Commit Graph

227 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Chenbo Feng
0521e0b3fc UPSTREAM: selinux: bpf: Add addtional check for bpf object file receive
Introduce a bpf object related check when sending and receiving files
through unix domain socket as well as binder. It checks if the receiving
process have privilege to read/write the bpf map or use the bpf program.
This check is necessary because the bpf maps and programs are using a
anonymous inode as their shared inode so the normal way of checking the
files and sockets when passing between processes cannot work properly on
eBPF object. This check only works when the BPF_SYSCALL is configured.

Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

(cherry-pick from net-next: f66e448cfd)
Bug: 30950746

Change-Id: I5b2cf4ccb4eab7eda91ddd7091d6aa3e7ed9f2cd
2017-11-07 12:59:54 -08:00
Chenbo Feng
f3ad3766a9 BACKPORT: security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall
Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the
userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps.
The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection
for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can
read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides
that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf
syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The
actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and
how the cmd should be checked.

Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Added the LIST_HEAD_INIT call for security hooks, it nolonger exist in
uptream code.
(cherry-pick from net-next: afdb09c720)
Bug: 30950746

Change-Id: Ieb3ac74392f531735fc7c949b83346a5f587a77b
2017-11-07 12:59:20 -08:00
Chenbo Feng
4672ded3ec BACKPORT: bpf: Add file mode configuration into bpf maps
Introduce the map read/write flags to the eBPF syscalls that returns the
map fd. The flags is used to set up the file mode when construct a new
file descriptor for bpf maps. To not break the backward capability, the
f_flags is set to O_RDWR if the flag passed by syscall is 0. Otherwise
it should be O_RDONLY or O_WRONLY. When the userspace want to modify or
read the map content, it will check the file mode to see if it is
allowed to make the change.

Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Deleted the file mode configuration code in unsupported map type and
removed the file mode check in non-existing helper functions.
(cherry-pick from net-next: 6e71b04a82)
Bug: 30950746

Change-Id: Icfad20f1abb77f91068d244fb0d87fa40824dd1b
2017-11-07 12:47:56 -08:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
cdbe07ad26 Merge 4.9.55 into android-4.9
Changes in 4.9.55
	USB: gadgetfs: Fix crash caused by inadequate synchronization
	USB: gadgetfs: fix copy_to_user while holding spinlock
	usb: gadget: udc: atmel: set vbus irqflags explicitly
	usb: gadget: udc: renesas_usb3: fix for no-data control transfer
	usb: gadget: udc: renesas_usb3: fix Pn_RAMMAP.Pn_MPKT value
	usb: gadget: udc: renesas_usb3: Fix return value of usb3_write_pipe()
	usb-storage: unusual_devs entry to fix write-access regression for Seagate external drives
	usb-storage: fix bogus hardware error messages for ATA pass-thru devices
	usb: renesas_usbhs: fix the BCLR setting condition for non-DCP pipe
	usb: renesas_usbhs: fix usbhsf_fifo_clear() for RX direction
	ALSA: usb-audio: Check out-of-bounds access by corrupted buffer descriptor
	usb: pci-quirks.c: Corrected timeout values used in handshake
	USB: cdc-wdm: ignore -EPIPE from GetEncapsulatedResponse
	USB: dummy-hcd: fix connection failures (wrong speed)
	USB: dummy-hcd: fix infinite-loop resubmission bug
	USB: dummy-hcd: Fix erroneous synchronization change
	USB: devio: Don't corrupt user memory
	usb: gadget: mass_storage: set msg_registered after msg registered
	USB: g_mass_storage: Fix deadlock when driver is unbound
	USB: uas: fix bug in handling of alternate settings
	USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
	usb: Increase quirk delay for USB devices
	USB: fix out-of-bounds in usb_set_configuration
	xhci: fix finding correct bus_state structure for USB 3.1 hosts
	xhci: Fix sleeping with spin_lock_irq() held in ASmedia 1042A workaround
	xhci: set missing SuperSpeedPlus Link Protocol bit in roothub descriptor
	Revert "xhci: Limit USB2 port wake support for AMD Promontory hosts"
	iio: adc: twl4030: Fix an error handling path in 'twl4030_madc_probe()'
	iio: adc: twl4030: Disable the vusb3v1 rugulator in the error handling path of 'twl4030_madc_probe()'
	iio: ad_sigma_delta: Implement a dedicated reset function
	staging: iio: ad7192: Fix - use the dedicated reset function avoiding dma from stack.
	iio: core: Return error for failed read_reg
	IIO: BME280: Updates to Humidity readings need ctrl_reg write!
	iio: ad7793: Fix the serial interface reset
	iio: adc: mcp320x: Fix readout of negative voltages
	iio: adc: mcp320x: Fix oops on module unload
	uwb: properly check kthread_run return value
	uwb: ensure that endpoint is interrupt
	staging: vchiq_2835_arm: Fix NULL ptr dereference in free_pagelist
	mm, oom_reaper: skip mm structs with mmu notifiers
	lib/ratelimit.c: use deferred printk() version
	lsm: fix smack_inode_removexattr and xattr_getsecurity memleak
	ALSA: compress: Remove unused variable
	Revert "ALSA: echoaudio: purge contradictions between dimension matrix members and total number of members"
	ALSA: usx2y: Suppress kernel warning at page allocation failures
	mlxsw: spectrum: Prevent mirred-related crash on removal
	net: sched: fix use-after-free in tcf_action_destroy and tcf_del_walker
	sctp: potential read out of bounds in sctp_ulpevent_type_enabled()
	tcp: update skb->skb_mstamp more carefully
	bpf/verifier: reject BPF_ALU64|BPF_END
	tcp: fix data delivery rate
	udpv6: Fix the checksum computation when HW checksum does not apply
	ip6_gre: skb_push ipv6hdr before packing the header in ip6gre_header
	net: phy: Fix mask value write on gmii2rgmii converter speed register
	ip6_tunnel: do not allow loading ip6_tunnel if ipv6 is disabled in cmdline
	net/sched: cls_matchall: fix crash when used with classful qdisc
	tcp: fastopen: fix on syn-data transmit failure
	net: emac: Fix napi poll list corruption
	packet: hold bind lock when rebinding to fanout hook
	bpf: one perf event close won't free bpf program attached by another perf event
	isdn/i4l: fetch the ppp_write buffer in one shot
	net_sched: always reset qdisc backlog in qdisc_reset()
	net: qcom/emac: specify the correct size when mapping a DMA buffer
	vti: fix use after free in vti_tunnel_xmit/vti6_tnl_xmit
	l2tp: Avoid schedule while atomic in exit_net
	l2tp: fix race condition in l2tp_tunnel_delete
	tun: bail out from tun_get_user() if the skb is empty
	net: dsa: Fix network device registration order
	packet: in packet_do_bind, test fanout with bind_lock held
	packet: only test po->has_vnet_hdr once in packet_snd
	net: Set sk_prot_creator when cloning sockets to the right proto
	netlink: do not proceed if dump's start() errs
	ip6_gre: ip6gre_tap device should keep dst
	ip6_tunnel: update mtu properly for ARPHRD_ETHER tunnel device in tx path
	tipc: use only positive error codes in messages
	net: rtnetlink: fix info leak in RTM_GETSTATS call
	socket, bpf: fix possible use after free
	powerpc/64s: Use emergency stack for kernel TM Bad Thing program checks
	powerpc/tm: Fix illegal TM state in signal handler
	percpu: make this_cpu_generic_read() atomic w.r.t. interrupts
	driver core: platform: Don't read past the end of "driver_override" buffer
	Drivers: hv: fcopy: restore correct transfer length
	stm class: Fix a use-after-free
	ftrace: Fix kmemleak in unregister_ftrace_graph
	HID: i2c-hid: allocate hid buffers for real worst case
	HID: wacom: leds: Don't try to control the EKR's read-only LEDs
	HID: wacom: Always increment hdev refcount within wacom_get_hdev_data
	HID: wacom: bits shifted too much for 9th and 10th buttons
	rocker: fix rocker_tlv_put_* functions for KASAN
	netlink: fix nla_put_{u8,u16,u32} for KASAN
	iwlwifi: mvm: use IWL_HCMD_NOCOPY for MCAST_FILTER_CMD
	iwlwifi: add workaround to disable wide channels in 5GHz
	scsi: sd: Do not override max_sectors_kb sysfs setting
	brcmfmac: add length check in brcmf_cfg80211_escan_handler()
	brcmfmac: setup passive scan if requested by user-space
	drm/i915/bios: ignore HDMI on port A
	nvme-pci: Use PCI bus address for data/queues in CMB
	mmc: core: add driver strength selection when selecting hs400es
	sched/cpuset/pm: Fix cpuset vs. suspend-resume bugs
	vfs: deny copy_file_range() for non regular files
	ext4: fix data corruption for mmap writes
	ext4: Don't clear SGID when inheriting ACLs
	ext4: don't allow encrypted operations without keys
	f2fs: don't allow encrypted operations without keys
	KVM: x86: fix singlestepping over syscall
	Linux 4.9.55

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
2017-10-12 22:31:24 +02:00
Edward Cree
e159492b3c bpf/verifier: reject BPF_ALU64|BPF_END
[ Upstream commit e67b8a685c ]

Neither ___bpf_prog_run nor the JITs accept it.
Also adds a new test case.

Fixes: 17a5267067 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-10-12 11:51:20 +02:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
a3840b1234 Merge 4.9.46 into android-4.9
Changes in 4.9.46
	sparc64: remove unnecessary log message
	af_key: do not use GFP_KERNEL in atomic contexts
	dccp: purge write queue in dccp_destroy_sock()
	dccp: defer ccid_hc_tx_delete() at dismantle time
	ipv4: fix NULL dereference in free_fib_info_rcu()
	net_sched/sfq: update hierarchical backlog when drop packet
	net_sched: remove warning from qdisc_hash_add
	bpf: fix bpf_trace_printk on 32 bit archs
	openvswitch: fix skb_panic due to the incorrect actions attrlen
	ptr_ring: use kmalloc_array()
	ipv4: better IP_MAX_MTU enforcement
	nfp: fix infinite loop on umapping cleanup
	sctp: fully initialize the IPv6 address in sctp_v6_to_addr()
	tipc: fix use-after-free
	ipv6: reset fn->rr_ptr when replacing route
	ipv6: repair fib6 tree in failure case
	tcp: when rearming RTO, if RTO time is in past then fire RTO ASAP
	net/mlx4_core: Enable 4K UAR if SRIOV module parameter is not enabled
	irda: do not leak initialized list.dev to userspace
	net: sched: fix NULL pointer dereference when action calls some targets
	net_sched: fix order of queue length updates in qdisc_replace()
	bpf, verifier: add additional patterns to evaluate_reg_imm_alu
	bpf: adjust verifier heuristics
	bpf, verifier: fix alu ops against map_value{, _adj} register types
	bpf: fix mixed signed/unsigned derived min/max value bounds
	bpf/verifier: fix min/max handling in BPF_SUB
	Input: trackpoint - add new trackpoint firmware ID
	Input: elan_i2c - add ELAN0602 ACPI ID to support Lenovo Yoga310
	Input: ALPS - fix two-finger scroll breakage in right side on ALPS touchpad
	KVM: s390: sthyi: fix sthyi inline assembly
	KVM: s390: sthyi: fix specification exception detection
	KVM: x86: block guest protection keys unless the host has them enabled
	ALSA: usb-audio: Add delay quirk for H650e/Jabra 550a USB headsets
	ALSA: core: Fix unexpected error at replacing user TLV
	ALSA: hda - Add stereo mic quirk for Lenovo G50-70 (17aa:3978)
	ALSA: firewire: fix NULL pointer dereference when releasing uninitialized data of iso-resource
	ARCv2: PAE40: Explicitly set MSB counterpart of SLC region ops addresses
	mm, shmem: fix handling /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/shmem_enabled
	i2c: designware: Fix system suspend
	mm/madvise.c: fix freeing of locked page with MADV_FREE
	fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
	mm/memblock.c: reversed logic in memblock_discard()
	drm: Release driver tracking before making the object available again
	drm/atomic: If the atomic check fails, return its value first
	drm: rcar-du: Fix crash in encoder failure error path
	drm: rcar-du: Fix display timing controller parameter
	drm: rcar-du: Fix H/V sync signal polarity configuration
	tracing: Call clear_boot_tracer() at lateinit_sync
	tracing: Fix kmemleak in tracing_map_array_free()
	tracing: Fix freeing of filter in create_filter() when set_str is false
	kbuild: linker script do not match C names unless LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION is configured
	cifs: Fix df output for users with quota limits
	cifs: return ENAMETOOLONG for overlong names in cifs_open()/cifs_lookup()
	nfsd: Limit end of page list when decoding NFSv4 WRITE
	ftrace: Check for null ret_stack on profile function graph entry function
	perf/core: Fix group {cpu,task} validation
	perf probe: Fix --funcs to show correct symbols for offline module
	perf/x86/intel/rapl: Make package handling more robust
	timers: Fix excessive granularity of new timers after a nohz idle
	x86/mm: Fix use-after-free of ldt_struct
	net: sunrpc: svcsock: fix NULL-pointer exception
	Revert "leds: handle suspend/resume in heartbeat trigger"
	netfilter: nat: fix src map lookup
	Bluetooth: hidp: fix possible might sleep error in hidp_session_thread
	Bluetooth: cmtp: fix possible might sleep error in cmtp_session
	Bluetooth: bnep: fix possible might sleep error in bnep_session
	Revert "android: binder: Sanity check at binder ioctl"
	binder: use group leader instead of open thread
	binder: Use wake up hint for synchronous transactions.
	ANDROID: binder: fix proc->tsk check.
	iio: imu: adis16480: Fix acceleration scale factor for adis16480
	iio: hid-sensor-trigger: Fix the race with user space powering up sensors
	staging: rtl8188eu: add RNX-N150NUB support
	Clarify (and fix) MAX_LFS_FILESIZE macros
	ntb_transport: fix qp count bug
	ntb_transport: fix bug calculating num_qps_mw
	NTB: ntb_test: fix bug printing ntb_perf results
	ntb: no sleep in ntb_async_tx_submit
	ntb: ntb_test: ensure the link is up before trying to configure the mws
	ntb: transport shouldn't disable link due to bogus values in SPADs
	ACPI: ioapic: Clear on-stack resource before using it
	ACPI / APEI: Add missing synchronize_rcu() on NOTIFY_SCI removal
	ACPI: EC: Fix regression related to wrong ECDT initialization order
	powerpc/mm: Ensure cpumask update is ordered
	Linux 4.9.46

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
2017-08-30 15:24:10 +02:00
Edward Cree
655da3da9b bpf/verifier: fix min/max handling in BPF_SUB
[ Upstream commit 9305706c2e ]

We have to subtract the src max from the dst min, and vice-versa, since
 (e.g.) the smallest result comes from the largest subtrahend.

Fixes: 484611357c ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-08-30 10:21:44 +02:00
Daniel Borkmann
bf5b91b782 bpf: fix mixed signed/unsigned derived min/max value bounds
[ Upstream commit 4cabc5b186 ]

Edward reported that there's an issue in min/max value bounds
tracking when signed and unsigned compares both provide hints
on limits when having unknown variables. E.g. a program such
as the following should have been rejected:

   0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
   1: (bf) r2 = r10
   2: (07) r2 += -8
   3: (18) r1 = 0xffff8a94cda93400
   5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
   6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
   7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8
   8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
   9: (b7) r2 = -1
  10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0
  R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp
  11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1
  R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp
  12: (0f) r0 += r1
  13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0
  R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=1 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1
  R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp
  14: (b7) r0 = 0
  15: (95) exit

What happens is that in the first part ...

   8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
   9: (b7) r2 = -1
  10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3

... r1 carries an unsigned value, and is compared as unsigned
against a register carrying an immediate. Verifier deduces in
reg_set_min_max() that since the compare is unsigned and operation
is greater than (>), that in the fall-through/false case, r1's
minimum bound must be 0 and maximum bound must be r2. Latter is
larger than the bound and thus max value is reset back to being
'invalid' aka BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE. Thus, r1 state is now
'R1=inv,min_value=0'. The subsequent test ...

  11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2

... is a signed compare of r1 with immediate value 1. Here,
verifier deduces in reg_set_min_max() that since the compare
is signed this time and operation is greater than (>), that
in the fall-through/false case, we can deduce that r1's maximum
bound must be 1, meaning with prior test, we result in r1 having
the following state: R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1. Given that
the actual value this holds is -8, the bounds are wrongly deduced.
When this is being added to r0 which holds the map_value(_adj)
type, then subsequent store access in above case will go through
check_mem_access() which invokes check_map_access_adj(), that
will then probe whether the map memory is in bounds based
on the min_value and max_value as well as access size since
the actual unknown value is min_value <= x <= max_value; commit
fce366a9dd ("bpf, verifier: fix alu ops against map_value{,
_adj} register types") provides some more explanation on the
semantics.

It's worth to note in this context that in the current code,
min_value and max_value tracking are used for two things, i)
dynamic map value access via check_map_access_adj() and since
commit 06c1c04972 ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory")
ii) also enforced at check_helper_mem_access() when passing a
memory address (pointer to packet, map value, stack) and length
pair to a helper and the length in this case is an unknown value
defining an access range through min_value/max_value in that
case. The min_value/max_value tracking is /not/ used in the
direct packet access case to track ranges. However, the issue
also affects case ii), for example, the following crafted program
based on the same principle must be rejected as well:

   0: (b7) r2 = 0
   1: (bf) r3 = r10
   2: (07) r3 += -512
   3: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8
   4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
   5: (b7) r6 = -1
   6: (2d) if r4 > r6 goto pc+5
  R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512
  R4=inv,min_value=0 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp
   7: (65) if r4 s> 0x1 goto pc+4
  R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512
  R4=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1
  R10=fp
   8: (07) r4 += 1
   9: (b7) r5 = 0
  10: (6a) *(u16 *)(r10 -512) = 0
  11: (85) call bpf_skb_load_bytes#26
  12: (b7) r0 = 0
  13: (95) exit

Meaning, while we initialize the max_value stack slot that the
verifier thinks we access in the [1,2] range, in reality we
pass -7 as length which is interpreted as u32 in the helper.
Thus, this issue is relevant also for the case of helper ranges.
Resetting both bounds in check_reg_overflow() in case only one
of them exceeds limits is also not enough as similar test can be
created that uses values which are within range, thus also here
learned min value in r1 is incorrect when mixed with later signed
test to create a range:

   0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
   1: (bf) r2 = r10
   2: (07) r2 += -8
   3: (18) r1 = 0xffff880ad081fa00
   5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
   6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
   7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8
   8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
   9: (b7) r2 = 2
  10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+3
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3
  R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp
  11: (65) if r1 s> 0x4 goto pc+2
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0
  R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp
  12: (0f) r0 += r1
  13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0
  R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=4
  R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp
  14: (b7) r0 = 0
  15: (95) exit

This leaves us with two options for fixing this: i) to invalidate
all prior learned information once we switch signed context, ii)
to track min/max signed and unsigned boundaries separately as
done in [0]. (Given latter introduces major changes throughout
the whole verifier, it's rather net-next material, thus this
patch follows option i), meaning we can derive bounds either
from only signed tests or only unsigned tests.) There is still the
case of adjust_reg_min_max_vals(), where we adjust bounds on ALU
operations, meaning programs like the following where boundaries
on the reg get mixed in context later on when bounds are merged
on the dst reg must get rejected, too:

   0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
   1: (bf) r2 = r10
   2: (07) r2 += -8
   3: (18) r1 = 0xffff89b2bf87ce00
   5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
   6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+6
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
   7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8
   8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
   9: (b7) r2 = 2
  10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+2
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3
  R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp
  11: (b7) r7 = 1
  12: (65) if r7 s> 0x0 goto pc+2
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3
  R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,max_value=0 R10=fp
  13: (b7) r0 = 0
  14: (95) exit

  from 12 to 15: R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0
  R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,min_value=1 R10=fp
  15: (0f) r7 += r1
  16: (65) if r7 s> 0x4 goto pc+2
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3
  R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp
  17: (0f) r0 += r7
  18: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0
  R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=4,max_value=4 R1=inv,min_value=3
  R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp
  19: (b7) r0 = 0
  20: (95) exit

Meaning, in adjust_reg_min_max_vals() we must also reset range
values on the dst when src/dst registers have mixed signed/
unsigned derived min/max value bounds with one unbounded value
as otherwise they can be added together deducing false boundaries.
Once both boundaries are established from either ALU ops or
compare operations w/o mixing signed/unsigned insns, then they
can safely be added to other regs also having both boundaries
established. Adding regs with one unbounded side to a map value
where the bounded side has been learned w/o mixing ops is
possible, but the resulting map value won't recover from that,
meaning such op is considered invalid on the time of actual
access. Invalid bounds are set on the dst reg in case i) src reg,
or ii) in case dst reg already had them. The only way to recover
would be to perform i) ALU ops but only 'add' is allowed on map
value types or ii) comparisons, but these are disallowed on
pointers in case they span a range. This is fine as only BPF_JEQ
and BPF_JNE may be performed on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers
which potentially turn them into PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE type depending
on the branch, so only here min/max value cannot be invalidated
for them.

In terms of state pruning, value_from_signed is considered
as well in states_equal() when dealing with adjusted map values.
With regards to breaking existing programs, there is a small
risk, but use-cases are rather quite narrow where this could
occur and mixing compares probably unlikely.

Joint work with Josef and Edward.

  [0] https://lists.iovisor.org/pipermail/iovisor-dev/2017-June/000822.html

Fixes: 484611357c ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Reported-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-08-30 10:21:43 +02:00
Daniel Borkmann
8d674bee8f bpf, verifier: fix alu ops against map_value{, _adj} register types
[ Upstream commit fce366a9dd ]

While looking into map_value_adj, I noticed that alu operations
directly on the map_value() resp. map_value_adj() register (any
alu operation on a map_value() register will turn it into a
map_value_adj() typed register) are not sufficiently protected
against some of the operations. Two non-exhaustive examples are
provided that the verifier needs to reject:

 i) BPF_AND on r0 (map_value_adj):

  0: (bf) r2 = r10
  1: (07) r2 += -8
  2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0
  3: (18) r1 = 0xbf842a00
  5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
  6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+2
   R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
  7: (57) r0 &= 8
  8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 22
   R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=8 R10=fp
  9: (95) exit

  from 6 to 9: R0=inv,min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
  9: (95) exit
  processed 10 insns

ii) BPF_ADD in 32 bit mode on r0 (map_value_adj):

  0: (bf) r2 = r10
  1: (07) r2 += -8
  2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0
  3: (18) r1 = 0xc24eee00
  5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
  6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+2
   R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
  7: (04) (u32) r0 += (u32) 0
  8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 22
   R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
  9: (95) exit

  from 6 to 9: R0=inv,min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
  9: (95) exit
  processed 10 insns

Issue is, while min_value / max_value boundaries for the access
are adjusted appropriately, we change the pointer value in a way
that cannot be sufficiently tracked anymore from its origin.
Operations like BPF_{AND,OR,DIV,MUL,etc} on a destination register
that is PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} was probably unintended, in fact,
all the test cases coming with 484611357c ("bpf: allow access
into map value arrays") perform BPF_ADD only on the destination
register that is PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ.

Only for UNKNOWN_VALUE register types such operations make sense,
f.e. with unknown memory content fetched initially from a constant
offset from the map value memory into a register. That register is
then later tested against lower / upper bounds, so that the verifier
can then do the tracking of min_value / max_value, and properly
check once that UNKNOWN_VALUE register is added to the destination
register with type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ}. This is also what the
original use-case is solving. Note, tracking on what is being
added is done through adjust_reg_min_max_vals() and later access
to the map value enforced with these boundaries and the given offset
from the insn through check_map_access_adj().

Tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer
arithmetic, in particular in check_alu_op(), we bail out on the
is_pointer_value() check on the dst_reg (which is false in root
case as we allow for pointer arithmetic via env->allow_ptr_leaks).

Similarly to PTR_TO_PACKET, one way to fix it is to restrict the
allowed operations on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} registers to 64 bit
mode BPF_ADD. The test_verifier suite runs fine after the patch
and it also rejects mentioned test cases.

Fixes: 484611357c ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-08-30 10:21:43 +02:00
Daniel Borkmann
577aa83b28 bpf: adjust verifier heuristics
[ Upstream commit 3c2ce60bdd ]

Current limits with regards to processing program paths do not
really reflect today's needs anymore due to programs becoming
more complex and verifier smarter, keeping track of more data
such as const ALU operations, alignment tracking, spilling of
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ registers, and other features allowing for
smarter matching of what LLVM generates.

This also comes with the side-effect that we result in fewer
opportunities to prune search states and thus often need to do
more work to prove safety than in the past due to different
register states and stack layout where we mismatch. Generally,
it's quite hard to determine what caused a sudden increase in
complexity, it could be caused by something as trivial as a
single branch somewhere at the beginning of the program where
LLVM assigned a stack slot that is marked differently throughout
other branches and thus causing a mismatch, where verifier
then needs to prove safety for the whole rest of the program.
Subsequently, programs with even less than half the insn size
limit can get rejected. We noticed that while some programs
load fine under pre 4.11, they get rejected due to hitting
limits on more recent kernels. We saw that in the vast majority
of cases (90+%) pruning failed due to register mismatches. In
case of stack mismatches, majority of cases failed due to
different stack slot types (invalid, spill, misc) rather than
differences in spilled registers.

This patch makes pruning more aggressive by also adding markers
that sit at conditional jumps as well. Currently, we only mark
jump targets for pruning. For example in direct packet access,
these are usually error paths where we bail out. We found that
adding these markers, it can reduce number of processed insns
by up to 30%. Another option is to ignore reg->id in probing
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers, which can help pruning
slightly as well by up to 7% observed complexity reduction as
stand-alone. Meaning, if a previous path with register type
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL for map X was found to be safe, then
in the current state a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL register for
the same map X must be safe as well. Last but not least the
patch also adds a scheduling point and bumps the current limit
for instructions to be processed to a more adequate value.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-08-30 10:21:43 +02:00
John Fastabend
e37bdeee95 bpf, verifier: add additional patterns to evaluate_reg_imm_alu
[ Upstream commit 43188702b3 ]

Currently the verifier does not track imm across alu operations when
the source register is of unknown type. This adds additional pattern
matching to catch this and track imm. We've seen LLVM generating this
pattern while working on cilium.

Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-08-30 10:21:43 +02:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
14accea70e Merge 4.9.39 into android-4.9
Changes in 4.9.39
	xen-netfront: Rework the fix for Rx stall during OOM and network stress
	net_sched: fix error recovery at qdisc creation
	net: sched: Fix one possible panic when no destroy callback
	net/phy: micrel: configure intterupts after autoneg workaround
	ipv6: avoid unregistering inet6_dev for loopback
	net: dp83640: Avoid NULL pointer dereference.
	tcp: reset sk_rx_dst in tcp_disconnect()
	net: prevent sign extension in dev_get_stats()
	bridge: mdb: fix leak on complete_info ptr on fail path
	rocker: move dereference before free
	bpf: prevent leaking pointer via xadd on unpriviledged
	net: handle NAPI_GRO_FREE_STOLEN_HEAD case also in napi_frags_finish()
	net/mlx5: Cancel delayed recovery work when unloading the driver
	liquidio: fix bug in soft reset failure detection
	net/mlx5e: Fix TX carrier errors report in get stats ndo
	ipv6: dad: don't remove dynamic addresses if link is down
	vxlan: fix hlist corruption
	net: core: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in netdev_stats_to_stats64
	net: ipv6: Compare lwstate in detecting duplicate nexthops
	vrf: fix bug_on triggered by rx when destroying a vrf
	rds: tcp: use sock_create_lite() to create the accept socket
	brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()
	brcmfmac: Fix a memory leak in error handling path in 'brcmf_cfg80211_attach'
	brcmfmac: Fix glom_skb leak in brcmf_sdiod_recv_chain
	sfc: don't read beyond unicast address list
	cfg80211: Define nla_policy for NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE
	cfg80211: Validate frequencies nested in NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES
	cfg80211: Check if PMKID attribute is of expected size
	cfg80211: Check if NAN service ID is of expected size
	irqchip/gic-v3: Fix out-of-bound access in gic_set_affinity
	parisc: Report SIGSEGV instead of SIGBUS when running out of stack
	parisc: use compat_sys_keyctl()
	parisc: DMA API: return error instead of BUG_ON for dma ops on non dma devs
	parisc/mm: Ensure IRQs are off in switch_mm()
	tools/lib/lockdep: Reduce MAX_LOCK_DEPTH to avoid overflowing lock_chain/: Depth
	thp, mm: fix crash due race in MADV_FREE handling
	kernel/extable.c: mark core_kernel_text notrace
	mm/list_lru.c: fix list_lru_count_node() to be race free
	fs/dcache.c: fix spin lockup issue on nlru->lock
	checkpatch: silence perl 5.26.0 unescaped left brace warnings
	binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE
	arm: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4MB
	arm64: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB
	powerpc: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB
	s390: reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE
	exec: Limit arg stack to at most 75% of _STK_LIM
	ARM64: dts: marvell: armada37xx: Fix timer interrupt specifiers
	vt: fix unchecked __put_user() in tioclinux ioctls
	rcu: Add memory barriers for NOCB leader wakeup
	nvmem: core: fix leaks on registration errors
	mnt: In umount propagation reparent in a separate pass
	mnt: In propgate_umount handle visiting mounts in any order
	mnt: Make propagate_umount less slow for overlapping mount propagation trees
	selftests/capabilities: Fix the test_execve test
	mm: fix overflow check in expand_upwards()
	crypto: talitos - Extend max key length for SHA384/512-HMAC and AEAD
	crypto: atmel - only treat EBUSY as transient if backlog
	crypto: sha1-ssse3 - Disable avx2
	crypto: caam - properly set IV after {en,de}crypt
	crypto: caam - fix signals handling
	Revert "sched/core: Optimize SCHED_SMT"
	sched/fair, cpumask: Export for_each_cpu_wrap()
	sched/topology: Fix building of overlapping sched-groups
	sched/topology: Optimize build_group_mask()
	sched/topology: Fix overlapping sched_group_mask
	PM / wakeirq: Convert to SRCU
	PM / QoS: return -EINVAL for bogus strings
	tracing: Use SOFTIRQ_OFFSET for softirq dectection for more accurate results
	kvm: vmx: Do not disable intercepts for BNDCFGS
	kvm: x86: Guest BNDCFGS requires guest MPX support
	kvm: vmx: Check value written to IA32_BNDCFGS
	kvm: vmx: allow host to access guest MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS
	4.9.39

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
2017-07-21 08:55:50 +02:00
Daniel Borkmann
cd5de9cb85 bpf: prevent leaking pointer via xadd on unpriviledged
commit 6bdf6abc56 upstream.

Leaking kernel addresses on unpriviledged is generally disallowed,
for example, verifier rejects the following:

  0: (b7) r0 = 0
  1: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400
  3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r2
  R2 leaks addr into ctx

Doing pointer arithmetic on them is also forbidden, so that they
don't turn into unknown value and then get leaked out. However,
there's xadd as a special case, where we don't check the src reg
for being a pointer register, e.g. the following will pass:

  0: (b7) r0 = 0
  1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r0
  2: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400 ; map
  4: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r1 +48) += r2
  5: (95) exit

We could store the pointer into skb->cb, loose the type context,
and then read it out from there again to leak it eventually out
of a map value. Or more easily in a different variant, too:

   0: (bf) r6 = r1
   1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
   2: (bf) r2 = r10
   3: (07) r2 += -8
   4: (18) r1 = 0x0
   6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
   7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+3
   R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp
   8: (b7) r3 = 0
   9: (7b) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = r3
  10: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r0 +0) += r6
  11: (b7) r0 = 0
  12: (95) exit

  from 7 to 11: R0=inv,min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp
  11: (b7) r0 = 0
  12: (95) exit

Prevent this by checking xadd src reg for pointer types. Also
add a couple of test cases related to this.

Fixes: 1be7f75d16 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: 17a5267067 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-07-21 07:42:18 +02:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
184ce810ce Merge 4.9.36 into android-4.9
Changes in 4.9.36
	ipv6: release dst on error in ip6_dst_lookup_tail
	net: don't call strlen on non-terminated string in dev_set_alias()
	decnet: dn_rtmsg: Improve input length sanitization in dnrmg_receive_user_skb
	net: Zero ifla_vf_info in rtnl_fill_vfinfo()
	net: vrf: Make add_fib_rules per network namespace flag
	af_unix: Add sockaddr length checks before accessing sa_family in bind and connect handlers
	Fix an intermittent pr_emerg warning about lo becoming free.
	sctp: disable BH in sctp_for_each_endpoint
	net: caif: Fix a sleep-in-atomic bug in cfpkt_create_pfx
	net: tipc: Fix a sleep-in-atomic bug in tipc_msg_reverse
	net/mlx5e: Added BW check for DIM decision mechanism
	net/mlx5e: Fix wrong indications in DIM due to counter wraparound
	proc: snmp6: Use correct type in memset
	igmp: acquire pmc lock for ip_mc_clear_src()
	igmp: add a missing spin_lock_init()
	ipv6: fix calling in6_ifa_hold incorrectly for dad work
	sctp: return next obj by passing pos + 1 into sctp_transport_get_idx
	net/mlx5e: Avoid doing a cleanup call if the profile doesn't have it
	net/mlx5: Wait for FW readiness before initializing command interface
	net/mlx5e: Fix timestamping capabilities reporting
	decnet: always not take dst->__refcnt when inserting dst into hash table
	net: 8021q: Fix one possible panic caused by BUG_ON in free_netdev
	sfc: provide dummy definitions of vswitch functions
	ipv6: Do not leak throw route references
	rtnetlink: add IFLA_GROUP to ifla_policy
	netfilter: xt_TCPMSS: add more sanity tests on tcph->doff
	netfilter: synproxy: fix conntrackd interaction
	NFSv4: fix a reference leak caused WARNING messages
	NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
	xen/blkback: don't use xen_blkif_get() in xen-blkback kthread
	drm/ast: Handle configuration without P2A bridge
	mm, swap_cgroup: reschedule when neeed in swap_cgroup_swapoff()
	MIPS: head: Reorder instructions missing a delay slot
	MIPS: Avoid accidental raw backtrace
	MIPS: pm-cps: Drop manual cache-line alignment of ready_count
	MIPS: Fix IRQ tracing & lockdep when rescheduling
	ALSA: hda - Fix endless loop of codec configure
	ALSA: hda - set input_path bitmap to zero after moving it to new place
	NFSv4.1: Fix a race in nfs4_proc_layoutget
	gpiolib: fix filtering out unwanted events
	drm/vmwgfx: Free hash table allocated by cmdbuf managed res mgr
	dm thin: do not queue freed thin mapping for next stage processing
	x86/mm: Fix boot crash caused by incorrect loop count calculation in sync_global_pgds()
	usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix possibe deadlock
	l2tp: fix race in l2tp_recv_common()
	l2tp: ensure session can't get removed during pppol2tp_session_ioctl()
	l2tp: fix duplicate session creation
	l2tp: hold session while sending creation notifications
	l2tp: take a reference on sessions used in genetlink handlers
	mm: numa: avoid waiting on freed migrated pages
	sparc64: Handle PIO & MEM non-resumable errors.
	sparc64: Zero pages on allocation for mondo and error queues.
	net: ethtool: add support for 2500BaseT and 5000BaseT link modes
	net: phy: add an option to disable EEE advertisement
	dt-bindings: net: add EEE capability constants
	net: phy: fix sign type error in genphy_config_eee_advert
	net: phy: use boolean dt properties for eee broken modes
	dt: bindings: net: use boolean dt properties for eee broken modes
	ARM64: dts: meson-gxbb-odroidc2: fix GbE tx link breakage
	xen/blkback: don't free be structure too early
	KVM: x86: fix fixing of hypercalls
	scsi: sd: Fix wrong DPOFUA disable in sd_read_cache_type
	stmmac: add missing of_node_put
	scsi: lpfc: Set elsiocb contexts to NULL after freeing it
	qla2xxx: Terminate exchange if corrupted
	qla2xxx: Fix erroneous invalid handle message
	drm/amdgpu: fix program vce instance logic error.
	drm/amdgpu: add support for new hainan variants
	net: phy: dp83848: add DP83620 PHY support
	perf/x86/intel: Handle exclusive threadid correctly on CPU hotplug
	net: korina: Fix NAPI versus resources freeing
	powerpc/eeh: Enable IO path on permanent error
	net: ethtool: Initialize buffer when querying device channel settings
	xen-netback: fix memory leaks on XenBus disconnect
	xen-netback: protect resource cleaning on XenBus disconnect
	bnxt_en: Fix "uninitialized variable" bug in TPA code path.
	bpf: don't trigger OOM killer under pressure with map alloc
	objtool: Fix IRET's opcode
	gianfar: Do not reuse pages from emergency reserve
	Btrfs: Fix deadlock between direct IO and fast fsync
	Btrfs: fix truncate down when no_holes feature is enabled
	virtio_console: fix a crash in config_work_handler
	swiotlb-xen: update dev_addr after swapping pages
	xen-netfront: Fix Rx stall during network stress and OOM
	scsi: virtio_scsi: Reject commands when virtqueue is broken
	iwlwifi: fix kernel crash when unregistering thermal zone
	platform/x86: ideapad-laptop: handle ACPI event 1
	amd-xgbe: Check xgbe_init() return code
	net: dsa: Check return value of phy_connect_direct()
	drm/amdgpu: check ring being ready before using
	vfio/spapr: fail tce_iommu_attach_group() when iommu_data is null
	mlxsw: spectrum_router: Correctly reallocate adjacency entries
	virtio_net: fix PAGE_SIZE > 64k
	ip6_tunnel: must reload ipv6h in ip6ip6_tnl_xmit()
	vxlan: do not age static remote mac entries
	ibmveth: Add a proper check for the availability of the checksum features
	kernel/panic.c: add missing \n
	Documentation: devicetree: change the mediatek ethernet compatible string
	drm/etnaviv: trick drm_mm into giving out a low IOVA
	perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix hardcoded socket 0 assumption in the Haswell init code
	pinctrl: intel: Set pin direction properly
	net: phy: marvell: fix Marvell 88E1512 used in SGMII mode
	mac80211: recalculate min channel width on VHT opmode changes
	perf/x86/intel: Use ULL constant to prevent undefined shift behaviour
	HID: i2c-hid: Add sleep between POWER ON and RESET
	scsi: lpfc: avoid double free of resource identifiers
	spi: davinci: use dma_mapping_error()
	arm64: assembler: make adr_l work in modules under KASLR
	net: thunderx: acpi: fix LMAC initialization
	drm/radeon/si: load special ucode for certain MC configs
	drm/amd/powerplay: fix vce cg logic error on CZ/St.
	drm/amd/powerplay: refine vce dpm update code on Cz.
	pmem: return EIO on read_pmem() failure
	mac80211: initialize SMPS field in HT capabilities
	x86/tsc: Add the Intel Denverton Processor to native_calibrate_tsc()
	x86/mpx: Use compatible types in comparison to fix sparse error
	perf/core: Fix sys_perf_event_open() vs. hotplug
	perf/x86: Reject non sampling events with precise_ip
	aio: fix lock dep warning
	coredump: Ensure proper size of sparse core files
	swiotlb: ensure that page-sized mappings are page-aligned
	s390/ctl_reg: make __ctl_load a full memory barrier
	usb: dwc2: gadget: Fix GUSBCFG.USBTRDTIM value
	be2net: fix status check in be_cmd_pmac_add()
	be2net: don't delete MAC on close on unprivileged BE3 VFs
	be2net: fix MAC addr setting on privileged BE3 VFs
	perf probe: Fix to show correct locations for events on modules
	net: phy: dp83867: allow RGMII_TXID/RGMII_RXID interface types
	tipc: allocate user memory with GFP_KERNEL flag
	perf probe: Fix to probe on gcc generated functions in modules
	net/mlx4_core: Eliminate warning messages for SRQ_LIMIT under SRIOV
	sctp: check af before verify address in sctp_addr_id2transport
	ip6_tunnel, ip6_gre: fix setting of DSCP on encapsulated packets
	ravb: Fix use-after-free on `ifconfig eth0 down`
	mm/vmalloc.c: huge-vmap: fail gracefully on unexpected huge vmap mappings
	xfrm: fix stack access out of bounds with CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY
	xfrm: NULL dereference on allocation failure
	xfrm: Oops on error in pfkey_msg2xfrm_state()
	netfilter: use skb_to_full_sk in ip_route_me_harder
	watchdog: bcm281xx: Fix use of uninitialized spinlock.
	sched/loadavg: Avoid loadavg spikes caused by delayed NO_HZ accounting
	spi: When no dma_chan map buffers with spi_master's parent
	spi: fix device-node leaks
	regulator: tps65086: Fix expected switch DT node names
	regulator: tps65086: Fix DT node referencing in of_parse_cb
	ARM: OMAP2+: omap_device: Sync omap_device and pm_runtime after probe defer
	ARM: dts: OMAP3: Fix MFG ID EEPROM
	ARM64/ACPI: Fix BAD_MADT_GICC_ENTRY() macro implementation
	ARM: 8685/1: ensure memblock-limit is pmd-aligned
	tools arch: Sync arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S with the kernel
	x86/boot/KASLR: Fix kexec crash due to 'virt_addr' calculation bug
	x86/mpx: Correctly report do_mpx_bt_fault() failures to user-space
	x86/mm: Fix flush_tlb_page() on Xen
	ocfs2: o2hb: revert hb threshold to keep compatible
	iommu/vt-d: Don't over-free page table directories
	iommu: Handle default domain attach failure
	iommu/dma: Don't reserve PCI I/O windows
	iommu/amd: Fix incorrect error handling in amd_iommu_bind_pasid()
	iommu/amd: Fix interrupt remapping when disable guest_mode
	cpufreq: s3c2416: double free on driver init error path
	clk: scpi: don't add cpufreq device if the scpi dvfs node is disabled
	objtool: Fix another GCC jump table detection issue
	infiniband: hns: avoid gcc-7.0.1 warning for uninitialized data
	brcmfmac: avoid writing channel out of allocated array
	i2c: brcmstb: Fix START and STOP conditions
	mtd: nand: brcmnand: Check flash #WP pin status before nand erase/program
	arm64: fix NULL dereference in have_cpu_die()
	KVM: x86: fix emulation of RSM and IRET instructions
	KVM: x86/vPMU: fix undefined shift in intel_pmu_refresh()
	KVM: x86: zero base3 of unusable segments
	KVM: nVMX: Fix exception injection
	Linux 4.9.36

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
2017-07-05 16:18:14 +02:00
Daniel Borkmann
251d00bf13 bpf: don't trigger OOM killer under pressure with map alloc
[ Upstream commit d407bd25a2 ]

This patch adds two helpers, bpf_map_area_alloc() and bpf_map_area_free(),
that are to be used for map allocations. Using kmalloc() for very large
allocations can cause excessive work within the page allocator, so i) fall
back earlier to vmalloc() when the attempt is considered costly anyway,
and even more importantly ii) don't trigger OOM killer with any of the
allocators.

Since this is based on a user space request, for example, when creating
maps with element pre-allocation, we really want such requests to fail
instead of killing other user space processes.

Also, don't spam the kernel log with warnings should any of the allocations
fail under pressure. Given that, we can make backend selection in
bpf_map_area_alloc() generic, and convert all maps over to use this API
for spots with potentially large allocation requests.

Note, replacing the one kmalloc_array() is fine as overflow checks happen
earlier in htab_map_alloc(), since it must also protect the multiplication
for vmalloc() should kmalloc_array() fail.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-07-05 14:40:21 +02:00
Daniel Borkmann
edb6da11b9 FROMLIST: bpf: cgroup skb progs cannot access ld_abs/ind
Commit fb9a307d11 ("bpf: Allow CGROUP_SKB eBPF program to
access sk_buff") enabled programs of BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB
type to use ld_abs/ind instructions. However, at this point,
we cannot use them, since offsets relative to SKF_LL_OFF will
end up pointing skb_mac_header(skb) out of bounds since in the
egress path it is not yet set at that point in time, but only
after __dev_queue_xmit() did a general reset on the mac header.
bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper() will then end up reading
data from a wrong offset.

BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB programs can use bpf_skb_load_bytes()
already to access packet data, which is also more flexible than
the insns carried over from cBPF.

Fixes: fb9a307d11 ("bpf: Allow CGROUP_SKB eBPF program to access sk_buff")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

(url: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/771946/)

Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Bug: 30950746
Change-Id: Ia32ac79d8c0d18f811ec101897284a8b60cb042a
2017-06-16 10:27:21 -07:00
Chenbo Feng
b9aad97657 FROMLIST: [net-next,v2,2/2] bpf: Remove the capability check for cgroup skb eBPF
program

Currently loading a cgroup skb eBPF program require a CAP_SYS_ADMIN
capability while attaching the program to a cgroup only requires the
user have CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. We can escape the capability
check when load the program just like socket filter program to make
the capability requirement consistent.

Change since v1:
Change the code style in order to be compliant with checkpatch.pl
preference

(url: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/769460/)
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Bug: 30950746
Change-Id: Ibe51235127d6f9349b8f563ad31effc061b278ed
2017-06-06 00:34:00 +00:00
Chenbo Feng
9e3c655559 FROMLIST: [net-next,v2,1/2] bpf: Allow CGROUP_SKB eBPF program to access
sk_buff

This allows cgroup eBPF program to classify packet based on their
protocol or other detail information. Currently program need
CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege to attach a cgroup eBPF program, and A
process with CAP_NET_ADMIN can already see all packets on the system,
for example, by creating an iptables rules that causes the packet to
be passed to userspace via NFLOG.

(url: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/769459/)

Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Bug: 30950746
Change-Id: I11bef84ce26cf8b8f1b89483c32a7fcdd61ae926
2017-06-06 00:33:51 +00:00
Daniel Mack
a5d371cda6 UPSTREAM: bpf: cgroup: fix documentation of __cgroup_bpf_update()
There's a 'not' missing in one paragraph. Add it.

Fixes: 3007098494 ("cgroup: add support for eBPF programs")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>
Reported-by: Rami Rosen <roszenrami@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Fixes: Change-Id: I3df35d8d3b1261503f9b5bcd90b18c9358f1ac28
       ("cgroup: add support for eBPF programs")
(cherry picked from commit 01ae87eab5)
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
2017-05-30 17:37:48 -07:00
Alexei Starovoitov
1ee2b4b803 BACKPORT: bpf: introduce BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE flag
If BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE flag is used in BPF_PROG_ATTACH command
to the given cgroup the descendent cgroup will be able to override
effective bpf program that was inherited from this cgroup.
By default it's not passed, therefore override is disallowed.

Examples:
1.
prog X attached to /A with default
prog Y fails to attach to /A/B and /A/B/C
Everything under /A runs prog X

2.
prog X attached to /A with allow_override.
prog Y fails to attach to /A/B with default (non-override)
prog M attached to /A/B with allow_override.
Everything under /A/B runs prog M only.

3.
prog X attached to /A with allow_override.
prog Y fails to attach to /A with default.
The user has to detach first to switch the mode.

In the future this behavior may be extended with a chain of
non-overridable programs.

Also fix the bug where detach from cgroup where nothing is attached
was not throwing error. Return ENOENT in such case.

Add several testcases and adjust libbpf.

Fixes: 3007098494 ("cgroup: add support for eBPF programs")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Fixes: Change-Id: I3df35d8d3b1261503f9b5bcd90b18c9358f1ac28
       ("cgroup: add support for eBPF programs")
[AmitP: Refactored original patch for android-4.9 where libbpf sources
        are in samples/bpf/ and test_cgrp2_attach2, test_cgrp2_sock,
        and test_cgrp2_sock2 sample tests do not exist.]
(cherry picked from commit 7f67763337)
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
2017-05-30 17:27:28 -07:00
Willem de Bruijn
2c1289c999 BACKPORT: UPSTREAM: bpf: pass sk to helper functions
Cherrypick from commit 8f917bba00

BPF helper functions access socket fields through skb->sk. This is not
set in ingress cgroup and socket filters. The association is only made
in skb_set_owner_r once the filter has accepted the packet. Sk is
available as socket lookup has taken place.

Temporarily set skb->sk to sk in these cases.

Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Bug: 30950746
Change-Id: Ifcbcbe2ab2882dc79c56f9707be1d6aef08c7fd3
2017-05-22 15:46:28 -07:00
Daniel Mack
00615dfcd2 UPSTREAM: bpf: add BPF_PROG_ATTACH and BPF_PROG_DETACH commands
Cherry-pick from commit f432455148

Extend the bpf(2) syscall by two new commands, BPF_PROG_ATTACH and
BPF_PROG_DETACH which allow attaching and detaching eBPF programs
to a target.

On the API level, the target could be anything that has an fd in
userspace, hence the name of the field in union bpf_attr is called
'target_fd'.

When called with BPF_ATTACH_TYPE_CGROUP_INET_{E,IN}GRESS, the target is
expected to be a valid file descriptor of a cgroup v2 directory which
has the bpf controller enabled. These are the only use-cases
implemented by this patch at this point, but more can be added.

If a program of the given type already exists in the given cgroup,
the program is swapped automically, so userspace does not have to drop
an existing program first before installing a new one, which would
otherwise leave a gap in which no program is attached.

For more information on the propagation logic to subcgroups, please
refer to the bpf cgroup controller implementation.

The API is guarded by CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Bug: 30950746
Change-Id: Iab156859332166835d51e1e6f64e5cb8b81870f2
2017-05-22 15:30:56 -07:00
Daniel Mack
f791c42b63 UPSTREAM: cgroup: add support for eBPF programs
Cherry-pick from commit 3007098494

This patch adds two sets of eBPF program pointers to struct cgroup.
One for such that are directly pinned to a cgroup, and one for such
that are effective for it.

To illustrate the logic behind that, assume the following example
cgroup hierarchy.

  A - B - C
        \ D - E

If only B has a program attached, it will be effective for B, C, D
and E. If D then attaches a program itself, that will be effective for
both D and E, and the program in B will only affect B and C. Only one
program of a given type is effective for a cgroup.

Attaching and detaching programs will be done through the bpf(2)
syscall. For now, ingress and egress inet socket filtering are the
only supported use-cases.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Bug: 30950746
Change-Id: I3df35d8d3b1261503f9b5bcd90b18c9358f1ac28
2017-05-22 15:30:56 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
ced0a31e66 bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
[ Upstream commit 0d0e57697f ]

The patch fixes two things at once:

1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
   the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
   as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
   off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
   this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.

2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
   we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
   first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
   access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
   constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().

Fixes: 1be7f75d16 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd3570086 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-05-14 14:00:21 +02:00
Yonghong Song
7bca0a9702 bpf: enhance verifier to understand stack pointer arithmetic
[ Upstream commit 332270fdc8 ]

llvm 4.0 and above generates the code like below:
....
440: (b7) r1 = 15
441: (05) goto pc+73
515: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r10 -152)
516: (bf) r7 = r10
517: (07) r7 += -112
518: (bf) r2 = r7
519: (0f) r2 += r1
520: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r8 +0)
521: (73) *(u8 *)(r2 +45) = r1
....
and the verifier complains "R2 invalid mem access 'inv'" for insn #521.
This is because verifier marks register r2 as unknown value after #519
where r2 is a stack pointer and r1 holds a constant value.

Teach verifier to recognize "stack_ptr + imm" and
"stack_ptr + reg with const val" as valid stack_ptr with new offset.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-05-14 14:00:20 +02:00
Alexei Starovoitov
0ea3c23577 bpf: improve verifier packet range checks
[ Upstream commit b1977682a3 ]

llvm can optimize the 'if (ptr > data_end)' checks to be in the order
slightly different than the original C code which will confuse verifier.
Like:
if (ptr + 16 > data_end)
  return TC_ACT_SHOT;
// may be followed by
if (ptr + 14 > data_end)
  return TC_ACT_SHOT;
while llvm can see that 'ptr' is valid for all 16 bytes,
the verifier could not.
Fix verifier logic to account for such case and add a test.

Reported-by: Huapeng Zhou <hzhou@fb.com>
Fixes: 969bf05eb3 ("bpf: direct packet access")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-05-03 08:36:35 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
0e0f1d6fdb bpf: fix mark_reg_unknown_value for spilled regs on map value marking
[ Upstream commit 6760bf2ddd ]

Martin reported a verifier issue that hit the BUG_ON() for his
test case in the mark_reg_unknown_value() function:

  [  202.861380] kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:467!
  [...]
  [  203.291109] Call Trace:
  [  203.296501]  [<ffffffff811364d5>] mark_map_reg+0x45/0x50
  [  203.308225]  [<ffffffff81136558>] mark_map_regs+0x78/0x90
  [  203.320140]  [<ffffffff8113938d>] do_check+0x226d/0x2c90
  [  203.331865]  [<ffffffff8113a6ab>] bpf_check+0x48b/0x780
  [  203.343403]  [<ffffffff81134c8e>] bpf_prog_load+0x27e/0x440
  [  203.355705]  [<ffffffff8118a38f>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x11af/0x1230
  [  203.369158]  [<ffffffff812d8188>] ? security_capable+0x48/0x60
  [  203.382035]  [<ffffffff811351a4>] SyS_bpf+0x124/0x960
  [  203.393185]  [<ffffffff810515f6>] ? __do_page_fault+0x276/0x490
  [  203.406258]  [<ffffffff816db320>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94

This issue got uncovered after the fix in a08dd0da53 ("bpf: fix
regression on verifier pruning wrt map lookups"). The reason why it
wasn't noticed before was, because as mentioned in a08dd0da53,
mark_map_regs() was doing the id matching incorrectly based on the
uncached regs[regno].id. So, in the first loop, we walked all regs
and as soon as we found regno == i, then this reg's id was cleared
when calling mark_reg_unknown_value() thus that every subsequent
register was probed against id of 0 (which, in combination with the
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL type is an invalid condition that no other
register state can hold), and therefore wasn't type transitioned such
as in the spilled register case for the second loop.

Now since that got fixed, it turned out that 57a09bf0a4 ("bpf:
Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") used
mark_reg_unknown_value() incorrectly for the spilled regs, and thus
hitting the BUG_ON() in some cases due to regno >= MAX_BPF_REG.

Although spilled regs have the same type as the non-spilled regs
for the verifier state, that is, struct bpf_reg_state, they are
semantically different from the non-spilled regs. In other words,
there can be up to 64 (MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) spilled regs
in the stack, for example, register R<x> could have been spilled by
the program to stack location X, Y, Z, and in mark_map_regs() we
need to scan these stack slots of type STACK_SPILL for potential
registers that we have to transition from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL.
Therefore, depending on the location, the spilled_regs regno can
be a lot higher than just MAX_BPF_REG's value since we operate on
stack instead. The reset in mark_reg_unknown_value() itself is
just fine, only that the BUG_ON() was inappropriate for this. Fix
it by making a __mark_reg_unknown_value() version that can be
called from mark_map_reg() generically; we know for the non-spilled
case that the regno is always < MAX_BPF_REG anyway.

Fixes: 57a09bf0a4 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers")
Reported-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-03-22 12:43:35 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann
1889d6d9b5 bpf: fix regression on verifier pruning wrt map lookups
[ Upstream commit a08dd0da53 ]

Commit 57a09bf0a4 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
registers") introduced a regression where existing programs stopped
loading due to reaching the verifier's maximum complexity limit,
whereas prior to this commit they were loading just fine; the affected
program has roughly 2k instructions.

What was found is that state pruning couldn't be performed effectively
anymore due to mismatches of the verifier's register state, in particular
in the id tracking. It doesn't mean that 57a09bf0a4 is incorrect per
se, but rather that verifier needs to perform a lot more work for the
same program with regards to involved map lookups.

Since commit 57a09bf0a4 is only about tracking registers with type
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, the id is only needed to follow registers
until they are promoted through pattern matching with a NULL check to
either PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or UNKNOWN_VALUE type. After that point, the
id becomes irrelevant for the transitioned types.

For UNKNOWN_VALUE, id is already reset to 0 via mark_reg_unknown_value(),
but not so for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE where id is becoming stale. It's even
transferred further into other types that don't make use of it. Among
others, one example is where UNKNOWN_VALUE is set on function call
return with RET_INTEGER return type.

states_equal() will then fall through the memcmp() on register state;
note that the second memcmp() uses offsetofend(), so the id is part of
that since d2a4dd37f6 ("bpf: fix state equivalence"). But the bisect
pointed already to 57a09bf0a4, where we really reach beyond complexity
limit. What I found was that states_equal() often failed in this
case due to id mismatches in spilled regs with registers in type
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. Unlike non-spilled regs, spilled regs just perform
a memcmp() on their reg state and don't have any other optimizations
in place, therefore also id was relevant in this case for making a
pruning decision.

We can safely reset id to 0 as well when converting to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.
For the affected program, it resulted in a ~17 fold reduction of
complexity and let the program load fine again. Selftest suite also
runs fine. The only other place where env->id_gen is used currently is
through direct packet access, but for these cases id is long living, thus
a different scenario.

Also, the current logic in mark_map_regs() is not fully correct when
marking NULL branch with UNKNOWN_VALUE. We need to cache the destination
reg's id in any case. Otherwise, once we marked that reg as UNKNOWN_VALUE,
it's id is reset and any subsequent registers that hold the original id
and are of type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL won't be marked UNKNOWN_VALUE
anymore, since mark_map_reg() reuses the uncached regs[regno].id that
was just overridden. Note, we don't need to cache it outside of
mark_map_regs(), since it's called once on this_branch and the other
time on other_branch, which are both two independent verifier states.
A test case for this is added here, too.

Fixes: 57a09bf0a4 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-03-22 12:43:35 +01:00
Alexei Starovoitov
b7f5aa1ca0 bpf: fix state equivalence
[ Upstream commit d2a4dd37f6 ]

Commmits 57a09bf0a4 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers")
and 484611357c ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") by themselves
are correct, but in combination they make state equivalence ignore 'id' field
of the register state which can lead to accepting invalid program.

Fixes: 57a09bf0a4 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers")
Fixes: 484611357c ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-03-22 12:43:35 +01:00
Thomas Graf
1411707acb bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers
[ Upstream commit 57a09bf0a4 ]

A BPF program is required to check the return register of a
map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps
track of this by converting the type of the result register from
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional
jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed
for the result register 0.

In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG
instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes
them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the
verifier objects when the register is accessed:

0: (b7) r1 = 10
1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1
2: (bf) r2 = r10
3: (07) r2 += -8
4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000
6: (85) call 1
7: (bf) r4 = r0
8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1
 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp
9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0
R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'

This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by
assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional
jump is observed.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-03-22 12:43:35 +01:00
Josef Bacik
e2d2afe15e bpf: fix states equal logic for varlen access
If we have a branch that looks something like this

int foo = map->value;
if (condition) {
  foo += blah;
} else {
  foo = bar;
}
map->array[foo] = baz;

We will incorrectly assume that the !condition branch is equal to the condition
branch as the register for foo will be UNKNOWN_VALUE in both cases.  We need to
adjust this logic to only do this if we didn't do a varlen access after we
processed the !condition branch, otherwise we have different ranges and need to
check the other branch as well.

Fixes: 484611357c ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-30 14:50:52 -05:00
Josef Bacik
f23cc643f9 bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access
I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in
invalid accesses to bpf map entries.  Fix this up by doing a few things

1) Kill BPF_MOD support.  This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real
life and just adds extra complexity.

2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the
minimum value to 0 for positive AND's.

3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are
by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values
could make them appear valid when they really aren't.

This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical
problems.

Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-16 13:21:45 -05:00
Daniel Borkmann
20b2b24f91 bpf: fix map not being uncharged during map creation failure
In map_create(), we first find and create the map, then once that
suceeded, we charge it to the user's RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, and then fetch
a new anon fd through anon_inode_getfd(). The problem is, once the
latter fails f.e. due to RLIMIT_NOFILE limit, then we only destruct
the map via map->ops->map_free(), but without uncharging the previously
locked memory first. That means that the user_struct allocation is
leaked as well as the accounted RLIMIT_MEMLOCK memory not released.
Make the label names in the fix consistent with bpf_prog_load().

Fixes: aaac3ba95e ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-07 13:22:26 -05:00
Daniel Borkmann
483bed2b0d bpf: fix htab map destruction when extra reserve is in use
Commit a6ed3ea65d ("bpf: restore behavior of bpf_map_update_elem")
added an extra per-cpu reserve to the hash table map to restore old
behaviour from pre prealloc times. When non-prealloc is in use for a
map, then problem is that once a hash table extra element has been
linked into the hash-table, and the hash table is destroyed due to
refcount dropping to zero, then htab_map_free() -> delete_all_elements()
will walk the whole hash table and drop all elements via htab_elem_free().
The problem is that the element from the extra reserve is first fed
to the wrong backend allocator and eventually freed twice.

Fixes: a6ed3ea65d ("bpf: restore behavior of bpf_map_update_elem")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-07 13:20:52 -05:00
Linus Torvalds
101105b171 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
 ">rename2() work from Miklos + current_time() from Deepa"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  fs: Replace current_fs_time() with current_time()
  fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME_SEC with current_time() for inode timestamps
  fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time() for inode timestamps
  fs: proc: Delete inode time initializations in proc_alloc_inode()
  vfs: Add current_time() api
  vfs: add note about i_op->rename changes to porting
  fs: rename "rename2" i_op to "rename"
  vfs: remove unused i_op->rename
  fs: make remaining filesystems use .rename2
  libfs: support RENAME_NOREPLACE in simple_rename()
  fs: support RENAME_NOREPLACE for local filesystems
  ncpfs: fix unused variable warning
2016-10-10 20:16:43 -07:00
Josef Bacik
484611357c bpf: allow access into map value arrays
Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this

struct foo {
	unsigned iter;
	int array[SOME_CONSTANT];
};

You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of
foo->array[] after the fact.  This is because we have no way to verify we won't
go off the end of the array at verification time.  This patch provides a start
for this work.  We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum
value a register could be while we're checking the code.  Then at the time we
try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that
region is a valid access into that memory region.  So in practice, code such as
this

unsigned index = 0;

if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT)
	foo->iter = index;
else
	index = foo->iter++;
foo->array[index] = bar;

would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and
SOME_CONSTANT-1.  If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra
check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %=
SOME_CONSTANT.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-29 01:35:35 -04:00
Shaohua Li
b761fe226b bpf: clean up put_cpu_var usage
put_cpu_var takes the percpu data, not the data returned from
get_cpu_var.

This doesn't change the behavior.

Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-27 22:09:17 -04:00
Deepa Dinamani
078cd8279e fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time() for inode timestamps
CURRENT_TIME macro is not appropriate for filesystems as it
doesn't use the right granularity for filesystem timestamps.
Use current_time() instead.

CURRENT_TIME is also not y2038 safe.

This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions
vfs timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them
y2038 safe. As part of the effort current_time() will be
extended to do range checks. Hence, it is necessary for all
file system timestamps to use current_time(). Also,
current_time() will be transitioned along with vfs to be
y2038 safe.

Note that whenever a single call to current_time() is used
to change timestamps in different inodes, it is because they
share the same time granularity.

Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-27 21:06:21 -04:00
Mickaël Salaün
1955351da4 bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access()
This prevent future potential pointer leaks when an unprivileged eBPF
program will read a pointer value from its context. Even if
is_valid_access() returns a pointer type, the eBPF verifier replace it
with UNKNOWN_VALUE. The register value that contains a kernel address is
then allowed to leak. Moreover, this fix allows unprivileged eBPF
programs to use functions with (legitimate) pointer arguments.

Not an issue currently since reg_type is only set for PTR_TO_PACKET or
PTR_TO_PACKET_END in XDP and TC programs that can only be loaded as
privileged. For now, the only unprivileged eBPF program allowed is for
socket filtering and all the types from its context are UNKNOWN_VALUE.
However, this fix is important for future unprivileged eBPF programs
which could use pointers in their context.

Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-27 03:51:34 -04:00
Jakub Kicinski
6b17387307 bpf: recognize 64bit immediate loads as consts
When running as parser interpret BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW
instructions as loading CONST_IMM with the value stored
in imm.  The verifier will continue not recognizing those
due to concerns about search space/program complexity
increase.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 19:50:02 -04:00
Jakub Kicinski
13a27dfc66 bpf: enable non-core use of the verfier
Advanced JIT compilers and translators may want to use
eBPF verifier as a base for parsers or to perform custom
checks and validations.

Add ability for external users to invoke the verifier
and provide callbacks to be invoked for every intruction
checked.  For now only add most basic callback for
per-instruction pre-interpretation checks is added.  More
advanced users may also like to have per-instruction post
callback and state comparison callback.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 19:50:02 -04:00
Jakub Kicinski
58e2af8b3a bpf: expose internal verfier structures
Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and
prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace
conflicts.  Those structures will soon be used by external
analyzers.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 19:50:02 -04:00
Jakub Kicinski
3df126f35f bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state
Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes
it impossible to run verifier on programs already
marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of
per-instruction state instead.

While touching the error path rename and move existing
jump target.

Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 19:50:02 -04:00
Daniel Borkmann
36bbef52c7 bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs
This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet
write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits
4acf6c0b84 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and
6841de8b0d ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a
complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc
(cls/act) programs.

For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data()
and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and
write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear
skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out,
or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative
to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we
can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually
access them.

At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of
course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an
invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds
a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the
skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic
makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a220 ("net: filter:
constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other
programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use
this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with,
for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated
to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning
to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the
bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the
writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions
and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well
as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when
direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks
on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for
helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites
can benefit from switching to direct read plus write.

For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into
a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities
are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit
this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers
where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for
this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change
underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for
packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates
for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write
instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available
helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(),
csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the
new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/
directory.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-20 23:32:11 -04:00
Daniel Borkmann
b399cf64e3 bpf, verifier: enforce larger zero range for pkt on overloading stack buffs
Current contract for the following two helper argument types is:

  * ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE: passed argument pair must be (ptr, >0).
  * ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO: passed argument pair can be either
    (NULL, 0) or (ptr, >0).

With 6841de8b0d ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), we can
pass also raw packet data to helpers, so depending on the argument type
being PTR_TO_PACKET, we now either assert memory via check_packet_access()
or check_stack_boundary(). As a result, the tests in check_packet_access()
currently allow more than intended with regards to reg->imm.

Back in 969bf05eb3 ("bpf: direct packet access"), check_packet_access()
was fine to ignore size argument since in check_mem_access() size was
bpf_size_to_bytes() derived and prior to the call to check_packet_access()
guaranteed to be larger than zero.

However, for the above two argument types, it currently means, we can have
a <= 0 size and thus breaking current guarantees for helpers. Enforce a
check for size <= 0 and bail out if so.

check_stack_boundary() doesn't have such an issue since it already tests
for access_size <= 0 and bails out, resp. access_size == 0 in case of NULL
pointer passed when allowed.

Fixes: 6841de8b0d ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-20 23:32:11 -04:00
Daniel Borkmann
f3694e0012 bpf: add BPF_CALL_x macros for declaring helpers
This work adds BPF_CALL_<n>() macros and converts all the eBPF helper functions
to use them, in a similar fashion like we do with SYSCALL_DEFINE<n>() macros
that are used today. Motivation for this is to hide all the register handling
and all necessary casts from the user, so that it is done automatically in the
background when adding a BPF_CALL_<n>() call.

This makes current helpers easier to review, eases to write future helpers,
avoids getting the casting mess wrong, and allows for extending all helpers at
once (f.e. build time checks, etc). It also helps detecting more easily in
code reviews that unused registers are not instrumented in the code by accident,
breaking compatibility with existing programs.

BPF_CALL_<n>() internals are quite similar to SYSCALL_DEFINE<n>() ones with some
fundamental differences, for example, for generating the actual helper function
that carries all u64 regs, we need to fill unused regs, so that we always end up
with 5 u64 regs as an argument.

I reviewed several 0-5 generated BPF_CALL_<n>() variants of the .i results and
they look all as expected. No sparse issue spotted. We let this also sit for a
few days with Fengguang's kbuild test robot, and there were no issues seen. On
s390, it barked on the "uses dynamic stack allocation" notice, which is an old
one from bpf_perf_event_output{,_tp}() reappearing here due to the conversion
to the call wrapper, just telling that the perf raw record/frag sits on stack
(gcc with s390's -mwarn-dynamicstack), but that's all. Did various runtime tests
and they were fine as well. All eBPF helpers are now converted to use these
macros, getting rid of a good chunk of all the raw castings.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-09 19:36:04 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
6088b5823b bpf: minor cleanups in helpers
Some minor misc cleanups, f.e. use sizeof(__u32) instead of hardcoding
and in __bpf_skb_max_len(), I missed that we always have skb->dev valid
anyway, so we can drop the unneeded test for dev; also few more other
misc bits addressed here.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-09 19:36:03 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
2d2be8cab2 bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access
LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via
skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the
verifier, example:

  [...]
   7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80)
   8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76)
   9: (bf) r2 = r9
  10: (07) r2 += 54
  11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12
   R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx
   R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp
  12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a
  14: (05) goto pc+430
  [...]

  from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv
                 R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp
  24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1
  25: (b7) r1 = 0
  26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1
  27: (b7) r2 = 40
  28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20)
  invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0)

The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we
currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect
tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and
derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0)
pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range
in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success.

For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX
pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the
appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers().
Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the
only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have
generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=)
that we would need to take into account as well.

After the fix:

  [...]
   7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80)
   8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76)
   9: (bf) r2 = r9
  10: (07) r2 += 54
  11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12
   R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx
   R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp
  12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a
  14: (05) goto pc+430
  [...]

  from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv
                 R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp
  24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1
  25: (b7) r1 = 0
  26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1
  27: (b7) r2 = 40
  28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20)
  29: (bf) r1 = r8
  30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47
   R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56
   R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp
  31: (b7) r1 = 1
  [...]

Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates
the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for
the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0),
pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two
with both test variants (>, >=).

Fixes: 969bf05eb3 ("bpf: direct packet access")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-08 17:28:37 -07:00
Alexei Starovoitov
fdc15d388d bpf: perf_event progs should only use preallocated maps
Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use
preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation
in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got triggered.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-02 10:46:44 -07:00
Alexei Starovoitov
ea2e7ce5d0 bpf: support 8-byte metafield access
The verifier supported only 4-byte metafields in
struct __sk_buff and struct xdp_md. The metafields in upcoming
struct bpf_perf_event are 8-byte to match register width in struct pt_regs.
Teach verifier to recognize 8-byte metafield access.
The patch doesn't affect safety of sockets and xdp programs.
They check for 4-byte only ctx access before these conditions are hit.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-02 10:46:44 -07:00