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ima: do not update security.ima if appraisal status is not INTEGRITY_PASS
commit020aae3ee5upstream. Commitb65a9cfc2c("Untangling ima mess, part 2: deal with counters") moved the call of ima_file_check() from may_open() to do_filp_open() at a point where the file descriptor is already opened. This breaks the assumption made by IMA that file descriptors being closed belong to files whose access was granted by ima_file_check(). The consequence is that security.ima and security.evm are updated with good values, regardless of the current appraisal status. For example, if a file does not have security.ima, IMA will create it after opening the file for writing, even if access is denied. Access to the file will be allowed afterwards. Avoid this issue by checking the appraisal status before updating security.ima. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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committed by
Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent
aa15fe4d6a
commit
2cfbb32f6c
@@ -303,6 +303,9 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
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if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)
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return;
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if (iint->ima_file_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
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return;
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rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo);
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if (rc < 0)
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return;
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