struct *tsk) { - if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC) && - (tsk->thread.load_vec || tm_active_with_altivec(tsk))) { + if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC) && (tsk->thread.load_vec)) { load_vr_state(&tsk->thread.vr_state); tsk->thread.used_vr = 1; tsk->thread.load_vec++; From 1251201c0d34fadf69d56efa675c2b7dd0a90eca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ingo Molnar Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2019 09:55:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 43/57] sched/core: Fix uclamp ABI bug, clean up and robustify sched_read_attr() ABI logic and code Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo reported that 'chrt' broke on recent kernels: $ chrt -p $$ chrt: failed to get pid 26306's policy: Argument list too long and he has root-caused the bug to the following commit increasing sched_attr size and breaking sched_read_attr() into returning -EFBIG: a509a7cd7974 ("sched/uclamp: Extend sched_setattr() to support utilization clamping") The other, bigger bug is that the whole sched_getattr() and sched_read_attr() logic of checking non-zero bits in new ABI components is arguably broken, and pretty much any extension of the ABI will spuriously break the ABI. That's way too fragile. Instead implement the perf syscall's extensible ABI instead, which we already implement on the sched_setattr() side: - if user-attributes have the same size as kernel attributes then the logic is unchanged. - if user-attributes are larger than the kernel knows about then simply skip the extra bits, but set attr->size to the (smaller) kernel size so that tooling can (in principle) handle older kernel as well. - if user-attributes are smaller than the kernel knows about then just copy whatever user-space can accept. Also clean up the whole logic: - Simplify the code flow - there's no need for 'ret' for example. - Standardize on 'kattr/uattr' and 'ksize/usize' naming to make sure we always know which side we are dealing with. - Why is it called 'read' when what it does is to copy to user? This code is so far away from VFS read() semantics that the naming is actively confusing. Name it sched_attr_copy_to_user() instead, which mirrors other copy_to_user() functionality. - Move the attr->size assignment from the head of sched_getattr() to the sched_attr_copy_to_user() function. Nothing else within the kernel should care about the size of the structure. With these fixes the sched_getattr() syscall now nicely supports an extensible ABI in both a forward and backward compatible fashion, and will also fix the chrt bug. As an added bonus the bogus -EFBIG return is removed as well, which as Thadeu noted should have been -E2BIG to begin with. Reported-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Tested-by: Dietmar Eggemann Tested-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Patrick Bellasi Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Fixes: a509a7cd7974 ("sched/uclamp: Extend sched_setattr() to support utilization clamping") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190904075532.GA26751@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- kernel/sched/core.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index 010d578118d6..df9f1fe5689b 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -5105,37 +5105,40 @@ out_unlock: return retval; } -static int sched_read_attr(struct sched_attr __user *uattr, - struct sched_attr *attr, - unsigned int usize) +/* + * Copy the kernel size attribute structure (which might be larger + * than what user-space knows about) to user-space. + * + * Note that all cases are valid: user-space buffer can be larger or + * smaller than the kernel-space buffer. The usual case is that both + * have the same size. + */ +static int +sched_attr_copy_to_user(struct sched_attr __user *uattr, + struct sched_attr *kattr, + unsigned int usize) { - int ret; + unsigned int ksize = sizeof(*kattr); if (!access_ok(uattr, usize)) return -EFAULT; /* - * If we're handed a smaller struct than we know of, - * ensure all the unknown bits are 0 - i.e. old - * user-space does not get uncomplete information. + * sched_getattr() ABI forwards and backwards compatibility: + * + * If usize == ksize then we just copy everything to user-space and all is good. + * + * If usize < ksize then we only copy as much as user-space has space for, + * this keeps ABI compatibility as well. We skip the rest. + * + * If usize > ksize then user-space is using a newer version of the ABI, + * which part the kernel doesn't know about. Just ignore it - tooling can + * detect the kernel's knowledge of attributes from the attr->size value + * which is set to ksize in this case. */ - if (usize < sizeof(*attr)) { - unsigned char *addr; - unsigned char *end; + kattr->size = min(usize, ksize); - addr = (void *)attr + usize; - end = (void *)attr + sizeof(*attr); - - for (; addr < end; addr++) { - if (*addr) - return -EFBIG; - } - - attr->size = usize; - } - - ret = copy_to_user(uattr, attr, attr->size); - if (ret) + if (copy_to_user(uattr, kattr, kattr->size)) return -EFAULT; return 0; @@ -5145,20 +5148,18 @@ static int sched_read_attr(struct sched_attr __user *uattr, * sys_sched_getattr - similar to sched_getparam, but with sched_attr * @pid: the pid in question. * @uattr: structure containing the extended parameters. - * @size: sizeof(attr) for fwd/bwd comp. + * @usize: sizeof(attr) that user-space knows about, for forwards and backwards compatibility. * @flags: for future extension. */ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(sched_getattr, pid_t, pid, struct sched_attr __user *, uattr, - unsigned int, size, unsigned int, flags) + unsigned int, usize, unsigned int, flags) { - struct sched_attr attr = { - .size = sizeof(struct sched_attr), - }; + struct sched_attr kattr = { }; struct task_struct *p; int retval; - if (!uattr || pid < 0 || size > PAGE_SIZE || - size < SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0 || flags) + if (!uattr || pid < 0 || usize > PAGE_SIZE || + usize < SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0 || flags) return -EINVAL; rcu_read_lock(); @@ -5171,25 +5172,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(sched_getattr, pid_t, pid, struct sched_attr __user *, uattr, if (retval) goto out_unlock; - attr.sched_policy = p->policy; + kattr.sched_policy = p->policy; if (p->sched_reset_on_fork) - attr.sched_flags |= SCHED_FLAG_RESET_ON_FORK; + kattr.sched_flags |= SCHED_FLAG_RESET_ON_FORK; if (task_has_dl_policy(p)) - __getparam_dl(p, &attr); + __getparam_dl(p, &kattr); else if (task_has_rt_policy(p)) - attr.sched_priority = p->rt_priority; + kattr.sched_priority = p->rt_priority; else - attr.sched_nice = task_nice(p); + kattr.sched_nice = task_nice(p); #ifdef CONFIG_UCLAMP_TASK - attr.sched_util_min = p->uclamp_req[UCLAMP_MIN].value; - attr.sched_util_max = p->uclamp_req[UCLAMP_MAX].value; + kattr.sched_util_min = p->uclamp_req[UCLAMP_MIN].value; + kattr.sched_util_max = p->uclamp_req[UCLAMP_MAX].value; #endif rcu_read_unlock(); - retval = sched_read_attr(uattr, &attr, size); - return retval; + return sched_attr_copy_to_user(uattr, &kattr, usize); out_unlock: rcu_read_unlock(); From b0841eefd9693827afb9888235e26ddd098f9cef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Sat, 31 Aug 2019 09:43:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 44/57] configfs: provide exclusion between IO and removals Make sure that attribute methods are not called after the item has been removed from the tree. To do so, we * at the point of no return in removals, grab ->frag_sem exclusive and mark the fragment dead. * call the methods of attributes with ->frag_sem taken shared and only after having verified that the fragment is still alive. The main benefit is for method instances - they are guaranteed that the objects they are accessing *and* all ancestors are still there. Another win is that we don't need to bother with extra refcount on config_item when opening a file - the item will be alive for as long as it stays in the tree, and we won't touch it/attributes/any associated data after it's been removed from the tree. Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig --- fs/configfs/dir.c | 23 ++++++++++++++ fs/configfs/file.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/configfs/dir.c b/fs/configfs/dir.c index 1df65c2440da..79fc25aaa8cd 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/configfs/dir.c @@ -1461,6 +1461,7 @@ static int configfs_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) struct config_item *item; struct configfs_subsystem *subsys; struct configfs_dirent *sd; + struct configfs_fragment *frag; struct module *subsys_owner = NULL, *dead_item_owner = NULL; int ret; @@ -1518,6 +1519,16 @@ static int configfs_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) } } while (ret == -EAGAIN); + frag = sd->s_frag; + if (down_write_killable(&frag->frag_sem)) { + spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock); + configfs_detach_rollback(dentry); + spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock); + return -EINTR; + } + frag->frag_dead = true; + up_write(&frag->frag_sem); + /* Get a working ref for the duration of this function */ item = configfs_get_config_item(dentry); @@ -1821,6 +1832,12 @@ void configfs_unregister_group(struct config_group *group) struct configfs_subsystem *subsys = group->cg_subsys; struct dentry *dentry = group->cg_item.ci_dentry; struct dentry *parent = group->cg_item.ci_parent->ci_dentry; + struct configfs_dirent *sd = dentry->d_fsdata; + struct configfs_fragment *frag = sd->s_frag; + + down_write(&frag->frag_sem); + frag->frag_dead = true; + up_write(&frag->frag_sem); inode_lock_nested(d_inode(parent), I_MUTEX_PARENT); spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock); @@ -1947,12 +1964,18 @@ void configfs_unregister_subsystem(struct configfs_subsystem *subsys) struct config_group *group = &subsys->su_group; struct dentry *dentry = group->cg_item.ci_dentry; struct dentry *root = dentry->d_sb->s_root; + struct configfs_dirent *sd = dentry->d_fsdata; + struct configfs_fragment *frag = sd->s_frag; if (dentry->d_parent != root) { pr_err("Tried to unregister non-subsystem!\n"); return; } + down_write(&frag->frag_sem); + frag->frag_dead = true; + up_write(&frag->frag_sem); + inode_lock_nested(d_inode(root), I_MUTEX_PARENT); inode_lock_nested(d_inode(dentry), I_MUTEX_CHILD); diff --git a/fs/configfs/file.c b/fs/configfs/file.c index 9d5e888df60b..fb65b706cc0d 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/file.c +++ b/fs/configfs/file.c @@ -48,22 +48,32 @@ struct configfs_buffer { }; }; - -static int fill_read_buffer(struct configfs_buffer * buffer) +static inline struct configfs_fragment *to_frag(struct file *file) { - ssize_t count; + struct configfs_dirent *sd = file->f_path.dentry->d_fsdata; + + return sd->s_frag; +} + +static int fill_read_buffer(struct file *file, struct configfs_buffer *buffer) +{ + struct configfs_fragment *frag = to_frag(file); + ssize_t count = -ENOENT; if (!buffer->page) buffer->page = (char *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!buffer->page) return -ENOMEM; - count = buffer->attr->show(buffer->item, buffer->page); + down_read(&frag->frag_sem); + if (!frag->frag_dead) + count = buffer->attr->show(buffer->item, buffer->page); + up_read(&frag->frag_sem); + if (count < 0) return count; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(count > (ssize_t)SIMPLE_ATTR_SIZE)) return -EIO; - buffer->needs_read_fill = 0; buffer->count = count; return 0; @@ -96,7 +106,7 @@ configfs_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pp mutex_lock(&buffer->mutex); if (buffer->needs_read_fill) { - retval = fill_read_buffer(buffer); + retval = fill_read_buffer(file, buffer); if (retval) goto out; } @@ -133,6 +143,7 @@ static ssize_t configfs_read_bin_file(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { + struct configfs_fragment *frag = to_frag(file); struct configfs_buffer *buffer = file->private_data; ssize_t retval = 0; ssize_t len = min_t(size_t, count, PAGE_SIZE); @@ -148,7 +159,12 @@ configfs_read_bin_file(struct file *file, char __user *buf, if (buffer->needs_read_fill) { /* perform first read with buf == NULL to get extent */ - len = buffer->bin_attr->read(buffer->item, NULL, 0); + down_read(&frag->frag_sem); + if (!frag->frag_dead) + len = buffer->bin_attr->read(buffer->item, NULL, 0); + else + len = -ENOENT; + up_read(&frag->frag_sem); if (len <= 0) { retval = len; goto out; @@ -168,8 +184,13 @@ configfs_read_bin_file(struct file *file, char __user *buf, buffer->bin_buffer_size = len; /* perform second read to fill buffer */ - len = buffer->bin_attr->read(buffer->item, - buffer->bin_buffer, len); + down_read(&frag->frag_sem); + if (!frag->frag_dead) + len = buffer->bin_attr->read(buffer->item, + buffer->bin_buffer, len); + else + len = -ENOENT; + up_read(&frag->frag_sem); if (len < 0) { retval = len; vfree(buffer->bin_buffer); @@ -220,9 +241,16 @@ fill_write_buffer(struct configfs_buffer * buffer, const char __user * buf, size } static int -flush_write_buffer(struct configfs_buffer *buffer, size_t count) +flush_write_buffer(struct file *file, struct configfs_buffer *buffer, size_t count) { - return buffer->attr->store(buffer->item, buffer->page, count); + struct configfs_fragment *frag = to_frag(file); + int res = -ENOENT; + + down_read(&frag->frag_sem); + if (!frag->frag_dead) + res = buffer->attr->store(buffer->item, buffer->page, count); + up_read(&frag->frag_sem); + return res; } @@ -252,7 +280,7 @@ configfs_write_file(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, lof mutex_lock(&buffer->mutex); len = fill_write_buffer(buffer, buf, count); if (len > 0) - len = flush_write_buffer(buffer, len); + len = flush_write_buffer(file, buffer, len); if (len > 0) *ppos += len; mutex_unlock(&buffer->mutex); @@ -328,6 +356,7 @@ out: static int __configfs_open_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, int type) { struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; + struct configfs_fragment *frag = to_frag(file); struct configfs_attribute *attr; struct configfs_buffer *buffer; int error; @@ -337,8 +366,13 @@ static int __configfs_open_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, int type if (!buffer) goto out; + error = -ENOENT; + down_read(&frag->frag_sem); + if (unlikely(frag->frag_dead)) + goto out_free_buffer; + error = -EINVAL; - buffer->item = configfs_get_config_item(dentry->d_parent); + buffer->item = to_item(dentry->d_parent); if (!buffer->item) goto out_free_buffer; @@ -396,6 +430,7 @@ static int __configfs_open_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, int type buffer->read_in_progress = false; buffer->write_in_progress = false; file->private_data = buffer; + up_read(&frag->frag_sem); return 0; out_put_module: @@ -403,6 +438,7 @@ out_put_module: out_put_item: config_item_put(buffer->item); out_free_buffer: + up_read(&frag->frag_sem); kfree(buffer); out: return error; @@ -412,8 +448,6 @@ static int configfs_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { struct configfs_buffer *buffer = filp->private_data; - if (buffer->item) - config_item_put(buffer->item); module_put(buffer->owner); if (buffer->page) free_page((unsigned long)buffer->page); @@ -439,12 +473,17 @@ static int configfs_release_bin_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) buffer->read_in_progress = false; if (buffer->write_in_progress) { + struct configfs_fragment *frag = to_frag(file); buffer->write_in_progress = false; - /* result of ->release() is ignored */ - buffer->bin_attr->write(buffer->item, buffer->bin_buffer, - buffer->bin_buffer_size); - + down_read(&frag->frag_sem); + if (!frag->frag_dead) { + /* result of ->release() is ignored */ + buffer->bin_attr->write(buffer->item, + buffer->bin_buffer, + buffer->bin_buffer_size); + } + up_read(&frag->frag_sem); /* vfree on NULL is safe */ vfree(buffer->bin_buffer); buffer->bin_buffer = NULL; From 02e740aeca79e9a3c464bc2ebb510457c85d2015 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Cooper Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2019 19:17:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 45/57] Documentation/process: Volunteer as the ambassador for Xen Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Tyler Hicks Cc: Ben Hutchings Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190904181702.19788-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst b/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst index d37cbc502936..f9e8c0b23c52 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ an involved disclosed party. The current ambassadors list: Microsoft VMware - XEN + Xen Andrew Cooper Canonical Tyler Hicks Debian Ben Hutchings From f56f791f6d8e8296c9dd194506ee2b703b1227d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2019 09:24:49 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 46/57] Documentation/process: Add Google contact for embargoed hardware issues This adds myself as the Google contact for embargoed hardware security issues and fixes some small typos. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Matt Linton Cc: Matthew Garrett Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Guenter Roeck Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/201909040922.56496BF70@keescook Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst b/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst index f9e8c0b23c52..47316d9c24f5 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Scope ----- Hardware issues which result in security problems are a different category -of security bugs than pure software bugs which only affect the Linux +of security bugs than pure software bugs which only affect the Linux kernel. Hardware issues like Meltdown, Spectre, L1TF etc. must be treated @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ Mitigation development The initial response team sets up an encrypted mailing-list or repurposes an existing one if appropriate. The disclosing party should provide a list -of contacts for all other parties who have already been, or should be +of contacts for all other parties who have already been, or should be, informed about the issue. The response team contacts these parties so they can name experts who should be subscribed to the mailing-list. @@ -230,8 +230,8 @@ an involved disclosed party. The current ambassadors list: SUSE Jiri Kosina Amazon - Google - ============== ======================================================== + Google Kees Cook + ============= ======================================================== If you want your organization to be added to the ambassadors list, please contact the hardware security team. The nominated ambassador has to From 08b0c891605acf727e43e3e03a25857d3e789b61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2019 11:30:50 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 47/57] drm/vmwgfx: Fix double free in vmw_recv_msg() We recently added a kfree() after the end of the loop: if (retries == RETRIES) { kfree(reply); return -EINVAL; } There are two problems. First the test is wrong and because retries equals RETRIES if we succeed on the last iteration through the loop. Second if we fail on the last iteration through the loop then the kfree is a double free. When you're reading this code, please note the break statement at the end of the while loop. This patch changes the loop so that if it's not successful then "reply" is NULL and we can test for that afterward. Cc: Fixes: 6b7c3b86f0b6 ("drm/vmwgfx: fix memory leak when too many retries have occurred") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellstrom Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellstrom --- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c index 59e9d05ab928..0af048d1a815 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static int vmw_recv_msg(struct rpc_channel *channel, void **msg, !!(HIGH_WORD(ecx) & MESSAGE_STATUS_HB)); if ((HIGH_WORD(ebx) & MESSAGE_STATUS_SUCCESS) == 0) { kfree(reply); - + reply = NULL; if ((HIGH_WORD(ebx) & MESSAGE_STATUS_CPT) != 0) { /* A checkpoint occurred. Retry. */ continue; @@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ static int vmw_recv_msg(struct rpc_channel *channel, void **msg, if ((HIGH_WORD(ecx) & MESSAGE_STATUS_SUCCESS) == 0) { kfree(reply); - + reply = NULL; if ((HIGH_WORD(ecx) & MESSAGE_STATUS_CPT) != 0) { /* A checkpoint occurred. Retry. */ continue; @@ -389,10 +389,8 @@ static int vmw_recv_msg(struct rpc_channel *channel, void **msg, break; } - if (retries == RETRIES) { - kfree(reply); + if (!reply) return -EINVAL; - } *msg_len = reply_len; *msg = reply; From d41a3effbb53b1bcea41e328d16a4d046a508381 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hillf Danton Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2019 13:37:29 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 48/57] keys: Fix missing null pointer check in request_key_auth_describe() If a request_key authentication token key gets revoked, there's a window in which request_key_auth_describe() can see it with a NULL payload - but it makes no check for this and something like the following oops may occur: BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000038 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000004ddf30 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... NIP [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x90/0xd0 LR [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 Call Trace: [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 (unreliable) [...] proc_keys_show+0x308/0x4c0 [...] seq_read+0x3d0/0x540 [...] proc_reg_read+0x90/0x110 [...] __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70 [...] vfs_read+0xb4/0x1b0 [...] ksys_read+0x7c/0x130 [...] system_call+0x5c/0x70 Fix this by checking for a NULL pointer when describing such a key. Also make the read routine check for a NULL pointer to be on the safe side. [DH: Modified to not take already-held rcu lock and modified to also check in the read routine] Fixes: 04c567d9313e ("[PATCH] Keys: Fix race between two instantiators of a key") Reported-by: Sachin Sant Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton Signed-off-by: David Howells Tested-by: Sachin Sant Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index e73ec040e250..ecba39c93fd9 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, { struct request_key_auth *rka = dereference_key_rcu(key); + if (!rka) + return; + seq_puts(m, "key:"); seq_puts(m, key->description); if (key_is_positive(key)) @@ -83,6 +86,9 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key, size_t datalen; long ret; + if (!rka) + return -EKEYREVOKED; + datalen = rka->callout_len; ret = datalen; From 36b7200f67dfe75b416b5281ed4ace9927b513bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stuart Hayes Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2019 12:09:48 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 49/57] iommu/amd: Flush old domains in kdump kernel When devices are attached to the amd_iommu in a kdump kernel, the old device table entries (DTEs), which were copied from the crashed kernel, will be overwritten with a new domain number. When the new DTE is written, the IOMMU is told to flush the DTE from its internal cache--but it is not told to flush the translation cache entries for the old domain number. Without this patch, AMD systems using the tg3 network driver fail when kdump tries to save the vmcore to a network system, showing network timeouts and (sometimes) IOMMU errors in the kernel log. This patch will flush IOMMU translation cache entries for the old domain when a DTE gets overwritten with a new domain number. Signed-off-by: Stuart Hayes Fixes: 3ac3e5ee5ed5 ('iommu/amd: Copy old trans table from old kernel') Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel --- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c index b607a92791d3..f853b96ee547 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c @@ -1143,6 +1143,17 @@ static void amd_iommu_flush_tlb_all(struct amd_iommu *iommu) iommu_completion_wait(iommu); } +static void amd_iommu_flush_tlb_domid(struct amd_iommu *iommu, u32 dom_id) +{ + struct iommu_cmd cmd; + + build_inv_iommu_pages(&cmd, 0, CMD_INV_IOMMU_ALL_PAGES_ADDRESS, + dom_id, 1); + iommu_queue_command(iommu, &cmd); + + iommu_completion_wait(iommu); +} + static void amd_iommu_flush_all(struct amd_iommu *iommu) { struct iommu_cmd cmd; @@ -1873,6 +1884,7 @@ static void set_dte_entry(u16 devid, struct protection_domain *domain, { u64 pte_root = 0; u64 flags = 0; + u32 old_domid; if (domain->mode != PAGE_MODE_NONE) pte_root = iommu_virt_to_phys(domain->pt_root); @@ -1922,8 +1934,20 @@ static void set_dte_entry(u16 devid, struct protection_domain *domain, flags &= ~DEV_DOMID_MASK; flags |= domain->id; + old_domid = amd_iommu_dev_table[devid].data[1] & DEV_DOMID_MASK; amd_iommu_dev_table[devid].data[1] = flags; amd_iommu_dev_table[devid].data[0] = pte_root; + + /* + * A kdump kernel might be replacing a domain ID that was copied from + * the previous kernel--if so, it needs to flush the translation cache + * entries for the old domain ID that is being overwritten + */ + if (old_domid) { + struct amd_iommu *iommu = amd_iommu_rlookup_table[devid]; + + amd_iommu_flush_tlb_domid(iommu, old_domid); + } } static void clear_dte_entry(u16 devid) From 754265bcab78a9014f0f99cd35e0d610fcd7dfa7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joerg Roedel Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2019 10:39:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 50/57] iommu/amd: Fix race in increase_address_space() After the conversion to lock-less dma-api call the increase_address_space() function can be called without any locking. Multiple CPUs could potentially race for increasing the address space, leading to invalid domain->mode settings and invalid page-tables. This has been happening in the wild under high IO load and memory pressure. Fix the race by locking this operation. The function is called infrequently so that this does not introduce a performance regression in the dma-api path again. Reported-by: Qian Cai Fixes: 256e4621c21a ('iommu/amd: Make use of the generic IOVA allocator') Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel --- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c index f853b96ee547..61de81965c44 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c @@ -1435,18 +1435,21 @@ static void free_pagetable(struct protection_domain *domain) * another level increases the size of the address space by 9 bits to a size up * to 64 bits. */ -static bool increase_address_space(struct protection_domain *domain, +static void increase_address_space(struct protection_domain *domain, gfp_t gfp) { + unsigned long flags; u64 *pte; - if (domain->mode == PAGE_MODE_6_LEVEL) + spin_lock_irqsave(&domain->lock, flags); + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->mode == PAGE_MODE_6_LEVEL)) /* address space already 64 bit large */ - return false; + goto out; pte = (void *)get_zeroed_page(gfp); if (!pte) - return false; + goto out; *pte = PM_LEVEL_PDE(domain->mode, iommu_virt_to_phys(domain->pt_root)); @@ -1454,7 +1457,10 @@ static bool increase_address_space(struct protection_domain *domain, domain->mode += 1; domain->updated = true; - return true; +out: + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&domain->lock, flags); + + return; } static u64 *alloc_pte(struct protection_domain *domain, From 8928e917aeafaf38d65cc5cbc1f11e952dbed062 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lee Jones Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2019 09:25:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 51/57] soc: qcom: geni: Provide parameter error checking When booting with ACPI, the Geni Serial Engine is not set as the I2C/SPI parent and thus, the wrapper (parent device) is unassigned. This causes the kernel to crash with a null dereference error. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190905082555.15020-1-lee.jones@linaro.org Fixes: 8bc529b25354 ("soc: qcom: geni: Add support for ACPI") Acked-by: Bjorn Andersson Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd Signed-off-by: Lee Jones Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann --- drivers/soc/qcom/qcom-geni-se.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom-geni-se.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom-geni-se.c index d5cf953b4337..7d622ea1274e 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom-geni-se.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom-geni-se.c @@ -630,6 +630,9 @@ int geni_se_tx_dma_prep(struct geni_se *se, void *buf, size_t len, struct geni_wrapper *wrapper = se->wrapper; u32 val; + if (!wrapper) + return -EINVAL; + *iova = dma_map_single(wrapper->dev, buf, len, DMA_TO_DEVICE); if (dma_mapping_error(wrapper->dev, *iova)) return -EIO; @@ -663,6 +666,9 @@ int geni_se_rx_dma_prep(struct geni_se *se, void *buf, size_t len, struct geni_wrapper *wrapper = se->wrapper; u32 val; + if (!wrapper) + return -EINVAL; + *iova = dma_map_single(wrapper->dev, buf, len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); if (dma_mapping_error(wrapper->dev, *iova)) return -EIO; From 1f493162b59b09224de4d9c94e4392807e0edcce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sasha Levin Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2019 05:58:52 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 52/57] Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues: Microsoft ambassador Add Sasha Levin as Microsoft's process ambassador. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190906095852.23568-1-sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst b/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst index 47316d9c24f5..c101748bfd92 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ an involved disclosed party. The current ambassadors list: Intel Qualcomm - Microsoft + Microsoft Sasha Levin VMware Xen Andrew Cooper From 0c043d70d04711fe6c380df9065fdc44192c49bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Benjamin Tissoires Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2019 12:02:32 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 53/57] Input: elan_i2c - remove Lenovo Legion Y7000 PnpID Looks like the Bios of the Lenovo Legion Y7000 is using ELAN061B when the actual device is supposed to be used with hid-multitouch. Remove it from the list of the supported device, hoping that no one will complain about the loss in functionality. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203467 Fixes: 738c06d0e456 ("Input: elan_i2c - add hardware ID for multiple Lenovo laptops") Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov --- include/linux/input/elan-i2c-ids.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/input/elan-i2c-ids.h b/include/linux/input/elan-i2c-ids.h index ceabb01a6a7d..1ecb6b45812c 100644 --- a/include/linux/input/elan-i2c-ids.h +++ b/include/linux/input/elan-i2c-ids.h @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static const struct acpi_device_id elan_acpi_id[] = { { "ELAN0618", 0 }, { "ELAN0619", 0 }, { "ELAN061A", 0 }, - { "ELAN061B", 0 }, +/* { "ELAN061B", 0 }, not working on the Lenovo Legion Y7000 */ { "ELAN061C", 0 }, { "ELAN061D", 0 }, { "ELAN061E", 0 }, From a8e0abae2fe0e788fa3d92c043605d1211c13735 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trilok Soni Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2019 12:01:57 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 54/57] Documentation/process: Add Qualcomm process ambassador for hardware security issues Add Trilok Soni as process ambassador for hardware security issues from Qualcomm. Signed-off-by: Trilok Soni Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1567796517-8964-1-git-send-email-tsoni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst b/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst index c101748bfd92..402636356fbe 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ an involved disclosed party. The current ambassadors list: AMD IBM Intel - Qualcomm + Qualcomm Trilok Soni Microsoft Sasha Levin VMware From 950b07c14e8c59444e2359f15fd70ed5112e11a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Sat, 7 Sep 2019 14:25:54 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 55/57] Revert "x86/apic: Include the LDR when clearing out APIC registers" This reverts commit 558682b5291937a70748d36fd9ba757fb25b99ae. Chris Wilson reports that it breaks his CPU hotplug test scripts. In particular, it breaks offlining and then re-onlining the boot CPU, which we treat specially (and the BIOS does too). The symptoms are that we can offline the CPU, but it then does not come back online again: smpboot: CPU 0 is now offline smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 0 APIC 0x0 smpboot: do_boot_cpu failed(-1) to wakeup CPU#0 Thomas says he knows why it's broken (my personal suspicion: our magic handling of the "cpu0_logical_apicid" thing), but for 5.3 the right fix is to just revert it, since we've never touched the LDR bits before, and it's not worth the risk to do anything else at this stage. [ Hotpluging of the boot CPU is special anyway, and should be off by default. See the "BOOTPARAM_HOTPLUG_CPU0" config option and the cpu0_hotplug kernel parameter. In general you should not do it, and it has various known limitations (hibernate and suspend require the boot CPU, for example). But it should work, even if the boot CPU is special and needs careful treatment - Linus ] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/156785100521.13300.14461504732265570003@skylake-alporthouse-com/ Reported-by: Chris Wilson Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Bandan Das Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c index dba2828b779a..aa5495d0f478 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c @@ -1179,10 +1179,6 @@ void clear_local_APIC(void) apic_write(APIC_LVT0, v | APIC_LVT_MASKED); v = apic_read(APIC_LVT1); apic_write(APIC_LVT1, v | APIC_LVT_MASKED); - if (!x2apic_enabled()) { - v = apic_read(APIC_LDR) & ~APIC_LDR_MASK; - apic_write(APIC_LDR, v); - } if (maxlvt >= 4) { v = apic_read(APIC_LVTPC); apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, v | APIC_LVT_MASKED); From bfafddd8de426d894fcf3e062370b1efaa195ebc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nick Desaulniers Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2019 15:55:23 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 56/57] include/linux/compiler.h: fix Oops for Clang-compiled kernels GCC unescapes escaped string section names while Clang does not. Because __section uses the `#` stringification operator for the section name, it doesn't need to be escaped. This fixes an Oops observed in distro's that use systemd and not net.core.bpf_jit_enable=1, when their kernels are compiled with Clang. Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/619 Link: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42950 Link: https://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=156412960619946&w=2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190904181740.GA19688@gmail.com/ Acked-by: Will Deacon Reported-by: Sedat Dilek Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf Tested-by: Sedat Dilek Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers [Cherry-picked from the __section cleanup series for 5.3] [Adjusted commit message] Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda --- include/linux/compiler.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h index f0fd5636fddb..5e88e7e33abe 100644 --- a/include/linux/compiler.h +++ b/include/linux/compiler.h @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ void ftrace_likely_update(struct ftrace_likely_data *f, int val, long ______r; \ static struct ftrace_likely_data \ __aligned(4) \ - __section("_ftrace_annotated_branch") \ + __section(_ftrace_annotated_branch) \ ______f = { \ .data.func = __func__, \ .data.file = __FILE__, \ @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ void ftrace_likely_update(struct ftrace_likely_data *f, int val, #define __trace_if_value(cond) ({ \ static struct ftrace_branch_data \ __aligned(4) \ - __section("_ftrace_branch") \ + __section(_ftrace_branch) \ __if_trace = { \ .func = __func__, \ .file = __FILE__, \ @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ void ftrace_likely_update(struct ftrace_likely_data *f, int val, ".popsection\n\t" /* Annotate a C jump table to allow objtool to follow the code flow */ -#define __annotate_jump_table __section(".rodata..c_jump_table") +#define __annotate_jump_table __section(.rodata..c_jump_table) #else #define annotate_reachable() @@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ unsigned long read_word_at_a_time(const void *addr) * visible to the compiler. */ #define __ADDRESSABLE(sym) \ - static void * __section(".discard.addressable") __used \ + static void * __section(.discard.addressable) __used \ __PASTE(__addressable_##sym, __LINE__) = (void *)&sym; /** From f74c2bb98776e2de508f4d607cd519873065118e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Sun, 8 Sep 2019 13:33:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 57/57] Linux 5.3-rc8 --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 0cbe8717bdb3..9b08f6383a52 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 3 SUBLEVEL = 0 -EXTRAVERSION = -rc7 +EXTRAVERSION = -rc8 NAME = Bobtail Squid # *DOCUMENTATION*