BACKPORT: kasan: add ability to detect double-kmem_cache_destroy()

(Backport: adjacent lines changed in kmem_cache_destroy.)

Because mm/slab_common.c is not instrumented with software KASAN modes,
it is not possible to detect use-after-free of the kmem_cache passed
into kmem_cache_destroy().  In particular, because of the s->refcount--
and subsequent early return if non-zero, KASAN would never be able to
see the double-free via kmem_cache_free(kmem_cache, s).  To be able to
detect a double-kmem_cache_destroy(), check accessibility of the
kmem_cache, and in case of failure return early.

While KASAN_HW_TAGS is able to detect such bugs, by checking
accessibility and returning early we fail more gracefully and also avoid
corrupting reused objects (where tags mismatch).

A recent case of a double-kmem_cache_destroy() was detected by KFENCE:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0000000000003f654905c168b09d@google.com, which
was not detectable by software KASAN modes.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211119142219.1519617-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit bed0a9b591)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: I6a3cbe5b92ea806c7c1e447a64c5f36abd679593
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>

mm/slab_common.c

@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ void kmem_cache_destroy(struct kmem_cache *s)
 {
 	int err;
 
-	if (unlikely(!s))
+	if (unlikely(!s) || !kasan_check_byte(s))
 		return;
 
 	cpus_read_lock();