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random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy store
commit 3e88bdff1c upstream.
If there is an architecture-specific random number generator (such as
RDRAND for Intel architectures), use it to initialize /dev/random's
entropy stores. Even in the worst case, if RDRAND is something like
AES(NSA_KEY, counter++), it won't hurt, and it will definitely help
against any other adversaries.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent
be0052b899
commit
d191959fa8
@@ -965,6 +965,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
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*/
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static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
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{
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int i;
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ktime_t now;
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unsigned long flags;
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@@ -974,6 +975,11 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
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now = ktime_get_real();
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mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
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for (i = r->poolinfo->poolwords; i; i--) {
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if (!arch_get_random_long(&flags))
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break;
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mix_pool_bytes(r, &flags, sizeof(flags));
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}
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mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
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}
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