unwind_for_each_frame stops after the first frame if regs->gprs[15] <=
sp.
The reason is that in case regs are specified, the first frame should be
regs->psw.addr and the second frame should be sp->gprs[8]. However,
currently the second frame is regs->gprs[15], which confuses
outside_of_stack().
Fix by introducing a flag to distinguish this special case from
unwinding the interrupt handler, for which the current behavior is
appropriate.
Fixes: 78c98f9074 ("s390/unwind: introduce stack unwind API")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
The problem is that we were putting the NUL terminator too far:
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
If the user input isn't NUL terminated and they haven't initialized the
whole buffer then it leads to an info leak. The NUL terminator should
be:
buf[len - 1] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Yihui Zeng <yzeng56@asu.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
[heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com: keep semantics of how *lenp and *ppos are handled]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
The Kryo cores share errata 1009 with Falkor, so add their model
definitions and enable it for them as well.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
[will: Update entry in silicon-errata.rst]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
VMX already does so if the host has SMEP, in order to support the combination of
CR0.WP=1 and CR4.SMEP=1. However, it is perfectly safe to always do so, and in
fact VMX already ends up running with EFER.NXE=1 on old processors that lack the
"load EFER" controls, because it may help avoiding a slow MSR write. Removing
all the conditionals simplifies the code.
SVM does not have similar code, but it should since recent AMD processors do
support SMEP. So this patch also makes the code for the two vendors more similar
while fixing NPT=0, CR0.WP=1 and CR4.SMEP=1 on AMD processors.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
In kvm_create_vm(), if we've successfully called kvm_arch_init_vm(), but
then fail later in the function, we need to call kvm_arch_destroy_vm()
so that it can do any necessary cleanup (like freeing memory).
Fixes: 44a95dae1d ("KVM: x86: Detect and Initialize AVIC support")
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
[Remove dependency on "kvm: Don't clear reference count on
kvm_create_vm() error path" which was not committed. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Currently, kernel fails to boot on some HyperV VMs when using EFI.
And it's a potential issue on all x86 platforms.
It's caused by broken kernel relocation on EFI systems, when below three
conditions are met:
1. Kernel image is not loaded to the default address (LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR)
by the loader.
2. There isn't enough room to contain the kernel, starting from the
default load address (eg. something else occupied part the region).
3. In the memmap provided by EFI firmware, there is a memory region
starts below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, and suitable for containing the
kernel.
EFI stub will perform a kernel relocation when condition 1 is met. But
due to condition 2, EFI stub can't relocate kernel to the preferred
address, so it fallback to ask EFI firmware to alloc lowest usable memory
region, got the low region mentioned in condition 3, and relocated
kernel there.
It's incorrect to relocate the kernel below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR. This
is the lowest acceptable kernel relocation address.
The first thing goes wrong is in arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S.
Kernel decompression will force use LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR as the output
address if kernel is located below it. Then the relocation before
decompression, which move kernel to the end of the decompression buffer,
will overwrite other memory region, as there is no enough memory there.
To fix it, just don't let EFI stub relocate the kernel to any address
lower than lowest acceptable address.
[ ardb: introduce efi_low_alloc_above() to reduce the scope of the change ]
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-6-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The EFI stubloader for ARM starts out by allocating a 32 MB window
at the base of RAM, in order to ensure that the decompressor (which
blindly copies the uncompressed kernel into that window) does not
overwrite other allocations that are made while running in the context
of the EFI firmware.
In some cases, (e.g., U-Boot running on the Raspberry Pi 2), this is
causing boot failures because this initial allocation conflicts with
a page of reserved memory at the base of RAM that contains the SMP spin
tables and other pieces of firmware data and which was put there by
the bootloader under the assumption that the TEXT_OFFSET window right
below the kernel is only used partially during early boot, and will be
left alone once the memory reservations are processed and taken into
account.
So let's permit reserved memory regions to exist in the region starting
at the base of RAM, and ending at TEXT_OFFSET - 5 * PAGE_SIZE, which is
the window below the kernel that is not touched by the early boot code.
Tested-by: Guillaume Gardet <Guillaume.Gardet@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-5-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Commit 428826f535 ("fdt: add support for rng-seed") introduced
add_bootloader_randomness(), permitting randomness provided by the
bootloader or firmware to be credited as entropy. However, the fact
that the UEFI support code was already wired into the RNG subsystem
via a call to add_device_randomness() was overlooked, and so it was
not converted at the same time.
Note that this UEFI (v2.4 or newer) feature is currently only
implemented for EFI stub booting on ARM, and further note that
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER must be enabled, and this should be
done only if there indeed is sufficient trust in the bootloader
_and_ its source of randomness.
[ ardb: update commit log ]
Tested-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-4-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull dmaengine fixes from Vinod Koul:
"A few fixes to the dmaengine drivers:
- fix in sprd driver for link list and potential memory leak
- tegra transfer failure fix
- imx size check fix for script_number
- xilinx fix for 64bit AXIDMA and control reg update
- qcom bam dma resource leak fix
- cppi slave transfer fix when idle"
* tag 'dmaengine-fix-5.4-rc6' of git://git.infradead.org/users/vkoul/slave-dma:
dmaengine: cppi41: Fix cppi41_dma_prep_slave_sg() when idle
dmaengine: qcom: bam_dma: Fix resource leak
dmaengine: sprd: Fix the possible memory leak issue
dmaengine: xilinx_dma: Fix control reg update in vdma_channel_set_config
dmaengine: xilinx_dma: Fix 64-bit simple AXIDMA transfer
dmaengine: imx-sdma: fix size check for sdma script_number
dmaengine: tegra210-adma: fix transfer failure
dmaengine: sprd: Fix the link-list pointer register configuration issue
Haiyang Zhang says:
====================
hv_netvsc: fix error handling in netvsc_attach/set_features
The error handling code path in these functions are not correct.
This patch set fixes them.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If rndis_filter_open() fails, we need to remove the rndis device created
in earlier steps, before returning an error code. Otherwise, the retry of
netvsc_attach() from its callers will fail and hang.
Fixes: 7b2ee50c0c ("hv_netvsc: common detach logic")
Signed-off-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When an error is returned by rndis_filter_set_offload_params(), we should
still assign the unaffected features to ndev->features. Otherwise, these
features will be missing.
Fixes: d6792a5a07 ("hv_netvsc: Add handler for LRO setting change")
Signed-off-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Release resources when attaching to ULD fail. Otherwise, data
mismatch is seen between LLD and ULD later on, which lead to
kernel panic when accessing resources that should not even
exist in the first place.
Fixes: 94cdb8bb99 ("cxgb4: Add support for dynamic allocation of resources for ULD")
Signed-off-by: Shahjada Abul Husain <shahjada@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Kulkarni <vishal@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Introduce UFS crypto variant operations to handle quirks in individual
UFS inline encryption hardware.
We also expose a default implementation for crypto operations that
conforms to the UFSHCI v2.1 specification, so that any user of crypto
variant operations can fall back on the default implementation
whenever there aren't any special quirks to handle.
Bug: 137270441
Change-Id: I8bd9bced66b50cfdd0483bbc3e999b00c0f11386
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
enable CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION and
CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT
Bug: 137270441
Test: Test cuttlefish boots both with and without inlinecrypt mount
option specified in fstab, while using both F2FS and EXT4 for
userdata.img. Also tested by running gce-xfstests on both the
auto and encrypt test groups on EXT4 and F2FS both with and
without the inlinecrypt mount option. The UFS changes were
tested on a Pixel 4 device.
Change-Id: Ie1b77f7615d6a7a60fdc9105c7ab2200d17636a8
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Wire up ext4 to support inline encryption via the helper functions which
fs/crypto/ now provides. This includes:
- Adding a mount option 'inlinecrypt' which enables inline encryption
on encrypted files where it can be used.
- Setting the bio_crypt_ctx on bios that will be submitted to an
inline-encrypted file.
Note: submit_bh_wbc() in fs/buffer.c also needed to be patched for
this part, since ext4 sometimes uses ll_rw_block() on file data.
- Not adding logically discontiguous data to bios that will be submitted
to an inline-encrypted file.
- Not doing filesystem-layer crypto on inline-encrypted files.
Bug: 137270441
Test: tested as series; see Ie1b77f7615d6a7a60fdc9105c7ab2200d17636a8
Change-Id: I73dac46ff1eba56a13975c387b20554416ddbad8
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11214781/
Wire up f2fs to support inline encryption via the helper functions which
fs/crypto/ now provides. This includes:
- Adding a mount option 'inlinecrypt' which enables inline encryption
on encrypted files where it can be used.
- Setting the bio_crypt_ctx on bios that will be submitted to an
inline-encrypted file.
- Not adding logically discontiguous data to bios that will be submitted
to an inline-encrypted file.
- Not doing filesystem-layer crypto on inline-encrypted files.
Bug: 137270441
Test: tested as series; see Ie1b77f7615d6a7a60fdc9105c7ab2200d17636a8
Change-Id: I2ea4da9e251e668b908408ecc091f09ebf8be8f4
Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11214785/
Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline
encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part
of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via
Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of
the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs.
To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with
'-o inlinecrypt'. The contents of any AES-256-XTS encrypted files will
then be encrypted using blk-crypto, instead of using the traditional
filesystem-layer crypto. fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use,
and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's
testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests.
Note that since blk-crypto has a fallack to Linux's crypto API, this
feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption
hardware.
Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when
submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This
patch just adds the common code.
Bug: 137270441
Test: tested as series; see Ie1b77f7615d6a7a60fdc9105c7ab2200d17636a8
Change-Id: I72e7e29db017404cdf7b5125718b5ba9590d31b4
Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11214761/
Wire up ufshcd.c with the UFS Crypto API, the block layer inline
encryption additions and the keyslot manager.
Bug: 137270441
Test: tested as series; see Ie1b77f7615d6a7a60fdc9105c7ab2200d17636a8
Change-Id: Idc703c9617497e368ce83af36587708968660b23
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11214753/
Introduce functions to manipulate UFS inline encryption hardware
in line with the JEDEC UFSHCI v2.1 specification and to work with the
block keyslot manager.
Bug: 137270441
Test: tested as series; see Ie1b77f7615d6a7a60fdc9105c7ab2200d17636a8
Change-Id: I98d2512858a231f11a6bf868198446378d3aa491
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11214745/
Add the crypto registers and structs defined in v2.1 of the JEDEC UFSHCI
specification in preparation to add support for inline encryption to
UFS.
Bug: 137270441
Test: tested as series; see Ie1b77f7615d6a7a60fdc9105c7ab2200d17636a8
Change-Id: I8e4006bfd69692f7d5c1c37f660d90b9e2fa1274
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11214737/
We introduce blk-crypto, which manages programming keyslots for struct
bios. With blk-crypto, filesystems only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with
the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry
about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-crypto handles
that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for layered devices like device
mapper to make use of inline encryption hardware.
Blk-crypto delegates crypto operations to inline encryption hardware when
available, and also contains a software fallback to the kernel crypto API.
For more details, refer to Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst.
Bug: 137270441
Test: tested as series; see Ie1b77f7615d6a7a60fdc9105c7ab2200d17636a8
Change-Id: I7df59fef0c1e90043b1899c5a95973e23afac0c5
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11214731/
bio_crypt_should_process would WARN that the bio did not have a
keyslot in any keyslot manager even when we were on the decrypt path
of blk-crypto, which is a bug. The WARN is now conditional on the
caller being responible for handling encryption rather than blk-crypto
(i.e. the WARN happens only if this function return true).
Bug: 137270441
Test: tested as series; see Ie1b77f7615d6a7a60fdc9105c7ab2200d17636a8
Change-Id: I01aa7a04a5ab9c9e579bde8a06d095916d880e2c
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
When a card is disconnected while in use, the system waits until all
opened files are closed then releases the card. This is done via
put_device() of the card device in each device release code.
The recently reported mutex deadlock bug happens in this code path;
snd_timer_close() for the timer device deals with the global
register_mutex and it calls put_device() there. When this timer
device is the last one, the card gets freed and it eventually calls
snd_timer_free(), which has again the protection with the global
register_mutex -- boom.
Basically put_device() call itself is race-free, so a relative simple
workaround is to move this put_device() call out of the mutex. For
achieving that, in this patch, snd_timer_close_locked() got a new
argument to store the card device pointer in return, and each caller
invokes put_device() with the returned object after the mutex unlock.
Reported-and-tested-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what
encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However,
it's the filesystem/fscrypt that knows about and manages encryption
contexts. As such, when the filesystem layer submits a bio to the block
layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for
inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the
encryption context for that bio.
We want to communicate the encryption context from the filesystem layer
to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the
block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which
can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private
field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass
information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various
functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging
logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx.
Bug: 137270441
Test: tested as series; see Ie1b77f7615d6a7a60fdc9105c7ab2200d17636a8
Change-Id: I479de9ec13758f1978b34d897e6956e680caeb92
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11214719/
We use io_kiocb->result == -EAGAIN as a way to know if we need to
re-submit a polled request, as -EAGAIN reporting happens out-of-line
for IO submission failures. This field is cleared when we originally
allocate the request, but it isn't reset when we retry the submission
from async context. This can cause issues where we think something
needs a re-issue, but we're really just reading stale data.
Reset ->result whenever we re-prep a request for polled submission.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9e645e1105 ("io_uring: add support for sqe links")
Reported-by: Bijan Mottahedeh <bijan.mottahedeh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
The current code in ftrace_regs_caller() doesn't assign
%r3 to contain the address of the current frame. This
is hidden if the kernel is compiled with FRAME_POINTER,
but without it just crashes because it tries to dereference
an arbitrary address. Fix this by always setting %r3 to the
current stack frame.
Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Inline Encryption hardware allows software to specify an encryption context
(an encryption key, crypto algorithm, data unit num, data unit size, etc.)
along with a data transfer request to a storage device, and the inline
encryption hardware will use that context to en/decrypt the data. The
inline encryption hardware is part of the storage device, and it
conceptually sits on the data path between system memory and the storage
device.
Inline Encryption hardware implementations often function around the
concept of "keyslots". These implementations often have a limited number
of "keyslots", each of which can hold an encryption context (we say that
an encryption context can be "programmed" into a keyslot). Requests made
to the storage device may have a keyslot associated with them, and the
inline encryption hardware will en/decrypt the data in the requests using
the encryption context programmed into that associated keyslot. As
keyslots are limited, and programming keys may be expensive in many
implementations, and multiple requests may use exactly the same encryption
contexts, we introduce a Keyslot Manager to efficiently manage keyslots.
The keyslot manager also functions as the interface that upper layers will
use to program keys into inline encryption hardware. For more information
on the Keyslot Manager, refer to documentation found in
block/keyslot-manager.c and linux/keyslot-manager.h.
Bug: 137270441
Test: tested as series; see Ie1b77f7615d6a7a60fdc9105c7ab2200d17636a8
Change-Id: Iea1ee5a7eec46cb50d33cf1e2d20dfb7335af4ed
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11214713/
f2fs inode numbers are stable across filesystem resizing, and f2fs inode
and file logical block numbers are always 32-bit. So f2fs can always
support IV_INO_LBLK_64 encryption policies. Wire up the needed
fscrypt_operations to declare support.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Change-Id: I15c9b0f277df106701c4aacdf9456dbb3f8876a1
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11210903/
IV_INO_LBLK_64 encryption policies have special requirements from the
filesystem beyond those of the existing encryption policies:
- Inode numbers must never change, even if the filesystem is resized.
- Inode numbers must be <= 32 bits.
- File logical block numbers must be <= 32 bits.
ext4 has 32-bit inode and file logical block numbers. However,
resize2fs can re-number inodes when shrinking an ext4 filesystem.
However, typically the people who would want to use this format don't
care about filesystem shrinking. They'd be fine with a solution that
just prevents the filesystem from being shrunk.
Therefore, add a new feature flag EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_STABLE_INODES that
will do exactly that. Then wire up the fscrypt_operations to expose
this flag to fs/crypto/, so that it allows IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies when
this flag is set.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Change-Id: Iff0f96b3869a907d0539eaf130df8f5e633d0b19
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11210907/
Inline encryption hardware compliant with the UFS v2.1 standard or with
the upcoming version of the eMMC standard has the following properties:
(1) Per I/O request, the encryption key is specified by a previously
loaded keyslot. There might be only a small number of keyslots.
(2) Per I/O request, the starting IV is specified by a 64-bit "data unit
number" (DUN). IV bits 64-127 are assumed to be 0. The hardware
automatically increments the DUN for each "data unit" of
configurable size in the request, e.g. for each filesystem block.
Property (1) makes it inefficient to use the traditional fscrypt
per-file keys. Property (2) precludes the use of the existing
DIRECT_KEY fscrypt policy flag, which needs at least 192 IV bits.
Therefore, add a new fscrypt policy flag IV_INO_LBLK_64 which causes the
encryption to modified as follows:
- The encryption keys are derived from the master key, encryption mode
number, and filesystem UUID.
- The IVs are chosen as (inode_number << 32) | file_logical_block_num.
For filenames encryption, file_logical_block_num is 0.
Since the file nonces aren't used in the key derivation, many files may
share the same encryption key. This is much more efficient on the
target hardware. Including the inode number in the IVs and mixing the
filesystem UUID into the keys ensures that data in different files is
nevertheless still encrypted differently.
Additionally, limiting the inode and block numbers to 32 bits and
placing the block number in the low bits maintains compatibility with
the 64-bit DUN convention (property (2) above).
Since this scheme assumes that inode numbers are stable (which may
preclude filesystem shrinking) and that inode and file logical block
numbers are at most 32-bit, IV_INO_LBLK_64 will only be allowed on
filesystems that meet these constraints. These are acceptable
limitations for the cases where this format would actually be used.
Note that IV_INO_LBLK_64 is an on-disk format, not an implementation.
This patch just adds support for it using the existing filesystem layer
encryption. A later patch will add support for inline encryption.
Co-developed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Change-Id: If97607ae4c111c2630d3cf337bd6fbc51abec896
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11210909/
The 'f' ioctls with numbers 19-26 decimal are currently used for fscrypt
(a.k.a. ext4/f2fs/ubifs encryption), and up to 39 decimal is reserved
for future fscrypt use, as per the comment in fs/ext4/ext4.h. So the
reserved range is 13-27 hex.
Document this in ioctl-number.rst.
Change-Id: Id106c59de21d1585c22729bd5b4339b27c298c9c
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11182409/
memset the struct fscrypt_info to zero before freeing. This isn't
really needed currently, since there's no secret key directly in the
fscrypt_info. But there's a decent chance that someone will add such a
field in the future, e.g. in order to use an API that takes a raw key
such as siphash(). So it's good to do this as a hardening measure.
Change-Id: I0fadabcf72d36a0aa786fd5bcc5153c5dbfec8ba
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11182405/
Now that ext4 and f2fs implement their own post-read workflow that
supports both fscrypt and fsverity, the fscrypt-only workflow based
around struct fscrypt_ctx is no longer used. So remove the unused code.
This is based on a patch from Chandan Rajendra's "Consolidate FS read
I/O callbacks code" patchset, but rebased onto the latest kernel, folded
__fscrypt_decrypt_bio() into fscrypt_decrypt_bio(), cleaned up
fscrypt_initialize(), and updated the commit message.
Change-Id: I811addfc89f0d0f7f87f0fe2102dd276ba07e437
Originally-from: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11182387/
Instead of open-coding the calculations for ESSIV handling, use an ESSIV
skcipher which does all of this under the hood. ESSIV was added to the
crypto API in v5.4.
This is based on a patch from Ard Biesheuvel, but reworked to apply
after all the fscrypt changes that went into v5.4.
Tested with 'kvm-xfstests -c ext4,f2fs -g encrypt', including the
ciphertext verification tests for v1 and v2 encryption policies.
Change-Id: I1b09160c0135a2d8b16db7b4139d22b903ec6a8e
Originally-from: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11182383/
"ctx:file_pos sysctl:read read ok narrow" works on s390 by accident: it
reads the wrong byte, which happens to have the expected value of 0.
Improve the test by seeking to the 4th byte and expecting 4 instead of
0.
This makes the latent problem apparent: the test attempts to read the
first byte of bpf_sysctl.file_pos, assuming this is the least-significant
byte, which is not the case on big-endian machines: a non-zero offset is
needed.
The point of the test is to verify narrow loads, so we cannot cheat our
way out by simply using BPF_W. The existence of the test means that such
loads have to be supported, most likely because llvm can generate them.
Fix the test by adding a big-endian variant, which uses an offset to
access the least-significant byte of bpf_sysctl.file_pos.
This reveals the final problem: verifier rejects accesses to bpf_sysctl
fields with offset > 0. Such accesses are already allowed for a wide
range of structs: __sk_buff, bpf_sock_addr and sk_msg_md to name a few.
Extend this support to bpf_sysctl by using bpf_ctx_range instead of
offsetof when matching field offsets.
Fixes: 7b146cebe3 ("bpf: Sysctl hook")
Fixes: e1550bfe0d ("bpf: Add file_pos field to bpf_sysctl ctx")
Fixes: 9a1027e525 ("selftests/bpf: Test file_pos field in bpf_sysctl ctx")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191028122902.9763-1-iii@linux.ibm.com
The devlink parameter "acl_region_rehash_interval" is a runtime
parameter whose value is stored in a dynamically allocated memory. While
reloading the driver, this memory is freed and then allocated again. A
use-after-free might happen if during this time frame someone tries to
retrieve its value.
Since commit 070c63f20f ("net: devlink: allow to change namespaces
during reload") the use-after-free can be reliably triggered when
reloading the driver into a namespace, as after freeing the memory (via
reload_down() callback) all the parameters are notified.
Fix this by unpublishing and then re-publishing the parameters during
reload.
Fixes: 98bbf70c1c ("mlxsw: spectrum: add "acl_region_rehash_interval" devlink param")
Fixes: 7c62cfb8c5 ("devlink: publish params only after driver init is done")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Current implementation for nvm_attr configuration instructs the management
FW to load/unload the nvm-cfg image for each user-provided attribute in
the input file. This consumes lot of cycles even for few tens of
attributes.
This patch updates the implementation to perform load/commit of the config
for every 50 attributes. After loading the nvm-image, MFW expects that
config should be committed in a predefined timer value (5 sec), hence it's
not possible to write large number of attributes in a single load/commit
window. Hence performing the commits in chunks.
Fixes: 0dabbe1bb3 ("qed: Add driver API for flashing the config attributes.")
Signed-off-by: Sudarsana Reddy Kalluru <skalluru@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
After commit 0ce1822c2a ("vxlan: add adjacent link to limit depth
level"), vxlan_changelink() could fail because of
netdev_adjacent_change_prepare().
netdev_adjacent_change_prepare() returns -EEXIST when old lower device
and new lower device are same.
(old lower device is "dst->remote_dev" and new lower device is "lowerdev")
So, before calling it, lowerdev should be NULL if these devices are same.
Test command1:
ip link add dummy0 type dummy
ip link add vxlan0 type vxlan dev dummy0 dstport 4789 vni 1
ip link set vxlan0 type vxlan ttl 5
RTNETLINK answers: File exists
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: 0ce1822c2a ("vxlan: add adjacent link to limit depth level")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When we're destroying the host transport mechanism, we should ensure
that we do not leak memory by failing to release any back channel
slots that might still exist.
Reported-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
If there are RDMA back channel requests being processed by the
server threads, then we should hold a reference to the transport
to ensure it doesn't get freed from underneath us.
Reported-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Fixes: 63cae47005 ("xprtrdma: Handle incoming backward direction RPC calls")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
If there are TCP back channel requests being processed by the
server threads, then we should hold a reference to the transport
to ensure it doesn't get freed from underneath us.
Reported-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Fixes: 2ea24497a1 ("SUNRPC: RPC callbacks may be split across several..")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
