commit a9c406e646 upstream.
Adding a second set of vectors to .entry.tramp.text will make it
larger than a single 4K page.
Allow the trampoline text to occupy up to three pages by adding two
more fixmap slots. Previous changes to tramp_valias allowed it to reach
beyond a single page.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c47e4d04ba upstream.
Spectre-BHB needs to add sequences to the vectors. Having one global
set of vectors is a problem for big/little systems where the sequence
is costly on cpus that are not vulnerable.
Making the vectors per-cpu in the style of KVM's bh_harden_hyp_vecs
requires the vectors to be generated by macros.
Make the kpti re-mapping of the kernel optional, so the macros can be
used without kpti.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 13d7a08352 upstream.
The macros for building the kpti trampoline are all behind
CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0, and in a region that outputs to the
.entry.tramp.text section.
Move the macros out so they can be used to generate other kinds of
trampoline. Only the symbols need to be guarded by
CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 and appear in the .entry.tramp.text section.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ed50da7764 upstream.
The tramp_ventry macro uses tramp_vectors as the address of the vectors
when calculating which ventry in the 'full fat' vectors to branch to.
While there is one set of tramp_vectors, this will be true.
Adding multiple sets of vectors will break this assumption.
Move the generation of the vectors to a macro, and pass the start
of the vectors as an argument to tramp_ventry.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6c5bf79b69 upstream.
Systems using kpti enter and exit the kernel through a trampoline mapping
that is always mapped, even when the kernel is not. tramp_valias is a macro
to find the address of a symbol in the trampoline mapping.
Adding extra sets of vectors will expand the size of the entry.tramp.text
section to beyond 4K. tramp_valias will be unable to generate addresses
for symbols beyond 4K as it uses the 12 bit immediate of the add
instruction.
As there are now two registers available when tramp_alias is called,
use the extra register to avoid the 4K limit of the 12 bit immediate.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c091fb6ae0 upstream.
The trampoline code has a data page that holds the address of the vectors,
which is unmapped when running in user-space. This ensures that with
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE, the randomised address of the kernel can't be
discovered until after the kernel has been mapped.
If the trampoline text page is extended to include multiple sets of
vectors, it will be larger than a single page, making it tricky to
find the data page without knowing the size of the trampoline text
pages, which will vary with PAGE_SIZE.
Move the data page to appear before the text page. This allows the
data page to be found without knowing the size of the trampoline text
pages. 'tramp_vectors' is used to refer to the beginning of the
.entry.tramp.text section, do that explicitly.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 03aff3a77a upstream.
Kpti stashes x30 in far_el1 while it uses x30 for all its work.
Making the vectors a per-cpu data structure will require a second
register.
Allow tramp_exit two registers before it unmaps the kernel, by
leaving x30 on the stack, and stashing x29 in far_el1.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d739da1694 upstream.
Subsequent patches will add additional sets of vectors that use
the same tricks as the kpti vectors to reach the full-fat vectors.
The full-fat vectors contain some cleanup for kpti that is patched
in by alternatives when kpti is in use. Once there are additional
vectors, the cleanup will be needed in more cases.
But on big/little systems, the cleanup would be harmful if no
trampoline vector were in use. Instead of forcing CPUs that don't
need a trampoline vector to use one, make the trampoline cleanup
optional.
Entry at the top of the vectors will skip the cleanup. The trampoline
vectors can then skip the first instruction, triggering the cleanup
to run.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1b33d4860d upstream.
The spectre-v4 sequence includes an SMC from the assembly entry code.
spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit is the patching callback that
generates an HVC or SMC depending on the SMCCC conduit type.
As this isn't specific to spectre-v4, rename it
smccc_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit so it can be re-used.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 25875aa71d upstream.
The mitigations for Spectre-BHB are only applied when an exception
is taken, but when unprivileged BPF is enabled, userspace can
load BPF programs that can be used to exploit the problem.
When unprivileged BPF is enabled, report the vulnerable status via
the spectre_v2 sysfs file.
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0de05d056a upstream.
The commit
44a3918c82 ("x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting")
added a warning for the "eIBRS + unprivileged eBPF" combination, which
has been shown to be vulnerable against Spectre v2 BHB-based attacks.
However, there's no warning about the "eIBRS + LFENCE retpoline +
unprivileged eBPF" combo. The LFENCE adds more protection by shortening
the speculation window after a mispredicted branch. That makes an attack
significantly more difficult, even with unprivileged eBPF. So at least
for now the logic doesn't warn about that combination.
But if you then add SMT into the mix, the SMT attack angle weakens the
effectiveness of the LFENCE considerably.
So extend the "eIBRS + unprivileged eBPF" warning to also include the
"eIBRS + LFENCE + unprivileged eBPF + SMT" case.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Suggested-by: Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 11ecdad722 upstream.
The implementor will be used to condition the FIQ support quirk.
The specific CPU types are not used at the moment, but let's add them
for documentation purposes.
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hector Martin <marcan@marcan.st>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b9baf5c8c5 upstream.
Workaround the Spectre BHB issues for Cortex-A15, Cortex-A57,
Cortex-A72, Cortex-A73 and Cortex-A75. We also include Brahma B15 as
well to be safe, which is affected by Spectre V2 in the same ways as
Cortex-A15.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
[changes due to lack of SYSTEM_FREEING_INITMEM - gregkh]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit eafd987d4a upstream.
With:
f8a66d608a ("x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd")
it became possible to enable the LFENCE "retpoline" on Intel. However,
Intel doesn't recommend it, as it has some weaknesses compared to
retpoline.
Now AMD doesn't recommend it either.
It can still be left available as a cmdline option. It's faster than
retpoline but is weaker in certain scenarios -- particularly SMT, but
even non-SMT may be vulnerable in some cases.
So just unconditionally warn if the user requests it on the cmdline.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e9b6013a7c upstream.
Update the link to the "Software Techniques for Managing Speculation
on AMD Processors" whitepaper.
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 244d00b5dd upstream.
AMD retpoline may be susceptible to speculation. The speculation
execution window for an incorrect indirect branch prediction using
LFENCE/JMP sequence may potentially be large enough to allow
exploitation using Spectre V2.
By default, don't use retpoline,lfence on AMD. Instead, use the
generic retpoline.
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 44a3918c82 upstream.
With unprivileged eBPF enabled, eIBRS (without retpoline) is vulnerable
to Spectre v2 BHB-based attacks.
When both are enabled, print a warning message and report it in the
'spectre_v2' sysfs vulnerabilities file.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 5.10]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5ad3eb1132 upstream.
Update the doc with the new fun.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 5.10]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1e19da8522 upstream.
Thanks to the chaps at VUsec it is now clear that eIBRS is not
sufficient, therefore allow enabling of retpolines along with eIBRS.
Add spectre_v2=eibrs, spectre_v2=eibrs,lfence and
spectre_v2=eibrs,retpoline options to explicitly pick your preferred
means of mitigation.
Since there's new mitigations there's also user visible changes in
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 to reflect these
new mitigations.
[ bp: Massage commit message, trim error messages,
do more precise eIBRS mode checking. ]
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Colp <patrick.colp@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d45476d983 upstream.
The RETPOLINE_AMD name is unfortunate since it isn't necessarily
AMD only, in fact Hygon also uses it. Furthermore it will likely be
sufficient for some Intel processors. Therefore rename the thing to
RETPOLINE_LFENCE to better describe what it is.
Add the spectre_v2=retpoline,lfence option as an alias to
spectre_v2=retpoline,amd to preserve existing setups. However, the output
of /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 will be changed.
[ bp: Fix typos, massage. ]
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 5.10]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Ensure finalize has access to the returned error code, if it had one.
Test: generic/377
Bug: 217570523
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Change-Id: Id9a0aca10c3158f8b414e0cbc2dd1282bb5ef16b
Commit d43583b890 ("KVM: arm64: Expose PSCI SYSTEM_RESET2 call to the
guest") hooked up the SYSTEM_RESET2 PSCI call for guests but failed to
preserve its arguments for userspace, instead overwriting them with
zeroes via smccc_set_retval(). As Linux only passes zeroes for these
arguments, this appeared to be working for Linux guests. Oh well.
Don't call smccc_set_retval() for a SYSTEM_RESET2 heading to userspace
and instead set X0 (and only X0) explicitly to PSCI_RET_INTERNAL_FAILURE
just in case the vCPU re-enters the guest.
Fixes: d43583b890 ("KVM: arm64: Expose PSCI SYSTEM_RESET2 call to the guest")
Reported-by: Andrew Walbran <qwandor@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220309181308.982-1-will@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit 9d3e7b7c82
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm.git next)
Bug: 216801012
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: Ieead1a813e6b4dfee1aa89e42ee1926efcd5f590
F2FS_FITS_IN_INODE only cares the type of f2fs inode, so there
is no need to read node page of f2fs inode.
Signed-off-by: Jia Yang <jiayang5@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
This moves the backing/fd files to their own space, instead of reusing
the userspace provided fds.
Bug: 222619123
Test: fuse_test passes, on cuttlefish CtsCameraTestCases passes
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Change-Id: I5d3b1ea8299f249ef5adc1ce2b7f45404a041208
Set KMI_GENERATION=1 for 3/9 KMI update
Leaf changes summary: 36 artifacts changed (1 filtered out)
Changed leaf types summary: 1 (1 filtered out) leaf types changed
Removed/Changed/Added functions summary: 0 Removed, 35 Changed, 0 Added function
Removed/Changed/Added variables summary: 0 Removed, 0 Changed, 0 Added variable
35 functions with some sub-type change:
[C] 'function int blk_mq_virtio_map_queues(blk_mq_queue_map*, virtio_device*, int)' at blk-mq-virtio.c:24:1 has some sub-type changes:
CRC (modversions) changed from 0xa6345867 to 0x535973fd
[C] 'function int register_virtio_device(virtio_device*)' at virtio.c:344:1 has some sub-type changes:
CRC (modversions) changed from 0x16faab28 to 0x3477d03c
[C] 'function int register_virtio_driver(virtio_driver*)' at virtio.c:320:1 has some sub-type changes:
CRC (modversions) changed from 0x23e1647b to 0x9964a633
... 32 omitted; 35 symbols have only CRC changes
'struct virtio_config_ops at virtio_config.h:77:1' changed:
type size changed from 896 to 960 (in bits)
1 data member insertion:
'void (virtio_device*)* enable_cbs', at offset 0 (in bits) at virtio_config.h:80:1
there are data member changes:
14 ('void (virtio_device*, unsigned int, void*, unsigned int)* get' .. 'typedef bool (virtio_device*, virtio_shm_region*, typedef u8)* get_shm_region') offsets changed (by +64 bits)
35 impacted interfaces
Bug: 222115076
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Change-Id: Iadce3c50cbd69e46ad20994235316fecfdc0d00c
This patch tries to make sure the virtio interrupt handler for INTX
won't be called after a reset and before virtio_device_ready(). We
can't use IRQF_NO_AUTOEN since we're using shared interrupt
(IRQF_SHARED). So this patch tracks the INTX enabling status in a new
intx_soft_enabled variable and toggle it during in
vp_disable/enable_vectors(). The INTX interrupt handler will check
intx_soft_enabled before processing the actual interrupt.
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211019070152.8236-6-jasowang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 080cd7c3ac)
Bug: 196772804
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keirf@google.com>
Change-Id: If90814df2859e742df050d406f2d67547bd6dbb3
We used to synchronize pending MSI-X irq handlers via
synchronize_irq(), this may not work for the untrusted device which
may keep sending interrupts after reset which may lead unexpected
results. Similarly, we should not enable MSI-X interrupt until the
device is ready. So this patch fixes those two issues by:
1) switching to use disable_irq() to prevent the virtio interrupt
handlers to be called after the device is reset.
2) using IRQF_NO_AUTOEN and enable the MSI-X irq during .ready()
This can make sure the virtio interrupt handler won't be called before
virtio_device_ready() and after reset.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211019070152.8236-5-jasowang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9e35276a53)
Bug: 196772804
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keirf@google.com>
Change-Id: I63832b87a567c4447064143fa62386c59481d43b
This patch introduces a new method to enable the callbacks for config
and virtqueues. This will be used for making sure the virtqueue
callbacks are only enabled after virtio_device_ready() if transport
implements this method.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211019070152.8236-4-jasowang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit d50497eb4e)
Bug: 196772804
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keirf@google.com>
Change-Id: I17ea164aa100d690ebde3b2f6c2e5514a9b5cfd9
Many drivers don't want interrupts enabled automatically via request_irq().
So they are handling this issue by either way of the below two:
(1)
irq_set_status_flags(irq, IRQ_NOAUTOEN);
request_irq(dev, irq...);
(2)
request_irq(dev, irq...);
disable_irq(irq);
The code in the second way is silly and unsafe. In the small time gap
between request_irq() and disable_irq(), interrupts can still come.
The code in the first way is safe though it's subobtimal.
Add a new IRQF_NO_AUTOEN flag which can be handed in by drivers to
request_irq() and request_nmi(). It prevents the automatic enabling of the
requested interrupt/nmi in the same safe way as #1 above. With that the
various usage sites of #1 and #2 above can be simplified and corrected.
Signed-off-by: Barry Song <song.bao.hua@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302224916.13980-2-song.bao.hua@hisilicon.com
(cherry picked from commit cbe16f35be)
Bug: 196772804
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keirf@google.com>
Change-Id: Ia3fa1c3c583c1562f2029250ac315ac2346def18
This reverts commit b51d71e4aa because
this script didn't end up being used. Remove it for now.
This script was planned to be used originally; however, in fact making a
custom build of fips140.ko alone isn't sufficient to support the testing
requirements, some of which were unknown at the time. The current
procedure is now to use a device-specific script to build custom boot
images; see http://go/fips140-for-android-gki#heading=h.bcuh1mqjhpc4.
Bug: 188620248
Change-Id: Ia6e41e3885fad7716d41ab466a656f097f3de2af
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
It's obsolete and only works for unsupported Windows hosts and is
totally insecure and should never be used. Remove it in order to remove
a potential attack vector on Android systems.
Bug: 157965270
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: I45acc8b894220cdc9f170f9d5428aca195e9af38
Bug: 222497969
Test: idle kingdom launches sucessfully with no mediaprovider crashes
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Change-Id: Ia5f842fd4a0bf9a21d7c88874b13b84d42ab2c4d
Bug: 222619123
Test: fuse_test passes, on cuttlefish CtsCameraTestCases passes
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Change-Id: I54c148206b5ad5ae5737939bcb076cbe6c40129c
