From 8333aae9bba1f007b1b3bfdcbc7262ff79d10227 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hangbin Liu Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 10:34:43 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 001/139] scripts/bpf_doc: Use silent mode when exec make cmd [ Upstream commit 5384cc0d1a88c27448a6a4e65b8abe6486de8012 ] When getting kernel version via make, the result may be polluted by other output, like directory change info. e.g. $ export MAKEFLAGS="-w" $ make kernelversion make: Entering directory '/home/net' 6.8.0 make: Leaving directory '/home/net' This will distort the reStructuredText output and make latter rst2man failed like: [...] bpf-helpers.rst:20: (WARNING/2) Field list ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. [...] Using silent mode would help. e.g. $ make -s --no-print-directory kernelversion 6.8.0 Fixes: fd0a38f9c37d ("scripts/bpf: Set version attribute for bpf-helpers(7) man page") Signed-off-by: Michael Hofmann Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet Acked-by: Alejandro Colomar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240315023443.2364442-1-liuhangbin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- scripts/bpf_doc.py | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/bpf_doc.py b/scripts/bpf_doc.py index 4de98b7bbea9..c2da6ed32104 100755 --- a/scripts/bpf_doc.py +++ b/scripts/bpf_doc.py @@ -396,8 +396,8 @@ class PrinterRST(Printer): version = version.stdout.decode().rstrip() except: try: - version = subprocess.run(['make', 'kernelversion'], cwd=linuxRoot, - capture_output=True, check=True) + version = subprocess.run(['make', '-s', '--no-print-directory', 'kernelversion'], + cwd=linuxRoot, capture_output=True, check=True) version = version.stdout.decode().rstrip() except: return 'Linux' From 0336995512cdab0c65e99e4cdd47c4606debe14e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Sakharov Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2024 04:15:23 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 002/139] dma-buf: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sanitycheck() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 2295bd846765c766701e666ed2e4b35396be25e6 ] If due to a memory allocation failure mock_chain() returns NULL, it is passed to dma_fence_enable_sw_signaling() resulting in NULL pointer dereference there. Call dma_fence_enable_sw_signaling() only if mock_chain() succeeds. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: d62c43a953ce ("dma-buf: Enable signaling on fence for selftests") Signed-off-by: Pavel Sakharov Reviewed-by: Christian König Signed-off-by: Christian König Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240319231527.1821372-1-p.sakharov@ispras.ru Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/dma-buf/st-dma-fence-chain.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/st-dma-fence-chain.c b/drivers/dma-buf/st-dma-fence-chain.c index 0a9b099d0518..d90479d830fc 100644 --- a/drivers/dma-buf/st-dma-fence-chain.c +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/st-dma-fence-chain.c @@ -84,11 +84,11 @@ static int sanitycheck(void *arg) return -ENOMEM; chain = mock_chain(NULL, f, 1); - if (!chain) + if (chain) + dma_fence_enable_sw_signaling(chain); + else err = -ENOMEM; - dma_fence_enable_sw_signaling(chain); - dma_fence_signal(f); dma_fence_put(f); From b51ec7fc9f877ef869c01d3ea6f18f6a64e831a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryosuke Yasuoka Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2024 09:54:10 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 003/139] nfc: nci: Fix uninit-value in nci_dev_up and nci_ntf_packet [ Upstream commit d24b03535e5eb82e025219c2f632b485409c898f ] syzbot reported the following uninit-value access issue [1][2]: nci_rx_work() parses and processes received packet. When the payload length is zero, each message type handler reads uninitialized payload and KMSAN detects this issue. The receipt of a packet with a zero-size payload is considered unexpected, and therefore, such packets should be silently discarded. This patch resolved this issue by checking payload size before calling each message type handler codes. Fixes: 6a2968aaf50c ("NFC: basic NCI protocol implementation") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+7ea9413ea6749baf5574@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+29b5ca705d2e0f4a44d2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7ea9413ea6749baf5574 [1] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=29b5ca705d2e0f4a44d2 [2] Signed-off-by: Ryosuke Yasuoka Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/nfc/nci/core.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/nfc/nci/core.c b/net/nfc/nci/core.c index b5071a2f597d..f76a2d806034 100644 --- a/net/nfc/nci/core.c +++ b/net/nfc/nci/core.c @@ -1512,6 +1512,11 @@ static void nci_rx_work(struct work_struct *work) nfc_send_to_raw_sock(ndev->nfc_dev, skb, RAW_PAYLOAD_NCI, NFC_DIRECTION_RX); + if (!nci_plen(skb->data)) { + kfree_skb(skb); + break; + } + /* Process frame */ switch (nci_mt(skb->data)) { case NCI_MT_RSP_PKT: From 57beec623ac5314c5e0e957624c7517d9efdfa59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Thompson Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2024 15:31:17 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 004/139] mlxbf_gige: stop PHY during open() error paths [ Upstream commit d6c30c5a168f8586b8bcc0d8e42e2456eb05209b ] The mlxbf_gige_open() routine starts the PHY as part of normal initialization. The mlxbf_gige_open() routine must stop the PHY during its error paths. Fixes: f92e1869d74e ("Add Mellanox BlueField Gigabit Ethernet driver") Signed-off-by: David Thompson Reviewed-by: Asmaa Mnebhi Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxbf_gige/mlxbf_gige_main.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxbf_gige/mlxbf_gige_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxbf_gige/mlxbf_gige_main.c index 83c4659390fd..113e3d9d3353 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxbf_gige/mlxbf_gige_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxbf_gige/mlxbf_gige_main.c @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static int mlxbf_gige_open(struct net_device *netdev) err = mlxbf_gige_tx_init(priv); if (err) - goto free_irqs; + goto phy_deinit; err = mlxbf_gige_rx_init(priv); if (err) goto tx_deinit; @@ -185,6 +185,9 @@ static int mlxbf_gige_open(struct net_device *netdev) tx_deinit: mlxbf_gige_tx_deinit(priv); +phy_deinit: + phy_stop(phydev); + free_irqs: mlxbf_gige_free_irqs(priv); return err; From 99a75d75007421d8e08ba139e24f77395cd08f62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2024 10:10:17 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 005/139] wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: rfi: fix potential response leaks [ Upstream commit 06a093807eb7b5c5b29b6cff49f8174a4e702341 ] If the rx payload length check fails, or if kmemdup() fails, we still need to free the command response. Fix that. Fixes: 21254908cbe9 ("iwlwifi: mvm: add RFI-M support") Co-authored-by: Anjaneyulu Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit Link: https://msgid.link/20240319100755.db2fa0196aa7.I116293b132502ac68a65527330fa37799694b79c@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/rfi.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/rfi.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/rfi.c index bb77bc9aa821..fb2408c0551d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/rfi.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/rfi.c @@ -122,14 +122,18 @@ struct iwl_rfi_freq_table_resp_cmd *iwl_rfi_get_freq_table(struct iwl_mvm *mvm) if (ret) return ERR_PTR(ret); - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(iwl_rx_packet_payload_len(cmd.resp_pkt) != resp_size)) + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(iwl_rx_packet_payload_len(cmd.resp_pkt) != + resp_size)) { + iwl_free_resp(&cmd); return ERR_PTR(-EIO); + } resp = kmemdup(cmd.resp_pkt->data, resp_size, GFP_KERNEL); + iwl_free_resp(&cmd); + if (!resp) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - iwl_free_resp(&cmd); return resp; } From 231b189fa1a14a8ee8c2c14a81834cea4019fb23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Przemek Kitszel Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 17:02:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 006/139] ixgbe: avoid sleeping allocation in ixgbe_ipsec_vf_add_sa() [ Upstream commit aec806fb4afba5fe80b09e29351379a4292baa43 ] Change kzalloc() flags used in ixgbe_ipsec_vf_add_sa() to GFP_ATOMIC, to avoid sleeping in IRQ context. Dan Carpenter, with the help of Smatch, has found following issue: The patch eda0333ac293: "ixgbe: add VF IPsec management" from Aug 13, 2018 (linux-next), leads to the following Smatch static checker warning: drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c:917 ixgbe_ipsec_vf_add_sa() warn: sleeping in IRQ context The call tree that Smatch is worried about is: ixgbe_msix_other() <- IRQ handler -> ixgbe_msg_task() -> ixgbe_rcv_msg_from_vf() -> ixgbe_ipsec_vf_add_sa() Fixes: eda0333ac293 ("ixgbe: add VF IPsec management") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Link: https://lore.kernel.org/intel-wired-lan/db31a0b0-4d9f-4e6b-aed8-88266eb5665c@moroto.mountain Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak Signed-off-by: Przemek Kitszel Reviewed-by: Shannon Nelson Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c index 774de63dd93a..15fc2acffb87 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c @@ -908,7 +908,13 @@ int ixgbe_ipsec_vf_add_sa(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, u32 *msgbuf, u32 vf) goto err_out; } - xs = kzalloc(sizeof(*xs), GFP_KERNEL); + algo = xfrm_aead_get_byname(aes_gcm_name, IXGBE_IPSEC_AUTH_BITS, 1); + if (unlikely(!algo)) { + err = -ENOENT; + goto err_out; + } + + xs = kzalloc(sizeof(*xs), GFP_ATOMIC); if (unlikely(!xs)) { err = -ENOMEM; goto err_out; @@ -924,14 +930,8 @@ int ixgbe_ipsec_vf_add_sa(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, u32 *msgbuf, u32 vf) memcpy(&xs->id.daddr.a4, sam->addr, sizeof(xs->id.daddr.a4)); xs->xso.dev = adapter->netdev; - algo = xfrm_aead_get_byname(aes_gcm_name, IXGBE_IPSEC_AUTH_BITS, 1); - if (unlikely(!algo)) { - err = -ENOENT; - goto err_xs; - } - aead_len = sizeof(*xs->aead) + IXGBE_IPSEC_KEY_BITS / 8; - xs->aead = kzalloc(aead_len, GFP_KERNEL); + xs->aead = kzalloc(aead_len, GFP_ATOMIC); if (unlikely(!xs->aead)) { err = -ENOMEM; goto err_xs; From 16307e7bc1120e87f243d00b8e403da9cfaa60d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandra Winter Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2024 12:53:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 007/139] s390/qeth: handle deferred cc1 [ Upstream commit afb373ff3f54c9d909efc7f810dc80a9742807b2 ] The IO subsystem expects a driver to retry a ccw_device_start, when the subsequent interrupt response block (irb) contains a deferred condition code 1. Symptoms before this commit: On the read channel we always trigger the next read anyhow, so no different behaviour here. On the write channel we may experience timeout errors, because the expected reply will never be received without the retry. Other callers of qeth_send_control_data() may wrongly assume that the ccw was successful, which may cause problems later. Note that since commit 2297791c92d0 ("s390/cio: dont unregister subchannel from child-drivers") and commit 5ef1dc40ffa6 ("s390/cio: fix invalid -EBUSY on ccw_device_start") deferred CC1s are much more likely to occur. See the commit message of the latter for more background information. Fixes: 2297791c92d0 ("s390/cio: dont unregister subchannel from child-drivers") Signed-off-by: Alexandra Winter Co-developed-by: Thorsten Winkler Signed-off-by: Thorsten Winkler Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240321115337.3564694-1-wintera@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c b/drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c index ae4b6d24bc90..1e6340e2c258 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c +++ b/drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c @@ -1179,6 +1179,20 @@ static int qeth_check_irb_error(struct qeth_card *card, struct ccw_device *cdev, } } +/** + * qeth_irq() - qeth interrupt handler + * @cdev: ccw device + * @intparm: expect pointer to iob + * @irb: Interruption Response Block + * + * In the good path: + * corresponding qeth channel is locked with last used iob as active_cmd. + * But this function is also called for error interrupts. + * + * Caller ensures that: + * Interrupts are disabled; ccw device lock is held; + * + */ static void qeth_irq(struct ccw_device *cdev, unsigned long intparm, struct irb *irb) { @@ -1220,11 +1234,10 @@ static void qeth_irq(struct ccw_device *cdev, unsigned long intparm, iob = (struct qeth_cmd_buffer *) (addr_t)intparm; } - qeth_unlock_channel(card, channel); - rc = qeth_check_irb_error(card, cdev, irb); if (rc) { /* IO was terminated, free its resources. */ + qeth_unlock_channel(card, channel); if (iob) qeth_cancel_cmd(iob, rc); return; @@ -1268,6 +1281,7 @@ static void qeth_irq(struct ccw_device *cdev, unsigned long intparm, rc = qeth_get_problem(card, cdev, irb); if (rc) { card->read_or_write_problem = 1; + qeth_unlock_channel(card, channel); if (iob) qeth_cancel_cmd(iob, rc); qeth_clear_ipacmd_list(card); @@ -1276,6 +1290,26 @@ static void qeth_irq(struct ccw_device *cdev, unsigned long intparm, } } + if (scsw_cmd_is_valid_cc(&irb->scsw) && irb->scsw.cmd.cc == 1 && iob) { + /* channel command hasn't started: retry. + * active_cmd is still set to last iob + */ + QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "irqcc1"); + rc = ccw_device_start_timeout(cdev, __ccw_from_cmd(iob), + (addr_t)iob, 0, 0, iob->timeout); + if (rc) { + QETH_DBF_MESSAGE(2, + "ccw retry on %x failed, rc = %i\n", + CARD_DEVID(card), rc); + QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, " err%d", rc); + qeth_unlock_channel(card, channel); + qeth_cancel_cmd(iob, rc); + } + return; + } + + qeth_unlock_channel(card, channel); + if (iob) { /* sanity check: */ if (irb->scsw.cmd.count > iob->length) { From 91b243de910a9ac8476d40238ab3dbfeedd5b7de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 13:57:32 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 008/139] tcp: properly terminate timers for kernel sockets [ Upstream commit 151c9c724d05d5b0dd8acd3e11cb69ef1f2dbada ] We had various syzbot reports about tcp timers firing after the corresponding netns has been dismantled. Fortunately Josef Bacik could trigger the issue more often, and could test a patch I wrote two years ago. When TCP sockets are closed, we call inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers() to 'stop' the timers. inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers() can be called from any context, including when socket lock is held. This is the reason it uses sk_stop_timer(), aka del_timer(). This means that ongoing timers might finish much later. For user sockets, this is fine because each running timer holds a reference on the socket, and the user socket holds a reference on the netns. For kernel sockets, we risk that the netns is freed before timer can complete, because kernel sockets do not hold reference on the netns. This patch adds inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync() function that using sk_stop_timer_sync() to make sure all timers are terminated before the kernel socket is released. Modules using kernel sockets close them in their netns exit() handler. Also add sock_not_owned_by_me() helper to get LOCKDEP support : inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync() must not be called while socket lock is held. It is very possible we can revert in the future commit 3a58f13a881e ("net: rds: acquire refcount on TCP sockets") which attempted to solve the issue in rds only. (net/smc/af_smc.c and net/mptcp/subflow.c have similar code) We probably can remove the check_net() tests from tcp_out_of_resources() and __tcp_close() in the future. Reported-by: Josef Bacik Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240314210740.GA2823176@perftesting/ Fixes: 26abe14379f8 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.") Fixes: 8a68173691f0 ("net: sk_clone_lock() should only do get_net() if the parent is not a kernel socket") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CANn89i+484ffqb93aQm1N-tjxxvb3WDKX0EbD7318RwRgsatjw@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Tested-by: Josef Bacik Cc: Tetsuo Handa Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240322135732.1535772-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/inet_connection_sock.h | 1 + include/net/sock.h | 7 +++++++ net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h b/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h index 080968d6e6c5..8132f330306d 100644 --- a/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h +++ b/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h @@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ void inet_csk_init_xmit_timers(struct sock *sk, void (*delack_handler)(struct timer_list *), void (*keepalive_handler)(struct timer_list *)); void inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers(struct sock *sk); +void inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync(struct sock *sk); static inline void inet_csk_schedule_ack(struct sock *sk) { diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h index 579732d47dfc..60577751ea9e 100644 --- a/include/net/sock.h +++ b/include/net/sock.h @@ -1833,6 +1833,13 @@ static inline void sock_owned_by_me(const struct sock *sk) #endif } +static inline void sock_not_owned_by_me(const struct sock *sk) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP + WARN_ON_ONCE(lockdep_sock_is_held(sk) && debug_locks); +#endif +} + static inline bool sock_owned_by_user(const struct sock *sk) { sock_owned_by_me(sk); diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c index 79fa19a36bbd..f7832d425382 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c @@ -771,6 +771,20 @@ void inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers(struct sock *sk) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers); +void inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); + + /* ongoing timer handlers need to acquire socket lock. */ + sock_not_owned_by_me(sk); + + icsk->icsk_pending = icsk->icsk_ack.pending = 0; + + sk_stop_timer_sync(sk, &icsk->icsk_retransmit_timer); + sk_stop_timer_sync(sk, &icsk->icsk_delack_timer); + sk_stop_timer_sync(sk, &sk->sk_timer); +} + void inet_csk_delete_keepalive_timer(struct sock *sk) { sk_stop_timer(sk, &sk->sk_timer); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 5a165e29f7be..f01c0a5d2c37 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -3052,6 +3052,8 @@ void tcp_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout) lock_sock(sk); __tcp_close(sk, timeout); release_sock(sk); + if (!sk->sk_net_refcnt) + inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync(sk); sock_put(sk); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_close); From beaf0e7996b79e06ccc2bdcb4442fbaeccc31200 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B8rn=20Mork?= Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 15:40:00 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 009/139] net: wwan: t7xx: Split 64bit accesses to fix alignment issues MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 7d5a7dd5a35876f0ecc286f3602a88887a788217 ] Some of the registers are aligned on a 32bit boundary, causing alignment faults on 64bit platforms. Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffc084a1d004 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000061 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x21: alignment fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000061, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000046ad6000 [ffffffc084a1d004] pgd=100000013ffff003, p4d=100000013ffff003, pud=100000013ffff003, pmd=0068000020a00711 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000061 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: mtk_t7xx(+) qcserial pppoe ppp_async option nft_fib_inet nf_flow_table_inet mt7921u(O) mt7921s(O) mt7921e(O) mt7921_common(O) iwlmvm(O) iwldvm(O) usb_wwan rndis_host qmi_wwan pppox ppp_generic nft_reject_ipv6 nft_reject_ipv4 nft_reject_inet nft_reject nft_redir nft_quota nft_numgen nft_nat nft_masq nft_log nft_limit nft_hash nft_flow_offload nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_tables nf_nat nf_flow_table nf_conntrack mt7996e(O) mt792x_usb(O) mt792x_lib(O) mt7915e(O) mt76_usb(O) mt76_sdio(O) mt76_connac_lib(O) mt76(O) mac80211(O) iwlwifi(O) huawei_cdc_ncm cfg80211(O) cdc_ncm cdc_ether wwan usbserial usbnet slhc sfp rtc_pcf8563 nfnetlink nf_reject_ipv6 nf_reject_ipv4 nf_log_syslog nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 mt6577_auxadc mdio_i2c libcrc32c compat(O) cdc_wdm cdc_acm at24 crypto_safexcel pwm_fan i2c_gpio i2c_smbus industrialio i2c_algo_bit i2c_mux_reg i2c_mux_pca954x i2c_mux_pca9541 i2c_mux_gpio i2c_mux dummy oid_registry tun sha512_arm64 sha1_ce sha1_generic seqiv md5 geniv des_generic libdes cbc authencesn authenc leds_gpio xhci_plat_hcd xhci_pci xhci_mtk_hcd xhci_hcd nvme nvme_core gpio_button_hotplug(O) dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_crypt dm_mod dax usbcore usb_common ptp aquantia pps_core mii tpm encrypted_keys trusted CPU: 3 PID: 5266 Comm: kworker/u9:1 Tainted: G O 6.6.22 #0 Hardware name: Bananapi BPI-R4 (DT) Workqueue: md_hk_wq t7xx_fsm_uninit [mtk_t7xx] pstate: 804000c5 (Nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : t7xx_cldma_hw_set_start_addr+0x1c/0x3c [mtk_t7xx] lr : t7xx_cldma_start+0xac/0x13c [mtk_t7xx] sp : ffffffc085d63d30 x29: ffffffc085d63d30 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffffff80c804f2c0 x24: ffffff80ca196c05 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffff80c814b9b8 x21: ffffff80c814b128 x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffffff80c814b080 x18: 0000000000000014 x17: 0000000055c9806b x16: 000000007c5296d0 x15: 000000000f6bca68 x14: 00000000dbdbdce4 x13: 000000001aeaf72a x12: 0000000000000001 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffffff80ca1ef6b4 x7 : ffffff80c814b818 x6 : 0000000000000018 x5 : 0000000000000870 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 000000010a947000 x1 : ffffffc084a1d004 x0 : ffffffc084a1d004 Call trace: t7xx_cldma_hw_set_start_addr+0x1c/0x3c [mtk_t7xx] t7xx_fsm_uninit+0x578/0x5ec [mtk_t7xx] process_one_work+0x154/0x2a0 worker_thread+0x2ac/0x488 kthread+0xe0/0xec ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Code: f9400800 91001000 8b214001 d50332bf (f9000022) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The inclusion of io-64-nonatomic-lo-hi.h indicates that all 64bit accesses can be replaced by pairs of nonatomic 32bit access. Fix alignment by forcing all accesses to be 32bit on 64bit platforms. Link: https://forum.openwrt.org/t/fibocom-fm350-gl-support/142682/72 Fixes: 39d439047f1d ("net: wwan: t7xx: Add control DMA interface") Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork Reviewed-by: Sergey Ryazanov Tested-by: Liviu Dudau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240322144000.1683822-1-bjorn@mork.no Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_cldma.c | 4 ++-- drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_hif_cldma.c | 9 +++++---- drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_pcie_mac.c | 8 ++++---- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_cldma.c b/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_cldma.c index 9f43f256db1d..f0a4783baf1f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_cldma.c +++ b/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_cldma.c @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ bool t7xx_cldma_tx_addr_is_set(struct t7xx_cldma_hw *hw_info, unsigned int qno) { u32 offset = REG_CLDMA_UL_START_ADDRL_0 + qno * ADDR_SIZE; - return ioread64(hw_info->ap_pdn_base + offset); + return ioread64_lo_hi(hw_info->ap_pdn_base + offset); } void t7xx_cldma_hw_set_start_addr(struct t7xx_cldma_hw *hw_info, unsigned int qno, u64 address, @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ void t7xx_cldma_hw_set_start_addr(struct t7xx_cldma_hw *hw_info, unsigned int qn reg = tx_rx == MTK_RX ? hw_info->ap_ao_base + REG_CLDMA_DL_START_ADDRL_0 : hw_info->ap_pdn_base + REG_CLDMA_UL_START_ADDRL_0; - iowrite64(address, reg + offset); + iowrite64_lo_hi(address, reg + offset); } void t7xx_cldma_hw_resume_queue(struct t7xx_cldma_hw *hw_info, unsigned int qno, diff --git a/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_hif_cldma.c b/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_hif_cldma.c index 6ff30cb8eb16..5d6032ceb9e5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_hif_cldma.c +++ b/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_hif_cldma.c @@ -139,8 +139,9 @@ static int t7xx_cldma_gpd_rx_from_q(struct cldma_queue *queue, int budget, bool return -ENODEV; } - gpd_addr = ioread64(hw_info->ap_pdn_base + REG_CLDMA_DL_CURRENT_ADDRL_0 + - queue->index * sizeof(u64)); + gpd_addr = ioread64_lo_hi(hw_info->ap_pdn_base + + REG_CLDMA_DL_CURRENT_ADDRL_0 + + queue->index * sizeof(u64)); if (req->gpd_addr == gpd_addr || hwo_polling_count++ >= 100) return 0; @@ -318,8 +319,8 @@ static void t7xx_cldma_txq_empty_hndl(struct cldma_queue *queue) struct t7xx_cldma_hw *hw_info = &md_ctrl->hw_info; /* Check current processing TGPD, 64-bit address is in a table by Q index */ - ul_curr_addr = ioread64(hw_info->ap_pdn_base + REG_CLDMA_UL_CURRENT_ADDRL_0 + - queue->index * sizeof(u64)); + ul_curr_addr = ioread64_lo_hi(hw_info->ap_pdn_base + REG_CLDMA_UL_CURRENT_ADDRL_0 + + queue->index * sizeof(u64)); if (req->gpd_addr != ul_curr_addr) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&md_ctrl->cldma_lock, flags); dev_err(md_ctrl->dev, "CLDMA%d queue %d is not empty\n", diff --git a/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_pcie_mac.c b/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_pcie_mac.c index 76da4c15e3de..f071ec7ff23d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_pcie_mac.c +++ b/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_pcie_mac.c @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static void t7xx_pcie_mac_atr_tables_dis(void __iomem *pbase, enum t7xx_atr_src_ for (i = 0; i < ATR_TABLE_NUM_PER_ATR; i++) { offset = ATR_PORT_OFFSET * port + ATR_TABLE_OFFSET * i; reg = pbase + ATR_PCIE_WIN0_T0_ATR_PARAM_SRC_ADDR + offset; - iowrite64(0, reg); + iowrite64_lo_hi(0, reg); } } @@ -112,17 +112,17 @@ static int t7xx_pcie_mac_atr_cfg(struct t7xx_pci_dev *t7xx_dev, struct t7xx_atr_ reg = pbase + ATR_PCIE_WIN0_T0_TRSL_ADDR + offset; value = cfg->trsl_addr & ATR_PCIE_WIN0_ADDR_ALGMT; - iowrite64(value, reg); + iowrite64_lo_hi(value, reg); reg = pbase + ATR_PCIE_WIN0_T0_TRSL_PARAM + offset; iowrite32(cfg->trsl_id, reg); reg = pbase + ATR_PCIE_WIN0_T0_ATR_PARAM_SRC_ADDR + offset; value = (cfg->src_addr & ATR_PCIE_WIN0_ADDR_ALGMT) | (atr_size << 1) | BIT(0); - iowrite64(value, reg); + iowrite64_lo_hi(value, reg); /* Ensure ATR is set */ - ioread64(reg); + ioread64_lo_hi(reg); return 0; } From ebabdae52f2a0ec378baf2c6e3a5f22725ee0b4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kiryushin Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 21:07:53 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 010/139] ACPICA: debugger: check status of acpi_evaluate_object() in acpi_db_walk_for_fields() [ Upstream commit 40e2710860e57411ab57a1529c5a2748abbe8a19 ] ACPICA commit 9061cd9aa131205657c811a52a9f8325a040c6c9 Errors in acpi_evaluate_object() can lead to incorrect state of buffer. This can lead to access to data in previously ACPI_FREEd buffer and secondary ACPI_FREE to the same buffer later. Handle errors in acpi_evaluate_object the same way it is done earlier with acpi_ns_handle_to_pathname. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/9061cd9a Fixes: 5fd033288a86 ("ACPICA: debugger: add command to dump all fields of particular subtype") Signed-off-by: Nikita Kiryushin Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/acpi/acpica/dbnames.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/acpica/dbnames.c b/drivers/acpi/acpica/dbnames.c index b91155ea9c34..c9131259f717 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/acpica/dbnames.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/acpica/dbnames.c @@ -550,8 +550,12 @@ acpi_db_walk_for_fields(acpi_handle obj_handle, ACPI_FREE(buffer.pointer); buffer.length = ACPI_ALLOCATE_LOCAL_BUFFER; - acpi_evaluate_object(obj_handle, NULL, NULL, &buffer); - + status = acpi_evaluate_object(obj_handle, NULL, NULL, &buffer); + if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) { + acpi_os_printf("Could Not evaluate object %p\n", + obj_handle); + return (AE_OK); + } /* * Since this is a field unit, surround the output in braces */ From b8b533eeee5ba53950d7e1358c7fa1614013cdf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jie Wang Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 20:43:09 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 011/139] net: hns3: fix index limit to support all queue stats [ Upstream commit 47e39d213e09c6cae0d6b4d95e454ea404013312 ] Currently, hns hardware supports more than 512 queues and the index limit in hclge_comm_tqps_update_stats is wrong. So this patch removes it. Fixes: 287db5c40d15 ("net: hns3: create new set of common tqp stats APIs for PF and VF reuse") Signed-off-by: Jie Wang Signed-off-by: Jijie Shao Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak Reviewed-by: Kalesh AP Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- .../ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_common/hclge_comm_tqp_stats.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_common/hclge_comm_tqp_stats.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_common/hclge_comm_tqp_stats.c index f3c9395d8351..618f66d9586b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_common/hclge_comm_tqp_stats.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_common/hclge_comm_tqp_stats.c @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ int hclge_comm_tqps_update_stats(struct hnae3_handle *handle, hclge_comm_cmd_setup_basic_desc(&desc, HCLGE_OPC_QUERY_TX_STATS, true); - desc.data[0] = cpu_to_le32(tqp->index & 0x1ff); + desc.data[0] = cpu_to_le32(tqp->index); ret = hclge_comm_cmd_send(hw, &desc, 1); if (ret) { dev_err(&hw->cmq.csq.pdev->dev, From 50b69054f455dcdb34bd6b22764c7579b270eef3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yonglong Liu Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 20:43:10 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 012/139] net: hns3: fix kernel crash when devlink reload during pf initialization [ Upstream commit 93305b77ffcb042f1538ecc383505e87d95aa05a ] The devlink reload process will access the hardware resources, but the register operation is done before the hardware is initialized. So, processing the devlink reload during initialization may lead to kernel crash. This patch fixes this by taking devl_lock during initialization. Fixes: b741269b2759 ("net: hns3: add support for registering devlink for PF") Signed-off-by: Yonglong Liu Signed-off-by: Jijie Shao Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_main.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_main.c index 27037ce79590..9db363fbc34f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_main.c @@ -11604,6 +11604,8 @@ static int hclge_init_ae_dev(struct hnae3_ae_dev *ae_dev) if (ret) goto err_pci_uninit; + devl_lock(hdev->devlink); + /* Firmware command queue initialize */ ret = hclge_comm_cmd_queue_init(hdev->pdev, &hdev->hw.hw); if (ret) @@ -11778,6 +11780,7 @@ static int hclge_init_ae_dev(struct hnae3_ae_dev *ae_dev) hclge_task_schedule(hdev, round_jiffies_relative(HZ)); + devl_unlock(hdev->devlink); return 0; err_mdiobus_unreg: @@ -11790,6 +11793,7 @@ err_msi_uninit: err_cmd_uninit: hclge_comm_cmd_uninit(hdev->ae_dev, &hdev->hw.hw); err_devlink_uninit: + devl_unlock(hdev->devlink); hclge_devlink_uninit(hdev); err_pci_uninit: pcim_iounmap(pdev, hdev->hw.hw.io_base); From 0e111ce740fc705a4cde38df41ecc8e61ba0e5ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jian Shen Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 20:43:11 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 013/139] net: hns3: mark unexcuted loopback test result as UNEXECUTED [ Upstream commit 5bd088d6c21a45ee70e6116879310e54174d75eb ] Currently, loopback test may be skipped when resetting, but the test result will still show as 'PASS', because the driver doesn't set ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED flag. Fix it by setting the flag and initializating the value to UNEXECUTED. Fixes: 4c8dab1c709c ("net: hns3: reconstruct function hns3_self_test") Signed-off-by: Jian Shen Signed-off-by: Jijie Shao Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- .../ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_ethtool.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_ethtool.c index e22835ae8a94..9fce976a08f0 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_ethtool.c @@ -78,6 +78,9 @@ static const struct hns3_stats hns3_rxq_stats[] = { #define HNS3_NIC_LB_TEST_NO_MEM_ERR 1 #define HNS3_NIC_LB_TEST_TX_CNT_ERR 2 #define HNS3_NIC_LB_TEST_RX_CNT_ERR 3 +#define HNS3_NIC_LB_TEST_UNEXECUTED 4 + +static int hns3_get_sset_count(struct net_device *netdev, int stringset); static int hns3_lp_setup(struct net_device *ndev, enum hnae3_loop loop, bool en) { @@ -419,18 +422,26 @@ static void hns3_do_external_lb(struct net_device *ndev, static void hns3_self_test(struct net_device *ndev, struct ethtool_test *eth_test, u64 *data) { + int cnt = hns3_get_sset_count(ndev, ETH_SS_TEST); struct hns3_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(ndev); struct hnae3_handle *h = priv->ae_handle; int st_param[HNAE3_LOOP_NONE][2]; bool if_running = netif_running(ndev); + int i; + + /* initialize the loopback test result, avoid marking an unexcuted + * loopback test as PASS. + */ + for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) + data[i] = HNS3_NIC_LB_TEST_UNEXECUTED; if (hns3_nic_resetting(ndev)) { netdev_err(ndev, "dev resetting!"); - return; + goto failure; } if (!(eth_test->flags & ETH_TEST_FL_OFFLINE)) - return; + goto failure; if (netif_msg_ifdown(h)) netdev_info(ndev, "self test start\n"); @@ -452,6 +463,10 @@ static void hns3_self_test(struct net_device *ndev, if (netif_msg_ifdown(h)) netdev_info(ndev, "self test end\n"); + return; + +failure: + eth_test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED; } static void hns3_update_limit_promisc_mode(struct net_device *netdev, From efb4573feaa54bb3cc04db1d2334d18f4a9aa322 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sabrina Dubroca Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 16:56:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 014/139] tls: recv: process_rx_list shouldn't use an offset with kvec [ Upstream commit 7608a971fdeb4c3eefa522d1bfe8d4bc6b2481cc ] Only MSG_PEEK needs to copy from an offset during the final process_rx_list call, because the bytes we copied at the beginning of tls_sw_recvmsg were left on the rx_list. In the KVEC case, we removed data from the rx_list as we were copying it, so there's no need to use an offset, just like in the normal case. Fixes: 692d7b5d1f91 ("tls: Fix recvmsg() to be able to peek across multiple records") Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e5487514f828e0347d2b92ca40002c62b58af73d.1711120964.git.sd@queasysnail.net Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index bdb5153f3788..e40f6ed65e6a 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -2238,7 +2238,7 @@ recv_end: } /* Drain records from the rx_list & copy if required */ - if (is_peek || is_kvec) + if (is_peek) err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, copied + peeked, decrypted - peeked, is_peek, NULL); else From f52c8f1210da45d905c9d3b7a3ff4ea02c692fd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sabrina Dubroca Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 16:56:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 015/139] tls: adjust recv return with async crypto and failed copy to userspace [ Upstream commit 85eef9a41d019b59be7bc91793f26251909c0710 ] process_rx_list may not copy as many bytes as we want to the userspace buffer, for example in case we hit an EFAULT during the copy. If this happens, we should only count the bytes that were actually copied, which may be 0. Subtracting async_copy_bytes is correct in both peek and !peek cases, because decrypted == async_copy_bytes + peeked for the peek case: peek is always !ZC, and we can go through either the sync or async path. In the async case, we add chunk to both decrypted and async_copy_bytes. In the sync case, we add chunk to both decrypted and peeked. I missed that in commit 6caaf104423d ("tls: fix peeking with sync+async decryption"). Fixes: 4d42cd6bc2ac ("tls: rx: fix return value for async crypto") Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1b5a1eaab3c088a9dd5d9f1059ceecd7afe888d1.1711120964.git.sd@queasysnail.net Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index e40f6ed65e6a..7166c0606527 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -2244,6 +2244,9 @@ recv_end: else err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, 0, async_copy_bytes, is_peek, NULL); + + /* we could have copied less than we wanted, and possibly nothing */ + decrypted += max(err, 0) - async_copy_bytes; } copied += decrypted; From 30fabe50a7ace3e9d57cf7f9288f33ea408491c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sabrina Dubroca Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 16:56:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 016/139] tls: get psock ref after taking rxlock to avoid leak [ Upstream commit 417e91e856099e9b8a42a2520e2255e6afe024be ] At the start of tls_sw_recvmsg, we take a reference on the psock, and then call tls_rx_reader_lock. If that fails, we return directly without releasing the reference. Instead of adding a new label, just take the reference after locking has succeeded, since we don't need it before. Fixes: 4cbc325ed6b4 ("tls: rx: allow only one reader at a time") Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fe2ade22d030051ce4c3638704ed58b67d0df643.1711120964.git.sd@queasysnail.net Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index 7166c0606527..348abadbc2d8 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -2062,10 +2062,10 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)) return sock_recv_errqueue(sk, msg, len, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR); - psock = sk_psock_get(sk); err = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT); if (err < 0) return err; + psock = sk_psock_get(sk); bpf_strp_enabled = sk_psock_strp_enabled(psock); /* If crypto failed the connection is broken */ From 24444af5ddf729376b90db0f135fa19973cb5dab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Thompson Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 14:36:27 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 017/139] mlxbf_gige: call request_irq() after NAPI initialized [ Upstream commit f7442a634ac06b953fc1f7418f307b25acd4cfbc ] The mlxbf_gige driver encounters a NULL pointer exception in mlxbf_gige_open() when kdump is enabled. The sequence to reproduce the exception is as follows: a) enable kdump b) trigger kdump via "echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger" c) kdump kernel executes d) kdump kernel loads mlxbf_gige module e) the mlxbf_gige module runs its open() as the the "oob_net0" interface is brought up f) mlxbf_gige module will experience an exception during its open(), something like: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000086000004 EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000e29a4000 [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000004 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 812 Comm: NetworkManager Tainted: G OE 5.15.0-1035-bluefield #37-Ubuntu Hardware name: https://www.mellanox.com BlueField-3 SmartNIC Main Card/BlueField-3 SmartNIC Main Card, BIOS 4.6.0.13024 Jan 19 2024 pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : 0x0 lr : __napi_poll+0x40/0x230 sp : ffff800008003e00 x29: ffff800008003e00 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 00000000ffffffff x26: ffff000066027238 x25: ffff00007cedec00 x24: ffff800008003ec8 x23: 000000000000012c x22: ffff800008003eb7 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffff000066027238 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: ffff578fcb450000 x16: ffffa870b083c7c0 x15: 0000aaab010441d0 x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 00726f7272655f65 x12: 6769675f6662786c x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffa870b0842398 x8 : 0000000000000004 x7 : fe5a48b9069706ea x6 : 17fdb11fc84ae0d2 x5 : d94a82549d594f35 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000400100 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000066027238 Call trace: 0x0 net_rx_action+0x178/0x360 __do_softirq+0x15c/0x428 __irq_exit_rcu+0xac/0xec irq_exit+0x18/0x2c handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xa0 gic_handle_irq+0xec/0x1b0 call_on_irq_stack+0x20/0x2c do_interrupt_handler+0x5c/0x70 el1_interrupt+0x30/0x50 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x2c el1h_64_irq+0x7c/0x80 __setup_irq+0x4c0/0x950 request_threaded_irq+0xf4/0x1bc mlxbf_gige_request_irqs+0x68/0x110 [mlxbf_gige] mlxbf_gige_open+0x5c/0x170 [mlxbf_gige] __dev_open+0x100/0x220 __dev_change_flags+0x16c/0x1f0 dev_change_flags+0x2c/0x70 do_setlink+0x220/0xa40 __rtnl_newlink+0x56c/0x8a0 rtnl_newlink+0x58/0x84 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x138/0x3c4 netlink_rcv_skb+0x64/0x130 rtnetlink_rcv+0x20/0x30 netlink_unicast+0x2ec/0x360 netlink_sendmsg+0x278/0x490 __sock_sendmsg+0x5c/0x6c ____sys_sendmsg+0x290/0x2d4 ___sys_sendmsg+0x84/0xd0 __sys_sendmsg+0x70/0xd0 __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x2c/0x40 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x100 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x54/0x184 do_el0_svc+0x30/0xac el0_svc+0x48/0x160 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x12c el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 Code: bad PC value ---[ end trace 7d1c3f3bf9d81885 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt Kernel Offset: 0x2870a7a00000 from 0xffff800008000000 PHYS_OFFSET: 0x80000000 CPU features: 0x0,000005c1,a3332a5a Memory Limit: none ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- The exception happens because there is a pending RX interrupt before the call to request_irq(RX IRQ) executes. Then, the RX IRQ handler fires immediately after this request_irq() completes. The RX IRQ handler runs "napi_schedule()" before NAPI is fully initialized via "netif_napi_add()" and "napi_enable()", both which happen later in the open() logic. The logic in mlxbf_gige_open() must fully initialize NAPI before any calls to request_irq() execute. Fixes: f92e1869d74e ("Add Mellanox BlueField Gigabit Ethernet driver") Signed-off-by: David Thompson Reviewed-by: Asmaa Mnebhi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325183627.7641-1-davthompson@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- .../mellanox/mlxbf_gige/mlxbf_gige_main.c | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxbf_gige/mlxbf_gige_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxbf_gige/mlxbf_gige_main.c index 113e3d9d3353..65e92541db6e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxbf_gige/mlxbf_gige_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxbf_gige/mlxbf_gige_main.c @@ -139,13 +139,10 @@ static int mlxbf_gige_open(struct net_device *netdev) control |= MLXBF_GIGE_CONTROL_PORT_EN; writeq(control, priv->base + MLXBF_GIGE_CONTROL); - err = mlxbf_gige_request_irqs(priv); - if (err) - return err; mlxbf_gige_cache_stats(priv); err = mlxbf_gige_clean_port(priv); if (err) - goto free_irqs; + return err; /* Clear driver's valid_polarity to match hardware, * since the above call to clean_port() resets the @@ -166,6 +163,10 @@ static int mlxbf_gige_open(struct net_device *netdev) napi_enable(&priv->napi); netif_start_queue(netdev); + err = mlxbf_gige_request_irqs(priv); + if (err) + goto napi_deinit; + /* Set bits in INT_EN that we care about */ int_en = MLXBF_GIGE_INT_EN_HW_ACCESS_ERROR | MLXBF_GIGE_INT_EN_TX_CHECKSUM_INPUTS | @@ -182,14 +183,17 @@ static int mlxbf_gige_open(struct net_device *netdev) return 0; +napi_deinit: + netif_stop_queue(netdev); + napi_disable(&priv->napi); + netif_napi_del(&priv->napi); + mlxbf_gige_rx_deinit(priv); + tx_deinit: mlxbf_gige_tx_deinit(priv); phy_deinit: phy_stop(phydev); - -free_irqs: - mlxbf_gige_free_irqs(priv); return err; } From 98cdac206b112bec63852e94802791e316acc2c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrei Matei Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 22:42:45 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 018/139] bpf: Protect against int overflow for stack access size [ Upstream commit ecc6a2101840177e57c925c102d2d29f260d37c8 ] This patch re-introduces protection against the size of access to stack memory being negative; the access size can appear negative as a result of overflowing its signed int representation. This should not actually happen, as there are other protections along the way, but we should protect against it anyway. One code path was missing such protections (fixed in the previous patch in the series), causing out-of-bounds array accesses in check_stack_range_initialized(). This patch causes the verification of a program with such a non-sensical access size to fail. This check used to exist in a more indirect way, but was inadvertendly removed in a833a17aeac7. Fixes: a833a17aeac7 ("bpf: Fix verification of indirect var-off stack access") Reported-by: syzbot+33f4297b5f927648741a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+aafd0513053a1cbf52ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQLORV5PT0iTAhRER+iLBTkByCYNBYyvBSgjN1T31K+gOw@mail.gmail.com/ Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327024245.318299-3-andreimatei1@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 1a29ac4db6ea..27cc6e3db5a8 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -4965,6 +4965,11 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type); if (!err && max_off > 0) err = -EINVAL; /* out of stack access into non-negative offsets */ + if (!err && access_size < 0) + /* access_size should not be negative (or overflow an int); others checks + * along the way should have prevented such an access. + */ + err = -EFAULT; /* invalid negative access size; integer overflow? */ if (err) { if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { From 852698c9fd5b177202ef6683565460d807f93ca7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2024 14:13:24 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 019/139] cifs: Fix duplicate fscache cookie warnings [ Upstream commit 8876a37277cb832e1861c35f8c661825179f73f5 ] fscache emits a lot of duplicate cookie warnings with cifs because the index key for the fscache cookies does not include everything that the cifs_find_inode() function does. The latter is used with iget5_locked() to distinguish between inodes in the local inode cache. Fix this by adding the creation time and file type to the fscache cookie key. Additionally, add a couple of comments to note that if one is changed the other must be also. Signed-off-by: David Howells Fixes: 70431bfd825d ("cifs: Support fscache indexing rewrite") cc: Shyam Prasad N cc: Rohith Surabattula cc: Jeff Layton cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/smb/client/fscache.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- fs/smb/client/inode.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/fscache.c b/fs/smb/client/fscache.c index f64bad513ba6..6df4ab2a6e5d 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/fscache.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/fscache.c @@ -12,6 +12,16 @@ #include "cifs_fs_sb.h" #include "cifsproto.h" +/* + * Key for fscache inode. [!] Contents must match comparisons in cifs_find_inode(). + */ +struct cifs_fscache_inode_key { + + __le64 uniqueid; /* server inode number */ + __le64 createtime; /* creation time on server */ + u8 type; /* S_IFMT file type */ +} __packed; + static void cifs_fscache_fill_volume_coherency( struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct cifs_fscache_volume_coherency_data *cd) @@ -97,15 +107,19 @@ void cifs_fscache_release_super_cookie(struct cifs_tcon *tcon) void cifs_fscache_get_inode_cookie(struct inode *inode) { struct cifs_fscache_inode_coherency_data cd; + struct cifs_fscache_inode_key key; struct cifsInodeInfo *cifsi = CIFS_I(inode); struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb = CIFS_SB(inode->i_sb); struct cifs_tcon *tcon = cifs_sb_master_tcon(cifs_sb); + key.uniqueid = cpu_to_le64(cifsi->uniqueid); + key.createtime = cpu_to_le64(cifsi->createtime); + key.type = (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) >> 12; cifs_fscache_fill_coherency(&cifsi->netfs.inode, &cd); cifsi->netfs.cache = fscache_acquire_cookie(tcon->fscache, 0, - &cifsi->uniqueid, sizeof(cifsi->uniqueid), + &key, sizeof(key), &cd, sizeof(cd), i_size_read(&cifsi->netfs.inode)); if (cifsi->netfs.cache) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/inode.c b/fs/smb/client/inode.c index 5343898bac8a..634f28f0d331 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/inode.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/inode.c @@ -1274,6 +1274,8 @@ cifs_find_inode(struct inode *inode, void *opaque) { struct cifs_fattr *fattr = opaque; + /* [!] The compared values must be the same in struct cifs_fscache_inode_key. */ + /* don't match inode with different uniqueid */ if (CIFS_I(inode)->uniqueid != fattr->cf_uniqueid) return 0; From 2553bfaa19b4219a8ad0ebbe785bc000cebf8274 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Raju Lakkaraju Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 12:28:05 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 020/139] net: lan743x: Add set RFE read fifo threshold for PCI1x1x chips [ Upstream commit e4a58989f5c839316ac63675e8800b9eed7dbe96 ] PCI11x1x Rev B0 devices might drop packets when receiving back to back frames at 2.5G link speed. Change the B0 Rev device's Receive filtering Engine FIFO threshold parameter from its hardware default of 4 to 3 dwords to prevent the problem. Rev C0 and later hardware already defaults to 3 dwords. Fixes: bb4f6bffe33c ("net: lan743x: Add PCI11010 / PCI11414 device IDs") Signed-off-by: Raju Lakkaraju Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326065805.686128-1-Raju.Lakkaraju@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c index e804613faa1f..d5123e8c4a9f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ #define PCS_POWER_STATE_DOWN 0x6 #define PCS_POWER_STATE_UP 0x4 +#define RFE_RD_FIFO_TH_3_DWORDS 0x3 + static void pci11x1x_strap_get_status(struct lan743x_adapter *adapter) { u32 chip_rev; @@ -3217,6 +3219,21 @@ static void lan743x_full_cleanup(struct lan743x_adapter *adapter) lan743x_pci_cleanup(adapter); } +static void pci11x1x_set_rfe_rd_fifo_threshold(struct lan743x_adapter *adapter) +{ + u16 rev = adapter->csr.id_rev & ID_REV_CHIP_REV_MASK_; + + if (rev == ID_REV_CHIP_REV_PCI11X1X_B0_) { + u32 misc_ctl; + + misc_ctl = lan743x_csr_read(adapter, MISC_CTL_0); + misc_ctl &= ~MISC_CTL_0_RFE_READ_FIFO_MASK_; + misc_ctl |= FIELD_PREP(MISC_CTL_0_RFE_READ_FIFO_MASK_, + RFE_RD_FIFO_TH_3_DWORDS); + lan743x_csr_write(adapter, MISC_CTL_0, misc_ctl); + } +} + static int lan743x_hardware_init(struct lan743x_adapter *adapter, struct pci_dev *pdev) { @@ -3232,6 +3249,7 @@ static int lan743x_hardware_init(struct lan743x_adapter *adapter, pci11x1x_strap_get_status(adapter); spin_lock_init(&adapter->eth_syslock_spinlock); mutex_init(&adapter->sgmii_rw_lock); + pci11x1x_set_rfe_rd_fifo_threshold(adapter); } else { adapter->max_tx_channels = LAN743X_MAX_TX_CHANNELS; adapter->used_tx_channels = LAN743X_USED_TX_CHANNELS; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h index 67877d3b6dd9..d304be17b9d8 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #define ID_REV_CHIP_REV_MASK_ (0x0000FFFF) #define ID_REV_CHIP_REV_A0_ (0x00000000) #define ID_REV_CHIP_REV_B0_ (0x00000010) +#define ID_REV_CHIP_REV_PCI11X1X_B0_ (0x000000B0) #define FPGA_REV (0x04) #define FPGA_REV_GET_MINOR_(fpga_rev) (((fpga_rev) >> 8) & 0x000000FF) @@ -311,6 +312,9 @@ #define SGMII_CTL_LINK_STATUS_SOURCE_ BIT(8) #define SGMII_CTL_SGMII_POWER_DN_ BIT(1) +#define MISC_CTL_0 (0x920) +#define MISC_CTL_0_RFE_READ_FIFO_MASK_ GENMASK(6, 4) + /* Vendor Specific SGMII MMD details */ #define SR_VSMMD_PCS_ID1 0x0004 #define SR_VSMMD_PCS_ID2 0x0005 From 06426737653357e65661b6fb039f535c677fa306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hariprasad Kelam Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 10:57:20 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 021/139] Octeontx2-af: fix pause frame configuration in GMP mode [ Upstream commit 40d4b4807cadd83fb3f46cc8cd67a945b5b25461 ] The Octeontx2 MAC block (CGX) has separate data paths (SMU and GMP) for different speeds, allowing for efficient data transfer. The previous patch which added pause frame configuration has a bug due to which pause frame feature is not working in GMP mode. This patch fixes the issue by configurating appropriate registers. Fixes: f7e086e754fe ("octeontx2-af: Pause frame configuration at cgx") Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Kelam Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326052720.4441-1-hkelam@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/cgx.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/cgx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/cgx.c index e6fe599f7bf3..254cad45a555 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/cgx.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/cgx.c @@ -814,6 +814,11 @@ static int cgx_lmac_enadis_pause_frm(void *cgxd, int lmac_id, if (!is_lmac_valid(cgx, lmac_id)) return -ENODEV; + cfg = cgx_read(cgx, lmac_id, CGXX_GMP_GMI_RXX_FRM_CTL); + cfg &= ~CGX_GMP_GMI_RXX_FRM_CTL_CTL_BCK; + cfg |= rx_pause ? CGX_GMP_GMI_RXX_FRM_CTL_CTL_BCK : 0x0; + cgx_write(cgx, lmac_id, CGXX_GMP_GMI_RXX_FRM_CTL, cfg); + cfg = cgx_read(cgx, lmac_id, CGXX_SMUX_RX_FRM_CTL); cfg &= ~CGX_SMUX_RX_FRM_CTL_CTL_BCK; cfg |= rx_pause ? CGX_SMUX_RX_FRM_CTL_CTL_BCK : 0x0; From 7d0567842b78390dd9b60f00f1d8f838d540e325 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 11:18:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 022/139] inet: inet_defrag: prevent sk release while still in use [ Upstream commit 18685451fc4e546fc0e718580d32df3c0e5c8272 ] ip_local_out() and other functions can pass skb->sk as function argument. If the skb is a fragment and reassembly happens before such function call returns, the sk must not be released. This affects skb fragments reassembled via netfilter or similar modules, e.g. openvswitch or ct_act.c, when run as part of tx pipeline. Eric Dumazet made an initial analysis of this bug. Quoting Eric: Calling ip_defrag() in output path is also implying skb_orphan(), which is buggy because output path relies on sk not disappearing. A relevant old patch about the issue was : 8282f27449bf ("inet: frag: Always orphan skbs inside ip_defrag()") [..] net/ipv4/ip_output.c depends on skb->sk being set, and probably to an inet socket, not an arbitrary one. If we orphan the packet in ipvlan, then downstream things like FQ packet scheduler will not work properly. We need to change ip_defrag() to only use skb_orphan() when really needed, ie whenever frag_list is going to be used. Eric suggested to stash sk in fragment queue and made an initial patch. However there is a problem with this: If skb is refragmented again right after, ip_do_fragment() will copy head->sk to the new fragments, and sets up destructor to sock_wfree. IOW, we have no choice but to fix up sk_wmem accouting to reflect the fully reassembled skb, else wmem will underflow. This change moves the orphan down into the core, to last possible moment. As ip_defrag_offset is aliased with sk_buff->sk member, we must move the offset into the FRAG_CB, else skb->sk gets clobbered. This allows to delay the orphaning long enough to learn if the skb has to be queued or if the skb is completing the reasm queue. In the former case, things work as before, skb is orphaned. This is safe because skb gets queued/stolen and won't continue past reasm engine. In the latter case, we will steal the skb->sk reference, reattach it to the head skb, and fix up wmem accouting when inet_frag inflates truesize. Fixes: 7026b1ddb6b8 ("netfilter: Pass socket pointer down through okfn().") Diagnosed-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: xingwei lee Reported-by: yue sun Reported-by: syzbot+e5167d7144a62715044c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326101845.30836-1-fw@strlen.de Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/skbuff.h | 7 +-- net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++----- net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h index c30d419ebf54..c4a8520dc748 100644 --- a/include/linux/skbuff.h +++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h @@ -745,8 +745,6 @@ typedef unsigned char *sk_buff_data_t; * @list: queue head * @ll_node: anchor in an llist (eg socket defer_list) * @sk: Socket we are owned by - * @ip_defrag_offset: (aka @sk) alternate use of @sk, used in - * fragmentation management * @dev: Device we arrived on/are leaving by * @dev_scratch: (aka @dev) alternate use of @dev when @dev would be %NULL * @cb: Control buffer. Free for use by every layer. Put private vars here @@ -870,10 +868,7 @@ struct sk_buff { struct llist_node ll_node; }; - union { - struct sock *sk; - int ip_defrag_offset; - }; + struct sock *sk; union { ktime_t tstamp; diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c b/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c index c9f9ac5013a7..834cdc57755f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ #include #include +#include "../core/sock_destructor.h" + /* Use skb->cb to track consecutive/adjacent fragments coming at * the end of the queue. Nodes in the rb-tree queue will * contain "runs" of one or more adjacent fragments. @@ -39,6 +41,7 @@ struct ipfrag_skb_cb { }; struct sk_buff *next_frag; int frag_run_len; + int ip_defrag_offset; }; #define FRAG_CB(skb) ((struct ipfrag_skb_cb *)((skb)->cb)) @@ -390,12 +393,12 @@ int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb, */ if (!last) fragrun_create(q, skb); /* First fragment. */ - else if (last->ip_defrag_offset + last->len < end) { + else if (FRAG_CB(last)->ip_defrag_offset + last->len < end) { /* This is the common case: skb goes to the end. */ /* Detect and discard overlaps. */ - if (offset < last->ip_defrag_offset + last->len) + if (offset < FRAG_CB(last)->ip_defrag_offset + last->len) return IPFRAG_OVERLAP; - if (offset == last->ip_defrag_offset + last->len) + if (offset == FRAG_CB(last)->ip_defrag_offset + last->len) fragrun_append_to_last(q, skb); else fragrun_create(q, skb); @@ -412,13 +415,13 @@ int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb, parent = *rbn; curr = rb_to_skb(parent); - curr_run_end = curr->ip_defrag_offset + + curr_run_end = FRAG_CB(curr)->ip_defrag_offset + FRAG_CB(curr)->frag_run_len; - if (end <= curr->ip_defrag_offset) + if (end <= FRAG_CB(curr)->ip_defrag_offset) rbn = &parent->rb_left; else if (offset >= curr_run_end) rbn = &parent->rb_right; - else if (offset >= curr->ip_defrag_offset && + else if (offset >= FRAG_CB(curr)->ip_defrag_offset && end <= curr_run_end) return IPFRAG_DUP; else @@ -432,7 +435,7 @@ int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb, rb_insert_color(&skb->rbnode, &q->rb_fragments); } - skb->ip_defrag_offset = offset; + FRAG_CB(skb)->ip_defrag_offset = offset; return IPFRAG_OK; } @@ -442,13 +445,28 @@ void *inet_frag_reasm_prepare(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff *parent) { struct sk_buff *fp, *head = skb_rb_first(&q->rb_fragments); - struct sk_buff **nextp; + void (*destructor)(struct sk_buff *); + unsigned int orig_truesize = 0; + struct sk_buff **nextp = NULL; + struct sock *sk = skb->sk; int delta; + if (sk && is_skb_wmem(skb)) { + /* TX: skb->sk might have been passed as argument to + * dst->output and must remain valid until tx completes. + * + * Move sk to reassembled skb and fix up wmem accounting. + */ + orig_truesize = skb->truesize; + destructor = skb->destructor; + } + if (head != skb) { fp = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!fp) - return NULL; + if (!fp) { + head = skb; + goto out_restore_sk; + } FRAG_CB(fp)->next_frag = FRAG_CB(skb)->next_frag; if (RB_EMPTY_NODE(&skb->rbnode)) FRAG_CB(parent)->next_frag = fp; @@ -457,6 +475,12 @@ void *inet_frag_reasm_prepare(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb, &q->rb_fragments); if (q->fragments_tail == skb) q->fragments_tail = fp; + + if (orig_truesize) { + /* prevent skb_morph from releasing sk */ + skb->sk = NULL; + skb->destructor = NULL; + } skb_morph(skb, head); FRAG_CB(skb)->next_frag = FRAG_CB(head)->next_frag; rb_replace_node(&head->rbnode, &skb->rbnode, @@ -464,13 +488,13 @@ void *inet_frag_reasm_prepare(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb, consume_skb(head); head = skb; } - WARN_ON(head->ip_defrag_offset != 0); + WARN_ON(FRAG_CB(head)->ip_defrag_offset != 0); delta = -head->truesize; /* Head of list must not be cloned. */ if (skb_unclone(head, GFP_ATOMIC)) - return NULL; + goto out_restore_sk; delta += head->truesize; if (delta) @@ -486,7 +510,7 @@ void *inet_frag_reasm_prepare(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb, clone = alloc_skb(0, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!clone) - return NULL; + goto out_restore_sk; skb_shinfo(clone)->frag_list = skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list; skb_frag_list_init(head); for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(head)->nr_frags; i++) @@ -503,6 +527,21 @@ void *inet_frag_reasm_prepare(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb, nextp = &skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list; } +out_restore_sk: + if (orig_truesize) { + int ts_delta = head->truesize - orig_truesize; + + /* if this reassembled skb is fragmented later, + * fraglist skbs will get skb->sk assigned from head->sk, + * and each frag skb will be released via sock_wfree. + * + * Update sk_wmem_alloc. + */ + head->sk = sk; + head->destructor = destructor; + refcount_add(ts_delta, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc); + } + return nextp; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_frag_reasm_prepare); @@ -510,6 +549,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_frag_reasm_prepare); void inet_frag_reasm_finish(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *head, void *reasm_data, bool try_coalesce) { + struct sock *sk = is_skb_wmem(head) ? head->sk : NULL; + const unsigned int head_truesize = head->truesize; struct sk_buff **nextp = reasm_data; struct rb_node *rbn; struct sk_buff *fp; @@ -573,6 +614,9 @@ void inet_frag_reasm_finish(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *head, head->prev = NULL; head->tstamp = q->stamp; head->mono_delivery_time = q->mono_delivery_time; + + if (sk) + refcount_add(sum_truesize - head_truesize, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_frag_reasm_finish); diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c b/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c index fb153569889e..6c309c1ec3b0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c @@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ static int ip_frag_queue(struct ipq *qp, struct sk_buff *skb) } skb_dst_drop(skb); + skb_orphan(skb); return -EINPROGRESS; insert_error: @@ -480,7 +481,6 @@ int ip_defrag(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user) struct ipq *qp; __IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASMREQDS); - skb_orphan(skb); /* Lookup (or create) queue header */ qp = ip_find(net, ip_hdr(skb), user, vif); diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c index 38db0064d661..87a394179092 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c @@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ static int nf_ct_frag6_queue(struct frag_queue *fq, struct sk_buff *skb, } skb_dst_drop(skb); + skb_orphan(skb); return -EINPROGRESS; insert_error: @@ -468,7 +469,6 @@ int nf_ct_frag6_gather(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user) hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb); fhdr = (struct frag_hdr *)skb_transport_header(skb); - skb_orphan(skb); fq = fq_find(net, fhdr->identification, user, hdr, skb->dev ? skb->dev->ifindex : 0); if (fq == NULL) { From 58638e3b48796fae3c5a6a47167c83c471e8a8dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 15:30:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 023/139] dm integrity: fix out-of-range warning [ Upstream commit 8e91c2342351e0f5ef6c0a704384a7f6fc70c3b2 ] Depending on the value of CONFIG_HZ, clang complains about a pointless comparison: drivers/md/dm-integrity.c:4085:12: error: result of comparison of constant 42949672950 with expression of type 'unsigned int' is always false [-Werror,-Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare] if (val >= (uint64_t)UINT_MAX * 1000 / HZ) { As the check remains useful for other configurations, shut up the warning by adding a second type cast to uint64_t. Fixes: 468dfca38b1a ("dm integrity: add a bitmap mode") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka Reviewed-by: Justin Stitt Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/md/dm-integrity.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c index 9c9e2b50c63c..696365f8f3b5 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c @@ -4167,7 +4167,7 @@ static int dm_integrity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv } else if (sscanf(opt_string, "sectors_per_bit:%llu%c", &llval, &dummy) == 1) { log2_sectors_per_bitmap_bit = !llval ? 0 : __ilog2_u64(llval); } else if (sscanf(opt_string, "bitmap_flush_interval:%u%c", &val, &dummy) == 1) { - if (val >= (uint64_t)UINT_MAX * 1000 / HZ) { + if ((uint64_t)val >= (uint64_t)UINT_MAX * 1000 / HZ) { r = -EINVAL; ti->error = "Invalid bitmap_flush_interval argument"; goto bad; From 8d029111b809b59a8ba0510330d497481fc28991 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sandipan Das Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 13:01:44 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 024/139] x86/cpufeatures: Add new word for scattered features [ Upstream commit 7f274e609f3d5f45c22b1dd59053f6764458b492 ] Add a new word for scattered features because all free bits among the existing Linux-defined auxiliary flags have been exhausted. Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8380d2a0da469a1f0ad75b8954a79fb689599ff6.1711091584.git.sandipan.das@amd.com Stable-dep-of: 598c2fafc06f ("perf/x86/amd/lbr: Use freeze based on availability") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 6 ++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h index f835b328ba24..578c3020be7b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -96,8 +96,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 20, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 21, feature_bit) || \ REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 22)) #define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit) \ ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \ @@ -121,8 +122,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 20, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 21, feature_bit) || \ DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 22)) #define cpu_has(c, bit) \ (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 9a157942ae3d..09cca23f020e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ /* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 21 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NCAPINTS 22 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ #define NBUGINTS 2 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ /* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 000037078db4..380e963149cc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK18 0 #define DISABLED_MASK19 0 #define DISABLED_MASK20 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21) +#define DISABLED_MASK21 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 22) #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h index 7ba1726b71c7..e9187ddd3d1f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ #define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK19 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK20 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21) +#define REQUIRED_MASK21 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 22) #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */ From ad141b08d1ce078ad52a00e2eed1589208c54586 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sandipan Das Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 13:01:45 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 025/139] perf/x86/amd/lbr: Use freeze based on availability [ Upstream commit 598c2fafc06fe5c56a1a415fb7b544b31453d637 ] Currently, the LBR code assumes that LBR Freeze is supported on all processors when X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2 is available i.e. CPUID leaf 0x80000022[EAX] bit 1 is set. This is incorrect as the availability of the feature is additionally dependent on CPUID leaf 0x80000022[EAX] bit 2 being set, which may not be set for all Zen 4 processors. Define a new feature bit for LBR and PMC freeze and set the freeze enable bit (FLBRI) in DebugCtl (MSR 0x1d9) conditionally. It should still be possible to use LBR without freeze for profile-guided optimization of user programs by using an user-only branch filter during profiling. When the user-only filter is enabled, branches are no longer recorded after the transition to CPL 0 upon PMI arrival. When branch entries are read in the PMI handler, the branch stack does not change. E.g. $ perf record -j any,u -e ex_ret_brn_tkn ./workload Since the feature bit is visible under flags in /proc/cpuinfo, it can be used to determine the feasibility of use-cases which require LBR Freeze to be supported by the hardware such as profile-guided optimization of kernels. Fixes: ca5b7c0d9621 ("perf/x86/amd/lbr: Add LbrExtV2 branch record support") Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/69a453c97cfd11c6f2584b19f937fe6df741510f.1711091584.git.sandipan.das@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/events/amd/core.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/events/amd/lbr.c | 16 ++++++++++------ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 8 ++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c index fd091b9dd706..3ac069a4559b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c @@ -904,8 +904,8 @@ static int amd_pmu_v2_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs) if (!status) goto done; - /* Read branch records before unfreezing */ - if (status & GLOBAL_STATUS_LBRS_FROZEN) { + /* Read branch records */ + if (x86_pmu.lbr_nr) { amd_pmu_lbr_read(); status &= ~GLOBAL_STATUS_LBRS_FROZEN; } diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/lbr.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/lbr.c index 38a75216c12c..b8fe74e8e0a6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/amd/lbr.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/lbr.c @@ -400,10 +400,12 @@ void amd_pmu_lbr_enable_all(void) wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LBR_SELECT, lbr_select); } - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, dbg_ctl); - rdmsrl(MSR_AMD_DBG_EXTN_CFG, dbg_extn_cfg); + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE)) { + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, dbg_ctl); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, dbg_ctl | DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_LBRS_ON_PMI); + } - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, dbg_ctl | DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_LBRS_ON_PMI); + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD_DBG_EXTN_CFG, dbg_extn_cfg); wrmsrl(MSR_AMD_DBG_EXTN_CFG, dbg_extn_cfg | DBG_EXTN_CFG_LBRV2EN); } @@ -416,10 +418,12 @@ void amd_pmu_lbr_disable_all(void) return; rdmsrl(MSR_AMD_DBG_EXTN_CFG, dbg_extn_cfg); - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, dbg_ctl); - wrmsrl(MSR_AMD_DBG_EXTN_CFG, dbg_extn_cfg & ~DBG_EXTN_CFG_LBRV2EN); - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, dbg_ctl & ~DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_LBRS_ON_PMI); + + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE)) { + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, dbg_ctl); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, dbg_ctl & ~DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_LBRS_ON_PMI); + } } __init int amd_pmu_lbr_init(void) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 09cca23f020e..1280daa72975 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -432,6 +432,14 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE (20*32+28) /* "" MSR_PRED_CMD[IBPB] flushes all branch type predictions */ #define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO (20*32+29) /* "" CPU is not affected by SRSO */ +/* + * Extended auxiliary flags: Linux defined - for features scattered in various + * CPUID levels like 0x80000022, etc. + * + * Reuse free bits when adding new feature flags! + */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE (21*32+ 0) /* AMD LBR and PMC Freeze */ + /* * BUG word(s) */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c index fc01f81f6e2a..94e0a42528dc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_MBA, CPUID_EBX, 6, 0x80000008, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x80000022, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x80000022, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE, CPUID_EAX, 2, 0x80000022, 0 }, { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } }; From 923579201dece7cb9fc30662b4f6e7d7801042a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Upton Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 18:48:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 026/139] KVM: arm64: Fix host-programmed guest events in nVHE commit e89c928bedd77d181edc2df01cb6672184775140 upstream. Programming PMU events in the host that count during guest execution is a feature supported by perf, e.g. perf stat -e cpu_cycles:G ./lkvm run While this works for VHE, the guest/host event bitmaps are not carried through to the hypervisor in the nVHE configuration. Make kvm_pmu_update_vcpu_events() conditional on whether or not _hardware_ supports PMUv3 rather than if the vCPU as vPMU enabled. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 84d751a019a9 ("KVM: arm64: Pass pmu events to hyp via vcpu") Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240305184840.636212-3-oliver.upton@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/kvm/arm_pmu.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/kvm/arm_pmu.h b/include/kvm/arm_pmu.h index 96b192139a23..6196b71c5eb5 100644 --- a/include/kvm/arm_pmu.h +++ b/include/kvm/arm_pmu.h @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_pmu_restore_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); */ #define kvm_pmu_update_vcpu_events(vcpu) \ do { \ - if (!has_vhe() && kvm_vcpu_has_pmu(vcpu)) \ + if (!has_vhe() && kvm_arm_support_pmu_v3()) \ vcpu->arch.pmu.events = *kvm_get_pmu_events(); \ } while (0) From 3d61f1704bdf2b4335336590baac0e755b06fd71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heiner Kallweit Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2024 12:49:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 027/139] r8169: fix issue caused by buggy BIOS on certain boards with RTL8168d commit 5d872c9f46bd2ea3524af3c2420a364a13667135 upstream. On some boards with this chip version the BIOS is buggy and misses to reset the PHY page selector. This results in the PHY ID read accessing registers on a different page, returning a more or less random value. Fix this by resetting the page selector first. Fixes: f1e911d5d0df ("r8169: add basic phylib support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/64f2055e-98b8-45ec-8568-665e3d54d4e6@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c index 06663c11ca96..85ed9879af6c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c @@ -5032,6 +5032,15 @@ static int r8169_mdio_register(struct rtl8169_private *tp) struct mii_bus *new_bus; int ret; + /* On some boards with this chip version the BIOS is buggy and misses + * to reset the PHY page selector. This results in the PHY ID read + * accessing registers on a different page, returning a more or + * less random value. Fix this by resetting the page selector first. + */ + if (tp->mac_version == RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_25 || + tp->mac_version == RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_26) + r8169_mdio_write(tp, 0x1f, 0); + new_bus = devm_mdiobus_alloc(&pdev->dev); if (!new_bus) return -ENOMEM; From 5d920886c38209a6b321180b55f722f8d6aa1d32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2024 17:16:14 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 028/139] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_LNX_5 to track recently added Linux-defined word commit 8cb4a9a82b21623dbb4b3051dd30d98356cf95bc upstream. Add CPUID_LNX_5 to track cpufeatures' word 21, and add the appropriate compile-time assert in KVM to prevent direct lookups on the features in CPUID_LNX_5. KVM uses X86_FEATURE_* flags to manage guest CPUID, and so must translate features that are scattered by Linux from the Linux-defined bit to the hardware-defined bit, i.e. should never try to directly access scattered features in guest CPUID. Opportunistically add NR_CPUID_WORDS to enum cpuid_leafs, along with a compile-time assert in KVM's CPUID infrastructure to ensure that future additions update cpuid_leafs along with NCAPINTS. No functional change intended. Fixes: 7f274e609f3d ("x86/cpufeatures: Add new word for scattered features") Cc: Sandipan Das Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Acked-by: Dave Hansen Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 578c3020be7b..16051c6f3b13 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ enum cpuid_leafs CPUID_7_EDX, CPUID_8000_001F_EAX, CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, + CPUID_LNX_5, + NR_CPUID_WORDS, }; #define X86_CAP_FMT_NUM "%d:%d" diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h index 7c8e2b20a13b..d2f6703a2633 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h @@ -83,10 +83,12 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = { */ static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf) { + BUILD_BUG_ON(NR_CPUID_WORDS != NCAPINTS); BUILD_BUG_ON(x86_leaf == CPUID_LNX_1); BUILD_BUG_ON(x86_leaf == CPUID_LNX_2); BUILD_BUG_ON(x86_leaf == CPUID_LNX_3); BUILD_BUG_ON(x86_leaf == CPUID_LNX_4); + BUILD_BUG_ON(x86_leaf == CPUID_LNX_5); BUILD_BUG_ON(x86_leaf >= ARRAY_SIZE(reverse_cpuid)); BUILD_BUG_ON(reverse_cpuid[x86_leaf].function == 0); } From 9bf4acc802966f07243777c3018400cc26cccbe4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2024 09:44:12 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 029/139] Revert "Bluetooth: hci_qca: Set BDA quirk bit if fwnode exists in DT" commit 4790a73ace86f3d165bbedba898e0758e6e1b82d upstream. This reverts commit 7dcd3e014aa7faeeaf4047190b22d8a19a0db696. Qualcomm Bluetooth controllers like WCN6855 do not have persistent storage for the Bluetooth address and must therefore start as unconfigured to allow the user to set a valid address unless one has been provided by the boot firmware in the devicetree. A recent change snuck into v6.8-rc7 and incorrectly started marking the default (non-unique) address as valid. This specifically also breaks the Bluetooth setup for some user of the Lenovo ThinkPad X13s. Note that this is the second time Qualcomm breaks the driver this way and that this was fixed last year by commit 6945795bc81a ("Bluetooth: fix use-bdaddr-property quirk"), which also has some further details. Fixes: 7dcd3e014aa7 ("Bluetooth: hci_qca: Set BDA quirk bit if fwnode exists in DT") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.8 Cc: Janaki Ramaiah Thota Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Reported-by: Clayton Craft Tested-by: Clayton Craft Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c | 13 +------------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c index 2acda547f4f3..63f7f58de49f 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ * * Copyright (C) 2007 Texas Instruments, Inc. * Copyright (c) 2010, 2012, 2018 The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. - * Copyright (c) 2023 Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. * * Acknowledgements: * This file is based on hci_ll.c, which was... @@ -1845,17 +1844,7 @@ retry: case QCA_WCN6750: case QCA_WCN6855: case QCA_WCN7850: - - /* Set BDA quirk bit for reading BDA value from fwnode property - * only if that property exist in DT. - */ - if (fwnode_property_present(dev_fwnode(hdev->dev.parent), "local-bd-address")) { - set_bit(HCI_QUIRK_USE_BDADDR_PROPERTY, &hdev->quirks); - bt_dev_info(hdev, "setting quirk bit to read BDA from fwnode later"); - } else { - bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "local-bd-address` is not present in the devicetree so not setting quirk bit for BDA"); - } - + set_bit(HCI_QUIRK_USE_BDADDR_PROPERTY, &hdev->quirks); hci_set_aosp_capable(hdev); ret = qca_read_soc_version(hdev, &ver, soc_type); From 298dc5dd38d2652cd6b362e3295be2d81f244a19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2024 08:55:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 030/139] arm64: dts: qcom: sc7180-trogdor: mark bluetooth address as broken commit e12e28009e584c8f8363439f6a928ec86278a106 upstream. Several Qualcomm Bluetooth controllers lack persistent storage for the device address and instead one can be provided by the boot firmware using the 'local-bd-address' devicetree property. The Bluetooth bindings clearly states that the address should be specified in little-endian order, but due to a long-standing bug in the Qualcomm driver which reversed the address some boot firmware has been providing the address in big-endian order instead. The boot firmware in SC7180 Trogdor Chromebooks is known to be affected so mark the 'local-bd-address' property as broken to maintain backwards compatibility with older firmware when fixing the underlying driver bug. Note that ChromeOS always updates the kernel and devicetree in lockstep so that there is no need to handle backwards compatibility with older devicetrees. Fixes: 7ec3e67307f8 ("arm64: dts: qcom: sc7180-trogdor: add initial trogdor and lazor dt") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10 Cc: Rob Clark Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Acked-by: Bjorn Andersson Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sc7180-trogdor.dtsi | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sc7180-trogdor.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sc7180-trogdor.dtsi index eae22e6e97c1..f55ce6f2fdc2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sc7180-trogdor.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sc7180-trogdor.dtsi @@ -923,6 +923,8 @@ ap_spi_fp: &spi10 { vddrf-supply = <&pp1300_l2c>; vddch0-supply = <&pp3300_l10c>; max-speed = <3200000>; + + qcom,local-bd-address-broken; }; }; From a2812ff7ea40b53480835cb22dbcf2b40f19954a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2024 08:55:54 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 031/139] Bluetooth: qca: fix device-address endianness commit 77f45cca8bc55d00520a192f5a7715133591c83e upstream. The WCN6855 firmware on the Lenovo ThinkPad X13s expects the Bluetooth device address in big-endian order when setting it using the EDL_WRITE_BD_ADDR_OPCODE command. Presumably, this is the case for all non-ROME devices which all use the EDL_WRITE_BD_ADDR_OPCODE command for this (unlike the ROME devices which use a different command and expect the address in little-endian order). Reverse the little-endian address before setting it to make sure that the address can be configured using tools like btmgmt or using the 'local-bd-address' devicetree property. Note that this can potentially break systems with boot firmware which has started relying on the broken behaviour and is incorrectly passing the address via devicetree in big-endian order. The only device affected by this should be the WCN3991 used in some Chromebooks. As ChromeOS updates the kernel and devicetree in lockstep, the new 'qcom,local-bd-address-broken' property can be used to determine if the firmware is buggy so that the underlying driver bug can be fixed without breaking backwards compatibility. Set the HCI_QUIRK_BDADDR_PROPERTY_BROKEN quirk for such platforms so that the address is reversed when parsing the address property. Fixes: 5c0a1001c8be ("Bluetooth: hci_qca: Add helper to set device address") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1 Cc: Balakrishna Godavarthi Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke Tested-by: Nikita Travkin # sc7180 Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c | 8 ++++++-- drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c | 10 ++++++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c index 0211f704a358..5277090c6d6d 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c @@ -758,11 +758,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(qca_uart_setup); int qca_set_bdaddr(struct hci_dev *hdev, const bdaddr_t *bdaddr) { + bdaddr_t bdaddr_swapped; struct sk_buff *skb; int err; - skb = __hci_cmd_sync_ev(hdev, EDL_WRITE_BD_ADDR_OPCODE, 6, bdaddr, - HCI_EV_VENDOR, HCI_INIT_TIMEOUT); + baswap(&bdaddr_swapped, bdaddr); + + skb = __hci_cmd_sync_ev(hdev, EDL_WRITE_BD_ADDR_OPCODE, 6, + &bdaddr_swapped, HCI_EV_VENDOR, + HCI_INIT_TIMEOUT); if (IS_ERR(skb)) { err = PTR_ERR(skb); bt_dev_err(hdev, "QCA Change address cmd failed (%d)", err); diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c index 63f7f58de49f..33956ddec933 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c @@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ struct qca_serdev { struct qca_power *bt_power; u32 init_speed; u32 oper_speed; + bool bdaddr_property_broken; const char *firmware_name; }; @@ -1787,6 +1788,7 @@ static int qca_setup(struct hci_uart *hu) const char *firmware_name = qca_get_firmware_name(hu); int ret; struct qca_btsoc_version ver; + struct qca_serdev *qcadev; const char *soc_name; ret = qca_check_speeds(hu); @@ -1845,6 +1847,11 @@ retry: case QCA_WCN6855: case QCA_WCN7850: set_bit(HCI_QUIRK_USE_BDADDR_PROPERTY, &hdev->quirks); + + qcadev = serdev_device_get_drvdata(hu->serdev); + if (qcadev->bdaddr_property_broken) + set_bit(HCI_QUIRK_BDADDR_PROPERTY_BROKEN, &hdev->quirks); + hci_set_aosp_capable(hdev); ret = qca_read_soc_version(hdev, &ver, soc_type); @@ -2212,6 +2219,9 @@ static int qca_serdev_probe(struct serdev_device *serdev) if (!qcadev->oper_speed) BT_DBG("UART will pick default operating speed"); + qcadev->bdaddr_property_broken = device_property_read_bool(&serdev->dev, + "qcom,local-bd-address-broken"); + if (data) qcadev->btsoc_type = data->soc_type; else From 3e773d04aef9c9e0cdf97cfd23bc82c52305e0a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2024 08:55:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 032/139] Bluetooth: add quirk for broken address properties commit 39646f29b100566451d37abc4cc8cdd583756dfe upstream. Some Bluetooth controllers lack persistent storage for the device address and instead one can be provided by the boot firmware using the 'local-bd-address' devicetree property. The Bluetooth devicetree bindings clearly states that the address should be specified in little-endian order, but due to a long-standing bug in the Qualcomm driver which reversed the address some boot firmware has been providing the address in big-endian order instead. Add a new quirk that can be set on platforms with broken firmware and use it to reverse the address when parsing the property so that the underlying driver bug can be fixed. Fixes: 5c0a1001c8be ("Bluetooth: hci_qca: Add helper to set device address") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1 Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/bluetooth/hci.h | 9 +++++++++ net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h index c69e09909449..09bc4bf805c6 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h @@ -175,6 +175,15 @@ enum { */ HCI_QUIRK_USE_BDADDR_PROPERTY, + /* When this quirk is set, the Bluetooth Device Address provided by + * the 'local-bd-address' fwnode property is incorrectly specified in + * big-endian order. + * + * This quirk can be set before hci_register_dev is called or + * during the hdev->setup vendor callback. + */ + HCI_QUIRK_BDADDR_PROPERTY_BROKEN, + /* When this quirk is set, the duplicate filtering during * scanning is based on Bluetooth devices addresses. To allow * RSSI based updates, restart scanning if needed. diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c index 7e64cf880f9f..e24b211b10ff 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c @@ -3293,7 +3293,10 @@ static void hci_dev_get_bd_addr_from_property(struct hci_dev *hdev) if (ret < 0 || !bacmp(&ba, BDADDR_ANY)) return; - bacpy(&hdev->public_addr, &ba); + if (test_bit(HCI_QUIRK_BDADDR_PROPERTY_BROKEN, &hdev->quirks)) + baswap(&hdev->public_addr, &ba); + else + bacpy(&hdev->public_addr, &ba); } struct hci_init_stage { From 38e3eaa861bde62b92e207b07a9dc595a784191f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hui Wang Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2024 12:30:30 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 033/139] Bluetooth: hci_event: set the conn encrypted before conn establishes commit c569242cd49287d53b73a94233db40097d838535 upstream. We have a BT headset (Lenovo Thinkplus XT99), the pairing and connecting has no problem, once this headset is paired, bluez will remember this device and will auto re-connect it whenever the device is powered on. The auto re-connecting works well with Windows and Android, but with Linux, it always fails. Through debugging, we found at the rfcomm connection stage, the bluetooth stack reports "Connection refused - security block (0x0003)". For this device, the re-connecting negotiation process is different from other BT headsets, it sends the Link_KEY_REQUEST command before the CONNECT_REQUEST completes, and it doesn't send ENCRYPT_CHANGE command during the negotiation. When the device sends the "connect complete" to hci, the ev->encr_mode is 1. So here in the conn_complete_evt(), if ev->encr_mode is 1, link type is ACL and HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT is not set, we set HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT to this conn, and update conn->enc_key_size accordingly. After this change, this BT headset could re-connect with Linux successfully. This is the btmon log after applying the patch, after receiving the "Connect Complete" with "Encryption: Enabled", will send the command to read encryption key size: > HCI Event: Connect Request (0x04) plen 10 Address: 8C:3C:AA:D8:11:67 (OUI 8C-3C-AA) Class: 0x240404 Major class: Audio/Video (headset, speaker, stereo, video, vcr) Minor class: Wearable Headset Device Rendering (Printing, Speaker) Audio (Speaker, Microphone, Headset) Link type: ACL (0x01) ... > HCI Event: Link Key Request (0x17) plen 6 Address: 8C:3C:AA:D8:11:67 (OUI 8C-3C-AA) < HCI Command: Link Key Request Reply (0x01|0x000b) plen 22 Address: 8C:3C:AA:D8:11:67 (OUI 8C-3C-AA) Link key: ${32-hex-digits-key} ... > HCI Event: Connect Complete (0x03) plen 11 Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 256 Address: 8C:3C:AA:D8:11:67 (OUI 8C-3C-AA) Link type: ACL (0x01) Encryption: Enabled (0x01) < HCI Command: Read Encryption Key... (0x05|0x0008) plen 2 Handle: 256 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 10 L2CAP: Information Request (0x0a) ident 1 len 2 Type: Extended features supported (0x0002) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 7 Read Encryption Key Size (0x05|0x0008) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 256 Key size: 16 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/704 Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel Reviewed-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Hui Wang Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index b150dee88f35..bc14223f6693 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -3234,6 +3234,31 @@ static void hci_conn_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, if (test_bit(HCI_ENCRYPT, &hdev->flags)) set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags); + /* "Link key request" completed ahead of "connect request" completes */ + if (ev->encr_mode == 1 && !test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags) && + ev->link_type == ACL_LINK) { + struct link_key *key; + struct hci_cp_read_enc_key_size cp; + + key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &ev->bdaddr); + if (key) { + set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags); + + if (!(hdev->commands[20] & 0x10)) { + conn->enc_key_size = HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE; + } else { + cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle); + if (hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_READ_ENC_KEY_SIZE, + sizeof(cp), &cp)) { + bt_dev_err(hdev, "sending read key size failed"); + conn->enc_key_size = HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE; + } + } + + hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status); + } + } + /* Get remote features */ if (conn->type == ACL_LINK) { struct hci_cp_read_remote_features cp; From 18e189442a5896255e764f8e875c13d16248ef2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bastien Nocera Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2024 15:24:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 034/139] Bluetooth: Fix TOCTOU in HCI debugfs implementation commit 7835fcfd132eb88b87e8eb901f88436f63ab60f7 upstream. struct hci_dev members conn_info_max_age, conn_info_min_age, le_conn_max_interval, le_conn_min_interval, le_adv_max_interval, and le_adv_min_interval can be modified from the HCI core code, as well through debugfs. The debugfs implementation, that's only available to privileged users, will check for boundaries, making sure that the minimum value being set is strictly above the maximum value that already exists, and vice-versa. However, as both minimum and maximum values can be changed concurrently to us modifying them, we need to make sure that the value we check is the value we end up using. For example, with ->conn_info_max_age set to 10, conn_info_min_age_set() gets called from vfs handlers to set conn_info_min_age to 8. In conn_info_min_age_set(), this goes through: if (val == 0 || val > hdev->conn_info_max_age) return -EINVAL; Concurrently, conn_info_max_age_set() gets called to set to set the conn_info_max_age to 7: if (val == 0 || val > hdev->conn_info_max_age) return -EINVAL; That check will also pass because we used the old value (10) for conn_info_max_age. After those checks that both passed, the struct hci_dev access is mutex-locked, disabling concurrent access, but that does not matter because the invalid value checks both passed, and we'll end up with conn_info_min_age = 8 and conn_info_max_age = 7 To fix this problem, we need to lock the structure access before so the check and assignment are not interrupted. This fix was originally devised by the BassCheck[1] team, and considered the problem to be an atomicity one. This isn't the case as there aren't any concerns about the variable changing while we check it, but rather after we check it parallel to another change. This patch fixes CVE-2024-24858 and CVE-2024-24857. [1] https://sites.google.com/view/basscheck/ Co-developed-by: Gui-Dong Han <2045gemini@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Gui-Dong Han <2045gemini@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/20231222161317.6255-1-2045gemini@gmail.com/ Link: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24858 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/20231222162931.6553-1-2045gemini@gmail.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/20231222162310.6461-1-2045gemini@gmail.com/ Link: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24857 Fixes: 31ad169148df ("Bluetooth: Add conn info lifetime parameters to debugfs") Fixes: 729a1051da6f ("Bluetooth: Expose default LE advertising interval via debugfs") Fixes: 71c3b60ec6d2 ("Bluetooth: Move BR/EDR debugfs file creation into hci_debugfs.c") Signed-off-by: Bastien Nocera Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c index 6124b3425f35..c9400a7d93d7 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c @@ -217,10 +217,12 @@ static int conn_info_min_age_set(void *data, u64 val) { struct hci_dev *hdev = data; - if (val == 0 || val > hdev->conn_info_max_age) - return -EINVAL; - hci_dev_lock(hdev); + if (val == 0 || val > hdev->conn_info_max_age) { + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); + return -EINVAL; + } + hdev->conn_info_min_age = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); @@ -245,10 +247,12 @@ static int conn_info_max_age_set(void *data, u64 val) { struct hci_dev *hdev = data; - if (val == 0 || val < hdev->conn_info_min_age) - return -EINVAL; - hci_dev_lock(hdev); + if (val == 0 || val < hdev->conn_info_min_age) { + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); + return -EINVAL; + } + hdev->conn_info_max_age = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); @@ -566,10 +570,12 @@ static int sniff_min_interval_set(void *data, u64 val) { struct hci_dev *hdev = data; - if (val == 0 || val % 2 || val > hdev->sniff_max_interval) - return -EINVAL; - hci_dev_lock(hdev); + if (val == 0 || val % 2 || val > hdev->sniff_max_interval) { + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); + return -EINVAL; + } + hdev->sniff_min_interval = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); @@ -594,10 +600,12 @@ static int sniff_max_interval_set(void *data, u64 val) { struct hci_dev *hdev = data; - if (val == 0 || val % 2 || val < hdev->sniff_min_interval) - return -EINVAL; - hci_dev_lock(hdev); + if (val == 0 || val % 2 || val < hdev->sniff_min_interval) { + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); + return -EINVAL; + } + hdev->sniff_max_interval = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); @@ -849,10 +857,12 @@ static int conn_min_interval_set(void *data, u64 val) { struct hci_dev *hdev = data; - if (val < 0x0006 || val > 0x0c80 || val > hdev->le_conn_max_interval) - return -EINVAL; - hci_dev_lock(hdev); + if (val < 0x0006 || val > 0x0c80 || val > hdev->le_conn_max_interval) { + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); + return -EINVAL; + } + hdev->le_conn_min_interval = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); @@ -877,10 +887,12 @@ static int conn_max_interval_set(void *data, u64 val) { struct hci_dev *hdev = data; - if (val < 0x0006 || val > 0x0c80 || val < hdev->le_conn_min_interval) - return -EINVAL; - hci_dev_lock(hdev); + if (val < 0x0006 || val > 0x0c80 || val < hdev->le_conn_min_interval) { + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); + return -EINVAL; + } + hdev->le_conn_max_interval = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); @@ -989,10 +1001,12 @@ static int adv_min_interval_set(void *data, u64 val) { struct hci_dev *hdev = data; - if (val < 0x0020 || val > 0x4000 || val > hdev->le_adv_max_interval) - return -EINVAL; - hci_dev_lock(hdev); + if (val < 0x0020 || val > 0x4000 || val > hdev->le_adv_max_interval) { + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); + return -EINVAL; + } + hdev->le_adv_min_interval = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); @@ -1017,10 +1031,12 @@ static int adv_max_interval_set(void *data, u64 val) { struct hci_dev *hdev = data; - if (val < 0x0020 || val > 0x4000 || val < hdev->le_adv_min_interval) - return -EINVAL; - hci_dev_lock(hdev); + if (val < 0x0020 || val > 0x4000 || val < hdev->le_adv_min_interval) { + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); + return -EINVAL; + } + hdev->le_adv_max_interval = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); From 7c1250796b6c262b505a46192f4716b8c6a6a8c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jesper Dangaard Brouer Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2024 13:14:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 035/139] xen-netfront: Add missing skb_mark_for_recycle commit 037965402a010898d34f4e35327d22c0a95cd51f upstream. Notice that skb_mark_for_recycle() is introduced later than fixes tag in commit 6a5bcd84e886 ("page_pool: Allow drivers to hint on SKB recycling"). It is believed that fixes tag were missing a call to page_pool_release_page() between v5.9 to v5.14, after which is should have used skb_mark_for_recycle(). Since v6.6 the call page_pool_release_page() were removed (in commit 535b9c61bdef ("net: page_pool: hide page_pool_release_page()") and remaining callers converted (in commit 6bfef2ec0172 ("Merge branch 'net-page_pool-remove-page_pool_release_page'")). This leak became visible in v6.8 via commit dba1b8a7ab68 ("mm/page_pool: catch page_pool memory leaks"). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 6c5aa6fc4def ("xen networking: add basic XDP support for xen-netfront") Reported-by: Leonidas Spyropoulos Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218654 Reported-by: Arthur Borsboom Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/171154167446.2671062.9127105384591237363.stgit@firesoul Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c index dc404e05970c..95b5ab4b964e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c @@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *xennet_alloc_one_rx_buffer(struct netfront_queue *queue) return NULL; } skb_add_rx_frag(skb, 0, page, 0, 0, PAGE_SIZE); + skb_mark_for_recycle(skb); /* Align ip header to a 16 bytes boundary */ skb_reserve(skb, NET_IP_ALIGN); From cbaac2e5488ed54833897264a5ffb2a341a9f196 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mahmoud Adam Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 16:31:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 036/139] net/rds: fix possible cp null dereference commit 62fc3357e079a07a22465b9b6ef71bb6ea75ee4b upstream. cp might be null, calling cp->cp_conn would produce null dereference [Simon Horman adds:] Analysis: * cp is a parameter of __rds_rdma_map and is not reassigned. * The following call-sites pass a NULL cp argument to __rds_rdma_map() - rds_get_mr() - rds_get_mr_for_dest * Prior to the code above, the following assumes that cp may be NULL (which is indicative, but could itself be unnecessary) trans_private = rs->rs_transport->get_mr( sg, nents, rs, &mr->r_key, cp ? cp->cp_conn : NULL, args->vec.addr, args->vec.bytes, need_odp ? ODP_ZEROBASED : ODP_NOT_NEEDED); * The code modified by this patch is guarded by IS_ERR(trans_private), where trans_private is assigned as per the previous point in this analysis. The only implementation of get_mr that I could locate is rds_ib_get_mr() which can return an ERR_PTR if the conn (4th) argument is NULL. * ret is set to PTR_ERR(trans_private). rds_ib_get_mr can return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV) if the conn (4th) argument is NULL. Thus ret may be -ENODEV in which case the code in question will execute. Conclusion: * cp may be NULL at the point where this patch adds a check; this patch does seem to address a possible bug Fixes: c055fc00c07b ("net/rds: fix WARNING in rds_conn_connect_if_down") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+ Signed-off-by: Mahmoud Adam Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326153132.55580-1-mngyadam@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/rds/rdma.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/rds/rdma.c b/net/rds/rdma.c index a4e3c5de998b..00dbcd4d28e6 100644 --- a/net/rds/rdma.c +++ b/net/rds/rdma.c @@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static int __rds_rdma_map(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_get_mr_args *args, } ret = PTR_ERR(trans_private); /* Trigger connection so that its ready for the next retry */ - if (ret == -ENODEV) + if (ret == -ENODEV && cp) rds_conn_connect_if_down(cp->cp_conn); goto out; } From fc77240f6316d17fc58a8881927c3732b1d75d51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 15:21:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 037/139] net: usb: ax88179_178a: avoid the interface always configured as random address commit 2e91bb99b9d4f756e92e83c4453f894dda220f09 upstream. After the commit d2689b6a86b9 ("net: usb: ax88179_178a: avoid two consecutive device resets"), reset is not executed from bind operation and mac address is not read from the device registers or the devicetree at that moment. Since the check to configure if the assigned mac address is random or not for the interface, happens after the bind operation from usbnet_probe, the interface keeps configured as random address, although the address is correctly read and set during open operation (the only reset now). In order to keep only one reset for the device and to avoid the interface always configured as random address, after reset, configure correctly the suitable field from the driver, if the mac address is read successfully from the device registers or the devicetree. Take into account if a locally administered address (random) was previously stored. cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.6+ Fixes: d2689b6a86b9 ("net: usb: ax88179_178a: avoid two consecutive device resets") Reported-by: Dave Stevenson Signed-off-by: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240403132158.344838-1-jtornosm@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c b/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c index d837c1887416..e0e9b4c53cb0 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c @@ -1273,6 +1273,8 @@ static void ax88179_get_mac_addr(struct usbnet *dev) if (is_valid_ether_addr(mac)) { eth_hw_addr_set(dev->net, mac); + if (!is_local_ether_addr(mac)) + dev->net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_PERM; } else { netdev_info(dev->net, "invalid MAC address, using random\n"); eth_hw_addr_random(dev->net); From db388b8e12aa7c3660617cc5e8beb90f71bba206 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marco Pinna Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2024 17:12:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 038/139] vsock/virtio: fix packet delivery to tap device commit b32a09ea7c38849ff925489a6bf5bd8914bc45df upstream. Commit 82dfb540aeb2 ("VSOCK: Add virtio vsock vsockmon hooks") added virtio_transport_deliver_tap_pkt() for handing packets to the vsockmon device. However, in virtio_transport_send_pkt_work(), the function is called before actually sending the packet (i.e. before placing it in the virtqueue with virtqueue_add_sgs() and checking whether it returned successfully). Queuing the packet in the virtqueue can fail even multiple times. However, in virtio_transport_deliver_tap_pkt() we deliver the packet to the monitoring tap interface only the first time we call it. This certainly avoids seeing the same packet replicated multiple times in the monitoring interface, but it can show the packet sent with the wrong timestamp or even before we succeed to queue it in the virtqueue. Move virtio_transport_deliver_tap_pkt() after calling virtqueue_add_sgs() and making sure it returned successfully. Fixes: 82dfb540aeb2 ("VSOCK: Add virtio vsock vsockmon hooks") Cc: stable@vge.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marco Pinna Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240329161259.411751-1-marco.pinn95@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport.c b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport.c index 16575ea83659..5434c9f11d28 100644 --- a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport.c +++ b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport.c @@ -109,7 +109,6 @@ virtio_transport_send_pkt_work(struct work_struct *work) if (!skb) break; - virtio_transport_deliver_tap_pkt(skb); reply = virtio_vsock_skb_reply(skb); sg_init_one(&hdr, virtio_vsock_hdr(skb), sizeof(*virtio_vsock_hdr(skb))); @@ -128,6 +127,8 @@ virtio_transport_send_pkt_work(struct work_struct *work) break; } + virtio_transport_deliver_tap_pkt(skb); + if (reply) { struct virtqueue *rx_vq = vsock->vqs[VSOCK_VQ_RX]; int val; From 1c9e71ca615debed700f665ba434e22dbbfd9cd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ingo Molnar Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 11:47:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 039/139] Revert "x86/mm/ident_map: Use gbpages only where full GB page should be mapped." commit c567f2948f57bdc03ed03403ae0234085f376b7d upstream. This reverts commit d794734c9bbfe22f86686dc2909c25f5ffe1a572. While the original change tries to fix a bug, it also unintentionally broke existing systems, see the regressions reported at: https://lore.kernel.org/all/3a1b9909-45ac-4f97-ad68-d16ef1ce99db@pavinjoseph.com/ Since d794734c9bbf was also marked for -stable, let's back it out before causing more damage. Note that due to another upstream change the revert was not 100% automatic: 0a845e0f6348 mm/treewide: replace pud_large() with pud_leaf() Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Cc: Russ Anderson Cc: Steve Wahl Cc: Dave Hansen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/3a1b9909-45ac-4f97-ad68-d16ef1ce99db@pavinjoseph.com/ Fixes: d794734c9bbf ("x86/mm/ident_map: Use gbpages only where full GB page should be mapped.") Signed-off-by: Steve Wahl Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c | 23 +++++------------------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c index f50cc210a981..968d7005f4a7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c @@ -26,31 +26,18 @@ static int ident_pud_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pud_t *pud_page, for (; addr < end; addr = next) { pud_t *pud = pud_page + pud_index(addr); pmd_t *pmd; - bool use_gbpage; next = (addr & PUD_MASK) + PUD_SIZE; if (next > end) next = end; - /* if this is already a gbpage, this portion is already mapped */ - if (pud_large(*pud)) - continue; - - /* Is using a gbpage allowed? */ - use_gbpage = info->direct_gbpages; - - /* Don't use gbpage if it maps more than the requested region. */ - /* at the begining: */ - use_gbpage &= ((addr & ~PUD_MASK) == 0); - /* ... or at the end: */ - use_gbpage &= ((next & ~PUD_MASK) == 0); - - /* Never overwrite existing mappings */ - use_gbpage &= !pud_present(*pud); - - if (use_gbpage) { + if (info->direct_gbpages) { pud_t pudval; + if (pud_present(*pud)) + continue; + + addr &= PUD_MASK; pudval = __pud((addr - info->offset) | info->page_flag); set_pud(pud, pudval); continue; From 745cf6a843896cdac8766c74379300ed73c78830 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2024 00:33:02 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 040/139] netfilter: nf_tables: reject new basechain after table flag update commit 994209ddf4f430946f6247616b2e33d179243769 upstream. When dormant flag is toggled, hooks are disabled in the commit phase by iterating over current chains in table (existing and new). The following configuration allows for an inconsistent state: add table x add chain x y { type filter hook input priority 0; } add table x { flags dormant; } add chain x w { type filter hook input priority 1; } which triggers the following warning when trying to unregister chain w which is already unregistered. [ 127.322252] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1211 at net/netfilter/core.c:50 1 __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [...] [ 127.322519] Call Trace: [ 127.322521] [ 127.322524] ? __warn+0x9f/0x1a0 [ 127.322531] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [ 127.322537] ? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0 [ 127.322545] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 [ 127.322552] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40 [ 127.322556] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 127.322563] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 127.322570] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x6a/0x260 [ 127.322577] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [ 127.322583] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x6a/0x260 [ 127.322590] ? __nf_tables_unregister_hook+0x8a/0xe0 [nf_tables] [ 127.322655] nft_table_disable+0x75/0xf0 [nf_tables] [ 127.322717] nf_tables_commit+0x2571/0x2620 [nf_tables] Fixes: 179d9ba5559a ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix table flag updates") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 2a5d9075a081..a7f84fe96de8 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -2372,6 +2372,9 @@ static int nf_tables_addchain(struct nft_ctx *ctx, u8 family, u8 genmask, struct nft_stats __percpu *stats = NULL; struct nft_chain_hook hook; + if (table->flags & __NFT_TABLE_F_UPDATE) + return -EINVAL; + if (flags & NFT_CHAIN_BINDING) return -EOPNOTSUPP; From 4e8447a9a3d367b5065a0b7abe101da6e0037b6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 18:04:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 041/139] netfilter: nf_tables: flush pending destroy work before exit_net release commit 24cea9677025e0de419989ecb692acd4bb34cac2 upstream. Similar to 2c9f0293280e ("netfilter: nf_tables: flush pending destroy work before netlink notifier") to address a race between exit_net and the destroy workqueue. The trace below shows an element to be released via destroy workqueue while exit_net path (triggered via module removal) has already released the set that is used in such transaction. [ 1360.547789] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.547861] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888140500cc0 by task kworker/4:1/152465 [ 1360.547870] CPU: 4 PID: 152465 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.8.0+ #359 [ 1360.547882] Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work [nf_tables] [ 1360.547984] Call Trace: [ 1360.547991] [ 1360.547998] dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 [ 1360.548014] print_report+0xc4/0x610 [ 1360.548026] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xba/0x160 [ 1360.548040] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548054] ? nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548176] kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 [ 1360.548189] ? nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548312] nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548447] ? __pfx_nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548577] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x18/0x30 [ 1360.548591] process_one_work+0x2f1/0x670 [ 1360.548610] worker_thread+0x4d3/0x760 [ 1360.548627] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548640] kthread+0x16b/0x1b0 [ 1360.548653] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548665] ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 [ 1360.548679] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548690] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 1360.548707] [ 1360.548719] Allocated by task 192061: [ 1360.548726] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 1360.548739] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 1360.548750] __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 [ 1360.548760] __kmalloc_node+0x1f1/0x450 [ 1360.548771] nf_tables_newset+0x10c7/0x1b50 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548883] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xbc4/0xdc0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.548909] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1a8/0x1e0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.548927] netlink_unicast+0x367/0x4f0 [ 1360.548935] netlink_sendmsg+0x34b/0x610 [ 1360.548944] ____sys_sendmsg+0x4d4/0x510 [ 1360.548953] ___sys_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120 [ 1360.548961] __sys_sendmsg+0xbe/0x140 [ 1360.548971] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120 [ 1360.548982] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d [ 1360.548994] Freed by task 192222: [ 1360.548999] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 1360.549009] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 1360.549019] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 1360.549028] poison_slab_object+0x100/0x180 [ 1360.549036] __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x30 [ 1360.549042] kfree+0xb6/0x260 [ 1360.549049] __nft_release_table+0x473/0x6a0 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549131] nf_tables_exit_net+0x170/0x240 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549221] ops_exit_list+0x50/0xa0 [ 1360.549229] free_exit_list+0x101/0x140 [ 1360.549236] unregister_pernet_operations+0x107/0x160 [ 1360.549245] unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30 [ 1360.549254] nf_tables_module_exit+0x43/0x80 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549345] __do_sys_delete_module+0x253/0x370 [ 1360.549352] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120 [ 1360.549360] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d (gdb) list *__nft_release_table+0x473 0x1e033 is in __nft_release_table (net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:11354). 11349 list_for_each_entry_safe(flowtable, nf, &table->flowtables, list) { 11350 list_del(&flowtable->list); 11351 nft_use_dec(&table->use); 11352 nf_tables_flowtable_destroy(flowtable); 11353 } 11354 list_for_each_entry_safe(set, ns, &table->sets, list) { 11355 list_del(&set->list); 11356 nft_use_dec(&table->use); 11357 if (set->flags & (NFT_SET_MAP | NFT_SET_OBJECT)) 11358 nft_map_deactivate(&ctx, set); (gdb) [ 1360.549372] Last potentially related work creation: [ 1360.549376] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 1360.549384] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9b/0xb0 [ 1360.549392] __queue_work+0x3fb/0x780 [ 1360.549399] queue_work_on+0x4f/0x60 [ 1360.549407] nft_rhash_remove+0x33b/0x340 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549516] nf_tables_commit+0x1c6a/0x2620 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549625] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x728/0xdc0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.549647] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1a8/0x1e0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.549671] netlink_unicast+0x367/0x4f0 [ 1360.549680] netlink_sendmsg+0x34b/0x610 [ 1360.549690] ____sys_sendmsg+0x4d4/0x510 [ 1360.549697] ___sys_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120 [ 1360.549706] __sys_sendmsg+0xbe/0x140 [ 1360.549715] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120 [ 1360.549725] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d Fixes: 0935d5588400 ("netfilter: nf_tables: asynchronous release") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index a7f84fe96de8..6483186a48f6 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -10981,6 +10981,7 @@ static void __exit nf_tables_module_exit(void) unregister_netdevice_notifier(&nf_tables_flowtable_notifier); nft_chain_filter_fini(); nft_chain_route_fini(); + nf_tables_trans_destroy_flush_work(); unregister_pernet_subsys(&nf_tables_net_ops); cancel_work_sync(&trans_gc_work); cancel_work_sync(&trans_destroy_work); From 9b5b7708ec2be21dd7ef8ca0e3abe4ae9f3b083b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ziyang Xuan Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 15:22:04 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 042/139] netfilter: nf_tables: Fix potential data-race in __nft_flowtable_type_get() commit 24225011d81b471acc0e1e315b7d9905459a6304 upstream. nft_unregister_flowtable_type() within nf_flow_inet_module_exit() can concurrent with __nft_flowtable_type_get() within nf_tables_newflowtable(). And thhere is not any protection when iterate over nf_tables_flowtables list in __nft_flowtable_type_get(). Therefore, there is pertential data-race of nf_tables_flowtables list entry. Use list_for_each_entry_rcu() to iterate over nf_tables_flowtables list in __nft_flowtable_type_get(), and use rcu_read_lock() in the caller nft_flowtable_type_get() to protect the entire type query process. Fixes: 3b49e2e94e6e ("netfilter: nf_tables: add flow table netlink frontend") Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 6483186a48f6..8d38cd504769 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -7841,11 +7841,12 @@ static int nft_flowtable_parse_hook(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, return err; } +/* call under rcu_read_lock */ static const struct nf_flowtable_type *__nft_flowtable_type_get(u8 family) { const struct nf_flowtable_type *type; - list_for_each_entry(type, &nf_tables_flowtables, list) { + list_for_each_entry_rcu(type, &nf_tables_flowtables, list) { if (family == type->family) return type; } @@ -7857,9 +7858,13 @@ nft_flowtable_type_get(struct net *net, u8 family) { const struct nf_flowtable_type *type; + rcu_read_lock(); type = __nft_flowtable_type_get(family); - if (type != NULL && try_module_get(type->owner)) + if (type != NULL && try_module_get(type->owner)) { + rcu_read_unlock(); return type; + } + rcu_read_unlock(); lockdep_nfnl_nft_mutex_not_held(); #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES From 18aae2cb87e5faa9c5bd865260ceadac60d5a6c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2024 12:20:51 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 043/139] netfilter: validate user input for expected length commit 0c83842df40f86e529db6842231154772c20edcc upstream. I got multiple syzbot reports showing old bugs exposed by BPF after commit 20f2505fb436 ("bpf: Try to avoid kzalloc in cgroup/{s,g}etsockopt") setsockopt() @optlen argument should be taken into account before copying data. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627 Read of size 96 at addr ffff88802cd73da0 by task syz-executor.4/7238 CPU: 1 PID: 7238 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-next-20240403-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189 __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:105 copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline] do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627 nf_setsockopt+0x295/0x2c0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101 do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a RIP: 0033:0x7fd22067dde9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fd21f9ff0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd2207abf80 RCX: 00007fd22067dde9 RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fd2206ca47a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020000880 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fd2207abf80 R15: 00007ffd2d0170d8 Allocated by task 7238: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4069 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x200/0x410 mm/slub.c:4082 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:664 [inline] __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd47/0x1050 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869 do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802cd73da0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of allocated 1-byte region [ffff88802cd73da0, ffff88802cd73da1) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88802cd73020 pfn:0x2cd73 flags: 0xfff80000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0xfff) page_type: 0xffffefff(slab) raw: 00fff80000000000 ffff888015041280 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 raw: ffff88802cd73020 000000008080007f 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x12cc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 5103, tgid 2119833701 (syz-executor.4), ts 5103, free_ts 70804600828 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1490 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1498 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x2e7e/0x2f40 mm/page_alloc.c:3454 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x256/0x6c0 mm/page_alloc.c:4712 __alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:244 [inline] alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:271 [inline] alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x120 mm/slub.c:2249 allocate_slab+0x5a/0x2e0 mm/slub.c:2412 new_slab mm/slub.c:2465 [inline] ___slab_alloc+0xcd1/0x14b0 mm/slub.c:3615 __slab_alloc+0x58/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3705 __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3758 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3936 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline] kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x286/0x450 mm/slub.c:4089 kstrdup+0x3a/0x80 mm/util.c:62 device_rename+0xb5/0x1b0 drivers/base/core.c:4558 dev_change_name+0x275/0x860 net/core/dev.c:1232 do_setlink+0xa4b/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2864 __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3680 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x180b/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3727 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x10d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6594 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 page last free pid 5146 tgid 5146 stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1110 [inline] free_unref_page+0xd3c/0xec0 mm/page_alloc.c:2617 discard_slab mm/slub.c:2511 [inline] __put_partials+0xeb/0x130 mm/slub.c:2980 put_cpu_partial+0x17c/0x250 mm/slub.c:3055 __slab_free+0x2ea/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4254 qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline] qlist_free_all+0x9e/0x140 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x14f/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x23/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:322 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3888 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3948 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline] __kmalloc_node_noprof+0x1d7/0x450 mm/slub.c:4076 kmalloc_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:681 [inline] kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x72/0x190 mm/util.c:634 bucket_table_alloc lib/rhashtable.c:186 [inline] rhashtable_rehash_alloc+0x9e/0x290 lib/rhashtable.c:367 rht_deferred_worker+0x4e1/0x2440 lib/rhashtable.c:427 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3218 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa2c/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3299 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3380 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88802cd73c80: 07 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc ffff88802cd73d00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc >ffff88802cd73d80: fa fc fc fc 01 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc ^ ffff88802cd73e00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc ffff88802cd73e80: 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240404122051.2303764-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 6 ++++++ net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 4 ++++ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 4 ++++ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c index aa23479b20b2..ed62c1026fe9 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c @@ -1111,6 +1111,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) struct ebt_table_info *newinfo; struct ebt_replace tmp; + if (len < sizeof(tmp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) return -EFAULT; @@ -1423,6 +1425,8 @@ static int update_counters(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) { struct ebt_replace hlp; + if (len < sizeof(hlp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&hlp, arg, sizeof(hlp))) return -EFAULT; @@ -2352,6 +2356,8 @@ static int compat_update_counters(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, { struct compat_ebt_replace hlp; + if (len < sizeof(hlp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&hlp, arg, sizeof(hlp))) return -EFAULT; diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index 2407066b0fec..b150c9929b12 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -956,6 +956,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) void *loc_cpu_entry; struct arpt_entry *iter; + if (len < sizeof(tmp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) return -EFAULT; @@ -1254,6 +1256,8 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) void *loc_cpu_entry; struct arpt_entry *iter; + if (len < sizeof(tmp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) return -EFAULT; diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c index da5998011ab9..1f365e28e316 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -1110,6 +1110,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) void *loc_cpu_entry; struct ipt_entry *iter; + if (len < sizeof(tmp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) return -EFAULT; @@ -1494,6 +1496,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) void *loc_cpu_entry; struct ipt_entry *iter; + if (len < sizeof(tmp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) return -EFAULT; diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index 0ce0ed17c758..37a2b3301e42 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -1127,6 +1127,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) void *loc_cpu_entry; struct ip6t_entry *iter; + if (len < sizeof(tmp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) return -EFAULT; @@ -1503,6 +1505,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) void *loc_cpu_entry; struct ip6t_entry *iter; + if (len < sizeof(tmp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) return -EFAULT; From 8a57544e9285a16dce8e58f470a1b30f426812c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe JAILLET Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2023 11:49:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 044/139] vboxsf: Avoid an spurious warning if load_nls_xxx() fails commit de3f64b738af57e2732b91a0774facc675b75b54 upstream. If an load_nls_xxx() function fails a few lines above, the 'sbi->bdi_id' is still 0. So, in the error handling path, we will call ida_simple_remove(..., 0) which is not allocated yet. In order to prevent a spurious "ida_free called for id=0 which is not allocated." message, tweak the error handling path and add a new label. Fixes: 0fd169576648 ("fs: Add VirtualBox guest shared folder (vboxsf) support") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d09eaaa4e2e08206c58a1a27ca9b3e81dc168773.1698835730.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/vboxsf/super.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/vboxsf/super.c b/fs/vboxsf/super.c index d2f6df69f611..74952e58cca0 100644 --- a/fs/vboxsf/super.c +++ b/fs/vboxsf/super.c @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static int vboxsf_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) if (!sbi->nls) { vbg_err("vboxsf: Count not load '%s' nls\n", nls_name); err = -EINVAL; - goto fail_free; + goto fail_destroy_idr; } } @@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ fail_free: ida_simple_remove(&vboxsf_bdi_ida, sbi->bdi_id); if (sbi->nls) unload_nls(sbi->nls); +fail_destroy_idr: idr_destroy(&sbi->ino_idr); kfree(sbi); return err; From a44770fed86515eedb5a7c00b787f847ebb134a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Sitnicki Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 12:46:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 045/139] bpf, sockmap: Prevent lock inversion deadlock in map delete elem commit ff91059932401894e6c86341915615c5eb0eca48 upstream. syzkaller started using corpuses where a BPF tracing program deletes elements from a sockmap/sockhash map. Because BPF tracing programs can be invoked from any interrupt context, locks taken during a map_delete_elem operation must be hardirq-safe. Otherwise a deadlock due to lock inversion is possible, as reported by lockdep: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&htab->buckets[i].lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(&host->lock); lock(&htab->buckets[i].lock); lock(&host->lock); Locks in sockmap are hardirq-unsafe by design. We expects elements to be deleted from sockmap/sockhash only in task (normal) context with interrupts enabled, or in softirq context. Detect when map_delete_elem operation is invoked from a context which is _not_ hardirq-unsafe, that is interrupts are disabled, and bail out with an error. Note that map updates are not affected by this issue. BPF verifier does not allow updating sockmap/sockhash from a BPF tracing program today. Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Reported-by: xingwei lee Reported-by: yue sun Reported-by: syzbot+bc922f476bd65abbd466@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d4066896495db380182e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Tested-by: syzbot+d4066896495db380182e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: John Fastabend Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d4066896495db380182e Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=bc922f476bd65abbd466 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240402104621.1050319-1-jakub@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/core/sock_map.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c index 91140bc0541f..aa7ff6a46429 100644 --- a/net/core/sock_map.c +++ b/net/core/sock_map.c @@ -413,6 +413,9 @@ static int __sock_map_delete(struct bpf_stab *stab, struct sock *sk_test, struct sock *sk; int err = 0; + if (irqs_disabled()) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* locks here are hardirq-unsafe */ + raw_spin_lock_bh(&stab->lock); sk = *psk; if (!sk_test || sk_test == sk) @@ -926,6 +929,9 @@ static int sock_hash_delete_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key) struct bpf_shtab_elem *elem; int ret = -ENOENT; + if (irqs_disabled()) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* locks here are hardirq-unsafe */ + hash = sock_hash_bucket_hash(key, key_size); bucket = sock_hash_select_bucket(htab, hash); From 55d3fe7b2b7bc354e7cbc1f7b8f98a29ccd5a366 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 13:09:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 046/139] net/sched: act_skbmod: prevent kernel-infoleak commit d313eb8b77557a6d5855f42d2234bd592c7b50dd upstream. syzbot found that tcf_skbmod_dump() was copying four bytes from kernel stack to user space [1]. The issue here is that 'struct tc_skbmod' has a four bytes hole. We need to clear the structure before filling fields. [1] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x366/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:185 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline] iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline] iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline] iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline] _copy_to_iter+0x366/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:185 copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:196 [inline] simple_copy_to_iter net/core/datagram.c:532 [inline] __skb_datagram_iter+0x185/0x1000 net/core/datagram.c:420 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5c/0x200 net/core/datagram.c:546 skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:4050 [inline] netlink_recvmsg+0x432/0x1610 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1962 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x340 net/socket.c:1068 __sys_recvfrom+0x35a/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2242 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2260 [inline] __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2256 [inline] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x126/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2256 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Uninit was stored to memory at: pskb_expand_head+0x30f/0x19d0 net/core/skbuff.c:2253 netlink_trim+0x2c2/0x330 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 netlink_unicast+0x9f/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1351 nlmsg_unicast include/net/netlink.h:1144 [inline] nlmsg_notify+0x21d/0x2f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2610 rtnetlink_send+0x73/0x90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:741 rtnetlink_maybe_send include/linux/rtnetlink.h:17 [inline] tcf_add_notify net/sched/act_api.c:2048 [inline] tcf_action_add net/sched/act_api.c:2071 [inline] tc_ctl_action+0x146e/0x19d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2119 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1737/0x1900 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6595 netlink_rcv_skb+0x375/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559 rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6613 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf4c/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x10df/0x11f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x877/0xb60 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Uninit was stored to memory at: __nla_put lib/nlattr.c:1041 [inline] nla_put+0x1c6/0x230 lib/nlattr.c:1099 tcf_skbmod_dump+0x23f/0xc20 net/sched/act_skbmod.c:256 tcf_action_dump_old net/sched/act_api.c:1191 [inline] tcf_action_dump_1+0x85e/0x970 net/sched/act_api.c:1227 tcf_action_dump+0x1fd/0x460 net/sched/act_api.c:1251 tca_get_fill+0x519/0x7a0 net/sched/act_api.c:1628 tcf_add_notify_msg net/sched/act_api.c:2023 [inline] tcf_add_notify net/sched/act_api.c:2042 [inline] tcf_action_add net/sched/act_api.c:2071 [inline] tc_ctl_action+0x1365/0x19d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2119 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1737/0x1900 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6595 netlink_rcv_skb+0x375/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559 rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6613 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf4c/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x10df/0x11f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x877/0xb60 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Local variable opt created at: tcf_skbmod_dump+0x9d/0xc20 net/sched/act_skbmod.c:244 tcf_action_dump_old net/sched/act_api.c:1191 [inline] tcf_action_dump_1+0x85e/0x970 net/sched/act_api.c:1227 Bytes 188-191 of 248 are uninitialized Memory access of size 248 starts at ffff888117697680 Data copied to user address 00007ffe56d855f0 Fixes: 86da71b57383 ("net_sched: Introduce skbmod action") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240403130908.93421-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sched/act_skbmod.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/act_skbmod.c b/net/sched/act_skbmod.c index d98758a63934..744ff9729469 100644 --- a/net/sched/act_skbmod.c +++ b/net/sched/act_skbmod.c @@ -239,13 +239,13 @@ static int tcf_skbmod_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tc_action *a, struct tcf_skbmod *d = to_skbmod(a); unsigned char *b = skb_tail_pointer(skb); struct tcf_skbmod_params *p; - struct tc_skbmod opt = { - .index = d->tcf_index, - .refcnt = refcount_read(&d->tcf_refcnt) - ref, - .bindcnt = atomic_read(&d->tcf_bindcnt) - bind, - }; + struct tc_skbmod opt; struct tcf_t t; + memset(&opt, 0, sizeof(opt)); + opt.index = d->tcf_index; + opt.refcnt = refcount_read(&d->tcf_refcnt) - ref, + opt.bindcnt = atomic_read(&d->tcf_bindcnt) - bind; spin_lock_bh(&d->tcf_lock); opt.action = d->tcf_action; p = rcu_dereference_protected(d->skbmod_p, From b7d1ce2cc7192e8a037faa3f5d3ba72c25976460 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 13:41:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 047/139] net/sched: fix lockdep splat in qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() commit 7eb322360b0266481e560d1807ee79e0cef5742b upstream. qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() is called with the qdisc lock held, not RTNL. We must use qdisc_lookup_rcu() instead of qdisc_lookup() syzbot reported: WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.1.74-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/sched/sch_api.c:305 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 3 locks held by udevd/1142: #0: ffffffff87c729a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:306 [inline] #0: ffffffff87c729a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:747 [inline] #0: ffffffff87c729a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: net_tx_action+0x64a/0x970 net/core/dev.c:5282 #1: ffff888171861108 (&sch->q.lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:350 [inline] #1: ffff888171861108 (&sch->q.lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: net_tx_action+0x754/0x970 net/core/dev.c:5297 #2: ffffffff87c729a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:306 [inline] #2: ffffffff87c729a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:747 [inline] #2: ffffffff87c729a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog+0x84/0x580 net/sched/sch_api.c:792 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 1142 Comm: udevd Not tainted 6.1.74-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024 Call Trace: [] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] [] dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28f lib/dump_stack.c:106 [] dump_stack+0x15/0x1e lib/dump_stack.c:113 [] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x1b9/0x260 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6592 [] qdisc_lookup+0xac/0x6f0 net/sched/sch_api.c:305 [] qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog+0x243/0x580 net/sched/sch_api.c:811 [] pfifo_tail_enqueue+0x32c/0x4b0 net/sched/sch_fifo.c:51 [] qdisc_enqueue include/net/sch_generic.h:833 [inline] [] netem_dequeue+0xeb3/0x15d0 net/sched/sch_netem.c:723 [] dequeue_skb net/sched/sch_generic.c:292 [inline] [] qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:397 [inline] [] __qdisc_run+0x249/0x1e60 net/sched/sch_generic.c:415 [] qdisc_run+0xd6/0x260 include/net/pkt_sched.h:125 [] net_tx_action+0x7c9/0x970 net/core/dev.c:5313 [] __do_softirq+0x2bd/0x9bd kernel/softirq.c:616 [] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:447 [inline] [] __irq_exit_rcu+0xca/0x230 kernel/softirq.c:700 [] irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:712 [] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x42/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1107 [] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:656 Fixes: d636fc5dd692 ("net: sched: add rcu annotations around qdisc->qdisc_sleeping") Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240402134133.2352776-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sched/sch_api.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c index e8f988e1c7e6..334a563e0bc1 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_api.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c @@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ void qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog(struct Qdisc *sch, int n, int len) notify = !sch->q.qlen && !WARN_ON_ONCE(!n && !qdisc_is_offloaded); /* TODO: perform the search on a per txq basis */ - sch = qdisc_lookup(qdisc_dev(sch), TC_H_MAJ(parentid)); + sch = qdisc_lookup_rcu(qdisc_dev(sch), TC_H_MAJ(parentid)); if (sch == NULL) { WARN_ON_ONCE(parentid != TC_H_ROOT); break; From e01835f3a1bd640e0f4b9e3b62fcfa7889c5d85a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Piotr Wejman Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2024 21:22:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 048/139] net: stmmac: fix rx queue priority assignment commit b3da86d432b7cd65b025a11f68613e333d2483db upstream. The driver should ensure that same priority is not mapped to multiple rx queues. From DesignWare Cores Ethernet Quality-of-Service Databook, section 17.1.29 MAC_RxQ_Ctrl2: "[...]The software must ensure that the content of this field is mutually exclusive to the PSRQ fields for other queues, that is, the same priority is not mapped to multiple Rx queues[...]" Previously rx_queue_priority() function was: - clearing all priorities from a queue - adding new priorities to that queue After this patch it will: - first assign new priorities to a queue - then remove those priorities from all other queues - keep other priorities previously assigned to that queue Fixes: a8f5102af2a7 ("net: stmmac: TX and RX queue priority configuration") Fixes: 2142754f8b9c ("net: stmmac: Add MAC related callbacks for XGMAC2") Signed-off-by: Piotr Wejman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240401192239.33942-1-piotrwejman90@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac4_core.c | 40 ++++++++++++++----- .../ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c | 38 ++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac4_core.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac4_core.c index 84276eb681d7..39112d5cb5b8 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac4_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac4_core.c @@ -87,19 +87,41 @@ static void dwmac4_rx_queue_priority(struct mac_device_info *hw, u32 prio, u32 queue) { void __iomem *ioaddr = hw->pcsr; - u32 base_register; - u32 value; + u32 clear_mask = 0; + u32 ctrl2, ctrl3; + int i; - base_register = (queue < 4) ? GMAC_RXQ_CTRL2 : GMAC_RXQ_CTRL3; - if (queue >= 4) + ctrl2 = readl(ioaddr + GMAC_RXQ_CTRL2); + ctrl3 = readl(ioaddr + GMAC_RXQ_CTRL3); + + /* The software must ensure that the same priority + * is not mapped to multiple Rx queues + */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) + clear_mask |= ((prio << GMAC_RXQCTRL_PSRQX_SHIFT(i)) & + GMAC_RXQCTRL_PSRQX_MASK(i)); + + ctrl2 &= ~clear_mask; + ctrl3 &= ~clear_mask; + + /* First assign new priorities to a queue, then + * clear them from others queues + */ + if (queue < 4) { + ctrl2 |= (prio << GMAC_RXQCTRL_PSRQX_SHIFT(queue)) & + GMAC_RXQCTRL_PSRQX_MASK(queue); + + writel(ctrl2, ioaddr + GMAC_RXQ_CTRL2); + writel(ctrl3, ioaddr + GMAC_RXQ_CTRL3); + } else { queue -= 4; - value = readl(ioaddr + base_register); - - value &= ~GMAC_RXQCTRL_PSRQX_MASK(queue); - value |= (prio << GMAC_RXQCTRL_PSRQX_SHIFT(queue)) & + ctrl3 |= (prio << GMAC_RXQCTRL_PSRQX_SHIFT(queue)) & GMAC_RXQCTRL_PSRQX_MASK(queue); - writel(value, ioaddr + base_register); + + writel(ctrl3, ioaddr + GMAC_RXQ_CTRL3); + writel(ctrl2, ioaddr + GMAC_RXQ_CTRL2); + } } static void dwmac4_tx_queue_priority(struct mac_device_info *hw, diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c index ec1616ffbfa7..dd73f38ec08d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c @@ -97,17 +97,41 @@ static void dwxgmac2_rx_queue_prio(struct mac_device_info *hw, u32 prio, u32 queue) { void __iomem *ioaddr = hw->pcsr; - u32 value, reg; + u32 clear_mask = 0; + u32 ctrl2, ctrl3; + int i; - reg = (queue < 4) ? XGMAC_RXQ_CTRL2 : XGMAC_RXQ_CTRL3; - if (queue >= 4) + ctrl2 = readl(ioaddr + XGMAC_RXQ_CTRL2); + ctrl3 = readl(ioaddr + XGMAC_RXQ_CTRL3); + + /* The software must ensure that the same priority + * is not mapped to multiple Rx queues + */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) + clear_mask |= ((prio << XGMAC_PSRQ_SHIFT(i)) & + XGMAC_PSRQ(i)); + + ctrl2 &= ~clear_mask; + ctrl3 &= ~clear_mask; + + /* First assign new priorities to a queue, then + * clear them from others queues + */ + if (queue < 4) { + ctrl2 |= (prio << XGMAC_PSRQ_SHIFT(queue)) & + XGMAC_PSRQ(queue); + + writel(ctrl2, ioaddr + XGMAC_RXQ_CTRL2); + writel(ctrl3, ioaddr + XGMAC_RXQ_CTRL3); + } else { queue -= 4; - value = readl(ioaddr + reg); - value &= ~XGMAC_PSRQ(queue); - value |= (prio << XGMAC_PSRQ_SHIFT(queue)) & XGMAC_PSRQ(queue); + ctrl3 |= (prio << XGMAC_PSRQ_SHIFT(queue)) & + XGMAC_PSRQ(queue); - writel(value, ioaddr + reg); + writel(ctrl3, ioaddr + XGMAC_RXQ_CTRL3); + writel(ctrl2, ioaddr + XGMAC_RXQ_CTRL2); + } } static void dwxgmac2_tx_queue_prio(struct mac_device_info *hw, u32 prio, From 77f5e52d7beedd92ca9264eaa0f2f802dde347a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Horatiu Vultur Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 09:16:34 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 049/139] net: phy: micrel: lan8814: Fix when enabling/disabling 1-step timestamping commit de99e1ea3a35f23ff83a31d6b08f43d27b2c6345 upstream. There are 2 issues with the blamed commit. 1. When the phy is initialized, it would enable the disabled of UDPv4 checksums. The UDPv6 checksum is already enabled by default. So when 1-step is configured then it would clear these flags. 2. After the 1-step is configured, then if 2-step is configured then the 1-step would be still configured because it is not clearing the flag. So the sync frames will still have origin timestamps set. Fix this by reading first the value of the register and then just change bit 12 as this one determines if the timestamp needs to be inserted in the frame, without changing any other bits. Fixes: ece19502834d ("net: phy: micrel: 1588 support for LAN8814 phy") Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur Reviewed-by: Divya Koppera Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240402071634.2483524-1-horatiu.vultur@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/phy/micrel.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/micrel.c b/drivers/net/phy/micrel.c index 9481f172830f..e67bffd6f423 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/micrel.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/micrel.c @@ -2188,6 +2188,7 @@ static int lan8814_hwtstamp(struct mii_timestamper *mii_ts, struct ifreq *ifr) struct hwtstamp_config config; int txcfg = 0, rxcfg = 0; int pkt_ts_enable; + int tx_mod; if (copy_from_user(&config, ifr->ifr_data, sizeof(config))) return -EFAULT; @@ -2237,9 +2238,14 @@ static int lan8814_hwtstamp(struct mii_timestamper *mii_ts, struct ifreq *ifr) lanphy_write_page_reg(ptp_priv->phydev, 5, PTP_RX_TIMESTAMP_EN, pkt_ts_enable); lanphy_write_page_reg(ptp_priv->phydev, 5, PTP_TX_TIMESTAMP_EN, pkt_ts_enable); - if (ptp_priv->hwts_tx_type == HWTSTAMP_TX_ONESTEP_SYNC) + tx_mod = lanphy_read_page_reg(ptp_priv->phydev, 5, PTP_TX_MOD); + if (ptp_priv->hwts_tx_type == HWTSTAMP_TX_ONESTEP_SYNC) { lanphy_write_page_reg(ptp_priv->phydev, 5, PTP_TX_MOD, - PTP_TX_MOD_TX_PTP_SYNC_TS_INSERT_); + tx_mod | PTP_TX_MOD_TX_PTP_SYNC_TS_INSERT_); + } else if (ptp_priv->hwts_tx_type == HWTSTAMP_TX_ON) { + lanphy_write_page_reg(ptp_priv->phydev, 5, PTP_TX_MOD, + tx_mod & ~PTP_TX_MOD_TX_PTP_SYNC_TS_INSERT_); + } if (config.rx_filter != HWTSTAMP_FILTER_NONE) lan8814_config_ts_intr(ptp_priv->phydev, true); From 10608161696c2768f53426642f78a42bcaaa53e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aleksandr Mishin Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2024 09:16:31 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 050/139] net: phy: micrel: Fix potential null pointer dereference commit 96c155943a703f0655c0c4cab540f67055960e91 upstream. In lan8814_get_sig_rx() and lan8814_get_sig_tx() ptp_parse_header() may return NULL as ptp_header due to abnormal packet type or corrupted packet. Fix this bug by adding ptp_header check. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: ece19502834d ("net: phy: micrel: 1588 support for LAN8814 phy") Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Mishin Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240329061631.33199-1-amishin@t-argos.ru Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/phy/micrel.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/micrel.c b/drivers/net/phy/micrel.c index e67bffd6f423..2cbb1d1830bb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/micrel.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/micrel.c @@ -2303,7 +2303,7 @@ static void lan8814_txtstamp(struct mii_timestamper *mii_ts, } } -static void lan8814_get_sig_rx(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 *sig) +static bool lan8814_get_sig_rx(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 *sig) { struct ptp_header *ptp_header; u32 type; @@ -2313,7 +2313,11 @@ static void lan8814_get_sig_rx(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 *sig) ptp_header = ptp_parse_header(skb, type); skb_pull_inline(skb, ETH_HLEN); + if (!ptp_header) + return false; + *sig = (__force u16)(ntohs(ptp_header->sequence_id)); + return true; } static bool lan8814_match_rx_ts(struct kszphy_ptp_priv *ptp_priv, @@ -2325,7 +2329,8 @@ static bool lan8814_match_rx_ts(struct kszphy_ptp_priv *ptp_priv, bool ret = false; u16 skb_sig; - lan8814_get_sig_rx(skb, &skb_sig); + if (!lan8814_get_sig_rx(skb, &skb_sig)) + return ret; /* Iterate over all RX timestamps and match it with the received skbs */ spin_lock_irqsave(&ptp_priv->rx_ts_lock, flags); @@ -2605,7 +2610,7 @@ static int lan8814_ptpci_adjfine(struct ptp_clock_info *ptpci, long scaled_ppm) return 0; } -static void lan8814_get_sig_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 *sig) +static bool lan8814_get_sig_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 *sig) { struct ptp_header *ptp_header; u32 type; @@ -2613,7 +2618,11 @@ static void lan8814_get_sig_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 *sig) type = ptp_classify_raw(skb); ptp_header = ptp_parse_header(skb, type); + if (!ptp_header) + return false; + *sig = (__force u16)(ntohs(ptp_header->sequence_id)); + return true; } static void lan8814_dequeue_tx_skb(struct kszphy_ptp_priv *ptp_priv) @@ -2631,7 +2640,8 @@ static void lan8814_dequeue_tx_skb(struct kszphy_ptp_priv *ptp_priv) spin_lock_irqsave(&ptp_priv->tx_queue.lock, flags); skb_queue_walk_safe(&ptp_priv->tx_queue, skb, skb_tmp) { - lan8814_get_sig_tx(skb, &skb_sig); + if (!lan8814_get_sig_tx(skb, &skb_sig)) + continue; if (memcmp(&skb_sig, &seq_id, sizeof(seq_id))) continue; @@ -2675,7 +2685,8 @@ static bool lan8814_match_skb(struct kszphy_ptp_priv *ptp_priv, spin_lock_irqsave(&ptp_priv->rx_queue.lock, flags); skb_queue_walk_safe(&ptp_priv->rx_queue, skb, skb_tmp) { - lan8814_get_sig_rx(skb, &skb_sig); + if (!lan8814_get_sig_rx(skb, &skb_sig)) + continue; if (memcmp(&skb_sig, &rx_ts->seq_id, sizeof(rx_ts->seq_id))) continue; From 66cb6659008b7b723ee558ff6df9e5459360b28d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antoine Tenart Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 12:34:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 051/139] selftests: net: gro fwd: update vxlan GRO test expectations commit 0fb101be97ca27850c5ecdbd1269423ce4d1f607 upstream. UDP tunnel packets can't be GRO in-between their endpoints as this causes different issues. The UDP GRO fwd vxlan tests were relying on this and their expectations have to be fixed. We keep both vxlan tests and expected no GRO from happening. The vxlan UDP GRO bench test was removed as it's not providing any valuable information now. Fixes: a062260a9d5f ("selftests: net: add UDP GRO forwarding self-tests") Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgro_fwd.sh | 10 ++-------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgro_fwd.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgro_fwd.sh index 9690a5d7ffd7..9e9b4644e0ea 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgro_fwd.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgro_fwd.sh @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ for family in 4 6; do create_vxlan_pair ip netns exec $NS_DST ethtool -K veth$DST rx-gro-list on - run_test "GRO frag list over UDP tunnel" $OL_NET$DST 1 1 + run_test "GRO frag list over UDP tunnel" $OL_NET$DST 10 10 cleanup # use NAT to circumvent GRO FWD check @@ -252,13 +252,7 @@ for family in 4 6; do # load arp cache before running the test to reduce the amount of # stray traffic on top of the UDP tunnel ip netns exec $NS_SRC $PING -q -c 1 $OL_NET$DST_NAT >/dev/null - run_test "GRO fwd over UDP tunnel" $OL_NET$DST_NAT 1 1 $OL_NET$DST - cleanup - - create_vxlan_pair - run_bench "UDP tunnel fwd perf" $OL_NET$DST - ip netns exec $NS_DST ethtool -K veth$DST rx-udp-gro-forwarding on - run_bench "UDP tunnel GRO fwd perf" $OL_NET$DST + run_test "GRO fwd over UDP tunnel" $OL_NET$DST_NAT 10 10 $OL_NET$DST cleanup done From 2eeab8c47c3c0276e0746bc382f405c9a236a5ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antoine Tenart Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 12:33:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 052/139] gro: fix ownership transfer commit ed4cccef64c1d0d5b91e69f7a8a6697c3a865486 upstream. If packets are GROed with fraglist they might be segmented later on and continue their journey in the stack. In skb_segment_list those skbs can be reused as-is. This is an issue as their destructor was removed in skb_gro_receive_list but not the reference to their socket, and then they can't be orphaned. Fix this by also removing the reference to the socket. For example this could be observed, kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:3131! (skb_orphan) RIP: 0010:ip6_rcv_core+0x11bc/0x19a0 Call Trace: ipv6_list_rcv+0x250/0x3f0 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x49d/0x8f0 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x634/0xd40 napi_complete_done+0x1d2/0x7d0 gro_cell_poll+0x118/0x1f0 A similar construction is found in skb_gro_receive, apply the same change there. Fixes: 5e10da5385d2 ("skbuff: allow 'slow_gro' for skb carring sock reference") Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/core/gro.c | 3 ++- net/ipv4/udp_offload.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/gro.c b/net/core/gro.c index 352f966cb1da..47118e97ecfd 100644 --- a/net/core/gro.c +++ b/net/core/gro.c @@ -252,8 +252,9 @@ int skb_gro_receive(struct sk_buff *p, struct sk_buff *skb) } merge: - /* sk owenrship - if any - completely transferred to the aggregated packet */ + /* sk ownership - if any - completely transferred to the aggregated packet */ skb->destructor = NULL; + skb->sk = NULL; delta_truesize = skb->truesize; if (offset > headlen) { unsigned int eat = offset - headlen; diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c index 8096576fd9bd..b9e638f76753 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c @@ -441,8 +441,9 @@ static int skb_gro_receive_list(struct sk_buff *p, struct sk_buff *skb) NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->count++; p->data_len += skb->len; - /* sk owenrship - if any - completely transferred to the aggregated packet */ + /* sk ownership - if any - completely transferred to the aggregated packet */ skb->destructor = NULL; + skb->sk = NULL; p->truesize += skb->truesize; p->len += skb->len; From 23178ec5abbdecfdd67eca17f3494f7c6ca0d925 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 13:59:05 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 053/139] x86/bugs: Fix the SRSO mitigation on Zen3/4 commit 4535e1a4174c4111d92c5a9a21e542d232e0fcaa upstream. The original version of the mitigation would patch in the calls to the untraining routines directly. That is, the alternative() in UNTRAIN_RET will patch in the CALL to srso_alias_untrain_ret() directly. However, even if commit e7c25c441e9e ("x86/cpu: Cleanup the untrain mess") meant well in trying to clean up the situation, due to micro- architectural reasons, the untraining routine srso_alias_untrain_ret() must be the target of a CALL instruction and not of a JMP instruction as it is done now. Reshuffle the alternative macros to accomplish that. Fixes: e7c25c441e9e ("x86/cpu: Cleanup the untrain mess") Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 20 ++++++++++++++------ arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 4 +--- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h index 8f80de627c60..5cdccea45554 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #ifndef CONFIG_X86_CMPXCHG64 extern void cmpxchg8b_emu(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 8f6f17a8617b..47e4e06a47d7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -167,11 +167,20 @@ .Lskip_rsb_\@: .endm +/* + * The CALL to srso_alias_untrain_ret() must be patched in directly at + * the spot where untraining must be done, ie., srso_alias_untrain_ret() + * must be the target of a CALL instruction instead of indirectly + * jumping to a wrapper which then calls it. Therefore, this macro is + * called outside of __UNTRAIN_RET below, for the time being, before the + * kernel can support nested alternatives with arbitrary nesting. + */ +.macro CALL_UNTRAIN_RET #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY -#define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET "call entry_untrain_ret" -#else -#define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET "" + ALTERNATIVE_2 "", "call entry_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ + "call srso_alias_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS #endif +.endm /* * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the @@ -188,9 +197,8 @@ #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \ defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO) ANNOTATE_UNRET_END - ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \ - CALL_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ - "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB + CALL_UNTRAIN_RET + ALTERNATIVE "", "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB #endif .endm diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index 65c5c44f006b..24c850e1e239 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -252,9 +252,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(srso_return_thunk) SYM_CODE_END(srso_return_thunk) SYM_FUNC_START(entry_untrain_ret) - ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp retbleed_untrain_ret", \ - "jmp srso_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \ - "jmp srso_alias_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS + ALTERNATIVE "jmp retbleed_untrain_ret", "jmp srso_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO SYM_FUNC_END(entry_untrain_ret) __EXPORT_THUNK(entry_untrain_ret) From ed37bdaee64b51faaee55d2dfce5b702ace7bab0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 16:05:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 054/139] x86/retpoline: Do the necessary fixup to the Zen3/4 srso return thunk for !SRSO commit 0e110732473e14d6520e49d75d2c88ef7d46fe67 upstream. The srso_alias_untrain_ret() dummy thunk in the !CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO case is there only for the altenative in CALL_UNTRAIN_RET to have a symbol to resolve. However, testing with kernels which don't have CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO enabled, leads to the warning in patch_return() to fire: missing return thunk: srso_alias_untrain_ret+0x0/0x10-0x0: eb 0e 66 66 2e WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:826 apply_returns (arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:826 Put in a plain "ret" there so that gcc doesn't put a return thunk in in its place which special and gets checked. In addition: ERROR: modpost: "srso_alias_untrain_ret" [arch/x86/kvm/kvm-amd.ko] undefined! make[2]: *** [scripts/Makefile.modpost:145: Module.symvers] Chyba 1 make[1]: *** [/usr/src/linux-6.8.3/Makefile:1873: modpost] Chyba 2 make: *** [Makefile:240: __sub-make] Chyba 2 since !SRSO builds would use the dummy return thunk as reported by petr.pisar@atlas.cz, https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218679. Reported-by: kernel test robot Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202404020901.da75a60f-oliver.sang@intel.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/202404020901.da75a60f-oliver.sang@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index 24c850e1e239..a96e816e5ccd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ SYM_START(srso_alias_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE) ret int3 SYM_FUNC_END(srso_alias_untrain_ret) +__EXPORT_THUNK(srso_alias_untrain_ret) #endif SYM_START(srso_alias_safe_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE) From 1829b618ccc42c6740f0b91e9251d7dddc2b4108 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ivan Vecera Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2024 11:06:37 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 055/139] i40e: Fix VF MAC filter removal commit ea2a1cfc3b2019bdea6324acd3c03606b60d71ad upstream. Commit 73d9629e1c8c ("i40e: Do not allow untrusted VF to remove administratively set MAC") fixed an issue where untrusted VF was allowed to remove its own MAC address although this was assigned administratively from PF. Unfortunately the introduced check is wrong because it causes that MAC filters for other MAC addresses including multi-cast ones are not removed. if (ether_addr_equal(addr, vf->default_lan_addr.addr) && i40e_can_vf_change_mac(vf)) was_unimac_deleted = true; else continue; if (i40e_del_mac_filter(vsi, al->list[i].addr)) { ... The else path with `continue` effectively skips any MAC filter removal except one for primary MAC addr when VF is allowed to do so. Fix the check condition so the `continue` is only done for primary MAC address. Fixes: 73d9629e1c8c ("i40e: Do not allow untrusted VF to remove administratively set MAC") Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt Reviewed-by: Brett Creeley Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240329180638.211412-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c index ed4be80fec2a..99cab36fb107 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c @@ -3078,11 +3078,12 @@ static int i40e_vc_del_mac_addr_msg(struct i40e_vf *vf, u8 *msg) /* Allow to delete VF primary MAC only if it was not set * administratively by PF or if VF is trusted. */ - if (ether_addr_equal(addr, vf->default_lan_addr.addr) && - i40e_can_vf_change_mac(vf)) - was_unimac_deleted = true; - else - continue; + if (ether_addr_equal(addr, vf->default_lan_addr.addr)) { + if (i40e_can_vf_change_mac(vf)) + was_unimac_deleted = true; + else + continue; + } if (i40e_del_mac_filter(vsi, al->list[i].addr)) { ret = I40E_ERR_INVALID_MAC_ADDR; From 1db7fcb2b290c47c202b79528824f119fa28937d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 11:22:48 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 056/139] erspan: make sure erspan_base_hdr is present in skb->head commit 17af420545a750f763025149fa7b833a4fc8b8f0 upstream. syzbot reported a problem in ip6erspan_rcv() [1] Issue is that ip6erspan_rcv() (and erspan_rcv()) no longer make sure erspan_base_hdr is present in skb linear part (skb->head) before getting @ver field from it. Add the missing pskb_may_pull() calls. v2: Reload iph pointer in erspan_rcv() after pskb_may_pull() because skb->head might have changed. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in pskb_may_pull_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:2742 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in pskb_may_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2756 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip6erspan_rcv net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:541 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in gre_rcv+0x11f8/0x1930 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:610 pskb_may_pull_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:2742 [inline] pskb_may_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2756 [inline] ip6erspan_rcv net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:541 [inline] gre_rcv+0x11f8/0x1930 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:610 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1d4c/0x2ca0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438 ip6_input_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:483 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] ip6_input+0x15d/0x430 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:492 ip6_mc_input+0xa7e/0xc80 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:586 dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish+0x955/0x970 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0xde/0x390 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:310 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5538 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x1da/0xa00 net/core/dev.c:5652 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5738 [inline] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5798 tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1549 tun_get_user+0x5566/0x69e0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2108 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline] vfs_write+0xb63/0x1520 fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:643 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x93/0xe0 fs/read_write.c:652 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3804 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3845 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x613/0xc50 mm/slub.c:3888 kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:577 __alloc_skb+0x35b/0x7a0 net/core/skbuff.c:668 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1318 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbf0 net/core/skbuff.c:6504 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa81/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2795 tun_alloc_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1525 [inline] tun_get_user+0x209a/0x69e0 drivers/net/tun.c:1846 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2108 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline] vfs_write+0xb63/0x1520 fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:643 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x93/0xe0 fs/read_write.c:652 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 CPU: 1 PID: 5045 Comm: syz-executor114 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1-syzkaller-00021-g962490525cff #0 Fixes: cb73ee40b1b3 ("net: ip_gre: use erspan key field for tunnel lookup") Reported-by: syzbot+1c1cf138518bf0c53d68@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/000000000000772f2c0614b66ef7@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Lorenzo Bianconi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328112248.1101491-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/ip_gre.c | 5 +++++ net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c index d67d026d7f97..0267fa05374a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c @@ -280,8 +280,13 @@ static int erspan_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tnl_ptk_info *tpi, tpi->flags | TUNNEL_NO_KEY, iph->saddr, iph->daddr, 0); } else { + if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, + gre_hdr_len + sizeof(*ershdr)))) + return PACKET_REJECT; + ershdr = (struct erspan_base_hdr *)(skb->data + gre_hdr_len); ver = ershdr->ver; + iph = ip_hdr(skb); tunnel = ip_tunnel_lookup(itn, skb->dev->ifindex, tpi->flags | TUNNEL_KEY, iph->saddr, iph->daddr, tpi->key); diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c index d3fba7d8dec4..b3e2d658af80 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c @@ -528,6 +528,9 @@ static int ip6erspan_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip6_tnl *tunnel; u8 ver; + if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*ershdr)))) + return PACKET_REJECT; + ipv6h = ipv6_hdr(skb); ershdr = (struct erspan_base_hdr *)skb->data; ver = ershdr->ver; From 2febb7eeb493dd31ee05dfd307a4f0e61ac183ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Kicinski Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2024 09:05:59 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 057/139] selftests: reuseaddr_conflict: add missing new line at the end of the output commit 31974122cfdeaf56abc18d8ab740d580d9833e90 upstream. The netdev CI runs in a VM and captures serial, so stdout and stderr get combined. Because there's a missing new line in stderr the test ends up corrupting KTAP: # Successok 1 selftests: net: reuseaddr_conflict which should have been: # Success ok 1 selftests: net: reuseaddr_conflict Fixes: 422d8dc6fd3a ("selftest: add a reuseaddr test") Reviewed-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240329160559.249476-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/net/reuseaddr_conflict.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/reuseaddr_conflict.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/reuseaddr_conflict.c index 7c5b12664b03..bfb07dc49518 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/reuseaddr_conflict.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/reuseaddr_conflict.c @@ -109,6 +109,6 @@ int main(void) fd1 = open_port(0, 1); if (fd1 >= 0) error(1, 0, "Was allowed to create an ipv4 reuseport on an already bound non-reuseport socket with no ipv6"); - fprintf(stderr, "Success"); + fprintf(stderr, "Success\n"); return 0; } From 167d4b47a9bdcb01541dfa29e9f3cbb8edd3dfd2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2024 14:10:04 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 058/139] ipv6: Fix infinite recursion in fib6_dump_done(). commit d21d40605bca7bd5fc23ef03d4c1ca1f48bc2cae upstream. syzkaller reported infinite recursive calls of fib6_dump_done() during netlink socket destruction. [1] From the log, syzkaller sent an AF_UNSPEC RTM_GETROUTE message, and then the response was generated. The following recvmmsg() resumed the dump for IPv6, but the first call of inet6_dump_fib() failed at kzalloc() due to the fault injection. [0] 12:01:34 executing program 3: r0 = socket$nl_route(0x10, 0x3, 0x0) sendmsg$nl_route(r0, ... snip ...) recvmmsg(r0, ... snip ...) (fail_nth: 8) Here, fib6_dump_done() was set to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done, and the next call of inet6_dump_fib() set it to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3]. syzkaller stopped receiving the response halfway through, and finally netlink_sock_destruct() called nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done(). fib6_dump_done() calls fib6_dump_end() and nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() if it is still not NULL. fib6_dump_end() rewrites nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() by nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3], but it has the same function, not NULL, calling itself recursively and hitting the stack guard page. To avoid the issue, let's set the destructor after kzalloc(). [0]: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 CPU: 1 PID: 432110 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117) should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153) should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3733) kmalloc_trace (mm/slub.c:3748 mm/slub.c:3827 mm/slub.c:3992) inet6_dump_fib (./include/linux/slab.h:628 ./include/linux/slab.h:749 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:662) rtnl_dump_all (net/core/rtnetlink.c:4029) netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2269) netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988) ____sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1046 net/socket.c:2801) ___sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:2846) do_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:2943) __x64_sys_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:3041 net/socket.c:3034 net/socket.c:3034) [1]: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at 00000000f2fa9af1 (stack is 00000000b7912430..000000009a436beb) stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 223719 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events netlink_sock_destruct_work RIP: 0010:fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:570) Code: 3c 24 e8 f3 e9 51 fd e9 28 fd ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd <53> 48 8d 5d 60 e8 b6 4d 07 fd 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d980000 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff84405990 RCX: ffffffff844059d3 RDX: ffff8881028e0000 RSI: ffffffff84405ac2 RDI: ffff88810c02f358 RBP: ffff88810c02f358 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000224 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff888007c82c78 R14: ffff888007c82c68 R15: ffff888007c82c68 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffc9000d97fff8 CR3: 0000000102309002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <#DF> fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) ... fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) netlink_sock_destruct (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:401) __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2177 (discriminator 2)) sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2224) __sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2235) sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2246) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3259) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3329 kernel/workqueue.c:3416) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:388) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:256) Modules linked in: Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzkaller Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: David Ahern Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240401211003.25274-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c index 1840735e9cb0..e606374854ce 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c @@ -646,19 +646,19 @@ static int inet6_dump_fib(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) if (!w) { /* New dump: * - * 1. hook callback destructor. - */ - cb->args[3] = (long)cb->done; - cb->done = fib6_dump_done; - - /* - * 2. allocate and initialize walker. + * 1. allocate and initialize walker. */ w = kzalloc(sizeof(*w), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!w) return -ENOMEM; w->func = fib6_dump_node; cb->args[2] = (long)w; + + /* 2. hook callback destructor. + */ + cb->args[3] = (long)cb->done; + cb->done = fib6_dump_done; + } arg.skb = skb; From 80247e0eca14ff177d565f58ecd3010f6b7910a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Thompson Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 17:09:29 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 059/139] mlxbf_gige: stop interface during shutdown commit 09ba28e1cd3cf715daab1fca6e1623e22fd754a6 upstream. The mlxbf_gige driver intermittantly encounters a NULL pointer exception while the system is shutting down via "reboot" command. The mlxbf_driver will experience an exception right after executing its shutdown() method. One example of this exception is: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000070 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000011d373000 [0000000000000070] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 13 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G S OE 5.15.0-bf.6.gef6992a #1 Hardware name: https://www.mellanox.com BlueField SoC/BlueField SoC, BIOS 4.0.2.12669 Apr 21 2023 pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : mlxbf_gige_handle_tx_complete+0xc8/0x170 [mlxbf_gige] lr : mlxbf_gige_poll+0x54/0x160 [mlxbf_gige] sp : ffff8000080d3c10 x29: ffff8000080d3c10 x28: ffffcce72cbb7000 x27: ffff8000080d3d58 x26: ffff0000814e7340 x25: ffff331cd1a05000 x24: ffffcce72c4ea008 x23: ffff0000814e4b40 x22: ffff0000814e4d10 x21: ffff0000814e4128 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff0000814e4a80 x18: ffffffffffffffff x17: 000000000000001c x16: ffffcce72b4553f4 x15: ffff80008805b8a7 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000030 x12: 0101010101010101 x11: 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x10: c2ac898b17576267 x9 : ffffcce720fa5404 x8 : ffff000080812138 x7 : 0000000000002e9a x6 : 0000000000000080 x5 : ffff00008de3b000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: mlxbf_gige_handle_tx_complete+0xc8/0x170 [mlxbf_gige] mlxbf_gige_poll+0x54/0x160 [mlxbf_gige] __napi_poll+0x40/0x1c8 net_rx_action+0x314/0x3a0 __do_softirq+0x128/0x334 run_ksoftirqd+0x54/0x6c smpboot_thread_fn+0x14c/0x190 kthread+0x10c/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Code: 8b070000 f9000ea0 f95056c0 f86178a1 (b9407002) ---[ end trace 7cc3941aa0d8e6a4 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt Kernel Offset: 0x4ce722520000 from 0xffff800008000000 PHYS_OFFSET: 0x80000000 CPU features: 0x000005c1,a3330e5a Memory Limit: none ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- During system shutdown, the mlxbf_gige driver's shutdown() is always executed. However, the driver's stop() method will only execute if networking interface configuration logic within the Linux distribution has been setup to do so. If shutdown() executes but stop() does not execute, NAPI remains enabled and this can lead to an exception if NAPI is scheduled while the hardware interface has only been partially deinitialized. The networking interface managed by the mlxbf_gige driver must be properly stopped during system shutdown so that IFF_UP is cleared, the hardware interface is put into a clean state, and NAPI is fully deinitialized. Fixes: f92e1869d74e ("Add Mellanox BlueField Gigabit Ethernet driver") Signed-off-by: David Thompson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325210929.25362-1-davthompson@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxbf_gige/mlxbf_gige_main.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxbf_gige/mlxbf_gige_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxbf_gige/mlxbf_gige_main.c index 65e92541db6e..d6b4d163bbbf 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxbf_gige/mlxbf_gige_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxbf_gige/mlxbf_gige_main.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "mlxbf_gige.h" @@ -417,8 +418,13 @@ static void mlxbf_gige_shutdown(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct mlxbf_gige *priv = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); - writeq(0, priv->base + MLXBF_GIGE_INT_EN); - mlxbf_gige_clean_port(priv); + rtnl_lock(); + netif_device_detach(priv->netdev); + + if (netif_running(priv->netdev)) + dev_close(priv->netdev); + + rtnl_unlock(); } static const struct acpi_device_id __maybe_unused mlxbf_gige_acpi_match[] = { From fd6692e9b5edc46a0751e5c9218f1ee7898718c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Atlas Yu Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 13:51:52 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 060/139] r8169: skip DASH fw status checks when DASH is disabled commit 5e864d90b20803edf6bd44a99fb9afa7171785f2 upstream. On devices that support DASH, the current code in the "rtl_loop_wait" function raises false alarms when DASH is disabled. This occurs because the function attempts to wait for the DASH firmware to be ready, even though it's not relevant in this case. r8169 0000:0c:00.0 eth0: RTL8168ep/8111ep, 38:7c:76:49:08:d9, XID 502, IRQ 86 r8169 0000:0c:00.0 eth0: jumbo features [frames: 9194 bytes, tx checksumming: ko] r8169 0000:0c:00.0 eth0: DASH disabled ... r8169 0000:0c:00.0 eth0: rtl_ep_ocp_read_cond == 0 (loop: 30, delay: 10000). This patch modifies the driver start/stop functions to skip checking the DASH firmware status when DASH is explicitly disabled. This prevents unnecessary delays and false alarms. The patch has been tested on several ThinkStation P8/PX workstations. Fixes: 0ab0c45d8aae ("r8169: add handling DASH when DASH is disabled") Signed-off-by: Atlas Yu Reviewed-by: Heiner Kallweit Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328055152.18443-1-atlas.yu@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c index 85ed9879af6c..3dbcb311dcbf 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c @@ -1135,17 +1135,40 @@ static void rtl8168ep_stop_cmac(struct rtl8169_private *tp) RTL_W8(tp, IBCR0, RTL_R8(tp, IBCR0) & ~0x01); } +static void rtl_dash_loop_wait(struct rtl8169_private *tp, + const struct rtl_cond *c, + unsigned long usecs, int n, bool high) +{ + if (!tp->dash_enabled) + return; + rtl_loop_wait(tp, c, usecs, n, high); +} + +static void rtl_dash_loop_wait_high(struct rtl8169_private *tp, + const struct rtl_cond *c, + unsigned long d, int n) +{ + rtl_dash_loop_wait(tp, c, d, n, true); +} + +static void rtl_dash_loop_wait_low(struct rtl8169_private *tp, + const struct rtl_cond *c, + unsigned long d, int n) +{ + rtl_dash_loop_wait(tp, c, d, n, false); +} + static void rtl8168dp_driver_start(struct rtl8169_private *tp) { r8168dp_oob_notify(tp, OOB_CMD_DRIVER_START); - rtl_loop_wait_high(tp, &rtl_dp_ocp_read_cond, 10000, 10); + rtl_dash_loop_wait_high(tp, &rtl_dp_ocp_read_cond, 10000, 10); } static void rtl8168ep_driver_start(struct rtl8169_private *tp) { r8168ep_ocp_write(tp, 0x01, 0x180, OOB_CMD_DRIVER_START); r8168ep_ocp_write(tp, 0x01, 0x30, r8168ep_ocp_read(tp, 0x30) | 0x01); - rtl_loop_wait_high(tp, &rtl_ep_ocp_read_cond, 10000, 30); + rtl_dash_loop_wait_high(tp, &rtl_ep_ocp_read_cond, 10000, 30); } static void rtl8168_driver_start(struct rtl8169_private *tp) @@ -1159,7 +1182,7 @@ static void rtl8168_driver_start(struct rtl8169_private *tp) static void rtl8168dp_driver_stop(struct rtl8169_private *tp) { r8168dp_oob_notify(tp, OOB_CMD_DRIVER_STOP); - rtl_loop_wait_low(tp, &rtl_dp_ocp_read_cond, 10000, 10); + rtl_dash_loop_wait_low(tp, &rtl_dp_ocp_read_cond, 10000, 10); } static void rtl8168ep_driver_stop(struct rtl8169_private *tp) @@ -1167,7 +1190,7 @@ static void rtl8168ep_driver_stop(struct rtl8169_private *tp) rtl8168ep_stop_cmac(tp); r8168ep_ocp_write(tp, 0x01, 0x180, OOB_CMD_DRIVER_STOP); r8168ep_ocp_write(tp, 0x01, 0x30, r8168ep_ocp_read(tp, 0x30) | 0x01); - rtl_loop_wait_low(tp, &rtl_ep_ocp_read_cond, 10000, 10); + rtl_dash_loop_wait_low(tp, &rtl_ep_ocp_read_cond, 10000, 10); } static void rtl8168_driver_stop(struct rtl8169_private *tp) From d12245080cb259d82b34699f6cd4ec11bdb688bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antoine Tenart Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 12:33:58 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 061/139] udp: do not accept non-tunnel GSO skbs landing in a tunnel commit 3d010c8031e39f5fa1e8b13ada77e0321091011f upstream. When rx-udp-gro-forwarding is enabled UDP packets might be GROed when being forwarded. If such packets might land in a tunnel this can cause various issues and udp_gro_receive makes sure this isn't the case by looking for a matching socket. This is performed in udp4/6_gro_lookup_skb but only in the current netns. This is an issue with tunneled packets when the endpoint is in another netns. In such cases the packets will be GROed at the UDP level, which leads to various issues later on. The same thing can happen with rx-gro-list. We saw this with geneve packets being GROed at the UDP level. In such case gso_size is set; later the packet goes through the geneve rx path, the geneve header is pulled, the offset are adjusted and frag_list skbs are not adjusted with regard to geneve. When those skbs hit skb_fragment, it will misbehave. Different outcomes are possible depending on what the GROed skbs look like; from corrupted packets to kernel crashes. One example is a BUG_ON[1] triggered in skb_segment while processing the frag_list. Because gso_size is wrong (geneve header was pulled) skb_segment thinks there is "geneve header size" of data in frag_list, although it's in fact the next packet. The BUG_ON itself has nothing to do with the issue. This is only one of the potential issues. Looking up for a matching socket in udp_gro_receive is fragile: the lookup could be extended to all netns (not speaking about performances) but nothing prevents those packets from being modified in between and we could still not find a matching socket. It's OK to keep the current logic there as it should cover most cases but we also need to make sure we handle tunnel packets being GROed too early. This is done by extending the checks in udp_unexpected_gso: GSO packets lacking the SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL/_CSUM bits and landing in a tunnel must be segmented. [1] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4408! RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0xd2a/0xf70 __udp_gso_segment+0xaa/0x560 Fixes: 9fd1ff5d2ac7 ("udp: Support UDP fraglist GRO/GSO.") Fixes: 36707061d6ba ("udp: allow forwarding of plain (non-fraglisted) UDP GRO packets") Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/udp.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/udp.c | 7 +++++++ net/ipv4/udp_offload.c | 6 ++++-- net/ipv6/udp.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/udp.h b/include/linux/udp.h index efd9ab6df379..79a4eae6f1f8 100644 --- a/include/linux/udp.h +++ b/include/linux/udp.h @@ -140,6 +140,24 @@ static inline void udp_cmsg_recv(struct msghdr *msg, struct sock *sk, } } +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(udp_encap_needed_key); +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(udpv6_encap_needed_key); +#endif + +static inline bool udp_encap_needed(void) +{ + if (static_branch_unlikely(&udp_encap_needed_key)) + return true; + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + if (static_branch_unlikely(&udpv6_encap_needed_key)) + return true; +#endif + + return false; +} + static inline bool udp_unexpected_gso(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { if (!skb_is_gso(skb)) @@ -153,6 +171,16 @@ static inline bool udp_unexpected_gso(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) !udp_test_bit(ACCEPT_FRAGLIST, sk)) return true; + /* GSO packets lacking the SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL/_CSUM bits might still + * land in a tunnel as the socket check in udp_gro_receive cannot be + * foolproof. + */ + if (udp_encap_needed() && + READ_ONCE(udp_sk(sk)->encap_rcv) && + !(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & + (SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL | SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL_CSUM))) + return true; + return false; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c index 7856b7a3e0ee..2a78c78186c3 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c @@ -603,6 +603,13 @@ static inline bool __udp_is_mcast_sock(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, } DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(udp_encap_needed_key); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_encap_needed_key); + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(udpv6_encap_needed_key); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(udpv6_encap_needed_key); +#endif + void udp_encap_enable(void) { static_branch_inc(&udp_encap_needed_key); diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c index b9e638f76753..be3ee7cfa955 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c @@ -544,8 +544,10 @@ struct sk_buff *udp_gro_receive(struct list_head *head, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int off = skb_gro_offset(skb); int flush = 1; - /* we can do L4 aggregation only if the packet can't land in a tunnel - * otherwise we could corrupt the inner stream + /* We can do L4 aggregation only if the packet can't land in a tunnel + * otherwise we could corrupt the inner stream. Detecting such packets + * cannot be foolproof and the aggregation might still happen in some + * cases. Such packets should be caught in udp_unexpected_gso later. */ NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->is_flist = 0; if (!sk || !udp_sk(sk)->gro_receive) { diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c index c2c02dea6c38..1775e9b9b85a 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c @@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ csum_copy_err: goto try_again; } -DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(udpv6_encap_needed_key); +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(udpv6_encap_needed_key); void udpv6_encap_enable(void) { static_branch_inc(&udpv6_encap_needed_key); From 8c58d384050b99d0aac8dd4c5a0d1c09f0f33152 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antoine Tenart Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 12:34:00 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 062/139] udp: do not transition UDP GRO fraglist partial checksums to unnecessary commit f0b8c30345565344df2e33a8417a27503589247d upstream. UDP GRO validates checksums and in udp4/6_gro_complete fraglist packets are converted to CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY to avoid later checks. However this is an issue for CHECKSUM_PARTIAL packets as they can be looped in an egress path and then their partial checksums are not fixed. Different issues can be observed, from invalid checksum on packets to traces like: gen01: hw csum failure skb len=3008 headroom=160 headlen=1376 tailroom=0 mac=(106,14) net=(120,40) trans=160 shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=0 gso(size=0 type=0 segs=0)) csum(0xffff232e ip_summed=2 complete_sw=0 valid=0 level=0) hash(0x77e3d716 sw=1 l4=1) proto=0x86dd pkttype=0 iif=12 ... Fix this by only converting CHECKSUM_NONE packets to CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY by reusing __skb_incr_checksum_unnecessary. All other checksum types are kept as-is, including CHECKSUM_COMPLETE as fraglist packets being segmented back would have their skb->csum valid. Fixes: 9fd1ff5d2ac7 ("udp: Support UDP fraglist GRO/GSO.") Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/udp_offload.c | 8 +------- net/ipv6/udp_offload.c | 8 +------- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c index be3ee7cfa955..de58415c1f97 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c @@ -710,13 +710,7 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int udp4_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff) skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= (SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST|SKB_GSO_UDP_L4); skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->count; - if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY) { - if (skb->csum_level < SKB_MAX_CSUM_LEVEL) - skb->csum_level++; - } else { - skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY; - skb->csum_level = 0; - } + __skb_incr_checksum_unnecessary(skb); return 0; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c index 7720d04ed396..b98c4c8d8e27 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c @@ -169,13 +169,7 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int udp6_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff) skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= (SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST|SKB_GSO_UDP_L4); skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->count; - if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY) { - if (skb->csum_level < SKB_MAX_CSUM_LEVEL) - skb->csum_level++; - } else { - skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY; - skb->csum_level = 0; - } + __skb_incr_checksum_unnecessary(skb); return 0; } From 940ff35ae8d19dc820c3127d39ed391f8fe70b9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antoine Tenart Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 12:34:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 063/139] udp: prevent local UDP tunnel packets from being GROed commit 64235eabc4b5b18c507c08a1f16cdac6c5661220 upstream. GRO has a fundamental issue with UDP tunnel packets as it can't detect those in a foolproof way and GRO could happen before they reach the tunnel endpoint. Previous commits have fixed issues when UDP tunnel packets come from a remote host, but if those packets are issued locally they could run into checksum issues. If the inner packet has a partial checksum the information will be lost in the GRO logic, either in udp4/6_gro_complete or in udp_gro_complete_segment and packets will have an invalid checksum when leaving the host. Prevent local UDP tunnel packets from ever being GROed at the outer UDP level. Due to skb->encapsulation being wrongly used in some drivers this is actually only preventing UDP tunnel packets with a partial checksum to be GROed (see iptunnel_handle_offloads) but those were also the packets triggering issues so in practice this should be sufficient. Fixes: 9fd1ff5d2ac7 ("udp: Support UDP fraglist GRO/GSO.") Fixes: 36707061d6ba ("udp: allow forwarding of plain (non-fraglisted) UDP GRO packets") Suggested-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/udp_offload.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c index de58415c1f97..84b7d6089f76 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c @@ -551,6 +551,12 @@ struct sk_buff *udp_gro_receive(struct list_head *head, struct sk_buff *skb, */ NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->is_flist = 0; if (!sk || !udp_sk(sk)->gro_receive) { + /* If the packet was locally encapsulated in a UDP tunnel that + * wasn't detected above, do not GRO. + */ + if (skb->encapsulation) + goto out; + if (skb->dev->features & NETIF_F_GRO_FRAGLIST) NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->is_flist = sk ? !udp_test_bit(GRO_ENABLED, sk) : 1; From 39efe5b6f6114247ea72fa8c1ed2faaead784cfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hariprasad Kelam Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 17:51:49 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 064/139] octeontx2-af: Fix issue with loading coalesced KPU profiles commit 0ba80d96585662299d4ea4624043759ce9015421 upstream. The current implementation for loading coalesced KPU profiles has a limitation. The "offset" field, which is used to locate profiles within the profile is restricted to a u16. This restricts the number of profiles that can be loaded. This patch addresses this limitation by increasing the size of the "offset" field. Fixes: 11c730bfbf5b ("octeontx2-af: support for coalescing KPU profiles") Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Kelam Reviewed-by: Kalesh AP Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_npc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_npc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_npc.c index 55639c133dd0..91a4ea529d07 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_npc.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_npc.c @@ -1669,7 +1669,7 @@ static int npc_fwdb_detect_load_prfl_img(struct rvu *rvu, uint64_t prfl_sz, struct npc_coalesced_kpu_prfl *img_data = NULL; int i = 0, rc = -EINVAL; void __iomem *kpu_prfl_addr; - u16 offset; + u32 offset; img_data = (struct npc_coalesced_kpu_prfl __force *)rvu->kpu_prfl_addr; if (le64_to_cpu(img_data->signature) == KPU_SIGN && From e7e7030f0ae29cdc70ed845144f1cabd509e29d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Su Hui Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 10:06:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 065/139] octeontx2-pf: check negative error code in otx2_open() commit e709acbd84fb6ef32736331b0147f027a3ef4c20 upstream. otx2_rxtx_enable() return negative error code such as -EIO, check -EIO rather than EIO to fix this problem. Fixes: c926252205c4 ("octeontx2-pf: Disable packet I/O for graceful exit") Signed-off-by: Su Hui Reviewed-by: Subbaraya Sundeep Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Reviewed-by: Kalesh AP Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328020620.4054692-1-suhui@nfschina.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/otx2_pf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/otx2_pf.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/otx2_pf.c index 7e2c30927c31..6b7fb324e756 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/otx2_pf.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/otx2_pf.c @@ -1914,7 +1914,7 @@ int otx2_open(struct net_device *netdev) * mcam entries are enabled to receive the packets. Hence disable the * packet I/O. */ - if (err == EIO) + if (err == -EIO) goto err_disable_rxtx; else if (err) goto err_tx_stop_queues; From d417e3c16dc55b40ecd9371c00d3215ca3191552 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aleksandr Mishin Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 19:55:05 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 066/139] octeontx2-af: Add array index check commit ef15ddeeb6bee87c044bf7754fac524545bf71e8 upstream. In rvu_map_cgx_lmac_pf() the 'iter', which is used as an array index, can reach value (up to 14) that exceed the size (MAX_LMAC_COUNT = 8) of the array. Fix this bug by adding 'iter' value check. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: 91c6945ea1f9 ("octeontx2-af: cn10k: Add RPM MAC support") Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Mishin Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_cgx.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_cgx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_cgx.c index d1e6b12ecfa7..cc6d6c94f400 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_cgx.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_cgx.c @@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ static int rvu_map_cgx_lmac_pf(struct rvu *rvu) continue; lmac_bmap = cgx_get_lmac_bmap(rvu_cgx_pdata(cgx, rvu)); for_each_set_bit(iter, &lmac_bmap, rvu->hw->lmac_per_cgx) { + if (iter >= MAX_LMAC_COUNT) + continue; lmac = cgx_get_lmacid(rvu_cgx_pdata(cgx, rvu), iter); rvu->pf2cgxlmac_map[pf] = cgxlmac_id_to_bmap(cgx, lmac); From fe74ea5b8b78d96b9ba313f070b18833a4e32b32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aleksandr Loktionov Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2024 10:44:00 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 067/139] i40e: fix i40e_count_filters() to count only active/new filters commit eb58c598ce45b7e787568fe27016260417c3d807 upstream. The bug usually affects untrusted VFs, because they are limited to 18 MACs, it affects them badly, not letting to create MAC all filters. Not stable to reproduce, it happens when VF user creates MAC filters when other MACVLAN operations are happened in parallel. But consequence is that VF can't receive desired traffic. Fix counter to be bumped only for new or active filters. Fixes: 621650cabee5 ("i40e: Refactoring VF MAC filters counting to make more reliable") Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov Reviewed-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c index d8a7fb21b7b7..5be56db1dafd 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c @@ -1249,8 +1249,11 @@ int i40e_count_filters(struct i40e_vsi *vsi) int bkt; int cnt = 0; - hash_for_each_safe(vsi->mac_filter_hash, bkt, h, f, hlist) - ++cnt; + hash_for_each_safe(vsi->mac_filter_hash, bkt, h, f, hlist) { + if (f->state == I40E_FILTER_NEW || + f->state == I40E_FILTER_ACTIVE) + ++cnt; + } return cnt; } From 3e89846283f3cf7c7a8e28b342576fd7c561d2ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aleksandr Loktionov Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2024 10:56:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 068/139] i40e: fix vf may be used uninitialized in this function warning commit f37c4eac99c258111d414d31b740437e1925b8e8 upstream. To fix the regression introduced by commit 52424f974bc5, which causes servers hang in very hard to reproduce conditions with resets races. Using two sources for the information is the root cause. In this function before the fix bumping v didn't mean bumping vf pointer. But the code used this variables interchangeably, so stale vf could point to different/not intended vf. Remove redundant "v" variable and iterate via single VF pointer across whole function instead to guarantee VF pointer validity. Fixes: 52424f974bc5 ("i40e: Fix VF hang when reset is triggered on another VF") Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov Reviewed-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c | 34 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c index 99cab36fb107..a5f0c95cba8b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c @@ -1626,8 +1626,8 @@ bool i40e_reset_all_vfs(struct i40e_pf *pf, bool flr) { struct i40e_hw *hw = &pf->hw; struct i40e_vf *vf; - int i, v; u32 reg; + int i; /* If we don't have any VFs, then there is nothing to reset */ if (!pf->num_alloc_vfs) @@ -1638,11 +1638,10 @@ bool i40e_reset_all_vfs(struct i40e_pf *pf, bool flr) return false; /* Begin reset on all VFs at once */ - for (v = 0; v < pf->num_alloc_vfs; v++) { - vf = &pf->vf[v]; + for (vf = &pf->vf[0]; vf < &pf->vf[pf->num_alloc_vfs]; ++vf) { /* If VF is being reset no need to trigger reset again */ if (!test_bit(I40E_VF_STATE_RESETTING, &vf->vf_states)) - i40e_trigger_vf_reset(&pf->vf[v], flr); + i40e_trigger_vf_reset(vf, flr); } /* HW requires some time to make sure it can flush the FIFO for a VF @@ -1651,14 +1650,13 @@ bool i40e_reset_all_vfs(struct i40e_pf *pf, bool flr) * the VFs using a simple iterator that increments once that VF has * finished resetting. */ - for (i = 0, v = 0; i < 10 && v < pf->num_alloc_vfs; i++) { + for (i = 0, vf = &pf->vf[0]; i < 10 && vf < &pf->vf[pf->num_alloc_vfs]; ++i) { usleep_range(10000, 20000); /* Check each VF in sequence, beginning with the VF to fail * the previous check. */ - while (v < pf->num_alloc_vfs) { - vf = &pf->vf[v]; + while (vf < &pf->vf[pf->num_alloc_vfs]) { if (!test_bit(I40E_VF_STATE_RESETTING, &vf->vf_states)) { reg = rd32(hw, I40E_VPGEN_VFRSTAT(vf->vf_id)); if (!(reg & I40E_VPGEN_VFRSTAT_VFRD_MASK)) @@ -1668,7 +1666,7 @@ bool i40e_reset_all_vfs(struct i40e_pf *pf, bool flr) /* If the current VF has finished resetting, move on * to the next VF in sequence. */ - v++; + ++vf; } } @@ -1678,39 +1676,39 @@ bool i40e_reset_all_vfs(struct i40e_pf *pf, bool flr) /* Display a warning if at least one VF didn't manage to reset in * time, but continue on with the operation. */ - if (v < pf->num_alloc_vfs) + if (vf < &pf->vf[pf->num_alloc_vfs]) dev_err(&pf->pdev->dev, "VF reset check timeout on VF %d\n", - pf->vf[v].vf_id); + vf->vf_id); usleep_range(10000, 20000); /* Begin disabling all the rings associated with VFs, but do not wait * between each VF. */ - for (v = 0; v < pf->num_alloc_vfs; v++) { + for (vf = &pf->vf[0]; vf < &pf->vf[pf->num_alloc_vfs]; ++vf) { /* On initial reset, we don't have any queues to disable */ - if (pf->vf[v].lan_vsi_idx == 0) + if (vf->lan_vsi_idx == 0) continue; /* If VF is reset in another thread just continue */ if (test_bit(I40E_VF_STATE_RESETTING, &vf->vf_states)) continue; - i40e_vsi_stop_rings_no_wait(pf->vsi[pf->vf[v].lan_vsi_idx]); + i40e_vsi_stop_rings_no_wait(pf->vsi[vf->lan_vsi_idx]); } /* Now that we've notified HW to disable all of the VF rings, wait * until they finish. */ - for (v = 0; v < pf->num_alloc_vfs; v++) { + for (vf = &pf->vf[0]; vf < &pf->vf[pf->num_alloc_vfs]; ++vf) { /* On initial reset, we don't have any queues to disable */ - if (pf->vf[v].lan_vsi_idx == 0) + if (vf->lan_vsi_idx == 0) continue; /* If VF is reset in another thread just continue */ if (test_bit(I40E_VF_STATE_RESETTING, &vf->vf_states)) continue; - i40e_vsi_wait_queues_disabled(pf->vsi[pf->vf[v].lan_vsi_idx]); + i40e_vsi_wait_queues_disabled(pf->vsi[vf->lan_vsi_idx]); } /* Hw may need up to 50ms to finish disabling the RX queues. We @@ -1719,12 +1717,12 @@ bool i40e_reset_all_vfs(struct i40e_pf *pf, bool flr) mdelay(50); /* Finish the reset on each VF */ - for (v = 0; v < pf->num_alloc_vfs; v++) { + for (vf = &pf->vf[0]; vf < &pf->vf[pf->num_alloc_vfs]; ++vf) { /* If VF is reset in another thread just continue */ if (test_bit(I40E_VF_STATE_RESETTING, &vf->vf_states)) continue; - i40e_cleanup_reset_vf(&pf->vf[v]); + i40e_cleanup_reset_vf(vf); } i40e_flush(hw); From 2990d8eacd2ccd545feec181b49867fa0e68591d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mario Limonciello Date: Fri, 6 Oct 2023 13:50:20 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 069/139] drm/amd: Evict resources during PM ops prepare() callback MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 5095d5418193eb2748c7d8553c7150b8f1c44696 ] Linux PM core has a prepare() callback run before suspend. If the system is under high memory pressure, the resources may need to be evicted into swap instead. If the storage backing for swap is offlined during the suspend() step then such a call may fail. So move this step into prepare() to move evict majority of resources and update all non-pmops callers to call the same callback. Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/2362 Reviewed-by: Christian König Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Stable-dep-of: ca299b4512d4 ("drm/amd: Flush GFXOFF requests in prepare stage") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu.h | 1 + drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c | 10 ++++++--- 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu.h index e636c7850f77..dd22d2559720 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu.h @@ -1342,6 +1342,7 @@ void amdgpu_driver_postclose_kms(struct drm_device *dev, void amdgpu_driver_release_kms(struct drm_device *dev); int amdgpu_device_ip_suspend(struct amdgpu_device *adev); +int amdgpu_device_prepare(struct drm_device *dev); int amdgpu_device_suspend(struct drm_device *dev, bool fbcon); int amdgpu_device_resume(struct drm_device *dev, bool fbcon); u32 amdgpu_get_vblank_counter_kms(struct drm_crtc *crtc); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c index 6a4749c0c5a5..902a446cc4d3 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c @@ -1639,6 +1639,7 @@ static void amdgpu_switcheroo_set_state(struct pci_dev *pdev, } else { pr_info("switched off\n"); dev->switch_power_state = DRM_SWITCH_POWER_CHANGING; + amdgpu_device_prepare(dev); amdgpu_device_suspend(dev, true); amdgpu_device_cache_pci_state(pdev); /* Shut down the device */ @@ -4167,6 +4168,31 @@ static int amdgpu_device_evict_resources(struct amdgpu_device *adev) /* * Suspend & resume. */ +/** + * amdgpu_device_prepare - prepare for device suspend + * + * @dev: drm dev pointer + * + * Prepare to put the hw in the suspend state (all asics). + * Returns 0 for success or an error on failure. + * Called at driver suspend. + */ +int amdgpu_device_prepare(struct drm_device *dev) +{ + struct amdgpu_device *adev = drm_to_adev(dev); + int r; + + if (dev->switch_power_state == DRM_SWITCH_POWER_OFF) + return 0; + + /* Evict the majority of BOs before starting suspend sequence */ + r = amdgpu_device_evict_resources(adev); + if (r) + return r; + + return 0; +} + /** * amdgpu_device_suspend - initiate device suspend * diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c index f24c3a20e901..9a5416331f02 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c @@ -2391,8 +2391,9 @@ static int amdgpu_pmops_prepare(struct device *dev) /* Return a positive number here so * DPM_FLAG_SMART_SUSPEND works properly */ - if (amdgpu_device_supports_boco(drm_dev)) - return pm_runtime_suspended(dev); + if (amdgpu_device_supports_boco(drm_dev) && + pm_runtime_suspended(dev)) + return 1; /* if we will not support s3 or s2i for the device * then skip suspend @@ -2401,7 +2402,7 @@ static int amdgpu_pmops_prepare(struct device *dev) !amdgpu_acpi_is_s3_active(adev)) return 1; - return 0; + return amdgpu_device_prepare(drm_dev); } static void amdgpu_pmops_complete(struct device *dev) @@ -2600,6 +2601,9 @@ static int amdgpu_pmops_runtime_suspend(struct device *dev) if (amdgpu_device_supports_boco(drm_dev)) adev->mp1_state = PP_MP1_STATE_UNLOAD; + ret = amdgpu_device_prepare(drm_dev); + if (ret) + return ret; ret = amdgpu_device_suspend(drm_dev, false); if (ret) { adev->in_runpm = false; From 43df8e64dfb86940623bb23b2e20eb09b1791eaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mario Limonciello Date: Fri, 6 Oct 2023 13:50:21 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 070/139] drm/amd: Add concept of running prepare_suspend() sequence for IP blocks MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit cb11ca3233aa3303dc11dca25977d2e7f24be00f ] If any IP blocks allocate memory during their hw_fini() sequence this can cause the suspend to fail under memory pressure. Introduce a new phase that IP blocks can use to allocate memory before suspend starts so that it can potentially be evicted into swap instead. Reviewed-by: Christian König Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Stable-dep-of: ca299b4512d4 ("drm/amd: Flush GFXOFF requests in prepare stage") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c | 12 +++++++++++- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/include/amd_shared.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c index 902a446cc4d3..77e35b919b06 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c @@ -4180,7 +4180,7 @@ static int amdgpu_device_evict_resources(struct amdgpu_device *adev) int amdgpu_device_prepare(struct drm_device *dev) { struct amdgpu_device *adev = drm_to_adev(dev); - int r; + int i, r; if (dev->switch_power_state == DRM_SWITCH_POWER_OFF) return 0; @@ -4190,6 +4190,16 @@ int amdgpu_device_prepare(struct drm_device *dev) if (r) return r; + for (i = 0; i < adev->num_ip_blocks; i++) { + if (!adev->ip_blocks[i].status.valid) + continue; + if (!adev->ip_blocks[i].version->funcs->prepare_suspend) + continue; + r = adev->ip_blocks[i].version->funcs->prepare_suspend((void *)adev); + if (r) + return r; + } + return 0; } diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/include/amd_shared.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/include/amd_shared.h index f175e65b853a..34467427c9f9 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/include/amd_shared.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/include/amd_shared.h @@ -294,6 +294,7 @@ struct amd_ip_funcs { int (*hw_init)(void *handle); int (*hw_fini)(void *handle); void (*late_fini)(void *handle); + int (*prepare_suspend)(void *handle); int (*suspend)(void *handle); int (*resume)(void *handle); bool (*is_idle)(void *handle); From 810dd068ae3b3973b769bd52866ca3b9286b5254 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mario Limonciello Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2024 13:32:21 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 071/139] drm/amd: Flush GFXOFF requests in prepare stage [ Upstream commit ca299b4512d4b4f516732a48ce9aa19d91f4473e ] If the system hasn't entered GFXOFF when suspend starts it can cause hangs accessing GC and RLC during the suspend stage. Cc: # 6.1.y: 5095d5418193 ("drm/amd: Evict resources during PM ops prepare() callback") Cc: # 6.1.y: cb11ca3233aa ("drm/amd: Add concept of running prepare_suspend() sequence for IP blocks") Cc: # 6.1.y: 2ceec37b0e3d ("drm/amd: Add missing kernel doc for prepare_suspend()") Cc: # 6.1.y: 3a9626c816db ("drm/amd: Stop evicting resources on APUs in suspend") Cc: # 6.6.y: 5095d5418193 ("drm/amd: Evict resources during PM ops prepare() callback") Cc: # 6.6.y: cb11ca3233aa ("drm/amd: Add concept of running prepare_suspend() sequence for IP blocks") Cc: # 6.6.y: 2ceec37b0e3d ("drm/amd: Add missing kernel doc for prepare_suspend()") Cc: # 6.6.y: 3a9626c816db ("drm/amd: Stop evicting resources on APUs in suspend") Cc: # 6.1+ Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/3132 Fixes: ab4750332dbe ("drm/amdgpu/sdma5.2: add begin/end_use ring callbacks") Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c index 77e35b919b06..b11690a816e7 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c @@ -4190,6 +4190,8 @@ int amdgpu_device_prepare(struct drm_device *dev) if (r) return r; + flush_delayed_work(&adev->gfx.gfx_off_delay_work); + for (i = 0; i < adev->num_ip_blocks; i++) { if (!adev->ip_blocks[i].status.valid) continue; From f3c2ceb847595d6c9f2b8bb9c786ba8027dbf1f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Damato Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2022 14:38:40 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 072/139] i40e: Store the irq number in i40e_q_vector [ Upstream commit 6b85a4f39ff7177b2428d4deab1151a31754e391 ] Make it easy to figure out the IRQ number for a particular i40e_q_vector by storing the assigned IRQ in the structure itself. Signed-off-by: Joe Damato Acked-by: Jesse Brandeburg Acked-by: Sridhar Samudrala Tested-by: Gurucharan (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Stable-dep-of: ea558de7238b ("i40e: Enforce software interrupt during busy-poll exit") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e.h | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e.h index 7d4cc4eafd59..59c4e9d64298 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e.h @@ -992,6 +992,7 @@ struct i40e_q_vector { struct rcu_head rcu; /* to avoid race with update stats on free */ char name[I40E_INT_NAME_STR_LEN]; bool arm_wb_state; + int irq_num; /* IRQ assigned to this q_vector */ } ____cacheline_internodealigned_in_smp; /* lan device */ diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c index 5be56db1dafd..ee0d7c29e8f1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c @@ -4145,6 +4145,7 @@ static int i40e_vsi_request_irq_msix(struct i40e_vsi *vsi, char *basename) } /* register for affinity change notifications */ + q_vector->irq_num = irq_num; q_vector->affinity_notify.notify = i40e_irq_affinity_notify; q_vector->affinity_notify.release = i40e_irq_affinity_release; irq_set_affinity_notifier(irq_num, &q_vector->affinity_notify); From 2f6953617d1c887524fbd66398b1d0a5efb1c289 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ivan Vecera Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2023 15:10:24 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 073/139] i40e: Remove _t suffix from enum type names [ Upstream commit addca9175e5f74cf29e8ad918c38c09b8663b5b8 ] Enum type names should not be suffixed by '_t'. Either to use 'typedef enum name name_t' to so plain 'name_t var' instead of 'enum name_t var'. Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231113231047.548659-6-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Stable-dep-of: ea558de7238b ("i40e: Enforce software interrupt during busy-poll exit") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e.h | 4 ++-- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ptp.c | 6 +++--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.h | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e.h index 59c4e9d64298..35862dedd59b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e.h @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ #define I40E_MAX_BW_INACTIVE_ACCUM 4 /* accumulate 4 credits max */ /* driver state flags */ -enum i40e_state_t { +enum i40e_state { __I40E_TESTING, __I40E_CONFIG_BUSY, __I40E_CONFIG_DONE, @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ enum i40e_state_t { BIT_ULL(__I40E_PF_RESET_AND_REBUILD_REQUESTED) /* VSI state flags */ -enum i40e_vsi_state_t { +enum i40e_vsi_state { __I40E_VSI_DOWN, __I40E_VSI_NEEDS_RESTART, __I40E_VSI_SYNCING_FILTERS, diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ptp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ptp.c index 97a9efe7b713..5f2555848a69 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ptp.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ptp.c @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ enum i40e_ptp_pin { GPIO_4 }; -enum i40e_can_set_pins_t { +enum i40e_can_set_pins { CANT_DO_PINS = -1, CAN_SET_PINS, CAN_DO_PINS @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static bool i40e_is_ptp_pin_dev(struct i40e_hw *hw) * return CAN_DO_PINS if pins can be manipulated within a NIC or * return CANT_DO_PINS otherwise. **/ -static enum i40e_can_set_pins_t i40e_can_set_pins(struct i40e_pf *pf) +static enum i40e_can_set_pins i40e_can_set_pins(struct i40e_pf *pf) { if (!i40e_is_ptp_pin_dev(&pf->hw)) { dev_warn(&pf->pdev->dev, @@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ static void i40e_ptp_set_pins_hw(struct i40e_pf *pf) static int i40e_ptp_set_pins(struct i40e_pf *pf, struct i40e_ptp_pins_settings *pins) { - enum i40e_can_set_pins_t pin_caps = i40e_can_set_pins(pf); + enum i40e_can_set_pins pin_caps = i40e_can_set_pins(pf); int i = 0; if (pin_caps == CANT_DO_PINS) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.h index 768290dc6f48..602ddd956245 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.h @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static inline u16 i40e_intrl_usec_to_reg(int intrl) * mentioning ITR_INDX, ITR_NONE cannot be used as an index 'n' into any * register but instead is a special value meaning "don't update" ITR0/1/2. */ -enum i40e_dyn_idx_t { +enum i40e_dyn_idx { I40E_IDX_ITR0 = 0, I40E_IDX_ITR1 = 1, I40E_IDX_ITR2 = 2, @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ struct i40e_rx_queue_stats { u64 page_busy_count; }; -enum i40e_ring_state_t { +enum i40e_ring_state { __I40E_TX_FDIR_INIT_DONE, __I40E_TX_XPS_INIT_DONE, __I40E_RING_STATE_NBITS /* must be last */ From 095cfa2d9bde4ddf444fdf208ac3ace598a439de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ivan Vecera Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2024 12:38:29 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 074/139] i40e: Enforce software interrupt during busy-poll exit [ Upstream commit ea558de7238bb12c3435c47f0631e9d17bf4a09f ] As for ice bug fixed by commit b7306b42beaf ("ice: manage interrupts during poll exit") followed by commit 23be7075b318 ("ice: fix software generating extra interrupts") I'm seeing the similar issue also with i40e driver. In certain situation when busy-loop is enabled together with adaptive coalescing, the driver occasionally misses that there are outstanding descriptors to clean when exiting busy poll. Try to catch the remaining work by triggering a software interrupt when exiting busy poll. No extra interrupts will be generated when busy polling is not used. The issue was found when running sockperf ping-pong tcp test with adaptive coalescing and busy poll enabled (50 as value busy_pool and busy_read sysctl knobs) and results in huge latency spikes with more than 100000us. The fix is inspired from the ice driver and do the following: 1) During napi poll exit in case of busy-poll (napo_complete_done() returns false) this is recorded to q_vector that we were in busy loop. 2) Extends i40e_buildreg_itr() to be able to add an enforced software interrupt into built value 2) In i40e_update_enable_itr() enforces a software interrupt trigger if we are exiting busy poll to catch any pending clean-ups 3) Reuses unused 3rd ITR (interrupt throttle) index and set it to 20K interrupts per second to limit the number of these sw interrupts. Test results ============ Prior: [root@dell-per640-07 net]# sockperf ping-pong -i 10.9.9.1 --tcp -m 1000 --mps=max -t 120 sockperf: == version #3.10-no.git == sockperf[CLIENT] send on:sockperf: using recvfrom() to block on socket(s) [ 0] IP = 10.9.9.1 PORT = 11111 # TCP sockperf: Warmup stage (sending a few dummy messages)... sockperf: Starting test... sockperf: Test end (interrupted by timer) sockperf: Test ended sockperf: [Total Run] RunTime=119.999 sec; Warm up time=400 msec; SentMessages=2438563; ReceivedMessages=2438562 sockperf: ========= Printing statistics for Server No: 0 sockperf: [Valid Duration] RunTime=119.549 sec; SentMessages=2429473; ReceivedMessages=2429473 sockperf: ====> avg-latency=24.571 (std-dev=93.297, mean-ad=4.904, median-ad=1.510, siqr=1.063, cv=3.797, std-error=0.060, 99.0% ci=[24.417, 24.725]) sockperf: # dropped messages = 0; # duplicated messages = 0; # out-of-order messages = 0 sockperf: Summary: Latency is 24.571 usec sockperf: Total 2429473 observations; each percentile contains 24294.73 observations sockperf: ---> observation = 103294.331 sockperf: ---> percentile 99.999 = 45.633 sockperf: ---> percentile 99.990 = 37.013 sockperf: ---> percentile 99.900 = 35.910 sockperf: ---> percentile 99.000 = 33.390 sockperf: ---> percentile 90.000 = 28.626 sockperf: ---> percentile 75.000 = 27.741 sockperf: ---> percentile 50.000 = 26.743 sockperf: ---> percentile 25.000 = 25.614 sockperf: ---> observation = 12.220 After: [root@dell-per640-07 net]# sockperf ping-pong -i 10.9.9.1 --tcp -m 1000 --mps=max -t 120 sockperf: == version #3.10-no.git == sockperf[CLIENT] send on:sockperf: using recvfrom() to block on socket(s) [ 0] IP = 10.9.9.1 PORT = 11111 # TCP sockperf: Warmup stage (sending a few dummy messages)... sockperf: Starting test... sockperf: Test end (interrupted by timer) sockperf: Test ended sockperf: [Total Run] RunTime=119.999 sec; Warm up time=400 msec; SentMessages=2400055; ReceivedMessages=2400054 sockperf: ========= Printing statistics for Server No: 0 sockperf: [Valid Duration] RunTime=119.549 sec; SentMessages=2391186; ReceivedMessages=2391186 sockperf: ====> avg-latency=24.965 (std-dev=5.934, mean-ad=4.642, median-ad=1.485, siqr=1.067, cv=0.238, std-error=0.004, 99.0% ci=[24.955, 24.975]) sockperf: # dropped messages = 0; # duplicated messages = 0; # out-of-order messages = 0 sockperf: Summary: Latency is 24.965 usec sockperf: Total 2391186 observations; each percentile contains 23911.86 observations sockperf: ---> observation = 195.841 sockperf: ---> percentile 99.999 = 45.026 sockperf: ---> percentile 99.990 = 39.009 sockperf: ---> percentile 99.900 = 35.922 sockperf: ---> percentile 99.000 = 33.482 sockperf: ---> percentile 90.000 = 28.902 sockperf: ---> percentile 75.000 = 27.821 sockperf: ---> percentile 50.000 = 26.860 sockperf: ---> percentile 25.000 = 25.685 sockperf: ---> observation = 12.277 Fixes: 0bcd952feec7 ("ethernet/intel: consolidate NAPI and NAPI exit") Reported-by: Hugo Ferreira Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera Reviewed-by: Jesse Brandeburg Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e.h | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 6 ++ .../net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_register.h | 3 + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.c | 82 ++++++++++++++----- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e.h index 35862dedd59b..5293fc00938c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e.h @@ -992,6 +992,7 @@ struct i40e_q_vector { struct rcu_head rcu; /* to avoid race with update stats on free */ char name[I40E_INT_NAME_STR_LEN]; bool arm_wb_state; + bool in_busy_poll; int irq_num; /* IRQ assigned to this q_vector */ } ____cacheline_internodealigned_in_smp; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c index ee0d7c29e8f1..a9db1ed74d3f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c @@ -3891,6 +3891,12 @@ static void i40e_vsi_configure_msix(struct i40e_vsi *vsi) q_vector->tx.target_itr >> 1); q_vector->tx.current_itr = q_vector->tx.target_itr; + /* Set ITR for software interrupts triggered after exiting + * busy-loop polling. + */ + wr32(hw, I40E_PFINT_ITRN(I40E_SW_ITR, vector - 1), + I40E_ITR_20K); + wr32(hw, I40E_PFINT_RATEN(vector - 1), i40e_intrl_usec_to_reg(vsi->int_rate_limit)); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_register.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_register.h index 7339003aa17c..694cb3e45c1e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_register.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_register.h @@ -328,8 +328,11 @@ #define I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_ITR_INDX_SHIFT 3 #define I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_ITR_INDX_MASK I40E_MASK(0x3, I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_ITR_INDX_SHIFT) #define I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_INTERVAL_SHIFT 5 +#define I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_INTERVAL_MASK I40E_MASK(0xFFF, I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_INTERVAL_SHIFT) #define I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_SW_ITR_INDX_ENA_SHIFT 24 #define I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_SW_ITR_INDX_ENA_MASK I40E_MASK(0x1, I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_SW_ITR_INDX_ENA_SHIFT) +#define I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_SW_ITR_INDX_SHIFT 25 +#define I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_SW_ITR_INDX_MASK I40E_MASK(0x3, I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_SW_ITR_INDX_SHIFT) #define I40E_PFINT_ICR0 0x00038780 /* Reset: CORER */ #define I40E_PFINT_ICR0_INTEVENT_SHIFT 0 #define I40E_PFINT_ICR0_INTEVENT_MASK I40E_MASK(0x1, I40E_PFINT_ICR0_INTEVENT_SHIFT) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.c index 94cf82668efa..3d83fccf742b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.c @@ -2571,7 +2571,22 @@ static int i40e_clean_rx_irq(struct i40e_ring *rx_ring, int budget) return failure ? budget : (int)total_rx_packets; } -static inline u32 i40e_buildreg_itr(const int type, u16 itr) +/** + * i40e_buildreg_itr - build a value for writing to I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN register + * @itr_idx: interrupt throttling index + * @interval: interrupt throttling interval value in usecs + * @force_swint: force software interrupt + * + * The function builds a value for I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN register that + * is used to update interrupt throttling interval for specified ITR index + * and optionally enforces a software interrupt. If the @itr_idx is equal + * to I40E_ITR_NONE then no interval change is applied and only @force_swint + * parameter is taken into account. If the interval change and enforced + * software interrupt are not requested then the built value just enables + * appropriate vector interrupt. + **/ +static u32 i40e_buildreg_itr(enum i40e_dyn_idx itr_idx, u16 interval, + bool force_swint) { u32 val; @@ -2585,23 +2600,33 @@ static inline u32 i40e_buildreg_itr(const int type, u16 itr) * an event in the PBA anyway so we need to rely on the automask * to hold pending events for us until the interrupt is re-enabled * - * The itr value is reported in microseconds, and the register - * value is recorded in 2 microsecond units. For this reason we - * only need to shift by the interval shift - 1 instead of the - * full value. + * We have to shift the given value as it is reported in microseconds + * and the register value is recorded in 2 microsecond units. */ - itr &= I40E_ITR_MASK; + interval >>= 1; + /* 1. Enable vector interrupt + * 2. Update the interval for the specified ITR index + * (I40E_ITR_NONE in the register is used to indicate that + * no interval update is requested) + */ val = I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_INTENA_MASK | - (type << I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_ITR_INDX_SHIFT) | - (itr << (I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_INTERVAL_SHIFT - 1)); + FIELD_PREP(I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_ITR_INDX_MASK, itr_idx) | + FIELD_PREP(I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_INTERVAL_MASK, interval); + + /* 3. Enforce software interrupt trigger if requested + * (These software interrupts rate is limited by ITR2 that is + * set to 20K interrupts per second) + */ + if (force_swint) + val |= I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_SWINT_TRIG_MASK | + I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_SW_ITR_INDX_ENA_MASK | + FIELD_PREP(I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN_SW_ITR_INDX_MASK, + I40E_SW_ITR); return val; } -/* a small macro to shorten up some long lines */ -#define INTREG I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN - /* The act of updating the ITR will cause it to immediately trigger. In order * to prevent this from throwing off adaptive update statistics we defer the * update so that it can only happen so often. So after either Tx or Rx are @@ -2620,8 +2645,10 @@ static inline u32 i40e_buildreg_itr(const int type, u16 itr) static inline void i40e_update_enable_itr(struct i40e_vsi *vsi, struct i40e_q_vector *q_vector) { + enum i40e_dyn_idx itr_idx = I40E_ITR_NONE; struct i40e_hw *hw = &vsi->back->hw; - u32 intval; + u16 interval = 0; + u32 itr_val; /* If we don't have MSIX, then we only need to re-enable icr0 */ if (!(vsi->back->flags & I40E_FLAG_MSIX_ENABLED)) { @@ -2643,8 +2670,8 @@ static inline void i40e_update_enable_itr(struct i40e_vsi *vsi, */ if (q_vector->rx.target_itr < q_vector->rx.current_itr) { /* Rx ITR needs to be reduced, this is highest priority */ - intval = i40e_buildreg_itr(I40E_RX_ITR, - q_vector->rx.target_itr); + itr_idx = I40E_RX_ITR; + interval = q_vector->rx.target_itr; q_vector->rx.current_itr = q_vector->rx.target_itr; q_vector->itr_countdown = ITR_COUNTDOWN_START; } else if ((q_vector->tx.target_itr < q_vector->tx.current_itr) || @@ -2653,25 +2680,36 @@ static inline void i40e_update_enable_itr(struct i40e_vsi *vsi, /* Tx ITR needs to be reduced, this is second priority * Tx ITR needs to be increased more than Rx, fourth priority */ - intval = i40e_buildreg_itr(I40E_TX_ITR, - q_vector->tx.target_itr); + itr_idx = I40E_TX_ITR; + interval = q_vector->tx.target_itr; q_vector->tx.current_itr = q_vector->tx.target_itr; q_vector->itr_countdown = ITR_COUNTDOWN_START; } else if (q_vector->rx.current_itr != q_vector->rx.target_itr) { /* Rx ITR needs to be increased, third priority */ - intval = i40e_buildreg_itr(I40E_RX_ITR, - q_vector->rx.target_itr); + itr_idx = I40E_RX_ITR; + interval = q_vector->rx.target_itr; q_vector->rx.current_itr = q_vector->rx.target_itr; q_vector->itr_countdown = ITR_COUNTDOWN_START; } else { /* No ITR update, lowest priority */ - intval = i40e_buildreg_itr(I40E_ITR_NONE, 0); if (q_vector->itr_countdown) q_vector->itr_countdown--; } - if (!test_bit(__I40E_VSI_DOWN, vsi->state)) - wr32(hw, INTREG(q_vector->reg_idx), intval); + /* Do not update interrupt control register if VSI is down */ + if (test_bit(__I40E_VSI_DOWN, vsi->state)) + return; + + /* Update ITR interval if necessary and enforce software interrupt + * if we are exiting busy poll. + */ + if (q_vector->in_busy_poll) { + itr_val = i40e_buildreg_itr(itr_idx, interval, true); + q_vector->in_busy_poll = false; + } else { + itr_val = i40e_buildreg_itr(itr_idx, interval, false); + } + wr32(hw, I40E_PFINT_DYN_CTLN(q_vector->reg_idx), itr_val); } /** @@ -2778,6 +2816,8 @@ tx_only: */ if (likely(napi_complete_done(napi, work_done))) i40e_update_enable_itr(vsi, q_vector); + else + q_vector->in_busy_poll = true; return min(work_done, budget - 1); } diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.h index 602ddd956245..6e567d343e03 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.h @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ enum i40e_dyn_idx { /* these are indexes into ITRN registers */ #define I40E_RX_ITR I40E_IDX_ITR0 #define I40E_TX_ITR I40E_IDX_ITR1 +#define I40E_SW_ITR I40E_IDX_ITR2 /* Supported RSS offloads */ #define I40E_DEFAULT_RSS_HENA ( \ From a33b7cb184921487ae7b8b739bcdc7d0266d2eb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heiner Kallweit Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 22:23:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 075/139] r8169: use spinlock to protect mac ocp register access MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 91c8643578a21e435c412ffbe902bb4b4773e262 ] For disabling ASPM during NAPI poll we'll have to access mac ocp registers in atomic context. This could result in races because a mac ocp read consists of a write to register OCPDR, followed by a read from the same register. Therefore add a spinlock to protect access to mac ocp registers. Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Tested-by: Kai-Heng Feng Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Stable-dep-of: 5e864d90b208 ("r8169: skip DASH fw status checks when DASH is disabled") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c index 3dbcb311dcbf..c7dd0eb94817 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c @@ -615,6 +615,8 @@ struct rtl8169_private { struct work_struct work; } wk; + spinlock_t mac_ocp_lock; + unsigned supports_gmii:1; unsigned aspm_manageable:1; unsigned dash_enabled:1; @@ -850,7 +852,7 @@ static int r8168_phy_ocp_read(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg) (RTL_R32(tp, GPHY_OCP) & 0xffff) : -ETIMEDOUT; } -static void r8168_mac_ocp_write(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u32 data) +static void __r8168_mac_ocp_write(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u32 data) { if (rtl_ocp_reg_failure(reg)) return; @@ -858,7 +860,16 @@ static void r8168_mac_ocp_write(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u32 data) RTL_W32(tp, OCPDR, OCPAR_FLAG | (reg << 15) | data); } -static u16 r8168_mac_ocp_read(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg) +static void r8168_mac_ocp_write(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u32 data) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags); + __r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, reg, data); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags); +} + +static u16 __r8168_mac_ocp_read(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg) { if (rtl_ocp_reg_failure(reg)) return 0; @@ -868,12 +879,28 @@ static u16 r8168_mac_ocp_read(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg) return RTL_R32(tp, OCPDR); } +static u16 r8168_mac_ocp_read(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg) +{ + unsigned long flags; + u16 val; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags); + val = __r8168_mac_ocp_read(tp, reg); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags); + + return val; +} + static void r8168_mac_ocp_modify(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u16 mask, u16 set) { - u16 data = r8168_mac_ocp_read(tp, reg); + unsigned long flags; + u16 data; - r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, reg, (data & ~mask) | set); + spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags); + data = __r8168_mac_ocp_read(tp, reg); + __r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, reg, (data & ~mask) | set); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags); } /* Work around a hw issue with RTL8168g PHY, the quirk disables @@ -5232,6 +5259,8 @@ static int rtl_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) tp->eee_adv = -1; tp->ocp_base = OCP_STD_PHY_BASE; + spin_lock_init(&tp->mac_ocp_lock); + dev->tstats = devm_netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(&pdev->dev, struct pcpu_sw_netstats); if (!dev->tstats) From 9109472e7102f58b915e473dabc8b7961a39b3f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heiner Kallweit Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 22:24:00 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 076/139] r8169: use spinlock to protect access to registers Config2 and Config5 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 6bc6c4e6893ee79a9862c61d1635e7da6d5a3333 ] For disabling ASPM during NAPI poll we'll have to access both registers in atomic context. Use a spinlock to protect access. Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Tested-by: Kai-Heng Feng Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Stable-dep-of: 5e864d90b208 ("r8169: skip DASH fw status checks when DASH is disabled") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c index c7dd0eb94817..4a1710b2726c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c @@ -615,6 +615,7 @@ struct rtl8169_private { struct work_struct work; } wk; + spinlock_t config25_lock; spinlock_t mac_ocp_lock; unsigned supports_gmii:1; @@ -680,6 +681,28 @@ static void rtl_pci_commit(struct rtl8169_private *tp) RTL_R8(tp, ChipCmd); } +static void rtl_mod_config2(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u8 clear, u8 set) +{ + unsigned long flags; + u8 val; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->config25_lock, flags); + val = RTL_R8(tp, Config2); + RTL_W8(tp, Config2, (val & ~clear) | set); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->config25_lock, flags); +} + +static void rtl_mod_config5(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u8 clear, u8 set) +{ + unsigned long flags; + u8 val; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->config25_lock, flags); + val = RTL_R8(tp, Config5); + RTL_W8(tp, Config5, (val & ~clear) | set); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->config25_lock, flags); +} + static bool rtl_is_8125(struct rtl8169_private *tp) { return tp->mac_version >= RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_61; @@ -1401,6 +1424,7 @@ static void __rtl8169_set_wol(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 wolopts) { WAKE_MAGIC, Config3, MagicPacket } }; unsigned int i, tmp = ARRAY_SIZE(cfg); + unsigned long flags; u8 options; rtl_unlock_config_regs(tp); @@ -1419,12 +1443,14 @@ static void __rtl8169_set_wol(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 wolopts) r8168_mac_ocp_modify(tp, 0xc0b6, BIT(0), 0); } + spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->config25_lock, flags); for (i = 0; i < tmp; i++) { options = RTL_R8(tp, cfg[i].reg) & ~cfg[i].mask; if (wolopts & cfg[i].opt) options |= cfg[i].mask; RTL_W8(tp, cfg[i].reg, options); } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->config25_lock, flags); switch (tp->mac_version) { case RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_02 ... RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_06: @@ -1436,10 +1462,10 @@ static void __rtl8169_set_wol(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 wolopts) case RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_34: case RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_37: case RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_39 ... RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_63: - options = RTL_R8(tp, Config2) & ~PME_SIGNAL; if (wolopts) - options |= PME_SIGNAL; - RTL_W8(tp, Config2, options); + rtl_mod_config2(tp, 0, PME_SIGNAL); + else + rtl_mod_config2(tp, PME_SIGNAL, 0); break; default: break; @@ -2748,8 +2774,8 @@ static void rtl_hw_aspm_clkreq_enable(struct rtl8169_private *tp, bool enable) { /* Don't enable ASPM in the chip if OS can't control ASPM */ if (enable && tp->aspm_manageable) { - RTL_W8(tp, Config5, RTL_R8(tp, Config5) | ASPM_en); - RTL_W8(tp, Config2, RTL_R8(tp, Config2) | ClkReqEn); + rtl_mod_config5(tp, 0, ASPM_en); + rtl_mod_config2(tp, 0, ClkReqEn); switch (tp->mac_version) { case RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_46 ... RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_48: @@ -2772,8 +2798,8 @@ static void rtl_hw_aspm_clkreq_enable(struct rtl8169_private *tp, bool enable) break; } - RTL_W8(tp, Config2, RTL_R8(tp, Config2) & ~ClkReqEn); - RTL_W8(tp, Config5, RTL_R8(tp, Config5) & ~ASPM_en); + rtl_mod_config2(tp, ClkReqEn, 0); + rtl_mod_config5(tp, ASPM_en, 0); } udelay(10); @@ -2934,7 +2960,7 @@ static void rtl_hw_start_8168e_1(struct rtl8169_private *tp) RTL_W32(tp, MISC, RTL_R32(tp, MISC) | TXPLA_RST); RTL_W32(tp, MISC, RTL_R32(tp, MISC) & ~TXPLA_RST); - RTL_W8(tp, Config5, RTL_R8(tp, Config5) & ~Spi_en); + rtl_mod_config5(tp, Spi_en, 0); } static void rtl_hw_start_8168e_2(struct rtl8169_private *tp) @@ -2967,7 +2993,7 @@ static void rtl_hw_start_8168e_2(struct rtl8169_private *tp) RTL_W8(tp, DLLPR, RTL_R8(tp, DLLPR) | PFM_EN); RTL_W32(tp, MISC, RTL_R32(tp, MISC) | PWM_EN); - RTL_W8(tp, Config5, RTL_R8(tp, Config5) & ~Spi_en); + rtl_mod_config5(tp, Spi_en, 0); rtl_hw_aspm_clkreq_enable(tp, true); } @@ -2990,7 +3016,7 @@ static void rtl_hw_start_8168f(struct rtl8169_private *tp) RTL_W8(tp, MCU, RTL_R8(tp, MCU) & ~NOW_IS_OOB); RTL_W8(tp, DLLPR, RTL_R8(tp, DLLPR) | PFM_EN); RTL_W32(tp, MISC, RTL_R32(tp, MISC) | PWM_EN); - RTL_W8(tp, Config5, RTL_R8(tp, Config5) & ~Spi_en); + rtl_mod_config5(tp, Spi_en, 0); rtl8168_config_eee_mac(tp); } @@ -5259,6 +5285,7 @@ static int rtl_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) tp->eee_adv = -1; tp->ocp_base = OCP_STD_PHY_BASE; + spin_lock_init(&tp->config25_lock); spin_lock_init(&tp->mac_ocp_lock); dev->tstats = devm_netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(&pdev->dev, From 77db987b47b7c93d6e7eadec5c211f3afcea42dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heiner Kallweit Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 22:25:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 077/139] r8169: prepare rtl_hw_aspm_clkreq_enable for usage in atomic context MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 49ef7d846d4bd77b0b9f1f801fc765b004690a07 ] Bail out if the function is used with chip versions that don't support ASPM configuration. In addition remove the delay, it tuned out that it's not needed, also vendor driver r8125 doesn't have it. Suggested-by: Kai-Heng Feng Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Tested-by: Kai-Heng Feng Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Stable-dep-of: 5e864d90b208 ("r8169: skip DASH fw status checks when DASH is disabled") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c index 4a1710b2726c..256630f57ffe 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c @@ -2772,6 +2772,9 @@ static void rtl_disable_exit_l1(struct rtl8169_private *tp) static void rtl_hw_aspm_clkreq_enable(struct rtl8169_private *tp, bool enable) { + if (tp->mac_version < RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_32) + return; + /* Don't enable ASPM in the chip if OS can't control ASPM */ if (enable && tp->aspm_manageable) { rtl_mod_config5(tp, 0, ASPM_en); @@ -2801,8 +2804,6 @@ static void rtl_hw_aspm_clkreq_enable(struct rtl8169_private *tp, bool enable) rtl_mod_config2(tp, ClkReqEn, 0); rtl_mod_config5(tp, ASPM_en, 0); } - - udelay(10); } static void rtl_set_fifo_size(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u16 rx_stat, From 4eed9d0a4816d81bf6b009a8d3a05f3817b9463e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 13:42:45 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 078/139] tcp: Fix bind() regression for v6-only wildcard and v4(-mapped-v6) non-wildcard addresses. [ Upstream commit d91ef1e1b55f730bee8ce286b02b7bdccbc42973 ] Jianguo Wu reported another bind() regression introduced by bhash2. Calling bind() for the following 3 addresses on the same port, the 3rd one should fail but now succeeds. 1. 0.0.0.0 or ::ffff:0.0.0.0 2. [::] w/ IPV6_V6ONLY 3. IPv4 non-wildcard address or v4-mapped-v6 non-wildcard address The first two bind() create tb2 like this: bhash2 -> tb2(:: w/ IPV6_V6ONLY) -> tb2(0.0.0.0) The 3rd bind() will match with the IPv6 only wildcard address bucket in inet_bind2_bucket_match_addr_any(), however, no conflicting socket exists in the bucket. So, inet_bhash2_conflict() will returns false, and thus, inet_bhash2_addr_any_conflict() returns false consequently. As a result, the 3rd bind() bypasses conflict check, which should be done against the IPv4 wildcard address bucket. So, in inet_bhash2_addr_any_conflict(), we must iterate over all buckets. Note that we cannot add ipv6_only flag for inet_bind2_bucket as it would confuse the following patetrn. 1. [::] w/ SO_REUSE{ADDR,PORT} and IPV6_V6ONLY 2. [::] w/ SO_REUSE{ADDR,PORT} 3. IPv4 non-wildcard address or v4-mapped-v6 non-wildcard address The first bind() would create a bucket with ipv6_only flag true, the second bind() would add the [::] socket into the same bucket, and the third bind() could succeed based on the wrong assumption that ipv6_only bucket would not conflict with v4(-mapped-v6) address. Fixes: 28044fc1d495 ("net: Add a bhash2 table hashed by port and address") Diagnosed-by: Jianguo Wu Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326204251.51301-3-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 19 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c index f7832d425382..8407098a5939 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c @@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ static bool inet_bhash2_addr_any_conflict(const struct sock *sk, int port, int l struct sock_reuseport *reuseport_cb; struct inet_bind_hashbucket *head2; struct inet_bind2_bucket *tb2; + bool conflict = false; bool reuseport_cb_ok; rcu_read_lock(); @@ -301,18 +302,20 @@ static bool inet_bhash2_addr_any_conflict(const struct sock *sk, int port, int l spin_lock(&head2->lock); - inet_bind_bucket_for_each(tb2, &head2->chain) - if (inet_bind2_bucket_match_addr_any(tb2, net, port, l3mdev, sk)) - break; + inet_bind_bucket_for_each(tb2, &head2->chain) { + if (!inet_bind2_bucket_match_addr_any(tb2, net, port, l3mdev, sk)) + continue; - if (tb2 && inet_bhash2_conflict(sk, tb2, uid, relax, reuseport_cb_ok, - reuseport_ok)) { - spin_unlock(&head2->lock); - return true; + if (!inet_bhash2_conflict(sk, tb2, uid, relax, reuseport_cb_ok, reuseport_ok)) + continue; + + conflict = true; + break; } spin_unlock(&head2->lock); - return false; + + return conflict; } /* From c1781222079cac0510a276194ca0a18fe12b8a80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Denis Kirjanov Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 21:45:02 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 079/139] drivers: net: convert to boolean for the mac_managed_pm flag [ Upstream commit eca485d22165695587bed02d8b9d0f7f44246c4a ] Signed-off-by: Dennis Kirjanov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Stable-dep-of: cbc17e7802f5 ("net: fec: Set mac_managed_pm during probe") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c | 2 +- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c | 2 +- drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c index 97d12c7eea77..51eb30c20c7c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c @@ -2236,7 +2236,7 @@ static int fec_enet_mii_probe(struct net_device *ndev) fep->link = 0; fep->full_duplex = 0; - phy_dev->mac_managed_pm = 1; + phy_dev->mac_managed_pm = true; phy_attached_info(phy_dev); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c index 256630f57ffe..6e3417712e40 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c @@ -5148,7 +5148,7 @@ static int r8169_mdio_register(struct rtl8169_private *tp) return -EUNATCH; } - tp->phydev->mac_managed_pm = 1; + tp->phydev->mac_managed_pm = true; phy_support_asym_pause(tp->phydev); diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c b/drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c index 6eacbf17f1c0..34cd568b27f1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c @@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ static int ax88772_init_phy(struct usbnet *dev) } phy_suspend(priv->phydev); - priv->phydev->mac_managed_pm = 1; + priv->phydev->mac_managed_pm = true; phy_attached_info(priv->phydev); @@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ static int ax88772_init_phy(struct usbnet *dev) return -ENODEV; } - priv->phydev_int->mac_managed_pm = 1; + priv->phydev_int->mac_managed_pm = true; phy_suspend(priv->phydev_int); return 0; From b3608fe28fab298ee2bcdde26bdaf9c179e8c69f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Fang Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 15:59:29 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 080/139] net: fec: Set mac_managed_pm during probe [ Upstream commit cbc17e7802f5de37c7c262204baadfad3f7f99e5 ] Setting mac_managed_pm during interface up is too late. In situations where the link is not brought up yet and the system suspends the regular PHY power management will run. Since the FEC ETHEREN control bit is cleared (automatically) on suspend the controller is off in resume. When the regular PHY power management resume path runs in this context it will write to the MII_DATA register but nothing will be transmitted on the MDIO bus. This can be observed by the following log: fec 5b040000.ethernet eth0: MDIO read timeout Microchip LAN87xx T1 5b040000.ethernet-1:04: PM: dpm_run_callback(): mdio_bus_phy_resume+0x0/0xc8 returns -110 Microchip LAN87xx T1 5b040000.ethernet-1:04: PM: failed to resume: error -110 The data written will however remain in the MII_DATA register. When the link later is set to administrative up it will trigger a call to fec_restart() which will restore the MII_SPEED register. This triggers the quirk explained in f166f890c8f0 ("net: ethernet: fec: Replace interrupt driven MDIO with polled IO") causing an extra MII_EVENT. This extra event desynchronizes all the MDIO register reads, causing them to complete too early. Leading all reads to read as 0 because fec_enet_mdio_wait() returns too early. When a Microchip LAN8700R PHY is connected to the FEC, the 0 reads causes the PHY to be initialized incorrectly and the PHY will not transmit any ethernet signal in this state. It cannot be brought out of this state without a power cycle of the PHY. Fixes: 557d5dc83f68 ("net: fec: use mac-managed PHY PM") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/1f45bdbe-eab1-4e59-8f24-add177590d27@actia.se/ Signed-off-by: Wei Fang [jernberg: commit message] Signed-off-by: John Ernberg Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328155909.59613-2-john.ernberg@actia.se Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c index 51eb30c20c7c..ebff14b0837d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c @@ -2236,8 +2236,6 @@ static int fec_enet_mii_probe(struct net_device *ndev) fep->link = 0; fep->full_duplex = 0; - phy_dev->mac_managed_pm = true; - phy_attached_info(phy_dev); return 0; @@ -2249,10 +2247,12 @@ static int fec_enet_mii_init(struct platform_device *pdev) struct net_device *ndev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); struct fec_enet_private *fep = netdev_priv(ndev); bool suppress_preamble = false; + struct phy_device *phydev; struct device_node *node; int err = -ENXIO; u32 mii_speed, holdtime; u32 bus_freq; + int addr; /* * The i.MX28 dual fec interfaces are not equal. @@ -2362,6 +2362,13 @@ static int fec_enet_mii_init(struct platform_device *pdev) goto err_out_free_mdiobus; of_node_put(node); + /* find all the PHY devices on the bus and set mac_managed_pm to true */ + for (addr = 0; addr < PHY_MAX_ADDR; addr++) { + phydev = mdiobus_get_phy(fep->mii_bus, addr); + if (phydev) + phydev->mac_managed_pm = true; + } + mii_cnt++; /* save fec0 mii_bus */ From 265a0fc55f137823c10005c4bce2d235d3a4f4ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Claudiu Beznea Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 10:41:22 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 081/139] net: ravb: Let IP-specific receive function to interrogate descriptors [ Upstream commit 2b993bfdb47b3aaafd8fe9cd5038b5e297b18ee1 ] ravb_poll() initial code used to interrogate the first descriptor of the RX queue in case gPTP is false to determine if ravb_rx() should be called. This is done for non-gPTP IPs. For gPTP IPs the driver PTP-specific information was used to determine if receive function should be called. As every IP has its own receive function that interrogates the RX descriptors list in the same way the ravb_poll() was doing there is no need to double check this in ravb_poll(). Removing the code from ravb_poll() leads to a cleaner code. Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Stable-dep-of: 596a4254915f ("net: ravb: Always process TX descriptor ring") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c | 13 ++----------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c index e7b70006261f..36e2718c564a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c @@ -1290,25 +1290,16 @@ static int ravb_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) struct net_device *ndev = napi->dev; struct ravb_private *priv = netdev_priv(ndev); const struct ravb_hw_info *info = priv->info; - bool gptp = info->gptp || info->ccc_gac; - struct ravb_rx_desc *desc; unsigned long flags; int q = napi - priv->napi; int mask = BIT(q); int quota = budget; - unsigned int entry; - if (!gptp) { - entry = priv->cur_rx[q] % priv->num_rx_ring[q]; - desc = &priv->gbeth_rx_ring[entry]; - } /* Processing RX Descriptor Ring */ /* Clear RX interrupt */ ravb_write(ndev, ~(mask | RIS0_RESERVED), RIS0); - if (gptp || desc->die_dt != DT_FEMPTY) { - if (ravb_rx(ndev, "a, q)) - goto out; - } + if (ravb_rx(ndev, "a, q)) + goto out; /* Processing TX Descriptor Ring */ spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags); From f9690dfa181434d828f7583e83d3176116f88566 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Barker Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 15:53:04 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 082/139] net: ravb: Always process TX descriptor ring [ Upstream commit 596a4254915f94c927217fe09c33a6828f33fb25 ] The TX queue should be serviced each time the poll function is called, even if the full RX work budget has been consumed. This prevents starvation of the TX queue when RX bandwidth usage is high. Fixes: c156633f1353 ("Renesas Ethernet AVB driver proper") Signed-off-by: Paul Barker Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240402145305.82148-1-paul.barker.ct@bp.renesas.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c index 36e2718c564a..b11cc365d19e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c @@ -1294,12 +1294,12 @@ static int ravb_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) int q = napi - priv->napi; int mask = BIT(q); int quota = budget; + bool unmask; /* Processing RX Descriptor Ring */ /* Clear RX interrupt */ ravb_write(ndev, ~(mask | RIS0_RESERVED), RIS0); - if (ravb_rx(ndev, "a, q)) - goto out; + unmask = !ravb_rx(ndev, "a, q); /* Processing TX Descriptor Ring */ spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags); @@ -1309,6 +1309,9 @@ static int ravb_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) netif_wake_subqueue(ndev, q); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags); + if (!unmask) + goto out; + napi_complete(napi); /* Re-enable RX/TX interrupts */ From f089d4554a0b22860bfb1b8392f1aed32033245f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Barker Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 15:53:05 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 083/139] net: ravb: Always update error counters [ Upstream commit 101b76418d7163240bc74a7e06867dca0e51183e ] The error statistics should be updated each time the poll function is called, even if the full RX work budget has been consumed. This prevents the counts from becoming stuck when RX bandwidth usage is high. This also ensures that error counters are not updated after we've re-enabled interrupts as that could result in a race condition. Also drop an unnecessary space. Fixes: c156633f1353 ("Renesas Ethernet AVB driver proper") Signed-off-by: Paul Barker Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240402145305.82148-2-paul.barker.ct@bp.renesas.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c index b11cc365d19e..756ac4a07f60 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c @@ -1309,6 +1309,15 @@ static int ravb_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) netif_wake_subqueue(ndev, q); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags); + /* Receive error message handling */ + priv->rx_over_errors = priv->stats[RAVB_BE].rx_over_errors; + if (info->nc_queues) + priv->rx_over_errors += priv->stats[RAVB_NC].rx_over_errors; + if (priv->rx_over_errors != ndev->stats.rx_over_errors) + ndev->stats.rx_over_errors = priv->rx_over_errors; + if (priv->rx_fifo_errors != ndev->stats.rx_fifo_errors) + ndev->stats.rx_fifo_errors = priv->rx_fifo_errors; + if (!unmask) goto out; @@ -1325,14 +1334,6 @@ static int ravb_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags); - /* Receive error message handling */ - priv->rx_over_errors = priv->stats[RAVB_BE].rx_over_errors; - if (info->nc_queues) - priv->rx_over_errors += priv->stats[RAVB_NC].rx_over_errors; - if (priv->rx_over_errors != ndev->stats.rx_over_errors) - ndev->stats.rx_over_errors = priv->rx_over_errors; - if (priv->rx_fifo_errors != ndev->stats.rx_fifo_errors) - ndev->stats.rx_fifo_errors = priv->rx_fifo_errors; out: return budget - quota; } From 2f7efda53a0a8b462fdd217e732147d7611befe2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Mikhalitsyn Date: Mon, 22 May 2023 18:12:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 084/139] KVM: SVM: enhance info printk's in SEV init MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 6d1bc9754b04075d938b47cf7f7800814b8911a7 ] Let's print available ASID ranges for SEV/SEV-ES guests. This information can be useful for system administrator to debug if SEV/SEV-ES fails to enable. There are a few reasons. SEV: - NPT is disabled (module parameter) - CPU lacks some features (sev, decodeassists) - Maximum SEV ASID is 0 SEV-ES: - mmio_caching is disabled (module parameter) - CPU lacks sev_es feature - Minimum SEV ASID value is 1 (can be adjusted in BIOS/UEFI) Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Stéphane Graber Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230522161249.800829-3-aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com [sean: print '0' for min SEV-ES ASID if there are no available ASIDs] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Stable-dep-of: 0aa6b90ef9d7 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for allowing zero SEV ASIDs") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 3dc0ee1fe9db..1fe9257d87b2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -2217,7 +2217,6 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, sev_asid_count)) goto out; - pr_info("SEV supported: %u ASIDs\n", sev_asid_count); sev_supported = true; /* SEV-ES support requested? */ @@ -2245,10 +2244,18 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count)) goto out; - pr_info("SEV-ES supported: %u ASIDs\n", sev_es_asid_count); sev_es_supported = true; out: + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV)) + pr_info("SEV %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n", + sev_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled", + min_sev_asid, max_sev_asid); + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES)) + pr_info("SEV-ES %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n", + sev_es_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled", + min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1); + sev_enabled = sev_supported; sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported; #endif From 815c2a1c432b072c7cb9f9fde69cbf093ecd34b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2023 17:44:49 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 085/139] KVM: SVM: WARN, but continue, if misc_cg_set_capacity() fails [ Upstream commit 106ed2cad9f7bd803bd31a18fe7a9219b077bf95 ] WARN and continue if misc_cg_set_capacity() fails, as the only scenario in which it can fail is if the specified resource is invalid, which should never happen when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y. Deliberately not bailing "fixes" a theoretical bug where KVM would leak the ASID bitmaps on failure, which again can't happen. If the impossible should happen, the end result is effectively the same with respect to SEV and SEV-ES (they are unusable), while continuing on has the advantage of letting KVM load, i.e. userspace can still run non-SEV guests. Reported-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230607004449.1421131-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Stable-dep-of: 0aa6b90ef9d7 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for allowing zero SEV ASIDs") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 1fe9257d87b2..0316fdf5040f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -2214,9 +2214,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) } sev_asid_count = max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1; - if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, sev_asid_count)) - goto out; - + WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, sev_asid_count)); sev_supported = true; /* SEV-ES support requested? */ @@ -2241,9 +2239,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) goto out; sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1; - if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count)) - goto out; - + WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count)); sev_es_supported = true; out: From 2233bd583cb5e9175c75d54686d77bbdd56e09e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 15:56:07 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 086/139] KVM: SVM: Use unsigned integers when dealing with ASIDs [ Upstream commit 466eec4a22a76c462781bf6d45cb02cbedf21a61 ] Convert all local ASID variables and parameters throughout the SEV code from signed integers to unsigned integers. As ASIDs are fundamentally unsigned values, and the global min/max variables are appropriately unsigned integers, too. Functionally, this is a glorified nop as KVM guarantees min_sev_asid is non-zero, and no CPU supports -1u as the _only_ asid, i.e. the signed vs. unsigned goof won't cause problems in practice. Opportunistically use sev_get_asid() in sev_flush_encrypted_page() instead of open coding an equivalent. Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240131235609.4161407-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Stable-dep-of: 0aa6b90ef9d7 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for allowing zero SEV ASIDs") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- arch/x86/kvm/trace.h | 10 +++++----- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 0316fdf5040f..9e50eaf967f2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -76,9 +76,10 @@ struct enc_region { }; /* Called with the sev_bitmap_lock held, or on shutdown */ -static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid) +static int sev_flush_asids(unsigned int min_asid, unsigned int max_asid) { - int ret, asid, error = 0; + int ret, error = 0; + unsigned int asid; /* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */ asid = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, nr_asids, min_asid); @@ -108,7 +109,7 @@ static inline bool is_mirroring_enc_context(struct kvm *kvm) } /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */ -static bool __sev_recycle_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid) +static bool __sev_recycle_asids(unsigned int min_asid, unsigned int max_asid) { if (sev_flush_asids(min_asid, max_asid)) return false; @@ -135,8 +136,9 @@ static void sev_misc_cg_uncharge(struct kvm_sev_info *sev) static int sev_asid_new(struct kvm_sev_info *sev) { - int asid, min_asid, max_asid, ret; + unsigned int asid, min_asid, max_asid; bool retry = true; + int ret; WARN_ON(sev->misc_cg); sev->misc_cg = get_current_misc_cg(); @@ -179,7 +181,7 @@ e_uncharge: return ret; } -static int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm) +static unsigned int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; @@ -276,8 +278,8 @@ e_no_asid: static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error) { + unsigned int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm); struct sev_data_activate activate; - int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm); int ret; /* activate ASID on the given handle */ @@ -2290,7 +2292,7 @@ int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd) */ static void sev_flush_encrypted_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *va) { - int asid = to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info.asid; + unsigned int asid = sev_get_asid(vcpu->kvm); /* * Note! The address must be a kernel address, as regular page walk @@ -2611,7 +2613,7 @@ void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu) { struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu); - int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm); + unsigned int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm); /* Assign the asid allocated with this SEV guest */ svm->asid = asid; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h b/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h index bc25589ad588..6c1dcf44c4fa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h @@ -729,13 +729,13 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_nested_intr_vmexit, * Tracepoint for nested #vmexit because of interrupt pending */ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_invlpga, - TP_PROTO(__u64 rip, int asid, u64 address), + TP_PROTO(__u64 rip, unsigned int asid, u64 address), TP_ARGS(rip, asid, address), TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( __u64, rip ) - __field( int, asid ) - __field( __u64, address ) + __field( __u64, rip ) + __field( unsigned int, asid ) + __field( __u64, address ) ), TP_fast_assign( @@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_invlpga, __entry->address = address; ), - TP_printk("rip: 0x%016llx asid: %d address: 0x%016llx", + TP_printk("rip: 0x%016llx asid: %u address: 0x%016llx", __entry->rip, __entry->asid, __entry->address) ); From 4af6d5b4d9f1769b2d95d2a96cc270274b91337e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ashish Kalra Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 15:56:08 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 087/139] KVM: SVM: Add support for allowing zero SEV ASIDs [ Upstream commit 0aa6b90ef9d75b4bd7b6d106d85f2a3437697f91 ] Some BIOSes allow the end user to set the minimum SEV ASID value (CPUID 0x8000001F_EDX) to be greater than the maximum number of encrypted guests, or maximum SEV ASID value (CPUID 0x8000001F_ECX) in order to dedicate all the SEV ASIDs to SEV-ES or SEV-SNP. The SEV support, as coded, does not handle the case where the minimum SEV ASID value can be greater than the maximum SEV ASID value. As a result, the following confusing message is issued: [ 30.715724] kvm_amd: SEV enabled (ASIDs 1007 - 1006) Fix the support to properly handle this case. Fixes: 916391a2d1dc ("KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-ES capability in KVM") Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Tom Lendacky Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104190520.62510-1-Ashish.Kalra@amd.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240131235609.4161407-4-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 9e50eaf967f2..d8e192ad5953 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -136,10 +136,21 @@ static void sev_misc_cg_uncharge(struct kvm_sev_info *sev) static int sev_asid_new(struct kvm_sev_info *sev) { - unsigned int asid, min_asid, max_asid; + /* + * SEV-enabled guests must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid. + * SEV-ES-enabled guest can use from 1 to min_sev_asid - 1. + * Note: min ASID can end up larger than the max if basic SEV support is + * effectively disabled by disallowing use of ASIDs for SEV guests. + */ + unsigned int min_asid = sev->es_active ? 1 : min_sev_asid; + unsigned int max_asid = sev->es_active ? min_sev_asid - 1 : max_sev_asid; + unsigned int asid; bool retry = true; int ret; + if (min_asid > max_asid) + return -ENOTTY; + WARN_ON(sev->misc_cg); sev->misc_cg = get_current_misc_cg(); ret = sev_misc_cg_try_charge(sev); @@ -151,12 +162,6 @@ static int sev_asid_new(struct kvm_sev_info *sev) mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock); - /* - * SEV-enabled guests must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid. - * SEV-ES-enabled guest can use from 1 to min_sev_asid - 1. - */ - min_asid = sev->es_active ? 1 : min_sev_asid; - max_asid = sev->es_active ? min_sev_asid - 1 : max_sev_asid; again: asid = find_next_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_asid + 1, min_asid); if (asid > max_asid) { @@ -2215,8 +2220,10 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) goto out; } - sev_asid_count = max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1; - WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, sev_asid_count)); + if (min_sev_asid <= max_sev_asid) { + sev_asid_count = max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1; + WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, sev_asid_count)); + } sev_supported = true; /* SEV-ES support requested? */ @@ -2247,7 +2254,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) out: if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV)) pr_info("SEV %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n", - sev_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled", + sev_supported ? min_sev_asid <= max_sev_asid ? "enabled" : + "unusable" : + "disabled", min_sev_asid, max_sev_asid); if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES)) pr_info("SEV-ES %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n", From 90a477dfda3be83709e1f761710e09835f51b49f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Fri, 24 Nov 2023 16:08:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 088/139] fs/pipe: Fix lockdep false-positive in watchqueue pipe_write() [ Upstream commit 055ca83559912f2cfd91c9441427bac4caf3c74e ] When you try to splice between a normal pipe and a notification pipe, get_pipe_info(..., true) fails, so splice() falls back to treating the notification pipe like a normal pipe - so we end up in iter_file_splice_write(), which first locks the input pipe, then calls vfs_iter_write(), which locks the output pipe. Lockdep complains about that, because we're taking a pipe lock while already holding another pipe lock. I think this probably (?) can't actually lead to deadlocks, since you'd need another way to nest locking a normal pipe into locking a watch_queue pipe, but the lockdep annotations don't make that clear. Bail out earlier in pipe_write() for notification pipes, before taking the pipe lock. Reported-and-tested-by: Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=011e4ea1da6692cf881c Fixes: c73be61cede5 ("pipe: Add general notification queue support") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231124150822.2121798-1-jannh@google.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/pipe.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c index 9873a6030df5..aa8e6ffe1cb5 100644 --- a/fs/pipe.c +++ b/fs/pipe.c @@ -424,6 +424,18 @@ pipe_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from) bool was_empty = false; bool wake_next_writer = false; + /* + * Reject writing to watch queue pipes before the point where we lock + * the pipe. + * Otherwise, lockdep would be unhappy if the caller already has another + * pipe locked. + * If we had to support locking a normal pipe and a notification pipe at + * the same time, we could set up lockdep annotations for that, but + * since we don't actually need that, it's simpler to just bail here. + */ + if (pipe_has_watch_queue(pipe)) + return -EXDEV; + /* Null write succeeds. */ if (unlikely(total_len == 0)) return 0; @@ -436,11 +448,6 @@ pipe_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from) goto out; } - if (pipe_has_watch_queue(pipe)) { - ret = -EXDEV; - goto out; - } - /* * If it wasn't empty we try to merge new data into * the last buffer. From d00c24ddec511f73bc5f91b86a114f36ab508076 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dominique Martinet Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 12:39:03 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 089/139] 9p: Fix read/write debug statements to report server reply [ Upstream commit be3193e58ec210b2a72fb1134c2a0695088a911d ] Previous conversion to iov missed these debug statements which would now always print the requested size instead of the actual server reply. Write also added a loop in a much older commit but we didn't report these, while reads do report each iteration -- it's more coherent to keep reporting all requests to server so move that at the same time. Fixes: 7f02464739da ("9p: convert to advancing variant of iov_iter_get_pages_alloc()") Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet Message-ID: <20240109-9p-rw-trace-v1-1-327178114257@codewreck.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/9p/client.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/9p/client.c b/net/9p/client.c index 84b93b04d0f0..1d9a8a1f3f10 100644 --- a/net/9p/client.c +++ b/net/9p/client.c @@ -1581,7 +1581,7 @@ p9_client_read_once(struct p9_fid *fid, u64 offset, struct iov_iter *to, received = rsize; } - p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_9P, "<<< RREAD count %d\n", count); + p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_9P, "<<< RREAD count %d\n", received); if (non_zc) { int n = copy_to_iter(dataptr, received, to); @@ -1607,9 +1607,6 @@ p9_client_write(struct p9_fid *fid, u64 offset, struct iov_iter *from, int *err) int total = 0; *err = 0; - p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_9P, ">>> TWRITE fid %d offset %llu count %zd\n", - fid->fid, offset, iov_iter_count(from)); - while (iov_iter_count(from)) { int count = iov_iter_count(from); int rsize = fid->iounit; @@ -1621,6 +1618,9 @@ p9_client_write(struct p9_fid *fid, u64 offset, struct iov_iter *from, int *err) if (count < rsize) rsize = count; + p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_9P, ">>> TWRITE fid %d offset %llu count %d (/%d)\n", + fid->fid, offset, rsize, count); + /* Don't bother zerocopy for small IO (< 1024) */ if (clnt->trans_mod->zc_request && rsize > 1024) { req = p9_client_zc_rpc(clnt, P9_TWRITE, NULL, from, 0, @@ -1648,7 +1648,7 @@ p9_client_write(struct p9_fid *fid, u64 offset, struct iov_iter *from, int *err) written = rsize; } - p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_9P, "<<< RWRITE count %d\n", count); + p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_9P, "<<< RWRITE count %d\n", written); p9_req_put(clnt, req); iov_iter_revert(from, count - written - iov_iter_count(from)); From 81f7c9da2bed3df06fd4c6a1ae8034001b1ed959 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pu Lehui Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2024 01:20:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 090/139] drivers/perf: riscv: Disable PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_* while not supported [ Upstream commit ea6873118493019474abbf57d5a800da365734df ] RISC-V perf driver does not yet support branch sampling. Although the specification is in the works [0], it is best to disable such events until support is available, otherwise we will get unexpected results. Due to this reason, two riscv bpf testcases get_branch_snapshot and perf_branches/perf_branches_hw fail. Link: https://github.com/riscv/riscv-control-transfer-records [0] Fixes: f5bfa23f576f ("RISC-V: Add a perf core library for pmu drivers") Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui Reviewed-by: Atish Patra Reviewed-by: Conor Dooley Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240312012053.1178140-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/perf/riscv_pmu.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/perf/riscv_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/riscv_pmu.c index 56897d4d4fd3..2d5cf135e8a1 100644 --- a/drivers/perf/riscv_pmu.c +++ b/drivers/perf/riscv_pmu.c @@ -246,6 +246,10 @@ static int riscv_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event) u64 event_config = 0; uint64_t cmask; + /* driver does not support branch stack sampling */ + if (has_branch_stack(event)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + hwc->flags = 0; mapped_event = rvpmu->event_map(event, &event_config); if (mapped_event < 0) { From 392c47fea7aac184340684774d982607065fca82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christian Hewitt Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 16:45:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 091/139] drm/panfrost: fix power transition timeout warnings [ Upstream commit 2bd02f5a0bac4bb13e0da18652dc75ba0e4958ec ] Increase the timeout value to prevent system logs on Amlogic boards flooding with power transition warnings: [ 13.047638] panfrost ffe40000.gpu: shader power transition timeout [ 13.048674] panfrost ffe40000.gpu: l2 power transition timeout [ 13.937324] panfrost ffe40000.gpu: shader power transition timeout [ 13.938351] panfrost ffe40000.gpu: l2 power transition timeout ... [39829.506904] panfrost ffe40000.gpu: shader power transition timeout [39829.507938] panfrost ffe40000.gpu: l2 power transition timeout [39949.508369] panfrost ffe40000.gpu: shader power transition timeout [39949.509405] panfrost ffe40000.gpu: l2 power transition timeout The 2000 value has been found through trial and error testing with devices using G52 and G31 GPUs. Fixes: 22aa1a209018 ("drm/panfrost: Really power off GPU cores in panfrost_gpu_power_off()") Signed-off-by: Christian Hewitt Reviewed-by: Steven Price Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno Signed-off-by: Steven Price Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240322164525.2617508-1-christianshewitt@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_gpu.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_gpu.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_gpu.c index 55d243048516..40b631445992 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_gpu.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_gpu.c @@ -379,19 +379,19 @@ void panfrost_gpu_power_off(struct panfrost_device *pfdev) gpu_write(pfdev, SHADER_PWROFF_LO, pfdev->features.shader_present); ret = readl_relaxed_poll_timeout(pfdev->iomem + SHADER_PWRTRANS_LO, - val, !val, 1, 1000); + val, !val, 1, 2000); if (ret) dev_err(pfdev->dev, "shader power transition timeout"); gpu_write(pfdev, TILER_PWROFF_LO, pfdev->features.tiler_present); ret = readl_relaxed_poll_timeout(pfdev->iomem + TILER_PWRTRANS_LO, - val, !val, 1, 1000); + val, !val, 1, 2000); if (ret) dev_err(pfdev->dev, "tiler power transition timeout"); gpu_write(pfdev, L2_PWROFF_LO, pfdev->features.l2_present); ret = readl_poll_timeout(pfdev->iomem + L2_PWRTRANS_LO, - val, !val, 0, 1000); + val, !val, 0, 2000); if (ret) dev_err(pfdev->dev, "l2 power transition timeout"); } From eb028d1ebd0b410095b79308b82f01ca1598223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pierre-Louis Bossart Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 17:18:12 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 092/139] ASoC: rt5682-sdw: fix locking sequence [ Upstream commit 310a5caa4e861616a27a83c3e8bda17d65026fa8 ] The disable_irq_lock protects the 'disable_irq' value, we need to lock before testing it. Fixes: 02fb23d72720 ("ASoC: rt5682-sdw: fix for JD event handling in ClockStop Mode0") Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart Reviewed-by: Bard Liao Reviewed-by: Chao Song Link: https://msgid.link/r/20240325221817.206465-2-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/rt5682-sdw.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/rt5682-sdw.c b/sound/soc/codecs/rt5682-sdw.c index 868a61c8b060..7685011a0935 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/rt5682-sdw.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/rt5682-sdw.c @@ -787,12 +787,12 @@ static int __maybe_unused rt5682_dev_resume(struct device *dev) return 0; if (!slave->unattach_request) { + mutex_lock(&rt5682->disable_irq_lock); if (rt5682->disable_irq == true) { - mutex_lock(&rt5682->disable_irq_lock); sdw_write_no_pm(slave, SDW_SCP_INTMASK1, SDW_SCP_INT1_IMPL_DEF); rt5682->disable_irq = false; - mutex_unlock(&rt5682->disable_irq_lock); } + mutex_unlock(&rt5682->disable_irq_lock); goto regmap_sync; } From 044c34fe3531a8061b7c23a40da82e3f2b28f80f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pierre-Louis Bossart Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 17:18:13 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 093/139] ASoC: rt711-sdca: fix locking sequence [ Upstream commit ee287771644394d071e6a331951ee8079b64f9a7 ] The disable_irq_lock protects the 'disable_irq' value, we need to lock before testing it. Fixes: 23adeb7056ac ("ASoC: rt711-sdca: fix for JD event handling in ClockStop Mode0") Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart Reviewed-by: Bard Liao Reviewed-by: Chao Song Link: https://msgid.link/r/20240325221817.206465-3-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/rt711-sdca-sdw.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/rt711-sdca-sdw.c b/sound/soc/codecs/rt711-sdca-sdw.c index 487d3010ddc1..931dbc68548e 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/rt711-sdca-sdw.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/rt711-sdca-sdw.c @@ -443,13 +443,13 @@ static int __maybe_unused rt711_sdca_dev_resume(struct device *dev) return 0; if (!slave->unattach_request) { + mutex_lock(&rt711->disable_irq_lock); if (rt711->disable_irq == true) { - mutex_lock(&rt711->disable_irq_lock); sdw_write_no_pm(slave, SDW_SCP_SDCA_INTMASK1, SDW_SCP_SDCA_INTMASK_SDCA_0); sdw_write_no_pm(slave, SDW_SCP_SDCA_INTMASK2, SDW_SCP_SDCA_INTMASK_SDCA_8); rt711->disable_irq = false; - mutex_unlock(&rt711->disable_irq_lock); } + mutex_unlock(&rt711->disable_irq_lock); goto regmap_sync; } From 4ff3d8ac62348697accf6d3e661c2d28f929f44a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pierre-Louis Bossart Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 17:18:14 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 094/139] ASoC: rt711-sdw: fix locking sequence [ Upstream commit aae86cfd8790bcc7693a5a0894df58de5cb5128c ] The disable_irq_lock protects the 'disable_irq' value, we need to lock before testing it. Fixes: b69de265bd0e ("ASoC: rt711: fix for JD event handling in ClockStop Mode0") Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart Reviewed-by: Bard Liao Reviewed-by: Chao Song Link: https://msgid.link/r/20240325221817.206465-4-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/codecs/rt711-sdw.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/rt711-sdw.c b/sound/soc/codecs/rt711-sdw.c index 9545b8a7eb19..af7a0ab5669f 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/rt711-sdw.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/rt711-sdw.c @@ -542,12 +542,12 @@ static int __maybe_unused rt711_dev_resume(struct device *dev) return 0; if (!slave->unattach_request) { + mutex_lock(&rt711->disable_irq_lock); if (rt711->disable_irq == true) { - mutex_lock(&rt711->disable_irq_lock); sdw_write_no_pm(slave, SDW_SCP_INTMASK1, SDW_SCP_INT1_IMPL_DEF); rt711->disable_irq = false; - mutex_unlock(&rt711->disable_irq_lock); } + mutex_unlock(&rt711->disable_irq_lock); goto regmap_sync; } From 7ff957cea8af6af4d6f1079f10aafe721d71f144 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Lee Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 18:01:31 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 095/139] ASoC: ops: Fix wraparound for mask in snd_soc_get_volsw [ Upstream commit fc563aa900659a850e2ada4af26b9d7a3de6c591 ] In snd_soc_info_volsw(), mask is generated by figuring out the index of the most significant bit set in max and converting the index to a bitmask through bit shift 1. Unintended wraparound occurs when max is an integer value with msb bit set. Since the bit shift value 1 is treated as an integer type, the left shift operation will wraparound and set mask to 0 instead of all 1's. In order to fix this, we type cast 1 as `1ULL` to prevent the wraparound. Fixes: 7077148fb50a ("ASoC: core: Split ops out of soc-core.c") Signed-off-by: Stephen Lee Link: https://msgid.link/r/20240326010131.6211-1-slee08177@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/soc-ops.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-ops.c b/sound/soc/soc-ops.c index 2d25748ca706..b27e89ff6a16 100644 --- a/sound/soc/soc-ops.c +++ b/sound/soc/soc-ops.c @@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ int snd_soc_get_volsw(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, int max = mc->max; int min = mc->min; int sign_bit = mc->sign_bit; - unsigned int mask = (1 << fls(max)) - 1; + unsigned int mask = (1ULL << fls(max)) - 1; unsigned int invert = mc->invert; int val; int ret; From 7171d6aef1f1d96213786443a16d3baca73c7c32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 15:53:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 096/139] ata: sata_sx4: fix pdc20621_get_from_dimm() on 64-bit [ Upstream commit 52f80bb181a9a1530ade30bc18991900bbb9697f ] gcc warns about a memcpy() with overlapping pointers because of an incorrect size calculation: In file included from include/linux/string.h:369, from drivers/ata/sata_sx4.c:66: In function 'memcpy_fromio', inlined from 'pdc20621_get_from_dimm.constprop' at drivers/ata/sata_sx4.c:962:2: include/linux/fortify-string.h:97:33: error: '__builtin_memcpy' accessing 4294934464 bytes at offsets 0 and [16, 16400] overlaps 6442385281 bytes at offset -2147450817 [-Werror=restrict] 97 | #define __underlying_memcpy __builtin_memcpy | ^ include/linux/fortify-string.h:620:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy' 620 | __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size); \ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ include/linux/fortify-string.h:665:26: note: in expansion of macro '__fortify_memcpy_chk' 665 | #define memcpy(p, q, s) __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s, \ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ include/asm-generic/io.h:1184:9: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy' 1184 | memcpy(buffer, __io_virt(addr), size); | ^~~~~~ The problem here is the overflow of an unsigned 32-bit number to a negative that gets converted into a signed 'long', keeping a large positive number. Replace the complex calculation with a more readable min() variant that avoids the warning. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/ata/sata_sx4.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/ata/sata_sx4.c b/drivers/ata/sata_sx4.c index 6ceec59cb291..fa1966638c06 100644 --- a/drivers/ata/sata_sx4.c +++ b/drivers/ata/sata_sx4.c @@ -958,8 +958,7 @@ static void pdc20621_get_from_dimm(struct ata_host *host, void *psource, offset -= (idx * window_size); idx++; - dist = ((long) (window_size - (offset + size))) >= 0 ? size : - (long) (window_size - offset); + dist = min(size, window_size - offset); memcpy_fromio(psource, dimm_mmio + offset / 4, dist); psource += dist; @@ -1006,8 +1005,7 @@ static void pdc20621_put_to_dimm(struct ata_host *host, void *psource, readl(mmio + PDC_DIMM_WINDOW_CTLR); offset -= (idx * window_size); idx++; - dist = ((long)(s32)(window_size - (offset + size))) >= 0 ? size : - (long) (window_size - offset); + dist = min(size, window_size - offset); memcpy_toio(dimm_mmio + offset / 4, psource, dist); writel(0x01, mmio + PDC_GENERAL_CTLR); readl(mmio + PDC_GENERAL_CTLR); From 4b87c1bc25593b5915b398d3998b3e3aff4d7dc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 23:38:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 097/139] scsi: mylex: Fix sysfs buffer lengths [ Upstream commit 1197c5b2099f716b3de327437fb50900a0b936c9 ] The myrb and myrs drivers use an odd way of implementing their sysfs files, calling snprintf() with a fixed length of 32 bytes to print into a page sized buffer. One of the strings is actually longer than 32 bytes, which clang can warn about: drivers/scsi/myrb.c:1906:10: error: 'snprintf' will always be truncated; specified size is 32, but format string expands to at least 34 [-Werror,-Wformat-truncation] drivers/scsi/myrs.c:1089:10: error: 'snprintf' will always be truncated; specified size is 32, but format string expands to at least 34 [-Werror,-Wformat-truncation] These could all be plain sprintf() without a length as the buffer is always long enough. On the other hand, sysfs files should not be overly long either, so just double the length to make sure the longest strings don't get truncated here. Fixes: 77266186397c ("scsi: myrs: Add Mylex RAID controller (SCSI interface)") Fixes: 081ff398c56c ("scsi: myrb: Add Mylex RAID controller (block interface)") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326223825.4084412-8-arnd@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/scsi/myrb.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- drivers/scsi/myrs.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/myrb.c b/drivers/scsi/myrb.c index e885c1dbf61f..e2f1b186efd0 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/myrb.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/myrb.c @@ -1775,9 +1775,9 @@ static ssize_t raid_state_show(struct device *dev, name = myrb_devstate_name(ldev_info->state); if (name) - ret = snprintf(buf, 32, "%s\n", name); + ret = snprintf(buf, 64, "%s\n", name); else - ret = snprintf(buf, 32, "Invalid (%02X)\n", + ret = snprintf(buf, 64, "Invalid (%02X)\n", ldev_info->state); } else { struct myrb_pdev_state *pdev_info = sdev->hostdata; @@ -1796,9 +1796,9 @@ static ssize_t raid_state_show(struct device *dev, else name = myrb_devstate_name(pdev_info->state); if (name) - ret = snprintf(buf, 32, "%s\n", name); + ret = snprintf(buf, 64, "%s\n", name); else - ret = snprintf(buf, 32, "Invalid (%02X)\n", + ret = snprintf(buf, 64, "Invalid (%02X)\n", pdev_info->state); } return ret; @@ -1886,11 +1886,11 @@ static ssize_t raid_level_show(struct device *dev, name = myrb_raidlevel_name(ldev_info->raid_level); if (!name) - return snprintf(buf, 32, "Invalid (%02X)\n", + return snprintf(buf, 64, "Invalid (%02X)\n", ldev_info->state); - return snprintf(buf, 32, "%s\n", name); + return snprintf(buf, 64, "%s\n", name); } - return snprintf(buf, 32, "Physical Drive\n"); + return snprintf(buf, 64, "Physical Drive\n"); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(raid_level); @@ -1903,15 +1903,15 @@ static ssize_t rebuild_show(struct device *dev, unsigned char status; if (sdev->channel < myrb_logical_channel(sdev->host)) - return snprintf(buf, 32, "physical device - not rebuilding\n"); + return snprintf(buf, 64, "physical device - not rebuilding\n"); status = myrb_get_rbld_progress(cb, &rbld_buf); if (rbld_buf.ldev_num != sdev->id || status != MYRB_STATUS_SUCCESS) - return snprintf(buf, 32, "not rebuilding\n"); + return snprintf(buf, 64, "not rebuilding\n"); - return snprintf(buf, 32, "rebuilding block %u of %u\n", + return snprintf(buf, 64, "rebuilding block %u of %u\n", rbld_buf.ldev_size - rbld_buf.blocks_left, rbld_buf.ldev_size); } diff --git a/drivers/scsi/myrs.c b/drivers/scsi/myrs.c index 7eb8c39da366..95e7c00cb7e5 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/myrs.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/myrs.c @@ -947,9 +947,9 @@ static ssize_t raid_state_show(struct device *dev, name = myrs_devstate_name(ldev_info->dev_state); if (name) - ret = snprintf(buf, 32, "%s\n", name); + ret = snprintf(buf, 64, "%s\n", name); else - ret = snprintf(buf, 32, "Invalid (%02X)\n", + ret = snprintf(buf, 64, "Invalid (%02X)\n", ldev_info->dev_state); } else { struct myrs_pdev_info *pdev_info; @@ -958,9 +958,9 @@ static ssize_t raid_state_show(struct device *dev, pdev_info = sdev->hostdata; name = myrs_devstate_name(pdev_info->dev_state); if (name) - ret = snprintf(buf, 32, "%s\n", name); + ret = snprintf(buf, 64, "%s\n", name); else - ret = snprintf(buf, 32, "Invalid (%02X)\n", + ret = snprintf(buf, 64, "Invalid (%02X)\n", pdev_info->dev_state); } return ret; @@ -1066,13 +1066,13 @@ static ssize_t raid_level_show(struct device *dev, ldev_info = sdev->hostdata; name = myrs_raid_level_name(ldev_info->raid_level); if (!name) - return snprintf(buf, 32, "Invalid (%02X)\n", + return snprintf(buf, 64, "Invalid (%02X)\n", ldev_info->dev_state); } else name = myrs_raid_level_name(MYRS_RAID_PHYSICAL); - return snprintf(buf, 32, "%s\n", name); + return snprintf(buf, 64, "%s\n", name); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(raid_level); @@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ static ssize_t rebuild_show(struct device *dev, unsigned char status; if (sdev->channel < cs->ctlr_info->physchan_present) - return snprintf(buf, 32, "physical device - not rebuilding\n"); + return snprintf(buf, 64, "physical device - not rebuilding\n"); ldev_info = sdev->hostdata; ldev_num = ldev_info->ldev_num; @@ -1098,11 +1098,11 @@ static ssize_t rebuild_show(struct device *dev, return -EIO; } if (ldev_info->rbld_active) { - return snprintf(buf, 32, "rebuilding block %zu of %zu\n", + return snprintf(buf, 64, "rebuilding block %zu of %zu\n", (size_t)ldev_info->rbld_lba, (size_t)ldev_info->cfg_devsize); } else - return snprintf(buf, 32, "not rebuilding\n"); + return snprintf(buf, 64, "not rebuilding\n"); } static ssize_t rebuild_store(struct device *dev, @@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ static ssize_t consistency_check_show(struct device *dev, unsigned short ldev_num; if (sdev->channel < cs->ctlr_info->physchan_present) - return snprintf(buf, 32, "physical device - not checking\n"); + return snprintf(buf, 64, "physical device - not checking\n"); ldev_info = sdev->hostdata; if (!ldev_info) @@ -1198,11 +1198,11 @@ static ssize_t consistency_check_show(struct device *dev, ldev_num = ldev_info->ldev_num; myrs_get_ldev_info(cs, ldev_num, ldev_info); if (ldev_info->cc_active) - return snprintf(buf, 32, "checking block %zu of %zu\n", + return snprintf(buf, 64, "checking block %zu of %zu\n", (size_t)ldev_info->cc_lba, (size_t)ldev_info->cfg_devsize); else - return snprintf(buf, 32, "not checking\n"); + return snprintf(buf, 64, "not checking\n"); } static ssize_t consistency_check_store(struct device *dev, From 9adcfd56703cfcdbeb5f076c714594873f02ec72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Li Nan Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2023 16:23:35 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 098/139] scsi: sd: Unregister device if device_add_disk() failed in sd_probe() [ Upstream commit 0296bea01cfa6526be6bd2d16dc83b4e7f1af91f ] "if device_add() succeeds, you should call device_del() when you want to get rid of it." In sd_probe(), device_add_disk() fails when device_add() has already succeeded, so change put_device() to device_unregister() to ensure device resources are released. Fixes: 2a7a891f4c40 ("scsi: sd: Add error handling support for add_disk()") Signed-off-by: Li Nan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231208082335.1754205-1-linan666@huaweicloud.com Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/scsi/sd.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/sd.c b/drivers/scsi/sd.c index c793bca88223..f32236c3f81c 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/sd.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sd.c @@ -3636,7 +3636,7 @@ static int sd_probe(struct device *dev) error = device_add_disk(dev, gd, NULL); if (error) { - put_device(&sdkp->disk_dev); + device_unregister(&sdkp->disk_dev); put_disk(gd); goto out; } From 78942ac754990d200ba5454678e3d8cb2e327d59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 10:11:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 099/139] cifs: Fix caching to try to do open O_WRONLY as rdwr on server [ Upstream commit e9e62243a3e2322cf639f653a0b0a88a76446ce7 ] When we're engaged in local caching of a cifs filesystem, we cannot perform caching of a partially written cache granule unless we can read the rest of the granule. This can result in unexpected access errors being reported to the user. Fix this by the following: if a file is opened O_WRONLY locally, but the mount was given the "-o fsc" flag, try first opening the remote file with GENERIC_READ|GENERIC_WRITE and if that returns -EACCES, try dropping the GENERIC_READ and doing the open again. If that last succeeds, invalidate the cache for that file as for O_DIRECT. Fixes: 70431bfd825d ("cifs: Support fscache indexing rewrite") Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Steve French cc: Shyam Prasad N cc: Rohith Surabattula cc: Jeff Layton cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/smb/client/dir.c | 15 +++++++++++++ fs/smb/client/file.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- fs/smb/client/fscache.h | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/dir.c b/fs/smb/client/dir.c index e382b794acbe..863c7bc3db86 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/dir.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/dir.c @@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ static int cifs_do_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *direntry, unsigned int disposition; struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server; struct cifs_open_parms oparms; + int rdwr_for_fscache = 0; *oplock = 0; if (tcon->ses->server->oplocks) @@ -191,6 +192,10 @@ static int cifs_do_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *direntry, unsigned return PTR_ERR(full_path); } + /* If we're caching, we need to be able to fill in around partial writes. */ + if (cifs_fscache_enabled(inode) && (oflags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY) + rdwr_for_fscache = 1; + #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY if (tcon->unix_ext && cap_unix(tcon->ses) && !tcon->broken_posix_open && (CIFS_UNIX_POSIX_PATH_OPS_CAP & @@ -267,6 +272,8 @@ static int cifs_do_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *direntry, unsigned desired_access |= GENERIC_READ; /* is this too little? */ if (OPEN_FMODE(oflags) & FMODE_WRITE) desired_access |= GENERIC_WRITE; + if (rdwr_for_fscache == 1) + desired_access |= GENERIC_READ; disposition = FILE_OVERWRITE_IF; if ((oflags & (O_CREAT | O_EXCL)) == (O_CREAT | O_EXCL)) @@ -295,6 +302,7 @@ static int cifs_do_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *direntry, unsigned if (!tcon->unix_ext && (mode & S_IWUGO) == 0) create_options |= CREATE_OPTION_READONLY; +retry_open: oparms = (struct cifs_open_parms) { .tcon = tcon, .cifs_sb = cifs_sb, @@ -308,8 +316,15 @@ static int cifs_do_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *direntry, unsigned rc = server->ops->open(xid, &oparms, oplock, buf); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(FYI, "cifs_create returned 0x%x\n", rc); + if (rc == -EACCES && rdwr_for_fscache == 1) { + desired_access &= ~GENERIC_READ; + rdwr_for_fscache = 2; + goto retry_open; + } goto out; } + if (rdwr_for_fscache == 2) + cifs_invalidate_cache(inode, FSCACHE_INVAL_DIO_WRITE); #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY /* diff --git a/fs/smb/client/file.c b/fs/smb/client/file.c index 0f3405e0f2e4..c240cea7ca34 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/file.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/file.c @@ -77,12 +77,12 @@ cifs_mark_open_files_invalid(struct cifs_tcon *tcon) */ } -static inline int cifs_convert_flags(unsigned int flags) +static inline int cifs_convert_flags(unsigned int flags, int rdwr_for_fscache) { if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) return GENERIC_READ; else if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY) - return GENERIC_WRITE; + return rdwr_for_fscache == 1 ? (GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE) : GENERIC_WRITE; else if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR) { /* GENERIC_ALL is too much permission to request can cause unnecessary access denied on create */ @@ -219,11 +219,16 @@ static int cifs_nt_open(const char *full_path, struct inode *inode, struct cifs_ int create_options = CREATE_NOT_DIR; struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server; struct cifs_open_parms oparms; + int rdwr_for_fscache = 0; if (!server->ops->open) return -ENOSYS; - desired_access = cifs_convert_flags(f_flags); + /* If we're caching, we need to be able to fill in around partial writes. */ + if (cifs_fscache_enabled(inode) && (f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY) + rdwr_for_fscache = 1; + + desired_access = cifs_convert_flags(f_flags, rdwr_for_fscache); /********************************************************************* * open flag mapping table: @@ -260,6 +265,7 @@ static int cifs_nt_open(const char *full_path, struct inode *inode, struct cifs_ if (f_flags & O_DIRECT) create_options |= CREATE_NO_BUFFER; +retry_open: oparms = (struct cifs_open_parms) { .tcon = tcon, .cifs_sb = cifs_sb, @@ -271,8 +277,16 @@ static int cifs_nt_open(const char *full_path, struct inode *inode, struct cifs_ }; rc = server->ops->open(xid, &oparms, oplock, buf); - if (rc) + if (rc) { + if (rc == -EACCES && rdwr_for_fscache == 1) { + desired_access = cifs_convert_flags(f_flags, 0); + rdwr_for_fscache = 2; + goto retry_open; + } return rc; + } + if (rdwr_for_fscache == 2) + cifs_invalidate_cache(inode, FSCACHE_INVAL_DIO_WRITE); /* TODO: Add support for calling posix query info but with passing in fid */ if (tcon->unix_ext) @@ -705,11 +719,11 @@ int cifs_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) use_cache: fscache_use_cookie(cifs_inode_cookie(file_inode(file)), file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE); - if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT && - (!((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) || - file->f_flags & O_APPEND)) - cifs_invalidate_cache(file_inode(file), - FSCACHE_INVAL_DIO_WRITE); + if (!(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) + goto out; + if ((file->f_flags & (O_ACCMODE | O_APPEND)) == O_RDONLY) + goto out; + cifs_invalidate_cache(file_inode(file), FSCACHE_INVAL_DIO_WRITE); out: free_dentry_path(page); @@ -774,6 +788,7 @@ cifs_reopen_file(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile, bool can_flush) int disposition = FILE_OPEN; int create_options = CREATE_NOT_DIR; struct cifs_open_parms oparms; + int rdwr_for_fscache = 0; xid = get_xid(); mutex_lock(&cfile->fh_mutex); @@ -837,7 +852,11 @@ cifs_reopen_file(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile, bool can_flush) } #endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY */ - desired_access = cifs_convert_flags(cfile->f_flags); + /* If we're caching, we need to be able to fill in around partial writes. */ + if (cifs_fscache_enabled(inode) && (cfile->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY) + rdwr_for_fscache = 1; + + desired_access = cifs_convert_flags(cfile->f_flags, rdwr_for_fscache); /* O_SYNC also has bit for O_DSYNC so following check picks up either */ if (cfile->f_flags & O_SYNC) @@ -849,6 +868,7 @@ cifs_reopen_file(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile, bool can_flush) if (server->ops->get_lease_key) server->ops->get_lease_key(inode, &cfile->fid); +retry_open: oparms = (struct cifs_open_parms) { .tcon = tcon, .cifs_sb = cifs_sb, @@ -874,6 +894,11 @@ cifs_reopen_file(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile, bool can_flush) /* indicate that we need to relock the file */ oparms.reconnect = true; } + if (rc == -EACCES && rdwr_for_fscache == 1) { + desired_access = cifs_convert_flags(cfile->f_flags, 0); + rdwr_for_fscache = 2; + goto retry_open; + } if (rc) { mutex_unlock(&cfile->fh_mutex); @@ -882,6 +907,9 @@ cifs_reopen_file(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile, bool can_flush) goto reopen_error_exit; } + if (rdwr_for_fscache == 2) + cifs_invalidate_cache(inode, FSCACHE_INVAL_DIO_WRITE); + #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY reopen_success: #endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY */ diff --git a/fs/smb/client/fscache.h b/fs/smb/client/fscache.h index 67b601041f0a..c691b98b442a 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/fscache.h +++ b/fs/smb/client/fscache.h @@ -108,6 +108,11 @@ static inline void cifs_readpage_to_fscache(struct inode *inode, __cifs_readpage_to_fscache(inode, page); } +static inline bool cifs_fscache_enabled(struct inode *inode) +{ + return fscache_cookie_enabled(cifs_inode_cookie(inode)); +} + #else /* CONFIG_CIFS_FSCACHE */ static inline void cifs_fscache_fill_coherency(struct inode *inode, @@ -123,6 +128,7 @@ static inline void cifs_fscache_release_inode_cookie(struct inode *inode) {} static inline void cifs_fscache_unuse_inode_cookie(struct inode *inode, bool update) {} static inline struct fscache_cookie *cifs_inode_cookie(struct inode *inode) { return NULL; } static inline void cifs_invalidate_cache(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags) {} +static inline bool cifs_fscache_enabled(struct inode *inode) { return false; } static inline int cifs_fscache_query_occupancy(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t first, unsigned int nr_pages, From 12059cf0487ff5299f03e3e3bc0f71213c99a3de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 10:06:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 100/139] ata: sata_mv: Fix PCI device ID table declaration compilation warning [ Upstream commit 3137b83a90646917c90951d66489db466b4ae106 ] Building with W=1 shows a warning for an unused variable when CONFIG_PCI is diabled: drivers/ata/sata_mv.c:790:35: error: unused variable 'mv_pci_tbl' [-Werror,-Wunused-const-variable] static const struct pci_device_id mv_pci_tbl[] = { Move the table into the same block that containsn the pci_driver definition. Fixes: 7bb3c5290ca0 ("sata_mv: Remove PCI dependency") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/ata/sata_mv.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/ata/sata_mv.c b/drivers/ata/sata_mv.c index 17f9062b0eaa..9cf540017a5e 100644 --- a/drivers/ata/sata_mv.c +++ b/drivers/ata/sata_mv.c @@ -787,37 +787,6 @@ static const struct ata_port_info mv_port_info[] = { }, }; -static const struct pci_device_id mv_pci_tbl[] = { - { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x5040), chip_504x }, - { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x5041), chip_504x }, - { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x5080), chip_5080 }, - { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x5081), chip_508x }, - /* RocketRAID 1720/174x have different identifiers */ - { PCI_VDEVICE(TTI, 0x1720), chip_6042 }, - { PCI_VDEVICE(TTI, 0x1740), chip_6042 }, - { PCI_VDEVICE(TTI, 0x1742), chip_6042 }, - - { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x6040), chip_604x }, - { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x6041), chip_604x }, - { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x6042), chip_6042 }, - { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x6080), chip_608x }, - { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x6081), chip_608x }, - - { PCI_VDEVICE(ADAPTEC2, 0x0241), chip_604x }, - - /* Adaptec 1430SA */ - { PCI_VDEVICE(ADAPTEC2, 0x0243), chip_7042 }, - - /* Marvell 7042 support */ - { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x7042), chip_7042 }, - - /* Highpoint RocketRAID PCIe series */ - { PCI_VDEVICE(TTI, 0x2300), chip_7042 }, - { PCI_VDEVICE(TTI, 0x2310), chip_7042 }, - - { } /* terminate list */ -}; - static const struct mv_hw_ops mv5xxx_ops = { .phy_errata = mv5_phy_errata, .enable_leds = mv5_enable_leds, @@ -4301,6 +4270,36 @@ static int mv_pci_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, static int mv_pci_device_resume(struct pci_dev *pdev); #endif +static const struct pci_device_id mv_pci_tbl[] = { + { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x5040), chip_504x }, + { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x5041), chip_504x }, + { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x5080), chip_5080 }, + { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x5081), chip_508x }, + /* RocketRAID 1720/174x have different identifiers */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(TTI, 0x1720), chip_6042 }, + { PCI_VDEVICE(TTI, 0x1740), chip_6042 }, + { PCI_VDEVICE(TTI, 0x1742), chip_6042 }, + + { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x6040), chip_604x }, + { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x6041), chip_604x }, + { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x6042), chip_6042 }, + { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x6080), chip_608x }, + { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x6081), chip_608x }, + + { PCI_VDEVICE(ADAPTEC2, 0x0241), chip_604x }, + + /* Adaptec 1430SA */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(ADAPTEC2, 0x0243), chip_7042 }, + + /* Marvell 7042 support */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(MARVELL, 0x7042), chip_7042 }, + + /* Highpoint RocketRAID PCIe series */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(TTI, 0x2300), chip_7042 }, + { PCI_VDEVICE(TTI, 0x2310), chip_7042 }, + + { } /* terminate list */ +}; static struct pci_driver mv_pci_driver = { .name = DRV_NAME, @@ -4313,6 +4312,7 @@ static struct pci_driver mv_pci_driver = { #endif }; +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, mv_pci_tbl); /** * mv_print_info - Dump key info to kernel log for perusal. @@ -4485,7 +4485,6 @@ static void __exit mv_exit(void) MODULE_AUTHOR("Brett Russ"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SCSI low-level driver for Marvell SATA controllers"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); -MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, mv_pci_tbl); MODULE_VERSION(DRV_VERSION); MODULE_ALIAS("platform:" DRV_NAME); From c19715ec258d4be92e0995660d31ae2612439f0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2024 13:56:18 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 101/139] nfsd: hold a lighter-weight client reference over CB_RECALL_ANY [ Upstream commit 10396f4df8b75ff6ab0aa2cd74296565466f2c8d ] Currently the CB_RECALL_ANY job takes a cl_rpc_users reference to the client. While a callback job is technically an RPC that counter is really more for client-driven RPCs, and this has the effect of preventing the client from being unhashed until the callback completes. If nfsd decides to send a CB_RECALL_ANY just as the client reboots, we can end up in a situation where the callback can't complete on the (now dead) callback channel, but the new client can't connect because the old client can't be unhashed. This usually manifests as a NFS4ERR_DELAY return on the CREATE_SESSION operation. The job is only holding a reference to the client so it can clear a flag after the RPC completes. Fix this by having CB_RECALL_ANY instead hold a reference to the cl_nfsdfs.cl_ref. Typically we only take that sort of reference when dealing with the nfsdfs info files, but it should work appropriately here to ensure that the nfs4_client doesn't disappear. Fixes: 44df6f439a17 ("NFSD: add delegation reaper to react to low memory condition") Reported-by: Vladimir Benes Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index e4522e86e984..8d15959004ad 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -2889,12 +2889,9 @@ static void nfsd4_cb_recall_any_release(struct nfsd4_callback *cb) { struct nfs4_client *clp = cb->cb_clp; - struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(clp->net, nfsd_net_id); - spin_lock(&nn->client_lock); clear_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_CB_RECALL_ANY, &clp->cl_flags); - put_client_renew_locked(clp); - spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock); + drop_client(clp); } static const struct nfsd4_callback_ops nfsd4_cb_recall_any_ops = { @@ -6231,7 +6228,7 @@ deleg_reaper(struct nfsd_net *nn) list_add(&clp->cl_ra_cblist, &cblist); /* release in nfsd4_cb_recall_any_release */ - atomic_inc(&clp->cl_rpc_users); + kref_get(&clp->cl_nfsdfs.cl_ref); set_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_CB_RECALL_ANY, &clp->cl_flags); clp->cl_ra_time = ktime_get_boottime_seconds(); } From 7ef6a7f9b32fdfc8bec0a10e6d5ac5374d4f02e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:46:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 102/139] x86/retpoline: Add NOENDBR annotation to the SRSO dummy return thunk commit b377c66ae3509ccea596512d6afb4777711c4870 upstream. srso_alias_untrain_ret() is special code, even if it is a dummy which is called in the !SRSO case, so annotate it like its real counterpart, to address the following objtool splat: vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: .export_symbol+0x2b290: data relocation to !ENDBR: srso_alias_untrain_ret+0x0 Fixes: 4535e1a4174c ("x86/bugs: Fix the SRSO mitigation on Zen3/4") Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240405144637.17908-1-bp@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index a96e816e5ccd..055955c9bfcb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC ANNOTATE_NOENDBR ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR ret int3 SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk) From 2e5f8dc1dec824d9df6d5f5eb9f1b5a73b57574f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Namjae Jeon Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2024 21:58:26 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 103/139] ksmbd: don't send oplock break if rename fails commit c1832f67035dc04fb89e6b591b64e4d515843cda upstream. Don't send oplock break if rename fails. This patch fix smb2.oplock.batch20 test. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index 39fc078284c8..c02b1772cb80 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -5579,8 +5579,9 @@ static int smb2_rename(struct ksmbd_work *work, if (!file_info->ReplaceIfExists) flags = RENAME_NOREPLACE; - smb_break_all_levII_oplock(work, fp, 0); rc = ksmbd_vfs_rename(work, &fp->filp->f_path, new_name, flags); + if (!rc) + smb_break_all_levII_oplock(work, fp, 0); out: kfree(new_name); return rc; From 51a6c2af9d20203ddeeaf73314ba8854b38d01bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Namjae Jeon Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2024 21:59:10 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 104/139] ksmbd: validate payload size in ipc response commit a677ebd8ca2f2632ccdecbad7b87641274e15aac upstream. If installing malicious ksmbd-tools, ksmbd.mountd can return invalid ipc response to ksmbd kernel server. ksmbd should validate payload size of ipc response from ksmbd.mountd to avoid memory overrun or slab-out-of-bounds. This patch validate 3 ipc response that has payload. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Chao Ma Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/ksmbd_netlink.h | 3 ++- fs/smb/server/mgmt/share_config.c | 7 +++++- fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/ksmbd_netlink.h b/fs/smb/server/ksmbd_netlink.h index 0ebf91ffa236..4464a62228cf 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/ksmbd_netlink.h +++ b/fs/smb/server/ksmbd_netlink.h @@ -166,7 +166,8 @@ struct ksmbd_share_config_response { __u16 force_uid; __u16 force_gid; __s8 share_name[KSMBD_REQ_MAX_SHARE_NAME]; - __u32 reserved[112]; /* Reserved room */ + __u32 reserved[111]; /* Reserved room */ + __u32 payload_sz; __u32 veto_list_sz; __s8 ____payload[]; }; diff --git a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/share_config.c b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/share_config.c index 328a412259dc..a2f0a2edceb8 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/share_config.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/share_config.c @@ -158,7 +158,12 @@ static struct ksmbd_share_config *share_config_request(struct unicode_map *um, share->name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL); if (!test_share_config_flag(share, KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_PIPE)) { - share->path = kstrdup(ksmbd_share_config_path(resp), + int path_len = PATH_MAX; + + if (resp->payload_sz) + path_len = resp->payload_sz - resp->veto_list_sz; + + share->path = kstrndup(ksmbd_share_config_path(resp), path_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (share->path) share->path_sz = strlen(share->path); diff --git a/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c b/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c index f29bb03f0dc4..8752ac82c557 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct ipc_msg_table_entry { struct hlist_node ipc_table_hlist; void *response; + unsigned int msg_sz; }; static struct delayed_work ipc_timer_work; @@ -275,6 +276,7 @@ static int handle_response(int type, void *payload, size_t sz) } memcpy(entry->response, payload, sz); + entry->msg_sz = sz; wake_up_interruptible(&entry->wait); ret = 0; break; @@ -453,6 +455,34 @@ out: return ret; } +static int ipc_validate_msg(struct ipc_msg_table_entry *entry) +{ + unsigned int msg_sz = entry->msg_sz; + + if (entry->type == KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST) { + struct ksmbd_rpc_command *resp = entry->response; + + msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp->payload_sz; + } else if (entry->type == KSMBD_EVENT_SPNEGO_AUTHEN_REQUEST) { + struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_response *resp = entry->response; + + msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_response) + + resp->session_key_len + resp->spnego_blob_len; + } else if (entry->type == KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST) { + struct ksmbd_share_config_response *resp = entry->response; + + if (resp->payload_sz) { + if (resp->payload_sz < resp->veto_list_sz) + return -EINVAL; + + msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) + + resp->payload_sz; + } + } + + return entry->msg_sz != msg_sz ? -EINVAL : 0; +} + static void *ipc_msg_send_request(struct ksmbd_ipc_msg *msg, unsigned int handle) { struct ipc_msg_table_entry entry; @@ -477,6 +507,13 @@ static void *ipc_msg_send_request(struct ksmbd_ipc_msg *msg, unsigned int handle ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(entry.wait, entry.response != NULL, IPC_WAIT_TIMEOUT); + if (entry.response) { + ret = ipc_validate_msg(&entry); + if (ret) { + kvfree(entry.response); + entry.response = NULL; + } + } out: down_write(&ipc_msg_table_lock); hash_del(&entry.ipc_table_hlist); From 883e072e83f1f322ebfebbcede7655420c6cf0ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Namjae Jeon Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 09:31:22 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 105/139] ksmbd: do not set SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION for SMB 3.1.1 commit 5ed11af19e56f0434ce0959376d136005745a936 upstream. SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION flag should be used only for 3.0 and 3.0.2 dialects. This flags set cause compatibility problems with other SMB clients. Reported-by: James Christopher Adduono Tested-by: James Christopher Adduono Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/smb2ops.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2ops.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2ops.c index 27a9dce3e03a..8600f32c981a 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2ops.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2ops.c @@ -228,6 +228,11 @@ void init_smb3_0_server(struct ksmbd_conn *conn) conn->cli_cap & SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION) conn->vals->capabilities |= SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION; + if (server_conf.flags & KSMBD_GLOBAL_FLAG_SMB2_ENCRYPTION || + (!(server_conf.flags & KSMBD_GLOBAL_FLAG_SMB2_ENCRYPTION_OFF) && + conn->cli_cap & SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION)) + conn->vals->capabilities |= SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION; + if (server_conf.flags & KSMBD_GLOBAL_FLAG_SMB3_MULTICHANNEL) conn->vals->capabilities |= SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_MULTI_CHANNEL; } @@ -275,11 +280,6 @@ int init_smb3_11_server(struct ksmbd_conn *conn) conn->vals->capabilities |= SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_LEASING | SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_DIRECTORY_LEASING; - if (server_conf.flags & KSMBD_GLOBAL_FLAG_SMB2_ENCRYPTION || - (!(server_conf.flags & KSMBD_GLOBAL_FLAG_SMB2_ENCRYPTION_OFF) && - conn->cli_cap & SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION)) - conn->vals->capabilities |= SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION; - if (server_conf.flags & KSMBD_GLOBAL_FLAG_SMB3_MULTICHANNEL) conn->vals->capabilities |= SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_MULTI_CHANNEL; From 2ff8f06550575e60b05ea650047ab9a9bfb32d66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christoffer Sandberg Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 11:27:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 106/139] ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix inactive headset mic jack commit daf6c4681a74034d5723e2fb761e0d7f3a1ca18f upstream. This patch adds the existing fixup to certain TF platforms implementing the ALC274 codec with a headset jack. It fixes/activates the inactive microphone of the headset. Signed-off-by: Christoffer Sandberg Signed-off-by: Werner Sembach Cc: Message-ID: <20240328102757.50310-1-wse@tuxedocomputers.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index fb12034d464e..24ab799b7ef1 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -10121,6 +10121,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d05, 0x1147, "TongFang GMxTGxx", ALC269_FIXUP_NO_SHUTUP), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d05, 0x115c, "TongFang GMxTGxx", ALC269_FIXUP_NO_SHUTUP), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d05, 0x121b, "TongFang GMxAGxx", ALC269_FIXUP_NO_SHUTUP), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d05, 0x1387, "TongFang GMxIXxx", ALC2XX_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d72, 0x1602, "RedmiBook", ALC255_FIXUP_XIAOMI_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d72, 0x1701, "XiaomiNotebook Pro", ALC298_FIXUP_DELL1_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d72, 0x1901, "RedmiBook 14", ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_HEADSET_MIC), From f35d7ede62d989b65d37a49ccbfc3b1b06182deb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: I Gede Agastya Darma Laksana Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 00:46:02 +0700 Subject: [PATCH 107/139] ALSA: hda/realtek: Update Panasonic CF-SZ6 quirk to support headset with microphone commit 1576f263ee2147dc395531476881058609ad3d38 upstream. This patch addresses an issue with the Panasonic CF-SZ6's existing quirk, specifically its headset microphone functionality. Previously, the quirk used ALC269_FIXUP_HEADSET_MODE, which does not support the CF-SZ6's design of a single 3.5mm jack for both mic and audio output effectively. The device uses pin 0x19 for the headset mic without jack detection. Following verification on the CF-SZ6 and discussions with the original patch author, i determined that the update to ALC269_FIXUP_ASPIRE_HEADSET_MIC is the appropriate solution. This change is custom-designed for the CF-SZ6's unique hardware setup, which includes a single 3.5mm jack for both mic and audio output, connecting the headset microphone to pin 0x19 without the use of jack detection. Fixes: 0fca97a29b83 ("ALSA: hda/realtek - Add Panasonic CF-SZ6 headset jack quirk") Signed-off-by: I Gede Agastya Darma Laksana Cc: Message-ID: <20240401174602.14133-1-gedeagas22@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 24ab799b7ef1..e8cf38dc8a5e 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -9905,7 +9905,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x10ec, 0x1252, "Intel Reference board", ALC295_FIXUP_CHROME_BOOK), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x10ec, 0x1254, "Intel Reference board", ALC295_FIXUP_CHROME_BOOK), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x10ec, 0x12cc, "Intel Reference board", ALC295_FIXUP_CHROME_BOOK), - SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x10f7, 0x8338, "Panasonic CF-SZ6", ALC269_FIXUP_HEADSET_MODE), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x10f7, 0x8338, "Panasonic CF-SZ6", ALC269_FIXUP_ASPIRE_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x144d, 0xc109, "Samsung Ativ book 9 (NP900X3G)", ALC269_FIXUP_INV_DMIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x144d, 0xc169, "Samsung Notebook 9 Pen (NP930SBE-K01US)", ALC298_FIXUP_SAMSUNG_AMP), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x144d, 0xc176, "Samsung Notebook 9 Pro (NP930MBE-K04US)", ALC298_FIXUP_SAMSUNG_AMP), From 9406d598a13ad4e0f13b63d3a2bdbaf30d73af44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herve Codina Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 16:21:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 108/139] driver core: Introduce device_link_wait_removal() commit 0462c56c290a99a7f03e817ae5b843116dfb575c upstream. The commit 80dd33cf72d1 ("drivers: base: Fix device link removal") introduces a workqueue to release the consumer and supplier devices used in the devlink. In the job queued, devices are release and in turn, when all the references to these devices are dropped, the release function of the device itself is called. Nothing is present to provide some synchronisation with this workqueue in order to ensure that all ongoing releasing operations are done and so, some other operations can be started safely. For instance, in the following sequence: 1) of_platform_depopulate() 2) of_overlay_remove() During the step 1, devices are released and related devlinks are removed (jobs pushed in the workqueue). During the step 2, OF nodes are destroyed but, without any synchronisation with devlink removal jobs, of_overlay_remove() can raise warnings related to missing of_node_put(): ERROR: memory leak, expected refcount 1 instead of 2 Indeed, the missing of_node_put() call is going to be done, too late, from the workqueue job execution. Introduce device_link_wait_removal() to offer a way to synchronize operations waiting for the end of devlink removals (i.e. end of workqueue jobs). Also, as a flushing operation is done on the workqueue, the workqueue used is moved from a system-wide workqueue to a local one. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Herve Codina Tested-by: Luca Ceresoli Reviewed-by: Nuno Sa Reviewed-by: Saravana Kannan Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325152140.198219-2-herve.codina@bootlin.com Signed-off-by: Rob Herring Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/base/core.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++--- include/linux/device.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/core.c b/drivers/base/core.c index 3078f44dc186..8d87808cdb8a 100644 --- a/drivers/base/core.c +++ b/drivers/base/core.c @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ static bool fw_devlink_is_permissive(void); static void __fw_devlink_link_to_consumers(struct device *dev); static bool fw_devlink_drv_reg_done; static bool fw_devlink_best_effort; +static struct workqueue_struct *device_link_wq; /** * __fwnode_link_add - Create a link between two fwnode_handles. @@ -585,12 +586,26 @@ static void devlink_dev_release(struct device *dev) /* * It may take a while to complete this work because of the SRCU * synchronization in device_link_release_fn() and if the consumer or - * supplier devices get deleted when it runs, so put it into the "long" - * workqueue. + * supplier devices get deleted when it runs, so put it into the + * dedicated workqueue. */ - queue_work(system_long_wq, &link->rm_work); + queue_work(device_link_wq, &link->rm_work); } +/** + * device_link_wait_removal - Wait for ongoing devlink removal jobs to terminate + */ +void device_link_wait_removal(void) +{ + /* + * devlink removal jobs are queued in the dedicated work queue. + * To be sure that all removal jobs are terminated, ensure that any + * scheduled work has run to completion. + */ + flush_workqueue(device_link_wq); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(device_link_wait_removal); + static struct class devlink_class = { .name = "devlink", .owner = THIS_MODULE, @@ -4132,9 +4147,14 @@ int __init devices_init(void) sysfs_dev_char_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("char", dev_kobj); if (!sysfs_dev_char_kobj) goto char_kobj_err; + device_link_wq = alloc_workqueue("device_link_wq", 0, 0); + if (!device_link_wq) + goto wq_err; return 0; + wq_err: + kobject_put(sysfs_dev_char_kobj); char_kobj_err: kobject_put(sysfs_dev_block_kobj); block_kobj_err: diff --git a/include/linux/device.h b/include/linux/device.h index 5520bb546a4a..f88b498ee9da 100644 --- a/include/linux/device.h +++ b/include/linux/device.h @@ -1099,6 +1099,7 @@ void device_link_del(struct device_link *link); void device_link_remove(void *consumer, struct device *supplier); void device_links_supplier_sync_state_pause(void); void device_links_supplier_sync_state_resume(void); +void device_link_wait_removal(void); extern __printf(3, 4) int dev_err_probe(const struct device *dev, int err, const char *fmt, ...); From 7b6df050c45a1ea158fd50bc32a8e1447dd1e951 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herve Codina Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 16:21:26 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 109/139] of: dynamic: Synchronize of_changeset_destroy() with the devlink removals commit 8917e7385346bd6584890ed362985c219fe6ae84 upstream. In the following sequence: 1) of_platform_depopulate() 2) of_overlay_remove() During the step 1, devices are destroyed and devlinks are removed. During the step 2, OF nodes are destroyed but __of_changeset_entry_destroy() can raise warnings related to missing of_node_put(): ERROR: memory leak, expected refcount 1 instead of 2 ... Indeed, during the devlink removals performed at step 1, the removal itself releasing the device (and the attached of_node) is done by a job queued in a workqueue and so, it is done asynchronously with respect to function calls. When the warning is present, of_node_put() will be called but wrongly too late from the workqueue job. In order to be sure that any ongoing devlink removals are done before the of_node destruction, synchronize the of_changeset_destroy() with the devlink removals. Fixes: 80dd33cf72d1 ("drivers: base: Fix device link removal") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Herve Codina Reviewed-by: Saravana Kannan Tested-by: Luca Ceresoli Reviewed-by: Nuno Sa Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325152140.198219-3-herve.codina@bootlin.com Signed-off-by: Rob Herring Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/of/dynamic.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/of/dynamic.c b/drivers/of/dynamic.c index 9bb9fe0fad07..e2a9651014c6 100644 --- a/drivers/of/dynamic.c +++ b/drivers/of/dynamic.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "OF: " fmt +#include #include #include #include @@ -679,6 +680,17 @@ void of_changeset_destroy(struct of_changeset *ocs) { struct of_changeset_entry *ce, *cen; + /* + * When a device is deleted, the device links to/from it are also queued + * for deletion. Until these device links are freed, the devices + * themselves aren't freed. If the device being deleted is due to an + * overlay change, this device might be holding a reference to a device + * node that will be freed. So, wait until all already pending device + * links are deleted before freeing a device node. This ensures we don't + * free any device node that has a non-zero reference count. + */ + device_link_wait_removal(); + list_for_each_entry_safe_reverse(ce, cen, &ocs->entries, node) __of_changeset_entry_destroy(ce); } From 97e93367e82752e475a33839a80b33bdbef1209f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Hildenbrand Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 23:21:30 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 110/139] x86/mm/pat: fix VM_PAT handling in COW mappings commit 04c35ab3bdae7fefbd7c7a7355f29fa03a035221 upstream. PAT handling won't do the right thing in COW mappings: the first PTE (or, in fact, all PTEs) can be replaced during write faults to point at anon folios. Reliably recovering the correct PFN and cachemode using follow_phys() from PTEs will not work in COW mappings. Using follow_phys(), we might just get the address+protection of the anon folio (which is very wrong), or fail on swap/nonswap entries, failing follow_phys() and triggering a WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn() and track_pfn_copy(), not properly calling free_pfn_range(). In free_pfn_range(), we either wouldn't call memtype_free() or would call it with the wrong range, possibly leaking memory. To fix that, let's update follow_phys() to refuse returning anon folios, and fallback to using the stored PFN inside vma->vm_pgoff for COW mappings if we run into that. We will now properly handle untrack_pfn() with COW mappings, where we don't need the cachemode. We'll have to fail fork()->track_pfn_copy() if the first page was replaced by an anon folio, though: we'd have to store the cachemode in the VMA to make this work, likely growing the VMA size. For now, lets keep it simple and let track_pfn_copy() just fail in that case: it would have failed in the past with swap/nonswap entries already, and it would have done the wrong thing with anon folios. Simple reproducer to trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn(): <--- C reproducer ---> #include #include #include #include int main(void) { struct io_uring_params p = {}; int ring_fd; size_t size; char *map; ring_fd = io_uring_setup(1, &p); if (ring_fd < 0) { perror("io_uring_setup"); return 1; } size = p.sq_off.array + p.sq_entries * sizeof(unsigned); /* Map the submission queue ring MAP_PRIVATE */ map = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, ring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQ_RING); if (map == MAP_FAILED) { perror("mmap"); return 1; } /* We have at least one page. Let's COW it. */ *map = 0; pause(); return 0; } <--- C reproducer ---> On a system with 16 GiB RAM and swap configured: # ./iouring & # memhog 16G # killall iouring [ 301.552930] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 301.553285] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1402 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:1060 untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100 [ 301.553989] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_g [ 301.558232] CPU: 7 PID: 1402 Comm: iouring Not tainted 6.7.5-100.fc38.x86_64 #1 [ 301.558772] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebu4 [ 301.559569] RIP: 0010:untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100 [ 301.559893] Code: 75 c4 eb cf 48 8b 43 10 8b a8 e8 00 00 00 3b 6b 28 74 b8 48 8b 7b 30 e8 ea 1a f7 000 [ 301.561189] RSP: 0018:ffffba2c0377fab8 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 301.561590] RAX: 00000000ffffffea RBX: ffff9208c8ce9cc0 RCX: 000000010455e047 [ 301.562105] RDX: 07fffffff0eb1e0a RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9208c391d200 [ 301.562628] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffba2c0377fab8 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 301.563145] R10: ffff9208d2292d50 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 00007fea890e0000 [ 301.563669] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba2c0377fc08 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 301.564186] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff920c2fbc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 301.564773] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 301.565197] CR2: 00007fea88ee8a20 CR3: 00000001033a8000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 301.565725] PKRU: 55555554 [ 301.565944] Call Trace: [ 301.566148] [ 301.566325] ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100 [ 301.566618] ? __warn+0x81/0x130 [ 301.566876] ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100 [ 301.567163] ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 [ 301.567466] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 [ 301.567743] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 [ 301.568038] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 301.568363] ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100 [ 301.568660] ? untrack_pfn+0x65/0x100 [ 301.568947] unmap_single_vma+0xa6/0xe0 [ 301.569247] unmap_vmas+0xb5/0x190 [ 301.569532] exit_mmap+0xec/0x340 [ 301.569801] __mmput+0x3e/0x130 [ 301.570051] do_exit+0x305/0xaf0 ... Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240403212131.929421-3-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand Reported-by: Wupeng Ma Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240227122814.3781907-1-mawupeng1@huawei.com Fixes: b1a86e15dc03 ("x86, pat: remove the dependency on 'vm_pgoff' in track/untrack pfn vma routines") Fixes: 5899329b1910 ("x86: PAT: implement track/untrack of pfnmap regions for x86 - v3") Acked-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- mm/memory.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c index 66a209f7eb86..d6fe9093ea91 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c @@ -997,6 +997,38 @@ static void free_pfn_range(u64 paddr, unsigned long size) memtype_free(paddr, paddr + size); } +static int get_pat_info(struct vm_area_struct *vma, resource_size_t *paddr, + pgprot_t *pgprot) +{ + unsigned long prot; + + VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_PAT)); + + /* + * We need the starting PFN and cachemode used for track_pfn_remap() + * that covered the whole VMA. For most mappings, we can obtain that + * information from the page tables. For COW mappings, we might now + * suddenly have anon folios mapped and follow_phys() will fail. + * + * Fallback to using vma->vm_pgoff, see remap_pfn_range_notrack(), to + * detect the PFN. If we need the cachemode as well, we're out of luck + * for now and have to fail fork(). + */ + if (!follow_phys(vma, vma->vm_start, 0, &prot, paddr)) { + if (pgprot) + *pgprot = __pgprot(prot); + return 0; + } + if (is_cow_mapping(vma->vm_flags)) { + if (pgprot) + return -EINVAL; + *paddr = (resource_size_t)vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT; + return 0; + } + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + return -EINVAL; +} + /* * track_pfn_copy is called when vma that is covering the pfnmap gets * copied through copy_page_range(). @@ -1007,20 +1039,13 @@ static void free_pfn_range(u64 paddr, unsigned long size) int track_pfn_copy(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { resource_size_t paddr; - unsigned long prot; unsigned long vma_size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; pgprot_t pgprot; if (vma->vm_flags & VM_PAT) { - /* - * reserve the whole chunk covered by vma. We need the - * starting address and protection from pte. - */ - if (follow_phys(vma, vma->vm_start, 0, &prot, &paddr)) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + if (get_pat_info(vma, &paddr, &pgprot)) return -EINVAL; - } - pgprot = __pgprot(prot); + /* reserve the whole chunk covered by vma. */ return reserve_pfn_range(paddr, vma_size, &pgprot, 1); } @@ -1095,7 +1120,6 @@ void untrack_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long pfn, unsigned long size) { resource_size_t paddr; - unsigned long prot; if (vma && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_PAT)) return; @@ -1103,11 +1127,8 @@ void untrack_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long pfn, /* free the chunk starting from pfn or the whole chunk */ paddr = (resource_size_t)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT; if (!paddr && !size) { - if (follow_phys(vma, vma->vm_start, 0, &prot, &paddr)) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + if (get_pat_info(vma, &paddr, NULL)) return; - } - size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; } free_pfn_range(paddr, size); diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c index fb83cf56377a..301c74c44438 100644 --- a/mm/memory.c +++ b/mm/memory.c @@ -5593,6 +5593,10 @@ int follow_phys(struct vm_area_struct *vma, goto out; pte = *ptep; + /* Never return PFNs of anon folios in COW mappings. */ + if (vm_normal_folio(vma, address, pte)) + goto unlock; + if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !pte_write(pte)) goto unlock; From 20a915154ccb88da08986ab6c9fc4c1cf6259de2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2024 14:48:27 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 111/139] x86/mce: Make sure to grab mce_sysfs_mutex in set_bank() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 3ddf944b32f88741c303f0b21459dbb3872b8bc5 upstream. Modifying a MCA bank's MCA_CTL bits which control which error types to be reported is done over /sys/devices/system/machinecheck/ ├── machinecheck0 │   ├── bank0 │   ├── bank1 │   ├── bank10 │   ├── bank11 ... sysfs nodes by writing the new bit mask of events to enable. When the write is accepted, the kernel deletes all current timers and reinits all banks. Doing that in parallel can lead to initializing a timer which is already armed and in the timer wheel, i.e., in use already: ODEBUG: init active (active state 0) object: ffff888063a28000 object type: timer_list hint: mce_timer_fn+0x0/0x240 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c:2642 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8120 at lib/debugobjects.c:514 debug_print_object+0x1a0/0x2a0 lib/debugobjects.c:514 Fix that by grabbing the sysfs mutex as the rest of the MCA sysfs code does. Reported by: Yue Sun Reported by: xingwei lee Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAEkJfYNiENwQY8yV1LYJ9LjJs%2Bx_-PqMv98gKig55=2vbzffRw@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c index cad6ea1911e9..359218bc1b34 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c @@ -2471,12 +2471,14 @@ static ssize_t set_bank(struct device *s, struct device_attribute *attr, return -EINVAL; b = &per_cpu(mce_banks_array, s->id)[bank]; - if (!b->init) return -ENODEV; b->ctl = new; + + mutex_lock(&mce_sysfs_mutex); mce_restart(); + mutex_unlock(&mce_sysfs_mutex); return size; } From 22943e4fe4b3a2dcbadc3d38d5bf840bbdbfe374 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 17:07:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 112/139] x86/coco: Require seeding RNG with RDRAND on CoCo systems commit 99485c4c026f024e7cb82da84c7951dbe3deb584 upstream. There are few uses of CoCo that don't rely on working cryptography and hence a working RNG. Unfortunately, the CoCo threat model means that the VM host cannot be trusted and may actively work against guests to extract secrets or manipulate computation. Since a malicious host can modify or observe nearly all inputs to guests, the only remaining source of entropy for CoCo guests is RDRAND. If RDRAND is broken -- due to CPU hardware fault -- the RNG as a whole is meant to gracefully continue on gathering entropy from other sources, but since there aren't other sources on CoCo, this is catastrophic. This is mostly a concern at boot time when initially seeding the RNG, as after that the consequences of a broken RDRAND are much more theoretical. So, try at boot to seed the RNG using 256 bits of RDRAND output. If this fails, panic(). This will also trigger if the system is booted without RDRAND, as RDRAND is essential for a safe CoCo boot. Add this deliberately to be "just a CoCo x86 driver feature" and not part of the RNG itself. Many device drivers and platforms have some desire to contribute something to the RNG, and add_device_randomness() is specifically meant for this purpose. Any driver can call it with seed data of any quality, or even garbage quality, and it can only possibly make the quality of the RNG better or have no effect, but can never make it worse. Rather than trying to build something into the core of the RNG, consider the particular CoCo issue just a CoCo issue, and therefore separate it all out into driver (well, arch/platform) code. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326160735.73531-1-Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c index 1d3ad275c366..801e943fd2b2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c @@ -3,13 +3,17 @@ * Confidential Computing Platform Capability checks * * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2024 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. * * Author: Tom Lendacky */ #include #include +#include +#include +#include #include #include @@ -128,3 +132,40 @@ u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val) } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cc_mkdec); + +__init void cc_random_init(void) +{ + /* + * The seed is 32 bytes (in units of longs), which is 256 bits, which + * is the security level that the RNG is targeting. + */ + unsigned long rng_seed[32 / sizeof(long)]; + size_t i, longs; + + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + return; + + /* + * Since the CoCo threat model includes the host, the only reliable + * source of entropy that can be neither observed nor manipulated is + * RDRAND. Usually, RDRAND failure is considered tolerable, but since + * CoCo guests have no other unobservable source of entropy, it's + * important to at least ensure the RNG gets some initial random seeds. + */ + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rng_seed); i += longs) { + longs = arch_get_random_longs(&rng_seed[i], ARRAY_SIZE(rng_seed) - i); + + /* + * A zero return value means that the guest doesn't have RDRAND + * or the CPU is physically broken, and in both cases that + * means most crypto inside of the CoCo instance will be + * broken, defeating the purpose of CoCo in the first place. So + * just panic here because it's absolutely unsafe to continue + * executing. + */ + if (longs == 0) + panic("RDRAND is defective."); + } + add_device_randomness(rng_seed, sizeof(rng_seed)); + memzero_explicit(rng_seed, sizeof(rng_seed)); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h index 60bb26097da1..1f97d00ad858 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static inline void cc_set_mask(u64 mask) u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val); u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val); +void cc_random_init(void); #else static inline u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val) { @@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ static inline u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val) { return val; } +static inline void cc_random_init(void) { } #endif #endif /* _ASM_X86_COCO_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index d1ffac9ad611..18a034613d94 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -1132,6 +1133,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) * memory size. */ sev_setup_arch(); + cc_random_init(); efi_fake_memmap(); efi_find_mirror(); From 447d844a3e10e3751f9a2ba4965d6f48b909671c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sumanth Korikkar Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 18:12:13 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 113/139] s390/entry: align system call table on 8 bytes commit 378ca2d2ad410a1cd5690d06b46c5e2297f4c8c0 upstream. Align system call table on 8 bytes. With sys_call_table entry size of 8 bytes that eliminates the possibility of a system call pointer crossing cache line boundary. Cc: stable@kernel.org Suggested-by: Ulrich Weigand Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev Signed-off-by: Sumanth Korikkar Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/kernel/entry.S | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S index d2a1f2f4f5b8..c9799dec9279 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S @@ -699,6 +699,7 @@ ENDPROC(stack_overflow) .Lthis_cpu: .short 0 .Lstosm_tmp: .byte 0 .section .rodata, "a" + .balign 8 #define SYSCALL(esame,emu) .quad __s390x_ ## esame .globl sys_call_table sys_call_table: From c88f7a709512b7ef384ffae20c26743f4f33d904 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Samuel Holland Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 19:19:13 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 114/139] riscv: Fix spurious errors from __get/put_kernel_nofault commit d080a08b06b6266cc3e0e86c5acfd80db937cb6b upstream. These macros did not initialize __kr_err, so they could fail even if the access did not fault. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d464118cdc41 ("riscv: implement __get_kernel_nofault and __put_user_nofault") Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240312022030.320789-1-samuel.holland@sifive.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h index ec0cab9fbddd..72ec1d9bd3f3 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ unsigned long __must_check clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n) #define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ do { \ - long __kr_err; \ + long __kr_err = 0; \ \ __get_user_nocheck(*((type *)(dst)), (type *)(src), __kr_err); \ if (unlikely(__kr_err)) \ @@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ do { \ #define __put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ do { \ - long __kr_err; \ + long __kr_err = 0; \ \ __put_user_nocheck(*((type *)(src)), (type *)(dst), __kr_err); \ if (unlikely(__kr_err)) \ From f6583444d7e78dae750798552b65a2519ff3ca84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan O'Rear Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2024 02:12:58 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 115/139] riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage commit d14fa1fcf69db9d070e75f1c4425211fa619dfc8 upstream. childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other means. [From the email thread] The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec. childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable from userspace in at least five ways: 1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers zeroed by the memset in the patch comment. This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch. 2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only happen at user/kernel boundaries. 3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the registers it returns. 4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code. 5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user registers without already allowing access to kernel registers. Fixes: 7db91e57a0ac ("RISC-V: Task implementation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stefan O'Rear Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327061258.2370291-1-sorear@fastmail.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c index 8955f2432c2d..6906cc0e5787 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c @@ -25,8 +25,6 @@ #include #include -register unsigned long gp_in_global __asm__("gp"); - #if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR) && !defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK) #include unsigned long __stack_chk_guard __read_mostly; @@ -170,7 +168,6 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args) if (unlikely(args->fn)) { /* Kernel thread */ memset(childregs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs)); - childregs->gp = gp_in_global; /* Supervisor/Machine, irqs on: */ childregs->status = SR_PP | SR_PIE; From 8c99dfb49bdc17edffc7ff3d46b400c8c291686c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ritvik Budhiraja Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 14:01:28 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 116/139] smb3: retrying on failed server close commit 173217bd73365867378b5e75a86f0049e1069ee8 upstream. In the current implementation, CIFS close sends a close to the server and does not check for the success of the server close. This patch adds functionality to check for server close return status and retries in case of an EBUSY or EAGAIN error. This can help avoid handle leaks Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ritvik Budhiraja Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c | 6 ++-- fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c | 11 +++++++ fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h | 7 +++-- fs/smb/client/file.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c | 4 +-- fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 9 +++--- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c b/fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c index 86fe433b1d32..f4ad343b06c1 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c @@ -370,6 +370,7 @@ smb2_close_cached_fid(struct kref *ref) { struct cached_fid *cfid = container_of(ref, struct cached_fid, refcount); + int rc; spin_lock(&cfid->cfids->cfid_list_lock); if (cfid->on_list) { @@ -383,9 +384,10 @@ smb2_close_cached_fid(struct kref *ref) cfid->dentry = NULL; if (cfid->is_open) { - SMB2_close(0, cfid->tcon, cfid->fid.persistent_fid, + rc = SMB2_close(0, cfid->tcon, cfid->fid.persistent_fid, cfid->fid.volatile_fid); - atomic_dec(&cfid->tcon->num_remote_opens); + if (rc != -EBUSY && rc != -EAGAIN) + atomic_dec(&cfid->tcon->num_remote_opens); } free_cached_dir(cfid); diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c b/fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c index 7286a56aebfa..0a79771c8f33 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c @@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ struct workqueue_struct *decrypt_wq; struct workqueue_struct *fileinfo_put_wq; struct workqueue_struct *cifsoplockd_wq; struct workqueue_struct *deferredclose_wq; +struct workqueue_struct *serverclose_wq; __u32 cifs_lock_secret; /* @@ -1866,6 +1867,13 @@ init_cifs(void) goto out_destroy_cifsoplockd_wq; } + serverclose_wq = alloc_workqueue("serverclose", + WQ_FREEZABLE|WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, 0); + if (!serverclose_wq) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out_destroy_serverclose_wq; + } + rc = cifs_init_inodecache(); if (rc) goto out_destroy_deferredclose_wq; @@ -1940,6 +1948,8 @@ out_destroy_decrypt_wq: destroy_workqueue(decrypt_wq); out_destroy_cifsiod_wq: destroy_workqueue(cifsiod_wq); +out_destroy_serverclose_wq: + destroy_workqueue(serverclose_wq); out_clean_proc: cifs_proc_clean(); return rc; @@ -1969,6 +1979,7 @@ exit_cifs(void) destroy_workqueue(cifsoplockd_wq); destroy_workqueue(decrypt_wq); destroy_workqueue(fileinfo_put_wq); + destroy_workqueue(serverclose_wq); destroy_workqueue(cifsiod_wq); cifs_proc_clean(); } diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h b/fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h index 58bb54994e22..5cabf144e485 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h +++ b/fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h @@ -389,10 +389,10 @@ struct smb_version_operations { /* set fid protocol-specific info */ void (*set_fid)(struct cifsFileInfo *, struct cifs_fid *, __u32); /* close a file */ - void (*close)(const unsigned int, struct cifs_tcon *, + int (*close)(const unsigned int, struct cifs_tcon *, struct cifs_fid *); /* close a file, returning file attributes and timestamps */ - void (*close_getattr)(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, + int (*close_getattr)(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct cifsFileInfo *pfile_info); /* send a flush request to the server */ int (*flush)(const unsigned int, struct cifs_tcon *, struct cifs_fid *); @@ -1359,6 +1359,7 @@ struct cifsFileInfo { bool invalidHandle:1; /* file closed via session abend */ bool swapfile:1; bool oplock_break_cancelled:1; + bool offload:1; /* offload final part of _put to a wq */ unsigned int oplock_epoch; /* epoch from the lease break */ __u32 oplock_level; /* oplock/lease level from the lease break */ int count; @@ -1367,6 +1368,7 @@ struct cifsFileInfo { struct cifs_search_info srch_inf; struct work_struct oplock_break; /* work for oplock breaks */ struct work_struct put; /* work for the final part of _put */ + struct work_struct serverclose; /* work for serverclose */ struct delayed_work deferred; bool deferred_close_scheduled; /* Flag to indicate close is scheduled */ char *symlink_target; @@ -2005,6 +2007,7 @@ extern struct workqueue_struct *decrypt_wq; extern struct workqueue_struct *fileinfo_put_wq; extern struct workqueue_struct *cifsoplockd_wq; extern struct workqueue_struct *deferredclose_wq; +extern struct workqueue_struct *serverclose_wq; extern __u32 cifs_lock_secret; extern mempool_t *cifs_mid_poolp; diff --git a/fs/smb/client/file.c b/fs/smb/client/file.c index c240cea7ca34..d23dfc83de50 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/file.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/file.c @@ -330,6 +330,7 @@ cifs_down_write(struct rw_semaphore *sem) } static void cifsFileInfo_put_work(struct work_struct *work); +void serverclose_work(struct work_struct *work); struct cifsFileInfo *cifs_new_fileinfo(struct cifs_fid *fid, struct file *file, struct tcon_link *tlink, __u32 oplock, @@ -376,6 +377,7 @@ struct cifsFileInfo *cifs_new_fileinfo(struct cifs_fid *fid, struct file *file, cfile->tlink = cifs_get_tlink(tlink); INIT_WORK(&cfile->oplock_break, cifs_oplock_break); INIT_WORK(&cfile->put, cifsFileInfo_put_work); + INIT_WORK(&cfile->serverclose, serverclose_work); INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&cfile->deferred, smb2_deferred_work_close); mutex_init(&cfile->fh_mutex); spin_lock_init(&cfile->file_info_lock); @@ -467,6 +469,40 @@ static void cifsFileInfo_put_work(struct work_struct *work) cifsFileInfo_put_final(cifs_file); } +void serverclose_work(struct work_struct *work) +{ + struct cifsFileInfo *cifs_file = container_of(work, + struct cifsFileInfo, serverclose); + + struct cifs_tcon *tcon = tlink_tcon(cifs_file->tlink); + + struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server; + int rc = 0; + int retries = 0; + int MAX_RETRIES = 4; + + do { + if (server->ops->close_getattr) + rc = server->ops->close_getattr(0, tcon, cifs_file); + else if (server->ops->close) + rc = server->ops->close(0, tcon, &cifs_file->fid); + + if (rc == -EBUSY || rc == -EAGAIN) { + retries++; + msleep(250); + } + } while ((rc == -EBUSY || rc == -EAGAIN) && (retries < MAX_RETRIES) + ); + + if (retries == MAX_RETRIES) + pr_warn("Serverclose failed %d times, giving up\n", MAX_RETRIES); + + if (cifs_file->offload) + queue_work(fileinfo_put_wq, &cifs_file->put); + else + cifsFileInfo_put_final(cifs_file); +} + /** * cifsFileInfo_put - release a reference of file priv data * @@ -507,10 +543,13 @@ void _cifsFileInfo_put(struct cifsFileInfo *cifs_file, struct cifs_fid fid = {}; struct cifs_pending_open open; bool oplock_break_cancelled; + bool serverclose_offloaded = false; spin_lock(&tcon->open_file_lock); spin_lock(&cifsi->open_file_lock); spin_lock(&cifs_file->file_info_lock); + + cifs_file->offload = offload; if (--cifs_file->count > 0) { spin_unlock(&cifs_file->file_info_lock); spin_unlock(&cifsi->open_file_lock); @@ -552,13 +591,20 @@ void _cifsFileInfo_put(struct cifsFileInfo *cifs_file, if (!tcon->need_reconnect && !cifs_file->invalidHandle) { struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server; unsigned int xid; + int rc = 0; xid = get_xid(); if (server->ops->close_getattr) - server->ops->close_getattr(xid, tcon, cifs_file); + rc = server->ops->close_getattr(xid, tcon, cifs_file); else if (server->ops->close) - server->ops->close(xid, tcon, &cifs_file->fid); + rc = server->ops->close(xid, tcon, &cifs_file->fid); _free_xid(xid); + + if (rc == -EBUSY || rc == -EAGAIN) { + // Server close failed, hence offloading it as an async op + queue_work(serverclose_wq, &cifs_file->serverclose); + serverclose_offloaded = true; + } } if (oplock_break_cancelled) @@ -566,10 +612,15 @@ void _cifsFileInfo_put(struct cifsFileInfo *cifs_file, cifs_del_pending_open(&open); - if (offload) - queue_work(fileinfo_put_wq, &cifs_file->put); - else - cifsFileInfo_put_final(cifs_file); + // if serverclose has been offloaded to wq (on failure), it will + // handle offloading put as well. If serverclose not offloaded, + // we need to handle offloading put here. + if (!serverclose_offloaded) { + if (offload) + queue_work(fileinfo_put_wq, &cifs_file->put); + else + cifsFileInfo_put_final(cifs_file); + } } int cifs_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c index 7d1b3fc014d9..d4045925f857 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c @@ -750,11 +750,11 @@ cifs_set_fid(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile, struct cifs_fid *fid, __u32 oplock) cinode->can_cache_brlcks = CIFS_CACHE_WRITE(cinode); } -static void +static int cifs_close_file(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct cifs_fid *fid) { - CIFSSMBClose(xid, tcon, fid->netfid); + return CIFSSMBClose(xid, tcon, fid->netfid); } static int diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c index 34d1262004df..3c471dc90659 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c @@ -1392,14 +1392,14 @@ smb2_set_fid(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile, struct cifs_fid *fid, __u32 oplock) memcpy(cfile->fid.create_guid, fid->create_guid, 16); } -static void +static int smb2_close_file(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct cifs_fid *fid) { - SMB2_close(xid, tcon, fid->persistent_fid, fid->volatile_fid); + return SMB2_close(xid, tcon, fid->persistent_fid, fid->volatile_fid); } -static void +static int smb2_close_getattr(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct cifsFileInfo *cfile) { @@ -1410,7 +1410,7 @@ smb2_close_getattr(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, rc = __SMB2_close(xid, tcon, cfile->fid.persistent_fid, cfile->fid.volatile_fid, &file_inf); if (rc) - return; + return rc; inode = d_inode(cfile->dentry); @@ -1436,6 +1436,7 @@ smb2_close_getattr(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, /* End of file and Attributes should not have to be updated on close */ spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + return rc; } static int diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c index 4c1231496a72..cc425a616899 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c @@ -3452,9 +3452,9 @@ __SMB2_close(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, memcpy(&pbuf->network_open_info, &rsp->network_open_info, sizeof(pbuf->network_open_info)); + atomic_dec(&tcon->num_remote_opens); } - atomic_dec(&tcon->num_remote_opens); close_exit: SMB2_close_free(&rqst); free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp); From 229042314602db62559ecacba127067c22ee7b88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paulo Alcantara Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 16:33:53 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 117/139] smb: client: fix potential UAF in cifs_debug_files_proc_show() commit ca545b7f0823f19db0f1148d59bc5e1a56634502 upstream. Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to avoid UAF. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c | 2 ++ fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h | 10 ++++++++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c b/fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c index 5df8d9323337..fa45b3e7efe8 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c @@ -186,6 +186,8 @@ static int cifs_debug_files_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); list_for_each_entry(server, &cifs_tcp_ses_list, tcp_ses_list) { list_for_each_entry(ses, &server->smb_ses_list, smb_ses_list) { + if (cifs_ses_exiting(ses)) + continue; list_for_each_entry(tcon, &ses->tcon_list, tcon_list) { spin_lock(&tcon->open_file_lock); list_for_each_entry(cfile, &tcon->openFileList, tlist) { diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h b/fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h index 5cabf144e485..e5a72f9c793e 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h +++ b/fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h @@ -2178,4 +2178,14 @@ static inline struct scatterlist *cifs_sg_set_buf(struct scatterlist *sg, return sg; } +static inline bool cifs_ses_exiting(struct cifs_ses *ses) +{ + bool ret; + + spin_lock(&ses->ses_lock); + ret = ses->ses_status == SES_EXITING; + spin_unlock(&ses->ses_lock); + return ret; +} + #endif /* _CIFS_GLOB_H */ From 8fefd166fcb368c5fcf48238e3f7c8af829e0a72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paulo Alcantara Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 16:33:55 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 118/139] smb: client: fix potential UAF in cifs_stats_proc_write() commit d3da25c5ac84430f89875ca7485a3828150a7e0a upstream. Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to avoid UAF. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c b/fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c index fa45b3e7efe8..6a9320a747e2 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c @@ -568,6 +568,8 @@ static ssize_t cifs_stats_proc_write(struct file *file, } #endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_STATS2 */ list_for_each_entry(ses, &server->smb_ses_list, smb_ses_list) { + if (cifs_ses_exiting(ses)) + continue; list_for_each_entry(tcon, &ses->tcon_list, tcon_list) { atomic_set(&tcon->num_smbs_sent, 0); spin_lock(&tcon->stat_lock); From 16b7d785775eb03929766819415055e367398f49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paulo Alcantara Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 16:33:56 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 119/139] smb: client: fix potential UAF in cifs_stats_proc_show() commit 0865ffefea197b437ba78b5dd8d8e256253efd65 upstream. Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to avoid UAF. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c b/fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c index 6a9320a747e2..a2afdf9c5f80 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/cifs_debug.c @@ -648,6 +648,8 @@ static int cifs_stats_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } #endif /* STATS2 */ list_for_each_entry(ses, &server->smb_ses_list, smb_ses_list) { + if (cifs_ses_exiting(ses)) + continue; list_for_each_entry(tcon, &ses->tcon_list, tcon_list) { i++; seq_printf(m, "\n%d) %s", i, tcon->tree_name); From 84488466b7a69570bdbf76dd9576847ab97d54e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paulo Alcantara Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 16:33:59 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 120/139] smb: client: fix potential UAF in smb2_is_valid_oplock_break() commit 22863485a4626ec6ecf297f4cc0aef709bc862e4 upstream. Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to avoid UAF. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c index 15fa022e7999..4d2e8b390e10 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c @@ -697,6 +697,8 @@ smb2_is_valid_oplock_break(char *buffer, struct TCP_Server_Info *server) /* look up tcon based on tid & uid */ spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); list_for_each_entry(ses, &pserver->smb_ses_list, smb_ses_list) { + if (cifs_ses_exiting(ses)) + continue; list_for_each_entry(tcon, &ses->tcon_list, tcon_list) { spin_lock(&tcon->open_file_lock); From c868cabdf6fdd61bea54532271f4708254e57fc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paulo Alcantara Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 16:33:58 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 121/139] smb: client: fix potential UAF in smb2_is_valid_lease_break() commit 705c76fbf726c7a2f6ff9143d4013b18daaaebf1 upstream. Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to avoid UAF. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c index 4d2e8b390e10..8c149cb531d3 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c @@ -622,6 +622,8 @@ smb2_is_valid_lease_break(char *buffer, struct TCP_Server_Info *server) /* look up tcon based on tid & uid */ spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); list_for_each_entry(ses, &pserver->smb_ses_list, smb_ses_list) { + if (cifs_ses_exiting(ses)) + continue; list_for_each_entry(tcon, &ses->tcon_list, tcon_list) { spin_lock(&tcon->open_file_lock); cifs_stats_inc( From 494c91e1e9413b407d12166a61b84200d4d54fac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paulo Alcantara Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 16:34:00 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 122/139] smb: client: fix potential UAF in is_valid_oplock_break() commit 69ccf040acddf33a3a85ec0f6b45ef84b0f7ec29 upstream. Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to avoid UAF. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/misc.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/misc.c b/fs/smb/client/misc.c index 41290c12d0bc..3826f7176608 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/misc.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/misc.c @@ -476,6 +476,8 @@ is_valid_oplock_break(char *buffer, struct TCP_Server_Info *srv) /* look up tcon based on tid & uid */ spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); list_for_each_entry(ses, &pserver->smb_ses_list, smb_ses_list) { + if (cifs_ses_exiting(ses)) + continue; list_for_each_entry(tcon, &ses->tcon_list, tcon_list) { if (tcon->tid != buf->Tid) continue; From f9414004798d9742c1af23a1d839fe6a9503751c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paulo Alcantara Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 16:34:02 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 123/139] smb: client: fix potential UAF in smb2_is_network_name_deleted() commit 63981561ffd2d4987807df4126f96a11e18b0c1d upstream. Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to avoid UAF. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c index 3c471dc90659..2291081653a8 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c @@ -2437,6 +2437,8 @@ smb2_is_network_name_deleted(char *buf, struct TCP_Server_Info *server) spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); list_for_each_entry(ses, &pserver->smb_ses_list, smb_ses_list) { + if (cifs_ses_exiting(ses)) + continue; list_for_each_entry(tcon, &ses->tcon_list, tcon_list) { if (tcon->tid == le32_to_cpu(shdr->Id.SyncId.TreeId)) { spin_lock(&tcon->tc_lock); From 7e8360ac8774e19b0b25f44fff84a105bb2417e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paulo Alcantara Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2024 16:34:04 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 124/139] smb: client: fix potential UAF in cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect() commit e0e50401cc3921c9eaf1b0e667db174519ea939f upstream. Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to avoid UAF. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/connect.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/connect.c b/fs/smb/client/connect.c index 49fdc6dfdcf8..8c2a784200ec 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/connect.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/connect.c @@ -216,6 +216,8 @@ cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); list_for_each_entry(ses, &pserver->smb_ses_list, smb_ses_list) { + if (cifs_ses_exiting(ses)) + continue; spin_lock(&ses->chan_lock); for (i = 0; i < ses->chan_count; i++) { spin_lock(&ses->chans[i].server->srv_lock); From 08ef93ebc73c12d8c6249b28bf729924e8ff9142 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Geliang Tang Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2024 13:08:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 125/139] selftests: mptcp: join: fix dev in check_endpoint commit 40061817d95bce6dd5634a61a65cd5922e6ccc92 upstream. There's a bug in pm_nl_check_endpoint(), 'dev' didn't be parsed correctly. If calling it in the 2nd test of endpoint_tests() too, it fails with an error like this: creation [FAIL] expected '10.0.2.2 id 2 subflow dev dev' \ found '10.0.2.2 id 2 subflow dev ns2eth2' The reason is '$2' should be set to 'dev', not '$1'. This patch fixes it. Fixes: 69c6ce7b6eca ("selftests: mptcp: add implicit endpoint test case") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240329-upstream-net-20240329-fallback-mib-v1-2-324a8981da48@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski [ Conflicts in mptcp_join.sh: only the fix has been added, not the verification because this modified subtest is quite different in v6.1: to add this verification, we would need to change a bit the subtest: pm_nl_check_endpoint() takes an extra argument for the title, the next chk_subflow_nr() will no longer need the title, etc. Easier with only the fix without the extra test. ] Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh index a20dca9d26d6..0b433606a298 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh @@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ pm_nl_check_endpoint() [ -n "$_flags" ]; flags="flags $_flags" shift elif [ $1 = "dev" ]; then - [ -n "$2" ]; dev="dev $1" + [ -n "$2" ]; dev="dev $2" shift elif [ $1 = "id" ]; then _id=$2 From d1fefedc1a0e31cc8001f7702a2c51d07343a499 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Davide Caratti Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2024 13:08:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 126/139] mptcp: don't account accept() of non-MPC client as fallback to TCP commit 7a1b3490f47e88ec4cbde65f1a77a0f4bc972282 upstream. Current MPTCP servers increment MPTcpExtMPCapableFallbackACK when they accept non-MPC connections. As reported by Christoph, this is "surprising" because the counter might become greater than MPTcpExtMPCapableSYNRX. MPTcpExtMPCapableFallbackACK counter's name suggests it should only be incremented when a connection was seen using MPTCP options, then a fallback to TCP has been done. Let's do that by incrementing it when the subflow context of an inbound MPC connection attempt is dropped. Also, update mptcp_connect.sh kselftest, to ensure that the above MIB does not increment in case a pure TCP client connects to a MPTCP server. Fixes: fc518953bc9c ("mptcp: add and use MIB counter infrastructure") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Christoph Paasch Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/449 Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240329-upstream-net-20240329-fallback-mib-v1-1-324a8981da48@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 3 --- net/mptcp/subflow.c | 2 ++ tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect.sh | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.c b/net/mptcp/protocol.c index 3bc21581486a..c652c8ca765c 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/protocol.c +++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.c @@ -3349,9 +3349,6 @@ static struct sock *mptcp_accept(struct sock *sk, int flags, int *err, newsk = new_mptcp_sock; MPTCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), MPTCP_MIB_MPCAPABLEPASSIVEACK); - } else { - MPTCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), - MPTCP_MIB_MPCAPABLEPASSIVEFALLBACK); } out: diff --git a/net/mptcp/subflow.c b/net/mptcp/subflow.c index 891c2f4fed08..f1d422396b28 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/subflow.c +++ b/net/mptcp/subflow.c @@ -816,6 +816,8 @@ dispose_child: return child; fallback: + if (fallback) + SUBFLOW_REQ_INC_STATS(req, MPTCP_MIB_MPCAPABLEPASSIVEFALLBACK); mptcp_subflow_drop_ctx(child); return child; } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect.sh index 18c9b00ca058..dacf4cf2246d 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect.sh @@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ do_transfer() local stat_cookierx_last=$(get_mib_counter "${listener_ns}" "TcpExtSyncookiesRecv") local stat_csum_err_s=$(get_mib_counter "${listener_ns}" "MPTcpExtDataCsumErr") local stat_csum_err_c=$(get_mib_counter "${connector_ns}" "MPTcpExtDataCsumErr") + local stat_tcpfb_last_l=$(get_mib_counter "${listener_ns}" "MPTcpExtMPCapableFallbackACK") timeout ${timeout_test} \ ip netns exec ${listener_ns} \ @@ -504,6 +505,7 @@ do_transfer() local stat_cookietx_now=$(get_mib_counter "${listener_ns}" "TcpExtSyncookiesSent") local stat_cookierx_now=$(get_mib_counter "${listener_ns}" "TcpExtSyncookiesRecv") local stat_ooo_now=$(get_mib_counter "${listener_ns}" "TcpExtTCPOFOQueue") + local stat_tcpfb_now_l=$(get_mib_counter "${listener_ns}" "MPTcpExtMPCapableFallbackACK") expect_synrx=$((stat_synrx_last_l)) expect_ackrx=$((stat_ackrx_last_l)) @@ -548,6 +550,11 @@ do_transfer() fi fi + if [ ${stat_ooo_now} -eq 0 ] && [ ${stat_tcpfb_last_l} -ne ${stat_tcpfb_now_l} ]; then + printf "[ FAIL ]\nunexpected fallback to TCP" + rets=1 + fi + if [ $retc -eq 0 ] && [ $rets -eq 0 ]; then printf "[ OK ]" fi From a6dc534c073b529dfd39683f63dd87ab30261f4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Geliang Tang Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2023 16:37:11 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 127/139] selftests: mptcp: display simult in extra_msg commit 629b35a225b0d49fbcff3b5c22e3b983c7c7b36f upstream. Just like displaying "invert" after "Info: ", "simult" should be displayed too when rm_subflow_nr doesn't match the expect value in chk_rm_nr(): syn [ ok ] synack [ ok ] ack [ ok ] add [ ok ] echo [ ok ] rm [ ok ] rmsf [ ok ] 3 in [2:4] Info: invert simult syn [ ok ] synack [ ok ] ack [ ok ] add [ ok ] echo [ ok ] rm [ ok ] rmsf [ ok ] Info: invert Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231025-send-net-next-20231025-v1-10-db8f25f798eb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh index 0b433606a298..635a1624b47d 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh @@ -1771,7 +1771,10 @@ chk_rm_nr() # in case of simult flush, the subflow removal count on each side is # unreliable count=$((count + cnt)) - [ "$count" != "$rm_subflow_nr" ] && suffix="$count in [$rm_subflow_nr:$((rm_subflow_nr*2))]" + if [ "$count" != "$rm_subflow_nr" ]; then + suffix="$count in [$rm_subflow_nr:$((rm_subflow_nr*2))]" + extra_msg="$extra_msg simult" + fi if [ $count -ge "$rm_subflow_nr" ] && \ [ "$count" -le "$((rm_subflow_nr *2 ))" ]; then echo -n "[ ok ] $suffix" From 9c2b4b657739ecda38e3b383354a29566955ac48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Hildenbrand Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 15:32:08 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 128/139] mm/secretmem: fix GUP-fast succeeding on secretmem folios commit 65291dcfcf8936e1b23cfd7718fdfde7cfaf7706 upstream. folio_is_secretmem() currently relies on secretmem folios being LRU folios, to save some cycles. However, folios might reside in a folio batch without the LRU flag set, or temporarily have their LRU flag cleared. Consequently, the LRU flag is unreliable for this purpose. In particular, this is the case when secretmem_fault() allocates a fresh page and calls filemap_add_folio()->folio_add_lru(). The folio might be added to the per-cpu folio batch and won't get the LRU flag set until the batch was drained using e.g., lru_add_drain(). Consequently, folio_is_secretmem() might not detect secretmem folios and GUP-fast can succeed in grabbing a secretmem folio, crashing the kernel when we would later try reading/writing to the folio, because the folio has been unmapped from the directmap. Fix it by removing that unreliable check. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240326143210.291116-2-david@redhat.com Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand Reported-by: xingwei lee Reported-by: yue sun Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CABOYnLyevJeravW=QrH0JUPYEcDN160aZFb7kwndm-J2rmz0HQ@mail.gmail.com/ Debugged-by: Miklos Szeredi Tested-by: Miklos Szeredi Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/secretmem.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/secretmem.h b/include/linux/secretmem.h index 988528b5da43..48ffe325184c 100644 --- a/include/linux/secretmem.h +++ b/include/linux/secretmem.h @@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page) * Using page_mapping() is quite slow because of the actual call * instruction and repeated compound_head(page) inside the * page_mapping() function. - * We know that secretmem pages are not compound and LRU so we can + * We know that secretmem pages are not compound, so we can * save a couple of cycles here. */ - if (PageCompound(page) || !PageLRU(page)) + if (PageCompound(page)) return false; mapping = (struct address_space *) From 5e6898b8544dbb52755cee40c0c360a4bfde69e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "min15.li" Date: Fri, 26 May 2023 17:06:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 129/139] nvme: fix miss command type check commit 31a5978243d24d77be4bacca56c78a0fbc43b00d upstream. In the function nvme_passthru_end(), only the value of the command opcode is checked, without checking the command type (IO command or Admin command). When we send a Dataset Management command (The opcode of the Dataset Management command is the same as the Set Feature command), kernel thinks it is a set feature command, then sets the controller's keep alive interval, and calls nvme_keep_alive_work(). Signed-off-by: min15.li Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Keith Busch Fixes: b58da2d270db ("nvme: update keep alive interval when kato is modified") Signed-off-by: Tokunori Ikegami Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 4 +++- drivers/nvme/host/ioctl.c | 3 ++- drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h | 2 +- drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c index d7516e99275b..20160683e868 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c @@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@ static u32 nvme_passthru_start(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct nvme_ns *ns, return effects; } -void nvme_passthru_end(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, u32 effects, +void nvme_passthru_end(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct nvme_ns *ns, u32 effects, struct nvme_command *cmd, int status) { if (effects & NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_CSE_MASK) { @@ -1167,6 +1167,8 @@ void nvme_passthru_end(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, u32 effects, nvme_queue_scan(ctrl); flush_work(&ctrl->scan_work); } + if (ns) + return; switch (cmd->common.opcode) { case nvme_admin_set_features: diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/ioctl.c b/drivers/nvme/host/ioctl.c index 91e6d0347579..b3e322e4ade3 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/ioctl.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/ioctl.c @@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ static int nvme_submit_user_cmd(struct request_queue *q, unsigned bufflen, void __user *meta_buffer, unsigned meta_len, u32 meta_seed, u64 *result, unsigned timeout, bool vec) { + struct nvme_ns *ns = q->queuedata; struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl; struct request *req; void *meta = NULL; @@ -181,7 +182,7 @@ static int nvme_submit_user_cmd(struct request_queue *q, blk_mq_free_request(req); if (effects) - nvme_passthru_end(ctrl, effects, cmd, ret); + nvme_passthru_end(ctrl, ns, effects, cmd, ret); return ret; } diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h b/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h index a892d679e338..8e28d2de45c0 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h @@ -1063,7 +1063,7 @@ static inline void nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) {}; u32 nvme_command_effects(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct nvme_ns *ns, u8 opcode); int nvme_execute_passthru_rq(struct request *rq, u32 *effects); -void nvme_passthru_end(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, u32 effects, +void nvme_passthru_end(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct nvme_ns *ns, u32 effects, struct nvme_command *cmd, int status); struct nvme_ctrl *nvme_ctrl_from_file(struct file *file); struct nvme_ns *nvme_find_get_ns(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, unsigned nsid); diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c b/drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c index adc0958755d6..a0a292d49588 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c @@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ static void nvmet_passthru_execute_cmd_work(struct work_struct *w) struct nvmet_req *req = container_of(w, struct nvmet_req, p.work); struct request *rq = req->p.rq; struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = nvme_req(rq)->ctrl; + struct nvme_ns *ns = rq->q->queuedata; u32 effects; int status; @@ -242,7 +243,7 @@ static void nvmet_passthru_execute_cmd_work(struct work_struct *w) blk_mq_free_request(rq); if (effects) - nvme_passthru_end(ctrl, effects, req->cmd, status); + nvme_passthru_end(ctrl, ns, effects, req->cmd, status); } static enum rq_end_io_ret nvmet_passthru_req_done(struct request *rq, From fd52c0397b53ebcd4931981b3bc38f3b760b74df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2024 11:14:13 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 130/139] x86/bugs: Change commas to semicolons in 'spectre_v2' sysfs file commit 0cd01ac5dcb1e18eb18df0f0d05b5de76522a437 upstream. Change the format of the 'spectre_v2' vulnerabilities sysfs file slightly by converting the commas to semicolons, so that mitigations for future variants can be grouped together and separated by commas. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index e3fec47a800b..4a1b4dee1425 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -2674,15 +2674,15 @@ static char *stibp_state(void) switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) { case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE: - return ", STIBP: disabled"; + return "; STIBP: disabled"; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: - return ", STIBP: forced"; + return "; STIBP: forced"; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED: - return ", STIBP: always-on"; + return "; STIBP: always-on"; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP: if (static_key_enabled(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) - return ", STIBP: conditional"; + return "; STIBP: conditional"; } return ""; } @@ -2691,10 +2691,10 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb)) - return ", IBPB: always-on"; + return "; IBPB: always-on"; if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb)) - return ", IBPB: conditional"; - return ", IBPB: disabled"; + return "; IBPB: conditional"; + return "; IBPB: disabled"; } return ""; } @@ -2704,11 +2704,11 @@ static char *pbrsb_eibrs_state(void) if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT)) - return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence"; + return "; PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence"; else - return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable"; + return "; PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable"; } else { - return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected"; + return "; PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected"; } } @@ -2727,9 +2727,9 @@ static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf) return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], ibpb_state(), - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? "; IBRS_FW" : "", stibp_state(), - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "", + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? "; RSB filling" : "", pbrsb_eibrs_state(), spectre_v2_module_string()); } From 74fcb181772e5b8a8f1244c7393c56ae6d03c330 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 16:36:44 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 131/139] x86/syscall: Don't force use of indirect calls for system calls commit 1e3ad78334a69b36e107232e337f9d693dcc9df2 upstream. Make build a switch statement instead, and the compiler can either decide to generate an indirect jump, or - more likely these days due to mitigations - just a series of conditional branches. Yes, the conditional branches also have branch prediction, but the branch prediction is much more controlled, in that it just causes speculatively running the wrong system call (harmless), rather than speculatively running possibly wrong random less controlled code gadgets. This doesn't mitigate other indirect calls, but the system call indirection is the first and most easily triggered case. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/entry/common.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c | 10 +++++++--- arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h | 10 ++++------ 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c index 9c0b26ae5106..a60d19228890 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static __always_inline bool do_syscall_x64(struct pt_regs *regs, int nr) if (likely(unr < NR_syscalls)) { unr = array_index_nospec(unr, NR_syscalls); - regs->ax = sys_call_table[unr](regs); + regs->ax = x64_sys_call(regs, unr); return true; } return false; @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static __always_inline bool do_syscall_x32(struct pt_regs *regs, int nr) if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI) && likely(xnr < X32_NR_syscalls)) { xnr = array_index_nospec(xnr, X32_NR_syscalls); - regs->ax = x32_sys_call_table[xnr](regs); + regs->ax = x32_sys_call(regs, xnr); return true; } return false; @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs, int nr) if (likely(unr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) { unr = array_index_nospec(unr, IA32_NR_syscalls); - regs->ax = ia32_sys_call_table[unr](regs); + regs->ax = ia32_sys_call(regs, unr); } else if (nr != -1) { regs->ax = __ia32_sys_ni_syscall(regs); } diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c index 8cfc9bc73e7f..c2235bae17ef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c @@ -18,8 +18,25 @@ #include #undef __SYSCALL +/* + * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but + * kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c still wants to know the system + * call address. + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) __ia32_##sym, - -__visible const sys_call_ptr_t ia32_sys_call_table[] = { +const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = { #include }; +#undef __SYSCALL +#endif + +#define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) case nr: return __ia32_##sym(regs); + +long ia32_sys_call(const struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int nr) +{ + switch (nr) { + #include + default: return __ia32_sys_ni_syscall(regs); + } +}; diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c index be120eec1fc9..33b3f09e6f15 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c @@ -11,8 +11,23 @@ #include #undef __SYSCALL +/* + * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but + * kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c still wants to know the system + * call address. + */ #define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) __x64_##sym, - -asmlinkage const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = { +const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = { #include }; +#undef __SYSCALL + +#define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs); + +long x64_sys_call(const struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int nr) +{ + switch (nr) { + #include + default: return __x64_sys_ni_syscall(regs); + } +}; diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c index bdd0e03a1265..03de4a932131 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c @@ -11,8 +11,12 @@ #include #undef __SYSCALL -#define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) __x64_##sym, +#define __SYSCALL(nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs); -asmlinkage const sys_call_ptr_t x32_sys_call_table[] = { -#include +long x32_sys_call(const struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int nr) +{ + switch (nr) { + #include + default: return __x64_sys_ni_syscall(regs); + } }; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h index 5b85987a5e97..8f0da479c77d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h @@ -16,19 +16,17 @@ #include /* for TS_COMPAT */ #include +/* This is used purely for kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c */ typedef long (*sys_call_ptr_t)(const struct pt_regs *); extern const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[]; -#if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) -#define ia32_sys_call_table sys_call_table -#else /* * These may not exist, but still put the prototypes in so we * can use IS_ENABLED(). */ -extern const sys_call_ptr_t ia32_sys_call_table[]; -extern const sys_call_ptr_t x32_sys_call_table[]; -#endif +extern long ia32_sys_call(const struct pt_regs *, unsigned int nr); +extern long x32_sys_call(const struct pt_regs *, unsigned int nr); +extern long x64_sys_call(const struct pt_regs *, unsigned int nr); /* * Only the low 32 bits of orig_ax are meaningful, so we return int. From 07dbb10f153f483e8249acebdffedf922e2ec2e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 08:56:58 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 132/139] x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry commit 7390db8aea0d64e9deb28b8e1ce716f5020c7ee5 upstream. Branch History Injection (BHI) attacks may allow a malicious application to influence indirect branch prediction in kernel by poisoning the branch history. eIBRS isolates indirect branch targets in ring0. The BHB can still influence the choice of indirect branch predictor entry, and although branch predictor entries are isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled, the BHB itself is not isolated between modes. Alder Lake and new processors supports a hardware control BHI_DIS_S to mitigate BHI. For older processors Intel has released a software sequence to clear the branch history on parts that don't support BHI_DIS_S. Add support to execute the software sequence at syscall entry and VMexit to overwrite the branch history. For now, branch history is not cleared at interrupt entry, as malicious applications are not believed to have sufficient control over the registers, since previous register state is cleared at interrupt entry. Researchers continue to poke at this area and it may become necessary to clear at interrupt entry as well in the future. This mitigation is only defined here. It is enabled later. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Co-developed-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/entry/common.c | 4 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 16 ++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 12 ++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 2 + 7 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c index a60d19228890..e72dac092245 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static __always_inline bool int80_is_external(void) } /** - * int80_emulation - 32-bit legacy syscall entry + * do_int80_emulation - 32-bit legacy syscall C entry from asm * * This entry point can be used by 32-bit and 64-bit programs to perform * 32-bit system calls. Instances of INT $0x80 can be found inline in @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static __always_inline bool int80_is_external(void) * eax: system call number * ebx, ecx, edx, esi, edi, ebp: arg1 - arg 6 */ -DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(int80_emulation) +__visible noinstr void do_int80_emulation(struct pt_regs *regs) { int nr; diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index c2383c2880ec..6624806e6904 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) /* clobbers %rax, make sure it is after saving the syscall nr */ IBRS_ENTER UNTRAIN_RET + CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */ @@ -1539,3 +1540,63 @@ SYM_CODE_START(rewind_stack_and_make_dead) call make_task_dead SYM_CODE_END(rewind_stack_and_make_dead) .popsection + +/* + * This sequence executes branches in order to remove user branch information + * from the branch history tracker in the Branch Predictor, therefore removing + * user influence on subsequent BTB lookups. + * + * It should be used on parts prior to Alder Lake. Newer parts should use the + * BHI_DIS_S hardware control instead. If a pre-Alder Lake part is being + * virtualized on newer hardware the VMM should protect against BHI attacks by + * setting BHI_DIS_S for the guests. + * + * CALLs/RETs are necessary to prevent Loop Stream Detector(LSD) from engaging + * and not clearing the branch history. The call tree looks like: + * + * call 1 + * call 2 + * call 2 + * call 2 + * call 2 + * call 2 + * ret + * ret + * ret + * ret + * ret + * ret + * + * This means that the stack is non-constant and ORC can't unwind it with %rsp + * alone. Therefore we unconditionally set up the frame pointer, which allows + * ORC to unwind properly. + * + * The alignment is for performance and not for safety, and may be safely + * refactored in the future if needed. + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(clear_bhb_loop) + push %rbp + mov %rsp, %rbp + movl $5, %ecx + ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL + call 1f + jmp 5f + .align 64, 0xcc + ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL +1: call 2f + RET + .align 64, 0xcc +2: movl $5, %eax +3: jmp 4f + nop +4: sub $1, %eax + jnz 3b + sub $1, %ecx + jnz 1b + RET +5: lfence + pop %rbp + RET +SYM_FUNC_END(clear_bhb_loop) +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(clear_bhb_loop) +STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(clear_bhb_loop) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S index 4bcd009a232b..b14b8cd85eb2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) IBRS_ENTER UNTRAIN_RET + CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY /* * SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT and AC @@ -210,6 +211,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) IBRS_ENTER UNTRAIN_RET + CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY movq %rsp, %rdi call do_fast_syscall_32 @@ -278,3 +280,17 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR int3 SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSCALL_compat) + +/* + * int 0x80 is used by 32 bit mode as a system call entry. Normally idt entries + * point to C routines, however since this is a system call interface the branch + * history needs to be scrubbed to protect against BHI attacks, and that + * scrubbing needs to take place in assembly code prior to entering any C + * routines. + */ +SYM_CODE_START(int80_emulation) + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + UNWIND_HINT_FUNC + CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY + jmp do_int80_emulation +SYM_CODE_END(int80_emulation) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 1280daa72975..d1e179653821 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -434,11 +434,12 @@ /* * Extended auxiliary flags: Linux defined - for features scattered in various - * CPUID levels like 0x80000022, etc. + * CPUID levels like 0x80000022, etc and Linux defined features. * * Reuse free bits when adding new feature flags! */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE (21*32+ 0) /* AMD LBR and PMC Freeze */ +#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP (21*32+ 1) /* "" Clear branch history at syscall entry using SW loop */ /* * BUG word(s) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 47e4e06a47d7..33e365cbe15b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -215,6 +215,14 @@ .Lskip_verw_\@: .endm +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +.macro CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY + ALTERNATIVE "", "call clear_bhb_loop", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP +.endm +#else +#define CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY +#endif + #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ @@ -243,6 +251,10 @@ extern void srso_alias_untrain_ret(void); extern void entry_untrain_ret(void); extern void entry_ibpb(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +extern void clear_bhb_loop(void); +#endif + extern void (*x86_return_thunk)(void); #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h index 8f0da479c77d..2725a4502321 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h @@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task) void do_syscall_64(struct pt_regs *regs, int nr); void do_int80_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs); long do_fast_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs); +void do_int80_emulation(struct pt_regs *regs); #endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index 0b2cad66dee1..de4490e331fa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -242,6 +242,8 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) call vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host + CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY + /* Put return value in AX */ mov %_ASM_BX, %_ASM_AX From 29c50bb6fbe4598d313ddb7ddb183e8b3d7bdf80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Sneddon Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2024 09:47:57 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 133/139] x86/bhi: Define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S commit 0f4a837615ff925ba62648d280a861adf1582df7 upstream. Newer processors supports a hardware control BHI_DIS_S to mitigate Branch History Injection (BHI). Setting BHI_DIS_S protects the kernel from userspace BHI attacks without having to manually overwrite the branch history. Define MSR_SPEC_CTRL bit BHI_DIS_S and its enumeration CPUID.BHI_CTRL. Mitigation is enabled later. Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 ++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index d1e179653821..20ba328d2527 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE (21*32+ 0) /* AMD LBR and PMC Freeze */ #define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP (21*32+ 1) /* "" Clear branch history at syscall entry using SW loop */ +#define X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL (21*32+ 2) /* "" BHI_DIS_S HW control available */ /* * BUG word(s) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 33a19ef23644..9b3d17d90bde 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -55,10 +55,13 @@ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior */ #define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT) +#define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S_SHIFT 10 /* Disable Branch History Injection behavior */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S_SHIFT) /* A mask for bits which the kernel toggles when controlling mitigations */ #define SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK (SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD \ - | SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S) + | SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S \ + | SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S) #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c index 94e0a42528dc..28c357cf7c75 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_EPB, CPUID_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN, CPUID_EBX, 0, 0x00000007, 1 }, { X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 2 }, + { X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL, CPUID_EDX, 4, 0x00000007, 2 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 0, 0x0000000f, 1 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 1 }, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h index d2f6703a2633..e43909d6504a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs { #define X86_FEATURE_IPRED_CTRL KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_7_2_EDX, 1) #define KVM_X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_7_2_EDX, 2) #define X86_FEATURE_DDPD_U KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_7_2_EDX, 3) -#define X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_7_2_EDX, 4) +#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_7_2_EDX, 4) #define X86_FEATURE_MCDT_NO KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_7_2_EDX, 5) struct cpuid_reg { @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ static __always_inline u32 __feature_translate(int x86_feature) KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(SGX1); KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(SGX2); KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(RRSBA_CTRL); + KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(BHI_CTRL); default: return x86_feature; } From 42196bdec0824900b02bc21e02e9bb139197ca14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 08:57:03 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 134/139] x86/bhi: Enumerate Branch History Injection (BHI) bug commit be482ff9500999f56093738f9219bbabc729d163 upstream. Mitigation for BHI is selected based on the bug enumeration. Add bits needed to enumerate BHI bug. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 20ba328d2527..0f1e0c73c474 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -489,4 +489,5 @@ #define X86_BUG_SRSO X86_BUG(1*32 + 0) /* AMD SRSO bug */ #define X86_BUG_DIV0 X86_BUG(1*32 + 1) /* AMD DIV0 speculation bug */ #define X86_BUG_RFDS X86_BUG(1*32 + 2) /* CPU is vulnerable to Register File Data Sampling */ +#define X86_BUG_BHI X86_BUG(1*32 + 3) /* CPU is affected by Branch History Injection */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 9b3d17d90bde..681e8401b8a3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -160,6 +160,10 @@ * are restricted to targets in * kernel. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO BIT(20) /* + * CPU is not affected by Branch + * History Injection. + */ #define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO BIT(24) /* * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier * Return Stack Buffer Predictions. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index ca243d7ba0ea..08fe77d2a3f9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1144,6 +1144,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) #define NO_SPECTRE_V2 BIT(8) #define NO_MMIO BIT(9) #define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB BIT(10) +#define NO_BHI BIT(11) #define VULNWL(vendor, family, model, whitelist) \ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, whitelist) @@ -1206,18 +1207,18 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */ - VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), + VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), + VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), + VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), /* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */ - VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), - VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), + VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB | NO_BHI), + VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB | NO_BHI), /* Zhaoxin Family 7 */ - VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL(ZHAOXIN, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), + VULNWL(ZHAOXIN, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), {} }; @@ -1454,6 +1455,13 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (vulnerable_to_rfds(ia32_cap)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS); + /* When virtualized, eIBRS could be hidden, assume vulnerable */ + if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO) && + !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_BHI) && + (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_BHI); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; From bb8384b6dfbc49be230071d1e844a8741982b1ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 08:57:05 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 135/139] x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob commit ec9404e40e8f36421a2b66ecb76dc2209fe7f3ef upstream. Branch history clearing software sequences and hardware control BHI_DIS_S were defined to mitigate Branch History Injection (BHI). Add cmdline spectre_bhi={on|off|auto} to control BHI mitigation: auto - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available. on - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available, otherwise deploy the software sequence at syscall entry and VMexit. off - Turn off BHI mitigation. The default is auto mode which does not deploy the software sequence mitigation. This is because of the hardening done in the syscall dispatch path, which is the likely target of BHI. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 45 ++++++++-- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 +++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 25 ++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index 32a8893e5617..62c7902c66fd 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -138,11 +138,10 @@ associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically, the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of Enhanced IBRS. -Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via -unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable -unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines). -For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use -retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines). +Previously the only known real-world BHB attack vector was via unprivileged +eBPF. Further research has found attacks that don't require unprivileged eBPF. +For a full mitigation against BHB attacks it is recommended to set BHI_DIS_S or +use the BHB clearing sequence. Attack scenarios ---------------- @@ -430,6 +429,21 @@ The possible values in this file are: 'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected' CPU is not affected by PBRSB =========================== ======================================================= + - Branch History Injection (BHI) protection status: + +.. list-table:: + + * - BHI: Not affected + - System is not affected + * - BHI: Retpoline + - System is protected by retpoline + * - BHI: BHI_DIS_S + - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S + * - BHI: SW loop + - System is protected by software clearing sequence + * - BHI: Syscall hardening + - Syscalls are hardened against BHI + Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will report vulnerability. @@ -484,7 +498,11 @@ Spectre variant 2 Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against - Spectre v2 variant attacks. + some Spectre v2 variant attacks. The BHB can still influence the choice of + indirect branch predictor entry, and although branch predictor entries are + isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled, the BHB itself is not isolated + between modes. Systems which support BHI_DIS_S will set it to protect against + BHI attacks. On Intel's enhanced IBRS systems, this includes cross-thread branch target injections on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, Intel eIBRS enables @@ -638,6 +656,21 @@ kernel command line. spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations cannot be disabled. + spectre_bhi= + + [X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection + (BHI) vulnerability. Syscalls are hardened against BHI + regardless of this setting. This setting affects the deployment + of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. + + on + unconditionally enable. + off + unconditionally disable. + auto + enable if hardware mitigation + control(BHI_DIS_S) is available. + For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt Mitigation selection guide diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 88dffaf8f0a9..13866591af4d 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5733,6 +5733,17 @@ sonypi.*= [HW] Sony Programmable I/O Control Device driver See Documentation/admin-guide/laptops/sonypi.rst + spectre_bhi= [X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection + (BHI) vulnerability. Syscalls are hardened against BHI + reglardless of this setting. This setting affects the + deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB + clearing sequence. + + on - unconditionally enable. + off - unconditionally disable. + auto - (default) enable only if hardware mitigation + control(BHI_DIS_S) is available. + spectre_v2= [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability. The default operation protects the kernel from diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index bea53385d31e..35ba10c28ca3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2563,6 +2563,31 @@ config MITIGATION_RFDS stored in floating point, vector and integer registers. See also +choice + prompt "Clear branch history" + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL + default SPECTRE_BHI_AUTO + help + Enable BHI mitigations. BHI attacks are a form of Spectre V2 attacks + where the branch history buffer is poisoned to speculatively steer + indirect branches. + See + +config SPECTRE_BHI_ON + bool "on" + help + Equivalent to setting spectre_bhi=on command line parameter. +config SPECTRE_BHI_OFF + bool "off" + help + Equivalent to setting spectre_bhi=off command line parameter. +config SPECTRE_BHI_AUTO + bool "auto" + help + Equivalent to setting spectre_bhi=auto command line parameter. + +endchoice + endif config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 0f1e0c73c474..a00b541644c7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -441,6 +441,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE (21*32+ 0) /* AMD LBR and PMC Freeze */ #define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP (21*32+ 1) /* "" Clear branch history at syscall entry using SW loop */ #define X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL (21*32+ 2) /* "" BHI_DIS_S HW control available */ +#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW (21*32+ 3) /* "" BHI_DIS_S HW control enabled */ /* * BUG word(s) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 4a1b4dee1425..cfd73f5921fe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1584,6 +1584,74 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_ dump_stack(); } +/* + * Set BHI_DIS_S to prevent indirect branches in kernel to be influenced by + * branch history in userspace. Not needed if BHI_NO is set. + */ +static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL)) + return false; + + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S; + update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW); + + return true; +} + +enum bhi_mitigations { + BHI_MITIGATION_OFF, + BHI_MITIGATION_ON, + BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO, +}; + +static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init = + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_ON) ? BHI_MITIGATION_ON : + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_OFF) ? BHI_MITIGATION_OFF : + BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO; + +static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) + bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_OFF; + else if (!strcmp(str, "on")) + bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_ON; + else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) + bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO; + else + pr_err("Ignoring unknown spectre_bhi option (%s)", str); + + return 0; +} +early_param("spectre_bhi", spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline); + +static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void) +{ + if (bhi_mitigation == BHI_MITIGATION_OFF) + return; + + /* Retpoline mitigates against BHI unless the CPU has RRSBA behavior */ + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && + !(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA)) + return; + + if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis()) + return; + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) + return; + + if (bhi_mitigation == BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO) + return; + + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP); + pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n"); +} + static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); @@ -1694,6 +1762,9 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE) spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(); + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_BHI)) + bhi_select_mitigation(); + spectre_v2_enabled = mode; pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]); @@ -2712,6 +2783,21 @@ static char *pbrsb_eibrs_state(void) } } +static const char * const spectre_bhi_state(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_BHI)) + return "; BHI: Not affected"; + else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW)) + return "; BHI: BHI_DIS_S"; + else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP)) + return "; BHI: SW loop"; + else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && + !(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA)) + return "; BHI: Retpoline"; + + return "; BHI: Vulnerable (Syscall hardening enabled)"; +} + static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf) { if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE) @@ -2724,13 +2810,15 @@ static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf) spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE) return sysfs_emit(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS+LFENCE with unprivileged eBPF and SMT\n"); - return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], ibpb_state(), boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? "; IBRS_FW" : "", stibp_state(), boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? "; RSB filling" : "", pbrsb_eibrs_state(), + spectre_bhi_state(), + /* this should always be at the end */ spectre_v2_module_string()); } From 43704e993ae54b8caf821501229dd2534ecb0e56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 08:57:09 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 136/139] x86/bhi: Mitigate KVM by default commit 95a6ccbdc7199a14b71ad8901cb788ba7fb5167b upstream. BHI mitigation mode spectre_bhi=auto does not deploy the software mitigation by default. In a cloud environment, it is a likely scenario where userspace is trusted but the guests are not trusted. Deploying system wide mitigation in such cases is not desirable. Update the auto mode to unconditionally mitigate against malicious guests. Deploy the software sequence at VMexit in auto mode also, when hardware mitigation is not available. Unlike the force =on mode, software sequence is not deployed at syscalls in auto mode. Suggested-by: Alexandre Chartre Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 7 +++++-- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 5 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 9 ++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 2 +- 6 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index 62c7902c66fd..9edb2860a3e1 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -439,10 +439,12 @@ The possible values in this file are: - System is protected by retpoline * - BHI: BHI_DIS_S - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S - * - BHI: SW loop + * - BHI: SW loop; KVM SW loop - System is protected by software clearing sequence * - BHI: Syscall hardening - Syscalls are hardened against BHI + * - BHI: Syscall hardening; KVM: SW loop + - System is protected from userspace attacks by syscall hardening; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will @@ -669,7 +671,8 @@ kernel command line. unconditionally disable. auto enable if hardware mitigation - control(BHI_DIS_S) is available. + control(BHI_DIS_S) is available, otherwise + enable alternate mitigation in KVM. For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 13866591af4d..b2c7b2f012e9 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5741,8 +5741,9 @@ on - unconditionally enable. off - unconditionally disable. - auto - (default) enable only if hardware mitigation - control(BHI_DIS_S) is available. + auto - (default) enable hardware mitigation + (BHI_DIS_S) if available, otherwise enable + alternate mitigation in KVM. spectre_v2= [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index a00b541644c7..7ded92672414 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -442,6 +442,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP (21*32+ 1) /* "" Clear branch history at syscall entry using SW loop */ #define X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL (21*32+ 2) /* "" BHI_DIS_S HW control available */ #define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW (21*32+ 3) /* "" BHI_DIS_S HW control enabled */ +#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT (21*32+ 4) /* "" Clear branch history at vmexit using SW loop */ /* * BUG word(s) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 33e365cbe15b..1e481d308e18 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -219,8 +219,13 @@ .macro CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY ALTERNATIVE "", "call clear_bhb_loop", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP .endm + +.macro CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY_VMEXIT + ALTERNATIVE "", "call clear_bhb_loop", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT +.endm #else #define CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY +#define CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY_VMEXIT #endif #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index cfd73f5921fe..96bd3ee83a48 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1645,9 +1645,14 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void) if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) return; + /* Mitigate KVM by default */ + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT); + pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n"); + if (bhi_mitigation == BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO) return; + /* Mitigate syscalls when the mitigation is forced =on */ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP); pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n"); } @@ -2790,10 +2795,12 @@ static const char * const spectre_bhi_state(void) else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW)) return "; BHI: BHI_DIS_S"; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP)) - return "; BHI: SW loop"; + return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop"; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && !(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA)) return "; BHI: Retpoline"; + else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT)) + return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop"; return "; BHI: Vulnerable (Syscall hardening enabled)"; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index de4490e331fa..b4f8937226c2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) call vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host - CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY + CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY_VMEXIT /* Put return value in AX */ mov %_ASM_BX, %_ASM_AX From 3e4283b77107d1105a378859eb196e3ba5661270 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Sneddon Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2024 09:49:17 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 137/139] KVM: x86: Add BHI_NO Intel processors that aren't vulnerable to BHI will set commit ed2e8d49b54d677f3123668a21a57822d679651f upstream. MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[BHI_NO] = 1;. Guests may use this BHI_NO bit to determine if they need to implement BHI mitigations or not. Allow this bit to be passed to the guests. Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 0e6e63a8f094..f724765032bc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ static unsigned int num_msr_based_features; ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR | ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | \ ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO | \ ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO | \ - ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO | ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR) + ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO | ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO) static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void) { From e21838dfd0844b093a92d4cdd4db836b473c912d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2024 19:32:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 138/139] x86: set SPECTRE_BHI_ON as default commit 2bb69f5fc72183e1c62547d900f560d0e9334925 upstream. Part of a merge commit from Linus that adjusted the default setting of SPECTRE_BHI_ON. Cc: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 35ba10c28ca3..ba815ac474a1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2566,7 +2566,7 @@ config MITIGATION_RFDS choice prompt "Clear branch history" depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL - default SPECTRE_BHI_AUTO + default SPECTRE_BHI_ON help Enable BHI mitigations. BHI attacks are a form of Spectre V2 attacks where the branch history buffer is poisoned to speculatively steer From bf1e3b1cb1e002ed1590c91f1a24433b59322368 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2024 16:28:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 139/139] Linux 6.1.85 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240408125256.218368873@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: SeongJae Park Tested-by: Kelsey Steele Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso Tested-by: Ron Economos Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) Tested-by: Conor Dooley Tested-by: Mark Brown Tested-by: Sven Joachim Tested-by: Shuah Khan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240409172805.638917723@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: kernelci.org bot Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240409173524.517362803@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 0e33150db2bf..5dff9ff99998 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 6 PATCHLEVEL = 1 -SUBLEVEL = 84 +SUBLEVEL = 85 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Curry Ramen