commit a0761a3017 upstream.
If we know that we have an encrypted link (based on having had
a key configured for TX in the past) then drop all data frames
in the key selection handler if there's no key anymore.
This fixes an issue with mac80211 internal TXQs - there we can
buffer frames for an encrypted link, but then if the key is no
longer there when they're dequeued, the frames are sent without
encryption. This happens if a station is disconnected while the
frames are still on the TXQ.
Detecting that a link should be encrypted based on a first key
having been configured for TX is fine as there are no use cases
for a connection going from with encryption to no encryption.
With extended key IDs, however, there is a case of having a key
configured for only decryption, so we can't just trigger this
behaviour on a key being configured.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20200326150855.6865c7f28a14.I9fb1d911b064262d33e33dfba730cdeef83926ca@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
[pali: Backported to 4.19 and older versions]
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3edc6b0d6c upstream.
For some chips/drivers, e.g., QCA6174 with ath10k, the decryption is
done by the hardware, and the Protected bit in the Frame Control field
is cleared in the lower level driver before the frame is passed to
mac80211. In such cases, the condition for ieee80211_has_protected() is
not met in ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() of mac80211 and the new security
validation steps are not executed.
Extend mac80211 to cover the case where the Protected bit has been
cleared, but the frame is indicated as having been decrypted by the
hardware. This extends protection against mixed key and fragment cache
attack for additional drivers/chips. This fixes CVE-2020-24586 and
CVE-2020-24587 for such cases.
Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.037aa5ca0390.I7bb888e2965a0db02a67075fcb5deb50eb7408aa@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a8c4d76a8d upstream.
EAPOL frames are used for authentication and key management between the
AP and each individual STA associated in the BSS. Those frames are not
supposed to be sent by one associated STA to another associated STA
(either unicast for broadcast/multicast).
Similarly, in 802.11 they're supposed to be sent to the authenticator
(AP) address.
Since it is possible for unexpected EAPOL frames to result in misbehavior
in supplicant implementations, it is better for the AP to not allow such
cases to be forwarded to other clients either directly, or indirectly if
the AP interface is part of a bridge.
Accept EAPOL (control port) frames only if they're transmitted to the
own address, or, due to interoperability concerns, to the PAE group
address.
Disable forwarding of EAPOL (or well, the configured control port
protocol) frames back to wireless medium in all cases. Previously, these
frames were accepted from fully authenticated and authorized stations
and also from unauthenticated stations for one of the cases.
Additionally, to avoid forwarding by the bridge, rewrite the PAE group
address case to the local MAC address.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.cb327ed0cabe.Ib7dcffa2a31f0913d660de65ba3c8aca75b1d10f@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3a11ce08c4 upstream.
Prior patches protected against fragmentation cache attacks
by coloring keys, but this shows that it can lead to issues
when multiple stations use the same sequence number. Add a
fragment cache to struct sta_info (in addition to the one in
the interface) to separate fragments for different stations
properly.
This then automatically clear most of the fragment cache when a
station disconnects (or reassociates) from an AP, or when client
interfaces disconnect from the network, etc.
On the way, also fix the comment there since this brings us in line
with the recommendation in 802.11-2016 ("An AP should support ...").
Additionally, remove a useless condition (since there's no problem
purging an already empty list).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.fc35046b0d52.I1ef101e3784d13e8f6600d83de7ec9a3a45bcd52@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 270032a2a9 upstream.
With old ciphers (WEP and TKIP) we shouldn't be using A-MSDUs
since A-MSDUs are only supported if we know that they are, and
the only practical way for that is HT support which doesn't
support old ciphers.
However, we would normally accept them anyway. Since we check
the MMIC before deaggregating A-MSDUs, and the A-MSDU bit in
the QoS header is not protected in TKIP (or WEP), this enables
attacks similar to CVE-2020-24588. To prevent that, drop A-MSDUs
completely with old ciphers.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.076543300172.I548e6e71f1ee9cad4b9a37bf212ae7db723587aa@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 94034c40ab upstream.
Simultaneously prevent mixed key attacks (CVE-2020-24587) and fragment
cache attacks (CVE-2020-24586). This is accomplished by assigning a
unique color to every key (per interface) and using this to track which
key was used to decrypt a fragment. When reassembling frames, it is
now checked whether all fragments were decrypted using the same key.
To assure that fragment cache attacks are also prevented, the ID that is
assigned to keys is unique even over (re)associations and (re)connects.
This means fragments separated by a (re)association or (re)connect will
not be reassembled. Because mac80211 now also prevents the reassembly of
mixed encrypted and plaintext fragments, all cache attacks are prevented.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.3f8290e59823.I622a67769ed39257327a362cfc09c812320eb979@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 965a7d72e7 upstream.
Do not mix plaintext and encrypted fragments in protected Wi-Fi
networks. This fixes CVE-2020-26147.
Previously, an attacker was able to first forward a legitimate encrypted
fragment towards a victim, followed by a plaintext fragment. The
encrypted and plaintext fragment would then be reassembled. For further
details see Section 6.3 and Appendix D in the paper "Fragment and Forge:
Breaking Wi-Fi Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation".
Because of this change there are now two equivalent conditions in the
code to determine if a received fragment requires sequential PNs, so we
also move this test to a separate function to make the code easier to
maintain.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.30c4394bb835.I5acfdb552cc1d20c339c262315950b3eac491397@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit d6843d1ee2 ]
After channel switch, we should consider any beacon with a
CSA IE as a new switch. If the CSA IE is a leftover from
before the switch that the AP forgot to remove, we'll get
a CSA-to-Self.
This caused issues in iwlwifi where the firmware saw a beacon
with a CSA-to-Self with mode = 1 on the new channel after a
switch. The firmware considered this a new switch and closed
its queues. Since the beacon didn't change between before and
after the switch, we wouldn't handle it (the CRC is the same)
and we wouldn't let the firmware open its queues again or
disconnect if the CSA IE stays for too long.
Clear the CRC valid state after we switch to make sure that
we handle the beacon and handle the CSA IE as required.
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408143124.b9e68aa98304.I465afb55ca2c7d59f7bf610c6046a1fd732b4c28@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1944015fe9 ]
Coverity reported the strange "if (~...)" condition that's
always true. It suggested that ! was intended instead of ~,
but upon further analysis I'm convinced that what really was
intended was a comparison to 0xff/0xffff (in HT/VHT cases
respectively), since this indicates that all of the rates
are enabled.
Change the comparison accordingly.
I'm guessing this never really mattered because a reset to
not having a rate mask is basically equivalent to having a
mask that enables all rates.
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Fixes: 2ffbe6d333 ("mac80211: fix and optimize MCS mask handling")
Fixes: b119ad6e72 ("mac80211: add rate mask logic for vht rates")
Reviewed-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210212112213.36b38078f569.I8546a20c80bc1669058eb453e213630b846e107b@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6194f7e647 ]
The multiplication of the u32 variables tx_time and estimated_retx is
performed using a 32 bit multiplication and the result is stored in
a u64 result. This has a potential u32 overflow issue, so avoid this
by casting tx_time to a u64 to force a 64 bit multiply.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unintentional integer overflow")
Fixes: 050ac52cbe ("mac80211: code for on-demand Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210205175352.208841-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 4fe40b8e15 upstream.
Deferring sampling attempts to the second stage has some bad interactions
with drivers that process the rate table in hardware and use the probe flag
to indicate probing packets (e.g. most mt76 drivers). On affected drivers
it can lead to probing not working at all.
If the link conditions turn worse, it might not be such a good idea to
do a lot of sampling for lower rates in this case.
Fix this by simply skipping the sample attempt instead of deferring it,
but keep the checks that would allow it to be sampled if it was skipped
too often, but only if it has less than 95% success probability.
Also ensure that IEEE80211_TX_CTL_RATE_CTRL_PROBE is set for all probing
packets.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: cccf129f82 ("mac80211: add the 'minstrel' rate control algorithm")
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201111183359.43528-2-nbd@nbd.name
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dcd479e10a upstream.
When (for example) an IBSS station is pre-moved to AUTHORIZED
before it's inserted, and then the insertion fails, we don't
clean up the fast RX/TX states that might already have been
created, since we don't go through all the state transitions
again on the way down.
Do that, if it hasn't been done already, when the station is
freed. I considered only freeing the fast TX/RX state there,
but we might add more state so it's more robust to wind down
the state properly.
Note that we warn if the station was ever inserted, it should
have been properly cleaned up in that case, and the driver
will probably not like things happening out of order.
Reported-by: syzbot+2e293dbd67de2836ba42@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201009141710.7223b322a955.I95bd08b9ad0e039c034927cce0b75beea38e059b@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 14f46c1e51 ]
When ieee80211_skb_resize() is called from ieee80211_build_hdr()
the skb has no 802.11 header yet, in fact it consist only of the
payload as the ethernet frame is removed. As such, we're using
the payload data for ieee80211_is_mgmt(), which is of course
completely wrong. This didn't really hurt us because these are
always data frames, so we could only have added more tailroom
than we needed if we determined it was a management frame and
sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt was false.
However, syzbot found that of course there need not be any payload,
so we're using at best uninitialized memory for the check.
Fix this to pass explicitly the kind of frame that we have instead
of checking there, by replacing the "bool may_encrypt" argument
with an argument that can carry the three possible states - it's
not going to be encrypted, it's a management frame, or it's a data
frame (and then we check sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt).
Reported-by: syzbot+32fd1a1bfe355e93f1e2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201009132538.e1fd7f802947.I799b288466ea2815f9d4c84349fae697dca2f189@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0b467b6387 ]
Without this patch, eapol frames cannot be received in mesh
mode, when 802.1X should be used. Initially only a MGTK is
defined, which is found and set as rx->key, when there are
no other keys set. ieee80211_drop_unencrypted would then
drop these eapol frames, as they are data frames without
encryption and there exists some rx->key.
Fix this by differentiating between mesh eapol frames and
other data frames with existing rx->key. Allow mesh mesh
eapol frames only if they are for our vif address.
With this patch in-place, ieee80211_rx_h_mesh_fwding continues
after the ieee80211_drop_unencrypted check and notices, that
these eapol frames have to be delivered locally, as they should.
Signed-off-by: Markus Theil <markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200625104214.50319-1-markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de
[small code cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 30b2f0be23 upstream.
commit 08a5bdde38 ("mac80211: consider QoS Null frames for STA_NULLFUNC_ACKED")
Fixed a bug where we failed to take into account a
nullfunc frame can be either non-QoS or QoS. It turns out
there is at least one more bug in
ieee80211_sta_tx_notify(), introduced in
commit 7b6ddeaf27 ("mac80211: use QoS NDP for AP probing"),
where we forgot to check for the QoS variant and so
assumed the QoS nullfunc frame never went out
Fix this by adding a helper ieee80211_is_any_nullfunc()
which consolidates the check for non-QoS and QoS nullfunc
frames. Replace existing compound conditionals and add a
couple more missing checks for QoS variant.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Pedersen <thomas@adapt-ip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200114055940.18502-3-thomas@adapt-ip.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit be8c827f50 upstream.
The original patch didn't copy the ieee80211_is_data() condition
because on most drivers the management frames don't go through
this path. However, they do on iwlwifi/mvm, so we do need to keep
the condition here.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ce2e1ca703 ("mac80211: Check port authorization in the ieee80211_tx_dequeue() case")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Woody Suwalski <terraluna977@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit a04564c99b ]
We only use the parsing CRC for checking if a beacon changed,
and elements with an ID > 63 cannot be represented in the
filter. Thus, like we did before with WMM and Cisco vendor
elements, just statically add these forgotten items to the
CRC:
- WLAN_EID_VHT_OPERATION
- WLAN_EID_OPMODE_NOTIF
I guess that in most cases when VHT/HE operation change, the HT
operation also changed, and so the change was picked up, but we
did notice that pure operating mode notification changes were
ignored.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200131111300.891737-22-luca@coelho.fi
[restrict to VHT for the mac80211 branch]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6f60126521 ]
TKIP replay protection was skipped for the very first frame received
after a new key is configured. While this is potentially needed to avoid
dropping a frame in some cases, this does leave a window for replay
attacks with group-addressed frames at the station side. Any earlier
frame sent by the AP using the same key would be accepted as a valid
frame and the internal RSC would then be updated to the TSC from that
frame. This would allow multiple previously transmitted group-addressed
frames to be replayed until the next valid new group-addressed frame
from the AP is received by the station.
Fix this by limiting the no-replay-protection exception to apply only
for the case where TSC=0, i.e., when this is for the very first frame
protected using the new key, and the local RSC had not been set to a
higher value when configuring the key (which may happen with GTK).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107153545.10934-1-j@w1.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 3e493173b7 upstream.
The Layer 2 Update frame is used to update bridges when a station roams
to another AP even if that STA does not transmit any frames after the
reassociation. This behavior was described in IEEE Std 802.11F-2003 as
something that would happen based on MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication, i.e.,
before completing 4-way handshake. However, this IEEE trial-use
recommended practice document was published before RSN (IEEE Std
802.11i-2004) and as such, did not consider RSN use cases. Furthermore,
IEEE Std 802.11F-2003 was withdrawn in 2006 and as such, has not been
maintained amd should not be used anymore.
Sending out the Layer 2 Update frame immediately after association is
fine for open networks (and also when using SAE, FT protocol, or FILS
authentication when the station is actually authenticated by the time
association completes). However, it is not appropriate for cases where
RSN is used with PSK or EAP authentication since the station is actually
fully authenticated only once the 4-way handshake completes after
authentication and attackers might be able to use the unauthenticated
triggering of Layer 2 Update frame transmission to disrupt bridge
behavior.
Fix this by postponing transmission of the Layer 2 Update frame from
station entry addition to the point when the station entry is marked
authorized. Similarly, send out the VLAN binding update only if the STA
entry has already been authorized.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 30ca1aa536 upstream.
Make ieee80211_send_layer2_update() a common function so other drivers
can re-use it.
Signed-off-by: Dedy Lansky <dlansky@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9 as dependency of commit 3e493173b7
"mac80211: Do not send Layer 2 Update frame before authorization":
- Retain type-casting of skb_put() return value
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
