[ Upstream commit fefb8a2a94 ]
Eliminate anonymous module_init() and module_exit(), which can lead to
confusion or ambiguity when reading System.map, crashes/oops/bugs,
or an initcall_debug log.
Give each of these init and exit functions unique driver-specific
names to eliminate the anonymous names.
Example 1: (System.map)
ffffffff832fc78c t init
ffffffff832fc79e t init
ffffffff832fc8f8 t init
Example 2: (initcall_debug log)
calling init+0x0/0x12 @ 1
initcall init+0x0/0x12 returned 0 after 15 usecs
calling init+0x0/0x60 @ 1
initcall init+0x0/0x60 returned 0 after 2 usecs
calling init+0x0/0x9a @ 1
initcall init+0x0/0x9a returned 0 after 74 usecs
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit@kernel.org>
Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220316192010.19001-3-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0e7174b9d5 ]
A common pattern for device reset is currently:
vdev->config->reset(vdev);
.. cleanup ..
reset prevents new interrupts from arriving and waits for interrupt
handlers to finish.
However if - as is common - the handler queues a work request which is
flushed during the cleanup stage, we have code adding buffers / trying
to get buffers while device is reset. Not good.
This was reproduced by running
modprobe virtio_console
modprobe -r virtio_console
in a loop.
Fix this up by calling virtio_break_device + flush before reset.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1786239
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f5912cc19a ]
Using MKWORD() on a byte-sized variable results in OOB read. Expand the
size of the reserved area so both MKWORD and MKBYTE continue to work
without overflow. Silences this warning on a -Warray-bounds build:
drivers/char/mwave/3780i.h:346:22: error: array subscript 'short unsigned int[0]' is partly outside array bounds of 'DSP_ISA_SLAVE_CONTROL[1]' [-Werror=array-bounds]
346 | #define MKWORD(var) (*((unsigned short *)(&var)))
| ~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/char/mwave/3780i.h:356:40: note: in definition of macro 'OutWordDsp'
356 | #define OutWordDsp(index,value) outw(value,usDspBaseIO+index)
| ^~~~~
drivers/char/mwave/3780i.c:373:41: note: in expansion of macro 'MKWORD'
373 | OutWordDsp(DSP_IsaSlaveControl, MKWORD(rSlaveControl));
| ^~~~~~
drivers/char/mwave/3780i.c:358:31: note: while referencing 'rSlaveControl'
358 | DSP_ISA_SLAVE_CONTROL rSlaveControl;
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211203084206.3104326-1-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 009ba8568b upstream.
_extract_crng() does plain loads of crng->init_time and
crng_global_init_time, which causes undefined behavior if
crng_reseed() and RNDRESEEDCRNG modify these corrently.
Use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() to make the behavior defined.
Don't fix the race on crng->init_time by protecting it with crng->lock,
since it's not a problem for duplicate reseedings to occur. I.e., the
lockless access with READ_ONCE() is fine.
Fixes: d848e5f8e1 ("random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG")
Fixes: e192be9d9a ("random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5d73d1e320 upstream.
extract_crng() and crng_backtrack_protect() load crng_node_pool with a
plain load, which causes undefined behavior if do_numa_crng_init()
modifies it concurrently.
Fix this by using READ_ONCE(). Note: as per the previous discussion
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211219025139.31085-1-ebiggers@kernel.org/T/#u,
READ_ONCE() is believed to be sufficient here, and it was requested that
it be used here instead of smp_load_acquire().
Also change do_numa_crng_init() to set crng_node_pool using
cmpxchg_release() instead of mb() + cmpxchg(), as the former is
sufficient here but is more lightweight.
Fixes: 1e7f583af6 ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly userspace programs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2253042d86 upstream.
When an IPMI watchdog timer is being stopped in ipmi_close() or
ipmi_ioctl(WDIOS_DISABLECARD), the current watchdog action is updated to
WDOG_TIMEOUT_NONE and _ipmi_set_timeout(IPMI_SET_TIMEOUT_NO_HB) is called
to install this action. The latter function ends up invoking
__ipmi_set_timeout() which makes the actual 'Set Watchdog Timer' IPMI
request.
For IPMI 1.0, this operation results in fully stopping the watchdog timer.
For IPMI >= 1.5, function __ipmi_set_timeout() always specifies the "don't
stop" flag in the prepared 'Set Watchdog Timer' IPMI request. This causes
that the watchdog timer has its action correctly updated to 'none' but the
timer continues to run. A problem is that IPMI firmware can then still log
an expiration event when the configured timeout is reached, which is
unexpected because the watchdog timer was requested to be stopped.
The patch fixes this problem by not setting the "don't stop" flag in
__ipmi_set_timeout() when the current action is WDOG_TIMEOUT_NONE which
results in stopping the watchdog timer. This makes the behaviour for
IPMI >= 1.5 consistent with IPMI 1.0. It also matches the logic in
__ipmi_heartbeat() which does not allow to reset the watchdog if the
current action is WDOG_TIMEOUT_NONE as that would start the timer.
Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
Message-Id: <10a41bdc-9c99-089c-8d89-fa98ce5ea080@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c51f8f88d7 upstream.
Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output. An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.
It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack. Oops.
This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key. (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.) Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.
Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.
Commit f227e3ec3b ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution. This patch replaces
it.
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: tytso@mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb@gmail.com>
Fixes: f227e3ec3b ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <lkml@sdf.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
[wt: backported to 4.9 -- various context adjustments; timer API change]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 44b8fb6eaa ]
After registering character device the file operation callbacks can be
called. The open callback registers interrupt handler.
Therefore interrupt handler can execute in parallel with rest of the init
function. To avoid such data race initialize telclk_interrupt variable
and struct alarm_events before registering character device.
Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).
Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik <madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200417153451.1551-1-madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d8d74ea3c0 ]
Synchronize with the results from the CRQs before continuing with
the initialization. This avoids trying to send TPM commands while
the rtce buffer has not been allocated, yet.
This patch fixes an existing race condition that may occurr if the
hypervisor does not quickly respond to the VTPM_GET_RTCE_BUFFER_SIZE
request sent during initialization and therefore the ibmvtpm->rtce_buf
has not been allocated at the time the first TPM command is sent.
Fixes: 132f762947 ("drivers/char/tpm: Add new device driver to support IBM vTPM")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit f227e3ec3b upstream.
This modifies the first 32 bits out of the 128 bits of a random CPU's
net_rand_state on interrupt or CPU activity to complicate remote
observations that could lead to guessing the network RNG's internal
state.
Note that depending on some network devices' interrupt rate moderation
or binding, this re-seeding might happen on every packet or even almost
never.
In addition, with NOHZ some CPUs might not even get timer interrupts,
leaving their local state rarely updated, while they are running
networked processes making use of the random state. For this reason, we
also perform this update in update_process_times() in order to at least
update the state when there is user or system activity, since it's the
only case we care about.
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f30d3ced9f upstream.
After changing the timing between GTT updates and execution on the GPU,
we started seeing sporadic failures on Ironlake. These were narrowed
down to being an insufficiently strong enough barrier/delay after
updating the GTT and scheduling execution on the GPU. By forcing the
uncached read, and adding the missing barrier for the singular
insert_page (relocation paths), the sporadic failures go away.
Fixes: 983d308cb8 ("agp/intel: Serialise after GTT updates")
Fixes: 3497971a71 ("agp/intel: Flush chipset writes after updating a single PTE")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Acked-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.0+
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200410083535.25464-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 69efea712f upstream.
It turns out that RDRAND is pretty slow. Comparing these two
constructions:
for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(ret))
arch_get_random_long(&ret);
and
long buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(long)];
extract_crng((u8 *)buf);
it amortizes out to 352 cycles per long for the top one and 107 cycles
per long for the bottom one, on Coffee Lake Refresh, Intel Core i9-9880H.
And importantly, the top one has the drawback of not benefiting from the
real rng, whereas the bottom one has all the nice benefits of using our
own chacha rng. As get_random_u{32,64} gets used in more places (perhaps
beyond what it was originally intended for when it was introduced as
get_random_{int,long} back in the md5 monstrosity era), it seems like it
might be a good thing to strengthen its posture a tiny bit. Doing this
should only be stronger and not any weaker because that pool is already
initialized with a bunch of rdrand data (when available). This way, we
get the benefits of the hardware rng as well as our own rng.
Another benefit of this is that we no longer hit pitfalls of the recent
stream of AMD bugs in RDRAND. One often used code pattern for various
things is:
do {
val = get_random_u32();
} while (hash_table_contains_key(val));
That recent AMD bug rendered that pattern useless, whereas we're really
very certain that chacha20 output will give pretty distributed numbers,
no matter what.
So, this simplification seems better both from a security perspective
and from a performance perspective.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221201037.30231-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
