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libceph: verify authorize reply on connect

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commit 5c056fdc5b upstream.

After sending an authorizer (ceph_x_authorize_a + ceph_x_authorize_b),
the client gets back a ceph_x_authorize_reply, which it is supposed to
verify to ensure the authenticity and protect against replay attacks.
The code for doing this is there (ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(),
ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply() + plumbing), but it is never
invoked by the the messenger.

AFAICT this goes back to 2009, when ceph authentication protocols
support was added to the kernel client in 4e7a5dcd1b ("ceph:
negotiate authentication protocol; implement AUTH_NONE protocol").

The second param of ceph_connection_operations::verify_authorizer_reply
is unused all the way down.  Pass 0 to facilitate backporting, and kill
it in the next commit.

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Ilya Dryomov
2016-12-02 16:35:09 +01:00
committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent d8c34b0cc0
commit fc6cb9c303
1 changed files with 13 additions and 0 deletions
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13
net/ceph/messenger.c
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@@ -2027,6 +2027,19 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con)
dout("process_connect on %p tag %d\n", con, (int)con->in_tag);
if (con->auth_reply_buf) {
/*
* Any connection that defines ->get_authorizer()
* should also define ->verify_authorizer_reply().
* See get_connect_authorizer().
*/
ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply";
return ret;
}
}
switch (con->in_reply.tag) {
case CEPH_MSGR_TAG_FEATURES:
pr_err("%s%lld %s feature set mismatch,"