commit 67a9c94317 upstream.
skb_tunnel_info() returns pointer of lwtstate->data as ip_tunnel_info
type without validation. lwtstate->data can have various types such as
mpls_iptunnel_encap, etc and these are not compatible.
So skb_tunnel_info() should validate before returning that pointer.
Splat looks like:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan]
Read of size 2 at addr ffff888106ec2698 by task ping/811
CPU: 1 PID: 811 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.13.0+ #1195
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x7b
print_address_description.constprop.8.cold.13+0x13/0x2ee
? vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan]
? vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan]
kasan_report.cold.14+0x83/0xdf
? vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan]
vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan]
[ ... ]
vxlan_xmit_one+0x148b/0x32b0 [vxlan]
[ ... ]
vxlan_xmit+0x25c5/0x4780 [vxlan]
[ ... ]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1ae/0x6e0
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1f39/0x31a0
[ ... ]
neigh_xmit+0x2f9/0x940
mpls_xmit+0x911/0x1600 [mpls_iptunnel]
lwtunnel_xmit+0x18f/0x450
ip_finish_output2+0x867/0x2040
[ ... ]
Fixes: 61adedf3e3 ("route: move lwtunnel state to dst_entry")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 40fc3054b4 upstream.
Commit 628a5c5618 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE") introduced
ip6_skb_dst_mtu with return value of signed int which is inconsistent
with actually returned values. Also 2 users of this function actually
assign its value to unsigned int variable and only __xfrm6_output
assigns result of this function to signed variable but actually uses
as unsigned in further comparisons and calls. Change this function
to return unsigned int value.
Fixes: 628a5c5618 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE")
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vfedorenko@novek.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit b71eaed8c0 ]
UDP sendmsg() path can be lockless, it is possible for another
thread to re-connect an change sk->sk_txhash under us.
There is no serious impact, but we can use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE()
pair to document the race.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __ip4_datagram_connect / skb_set_owner_w
write to 0xffff88813397920c of 4 bytes by task 30997 on cpu 1:
sk_set_txhash include/net/sock.h:1937 [inline]
__ip4_datagram_connect+0x69e/0x710 net/ipv4/datagram.c:75
__ip6_datagram_connect+0x551/0x840 net/ipv6/datagram.c:189
ip6_datagram_connect+0x2a/0x40 net/ipv6/datagram.c:272
inet_dgram_connect+0xfd/0x180 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:580
__sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1837 [inline]
__sys_connect+0x245/0x280 net/socket.c:1854
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1864 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1861 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1861
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff88813397920c of 4 bytes by task 31039 on cpu 0:
skb_set_hash_from_sk include/net/sock.h:2211 [inline]
skb_set_owner_w+0x118/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2101
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x452/0x4e0 net/core/sock.c:2359
sock_alloc_send_skb+0x2d/0x40 net/core/sock.c:2373
__ip6_append_data+0x1743/0x21a0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1621
ip6_make_skb+0x258/0x420 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1983
udpv6_sendmsg+0x160a/0x16b0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1527
inet6_sendmsg+0x5f/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:642
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
__sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0xbca3c43d -> 0xfdb309e0
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 31039 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit a2805dca51 upstream.
caif_enroll_dev() can fail in some cases. Ingnoring
these cases can lead to memory leak due to not assigning
link_support pointer to anywhere.
Fixes: 7c18d2205e ("caif: Restructure how link caif link layer enroll")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5c4c8c9544 upstream.
hci_chan can be created in 2 places: hci_loglink_complete_evt() if
it is an AMP hci_chan, or l2cap_conn_add() otherwise. In theory,
Only AMP hci_chan should be removed by a call to
hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt(). However, the controller might mess
up, call that function, and destroy an hci_chan which is not initiated
by hci_loglink_complete_evt().
This patch adds a verification that the destroyed hci_chan must have
been init'd by hci_loglink_complete_evt().
Example crash call trace:
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xe3/0x144 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description+0x67/0x22a mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:412 [inline]
kasan_report+0x251/0x28f mm/kasan/report.c:396
hci_send_acl+0x3b/0x56e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4072
l2cap_send_cmd+0x5af/0x5c2 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:877
l2cap_send_move_chan_cfm_icid+0x8e/0xb1 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4661
l2cap_move_fail net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5146 [inline]
l2cap_move_channel_rsp net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5185 [inline]
l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5464 [inline]
l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5799 [inline]
l2cap_recv_frame+0x1d12/0x51aa net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7023
l2cap_recv_acldata+0x2ea/0x693 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7596
hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4606 [inline]
hci_rx_work+0x2bd/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4796
process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175
worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321
kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415
Allocated by task 38:
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0x8d/0x9a mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x102/0x129 mm/slub.c:2787
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:515 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:709 [inline]
hci_chan_create+0x86/0x26d net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1674
l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1c/0x814 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7062
l2cap_conn_add net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7059 [inline]
l2cap_connect_cfm+0x134/0x852 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7381
hci_connect_cfm+0x9d/0x122 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1404
hci_remote_ext_features_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4161 [inline]
hci_event_packet+0x463f/0x72fa net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:5981
hci_rx_work+0x197/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4791
process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175
worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321
kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415
Freed by task 1732:
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/kasan.c:521 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x128 mm/kasan/kasan.c:493
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0xaa/0xf6 mm/slub.c:1436
slab_free mm/slub.c:3009 [inline]
kfree+0x182/0x21e mm/slub.c:3972
hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4891 [inline]
hci_event_packet+0x6a1c/0x72fa net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6050
hci_rx_work+0x197/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4791
process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175
worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321
kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881d7af9180
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
128-byte region [ffff8881d7af9180, ffff8881d7af9200)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00075ebe40 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881da403200 index:0x0
flags: 0x8000000000000200(slab)
raw: 8000000000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff8881da403200
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080150015 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8881d7af9080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8881d7af9100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8881d7af9180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8881d7af9200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8881d7af9280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Signed-off-by: Archie Pusaka <apusaka@chromium.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+98228e7407314d2d4ba2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Alain Michaud <alainm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: George Kennedy <george.kennedy@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3a5ca85707 upstream.
When a non-initial netns is destroyed, the usual policy is to delete
all virtual network interfaces contained, but move physical interfaces
back to the initial netns. This keeps the physical interface visible
on the system.
CAN devices are somewhat special, as they define rtnl_link_ops even
if they are physical devices. If a CAN interface is moved into a
non-initial netns, destroying that netns lets the interface vanish
instead of moving it back to the initial netns. default_device_exit()
skips CAN interfaces due to having rtnl_link_ops set. Reproducer:
ip netns add foo
ip link set can0 netns foo
ip netns delete foo
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 84 at net/core/dev.c:11030 ops_exit_list+0x38/0x60
CPU: 1 PID: 84 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 5.10.19 #1
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
[<c010e700>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010a1d8>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010a1d8>] (show_stack) from [<c086dc10>] (dump_stack+0x94/0xa8)
[<c086dc10>] (dump_stack) from [<c086b938>] (__warn+0xb8/0x114)
[<c086b938>] (__warn) from [<c086ba10>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x7c/0xac)
[<c086ba10>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0629f20>] (ops_exit_list+0x38/0x60)
[<c0629f20>] (ops_exit_list) from [<c062a5c4>] (cleanup_net+0x230/0x380)
[<c062a5c4>] (cleanup_net) from [<c0142c20>] (process_one_work+0x1d8/0x438)
[<c0142c20>] (process_one_work) from [<c0142ee4>] (worker_thread+0x64/0x5a8)
[<c0142ee4>] (worker_thread) from [<c0148a98>] (kthread+0x148/0x14c)
[<c0148a98>] (kthread) from [<c0100148>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c)
To properly restore physical CAN devices to the initial netns on owning
netns exit, introduce a flag on rtnl_link_ops that can be set by drivers.
For CAN devices setting this flag, default_device_exit() considers them
non-virtual, applying the usual namespace move.
The issue was introduced in the commit mentioned below, as at that time
CAN devices did not have a dellink() operation.
Fixes: e008b5fc8d ("net: Simplfy default_device_exit and improve batching.")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302122423.872326-1-martin@strongswan.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ee576c47db upstream.
The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, casting
it with IPCB or IP6CB, assuming the skb to have come directly from the
inet layer. But when the packet comes from the ndo layer, especially
when forwarded, there's no telling what might be in skb->cb at that
point. As a result, the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory
contents, which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one
reported by a user:
panic+0x108/0x2ea
__stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20
__icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0
icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160
In icmp_send, skb->cb is cast with IPCB and an ip_options struct is read
from it. The optlen parameter there is of particular note, as it can
induce writes beyond bounds. There are quite a few ways that can happen
in __ip_options_echo. For example:
// sptr/skb are attacker-controlled skb bytes
sptr = skb_network_header(skb);
// dptr/dopt points to stack memory allocated by __icmp_send
dptr = dopt->__data;
// sopt is the corrupt skb->cb in question
if (sopt->rr) {
optlen = sptr[sopt->rr+1]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
soffset = sptr[sopt->rr+2]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
// this now writes potentially attacker-controlled data, over
// flowing the stack:
memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->rr, optlen);
}
In the icmpv6_send case, the story is similar, but not as dire, as only
IP6CB(skb)->iif and IP6CB(skb)->dsthao are used. The dsthao case is
worse than the iif case, but it is passed to ipv6_find_tlv, which does
a bit of bounds checking on the value.
This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41,
sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by
good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've
avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89
CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160
__kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38
kasan_report+0x32/0x40
check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0
memcpy+0x39/0x60
__ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
__icmp_send+0x744/0x1700
Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for
the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the
gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the
shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send.
This commit fixes the issue by passing an empty IPCB or IP6CB along to
the functions that actually do the work. For the icmp_send, this was
already trivial, thanks to __icmp_send providing the plumbing function.
For icmpv6_send, this required a tiny bit of refactoring to make it
behave like the v4 case, after which it was straight forward.
Fixes: a2b78e9b2c ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs")
Reported-by: SinYu <liuxyon@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAF=yD-LOF116aHub6RMe8vB8ZpnrrnoTdqhobEx+bvoA8AsP0w@mail.gmail.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210223131858.72082-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0b41713b60 upstream.
This introduces a helper function to be called only by network drivers
that wraps calls to icmp[v6]_send in a conntrack transformation, in case
NAT has been used. We don't want to pollute the non-driver path, though,
so we introduce this as a helper to be called by places that actually
make use of this, as suggested by Florian.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 469aceddfa ]
Toshiaki pointed out that we now have two very similar functions to extract
the L3 protocol number in the presence of VLAN tags. And Daniel pointed out
that the unbounded parsing loop makes it possible for maliciously crafted
packets to loop through potentially hundreds of tags.
Fix both of these issues by consolidating the two parsing functions and
limiting the VLAN tag parsing to a max depth of 8 tags. As part of this,
switch over __vlan_get_protocol() to use skb_header_pointer() instead of
pskb_may_pull(), to avoid the possible side effects of the latter and keep
the skb pointer 'const' through all the parsing functions.
v2:
- Use limit of 8 tags instead of 32 (matching XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT)
Reported-by: Toshiaki Makita <toshiaki.makita1@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Fixes: d7bf2ebebc ("sched: consistently handle layer3 header accesses in the presence of VLANs")
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 02a1b175b0 ]
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt:46 says:
ip_forward_use_pmtu - BOOLEAN
By default we don't trust protocol path MTUs while forwarding
because they could be easily forged and can lead to unwanted
fragmentation by the router.
You only need to enable this if you have user-space software
which tries to discover path mtus by itself and depends on the
kernel honoring this information. This is normally not the case.
Default: 0 (disabled)
Possible values:
0 - disabled
1 - enabled
Which makes it pretty clear that setting it to 1 is a potential
security/safety/DoS issue, and yet it is entirely reasonable to want
forwarded traffic to honour explicitly administrator configured
route mtus (instead of defaulting to device mtu).
Indeed, I can't think of a single reason why you wouldn't want to.
Since you configured a route mtu you probably know better...
It is pretty common to have a higher device mtu to allow receiving
large (jumbo) frames, while having some routes via that interface
(potentially including the default route to the internet) specify
a lower mtu.
Note that ipv6 forwarding uses device mtu unless the route is locked
(in which case it will use the route mtu).
This approach is not usable for IPv4 where an 'mtu lock' on a route
also has the side effect of disabling TCP path mtu discovery via
disabling the IPv4 DF (don't frag) bit on all outgoing frames.
I'm not aware of a way to lock a route from an IPv6 RA, so that also
potentially seems wrong.
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Sunmeet Gill (Sunny) <sgill@quicinc.com>
Cc: Vinay Paradkar <vparadka@qti.qualcomm.com>
Cc: Tyler Wear <twear@quicinc.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 339ddaa626 upstream.
Starting with the upgrade to v5.8-rc3, I've noticed I wasn't able to
connect to my Bluetooth headset properly anymore. While connecting to
the device would eventually succeed, bluetoothd seemed to be confused
about the current connection state where the state was flapping hence
and forth. Bisecting this issue led to commit 3ca44c16b0 (Bluetooth:
Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm, 2020-05-19), which
refactored `hci_encrypt_cfm` to also handle updating the connection
state.
The commit in question changed the code to call `hci_connect_cfm` inside
`hci_encrypt_cfm` and to change the connection state. But with the
conversion, we now only update the connection state if a status was set
already. In fact, the reverse should be true: the status should be
updated if no status is yet set. So let's fix the isuse by reversing the
condition.
Fixes: 3ca44c16b0 ("Bluetooth: Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm")
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Acked-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3ca44c16b0 upstream.
This makes hci_encrypt_cfm calls hci_connect_cfm in case the connection
state is BT_CONFIG so callers don't have to check the state.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt <hegtvedt@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f19425641c upstream.
Only sockets will have the chan->data set to an actual sk, channels
like A2MP would have its own data which would likely cause a crash when
calling sk_filter, in order to fix this a new callback has been
introduced so channels can implement their own filtering if necessary.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 91a46c6d1b ]
XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL was not cloned completely from the old to the new.
Migrate this attribute during XFRMA_MSG_MIGRATE
v1->v2:
- move curleft cloning to a separate patch
Fixes: af2f464e32 ("xfrm: Assign esn pointers when cloning a state")
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1e105e6afa ]
Following bug was reported via irc:
nft list ruleset
set knock_candidates_ipv4 {
type ipv4_addr . inet_service
size 65535
elements = { 127.0.0.1 . 123,
127.0.0.1 . 123 }
}
..
udp dport 123 add @knock_candidates_ipv4 { ip saddr . 123 }
udp dport 123 add @knock_candidates_ipv4 { ip saddr . udp dport }
It should not have been possible to add a duplicate set entry.
After some debugging it turned out that the problem is the immediate
value (123) in the second-to-last rule.
Concatenations use 32bit registers, i.e. the elements are 8 bytes each,
not 6 and it turns out the kernel inserted
inet firewall @knock_candidates_ipv4
element 0100007f ffff7b00 : 0 [end]
element 0100007f 00007b00 : 0 [end]
Note the non-zero upper bits of the first element. It turns out that
nft_immediate doesn't zero the destination register, but this is needed
when the length isn't a multiple of 4.
Furthermore, the zeroing in nft_payload is broken. We can't use
[len / 4] = 0 -- if len is a multiple of 4, index is off by one.
Skip zeroing in this case and use a conditional instead of (len -1) / 4.
Fixes: 49499c3e6e ("netfilter: nf_tables: switch registers to 32 bit addressing")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit d9539752d2 upstream.
Add missed sock updates to compat path via a new helper, which will be
used more in coming patches. (The net/core/scm.c code is left as-is here
to assist with -stable backports for the compat path.)
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 48a87cc26c ("net: netprio: fd passed in SCM_RIGHTS datagram not set correctly")
Fixes: d84295067f ("net: net_cls: fd passed in SCM_RIGHTS datagram not set correctly")
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 8c0de6e96c ]
IPV6_ADDRFORM causes resource leaks when converting an IPv6 socket
to IPv4, particularly struct ipv6_ac_socklist. Similar to
struct ipv6_mc_socklist, we should just close it on this path.
This bug can be easily reproduced with the following C program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
int main()
{
int s, value;
struct sockaddr_in6 addr;
struct ipv6_mreq m6;
s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
addr.sin6_port = htons(5000);
inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::ffff:192.168.122.194", &addr.sin6_addr);
connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
inet_pton(AF_INET6, "fe80::AAAA", &m6.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
m6.ipv6mr_interface = 5;
setsockopt(s, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST, &m6, sizeof(m6));
value = AF_INET;
setsockopt(s, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_ADDRFORM, &value, sizeof(value));
close(s);
return 0;
}
Reported-by: ch3332xr@gmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 1e82a62fec ]
A potential deadlock can occur during registering or unregistering a
new generic netlink family between the main nl_table_lock and the
cb_lock where each thread wants the lock held by the other, as
demonstrated below.
1) Thread 1 is performing a netlink_bind() operation on a socket. As part
of this call, it will call netlink_lock_table(), incrementing the
nl_table_users count to 1.
2) Thread 2 is registering (or unregistering) a genl_family via the
genl_(un)register_family() API. The cb_lock semaphore will be taken for
writing.
3) Thread 1 will call genl_bind() as part of the bind operation to handle
subscribing to GENL multicast groups at the request of the user. It will
attempt to take the cb_lock semaphore for reading, but it will fail and
be scheduled away, waiting for Thread 2 to finish the write.
4) Thread 2 will call netlink_table_grab() during the (un)registration
call. However, as Thread 1 has incremented nl_table_users, it will not
be able to proceed, and both threads will be stuck waiting for the
other.
genl_bind() is a noop, unless a genl_family implements the mcast_bind()
function to handle setting up family-specific multicast operations. Since
no one in-tree uses this functionality as Cong pointed out, simply removing
the genl_bind() function will remove the possibility for deadlock, as there
is no attempt by Thread 1 above to take the cb_lock semaphore.
Fixes: c380d9a7af ("genetlink: pass multicast bind/unbind to families")
Suggested-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 41b14fb872 ]
Clearing the sock TX queue in sk_set_socket() might cause unexpected
out-of-order transmit when called from sock_orphan(), as outstanding
packets can pick a different TX queue and bypass the ones already queued.
This is undesired in general. More specifically, it breaks the in-order
scheduling property guarantee for device-offloaded TLS sockets.
Remove the call to sk_tx_queue_clear() in sk_set_socket(), and add it
explicitly only where needed.
Fixes: e022f0b4a0 ("net: Introduce sk_tx_queue_mapping")
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
