irda: prevent heap corruption on invalid nickname

commit d50e7e3604 upstream.

Invalid nicknames containing only spaces will result in an underflow in
a memcpy size calculation, subsequently destroying the heap and
panicking.

v2 also catches the case where the provided nickname is longer than the
buffer size, which can result in controllable heap corruption.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This commit is contained in:
Dan Rosenberg
2011-03-19 20:14:30 +00:00
committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 396c7c0bf6
commit d7a23a52a0

View File

@@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ irnet_ctrl_write(irnet_socket * ap,
while(isspace(start[length - 1]))
length--;
DABORT(length < 5 || length > NICKNAME_MAX_LEN + 5,
-EINVAL, CTRL_ERROR, "Invalid nickname.\n");
/* Copy the name for later reuse */
memcpy(ap->rname, start + 5, length - 5);
ap->rname[length - 5] = '\0';