Fixed potential format string attacks

Potential format string attacks on error reporting in channels.c
This commit is contained in:
Aris Adamantiadis
2009-06-17 23:42:07 +02:00
committed by Andreas Schneider
parent 3873489688
commit 39c7e3c7dd

View File

@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static void channel_rcv_change_window(SSH_SESSION *session) {
channel = channel_from_msg(session);
if (channel == NULL) {
ssh_log(session, SSH_LOG_FUNCTIONS, ssh_get_error(session));
ssh_log(session, SSH_LOG_FUNCTIONS, "%s", ssh_get_error(session));
}
rc = buffer_get_u32(session->in_buffer, &bytes);
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static void channel_rcv_eof(SSH_SESSION *session) {
channel = channel_from_msg(session);
if (channel == NULL) {
ssh_log(session, SSH_LOG_FUNCTIONS, ssh_get_error(session));
ssh_log(session, SSH_LOG_FUNCTIONS, "%s", ssh_get_error(session));
leave_function();
return;
}
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ static void channel_rcv_close(SSH_SESSION *session) {
channel = channel_from_msg(session);
if (channel == NULL) {
ssh_log(session, SSH_LOG_FUNCTIONS, ssh_get_error(session));
ssh_log(session, SSH_LOG_FUNCTIONS, "%s", ssh_get_error(session));
leave_function();
return;
}
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ static void channel_rcv_request(SSH_SESSION *session) {
channel = channel_from_msg(session);
if (channel == NULL) {
ssh_log(session, SSH_LOG_FUNCTIONS, ssh_get_error(session));
ssh_log(session, SSH_LOG_FUNCTIONS,"%s", ssh_get_error(session));
leave_function();
return;
}