[ Upstream commit 2af7a834a4 ]
Today, the stacked call to vfio_ccw_sch_io_todo() does three things:
1) Update a solicited IRB with CP information, and release the CP
if the interrupt was the end of a START operation.
2) Copy the IRB data into the io_region, under the protection of
the io_mutex
3) Reset the vfio-ccw FSM state to IDLE to acknowledge that
vfio-ccw can accept more work.
The trouble is that step 3 is (A) invoked for both solicited and
unsolicited interrupts, and (B) sitting after the mutex for step 2.
This second piece becomes a problem if it processes an interrupt
for a CLEAR SUBCHANNEL while another thread initiates a START,
thus allowing the CP and FSM states to get out of sync. That is:
CPU 1 CPU 2
fsm_do_clear()
fsm_irq()
fsm_io_request()
vfio_ccw_sch_io_todo()
fsm_io_helper()
Since the FSM state and CP should be kept in sync, let's make a
note when the CP is released, and rely on that as an indication
that the FSM should also be reset at the end of this routine and
open up the device for more work.
Signed-off-by: Eric Farman <farman@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210511195631.3995081-4-farman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6c02ac4c92 ]
When an I/O request is made, the fsm_io_request() routine
moves the FSM state from IDLE to CP_PROCESSING, and then
fsm_io_helper() moves it to CP_PENDING if the START SUBCHANNEL
received a cc0. Yet, the error case to go from CP_PROCESSING
back to IDLE is done after the FSM call returns.
Let's move this up into the FSM proper, to provide some
better symmetry when unwinding in this case.
Signed-off-by: Eric Farman <farman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20210511195631.3995081-3-farman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8ab78863e9 ]
The function rawsock_create() calls a privileged function sk_alloc(), which requires a ns-aware check to check net->user_ns, i.e., ns_capable(). However, the original code checks the init_user_ns using capable(). So we replace the capable() with ns_capable().
Signed-off-by: Jeimon <jjjinmeng.zhou@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c7299fea67 ]
When an SPI device is unregistered, the spi->controller->cleanup() is
called in the device's release callback. That's wrong for a couple of
reasons:
1. spi_dev_put() can be called before spi_add_device() is called. And
it's spi_add_device() that calls spi_setup(). This will cause clean()
to get called without the spi device ever being setup.
2. There's no guarantee that the controller's driver would be present by
the time the spi device's release function gets called.
3. It also causes "sleeping in atomic context" stack dump[1] when device
link deletion code does a put_device() on the spi device.
Fix these issues by simply moving the cleanup from the device release
callback to the actual spi_unregister_device() function.
[1] - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHp75Vc=FCGcUyS0v6fnxme2YJ+qD+Y-hQDQLa2JhWNON9VmsQ@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210426235638.1285530-1-saravanak@google.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 591a22c14d upstream.
Commit bfb819ea20 ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
tried to make sure that there could not be a confusion between the opener of
a /proc/$pid/attr/ file and the writer. It used struct cred to make sure
the privileges didn't change. However, there were existing cases where a more
privileged thread was passing the opened fd to a differently privileged thread
(during container setup). Instead, use mm_struct to track whether the opener
and writer are still the same process. (This is what several other proc files
already do, though for different reasons.)
Reported-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Fixes: bfb819ea20 ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7a6b1ab747 upstream.
IFF_POINTOPOINT interfaces use NUD_NOARP entries for IPv6. It's possible to
fill up the neighbour table with enough entries that it will overflow for
valid connections after that.
This behaviour is more prevalent after commit 58956317c8 ("neighbor:
Improve garbage collection") is applied, as it prevents removal from
entries that are not NUD_FAILED, unless they are more than 5s old.
Fixes: 58956317c8 (neighbor: Improve garbage collection)
Reported-by: Kasper Dupont <kasperd@gjkwv.06.feb.2021.kasperd.net>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 107866a8eb upstream.
Do this in order to prevent the task from being freed if the thread
returns (which can be triggered by the frontend) before the call to
kthread_stop done as part of the backend tear down. Not taking the
reference will lead to a use-after-free in that scenario. Such
reference was taken before but dropped as part of the rework done in
2ac061ce97.
Reintroduce the reference taking and add a comment this time
explaining why it's needed.
This is XSA-374 / CVE-2021-28691.
Fixes: 2ac061ce97 ('xen/netback: cleanup init and deinit code')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c781471d67 upstream.
Sometimes users forget to turn on nftables extensions from Kconfig that
they need. In such case, the error reporting from userspace is
misleading:
$ sudo nft add rule x y counter
Error: Could not process rule: No such file or directory
add rule x y counter
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Add missing NL_SET_BAD_ATTR() to provide a hint:
$ nft add rule x y counter
Error: Could not process rule: No such file or directory
add rule x y counter
^^^^^^^
Fixes: 83d9dcba06 ("netfilter: nf_tables: extended netlink error reporting for expressions")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 57648e8604 upstream.
Mark bus as suspended during system suspend to block the future
transfers. Implement geni_i2c_resume_noirq() to resume the bus.
Fixes: 37692de5d5 ("i2c: i2c-qcom-geni: Add bus driver for the Qualcomm GENI I2C controller")
Signed-off-by: Roja Rani Yarubandi <rojay@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 89b158635a upstream.
LZ4 final literal copy could be overlapped when doing
in-place decompression, so it's unsafe to just use memcpy()
on an optimized memcpy approach but memmove() instead.
Upstream LZ4 has updated this years ago [1] (and the impact
is non-sensible [2] plus only a few bytes remain), this commit
just synchronizes LZ4 upstream code to the kernel side as well.
It can be observed as EROFS in-place decompression failure
on specific files when X86_FEATURE_ERMS is unsupported,
memcpy() optimization of commit 59daa706fb ("x86, mem:
Optimize memcpy by avoiding memory false dependece") will
be enabled then.
Currently most modern x86-CPUs support ERMS, these CPUs just
use "rep movsb" approach so no problem at all. However, it can
still be verified with forcely disabling ERMS feature...
arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S:
ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp memcpy_orig", "", X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD, \
- "jmp memcpy_erms", X86_FEATURE_ERMS
+ "jmp memcpy_orig", X86_FEATURE_ERMS
We didn't observe any strange on arm64/arm/x86 platform before
since most memcpy() would behave in an increasing address order
("copy upwards" [3]) and it's the correct order of in-place
decompression but it really needs an update to memmove() for sure
considering it's an undefined behavior according to the standard
and some unique optimization already exists in the kernel.
[1] 33cb8518ac
[2] https://github.com/lz4/lz4/pull/717#issuecomment-497818921
[3] https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=12518
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201122030749.2698994-1-hsiangkao@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com>
Cc: Yann Collet <yann.collet.73@gmail.com>
Cc: Miao Xie <miaoxie@huawei.com>
Cc: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Cc: Li Guifu <bluce.liguifu@huawei.com>
Cc: Guo Xuenan <guoxuenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c02027b574 upstream.
Currenly, we disable kvmclock from machine_shutdown() hook and this
only happens for boot CPU. We need to disable it for all CPUs to
guard against memory corruption e.g. on restore from hibernate.
Note, writing '0' to kvmclock MSR doesn't clear memory location, it
just prevents hypervisor from updating the location so for the short
while after write and while CPU is still alive, the clock remains usable
and correct so we don't need to switch to some other clocksource.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210414123544.1060604-4-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8b79feffec upstream.
Various PV features (Async PF, PV EOI, steal time) work through memory
shared with hypervisor and when we restore from hibernation we must
properly teardown all these features to make sure hypervisor doesn't
write to stale locations after we jump to the previously hibernated kernel
(which can try to place anything there). For secondary CPUs the job is
already done by kvm_cpu_down_prepare(), register syscore ops to do
the same for boot CPU.
Krzysztof:
This fixes memory corruption visible after second resume from
hibernation:
BUG: Bad page state in process dbus-daemon pfn:18b01
page:ffffea000062c040 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 compound_mapcount: -30591
flags: 0xfffffc0078141(locked|error|workingset|writeback|head|mappedtodisk|reclaim)
raw: 000fffffc0078141 dead0000000002d0 dead000000000100 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_PREP flag set
bad because of flags: 0x78141(locked|error|workingset|writeback|head|mappedtodisk|reclaim)
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210414123544.1060604-3-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
[krzysztof: Extend the commit message, adjust for v5.10 context]
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit cb853ded1d upstream.
Commit 03fdfb2690 ("KVM: arm64: Don't write junk to sysregs on
reset") flipped the register number to 0 for all the debug registers
in the sysreg table, hereby indicating that these registers live
in a separate shadow structure.
However, the author of this patch failed to realise that all the
accessors are using that particular index instead of the register
encoding, resulting in all the registers hitting index 0. Not quite
a valid implementation of the architecture...
Address the issue by fixing all the accessors to use the CRm field
of the encoding, which contains the debug register index.
Fixes: 03fdfb2690 ("KVM: arm64: Don't write junk to sysregs on reset")
Reported-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0884335a2e upstream.
Drop bits 63:32 on loads/stores to/from DRs and CRs when the vCPU is not
in 64-bit mode. The APM states bits 63:32 are dropped for both DRs and
CRs:
In 64-bit mode, the operand size is fixed at 64 bits without the need
for a REX prefix. In non-64-bit mode, the operand size is fixed at 32
bits and the upper 32 bits of the destination are forced to 0.
Fixes: 7ff76d58a9 ("KVM: SVM: enhance MOV CR intercept handler")
Fixes: cae3797a46 ("KVM: SVM: enhance mov DR intercept handler")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210422022128.3464144-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5e753a817b upstream.
The following test case reproduces an issue of wrongly freeing in-use
blocks on the readonly seed device when fstrim is called on the rw sprout
device. As shown below.
Create a seed device and add a sprout device to it:
$ mkfs.btrfs -fq -dsingle -msingle /dev/loop0
$ btrfstune -S 1 /dev/loop0
$ mount /dev/loop0 /btrfs
$ btrfs dev add -f /dev/loop1 /btrfs
BTRFS info (device loop0): relocating block group 290455552 flags system
BTRFS info (device loop0): relocating block group 1048576 flags system
BTRFS info (device loop0): disk added /dev/loop1
$ umount /btrfs
Mount the sprout device and run fstrim:
$ mount /dev/loop1 /btrfs
$ fstrim /btrfs
$ umount /btrfs
Now try to mount the seed device, and it fails:
$ mount /dev/loop0 /btrfs
mount: /btrfs: wrong fs type, bad option, bad superblock on /dev/loop0, missing codepage or helper program, or other error.
Block 5292032 is missing on the readonly seed device:
$ dmesg -kt | tail
<snip>
BTRFS error (device loop0): bad tree block start, want 5292032 have 0
BTRFS warning (device loop0): couldn't read-tree root
BTRFS error (device loop0): open_ctree failed
>From the dump-tree of the seed device (taken before the fstrim). Block
5292032 belonged to the block group starting at 5242880:
$ btrfs inspect dump-tree -e /dev/loop0 | grep -A1 BLOCK_GROUP
<snip>
item 3 key (5242880 BLOCK_GROUP_ITEM 8388608) itemoff 16169 itemsize 24
block group used 114688 chunk_objectid 256 flags METADATA
<snip>
>From the dump-tree of the sprout device (taken before the fstrim).
fstrim used block-group 5242880 to find the related free space to free:
$ btrfs inspect dump-tree -e /dev/loop1 | grep -A1 BLOCK_GROUP
<snip>
item 1 key (5242880 BLOCK_GROUP_ITEM 8388608) itemoff 16226 itemsize 24
block group used 32768 chunk_objectid 256 flags METADATA
<snip>
BPF kernel tracing the fstrim command finds the missing block 5292032
within the range of the discarded blocks as below:
kprobe:btrfs_discard_extent {
printf("freeing start %llu end %llu num_bytes %llu:\n",
arg1, arg1+arg2, arg2);
}
freeing start 5259264 end 5406720 num_bytes 147456
<snip>
Fix this by avoiding the discard command to the readonly seed device.
Reported-by: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit d84cf06e3d ]
The userfaultfd hugetlb tests cause a resv_huge_pages underflow. This
happens when hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte() is called with !is_continue on
an index for which we already have a page in the cache. When this
happens, we allocate a second page, double consuming the reservation,
and then fail to insert the page into the cache and return -EEXIST.
To fix this, we first check if there is a page in the cache which
already consumed the reservation, and return -EEXIST immediately if so.
There is still a rare condition where we fail to copy the page contents
AND race with a call for hugetlb_no_page() for this index and again we
will underflow resv_huge_pages. That is fixed in a more complicated
patch not targeted for -stable.
Test:
Hacked the code locally such that resv_huge_pages underflows produce a
warning, then:
./tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd hugetlb_shared 10
2 /tmp/kokonut_test/huge/userfaultfd_test && echo test success
./tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd hugetlb 10
2 /tmp/kokonut_test/huge/userfaultfd_test && echo test success
Both tests succeed and produce no warnings. After the test runs number
of free/resv hugepages is correct.
[mike.kravetz@oracle.com: changelog fixes]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210528004649.85298-1-almasrymina@google.com
Fixes: 8fb5debc5f ("userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: add hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Signed-off-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 76a6d5cd74 upstream.
There are a few cases where cloning an inline extent requires copying data
into a page of the destination inode. For these cases we are allocating
the required data and metadata space while holding a leaf locked. This can
result in a deadlock when we are low on available space because allocating
the space may flush delalloc and two deadlock scenarios can happen:
1) When starting writeback for an inode with a very small dirty range that
fits in an inline extent, we deadlock during the writeback when trying
to insert the inline extent, at cow_file_range_inline(), if the extent
is going to be located in the leaf for which we are already holding a
read lock;
2) After successfully starting writeback, for non-inline extent cases,
the async reclaim thread will hang waiting for an ordered extent to
complete if the ordered extent completion needs to modify the leaf
for which the clone task is holding a read lock (for adding or
replacing file extent items). So the cloning task will wait forever
on the async reclaim thread to make progress, which in turn is
waiting for the ordered extent completion which in turn is waiting
to acquire a write lock on the same leaf.
So fix this by making sure we release the path (and therefore the leaf)
every time we need to copy the inline extent's data into a page of the
destination inode, as by that time we do not need to have the leaf locked.
Fixes: 05a5a7621c ("Btrfs: implement full reflink support for inline extents")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dc09ef3562 upstream.
Error injection stress uncovered a problem where we'd leave a dangling
inode ref if we failed during a rename_exchange. This happens because
we insert the inode ref for one side of the rename, and then for the
other side. If this second inode ref insert fails we'll leave the first
one dangling and leave a corrupt file system behind. Fix this by
aborting if we did the insert for the first inode ref.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 011b28acf9 upstream.
This function has the following pattern
while (1) {
ret = whatever();
if (ret)
goto out;
}
ret = 0
out:
return ret;
However several places in this while loop we simply break; when there's
a problem, thus clearing the return value, and in one case we do a
return -EIO, and leak the memory for the path.
Fix this by re-arranging the loop to deal with ret == 1 coming from
btrfs_search_slot, and then simply delete the
ret = 0;
out:
bit so everybody can break if there is an error, which will allow for
proper error handling to occur.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 856bd270dc upstream.
We are unconditionally returning 0 in cleanup_ref_head, despite the fact
that btrfs_del_csums could fail. We need to return the error so the
transaction gets aborted properly, fix this by returning ret from
btrfs_del_csums in cleanup_ref_head.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b86652be7c upstream.
Error injection stress would sometimes fail with checksums on disk that
did not have a corresponding extent. This occurred because the pattern
in btrfs_del_csums was
while (1) {
ret = btrfs_search_slot();
if (ret < 0)
break;
}
ret = 0;
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
If we got an error from btrfs_search_slot we'd clear the error because
we were breaking instead of goto out. Instead of using goto out, simply
handle the cases where we may leave a random value in ret, and get rid
of the
ret = 0;
out:
pattern and simply allow break to have the proper error reporting. With
this fix we properly abort the transaction and do not commit thinking we
successfully deleted the csum.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d61bec08b9 upstream.
While doing error injection testing I saw that sometimes we'd get an
abort that wouldn't stop the current transaction commit from completing.
This abort was coming from finish ordered IO, but at this point in the
transaction commit we should have gotten an error and stopped.
It turns out the abort came from finish ordered io while trying to write
out the free space cache. It occurred to me that any failure inside of
finish_ordered_io isn't actually raised to the person doing the writing,
so we could have any number of failures in this path and think the
ordered extent completed successfully and the inode was fine.
Fix this by marking the ordered extent with BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR, and
marking the mapping of the inode with mapping_set_error, so any callers
that simply call fdatawait will also get the error.
With this we're seeing the IO error on the free space inode when we fail
to do the finish_ordered_io.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 82123a3d1d upstream.
When checking if the probed instruction is the suffix of a prefixed
instruction, we access the instruction at the previous word. If the
probed instruction is the very first word of a module, we can end up
trying to access an invalid page.
Fix this by skipping the check for all instructions at the beginning of
a page. Prefixed instructions cannot cross a 64-byte boundary and as
such, we don't expect to encounter a suffix as the very first word in a
page for kernel text. Even if there are prefixed instructions crossing
a page boundary (from a module, for instance), the instruction will be
illegal, so preventing probing on the suffix of such prefix instructions
isn't worthwhile.
Fixes: b4657f7650 ("powerpc/kprobes: Don't allow breakpoints on suffixes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.8+
Reported-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0df9a032a05576a2fa8e97d1b769af2ff0eafbd6.1621416666.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7d65f9e806 upstream.
PIC interrupts do not support affinity setting and they can end up on
any online CPU. Therefore, it's required to mark the associated vectors
as system-wide reserved. Otherwise, the corresponding irq descriptors
are copied to the secondary CPUs but the vectors are not marked as
assigned or reserved. This works correctly for the IO/APIC case.
When the IO/APIC is disabled via config, kernel command line or lack of
enumeration then all legacy interrupts are routed through the PIC, but
nothing marks them as system-wide reserved vectors.
As a consequence, a subsequent allocation on a secondary CPU can result in
allocating one of these vectors, which triggers the BUG() in
apic_update_vector() because the interrupt descriptor slot is not empty.
Imran tried to work around that by marking those interrupts as allocated
when a CPU comes online. But that's wrong in case that the IO/APIC is
available and one of the legacy interrupts, e.g. IRQ0, has been switched to
PIC mode because then marking them as allocated will fail as they are
already marked as system vectors.
Stay consistent and update the legacy vectors after attempting IO/APIC
initialization and mark them as system vectors in case that no IO/APIC is
available.
Fixes: 69cde0004a ("x86/vector: Use matrix allocator for vector assignment")
Reported-by: Imran Khan <imran.f.khan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210519233928.2157496-1-imran.f.khan@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 009767dbf4 upstream.
The first two bits of the CPUID leaf 0x8000001F EAX indicate whether SEV
or SME is supported, respectively. It's better to check whether SEV or
SME is actually supported before accessing the MSR_AMD64_SEV to check
whether SEV or SME is enabled.
This is both a bare-metal issue and a guest/VM issue. Since the first
generation Hygon Dhyana CPU doesn't support the MSR_AMD64_SEV, reading that
MSR results in a #GP - either directly from hardware in the bare-metal
case or via the hypervisor (because the RDMSR is actually intercepted)
in the guest/VM case, resulting in a failed boot. And since this is very
early in the boot phase, rdmsrl_safe()/native_read_msr_safe() can't be
used.
So check the CPUID bits first, before accessing the MSR.
[ tlendacky: Expand and improve commit message. ]
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Fixes: eab696d8e8 ("x86/sev: Do not require Hypervisor CPUID bit for SEV guests")
Signed-off-by: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.10+
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210602070207.2480-1-puwen@hygon.cn
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9bfecd0583 upstream.
While digesting the XSAVE-related horrors which got introduced with
the supervisor/user split, the recent addition of ENQCMD-related
functionality got on the radar and turned out to be similarly broken.
update_pasid(), which is only required when X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD is
available, is invoked from two places:
1) From switch_to() for the incoming task
2) Via a SMP function call from the IOMMU/SMV code
#1 is half-ways correct as it hacks around the brokenness of get_xsave_addr()
by enforcing the state to be 'present', but all the conditionals in that
code are completely pointless for that.
Also the invocation is just useless overhead because at that point
it's guaranteed that TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD is set on the incoming task
and all of this can be handled at return to user space.
#2 is broken beyond repair. The comment in the code claims that it is safe
to invoke this in an IPI, but that's just wishful thinking.
FPU state of a running task is protected by fregs_lock() which is
nothing else than a local_bh_disable(). As BH-disabled regions run
usually with interrupts enabled the IPI can hit a code section which
modifies FPU state and there is absolutely no guarantee that any of the
assumptions which are made for the IPI case is true.
Also the IPI is sent to all CPUs in mm_cpumask(mm), but the IPI is
invoked with a NULL pointer argument, so it can hit a completely
unrelated task and unconditionally force an update for nothing.
Worse, it can hit a kernel thread which operates on a user space
address space and set a random PASID for it.
The offending commit does not cleanly revert, but it's sufficient to
force disable X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD and to remove the broken update_pasid()
code to make this dysfunctional all over the place. Anything more
complex would require more surgery and none of the related functions
outside of the x86 core code are blatantly wrong, so removing those
would be overkill.
As nothing enables the PASID bit in the IA32_XSS MSR yet, which is
required to make this actually work, this cannot result in a regression
except for related out of tree train-wrecks, but they are broken already
today.
Fixes: 20f0afd1fb ("x86/mmu: Allocate/free a PASID")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87mtsd6gr9.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bac9c6fa1f upstream.
Recently we found that there is a lot MemFree left in /proc/meminfo
after do a lot of pages soft offline, it's not quite correct.
Before Oscar's rework of soft offline for free pages [1], if we soft
offline free pages, these pages are left in buddy with HWPoison flag,
and NR_FREE_PAGES is not updated immediately. So the difference between
NR_FREE_PAGES and real number of available free pages is also even big
at the beginning.
However, with the workload running, when we catch HWPoison page in any
alloc functions subsequently, we will remove it from buddy, meanwhile
update the NR_FREE_PAGES and try again, so the NR_FREE_PAGES will get
more and more closer to the real number of available free pages.
(regardless of unpoison_memory())
Now, for offline free pages, after a successful call
take_page_off_buddy(), the page is no longer belong to buddy allocator,
and will not be used any more, but we missed accounting NR_FREE_PAGES in
this situation, and there is no chance to be updated later.
Do update in take_page_off_buddy() like rmqueue() does, but avoid double
counting if some one already set_migratetype_isolate() on the page.
[1]: commit 06be6ff3d2 ("mm,hwpoison: rework soft offline for free pages")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075247.11130-1-dinghui@sangfor.com.cn
Fixes: 06be6ff3d2 ("mm,hwpoison: rework soft offline for free pages")
Signed-off-by: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>
Suggested-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 04f7ce3f07 upstream.
In pmd/pud_advanced_tests(), the vaddr is aligned up to the next pmd/pud
entry, and so it does not match the given pmdp/pudp and (aligned down)
pfn any more.
For s390, this results in memory corruption, because the IDTE
instruction used e.g. in xxx_get_and_clear() will take the vaddr for
some calculations, in combination with the given pmdp. It will then end
up with a wrong table origin, ending on ...ff8, and some of those
wrongly set low-order bits will also select a wrong pagetable level for
the index addition. IDTE could therefore invalidate (or 0x20) something
outside of the page tables, depending on the wrongly picked index, which
in turn depends on the random vaddr.
As result, we sometimes see "BUG task_struct (Not tainted): Padding
overwritten" on s390, where one 0x5a padding value got overwritten with
0x7a.
Fix this by aligning down, similar to how the pmd/pud_aligned pfns are
calculated.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210525130043.186290-2-gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: a5c3b9ffb0 ("mm/debug_vm_pgtable: add tests validating advanced arch page table helpers")
Signed-off-by: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.9+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0711f0d705 upstream.
During boot, kernel_init_freeable() initializes `cad_pid` to the init
task's struct pid. Later on, we may change `cad_pid` via a sysctl, and
when this happens proc_do_cad_pid() will increment the refcount on the
new pid via get_pid(), and will decrement the refcount on the old pid
via put_pid(). As we never called get_pid() when we initialized
`cad_pid`, we decrement a reference we never incremented, can therefore
free the init task's struct pid early. As there can be dangling
references to the struct pid, we can later encounter a use-after-free
(e.g. when delivering signals).
This was spotted when fuzzing v5.13-rc3 with Syzkaller, but seems to
have been around since the conversion of `cad_pid` to struct pid in
commit 9ec52099e4 ("[PATCH] replace cad_pid by a struct pid") from the
pre-KASAN stone age of v2.6.19.
Fix this by getting a reference to the init task's struct pid when we
assign it to `cad_pid`.
Full KASAN splat below.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509
Read of size 4 at addr ffff23794dda0004 by task syz-executor.0/273
CPU: 1 PID: 273 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.12.0-00001-g9aef892b2d15 #1
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline]
task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509
do_notify_parent+0x308/0xe60 kernel/signal.c:1950
exit_notify kernel/exit.c:682 [inline]
do_exit+0x2334/0x2bd0 kernel/exit.c:845
do_group_exit+0x108/0x2c8 kernel/exit.c:922
get_signal+0x4e4/0x2a88 kernel/signal.c:2781
do_signal arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:882 [inline]
do_notify_resume+0x300/0x970 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:936
work_pending+0xc/0x2dc
Allocated by task 0:
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x50/0x5c0 mm/slab.h:516
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2907 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2915 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f4/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:2920
alloc_pid+0xdc/0xc00 kernel/pid.c:180
copy_process+0x2794/0x5e18 kernel/fork.c:2129
kernel_clone+0x194/0x13c8 kernel/fork.c:2500
kernel_thread+0xd4/0x110 kernel/fork.c:2552
rest_init+0x44/0x4a0 init/main.c:687
arch_call_rest_init+0x1c/0x28
start_kernel+0x520/0x554 init/main.c:1064
0x0
Freed by task 270:
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1562 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x98/0x260 mm/slub.c:1600
slab_free mm/slub.c:3161 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x224/0x8e0 mm/slub.c:3177
put_pid.part.4+0xe0/0x1a8 kernel/pid.c:114
put_pid+0x30/0x48 kernel/pid.c:109
proc_do_cad_pid+0x190/0x1b0 kernel/sysctl.c:1401
proc_sys_call_handler+0x338/0x4b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:591
proc_sys_write+0x34/0x48 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:617
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1977 [inline]
new_sync_write+0x3ac/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518
vfs_write fs/read_write.c:605 [inline]
vfs_write+0x9c4/0x1018 fs/read_write.c:585
ksys_write+0x124/0x240 fs/read_write.c:658
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:670 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:667 [inline]
__arm64_sys_write+0x78/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:667
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 [inline]
el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x16c/0x388 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129
do_el0_svc+0xf8/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:168
el0_svc+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:416
el0_sync_handler+0x134/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:432
el0_sync+0x154/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:701
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff23794dda0000
which belongs to the cache pid of size 224
The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of
224-byte region [ffff23794dda0000, ffff23794dda00e0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x4dda0
head:(____ptrval____) order:1 compound_mapcount:0
flags: 0x3fffc0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 03fffc0000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff23794d40d080
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff23794dd9ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff23794dd9ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff23794dda0000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff23794dda0080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
ffff23794dda0100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210524172230.38715-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Fixes: 9ec52099e4 ("[PATCH] replace cad_pid by a struct pid")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In branches to which 24d209dba5 ("usb: dwc2: Fix hibernation between
host and device modes.") has been back-ported, the bus_suspended member
of struct dwc2_hsotg is only present in builds that support host-mode.
To avoid having to pull in several more non-Fix commits in order to
get it to compile, wrap the usage of the member in a macro conditional.
Fixes: 24d209dba5 ("usb: dwc2: Fix hibernation between host and device modes.")
Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell <phil@raspberrypi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b45f189a19 upstream.
When running generic/527 with fast_commit configuration, the following
issue is seen on Power. With fast_commit, during ext4_fc_replay()
(which can be called from ext4_fill_super()), if inode eviction
happens then it can access an uninitialized percpu counter variable.
This patch adds the check before accessing the counters in
ext4_free_inode() path.
[ 321.165371] run fstests generic/527 at 2021-04-29 08:38:43
[ 323.027786] EXT4-fs (dm-0): mounted filesystem with ordered data mode. Opts: block_validity. Quota mode: none.
[ 323.618772] BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0x1fbd80000
[ 323.619767] Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000bae78c
cpu 0x1: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c000000010706ef0]
pc: c000000000bae78c: percpu_counter_add_batch+0x3c/0x100
lr: c0000000006d0bb0: ext4_free_inode+0x780/0xb90
pid = 5593, comm = mount
ext4_free_inode+0x780/0xb90
ext4_evict_inode+0xa8c/0xc60
evict+0xfc/0x1e0
ext4_fc_replay+0xc50/0x20f0
do_one_pass+0xfe0/0x1350
jbd2_journal_recover+0x184/0x2e0
jbd2_journal_load+0x1c0/0x4a0
ext4_fill_super+0x2458/0x4200
mount_bdev+0x1dc/0x290
ext4_mount+0x28/0x40
legacy_get_tree+0x4c/0xa0
vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x120
path_mount+0xcf8/0xd70
do_mount+0x80/0xd0
sys_mount+0x3fc/0x490
system_call_exception+0x384/0x3d0
system_call_common+0xec/0x278
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 8016e29f43 ("ext4: fast commit recovery path")
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshad Shirwadkar <harshadshirwadkar@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6cceb9a75c54bef8fa9696c1b08c8df5ff6169e2.1619692410.git.riteshh@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
