commit a7583e72a5 upstream.
The commit 0f27cff859 ("ACPI: sysfs: Make ACPI GPE mask kernel
parameter cover all GPEs") says:
"Use a bitmap of size 0xFF instead of a u64 for the GPE mask so 256
GPEs can be masked"
But the masking of GPE 0xFF it not supported and the check condition
"gpe > ACPI_MASKABLE_GPE_MAX" is not valid because the type of gpe is
u8.
So modify the macro ACPI_MASKABLE_GPE_MAX to 0x100, and drop the "gpe >
ACPI_MASKABLE_GPE_MAX" check. In addition, update the docs "Format" for
acpi_mask_gpe parameter.
Fixes: 0f27cff859 ("ACPI: sysfs: Make ACPI GPE mask kernel parameter cover all GPEs")
Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye <yeyunfeng@huawei.com>
[ rjw: Use u16 as gpe data type in acpi_gpe_apply_masked_gpes() ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 7635d9cbe8 ]
Userspace falls short when trying to find out whether a specific memory
range is eligible for THP. There are usecases that would like to know
that
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1809251248450.50347@chino.kir.corp.google.com
: This is used to identify heap mappings that should be able to fault thp
: but do not, and they normally point to a low-on-memory or fragmentation
: issue.
The only way to deduce this now is to query for hg resp. nh flags and
confronting the state with the global setting. Except that there is also
PR_SET_THP_DISABLE that might change the picture. So the final logic is
not trivial. Moreover the eligibility of the vma depends on the type of
VMA as well. In the past we have supported only anononymous memory VMAs
but things have changed and shmem based vmas are supported as well these
days and the query logic gets even more complicated because the
eligibility depends on the mount option and another global configuration
knob.
Simplify the current state and report the THP eligibility in
/proc/<pid>/smaps for each existing vma. Reuse
transparent_hugepage_enabled for this purpose. The original
implementation of this function assumes that the caller knows that the vma
itself is supported for THP so make the core checks into
__transparent_hugepage_enabled and use it for existing callers.
__show_smap just use the new transparent_hugepage_enabled which also
checks the vma support status (please note that this one has to be out of
line due to include dependency issues).
[mhocko@kernel.org: fix oops with NULL ->f_mapping]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181224185106.GC16738@dhcp22.suse.cz
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181211143641.3503-3-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Oppenheimer <bepvte@gmail.com>
Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 64870ed1b1 upstream.
For MDS vulnerable processors with TSX support, enabling either MDS or
TAA mitigations will enable the use of VERW to flush internal processor
buffers at the right code path. IOW, they are either both mitigated
or both not. However, if the command line options are inconsistent,
the vulnerabilites sysfs files may not report the mitigation status
correctly.
For example, with only the "mds=off" option:
vulnerabilities/mds:Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable
The mds vulnerabilities file has wrong status in this case. Similarly,
the taa vulnerability file will be wrong with mds mitigation on, but
taa off.
Change taa_select_mitigation() to sync up the two mitigation status
and have them turned off if both "mds=off" and "tsx_async_abort=off"
are present.
Update documentation to emphasize the fact that both "mds=off" and
"tsx_async_abort=off" have to be specified together for processors that
are affected by both TAA and MDS to be effective.
[ bp: Massage and add kernel-parameters.txt change too. ]
Fixes: 1b42f01741 ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-2-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 3511ba7d4c ]
This commit fixes incorrect property because it was different
from the actual.
The parameters of '#address-cells' and '#size-cells' were removed,
and 'interrupts', 'pinctrl-names' and 'pinctrl-0' were added.
Fixes: 4dcd5c2781 ("spi: add DT bindings for UniPhier SPI controller")
Signed-off-by: Keiji Hayashibara <hayashibara.keiji@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b78ac6ecd1 ]
Allow the configuration of the MDIO clock divider when the Device Tree
contains 'clock-frequency' property (similar to I2C and SPI buses).
Because the hardware may have lost its state during suspend/resume,
re-apply the MDIO clock divider upon resumption.
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 1aa9b9572b upstream.
The page table pages corresponding to broken down large pages are zapped in
FIFO order, so that the large page can potentially be recovered, if it is
not longer being used for execution. This removes the performance penalty
for walking deeper EPT page tables.
By default, one large page will last about one hour once the guest
reaches a steady state.
Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b8e8c8303f upstream.
With some Intel processors, putting the same virtual address in the TLB
as both a 4 KiB and 2 MiB page can confuse the instruction fetch unit
and cause the processor to issue a machine check resulting in a CPU lockup.
Unfortunately when EPT page tables use huge pages, it is possible for a
malicious guest to cause this situation.
Add a knob to mark huge pages as non-executable. When the nx_huge_pages
parameter is enabled (and we are using EPT), all huge pages are marked as
NX. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
This is not an issue for shadow paging (except nested EPT), because then
the host is in control of TLB flushes and the problematic situation cannot
happen. With nested EPT, again the nested guest can cause problems shadow
and direct EPT is treated in the same way.
[ tglx: Fixup default to auto and massage wording a bit ]
Originally-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0d9ce162cf upstream.
It doesn't seem as if there is any particular need for kvm_lock to be a
spinlock, so convert the lock to a mutex so that sleepable functions (in
particular cond_resched()) can be called while holding it.
Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit db4d30fbb7 upstream.
Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an
unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB
multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is
changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant
erratum can be found here:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195
There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully
disclose the impact.
This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT.
It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by
using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page
tables.
Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which
are mitigated against this issue.
Signed-off-by: Vineela Tummalapalli <vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 95c5824f75 upstream.
Add a kernel cmdline parameter "tsx" to control the Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. On CPUs that support TSX
control, use "tsx=on|off" to enable or disable TSX. Not specifying this
option is equivalent to "tsx=off". This is because on certain processors
TSX may be used as a part of a speculative side channel attack.
Carve out the TSX controlling functionality into a separate compilation
unit because TSX is a CPU feature while the TSX async abort control
machinery will go to cpu/bugs.c.
[ bp: - Massage, shorten and clear the arg buffer.
- Clarifications of the tsx= possible options - Josh.
- Expand on TSX_CTRL availability - Pawan. ]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit de53fd7aed upstream.
It has been observed, that highly-threaded, non-cpu-bound applications
running under cpu.cfs_quota_us constraints can hit a high percentage of
periods throttled while simultaneously not consuming the allocated
amount of quota. This use case is typical of user-interactive non-cpu
bound applications, such as those running in kubernetes or mesos when
run on multiple cpu cores.
This has been root caused to cpu-local run queue being allocated per cpu
bandwidth slices, and then not fully using that slice within the period.
At which point the slice and quota expires. This expiration of unused
slice results in applications not being able to utilize the quota for
which they are allocated.
The non-expiration of per-cpu slices was recently fixed by
'commit 512ac999d2 ("sched/fair: Fix bandwidth timer clock drift
condition")'. Prior to that it appears that this had been broken since
at least 'commit 51f2176d74 ("sched/fair: Fix unlocked reads of some
cfs_b->quota/period")' which was introduced in v3.16-rc1 in 2014. That
added the following conditional which resulted in slices never being
expired.
if (cfs_rq->runtime_expires != cfs_b->runtime_expires) {
/* extend local deadline, drift is bounded above by 2 ticks */
cfs_rq->runtime_expires += TICK_NSEC;
Because this was broken for nearly 5 years, and has recently been fixed
and is now being noticed by many users running kubernetes
(https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/67577) it is my opinion
that the mechanisms around expiring runtime should be removed
altogether.
This allows quota already allocated to per-cpu run-queues to live longer
than the period boundary. This allows threads on runqueues that do not
use much CPU to continue to use their remaining slice over a longer
period of time than cpu.cfs_period_us. However, this helps prevent the
above condition of hitting throttling while also not fully utilizing
your cpu quota.
This theoretically allows a machine to use slightly more than its
allotted quota in some periods. This overflow would be bounded by the
remaining quota left on each per-cpu runqueueu. This is typically no
more than min_cfs_rq_runtime=1ms per cpu. For CPU bound tasks this will
change nothing, as they should theoretically fully utilize all of their
quota in each period. For user-interactive tasks as described above this
provides a much better user/application experience as their cpu
utilization will more closely match the amount they requested when they
hit throttling. This means that cpu limits no longer strictly apply per
period for non-cpu bound applications, but that they are still accurate
over longer timeframes.
This greatly improves performance of high-thread-count, non-cpu bound
applications with low cfs_quota_us allocation on high-core-count
machines. In the case of an artificial testcase (10ms/100ms of quota on
80 CPU machine), this commit resulted in almost 30x performance
improvement, while still maintaining correct cpu quota restrictions.
That testcase is available at https://github.com/indeedeng/fibtest.
Fixes: 512ac999d2 ("sched/fair: Fix bandwidth timer clock drift condition")
Signed-off-by: Dave Chiluk <chiluk+linux@indeed.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: John Hammond <jhammond@indeed.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kyle Anderson <kwa@yelp.com>
Cc: Gabriel Munos <gmunoz@netflix.com>
Cc: Peter Oskolkov <posk@posk.io>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <bgregg@netflix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1563900266-19734-2-git-send-email-chiluk+linux@indeed.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit c6875f3aac ]
Currently execution of panic() continues until Xen's panic notifier
(xen_panic_event()) is called at which point we make a hypercall that
never returns.
This means that any notifier that is supposed to be called later as
well as significant part of panic() code (such as pstore writes from
kmsg_dump()) is never executed.
There is no reason for xen_panic_event() to be this last point in
execution since panic()'s emergency_restart() will call into
xen_emergency_restart() from where we can perform our hypercall.
Nevertheless, we will provide xen_legacy_crash boot option that will
preserve original behavior during crash. This option could be used,
for example, if running kernel dumper (which happens after panic
notifiers) is undesirable.
Reported-by: James Dingwall <james@dingwall.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit a111b7c0f2 upstream.
Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre
v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
The default behavior is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
[will: reorder checks so KASLR implies KPTI and SSBS is affected by cmdline]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0be0bfd2de upstream.
Once upon a time, commit 2cac0c00a6 ("ovl: get exclusive ownership on
upper/work dirs") in v4.13 added some sanity checks on overlayfs layers.
This change caused a docker regression. The root cause was mount leaks
by docker, which as far as I know, still exist.
To mitigate the regression, commit 85fdee1eef ("ovl: fix regression
caused by exclusive upper/work dir protection") in v4.14 turned the
mount errors into warnings for the default index=off configuration.
Recently, commit 146d62e5a5 ("ovl: detect overlapping layers") in
v5.2, re-introduced exclusive upper/work dir checks regardless of
index=off configuration.
This changes the status quo and mount leak related bug reports have
started to re-surface. Restore the status quo to fix the regressions.
To clarify, index=off does NOT relax overlapping layers check for this
ovelayfs mount. index=off only relaxes exclusive upper/work dir checks
with another overlayfs mount.
To cover the part of overlapping layers detection that used the
exclusive upper/work dir checks to detect overlap with self upper/work
dir, add a trap also on the work base dir.
Link: https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/34672
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20171006121405.GA32700@veci.piliscsaba.szeredi.hu/
Link: https://github.com/containers/libpod/issues/3540
Fixes: 146d62e5a5 ("ovl: detect overlapping layers")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 103cda6a3b ]
Exynos4212 and Exynos4412 have only four ADC channels so using
"samsung,exynos-adc-v1" compatible (for eight channels ADCv1) on them is
wrong. Add a new compatible for Exynos4x12.
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit a205982598 upstream
The previous commit added macro calls in the entry code which mitigate the
Spectre v1 swapgs issue if the X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_* features are
enabled. Enable those features where applicable.
The mitigations may be disabled with "nospectre_v1" or "mitigations=off".
There are different features which can affect the risk of attack:
- When FSGSBASE is enabled, unprivileged users are able to place any
value in GS, using the wrgsbase instruction. This means they can
write a GS value which points to any value in kernel space, which can
be useful with the following gadget in an interrupt/exception/NMI
handler:
if (coming from user space)
swapgs
mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg
// for example: mov %(reg1), %reg2
If an interrupt is coming from user space, and the entry code
speculatively skips the swapgs (due to user branch mistraining), it
may speculatively execute the GS-based load and a subsequent dependent
load or store, exposing the kernel data to an L1 side channel leak.
Note that, on Intel, a similar attack exists in the above gadget when
coming from kernel space, if the swapgs gets speculatively executed to
switch back to the user GS. On AMD, this variant isn't possible
because swapgs is serializing with respect to future GS-based
accesses.
NOTE: The FSGSBASE patch set hasn't been merged yet, so the above case
doesn't exist quite yet.
- When FSGSBASE is disabled, the issue is mitigated somewhat because
unprivileged users must use prctl(ARCH_SET_GS) to set GS, which
restricts GS values to user space addresses only. That means the
gadget would need an additional step, since the target kernel address
needs to be read from user space first. Something like:
if (coming from user space)
swapgs
mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
mov (%reg1), %reg2
// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg2
// for example: mov %(reg2), %reg3
It's difficult to audit for this gadget in all the handlers, so while
there are no known instances of it, it's entirely possible that it
exists somewhere (or could be introduced in the future). Without
tooling to analyze all such code paths, consider it vulnerable.
Effects of SMAP on the !FSGSBASE case:
- If SMAP is enabled, and the CPU reports RDCL_NO (i.e., not
susceptible to Meltdown), the kernel is prevented from speculatively
reading user space memory, even L1 cached values. This effectively
disables the !FSGSBASE attack vector.
- If SMAP is enabled, but the CPU *is* susceptible to Meltdown, SMAP
still prevents the kernel from speculatively reading user space
memory. But it does *not* prevent the kernel from reading the
user value from L1, if it has already been cached. This is probably
only a small hurdle for an attacker to overcome.
Thanks to Dave Hansen for contributing the speculative_smap() function.
Thanks to Andrew Cooper for providing the inside scoop on whether swapgs
is serializing on AMD.
[ tglx: Fixed the USER fence decision and polished the comment as suggested
by Dave Hansen ]
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 69d927bba3 ]
Recent probing at the Linux Kernel Memory Model uncovered a
'surprise'. Strongly ordered architectures where the atomic RmW
primitive implies full memory ordering and
smp_mb__{before,after}_atomic() are a simple barrier() (such as x86)
fail for:
*x = 1;
atomic_inc(u);
smp_mb__after_atomic();
r0 = *y;
Because, while the atomic_inc() implies memory order, it
(surprisingly) does not provide a compiler barrier. This then allows
the compiler to re-order like so:
atomic_inc(u);
*x = 1;
smp_mb__after_atomic();
r0 = *y;
Which the CPU is then allowed to re-order (under TSO rules) like:
atomic_inc(u);
r0 = *y;
*x = 1;
And this very much was not intended. Therefore strengthen the atomic
RmW ops to include a compiler barrier.
NOTE: atomic_{or,and,xor} and the bitops already had the compiler
barrier.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 509466b7d4 ]
runnable_avg_yN_inv[] is only used in kernel/sched/pelt.c but was
included in several other places because they need other macros all
came from kernel/sched/sched-pelt.h which was generated by
Documentation/scheduler/sched-pelt. As the result, it causes compilation
a lot of warnings,
kernel/sched/sched-pelt.h:4:18: warning: 'runnable_avg_yN_inv' defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
kernel/sched/sched-pelt.h:4:18: warning: 'runnable_avg_yN_inv' defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
kernel/sched/sched-pelt.h:4:18: warning: 'runnable_avg_yN_inv' defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
...
Silence it by appending the __maybe_unused attribute for it, so all
generated variables and macros can still be kept in the same file.
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1559596304-31581-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 36815b416f ]
Permit mux_id values up to 254 to be used in qmimux_register_device()
for compatibility with ip(8) and the rmnet driver.
Fixes: c6adf77953 ("net: usb: qmi_wwan: add qmap mux protocol support")
Cc: Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Reinhard Speyerer <rspmn@arcor.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0df82dcd55 ]
Fully compatible with mcp2515, the mcp25625 have integrated transceiver.
This patch add the mcp25625 to the device tree bindings documentation.
Signed-off-by: Sean Nyekjaer <sean@geanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 4275035197 upstream.
The architecture implementations of 'arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser()' and
'futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic()' are permitted to return only -EFAULT,
-EAGAIN or -ENOSYS in the case of failure.
Update the comments in the asm-generic/ implementation and also a stray
reference in the robust futex documentation.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5f3e2bf008 upstream.
Some TCP peers announce a very small MSS option in their SYN and/or
SYN/ACK messages.
This forces the stack to send packets with a very high network/cpu
overhead.
Linux has enforced a minimal value of 48. Since this value includes
the size of TCP options, and that the options can consume up to 40
bytes, this means that each segment can include only 8 bytes of payload.
In some cases, it can be useful to increase the minimal value
to a saner value.
We still let the default to 48 (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS), for compatibility
reasons.
Note that TCP_MAXSEG socket option enforces a minimal value
of (TCP_MIN_MSS). David Miller increased this minimal value
in commit c39508d6f1 ("tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.")
from 64 to 88.
We might in the future merge TCP_MIN_SND_MSS and TCP_MIN_MSS.
CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 096ea522e8 upstream.
Recent versions of sphinx will emit messages like:
Documentation/sphinx/kerneldoc.py:103:
RemovedInSphinx20Warning: app.warning() is now deprecated.
Use sphinx.util.logging instead.
Switch to sphinx.util.logging to make this unsightly message go away.
Alas, that interface was only added in version 1.6, so we have to add a
version check to keep things working with older sphinxes.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2404dad1f6 upstream.
AutoReporter is going away; recent versions of sphinx emit a warning like:
Documentation/sphinx/kerneldoc.py:125:
RemovedInSphinx20Warning: AutodocReporter is now deprecated.
Use sphinx.util.docutils.switch_source_input() instead.
Make the switch. But switch_source_input() only showed up in 1.7, so we
have to do ugly version checks to keep things working in older versions.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3bc8088464 upstream.
Our version check in Documentation/conf.py never envisioned a world where
Sphinx moved beyond 1.x. Now that the unthinkable has happened, fix our
version check to handle higher version numbers correctly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 969f5ea627 upstream.
Revisions of the Cortex-A76 CPU prior to r4p0 are affected by an erratum
that can prevent interrupts from being taken when single-stepping.
This patch implements a software workaround to prevent userspace from
effectively being able to disable interrupts.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ede95a63b5 upstream.
Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module
space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later
attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for
example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then
before commit 290af86629 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case
where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort
with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out.
Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case
of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached
or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter
was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can
be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit
is reached.
Fixes: 290af86629 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
Fixes: 0a14842f5a ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5467a68cbf upstream.
For lockless accesses to dentries we don't have pinned we rely
(among other things) upon having an RCU delay between dropping
the last reference and actually freeing the memory.
On the other hand, for things like pipes and sockets we neither
do that kind of lockless access, nor want to deal with the
overhead of an RCU delay every time a socket gets closed.
So delay was made optional - setting DCACHE_RCUACCESS in ->d_flags
made sure it would happen. We tried to avoid setting it unless
we knew we need it. Unfortunately, that had led to recurring
class of bugs, in which we missed the need to set it.
We only really need it for dentries that are created by
d_alloc_pseudo(), so let's not bother with trying to be smart -
just make having an RCU delay the default. The ones that do
*not* get it set the replacement flag (DCACHE_NORCU) and we'd
better use that sparingly. d_alloc_pseudo() is the only
such user right now.
FWIW, the race that finally prompted that switch had been
between __lock_parent() of immediate subdirectory of what's
currently the root of a disconnected tree (e.g. from
open-by-handle in progress) racing with d_splice_alias()
elsewhere picking another alias for the same inode, either
on outright corrupted fs image, or (in case of open-by-handle
on NFS) that subdirectory having been just moved on server.
It's not easy to hit, so the sky is not falling, but that's
not the first race on similar missed cases and the logics
for settinf DCACHE_RCUACCESS has gotten ridiculously
convoluted.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
