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tls: rx: strp: fix determining record length in copy mode
[ Upstream commit8b0c0dc9fb] We call tls_rx_msg_size(skb) before doing skb->len += chunk. So the tls_rx_msg_size() code will see old skb->len, most likely leading to an over-read. Worst case we will over read an entire record, next iteration will try to trim the skb but may end up turning frag len negative or discarding the subsequent record (since we already told TCP we've read it during previous read but now we'll trim it out of the skb). Fixes:84c61fe1a7("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser") Tested-by: Shai Amiram <samiram@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent
ecd9f6ed9e
commit
c48b8399e4
@@ -210,19 +210,28 @@ static int tls_strp_copyin(read_descriptor_t *desc, struct sk_buff *in_skb,
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skb_frag_size(frag),
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chunk));
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sz = tls_rx_msg_size(strp, strp->anchor);
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skb->len += chunk;
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skb->data_len += chunk;
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skb_frag_size_add(frag, chunk);
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sz = tls_rx_msg_size(strp, skb);
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if (sz < 0) {
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desc->error = sz;
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return 0;
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}
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/* We may have over-read, sz == 0 is guaranteed under-read */
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if (sz > 0)
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chunk = min_t(size_t, chunk, sz - skb->len);
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if (unlikely(sz && sz < skb->len)) {
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int over = skb->len - sz;
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WARN_ON_ONCE(over > chunk);
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skb->len -= over;
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skb->data_len -= over;
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skb_frag_size_add(frag, -over);
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chunk -= over;
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}
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skb->len += chunk;
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skb->data_len += chunk;
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skb_frag_size_add(frag, chunk);
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frag++;
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len -= chunk;
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offset += chunk;
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