[ Upstream commit 7c48662b9d ]
The problem is that gpio_free() can sleep and the cfg_soc() can be
called with spinlocks held. One problematic call tree is:
--> ath_reset_internal() takes &sc->sc_pcu_lock spin lock
--> ath9k_hw_reset()
--> ath9k_hw_gpio_request_in()
--> ath9k_hw_gpio_request()
--> ath9k_hw_gpio_cfg_soc()
Remove gpio_free(), use error message instead, so we should make sure
there is no GPIO conflict.
Also remove ath9k_hw_gpio_free() from ath9k_hw_apply_gpio_override(),
as gpio_mask will never be set for SOC chips.
Signed-off-by: Miaoqing Pan <miaoqing@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1628481916-15030-1-git-send-email-miaoqing@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 23151b9ae7 ]
Bad header can have large length field which can cause OOB.
cptr is the last bytes for read, and the eeprom is parsed
from high to low address. The OOB, triggered by the condition
length > cptr could cause memory error with a read on
negative index.
There are some sanity check around length, but it is not
compared with cptr (the remaining bytes). Here, the
corrupted/bad EEPROM can cause panic.
I was able to reproduce the crash, but I cannot find the
log and the reproducer now. After I applied the patch, the
bug is no longer reproducible.
Signed-off-by: Zekun Shen <bruceshenzk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YM3xKsQJ0Hw2hjrc@Zekuns-MBP-16.fios-router.home
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit ca2848022c upstream.
Do not delete a key cache entry that is still being referenced by
pending frames in TXQs. This avoids reuse of the key cache entry while a
frame might still be transmitted using it.
To avoid having to do any additional operations during the main TX path
operations, track pending key cache entries in a new bitmap and check
whether any pending entries can be deleted before every new key
add/remove operation. Also clear any remaining entries when stopping the
interface.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201214172118.18100-6-jouni@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 144cd24dbc upstream.
tkip_keymap can be used internally to avoid the reference to key->cipher
and with this, only the key index value itself is needed. This allows
ath_key_delete() call to be postponed to be handled after the upper
layer STA and key entry have already been removed. This is needed to
make ath9k key cache management safer.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201214172118.18100-5-jouni@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 56c5485c9e upstream.
It is possible for there to be pending frames in TXQs with a reference
to the key cache entry that is being deleted. If such a key cache entry
is cleared, those pending frame in TXQ might get transmitted without
proper encryption. It is safer to leave the previously used key into the
key cache in such cases. Instead, only clear the MAC address to prevent
RX processing from using this key cache entry.
This is needed in particularly in AP mode where the TXQs cannot be
flushed on station disconnection. This change alone may not be able to
address all cases where the key cache entry might get reused for other
purposes immediately (the key cache entry should be released for reuse
only once the TXQs do not have any remaining references to them), but
this makes it less likely to get unprotected frames and the more
complete changes may end up being significantly more complex.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201214172118.18100-2-jouni@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 11ef6bc846 ]
At least on wl12xx, reading the MAC after boot can fail with a warning
at drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/sdio.c:78 wl12xx_sdio_raw_read.
The failed call comes from wl12xx_get_mac() that wlcore_nvs_cb() calls
after request_firmware_work_func().
After the error, no wireless interface is created. Reloading the wl12xx
module makes the interface work.
Turns out the wlan controller can be in a low-power ELP state after the
boot from the bootloader or kexec, and needs to be woken up first.
Let's wake the hardware and add a sleep after that similar to
wl12xx_pre_boot() is already doing.
Note that a similar issue could exist for wl18xx, but I have not seen it
so far. And a search for wl18xx_get_mac and wl12xx_sdio_raw_read did not
produce similar errors.
Cc: Carl Philipp Klemm <philipp@uvos.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210603062814.19464-1-tony@atomide.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 272fdc0c45 ]
kernel test robot reports over 200 build errors and warnings
that are due to this Kconfig problem when CARL9170=m,
MAC80211=y, and LEDS_CLASS=m.
WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for MAC80211_LEDS
Depends on [n]: NET [=y] && WIRELESS [=y] && MAC80211 [=y] && (LEDS_CLASS [=m]=y || LEDS_CLASS [=m]=MAC80211 [=y])
Selected by [m]:
- CARL9170_LEDS [=y] && NETDEVICES [=y] && WLAN [=y] && WLAN_VENDOR_ATH [=y] && CARL9170 [=m]
CARL9170_LEDS selects MAC80211_LEDS even though its kconfig
dependencies are not met. This happens because 'select' does not follow
any Kconfig dependency chains.
Fix this by making CARL9170_LEDS depend on MAC80211_LEDS, where
the latter supplies any needed dependencies on LEDS_CLASS.
Fixes: 1d7e1e6b1b ("carl9170: Makefile, Kconfig files and MAINTAINERS")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@googlemail.com>
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Suggested-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210530031134.23274-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit fb312ac5cc upstream.
I got this crash more times during debugging of PCIe controller and crash
happens somehow at the time when PCIe kernel code started link retraining (as
part of ASPM code) when at the same time PCIe link went down and ath9k probably
executed hw reset procedure.
Currently I'm not able to reproduce this issue as it looks like to be
some race condition between link training, ASPM, link down and reset
path. And as always, race conditions which depends on more input
parameters are hard to reproduce as it depends on precise timings.
But it is clear that pointers are zero in this case and should be
properly filled as same code pattern is used in ath9k_stop() function.
Anyway I was able to reproduce this crash by manually triggering ath
reset worker prior putting card up. I created simple patch to export
reset functionality via debugfs and use it to "simulate" of triggering
reset. s proved that NULL-pointer dereference issue is there.
Function ath9k_hw_reset() is dereferencing chan structure pointer, so it
needs to be non-NULL pointer.
Function ath9k_stop() already contains code which sets ah->curchan to valid
non-NULL pointer prior calling ath9k_hw_reset() function.
Add same code pattern also into ath_reset_internal() function to prevent
kernel NULL pointer dereference in ath9k_hw_reset() function.
This change fixes kernel NULL pointer dereference in ath9k_hw_reset() which
is caused by calling ath9k_hw_reset() from ath_reset_internal() with NULL
chan structure.
[ 45.334305] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008
[ 45.344417] Mem abort info:
[ 45.347301] ESR = 0x96000005
[ 45.350448] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 45.356166] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 45.359350] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 45.362596] Data abort info:
[ 45.365756] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005
[ 45.369735] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 45.372814] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=000000000685d000
[ 45.379663] [0000000000000008] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
[ 45.388856] Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
[ 45.393897] Modules linked in: ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw
[ 45.399574] CPU: 1 PID: 309 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2-dirty #785
[ 45.414746] Workqueue: phy0 ath_reset_work [ath9k]
[ 45.419713] pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
[ 45.425910] pc : ath9k_hw_reset+0xc4/0x1c48 [ath9k_hw]
[ 45.431234] lr : ath9k_hw_reset+0xc0/0x1c48 [ath9k_hw]
[ 45.436548] sp : ffffffc0118dbca0
[ 45.439961] x29: ffffffc0118dbca0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 45.445442] x27: ffffff800dee4080 x26: 0000000000000000
[ 45.450923] x25: ffffff800df9b9d8 x24: 0000000000000000
[ 45.456404] x23: ffffffc0115f6000 x22: ffffffc008d0d408
[ 45.461885] x21: ffffff800dee5080 x20: ffffff800df9b9d8
[ 45.467366] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 45.472846] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 45.478326] x15: 0000000000000010 x14: ffffffffffffffff
[ 45.483807] x13: ffffffc0918db94f x12: ffffffc011498720
[ 45.489289] x11: 0000000000000003 x10: ffffffc0114806e0
[ 45.494770] x9 : ffffffc01014b2ec x8 : 0000000000017fe8
[ 45.500251] x7 : c0000000ffffefff x6 : 0000000000000001
[ 45.505733] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 45.511213] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffff801fece870
[ 45.516693] x1 : ffffffc00eded000 x0 : 000000000000003f
[ 45.522174] Call trace:
[ 45.524695] ath9k_hw_reset+0xc4/0x1c48 [ath9k_hw]
[ 45.529653] ath_reset_internal+0x1a8/0x2b8 [ath9k]
[ 45.534696] ath_reset_work+0x2c/0x40 [ath9k]
[ 45.539198] process_one_work+0x210/0x480
[ 45.543339] worker_thread+0x5c/0x510
[ 45.547115] kthread+0x12c/0x130
[ 45.550445] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x1c
[ 45.554138] Code: 910922c2 9117e021 95ff0398 b4000294 (b9400a61)
[ 45.560430] ---[ end trace 566410ba90b50e8b ]---
[ 45.565193] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 45.572282] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 45.576331] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 45.579924] CPU features: 0x00040002,0000200c
[ 45.584416] Memory Limit: none
[ 45.587564] Rebooting in 3 seconds..
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210402122653.24014-1-pali@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 7e79b38fe9 ]
The libertas driver was trying to register sysfs groups "by hand" which
causes them to be created _after_ the device is initialized and
announced to userspace, which causes races and can prevent userspace
tools from seeing the sysfs files correctly.
Fix this up by using the built-in sysfs_groups pointers in struct
net_device which were created for this very reason, fixing the race
condition, and properly allowing for any error that might have occured
to be handled properly.
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-54-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 62a8ff67eb upstream.
In certain scenarios a normal MSDU can be received as an A-MSDU when
the A-MSDU present bit of a QoS header gets flipped during reception.
Since this bit is unauthenticated, the hardware crypto engine can pass
the frame to the driver without any error indication.
This could result in processing unintended subframes collected in the
A-MSDU list. Hence, validate A-MSDU list by checking if the first frame
has a valid subframe header.
Comparing the non-aggregated MSDU and an A-MSDU, the fields of the first
subframe DA matches the LLC/SNAP header fields of a normal MSDU.
In order to avoid processing such frames, add a validation to
filter such A-MSDU frames where the first subframe header DA matches
with the LLC/SNAP header pattern.
Tested-on: QCA9984 hw1.0 PCI 10.4-3.10-00047
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sriram R <srirrama@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.e6f5eb7b9847.I38a77ae26096862527a5eab73caebd7346af8b66@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 68c5634c4a upstream.
This reverts commit 765976285a.
Because of recent interactions with developers from @umn.edu, all
commits from them have been recently re-reviewed to ensure if they were
correct or not.
Upon review, this commit was found to be incorrect for the reasons
below, so it must be reverted. It will be fixed up "correctly" in a
later kernel change.
This commit is not correct, it should not have used unlikely() and is
not propagating the error properly to the calling function, so it should
be reverted at this point in time. Also, if the check failed, the
work queue was still assumed to be allocated, so further accesses would
have continued to fail, meaning this patch does nothing to solve the
root issues at all.
Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@umn.edu>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Bryan Brattlof <hello@bryanbrattlof.com>
Fixes: 765976285a ("rtlwifi: fix a potential NULL pointer dereference")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-13-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit bb43e5718d ]
Fix the following out-of-bounds warnings by adding a new structure
wl3501_req instead of duplicating the same members in structure
wl3501_join_req and wl3501_scan_confirm:
arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:182:25: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' offset [39, 108] from the object at 'sig' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'beacon_period' with type 'short unsigned int' at offset 36 [-Warray-bounds]
arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:182:25: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' offset [25, 95] from the object at 'sig' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'beacon_period' with type 'short unsigned int' at offset 22 [-Warray-bounds]
Refactor the code, accordingly:
$ pahole -C wl3501_req drivers/net/wireless/wl3501_cs.o
struct wl3501_req {
u16 beacon_period; /* 0 2 */
u16 dtim_period; /* 2 2 */
u16 cap_info; /* 4 2 */
u8 bss_type; /* 6 1 */
u8 bssid[6]; /* 7 6 */
struct iw_mgmt_essid_pset ssid; /* 13 34 */
struct iw_mgmt_ds_pset ds_pset; /* 47 3 */
struct iw_mgmt_cf_pset cf_pset; /* 50 8 */
struct iw_mgmt_ibss_pset ibss_pset; /* 58 4 */
struct iw_mgmt_data_rset bss_basic_rset; /* 62 10 */
/* size: 72, cachelines: 2, members: 10 */
/* last cacheline: 8 bytes */
};
$ pahole -C wl3501_join_req drivers/net/wireless/wl3501_cs.o
struct wl3501_join_req {
u16 next_blk; /* 0 2 */
u8 sig_id; /* 2 1 */
u8 reserved; /* 3 1 */
struct iw_mgmt_data_rset operational_rset; /* 4 10 */
u16 reserved2; /* 14 2 */
u16 timeout; /* 16 2 */
u16 probe_delay; /* 18 2 */
u8 timestamp[8]; /* 20 8 */
u8 local_time[8]; /* 28 8 */
struct wl3501_req req; /* 36 72 */
/* size: 108, cachelines: 2, members: 10 */
/* last cacheline: 44 bytes */
};
$ pahole -C wl3501_scan_confirm drivers/net/wireless/wl3501_cs.o
struct wl3501_scan_confirm {
u16 next_blk; /* 0 2 */
u8 sig_id; /* 2 1 */
u8 reserved; /* 3 1 */
u16 status; /* 4 2 */
char timestamp[8]; /* 6 8 */
char localtime[8]; /* 14 8 */
struct wl3501_req req; /* 22 72 */
/* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) was 30 bytes ago --- */
u8 rssi; /* 94 1 */
/* size: 96, cachelines: 2, members: 8 */
/* padding: 1 */
/* last cacheline: 32 bytes */
};
The problem is that the original code is trying to copy data into a
bunch of struct members adjacent to each other in a single call to
memcpy(). Now that a new struct wl3501_req enclosing all those adjacent
members is introduced, memcpy() doesn't overrun the length of
&sig.beacon_period and &this->bss_set[i].beacon_period, because the
address of the new struct object _req_ is used as the destination,
instead.
This helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Warray-bounds
and get us closer to being able to tighten the FORTIFY_SOURCE routines
on memcpy().
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/109
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1fbaf516da763b50edac47d792a9145aa4482e29.1618442265.git.gustavoars@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 820aa37638 ]
Fix the following out-of-bounds warnings by enclosing structure members
daddr and saddr into new struct addr, in structures wl3501_md_req and
wl3501_md_ind:
arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:182:25: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' offset [18, 23] from the object at 'sig' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'daddr' with type 'u8[6]' {aka 'unsigned char[6]'} at offset 11 [-Warray-bounds]
arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:182:25: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' offset [18, 23] from the object at 'sig' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'daddr' with type 'u8[6]' {aka 'unsigned char[6]'} at offset 11 [-Warray-bounds]
Refactor the code, accordingly:
$ pahole -C wl3501_md_req drivers/net/wireless/wl3501_cs.o
struct wl3501_md_req {
u16 next_blk; /* 0 2 */
u8 sig_id; /* 2 1 */
u8 routing; /* 3 1 */
u16 data; /* 4 2 */
u16 size; /* 6 2 */
u8 pri; /* 8 1 */
u8 service_class; /* 9 1 */
struct {
u8 daddr[6]; /* 10 6 */
u8 saddr[6]; /* 16 6 */
} addr; /* 10 12 */
/* size: 22, cachelines: 1, members: 8 */
/* last cacheline: 22 bytes */
};
$ pahole -C wl3501_md_ind drivers/net/wireless/wl3501_cs.o
struct wl3501_md_ind {
u16 next_blk; /* 0 2 */
u8 sig_id; /* 2 1 */
u8 routing; /* 3 1 */
u16 data; /* 4 2 */
u16 size; /* 6 2 */
u8 reception; /* 8 1 */
u8 pri; /* 9 1 */
u8 service_class; /* 10 1 */
struct {
u8 daddr[6]; /* 11 6 */
u8 saddr[6]; /* 17 6 */
} addr; /* 11 12 */
/* size: 24, cachelines: 1, members: 9 */
/* padding: 1 */
/* last cacheline: 24 bytes */
};
The problem is that the original code is trying to copy data into a
couple of arrays adjacent to each other in a single call to memcpy().
Now that a new struct _addr_ enclosing those two adjacent arrays
is introduced, memcpy() doesn't overrun the length of &sig.daddr[0]
and &sig.daddr, because the address of the new struct object _addr_
is used, instead.
This helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Warray-bounds
and get us closer to being able to tighten the FORTIFY_SOURCE routines
on memcpy().
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/109
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d260fe56aed7112bff2be5b4d152d03ad7b78e78.1618442265.git.gustavoars@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7dd9a40fd6 ]
When the error check in ath9k_hw_read_revisions() was added, it checked for
-EIO which is what ath9k_regread() in the ath9k_htc driver uses. However,
for plain ath9k, the register read function uses ioread32(), which just
returns -1 on error. So if such a read fails, it still gets passed through
and ends up as a weird mac revision in the log output.
Fix this by changing ath9k_regread() to return -1 on error like ioread32()
does, and fix the error check to look for that instead of -EIO.
Fixes: 2f90c7e5d0 ("ath9k: Check for errors when reading SREV register")
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210326180819.142480-1-toke@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a8e083ee8e ]
In mwl8k_probe_hw, hw->priv->txq is freed at the first time by
dma_free_coherent() in the call chain:
if(!priv->ap_fw)->mwl8k_init_txqs(hw)->mwl8k_txq_init(hw, i).
Then in err_free_queues of mwl8k_probe_hw, hw->priv->txq is freed
at the second time by mwl8k_txq_deinit(hw, i)->dma_free_coherent().
My patch set txq->txd to NULL after the first free to avoid the
double free.
Fixes: a66098daac ("mwl8k: Marvell TOPDOG wireless driver")
Signed-off-by: Lv Yunlong <lyl2019@mail.ustc.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210402182627.4256-1-lyl2019@mail.ustc.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 87fce88658 ]
Currently the expression ~nic_conf1 is always true because nic_conf1
is a u16 and according to 6.5.3.3 of the C standard the ~ operator
promotes the u16 to an integer before flipping all the bits. Thus
the top 16 bits of the integer result are all set so the expression
is always true. If the intention was to flip all the bits of nic_conf1
then casting the integer result back to a u16 is a suitabel fix.
Interestingly static analyzers seem to thing a bitwise ! should be
used instead of ~ for this scenario, so I think the original intent
of the expression may need some extra consideration.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Logical vs. bitwise operator")
Fixes: c869f77d6a ("add mt7601u driver")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kubakici@wp.pl>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225183241.1002129-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b55379e343 ]
Failed to transmit wmi management frames:
[84977.840894] ath10k_snoc a000000.wifi: wmi mgmt tx queue is full
[84977.840913] ath10k_snoc a000000.wifi: failed to transmit packet, dropping: -28
[84977.840924] ath10k_snoc a000000.wifi: failed to submit frame: -28
[84977.840932] ath10k_snoc a000000.wifi: failed to transmit frame: -28
This issue is caused by race condition between skb_dequeue and
__skb_queue_tail. The queue of ‘wmi_mgmt_tx_queue’ is protected by a
different lock: ar->data_lock vs list->lock, the result is no protection.
So when ath10k_mgmt_over_wmi_tx_work() and ath10k_mac_tx_wmi_mgmt()
running concurrently on different CPUs, there appear to be a rare corner
cases when the queue length is 1,
CPUx (skb_deuque) CPUy (__skb_queue_tail)
next=list
prev=list
struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(list); WRITE_ONCE(newsk->next, next);
WRITE_ONCE(list->qlen, list->qlen - 1);WRITE_ONCE(newsk->prev, prev);
next = skb->next; WRITE_ONCE(next->prev, newsk);
prev = skb->prev; WRITE_ONCE(prev->next, newsk);
skb->next = skb->prev = NULL; list->qlen++;
WRITE_ONCE(next->prev, prev);
WRITE_ONCE(prev->next, next);
If the instruction ‘next = skb->next’ is executed before
‘WRITE_ONCE(prev->next, newsk)’, newsk will be lost, as CPUx get the
old ‘next’ pointer, but the length is still added by one. The final
result is the length of the queue will reach the maximum value but
the queue is empty.
So remove ar->data_lock, and use 'skb_queue_tail' instead of
'__skb_queue_tail' to prevent the potential race condition. Also switch
to use skb_queue_len_lockless, in case we queue a few SKBs simultaneously.
Tested-on: WCN3990 hw1.0 SNOC WLAN.HL.3.1.c2-00033-QCAHLSWMTPLZ-1
Signed-off-by: Miaoqing Pan <miaoqing@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1608618887-8857-1-git-send-email-miaoqing@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit cb88d01b67 ]
We can currently get a "command execute failure 19" error on beacon loss
if the signal is weak:
wlcore: Beacon loss detected. roles:0xff
wlcore: Connection loss work (role_id: 0).
...
wlcore: ERROR command execute failure 19
...
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1552 at drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/main.c:803
...
(wl12xx_queue_recovery_work.part.0 [wlcore])
(wl12xx_cmd_role_start_sta [wlcore])
(wl1271_op_bss_info_changed [wlcore])
(ieee80211_prep_connection [mac80211])
Error 19 is defined as CMD_STATUS_WRONG_NESTING from the wlcore firmware,
and seems to mean that the firmware no longer wants to see the quirk
handling for WLCORE_QUIRK_START_STA_FAILS done.
This quirk got added with commit 18eab43070 ("wlcore: workaround
start_sta problem in wl12xx fw"), and it seems that this already got fixed
in the firmware long time ago back in 2012 as wl18xx never had this quirk
in place to start with.
As we no longer even support firmware that early, to me it seems that it's
safe to just drop WLCORE_QUIRK_START_STA_FAILS to fix the error. Looks
like earlier firmware got disabled back in 2013 with commit 0e284c074e
("wl12xx: increase minimum singlerole firmware version required").
If it turns out we still need WLCORE_QUIRK_START_STA_FAILS with any
firmware that the driver works with, we can simply revert this patch and
add extra checks for firmware version used.
With this fix wlcore reconnects properly after a beacon loss.
Cc: Raz Bouganim <r-bouganim@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210115065613.7731-1-tony@atomide.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4773acf3d4 ]
The documentation for the PHY update [1] states:
Loop 4 times with index i
If PHY Revision >= 3
Copy table[i] to coef[i]
Otherwise
Set coef[i] to 0
the copy of the table to coef is currently implemented the wrong way
around, table is being updated from uninitialized values in coeff.
Fix this by swapping the assignment around.
[1] https://bcm-v4.sipsolutions.net/802.11/PHY/N/RestoreCal/
Fixes: 2f258b74d1 ("b43: N-PHY: implement restoring general configuration")
Addresses-Coverity: ("Uninitialized scalar variable")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3d372c4edf ]
If we spin for a long time in memory reads that (for some reason in
hardware) take a long time, then we'll eventually get messages such
as
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 24s! [kworker/2:2:272]
This is because the reading really does take a very long time, and
we don't schedule, so we're hogging the CPU with this task, at least
if CONFIG_PREEMPT is not set, e.g. with CONFIG_PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY=y.
Previously I misinterpreted the situation and thought that this was
only going to happen if we had interrupts disabled, and then fixed
this (which is good anyway, however), but that didn't always help;
looking at it again now I realized that the spin unlock will only
reschedule if CONFIG_PREEMPT is used.
In order to avoid this issue, change the code to cond_resched() if
we've been spinning for too long here.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Fixes: 04516706bb ("iwlwifi: pcie: limit memory read spin time")
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20210115130253.217a9d6a6a12.If964cb582ab0aaa94e81c4ff3b279eaafda0fd3f@changeid
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit e186620d7b upstream.
Without crc32, the driver fails to link:
arm-linux-gnueabi-ld: drivers/net/wireless/ath/wil6210/fw.o: in function `wil_fw_verify':
fw.c:(.text+0x74c): undefined reference to `crc32_le'
arm-linux-gnueabi-ld: drivers/net/wireless/ath/wil6210/fw.o:fw.c:(.text+0x758): more undefined references to `crc32_le' follow
Fixes: 151a970650 ("wil6210: firmware download")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit a31eb61564 ]
ezusb_xmit() allocates a context which is leaked if
orinoco_process_xmit_skb() returns an error.
Move ezusb_alloc_ctx() after the invocation of
orinoco_process_xmit_skb() because the context is not needed so early.
ezusb_access_ltv() will cleanup the context in case of an error.
Fixes: bac6fafd4d ("orinoco: refactor xmit path")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113212252.2243570-2-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 04516706bb ]
When we read device memory, we lock a spinlock, write the address we
want to read from the device and then spin in a loop reading the data
in 32-bit quantities from another register.
As the description makes clear, this is rather inefficient, incurring
a PCIe bus transaction for every read. In a typical device today, we
want to read 786k SMEM if it crashes, leading to 192k register reads.
Occasionally, we've seen the whole loop take over 20 seconds and then
triggering the soft lockup detector.
Clearly, it is unreasonable to spin here for such extended periods of
time.
To fix this, break the loop down into an outer and an inner loop, and
break out of the inner loop if more than half a second elapsed. To
avoid too much overhead, check for that only every 128 reads, though
there's no particular reason for that number. Then, unlock and relock
to obtain NIC access again, reprogram the start address and continue.
This will keep (interrupt) latencies on the CPU down to a reasonable
time.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mordechay Goodstein <mordechay.goodstein@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20201022165103.45878a7e49aa.I3b9b9c5a10002915072312ce75b68ed5b3dc6e14@changeid
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 478762855b upstream.
In p54p_tx(), skb->data is mapped to streaming DMA on line 337:
mapping = pci_map_single(..., skb->data, ...);
Then skb->data is accessed on line 349:
desc->device_addr = ((struct p54_hdr *)skb->data)->req_id;
This access may cause data inconsistency between CPU cache and hardware.
To fix this problem, ((struct p54_hdr *)skb->data)->req_id is stored in
a local variable before DMA mapping, and then the driver accesses this
local variable instead of skb->data.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200802132949.26788-1-baijiaju@tsinghua.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit bad60b8d1a ]
The idx in __ath10k_htt_rx_ring_fill_n function lives in
consistent dma region writable by the device. Malfunctional
or malicious device could manipulate such idx to have a OOB
write. Either by
htt->rx_ring.netbufs_ring[idx] = skb;
or by
ath10k_htt_set_paddrs_ring(htt, paddr, idx);
The idx can also be negative as it's signed, giving a large
memory space to write to.
It's possibly exploitable by corruptting a legit pointer with
a skb pointer. And then fill skb with payload as rougue object.
Part of the log here. Sometimes it appears as UAF when writing
to a freed memory by chance.
[ 15.594376] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff887f5c1804f0
[ 15.595483] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 15.596250] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ 15.597013] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 15.597395] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 15.597967] CPU: 0 PID: 82 Comm: kworker/u2:2 Not tainted 5.6.0 #69
[ 15.598843] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 15.600438] Workqueue: ath10k_wq ath10k_core_register_work [ath10k_core]
[ 15.601389] RIP: 0010:__ath10k_htt_rx_ring_fill_n
(linux/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c:173) ath10k_core
Signed-off-by: Zekun Shen <bruceshenzk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200623221105.3486-1-bruceshenzk@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
