shinys000114/linux
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/hardkernel/linux.git synced 2026-06-07 11:26:02 +09:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability

Browse Source 
commit ea156d192f upstream

Three changes to the content of the sysfs file:

 - If EPT is disabled, L1TF cannot be exploited even across threads on the
   same core, and SMT is irrelevant.

 - If mitigation is completely disabled, and SMT is enabled, print "vulnerable"
   instead of "vulnerable, SMT vulnerable"

 - Reorder the two parts so that the main vulnerability state comes first
   and the detail on SMT is second.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Paolo Bonzini
2018-08-05 16:07:45 +02:00
committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent ce2c755166
commit ee782edd87
1 changed files with 9 additions and 3 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

12
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
View File

@@ -737,9 +737,15 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO)
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: SMT %s, L1D %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled",
l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||
(l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&
cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED))
return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
}
#else
static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)