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usb: gadget: storage: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
commit 9ae24af366 upstream.
num can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c:3177 fsg_lun_make() warn:
potential spectre issue 'fsg_opts->common->luns' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing num before using it to index
fsg_opts->common->luns
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent
17275e092a
commit
87f8db6581
@@ -220,6 +220,8 @@
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#include <linux/usb/gadget.h>
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#include <linux/usb/composite.h>
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#include <linux/nospec.h>
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#include "configfs.h"
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@@ -3260,6 +3262,7 @@ static struct config_group *fsg_lun_make(struct config_group *group,
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fsg_opts = to_fsg_opts(&group->cg_item);
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if (num >= FSG_MAX_LUNS)
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return ERR_PTR(-ERANGE);
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num = array_index_nospec(num, FSG_MAX_LUNS);
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mutex_lock(&fsg_opts->lock);
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if (fsg_opts->refcnt || fsg_opts->common->luns[num]) {
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