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x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs

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commit bb4b3b7762 upstream

If spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled, RSB is filled on context switch
in order to protect from various classes of spectrev2 attacks.

If this mitigation is enabled, say so in sysfs for spectrev2.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438580.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Jiri Kosina
2018-09-25 14:39:28 +02:00
committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent cacd9385b7
commit 44a076100a
1 changed files with 2 additions and 1 deletions
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3
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
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@@ -874,10 +874,11 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
(x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "",
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
spectre_v2_module_string());
return ret;