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e4e845c8ddd2a810eaafb2690e2bdf7fd3e1efe4
42937 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Christophe JAILLET
|
99719bb0c2 |
kdb: Fix a potential buffer overflow in kdb_local()
[ Upstream commit 4f41d30cd6dc865c3cbc1a852372321eba6d4e4c ]
When appending "[defcmd]" to 'kdb_prompt_str', the size of the string
already in the buffer should be taken into account.
An option could be to switch from strncat() to strlcat() which does the
correct test to avoid such an overflow.
However, this actually looks as dead code, because 'defcmd_in_progress'
can't be true here.
See a more detailed explanation at [1].
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAD=FV=WSh7wKN7Yp-3wWiDgX4E3isQ8uh0LCzTmd1v9Cg9j+nQ@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes:
|
||
|
Hao Sun
|
e8d3872b61 |
bpf: Reject variable offset alu on PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS
[ Upstream commit 22c7fa171a02d310e3a3f6ed46a698ca8a0060ed ]
For PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS, check_flow_keys_access() only uses fixed off
for validation. However, variable offset ptr alu is not prohibited
for this ptr kind. So the variable offset is not checked.
The following prog is accepted:
func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
0: (bf) r6 = r1 ; R1=ctx() R6_w=ctx()
1: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r6 +144) ; R6_w=ctx() R7_w=flow_keys()
2: (b7) r8 = 1024 ; R8_w=1024
3: (37) r8 /= 1 ; R8_w=scalar()
4: (57) r8 &= 1024 ; R8_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,
smax=umax=smax32=umax32=1024,var_off=(0x0; 0x400))
5: (0f) r7 += r8
mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 5 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r8 stack= before 4: (57) r8 &= 1024
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r8 stack= before 3: (37) r8 /= 1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r8 stack= before 2: (b7) r8 = 1024
6: R7_w=flow_keys(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=1024,var_off
=(0x0; 0x400)) R8_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=1024,
var_off=(0x0; 0x400))
6: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) ; R0_w=scalar()
7: (95) exit
This prog loads flow_keys to r7, and adds the variable offset r8
to r7, and finally causes out-of-bounds access:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90014c80038
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1231 [inline]
__bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:651 [inline]
bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:658 [inline]
bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu include/linux/filter.h:675 [inline]
bpf_flow_dissect+0x15f/0x350 net/core/flow_dissector.c:991
bpf_prog_test_run_flow_dissector+0x39d/0x620 net/bpf/test_run.c:1359
bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4107 [inline]
__sys_bpf+0xf8f/0x4560 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5475
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5561 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5559 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x73/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5559
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
Fix this by rejecting ptr alu with variable offset on flow_keys.
Applying the patch rejects the program with "R7 pointer arithmetic
on flow_keys prohibited".
Fixes:
|
||
|
Jiri Olsa
|
8c8bcd45e9 |
bpf: Fix re-attachment branch in bpf_tracing_prog_attach
commit 715d82ba636cb3629a6e18a33bb9dbe53f9936ee upstream.
The following case can cause a crash due to missing attach_btf:
1) load rawtp program
2) load fentry program with rawtp as target_fd
3) create tracing link for fentry program with target_fd = 0
4) repeat 3
In the end we have:
- prog->aux->dst_trampoline == NULL
- tgt_prog == NULL (because we did not provide target_fd to link_create)
- prog->aux->attach_btf == NULL (the program was loaded with attach_prog_fd=X)
- the program was loaded for tgt_prog but we have no way to find out which one
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x20/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x15b/0x430
? fixup_exception+0x22/0x330
? exc_page_fault+0x6f/0x170
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? bpf_tracing_prog_attach+0x279/0x560
? btf_obj_id+0x5/0x10
bpf_tracing_prog_attach+0x439/0x560
__sys_bpf+0x1cf4/0x2de0
__x64_sys_bpf+0x1c/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xf0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
Return -EINVAL in this situation.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Heiko Carstens
|
7fc3dd358a |
tick-sched: Fix idle and iowait sleeptime accounting vs CPU hotplug
commit 71fee48fb772ac4f6cfa63dbebc5629de8b4cc09 upstream. When offlining and onlining CPUs the overall reported idle and iowait times as reported by /proc/stat jump backward and forward: cpu 132 0 176 225249 47 6 6 21 0 0 cpu0 80 0 115 112575 33 3 4 18 0 0 cpu1 52 0 60 112673 13 3 1 2 0 0 cpu 133 0 177 226681 47 6 6 21 0 0 cpu0 80 0 116 113387 33 3 4 18 0 0 cpu 133 0 178 114431 33 6 6 21 0 0 <---- jump backward cpu0 80 0 116 114247 33 3 4 18 0 0 cpu1 52 0 61 183 0 3 1 2 0 0 <---- idle + iowait start with 0 cpu 133 0 178 228956 47 6 6 21 0 0 <---- jump forward cpu0 81 0 117 114929 33 3 4 18 0 0 Reason for this is that get_idle_time() in fs/proc/stat.c has different sources for both values depending on if a CPU is online or offline: - if a CPU is online the values may be taken from its per cpu tick_cpu_sched structure - if a CPU is offline the values are taken from its per cpu cpustat structure The problem is that the per cpu tick_cpu_sched structure is set to zero on CPU offline. See tick_cancel_sched_timer() in kernel/time/tick-sched.c. Therefore when a CPU is brought offline and online afterwards both its idle and iowait sleeptime will be zero, causing a jump backward in total system idle and iowait sleeptime. In a similar way if a CPU is then brought offline again the total idle and iowait sleeptimes will jump forward. It looks like this behavior was introduced with commit |
||
|
Hou Tao
|
3bc29c780a |
bpf: Use c->unit_size to select target cache during free
[ Upstream commit 7ac5c53e00735d183a0f5e2cfce5eeb6c16319f2 ]
At present, bpf memory allocator uses check_obj_size() to ensure that
ksize() of allocated pointer is equal with the unit_size of used
bpf_mem_cache. Its purpose is to prevent bpf_mem_free() from selecting
a bpf_mem_cache which has different unit_size compared with the
bpf_mem_cache used for allocation. But as reported by lkp, the return
value of ksize() or kmalloc_size_roundup() may change due to slab merge
and it will lead to the warning report in check_obj_size().
The reported warning happened as follows:
(1) in bpf_mem_cache_adjust_size(), kmalloc_size_roundup(96) returns the
object_size of kmalloc-96 instead of kmalloc-cg-96. The object_size of
kmalloc-96 is 96, so size_index for 96 is not adjusted accordingly.
(2) the object_size of kmalloc-cg-96 is adjust from 96 to 128 due to
slab merge in __kmem_cache_alias(). For SLAB, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN is
enabled by default for kmalloc slab, so align is 64 and size is 128 for
kmalloc-cg-96. SLUB has a similar merge logic, but its object_size will
not be changed, because its align is 8 under x86-64.
(3) when unit_alloc() does kmalloc_node(96, __GFP_ACCOUNT, node),
ksize() returns 128 instead of 96 for the returned pointer.
(4) the warning in check_obj_size() is triggered.
Considering the slab merge can happen in anytime (e.g, a slab created in
a new module), the following case is also possible: during the
initialization of bpf_global_ma, there is no slab merge and ksize() for
a 96-bytes object returns 96. But after that a new slab created by a
kernel module is merged to kmalloc-cg-96 and the object_size of
kmalloc-cg-96 is adjust from 96 to 128 (which is possible for x86-64 +
CONFIG_SLAB, because its alignment requirement is 64 for 96-bytes slab).
So soon or later, when bpf_global_ma frees a 96-byte-sized pointer
which is allocated from bpf_mem_cache with unit_size=96, bpf_mem_free()
will free the pointer through a bpf_mem_cache in which unit_size is 128,
because the return value of ksize() changes. The warning for the
mismatch will be triggered again.
A feasible fix is introducing similar APIs compared with ksize() and
kmalloc_size_roundup() to return the actually-allocated size instead of
size which may change due to slab merge, but it will introduce
unnecessary dependency on the implementation details of mm subsystem.
As for now the pointer of bpf_mem_cache is saved in the 8-bytes area
(or 4-bytes under 32-bit host) above the returned pointer, using
unit_size in the saved bpf_mem_cache to select the target cache instead
of inferring the size from the pointer itself. Beside no extra
dependency on mm subsystem, the performance for bpf_mem_free_rcu() is
also improved as shown below.
Before applying the patch, the performances of bpf_mem_alloc() and
bpf_mem_free_rcu() on 8-CPUs VM with one producer are as follows:
kmalloc : alloc 11.69 ± 0.28M/s free 29.58 ± 0.93M/s
percpu : alloc 14.11 ± 0.52M/s free 14.29 ± 0.99M/s
After apply the patch, the performance for bpf_mem_free_rcu() increases
9% and 146% for kmalloc memory and per-cpu memory respectively:
kmalloc: alloc 11.01 ± 0.03M/s free 32.42 ± 0.48M/s
percpu: alloc 12.84 ± 0.12M/s free 35.24 ± 0.23M/s
After the fixes, there is no need to adjust size_index to fix the
mismatch between allocation and free, so remove it as well. Also return
NULL instead of ZERO_SIZE_PTR for zero-sized alloc in bpf_mem_alloc(),
because there is no bpf_mem_cache pointer saved above ZERO_SIZE_PTR.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Hou Tao
|
63ddf081e1 |
bpf: Use pcpu_alloc_size() in bpf_mem_free{_rcu}()
[ Upstream commit 3f2189e4f77b7a3e979d143dc4ff586488c7e8a5 ] For bpf_global_percpu_ma, the pointer passed to bpf_mem_free_rcu() is allocated by kmalloc() and its size is fixed (16-bytes on x86-64). So no matter which cache allocates the dynamic per-cpu area, on x86-64 cache[2] will always be used to free the per-cpu area. Fix the unbalance by checking whether the bpf memory allocator is per-cpu or not and use pcpu_alloc_size() instead of ksize() to find the correct cache for per-cpu free. Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231020133202.4043247-5-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Stable-dep-of: 7ac5c53e0073 ("bpf: Use c->unit_size to select target cache during free") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Hou Tao
|
62752b6732 |
bpf: Re-enable unit_size checking for global per-cpu allocator
[ Upstream commit baa8fdecd87bb8751237b45e3bcb5a179e5a12ca ] With pcpu_alloc_size() in place, check whether or not the size of the dynamic per-cpu area is matched with unit_size. Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231020133202.4043247-4-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Stable-dep-of: 7ac5c53e0073 ("bpf: Use c->unit_size to select target cache during free") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Hou Tao
|
3d83b820bf |
bpf: Limit the number of kprobes when attaching program to multiple kprobes
[ Upstream commit d6d1e6c17cab2dcb7b8530c599f00e7de906d380 ]
An abnormally big cnt may also be assigned to kprobe_multi.cnt when
attaching multiple kprobes. It will trigger the following warning in
kvmalloc_node():
if (unlikely(size > INT_MAX)) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(!(flags & __GFP_NOWARN));
return NULL;
}
Fix the warning by limiting the maximal number of kprobes in
bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach(). If the number of kprobes is greater than
MAX_KPROBE_MULTI_CNT, the attachment will fail and return -E2BIG.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Hou Tao
|
5735054af3 |
bpf: Limit the number of uprobes when attaching program to multiple uprobes
[ Upstream commit 8b2efe51ba85ca83460941672afac6fca4199df6 ]
An abnormally big cnt may be passed to link_create.uprobe_multi.cnt,
and it will trigger the following warning in kvmalloc_node():
if (unlikely(size > INT_MAX)) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(!(flags & __GFP_NOWARN));
return NULL;
}
Fix the warning by limiting the maximal number of uprobes in
bpf_uprobe_multi_link_attach(). If the number of uprobes is greater than
MAX_UPROBE_MULTI_CNT, the attachment will return -E2BIG.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Joakim Zhang
|
849ca053be |
dma-mapping: clear dev->dma_mem to NULL after freeing it
[ Upstream commit b07bc2347672cc8c7293c64499f1488278c5ca3d ]
Reproduced with below sequence:
dma_declare_coherent_memory()->dma_release_coherent_memory()
->dma_declare_coherent_memory()->"return -EBUSY" error
It will return -EBUSY from the dma_assign_coherent_memory()
in dma_declare_coherent_memory(), the reason is that dev->dma_mem
pointer has not been set to NULL after it's freed.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Yonghong Song
|
d048dced8e |
bpf: Fix a race condition between btf_put() and map_free()
[ Upstream commit 59e5791f59dd83e8aa72a4e74217eabb6e8cfd90 ]
When running `./test_progs -j` in my local vm with latest kernel,
I once hit a kasan error like below:
[ 1887.184724] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
[ 1887.185599] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888106806910 by task kworker/u12:2/2830
[ 1887.186498]
[ 1887.186712] CPU: 3 PID: 2830 Comm: kworker/u12:2 Tainted: G OEL 6.7.0-rc3-00699-g90679706d486-dirty #494
[ 1887.188034] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 1887.189618] Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred
[ 1887.190341] Call Trace:
[ 1887.190666] <TASK>
[ 1887.190949] dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0xe0
[ 1887.191423] ? nf_tcp_handle_invalid+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 1887.192019] ? panic+0x3c0/0x3c0
[ 1887.192449] print_report+0x14f/0x720
[ 1887.192930] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
[ 1887.193459] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xac/0x120
[ 1887.194004] ? bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
[ 1887.194572] kasan_report+0xc3/0x100
[ 1887.195085] ? bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
[ 1887.195668] bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
[ 1887.196183] ? __bpf_obj_drop_impl+0xb0/0xb0
[ 1887.196736] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
[ 1887.197270] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
[ 1887.197802] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x40
[ 1887.198319] bpf_obj_free_fields+0x1d4/0x260
[ 1887.198883] array_map_free+0x1a3/0x260
[ 1887.199380] bpf_map_free_deferred+0x7b/0xe0
[ 1887.199943] process_scheduled_works+0x3a2/0x6c0
[ 1887.200549] worker_thread+0x633/0x890
[ 1887.201047] ? __kthread_parkme+0xd7/0xf0
[ 1887.201574] ? kthread+0x102/0x1d0
[ 1887.202020] kthread+0x1ab/0x1d0
[ 1887.202447] ? pr_cont_work+0x270/0x270
[ 1887.202954] ? kthread_blkcg+0x50/0x50
[ 1887.203444] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
[ 1887.203914] ? kthread_blkcg+0x50/0x50
[ 1887.204397] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[ 1887.204913] </TASK>
[ 1887.204913] </TASK>
[ 1887.205209]
[ 1887.205416] Allocated by task 2197:
[ 1887.205881] kasan_set_track+0x3f/0x60
[ 1887.206366] __kasan_kmalloc+0x6e/0x80
[ 1887.206856] __kmalloc+0xac/0x1a0
[ 1887.207293] btf_parse_fields+0xa15/0x1480
[ 1887.207836] btf_parse_struct_metas+0x566/0x670
[ 1887.208387] btf_new_fd+0x294/0x4d0
[ 1887.208851] __sys_bpf+0x4ba/0x600
[ 1887.209292] __x64_sys_bpf+0x41/0x50
[ 1887.209762] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xf0
[ 1887.210222] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
[ 1887.210868]
[ 1887.211074] Freed by task 36:
[ 1887.211460] kasan_set_track+0x3f/0x60
[ 1887.211951] kasan_save_free_info+0x28/0x40
[ 1887.212485] ____kasan_slab_free+0x101/0x180
[ 1887.213027] __kmem_cache_free+0xe4/0x210
[ 1887.213514] btf_free+0x5b/0x130
[ 1887.213918] rcu_core+0x638/0xcc0
[ 1887.214347] __do_softirq+0x114/0x37e
The error happens at bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0:
00000000000034c0 <bpf_rb_root_free>:
; {
34c0: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64
34c4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 0x34c9 <bpf_rb_root_free+0x9>
34c9: 55 pushq %rbp
34ca: 48 89 e5 movq %rsp, %rbp
...
; if (rec && rec->refcount_off >= 0 &&
36aa: 4d 85 ed testq %r13, %r13
36ad: 74 a9 je 0x3658 <bpf_rb_root_free+0x198>
36af: 49 8d 7d 10 leaq 0x10(%r13), %rdi
36b3: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 0x36b8 <bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8>
<==== kasan function
36b8: 45 8b 7d 10 movl 0x10(%r13), %r15d
<==== use-after-free load
36bc: 45 85 ff testl %r15d, %r15d
36bf: 78 8c js 0x364d <bpf_rb_root_free+0x18d>
So the problem is at rec->refcount_off in the above.
I did some source code analysis and find the reason.
CPU A CPU B
bpf_map_put:
...
btf_put with rcu callback
...
bpf_map_free_deferred
with system_unbound_wq
... ... ...
... btf_free_rcu: ...
... ... bpf_map_free_deferred:
... ...
... ---------> btf_struct_metas_free()
... | race condition ...
... ---------> map->ops->map_free()
...
... btf->struct_meta_tab = NULL
In the above, map_free() corresponds to array_map_free() and eventually
calling bpf_rb_root_free() which calls:
...
__bpf_obj_drop_impl(obj, field->graph_root.value_rec, false);
...
Here, 'value_rec' is assigned in btf_check_and_fixup_fields() with following code:
meta = btf_find_struct_meta(btf, btf_id);
if (!meta)
return -EFAULT;
rec->fields[i].graph_root.value_rec = meta->record;
So basically, 'value_rec' is a pointer to the record in struct_metas_tab.
And it is possible that that particular record has been freed by
btf_struct_metas_free() and hence we have a kasan error here.
Actually it is very hard to reproduce the failure with current bpf/bpf-next
code, I only got the above error once. To increase reproducibility, I added
a delay in bpf_map_free_deferred() to delay map->ops->map_free(), which
significantly increased reproducibility.
# diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
# index 5e43ddd1b83f..aae5b5213e93 100644
# --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
# +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
# @@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
# struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
# struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
#
# + mdelay(100);
# security_bpf_map_free(map);
# bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
# /* implementation dependent freeing */
Hao also provided test cases ([1]) for easily reproducing the above issue.
There are two ways to fix the issue, the v1 of the patch ([2]) moving
btf_put() after map_free callback, and the v5 of the patch ([3]) using
a kptr style fix which tries to get a btf reference during
map_check_btf(). Each approach has its pro and cons. The first approach
delays freeing btf while the second approach needs to acquire reference
depending on context which makes logic not very elegant and may
complicate things with future new data structures. Alexei
suggested in [4] going back to v1 which is what this patch
tries to do.
Rerun './test_progs -j' with the above mdelay() hack for a couple
of times and didn't observe the error for the above rb_root test cases.
Running Hou's test ([1]) is also successful.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231207141500.917136-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/
[2] v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231204173946.3066377-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev/
[3] v5: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231208041621.2968241-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev/
[4] v4: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQJ3FiXUhZJwX_81sjZvSYYKCFB3BT6P8D59RS2Gu+0Z7g@mail.gmail.com/
Cc: Hou Tao <houtao@huaweicloud.com>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Andrei Matei
|
0954982db8 |
bpf: Fix accesses to uninit stack slots
[ Upstream commit 6b4a64bafd107e521c01eec3453ce94a3fb38529 ] Privileged programs are supposed to be able to read uninitialized stack memory (ever since |
||
|
Andrei Matei
|
ad140fc856 |
bpf: Guard stack limits against 32bit overflow
[ Upstream commit 1d38a9ee81570c4bd61f557832dead4d6f816760 ] This patch promotes the arithmetic around checking stack bounds to be done in the 64-bit domain, instead of the current 32bit. The arithmetic implies adding together a 64-bit register with a int offset. The register was checked to be below 1<<29 when it was variable, but not when it was fixed. The offset either comes from an instruction (in which case it is 16 bit), from another register (in which case the caller checked it to be below 1<<29 [1]), or from the size of an argument to a kfunc (in which case it can be a u32 [2]). Between the register being inconsistently checked to be below 1<<29, and the offset being up to an u32, it appears that we were open to overflowing the `int`s which were currently used for arithmetic. [1] |
||
|
Andrei Matei
|
08b91babcc |
bpf: Fix verification of indirect var-off stack access
[ Upstream commit a833a17aeac73b33f79433d7cee68d5cafd71e4f ]
This patch fixes a bug around the verification of possibly-zero-sized
stack accesses. When the access was done through a var-offset stack
pointer, check_stack_access_within_bounds was incorrectly computing the
maximum-offset of a zero-sized read to be the same as the register's min
offset. Instead, we have to take in account the register's maximum
possible value. The patch also simplifies how the max offset is checked;
the check is now simpler than for min offset.
The bug was allowing accesses to erroneously pass the
check_stack_access_within_bounds() checks, only to later crash in
check_stack_range_initialized() when all the possibly-affected stack
slots are iterated (this time with a correct max offset).
check_stack_range_initialized() is relying on
check_stack_access_within_bounds() for its accesses to the
stack-tracking vector to be within bounds; in the case of zero-sized
accesses, we were essentially only verifying that the lowest possible
slot was within bounds. We would crash when the max-offset of the stack
pointer was >= 0 (which shouldn't pass verification, and hopefully is
not something anyone's code attempts to do in practice).
Thanks Hao for reporting!
Fixes:
|
||
|
Andrii Nakryiko
|
8dc15b0670 |
bpf: fix check for attempt to corrupt spilled pointer
[ Upstream commit ab125ed3ec1c10ccc36bc98c7a4256ad114a3dae ]
When register is spilled onto a stack as a 1/2/4-byte register, we set
slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] (plus potentially few more below it,
depending on actual spill size). So to check if some stack slot has
spilled register we need to consult slot_type[7], not slot_type[0].
To avoid the need to remember and double-check this in the future, just
use is_spilled_reg() helper.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Hou Tao
|
f91cd728b1 |
bpf: Defer the free of inner map when necessary
[ Upstream commit 876673364161da50eed6b472d746ef88242b2368 ] When updating or deleting an inner map in map array or map htab, the map may still be accessed by non-sleepable program or sleepable program. However bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() decreases the ref-counter of the inner map directly through bpf_map_put(), if the ref-counter is the last one (which is true for most cases), the inner map will be freed by ops->map_free() in a kworker. But for now, most .map_free() callbacks don't use synchronize_rcu() or its variants to wait for the elapse of a RCU grace period, so after the invocation of ops->map_free completes, the bpf program which is accessing the inner map may incur use-after-free problem. Fix the free of inner map by invoking bpf_map_free_deferred() after both one RCU grace period and one tasks trace RCU grace period if the inner map has been removed from the outer map before. The deferment is accomplished by using call_rcu() or call_rcu_tasks_trace() when releasing the last ref-counter of bpf map. The newly-added rcu_head field in bpf_map shares the same storage space with work field to reduce the size of bpf_map. Fixes: |
||
|
Hou Tao
|
1c40ec6b8e |
bpf: Add map and need_defer parameters to .map_fd_put_ptr()
[ Upstream commit 20c20bd11a0702ce4dc9300c3da58acf551d9725 ] map is the pointer of outer map, and need_defer needs some explanation. need_defer tells the implementation to defer the reference release of the passed element and ensure that the element is still alive before the bpf program, which may manipulate it, exits. The following three cases will invoke map_fd_put_ptr() and different need_defer values will be passed to these callers: 1) release the reference of the old element in the map during map update or map deletion. The release must be deferred, otherwise the bpf program may incur use-after-free problem, so need_defer needs to be true. 2) release the reference of the to-be-added element in the error path of map update. The to-be-added element is not visible to any bpf program, so it is OK to pass false for need_defer parameter. 3) release the references of all elements in the map during map release. Any bpf program which has access to the map must have been exited and released, so need_defer=false will be OK. These two parameters will be used by the following patches to fix the potential use-after-free problem for map-in-map. Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204140425.1480317-3-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Stable-dep-of: 876673364161 ("bpf: Defer the free of inner map when necessary") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Andrii Nakryiko
|
0866f6427b |
bpf: enforce precision of R0 on callback return
[ Upstream commit 0acd03a5bd188b0c501d285d938439618bd855c4 ]
Given verifier checks actual value, r0 has to be precise, so we need to
propagate precision properly. r0 also has to be marked as read,
otherwise subsequent state comparisons will ignore such register as
unimportant and precision won't really help here.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Jordan Rome
|
a341738951 |
bpf: Add crosstask check to __bpf_get_stack
[ Upstream commit b8e3a87a627b575896e448021e5c2f8a3bc19931 ]
Currently get_perf_callchain only supports user stack walking for
the current task. Passing the correct *crosstask* param will return
0 frames if the task passed to __bpf_get_stack isn't the current
one instead of a single incorrect frame/address. This change
passes the correct *crosstask* param but also does a preemptive
check in __bpf_get_stack if the task is current and returns
-EOPNOTSUPP if it is not.
This issue was found using bpf_get_task_stack inside a BPF
iterator ("iter/task"), which iterates over all tasks.
bpf_get_task_stack works fine for fetching kernel stacks
but because get_perf_callchain relies on the caller to know
if the requested *task* is the current one (via *crosstask*)
it was failing in a confusing way.
It might be possible to get user stacks for all tasks utilizing
something like access_process_vm but that requires the bpf
program calling bpf_get_task_stack to be sleepable and would
therefore be a breaking change.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Florian Lehner
|
de0b27e632 |
bpf, lpm: Fix check prefixlen before walking trie
[ Upstream commit 9b75dbeb36fcd9fc7ed51d370310d0518a387769 ]
When looking up an element in LPM trie, the condition 'matchlen ==
trie->max_prefixlen' will never return true, if key->prefixlen is larger
than trie->max_prefixlen. Consequently all elements in the LPM trie will
be visited and no element is returned in the end.
To resolve this, check key->prefixlen first before walking the LPM trie.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Yiwei Lin
|
20c0981478 |
sched/fair: Update min_vruntime for reweight_entity() correctly
[ Upstream commit 5068d84054b766efe7c6202fc71b2350d1c326f1 ]
Since reweight_entity() may have chance to change the weight of
cfs_rq->curr entity, we should also update_min_vruntime() if
this is the case
Fixes: eab03c23c2a1 ("sched/eevdf: Fix vruntime adjustment on reweight")
Signed-off-by: Yiwei Lin <s921975628@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Abel Wu <wuyun.abel@bytedance.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231117080106.12890-1-s921975628@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
766c6c1dd1 |
posix-timers: Get rid of [COMPAT_]SYS_NI() uses
[ Upstream commit a4aebe936554dac6a91e5d091179c934f8325708 ] Only the posix timer system calls use this (when the posix timer support is disabled, which does not actually happen in any normal case), because they had debug code to print out a warning about missing system calls. Get rid of that special case, and just use the standard COND_SYSCALL interface that creates weak system call stubs that return -ENOSYS for when the system call does not exist. This fixes a kCFI issue with the SYS_NI() hackery: CFI failure at int80_emulation+0x67/0xb0 (target: sys_ni_posix_timers+0x0/0x70; expected type: 0xb02b34d9) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 48 at int80_emulation+0x67/0xb0 Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
33e42861eb |
ring-buffer: Do not record in NMI if the arch does not support cmpxchg in NMI
[ Upstream commit 712292308af2265cd9b126aedfa987f10f452a33 ] As the ring buffer recording requires cmpxchg() to work, if the architecture does not support cmpxchg in NMI, then do not do any recording within an NMI. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231213175403.6fc18540@gandalf.local.home Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Zheng Yejian
|
d9a6029dde |
tracing: Fix uaf issue when open the hist or hist_debug file
[ Upstream commit 1cc111b9cddc71ce161cd388f11f0e9048edffdb ]
KASAN report following issue. The root cause is when opening 'hist'
file of an instance and accessing 'trace_event_file' in hist_show(),
but 'trace_event_file' has been freed due to the instance being removed.
'hist_debug' file has the same problem. To fix it, call
tracing_{open,release}_file_tr() in file_operations callback to have
the ref count and avoid 'trace_event_file' being freed.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hist_show+0x11e0/0x1278
Read of size 8 at addr ffff242541e336b8 by task head/190
CPU: 4 PID: 190 Comm: head Not tainted 6.7.0-rc5-g26aff849438c #133
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x98/0xf8
show_stack+0x1c/0x30
dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x58
print_report+0xf0/0x5a0
kasan_report+0x80/0xc0
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x1c/0x28
hist_show+0x11e0/0x1278
seq_read_iter+0x344/0xd78
seq_read+0x128/0x1c0
vfs_read+0x198/0x6c8
ksys_read+0xf4/0x1e0
__arm64_sys_read+0x70/0xa8
invoke_syscall+0x70/0x260
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb0/0x280
do_el0_svc+0x44/0x60
el0_svc+0x34/0x68
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb8/0xc0
el0t_64_sync+0x168/0x170
Allocated by task 188:
kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x50
kasan_set_track+0x28/0x38
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x20/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x6c/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc+0x15c/0x4a8
trace_create_new_event+0x84/0x348
__trace_add_new_event+0x18/0x88
event_trace_add_tracer+0xc4/0x1a0
trace_array_create_dir+0x6c/0x100
trace_array_create+0x2e8/0x568
instance_mkdir+0x48/0x80
tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x90/0xe8
vfs_mkdir+0x3c4/0x610
do_mkdirat+0x144/0x200
__arm64_sys_mkdirat+0x8c/0xc0
invoke_syscall+0x70/0x260
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb0/0x280
do_el0_svc+0x44/0x60
el0_svc+0x34/0x68
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb8/0xc0
el0t_64_sync+0x168/0x170
Freed by task 191:
kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x50
kasan_set_track+0x28/0x38
kasan_save_free_info+0x34/0x58
__kasan_slab_free+0xe4/0x158
kmem_cache_free+0x19c/0x508
event_file_put+0xa0/0x120
remove_event_file_dir+0x180/0x320
event_trace_del_tracer+0xb0/0x180
__remove_instance+0x224/0x508
instance_rmdir+0x44/0x78
tracefs_syscall_rmdir+0xbc/0x140
vfs_rmdir+0x1cc/0x4c8
do_rmdir+0x220/0x2b8
__arm64_sys_unlinkat+0xc0/0x100
invoke_syscall+0x70/0x260
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb0/0x280
do_el0_svc+0x44/0x60
el0_svc+0x34/0x68
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb8/0xc0
el0t_64_sync+0x168/0x170
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231214012153.676155-1-zhengyejian1@huawei.com
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
0df76142ca |
tracing: Add size check when printing trace_marker output
[ Upstream commit 60be76eeabb3d83858cc6577fc65c7d0f36ffd42 ] If for some reason the trace_marker write does not have a nul byte for the string, it will overflow the print: trace_seq_printf(s, ": %s", field->buf); The field->buf could be missing the nul byte. To prevent overflow, add the max size that the buf can be by using the event size and the field location. int max = iter->ent_size - offsetof(struct print_entry, buf); trace_seq_printf(s, ": %*.s", max, field->buf); Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231212084444.4619b8ce@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
f3dc260cd5 |
tracing: Have large events show up as '[LINE TOO BIG]' instead of nothing
[ Upstream commit b55b0a0d7c4aa2dac3579aa7e6802d1f57445096 ]
If a large event was added to the ring buffer that is larger than what the
trace_seq can handle, it just drops the output:
~# cat /sys/kernel/tracing/trace
# tracer: nop
#
# entries-in-buffer/entries-written: 2/2 #P:8
#
# _-----=> irqs-off/BH-disabled
# / _----=> need-resched
# | / _---=> hardirq/softirq
# || / _--=> preempt-depth
# ||| / _-=> migrate-disable
# |||| / delay
# TASK-PID CPU# ||||| TIMESTAMP FUNCTION
# | | | ||||| | |
<...>-859 [001] ..... 141.118951: tracing_mark_write <...>-859 [001] ..... 141.148201: tracing_mark_write: 78901234
Instead, catch this case and add some context:
~# cat /sys/kernel/tracing/trace
# tracer: nop
#
# entries-in-buffer/entries-written: 2/2 #P:8
#
# _-----=> irqs-off/BH-disabled
# / _----=> need-resched
# | / _---=> hardirq/softirq
# || / _--=> preempt-depth
# ||| / _-=> migrate-disable
# |||| / delay
# TASK-PID CPU# ||||| TIMESTAMP FUNCTION
# | | | ||||| | |
<...>-852 [001] ..... 121.550551: tracing_mark_write[LINE TOO BIG]
<...>-852 [001] ..... 121.550581: tracing_mark_write: 78901234
This now emulates the same output as trace_pipe.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231209171058.78c1a026@gandalf.local.home
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Alison Schofield
|
e4a5b2f60e |
kernel/resource: Increment by align value in get_free_mem_region()
[ Upstream commit 659aa050a53817157b7459529538598a6449c1d3 ]
Currently get_free_mem_region() searches for available capacity
in increments equal to the region size being requested. This can
cause the search to take giant steps through the resource leaving
needless gaps and missing available space.
Specifically 'cxl create-region' fails with ERANGE even though capacity
of the given size and CXL's expected 256M x InterleaveWays alignment can
be satisfied.
Replace the total-request-size increment with a next alignment increment
so that the next possible address is always examined for availability.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Frederic Weisbecker
|
5d1e4e5fd1 |
rcu/tasks-trace: Handle new PF_IDLE semantics
[ Upstream commit a80712b9cc7e57830260ec5e1feb9cdb59e1da2f ] The commit: |
||
|
Frederic Weisbecker
|
b3ffc11675 |
rcu/tasks: Handle new PF_IDLE semantics
[ Upstream commit 9715ed501b585d47444865071674c961c0cc0020 ] The commit: |
||
|
Frederic Weisbecker
|
547c59c83a |
rcu: Introduce rcu_cpu_online()
[ Upstream commit 2be4686d866ad5896f2bb94d82fe892197aea9c7 ]
Export the RCU point of view as to when a CPU is considered offline
(ie: when does RCU consider that a CPU is sufficiently down in the
hotplug process to not feature any possible read side).
This will be used by RCU-tasks whose vision of an offline CPU should
reasonably match the one of RCU core.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Peter Zijlstra
|
39d04e5588 |
rcu: Break rcu_node_0 --> &rq->__lock order
[ Upstream commit 85d68222ddc5f4522e456d97d201166acb50f716 ] Commit |
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
ccd48707d5 |
tracing: Fix blocked reader of snapshot buffer
commit 39a7dc23a1ed0fe81141792a09449d124c5953bd upstream.
If an application blocks on the snapshot or snapshot_raw files, expecting
to be woken up when a snapshot occurs, it will not happen. Or it may
happen with an unexpected result.
That result is that the application will be reading the main buffer
instead of the snapshot buffer. That is because when the snapshot occurs,
the main and snapshot buffers are swapped. But the reader has a descriptor
still pointing to the buffer that it originally connected to.
This is fine for the main buffer readers, as they may be blocked waiting
for a watermark to be hit, and when a snapshot occurs, the data that the
main readers want is now on the snapshot buffer.
But for waiters of the snapshot buffer, they are waiting for an event to
occur that will trigger the snapshot and they can then consume it quickly
to save the snapshot before the next snapshot occurs. But to do this, they
need to read the new snapshot buffer, not the old one that is now
receiving new data.
Also, it does not make sense to have a watermark "buffer_percent" on the
snapshot buffer, as the snapshot buffer is static and does not receive new
data except all at once.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231228095149.77f5b45d@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
a12754a8f5 |
ftrace: Fix modification of direct_function hash while in use
commit d05cb470663a2a1879277e544f69e660208f08f2 upstream.
Masami Hiramatsu reported a memory leak in register_ftrace_direct() where
if the number of new entries are added is large enough to cause two
allocations in the loop:
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
hlist_for_each_entry(entry, &hash->buckets[i], hlist) {
new = ftrace_add_rec_direct(entry->ip, addr, &free_hash);
if (!new)
goto out_remove;
entry->direct = addr;
}
}
Where ftrace_add_rec_direct() has:
if (ftrace_hash_empty(direct_functions) ||
direct_functions->count > 2 * (1 << direct_functions->size_bits)) {
struct ftrace_hash *new_hash;
int size = ftrace_hash_empty(direct_functions) ? 0 :
direct_functions->count + 1;
if (size < 32)
size = 32;
new_hash = dup_hash(direct_functions, size);
if (!new_hash)
return NULL;
*free_hash = direct_functions;
direct_functions = new_hash;
}
The "*free_hash = direct_functions;" can happen twice, losing the previous
allocation of direct_functions.
But this also exposed a more serious bug.
The modification of direct_functions above is not safe. As
direct_functions can be referenced at any time to find what direct caller
it should call, the time between:
new_hash = dup_hash(direct_functions, size);
and
direct_functions = new_hash;
can have a race with another CPU (or even this one if it gets interrupted),
and the entries being moved to the new hash are not referenced.
That's because the "dup_hash()" is really misnamed and is really a
"move_hash()". It moves the entries from the old hash to the new one.
Now even if that was changed, this code is not proper as direct_functions
should not be updated until the end. That is the best way to handle
function reference changes, and is the way other parts of ftrace handles
this.
The following is done:
1. Change add_hash_entry() to return the entry it created and inserted
into the hash, and not just return success or not.
2. Replace ftrace_add_rec_direct() with add_hash_entry(), and remove
the former.
3. Allocate a "new_hash" at the start that is made for holding both the
new hash entries as well as the existing entries in direct_functions.
4. Copy (not move) the direct_function entries over to the new_hash.
5. Copy the entries of the added hash to the new_hash.
6. If everything succeeds, then use rcu_pointer_assign() to update the
direct_functions with the new_hash.
This simplifies the code and fixes both the memory leak as well as the
race condition mentioned above.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/170368070504.42064.8960569647118388081.stgit@devnote2/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231229115134.08dd5174@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
baa8894403 |
ring-buffer: Fix wake ups when buffer_percent is set to 100
commit 623b1f896fa8a669a277ee5a258307a16c7377a3 upstream.
The tracefs file "buffer_percent" is to allow user space to set a
water-mark on how much of the tracing ring buffer needs to be filled in
order to wake up a blocked reader.
0 - is to wait until any data is in the buffer
1 - is to wait for 1% of the sub buffers to be filled
50 - would be half of the sub buffers are filled with data
100 - is not to wake the waiter until the ring buffer is completely full
Unfortunately the test for being full was:
dirty = ring_buffer_nr_dirty_pages(buffer, cpu);
return (dirty * 100) > (full * nr_pages);
Where "full" is the value for "buffer_percent".
There is two issues with the above when full == 100.
1. dirty * 100 > 100 * nr_pages will never be true
That is, the above is basically saying that if the user sets
buffer_percent to 100, more pages need to be dirty than exist in the
ring buffer!
2. The page that the writer is on is never considered dirty, as dirty
pages are only those that are full. When the writer goes to a new
sub-buffer, it clears the contents of that sub-buffer.
That is, even if the check was ">=" it would still not be equal as the
most pages that can be considered "dirty" is nr_pages - 1.
To fix this, add one to dirty and use ">=" in the compare.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231226125902.4a057f1d@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Arnd Bergmann
|
7844d7d8d8 |
kexec: select CRYPTO from KEXEC_FILE instead of depending on it
[ Upstream commit e63bde3d9417f8318d6dd0d0fafa35ebf307aabd ] All other users of crypto code use 'select' instead of 'depends on', so do the same thing with KEXEC_FILE for consistency. In practice this makes very little difference as kernels with kexec support are very likely to also include some other feature that already selects both crypto and crypto_sha256, but being consistent here helps for usability as well as to avoid potential circular dependencies. This reverts the dependency back to what it was originally before commit |
||
|
Arnd Bergmann
|
78422b744a |
kexec: fix KEXEC_FILE dependencies
[ Upstream commit c1ad12ee0efc07244be37f69311e6f7c4ac98e62 ] The cleanup for the CONFIG_KEXEC Kconfig logic accidentally changed the 'depends on CRYPTO=y' dependency to a plain 'depends on CRYPTO', which causes a link failure when all the crypto support is in a loadable module and kexec_file support is built-in: x86_64-linux-ld: vmlinux.o: in function `__x64_sys_kexec_file_load': (.text+0x32e30a): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_shash' x86_64-linux-ld: (.text+0x32e58e): undefined reference to `crypto_shash_update' x86_64-linux-ld: (.text+0x32e6ee): undefined reference to `crypto_shash_final' Both s390 and x86 have this problem, while ppc64 and riscv have the correct dependency already. On riscv, the dependency is only used for the purgatory, not for the kexec_file code itself, which may be a bit surprising as it means that with CONFIG_CRYPTO=m, it is possible to enable KEXEC_FILE but then the purgatory code is silently left out. Move this into the common Kconfig.kexec file in a way that is correct everywhere, using the dependency on CRYPTO_SHA256=y only when the purgatory code is available. This requires reversing the dependency between ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_PURGATORY and KEXEC_FILE, but the effect remains the same, other than making riscv behave like the other ones. On s390, there is an additional dependency on CRYPTO_SHA256_S390, which should technically not be required but gives better performance. Remove this dependency here, noting that it was not present in the initial Kconfig code but was brought in without an explanation in commit |
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
7e39c55ee0 |
tracing / synthetic: Disable events after testing in synth_event_gen_test_init()
commit 88b30c7f5d27e1594d70dc2bd7199b18f2b57fa9 upstream.
The synth_event_gen_test module can be built in, if someone wants to run
the tests at boot up and not have to load them.
The synth_event_gen_test_init() function creates and enables the synthetic
events and runs its tests.
The synth_event_gen_test_exit() disables the events it created and
destroys the events.
If the module is builtin, the events are never disabled. The issue is, the
events should be disable after the tests are run. This could be an issue
if the rest of the boot up tests are enabled, as they expect the events to
be in a known state before testing. That known state happens to be
disabled.
When CONFIG_SYNTH_EVENT_GEN_TEST=y and CONFIG_EVENT_TRACE_STARTUP_TEST=y
a warning will trigger:
Running tests on trace events:
Testing event create_synth_test:
Enabled event during self test!
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1 at kernel/trace/trace_events.c:4150 event_trace_self_tests+0x1c2/0x480
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-test-00031-gb803d7c664d5-dirty #276
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:event_trace_self_tests+0x1c2/0x480
Code: bb e8 a2 ab 5d fc 48 8d 7b 48 e8 f9 3d 99 fc 48 8b 73 48 40 f6 c6 01 0f 84 d6 fe ff ff 48 c7 c7 20 b6 ad bb e8 7f ab 5d fc 90 <0f> 0b 90 48 89 df e8 d3 3d 99 fc 48 8b 1b 4c 39 f3 0f 85 2c ff ff
RSP: 0000:ffffc9000001fdc0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000029 RBX: ffff88810399ca80 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffb9f19478 RDI: ffff88823c734e64
RBP: ffff88810399f300 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff79eb32a
R10: ffffffffbcf59957 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888104068090
R13: ffffffffbc89f0a0 R14: ffffffffbc8a0f08 R15: 0000000000000078
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88823c700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000001f6282001 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0xa5/0x200
? event_trace_self_tests+0x1c2/0x480
? report_bug+0x1f6/0x220
? handle_bug+0x6f/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x50
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? tracer_preempt_on+0x78/0x1c0
? event_trace_self_tests+0x1c2/0x480
? __pfx_event_trace_self_tests_init+0x10/0x10
event_trace_self_tests_init+0x27/0xe0
do_one_initcall+0xd6/0x3c0
? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
? rcu_is_watching+0x38/0x60
kernel_init_freeable+0x324/0x450
? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
kernel_init+0x1f/0x1e0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x33/0x50
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60
? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
This is because the synth_event_gen_test_init() left the synthetic events
that it created enabled. By having it disable them after testing, the
other selftests will run fine.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231220111525.2f0f49b0@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
bddd8b50bf |
ring-buffer: Fix slowpath of interrupted event
[ Upstream commit b803d7c664d55705831729d2f2e29c874bcd62ea ]
To synchronize the timestamps with the ring buffer reservation, there are
two timestamps that are saved in the buffer meta data.
1. before_stamp
2. write_stamp
When the two are equal, the write_stamp is considered valid, as in, it may
be used to calculate the delta of the next event as the write_stamp is the
timestamp of the previous reserved event on the buffer.
This is done by the following:
/*A*/ w = current position on the ring buffer
before = before_stamp
after = write_stamp
ts = read current timestamp
if (before != after) {
write_stamp is not valid, force adding an absolute
timestamp.
}
/*B*/ before_stamp = ts
/*C*/ write = local_add_return(event length, position on ring buffer)
if (w == write - event length) {
/* Nothing interrupted between A and C */
/*E*/ write_stamp = ts;
delta = ts - after
/*
* If nothing interrupted again,
* before_stamp == write_stamp and write_stamp
* can be used to calculate the delta for
* events that come in after this one.
*/
} else {
/*
* The slow path!
* Was interrupted between A and C.
*/
This is the place that there's a bug. We currently have:
after = write_stamp
ts = read current timestamp
/*F*/ if (write == current position on the ring buffer &&
after < ts && cmpxchg(write_stamp, after, ts)) {
delta = ts - after;
} else {
delta = 0;
}
The assumption is that if the current position on the ring buffer hasn't
moved between C and F, then it also was not interrupted, and that the last
event written has a timestamp that matches the write_stamp. That is the
write_stamp is valid.
But this may not be the case:
If a task context event was interrupted by softirq between B and C.
And the softirq wrote an event that got interrupted by a hard irq between
C and E.
and the hard irq wrote an event (does not need to be interrupted)
We have:
/*B*/ before_stamp = ts of normal context
---> interrupted by softirq
/*B*/ before_stamp = ts of softirq context
---> interrupted by hardirq
/*B*/ before_stamp = ts of hard irq context
/*E*/ write_stamp = ts of hard irq context
/* matches and write_stamp valid */
<----
/*E*/ write_stamp = ts of softirq context
/* No longer matches before_stamp, write_stamp is not valid! */
<---
w != write - length, go to slow path
// Right now the order of events in the ring buffer is:
//
// |-- softirq event --|-- hard irq event --|-- normal context event --|
//
after = write_stamp (this is the ts of softirq)
ts = read current timestamp
if (write == current position on the ring buffer [true] &&
after < ts [true] && cmpxchg(write_stamp, after, ts) [true]) {
delta = ts - after [Wrong!]
The delta is to be between the hard irq event and the normal context
event, but the above logic made the delta between the softirq event and
the normal context event, where the hard irq event is between the two. This
will shift all the remaining event timestamps on the sub-buffer
incorrectly.
The write_stamp is only valid if it matches the before_stamp. The cmpxchg
does nothing to help this.
Instead, the following logic can be done to fix this:
before = before_stamp
ts = read current timestamp
before_stamp = ts
after = write_stamp
if (write == current position on the ring buffer &&
after == before && after < ts) {
delta = ts - after
} else {
delta = 0;
}
The above will only use the write_stamp if it still matches before_stamp
and was tested to not have changed since C.
As a bonus, with this logic we do not need any 64-bit cmpxchg() at all!
This means the 32-bit rb_time_t workaround can finally be removed. But
that's for a later time.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231218175229.58ec3daf@gandalf.local.home/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231218230712.3a76b081@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fixes: dd93942570789 ("ring-buffer: Do not try to put back write_stamp")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
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Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
307f56f260 |
ring-buffer: Remove useless update to write_stamp in rb_try_to_discard()
[ Upstream commit 083e9f65bd215582bf8f6a920db729fadf16704f ] When filtering is enabled, a temporary buffer is created to place the content of the trace event output so that the filter logic can decide from the trace event output if the trace event should be filtered out or not. If it is to be filtered out, the content in the temporary buffer is simply discarded, otherwise it is written into the trace buffer. But if an interrupt were to come in while a previous event was using that temporary buffer, the event written by the interrupt would actually go into the ring buffer itself to prevent corrupting the data on the temporary buffer. If the event is to be filtered out, the event in the ring buffer is discarded, or if it fails to discard because another event were to have already come in, it is turned into padding. The update to the write_stamp in the rb_try_to_discard() happens after a fix was made to force the next event after the discard to use an absolute timestamp by setting the before_stamp to zero so it does not match the write_stamp (which causes an event to use the absolute timestamp). But there's an effort in rb_try_to_discard() to put back the write_stamp to what it was before the event was added. But this is useless and wasteful because nothing is going to be using that write_stamp for calculations as it still will not match the before_stamp. Remove this useless update, and in doing so, we remove another cmpxchg64()! Also update the comments to reflect this change as well as remove some extra white space in another comment. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231215081810.1f4f38fe@rorschach.local.home Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com> Fixes: b2dd797543cf ("ring-buffer: Force absolute timestamp on discard of event") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Mathieu Desnoyers
|
82aaf7fc98 |
ring-buffer: Fix 32-bit rb_time_read() race with rb_time_cmpxchg()
[ Upstream commit dec890089bf79a4954b61482715ee2d084364856 ]
The following race can cause rb_time_read() to observe a corrupted time
stamp:
rb_time_cmpxchg()
[...]
if (!rb_time_read_cmpxchg(&t->msb, msb, msb2))
return false;
if (!rb_time_read_cmpxchg(&t->top, top, top2))
return false;
<interrupted before updating bottom>
__rb_time_read()
[...]
do {
c = local_read(&t->cnt);
top = local_read(&t->top);
bottom = local_read(&t->bottom);
msb = local_read(&t->msb);
} while (c != local_read(&t->cnt));
*cnt = rb_time_cnt(top);
/* If top and msb counts don't match, this interrupted a write */
if (*cnt != rb_time_cnt(msb))
return false;
^ this check fails to catch that "bottom" is still not updated.
So the old "bottom" value is returned, which is wrong.
Fix this by checking that all three of msb, top, and bottom 2-bit cnt
values match.
The reason to favor checking all three fields over requiring a specific
update order for both rb_time_set() and rb_time_cmpxchg() is because
checking all three fields is more robust to handle partial failures of
rb_time_cmpxchg() when interrupted by nested rb_time_set().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231211201324.652870-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231212193049.680122-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Fixes: f458a1453424e ("ring-buffer: Test last update in 32bit version of __rb_time_read()")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Jiri Olsa
|
f64b2dc8a4 |
bpf: Fix prog_array_map_poke_run map poke update
commit 4b7de801606e504e69689df71475d27e35336fb3 upstream.
Lee pointed out issue found by syscaller [0] hitting BUG in prog array
map poke update in prog_array_map_poke_run function due to error value
returned from bpf_arch_text_poke function.
There's race window where bpf_arch_text_poke can fail due to missing
bpf program kallsym symbols, which is accounted for with check for
-EINVAL in that BUG_ON call.
The problem is that in such case we won't update the tail call jump
and cause imbalance for the next tail call update check which will
fail with -EBUSY in bpf_arch_text_poke.
I'm hitting following race during the program load:
CPU 0 CPU 1
bpf_prog_load
bpf_check
do_misc_fixups
prog_array_map_poke_track
map_update_elem
bpf_fd_array_map_update_elem
prog_array_map_poke_run
bpf_arch_text_poke returns -EINVAL
bpf_prog_kallsyms_add
After bpf_arch_text_poke (CPU 1) fails to update the tail call jump, the next
poke update fails on expected jump instruction check in bpf_arch_text_poke
with -EBUSY and triggers the BUG_ON in prog_array_map_poke_run.
Similar race exists on the program unload.
Fixing this by moving the update to bpf_arch_poke_desc_update function which
makes sure we call __bpf_arch_text_poke that skips the bpf address check.
Each architecture has slightly different approach wrt looking up bpf address
in bpf_arch_text_poke, so instead of splitting the function or adding new
'checkip' argument in previous version, it seems best to move the whole
map_poke_run update as arch specific code.
[0] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=97a4fe20470e9bc30810
Fixes:
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
3432f9686a |
ring-buffer: Have rb_time_cmpxchg() set the msb counter too
commit 0aa0e5289cfe984a8a9fdd79ccf46ccf080151f7 upstream.
The rb_time_cmpxchg() on 32-bit architectures requires setting three
32-bit words to represent the 64-bit timestamp, with some salt for
synchronization. Those are: msb, top, and bottom
The issue is, the rb_time_cmpxchg() did not properly salt the msb portion,
and the msb that was written was stale.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231215084114.20899342@rorschach.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
b3778a2fa4 |
ring-buffer: Do not try to put back write_stamp
commit dd939425707898da992e59ab0fcfae4652546910 upstream.
If an update to an event is interrupted by another event between the time
the initial event allocated its buffer and where it wrote to the
write_stamp, the code try to reset the write stamp back to the what it had
just overwritten. It knows that it was overwritten via checking the
before_stamp, and if it didn't match what it wrote to the before_stamp
before it allocated its space, it knows it was overwritten.
To put back the write_stamp, it uses the before_stamp it read. The problem
here is that by writing the before_stamp to the write_stamp it makes the
two equal again, which means that the write_stamp can be considered valid
as the last timestamp written to the ring buffer. But this is not
necessarily true. The event that interrupted the event could have been
interrupted in a way that it was interrupted as well, and can end up
leaving with an invalid write_stamp. But if this happens and returns to
this context that uses the before_stamp to update the write_stamp again,
it can possibly incorrectly make it valid, causing later events to have in
correct time stamps.
As it is OK to leave this function with an invalid write_stamp (one that
doesn't match the before_stamp), there's no reason to try to make it valid
again in this case. If this race happens, then just leave with the invalid
write_stamp and the next event to come along will just add a absolute
timestamp and validate everything again.
Bonus points: This gets rid of another cmpxchg64!
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231214222921.193037a7@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
bc17bc9643 |
ring-buffer: Fix a race in rb_time_cmpxchg() for 32 bit archs
commit fff88fa0fbc7067ba46dde570912d63da42c59a9 upstream.
Mathieu Desnoyers pointed out an issue in the rb_time_cmpxchg() for 32 bit
architectures. That is:
static bool rb_time_cmpxchg(rb_time_t *t, u64 expect, u64 set)
{
unsigned long cnt, top, bottom, msb;
unsigned long cnt2, top2, bottom2, msb2;
u64 val;
/* The cmpxchg always fails if it interrupted an update */
if (!__rb_time_read(t, &val, &cnt2))
return false;
if (val != expect)
return false;
<<<< interrupted here!
cnt = local_read(&t->cnt);
The problem is that the synchronization counter in the rb_time_t is read
*after* the value of the timestamp is read. That means if an interrupt
were to come in between the value being read and the counter being read,
it can change the value and the counter and the interrupted process would
be clueless about it!
The counter needs to be read first and then the value. That way it is easy
to tell if the value is stale or not. If the counter hasn't been updated,
then the value is still good.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231211201324.652870-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231212115301.7a9c9a64@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
ae76d9bdf1 |
ring-buffer: Fix writing to the buffer with max_data_size
commit b3ae7b67b87fed771fa5bf95389df06b0433603e upstream. The maximum ring buffer data size is the maximum size of data that can be recorded on the ring buffer. Events must be smaller than the sub buffer data size minus any meta data. This size is checked before trying to allocate from the ring buffer because the allocation assumes that the size will fit on the sub buffer. The maximum size was calculated as the size of a sub buffer page (which is currently PAGE_SIZE minus the sub buffer header) minus the size of the meta data of an individual event. But it missed the possible adding of a time stamp for events that are added long enough apart that the event meta data can't hold the time delta. When an event is added that is greater than the current BUF_MAX_DATA_SIZE minus the size of a time stamp, but still less than or equal to BUF_MAX_DATA_SIZE, the ring buffer would go into an infinite loop, looking for a page that can hold the event. Luckily, there's a check for this loop and after 1000 iterations and a warning is emitted and the ring buffer is disabled. But this should never happen. This can happen when a large event is added first, or after a long period where an absolute timestamp is prefixed to the event, increasing its size by 8 bytes. This passes the check and then goes into the algorithm that causes the infinite loop. For events that are the first event on the sub-buffer, it does not need to add a timestamp, because the sub-buffer itself contains an absolute timestamp, and adding one is redundant. The fix is to check if the event is to be the first event on the sub-buffer, and if it is, then do not add a timestamp. This also fixes 32 bit adding a timestamp when a read of before_stamp or write_stamp is interrupted. There's still no need to add that timestamp if the event is going to be the first event on the sub buffer. Also, if the buffer has "time_stamp_abs" set, then also check if the length plus the timestamp is greater than the BUF_MAX_DATA_SIZE. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231212104549.58863438@gandalf.local.home/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231212071837.5fdd6c13@gandalf.local.home Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231212111617.39e02849@gandalf.local.home Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Fixes: |
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
307ed139d7 |
ring-buffer: Have saved event hold the entire event
commit b049525855fdd0024881c9b14b8fbec61c3f53d3 upstream.
For the ring buffer iterator (non-consuming read), the event needs to be
copied into the iterator buffer to make sure that a writer does not
overwrite it while the user is reading it. If a write happens during the
copy, the buffer is simply discarded.
But the temp buffer itself was not big enough. The allocation of the
buffer was only BUF_MAX_DATA_SIZE, which is the maximum data size that can
be passed into the ring buffer and saved. But the temp buffer needs to
hold the meta data as well. That would be BUF_PAGE_SIZE and not
BUF_MAX_DATA_SIZE.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231212072558.61f76493@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
5e58483677 |
ring-buffer: Do not update before stamp when switching sub-buffers
commit 9e45e39dc249c970d99d2681f6bcb55736fd725c upstream.
The ring buffer timestamps are synchronized by two timestamp placeholders.
One is the "before_stamp" and the other is the "write_stamp" (sometimes
referred to as the "after stamp" but only in the comments. These two
stamps are key to knowing how to handle nested events coming in with a
lockless system.
When moving across sub-buffers, the before stamp is updated but the write
stamp is not. There's an effort to put back the before stamp to something
that seems logical in case there's nested events. But as the current event
is about to cross sub-buffers, and so will any new nested event that happens,
updating the before stamp is useless, and could even introduce new race
conditions.
The first event on a sub-buffer simply uses the sub-buffer's timestamp
and keeps a "delta" of zero. The "before_stamp" and "write_stamp" are not
used in the algorithm in this case. There's no reason to try to fix the
before_stamp when this happens.
As a bonus, it removes a cmpxchg() when crossing sub-buffers!
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231211114420.36dde01b@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
5062b8c5ae |
tracing: Update snapshot buffer on resize if it is allocated
commit d06aff1cb13d2a0d52b48e605462518149c98c81 upstream.
The snapshot buffer is to mimic the main buffer so that when a snapshot is
needed, the snapshot and main buffer are swapped. When the snapshot buffer
is allocated, it is set to the minimal size that the ring buffer may be at
and still functional. When it is allocated it becomes the same size as the
main ring buffer, and when the main ring buffer changes in size, it should
do.
Currently, the resize only updates the snapshot buffer if it's used by the
current tracer (ie. the preemptirqsoff tracer). But it needs to be updated
anytime it is allocated.
When changing the size of the main buffer, instead of looking to see if
the current tracer is utilizing the snapshot buffer, just check if it is
allocated to know if it should be updated or not.
Also fix typo in comment just above the code change.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231210225447.48476a6a@rorschach.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
b02bf0d952 |
ring-buffer: Fix memory leak of free page
commit 17d801758157bec93f26faaf5ff1a8b9a552d67a upstream.
Reading the ring buffer does a swap of a sub-buffer within the ring buffer
with a empty sub-buffer. This allows the reader to have full access to the
content of the sub-buffer that was swapped out without having to worry
about contention with the writer.
The readers call ring_buffer_alloc_read_page() to allocate a page that
will be used to swap with the ring buffer. When the code is finished with
the reader page, it calls ring_buffer_free_read_page(). Instead of freeing
the page, it stores it as a spare. Then next call to
ring_buffer_alloc_read_page() will return this spare instead of calling
into the memory management system to allocate a new page.
Unfortunately, on freeing of the ring buffer, this spare page is not
freed, and causes a memory leak.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231210221250.7b9cc83c@rorschach.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Ignat Korchagin
|
37b561d559 |
kexec: drop dependency on ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC from CRASH_DUMP
commit c41bd2514184d75db087fe4c1221237fb7922875 upstream.
In commit f8ff23429c62 ("kernel/Kconfig.kexec: drop select of KEXEC for
CRASH_DUMP") we tried to fix a config regression, where CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP
required CONFIG_KEXEC.
However, it was not enough at least for arm64 platforms. While further
testing the patch with our arm64 config I noticed that CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP
is unavailable in menuconfig. This is because CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP still
depends on the new CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC introduced in commit
|