shinys000114/linux
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/hardkernel/linux.git synced 2026-06-07 03:15:31 +09:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

KVM: SVM: Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests

Browse Source 
commit 0b0be065b7 upstream.

Never intercept #GP for SEV guests as reading SEV guest private memory
will return cyphertext, i.e. emulating on #GP can't work as intended.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Sean Christopherson
2022-01-20 01:07:13 +00:00
committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 3470722fac
commit 5756565608
1 changed files with 8 additions and 3 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

11
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
View File

@@ -303,7 +303,11 @@ int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
return ret;
}
if (svm_gp_erratum_intercept)
/*
* Never intercept #GP for SEV guests, KVM can't
* decrypt guest memory to workaround the erratum.
*/
if (svm_gp_erratum_intercept && !sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
}
}
@@ -1176,9 +1180,10 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
* trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
* We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
* as VMware does.
* as VMware does. Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests as KVM can't
* decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction.
*/
if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
if (enable_vmware_backdoor && !sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);