[ Upstream commit 5158814cbb ]
The command word is defined as following:
/* Command */
#define SPI_CMD_COMMAND_SHIFT 0
#define SPI_CMD_DEVICE_ID_SHIFT 4
#define SPI_CMD_PREPEND_BYTE_CNT_SHIFT 8
#define SPI_CMD_ONE_BYTE_SHIFT 11
#define SPI_CMD_ONE_WIRE_SHIFT 12
If the prepend byte count field starts at bit 8, and the next defined
bit is SPI_CMD_ONE_BYTE at bit 11, it can be at most 3 bits wide, and
thus the max value is 7, not 15.
Fixes: b17de07606 ("spi/bcm63xx: work around inability to keep CS up")
Signed-off-by: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230629071453.62024-1-jonas.gorski@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 004d25060c ]
In a setup where a Thunderbolt hub connects to Ethernet and a display
through USB Type-C, users may experience a hung task timeout when they
remove the cable between the PC and the Thunderbolt hub.
This is because the igb_down function is called multiple times when
the Thunderbolt hub is unplugged. For example, the igb_io_error_detected
triggers the first call, and the igb_remove triggers the second call.
The second call to igb_down will block at napi_synchronize.
Here's the call trace:
__schedule+0x3b0/0xddb
? __mod_timer+0x164/0x5d3
schedule+0x44/0xa8
schedule_timeout+0xb2/0x2a4
? run_local_timers+0x4e/0x4e
msleep+0x31/0x38
igb_down+0x12c/0x22a [igb 6615058754948bfde0bf01429257eb59f13030d4]
__igb_close+0x6f/0x9c [igb 6615058754948bfde0bf01429257eb59f13030d4]
igb_close+0x23/0x2b [igb 6615058754948bfde0bf01429257eb59f13030d4]
__dev_close_many+0x95/0xec
dev_close_many+0x6e/0x103
unregister_netdevice_many+0x105/0x5b1
unregister_netdevice_queue+0xc2/0x10d
unregister_netdev+0x1c/0x23
igb_remove+0xa7/0x11c [igb 6615058754948bfde0bf01429257eb59f13030d4]
pci_device_remove+0x3f/0x9c
device_release_driver_internal+0xfe/0x1b4
pci_stop_bus_device+0x5b/0x7f
pci_stop_bus_device+0x30/0x7f
pci_stop_bus_device+0x30/0x7f
pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0x12/0x19
pciehp_unconfigure_device+0x76/0xe9
pciehp_disable_slot+0x6e/0x131
pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change+0x7a/0x3f7
pciehp_ist+0xbe/0x194
irq_thread_fn+0x22/0x4d
? irq_thread+0x1fd/0x1fd
irq_thread+0x17b/0x1fd
? irq_forced_thread_fn+0x5f/0x5f
kthread+0x142/0x153
? __irq_get_irqchip_state+0x46/0x46
? kthread_associate_blkcg+0x71/0x71
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
In this case, igb_io_error_detected detaches the network interface
and requests a PCIE slot reset, however, the PCIE reset callback is
not being invoked and thus the Ethernet connection breaks down.
As the PCIE error in this case is a non-fatal one, requesting a
slot reset can be avoided.
This patch fixes the task hung issue and preserves Ethernet
connection by ignoring non-fatal PCIE errors.
Signed-off-by: Ying Hsu <yinghsu@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy <himasekharx.reddy.pucha@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230620174732.4145155-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1a528ab1da ]
Roee reported various hard-to-debug crashes with pings in
EHT aggregation scenarios. Enabling KASAN showed that we
access the BAID allocation out of bounds, and looking at
the code a bit shows that since the reorder buffer entry
(struct iwl_mvm_reorder_buf_entry) is 128 bytes if debug
such as lockdep is enabled, then staring from an agg size
512 we overflow the size calculation, and allocate a much
smaller structure than we should, causing slab corruption
once we initialize this.
Fix this by simply using u32 instead of u16.
Reported-by: Roee Goldfiner <roee.h.goldfiner@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gregory Greenman <gregory.greenman@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230620125813.f428c856030d.I2c2bb808e945adb71bc15f5b2bac2d8957ea90eb@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 71e7552c90 ]
-Wstringop-overflow is legitimately warning us about extra_size
pontentially being zero at some point, hence potenially ending
up _allocating_ zero bytes of memory for extra pointer and then
trying to access such object in a call to copy_from_user().
Fix this by adding a sanity check to ensure we never end up
trying to allocate zero bytes of data for extra pointer, before
continue executing the rest of the code in the function.
Address the following -Wstringop-overflow warning seen when built
m68k architecture with allyesconfig configuration:
from net/wireless/wext-core.c:11:
In function '_copy_from_user',
inlined from 'copy_from_user' at include/linux/uaccess.h:183:7,
inlined from 'ioctl_standard_iw_point' at net/wireless/wext-core.c:825:7:
arch/m68k/include/asm/string.h:48:25: warning: '__builtin_memset' writing 1 or more bytes into a region of size 0 overflows the destination [-Wstringop-overflow=]
48 | #define memset(d, c, n) __builtin_memset(d, c, n)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/uaccess.h:153:17: note: in expansion of macro 'memset'
153 | memset(to + (n - res), 0, res);
| ^~~~~~
In function 'kmalloc',
inlined from 'kzalloc' at include/linux/slab.h:694:9,
inlined from 'ioctl_standard_iw_point' at net/wireless/wext-core.c:819:10:
include/linux/slab.h:577:16: note: at offset 1 into destination object of size 0 allocated by '__kmalloc'
577 | return __kmalloc(size, flags);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This help with the ongoing efforts to globally enable
-Wstringop-overflow.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/315
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZItSlzvIpjdjNfd8@work
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ee9fd0ac30 ]
KCSAN reported a data-race when accessing node->ref.
Although node->ref does not have to be accurate,
take this chance to use a more common READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE()
pattern instead of data_race().
There is an existing bpf_lru_node_is_ref() and bpf_lru_node_set_ref().
This patch also adds bpf_lru_node_clear_ref() to do the
WRITE_ONCE(node->ref, 0) also.
==================================================================
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __bpf_lru_list_rotate / __htab_lru_percpu_map_update_elem
write to 0xffff888137038deb of 1 bytes by task 11240 on cpu 1:
__bpf_lru_node_move kernel/bpf/bpf_lru_list.c:113 [inline]
__bpf_lru_list_rotate_active kernel/bpf/bpf_lru_list.c:149 [inline]
__bpf_lru_list_rotate+0x1bf/0x750 kernel/bpf/bpf_lru_list.c:240
bpf_lru_list_pop_free_to_local kernel/bpf/bpf_lru_list.c:329 [inline]
bpf_common_lru_pop_free kernel/bpf/bpf_lru_list.c:447 [inline]
bpf_lru_pop_free+0x638/0xe20 kernel/bpf/bpf_lru_list.c:499
prealloc_lru_pop kernel/bpf/hashtab.c:290 [inline]
__htab_lru_percpu_map_update_elem+0xe7/0x820 kernel/bpf/hashtab.c:1316
bpf_percpu_hash_update+0x5e/0x90 kernel/bpf/hashtab.c:2313
bpf_map_update_value+0x2a9/0x370 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:200
generic_map_update_batch+0x3ae/0x4f0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1687
bpf_map_do_batch+0x2d9/0x3d0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4534
__sys_bpf+0x338/0x810
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5096 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5094 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x43/0x50 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5094
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
read to 0xffff888137038deb of 1 bytes by task 11241 on cpu 0:
bpf_lru_node_set_ref kernel/bpf/bpf_lru_list.h:70 [inline]
__htab_lru_percpu_map_update_elem+0x2f1/0x820 kernel/bpf/hashtab.c:1332
bpf_percpu_hash_update+0x5e/0x90 kernel/bpf/hashtab.c:2313
bpf_map_update_value+0x2a9/0x370 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:200
generic_map_update_batch+0x3ae/0x4f0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1687
bpf_map_do_batch+0x2d9/0x3d0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4534
__sys_bpf+0x338/0x810
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5096 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5094 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x43/0x50 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5094
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
value changed: 0x01 -> 0x00
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 11241 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-syzkaller-00136-g6a66fdd29ea1 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/30/2023
==================================================================
Reported-by: syzbot+ebe648a84e8784763f82@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230511043748.1384166-1-martin.lau@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0dd37d6dd3 ]
We've run into the case that the balancer tries to balance a migration
disabled task and trigger the warning in set_task_cpu() like below:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 0 at kernel/sched/core.c:3115 set_task_cpu+0x188/0x240
Modules linked in: hclgevf xt_CHECKSUM ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 <...snip>
CPU: 7 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G O 6.1.0-rc4+ #1
Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDC, BIOS 2280-V2 CS V5.B221.01 12/09/2021
pstate: 604000c9 (nZCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : set_task_cpu+0x188/0x240
lr : load_balance+0x5d0/0xc60
sp : ffff80000803bc70
x29: ffff80000803bc70 x28: ffff004089e190e8 x27: ffff004089e19040
x26: ffff007effcabc38 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000001
x23: ffff80000803be84 x22: 000000000000000c x21: ffffb093e79e2a78
x20: 000000000000000c x19: ffff004089e19040 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000001fad x16: 0000000000000030 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000003 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000400 x9 : ffffb093e4cee530
x8 : 00000000fffffffe x7 : 0000000000ce168a x6 : 000000000000013e
x5 : 00000000ffffffe1 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000b2a
x2 : 0000000000000b2a x1 : ffffb093e6d6c510 x0 : 0000000000000001
Call trace:
set_task_cpu+0x188/0x240
load_balance+0x5d0/0xc60
rebalance_domains+0x26c/0x380
_nohz_idle_balance.isra.0+0x1e0/0x370
run_rebalance_domains+0x6c/0x80
__do_softirq+0x128/0x3d8
____do_softirq+0x18/0x24
call_on_irq_stack+0x2c/0x38
do_softirq_own_stack+0x24/0x3c
__irq_exit_rcu+0xcc/0xf4
irq_exit_rcu+0x18/0x24
el1_interrupt+0x4c/0xe4
el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x2c
el1h_64_irq+0x74/0x78
arch_cpu_idle+0x18/0x4c
default_idle_call+0x58/0x194
do_idle+0x244/0x2b0
cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x3c
secondary_start_kernel+0x14c/0x190
__secondary_switched+0xb0/0xb4
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Further investigation shows that the warning is superfluous, the migration
disabled task is just going to be migrated to its current running CPU.
This is because that on load balance if the dst_cpu is not allowed by the
task, we'll re-select a new_dst_cpu as a candidate. If no task can be
balanced to dst_cpu we'll try to balance the task to the new_dst_cpu
instead. In this case when the migration disabled task is not on CPU it
only allows to run on its current CPU, load balance will select its
current CPU as new_dst_cpu and later triggers the warning above.
The new_dst_cpu is chosen from the env->dst_grpmask. Currently it
contains CPUs in sched_group_span() and if we have overlapped groups it's
possible to run into this case. This patch makes env->dst_grpmask of
group_balance_mask() which exclude any CPUs from the busiest group and
solve the issue. For balancing in a domain with no overlapped groups
the behaviour keeps same as before.
Suggested-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230530082507.10444-1-yangyicong@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ab9b400809 ]
Both create_mapping_noalloc() and update_mapping_prot() sanity-check
their 'virt' parameter, but the check itself doesn't make much sense.
The condition used today appears to be a historical accident.
The sanity-check condition:
if ((virt >= PAGE_END) && (virt < VMALLOC_START)) {
[ ... warning here ... ]
return;
}
... can only be true for the KASAN shadow region or the module region,
and there's no reason to exclude these specifically for creating and
updateing mappings.
When arm64 support was first upstreamed in commit:
c1cc155261 ("arm64: MMU initialisation")
... the condition was:
if (virt < VMALLOC_START) {
[ ... warning here ... ]
return;
}
At the time, VMALLOC_START was the lowest kernel address, and this was
checking whether 'virt' would be translated via TTBR1.
Subsequently in commit:
14c127c957 ("arm64: mm: Flip kernel VA space")
... the condition was changed to:
if ((virt >= VA_START) && (virt < VMALLOC_START)) {
[ ... warning here ... ]
return;
}
This appear to have been a thinko. The commit moved the linear map to
the bottom of the kernel address space, with VMALLOC_START being at the
halfway point. The old condition would warn for changes to the linear
map below this, and at the time VA_START was the end of the linear map.
Subsequently we cleaned up the naming of VA_START in commit:
77ad4ce693 ("arm64: memory: rename VA_START to PAGE_END")
... keeping the erroneous condition as:
if ((virt >= PAGE_END) && (virt < VMALLOC_START)) {
[ ... warning here ... ]
return;
}
Correct the condition to check against the start of the TTBR1 address
space, which is currently PAGE_OFFSET. This simplifies the logic, and
more clearly matches the "outside kernel range" message in the warning.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230615102628.1052103-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8ce8849dd1 ]
posix_timer_add() tries to allocate a posix timer ID by starting from the
cached ID which was stored by the last successful allocation.
This is done in a loop searching the ID space for a free slot one by
one. The loop has to terminate when the search wrapped around to the
starting point.
But that's racy vs. establishing the starting point. That is read out
lockless, which leads to the following problem:
CPU0 CPU1
posix_timer_add()
start = sig->posix_timer_id;
lock(hash_lock);
... posix_timer_add()
if (++sig->posix_timer_id < 0)
start = sig->posix_timer_id;
sig->posix_timer_id = 0;
So CPU1 can observe a negative start value, i.e. -1, and the loop break
never happens because the condition can never be true:
if (sig->posix_timer_id == start)
break;
While this is unlikely to ever turn into an endless loop as the ID space is
huge (INT_MAX), the racy read of the start value caught the attention of
KCSAN and Dmitry unearthed that incorrectness.
Rewrite it so that all id operations are under the hash lock.
Reported-by: syzbot+5c54bd3eb218bb595aa9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87bkhzdn6g.ffs@tglx
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 010444623e ]
Currently, there is no limit for raid1/raid10 plugged bio. While flushing
writes, raid1 has cond_resched() while raid10 doesn't, and too many
writes can cause soft lockup.
Follow up soft lockup can be triggered easily with writeback test for
raid10 with ramdisks:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#10 stuck for 27s! [md0_raid10:1293]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
call_rcu+0x16/0x20
put_object+0x41/0x80
__delete_object+0x50/0x90
delete_object_full+0x2b/0x40
kmemleak_free+0x46/0xa0
slab_free_freelist_hook.constprop.0+0xed/0x1a0
kmem_cache_free+0xfd/0x300
mempool_free_slab+0x1f/0x30
mempool_free+0x3a/0x100
bio_free+0x59/0x80
bio_put+0xcf/0x2c0
free_r10bio+0xbf/0xf0
raid_end_bio_io+0x78/0xb0
one_write_done+0x8a/0xa0
raid10_end_write_request+0x1b4/0x430
bio_endio+0x175/0x320
brd_submit_bio+0x3b9/0x9b7 [brd]
__submit_bio+0x69/0xe0
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x1e6/0x5a0
submit_bio_noacct+0x38c/0x7e0
flush_pending_writes+0xf0/0x240
raid10d+0xac/0x1ed0
Fix the problem by adding cond_resched() to raid10 like what raid1 did.
Note that unlimited plugged bio still need to be optimized, for example,
in the case of lots of dirty pages writeback, this will take lots of
memory and io will spend a long time in plug, hence io latency is bad.
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230529131106.2123367-2-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 6909cf5c41 upstream.
When run on a file system where the inline_data feature has been
enabled, xfstests generic/269, generic/270, and generic/476 cause ext4
to emit error messages indicating that inline directory entries are
corrupted. This occurs because the inline offset used to locate
inline directory entries in the inode body is not updated when an
xattr in that shared region is deleted and the region is shifted in
memory to recover the space it occupied. If the deleted xattr precedes
the system.data attribute, which points to the inline directory entries,
that attribute will be moved further up in the region. The inline
offset continues to point to whatever is located in system.data's former
location, with unfortunate effects when used to access directory entries
or (presumably) inline data in the inode body.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Whitney <enwlinux@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230522181520.1570360-1-enwlinux@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2329cc7a10 upstream.
When a new mode is set to modeset->mode, the previous mode should be freed.
This fixes the following kmemleak report:
drm_mode_duplicate+0x45/0x220 [drm]
drm_client_modeset_probe+0x944/0xf50 [drm]
__drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0xb4/0x2c0 [drm_kms_helper]
drm_fbdev_client_hotplug+0x2bc/0x4d0 [drm_kms_helper]
drm_client_register+0x169/0x240 [drm]
ast_pci_probe+0x142/0x190 [ast]
local_pci_probe+0xdc/0x180
work_for_cpu_fn+0x4e/0xa0
process_one_work+0x8b7/0x1540
worker_thread+0x70a/0xed0
kthread+0x29f/0x340
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Zhang Yi <yizhan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jocelyn Falempe <jfalempe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230711092203.68157-3-jfalempe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4e076c73e4 upstream.
This requires a bit of background. Properly done a modeset driver's
unload/remove sequence should be
drm_dev_unplug();
drm_atomic_helper_shutdown();
drm_dev_put();
The trouble is that the drm_dev_unplugged() checks are by design racy,
they do not synchronize against all outstanding ioctl. This is because
those ioctl could block forever (both for modeset and for driver
specific ioctls), leading to deadlocks in hotunplug. Instead the code
sections that touch the hardware need to be annotated with
drm_dev_enter/exit, to avoid accessing hardware resources after the
unload/remove has finished.
To avoid use-after-free issues all the involved userspace visible
objects are supposed to hold a reference on the underlying drm_device,
like drm_file does.
The issue now is that we missed one, the atomic modeset ioctl can be run
in a nonblocking fashion, and in that case it cannot rely on the implied
drm_device reference provided by the ioctl calling context. This can
result in a use-after-free if an nonblocking atomic commit is carefully
raced against a driver unload.
Fix this by unconditionally grabbing a drm_device reference for any
drm_atomic_state structures. Strictly speaking this isn't required for
blocking commits and TEST_ONLY calls, but it's the simpler approach.
Thanks to shanzhulig for the initial idea of grabbing an unconditional
reference, I just added comments, a condensed commit message and fixed a
minor potential issue in where exactly we drop the final reference.
Reported-by: shanzhulig <shanzhulig@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: shanzhulig <shanzhulig@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fc0cba0c7b upstream.
System crash due to use after free.
Current code allows terminate_rport_io to exit before making
sure all IOs has returned. For FCP-2 device, IO's can hang
on in HW because driver has not tear down the session in FW at
first sign of cable pull. When dev_loss_tmo timer pops,
terminate_rport_io is called and upper layer is about to
free various resources. Terminate_rport_io trigger qla to do
the final cleanup, but the cleanup might not be fast enough where it
leave qla still holding on to the same resource.
Wait for IO's to return to upper layer before resources are freed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <qutran@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230428075339.32551-7-njavali@marvell.com
Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 02b0095e2f upstream.
Fix an issue in function 'tracing_err_log_open'.
The function doesn't call 'seq_open' if the file is opened only with
write permissions, which results in 'file->private_data' being left as null.
If we then use 'lseek' on that opened file, 'seq_lseek' dereferences
'file->private_data' in 'mutex_lock(&m->lock)', resulting in a kernel panic.
Writing to this node requires root privileges, therefore this bug
has very little security impact.
Tracefs node: /sys/kernel/tracing/error_log
Example Kernel panic:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000038
Call trace:
mutex_lock+0x30/0x110
seq_lseek+0x34/0xb8
__arm64_sys_lseek+0x6c/0xb8
invoke_syscall+0x58/0x13c
el0_svc_common+0xc4/0x10c
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x98
el0_svc+0x24/0x88
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xe4
el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8
Code: d503201f aa0803e0 aa1f03e1 aa0103e9 (c8e97d02)
---[ end trace 561d1b49c12cf8a5 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230703155237eucms1p4dfb6a19caa14c79eb6c823d127b39024@eucms1p4
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230704102706eucms1p30d7ecdcc287f46ad67679fc8491b2e0f@eucms1p3
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8a062902be ("tracing: Add tracing error log")
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Stachyra <m.stachyra@samsung.com>
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bc8d591654 upstream.
split_if_spec expects a NULL-pointer as an end marker for the argument
list, but tuntap_probe never supplied that terminating NULL. As a result
incorrectly formatted interface specification string may cause a crash
because of the random memory access. Fix that by adding NULL terminator
to the split_if_spec argument list.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7282bee787 ("[PATCH] xtensa: Architecture support for Tensilica Xtensa Part 8")
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7e42907f3a upstream.
Soft lockup occurs when reading file 'trace_pipe':
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#6 stuck for 22s! [cat:4488]
[...]
RIP: 0010:ring_buffer_empty_cpu+0xed/0x170
RSP: 0018:ffff88810dd6fc48 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000246 RCX: ffffffff93d1aaeb
RDX: ffff88810a280040 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88811164b218
RBP: ffff88811164b218 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88815156600f
R10: ffffed102a2acc01 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000051651901
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888115e49500 R15: 0000000000000000
[...]
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8d853c2000 CR3: 000000010dcd8000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
__find_next_entry+0x1a8/0x4b0
? peek_next_entry+0x250/0x250
? down_write+0xa5/0x120
? down_write_killable+0x130/0x130
trace_find_next_entry_inc+0x3b/0x1d0
tracing_read_pipe+0x423/0xae0
? tracing_splice_read_pipe+0xcb0/0xcb0
vfs_read+0x16b/0x490
ksys_read+0x105/0x210
? __ia32_sys_pwrite64+0x200/0x200
? switch_fpu_return+0x108/0x220
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6
Through the vmcore, I found it's because in tracing_read_pipe(),
ring_buffer_empty_cpu() found some buffer is not empty but then it
cannot read anything due to "rb_num_of_entries() == 0" always true,
Then it infinitely loop the procedure due to user buffer not been
filled, see following code path:
tracing_read_pipe() {
... ...
waitagain:
tracing_wait_pipe() // 1. find non-empty buffer here
trace_find_next_entry_inc() // 2. loop here try to find an entry
__find_next_entry()
ring_buffer_empty_cpu(); // 3. find non-empty buffer
peek_next_entry() // 4. but peek always return NULL
ring_buffer_peek()
rb_buffer_peek()
rb_get_reader_page()
// 5. because rb_num_of_entries() == 0 always true here
// then return NULL
// 6. user buffer not been filled so goto 'waitgain'
// and eventually leads to an deadloop in kernel!!!
}
By some analyzing, I found that when resetting ringbuffer, the 'entries'
of its pages are not all cleared (see rb_reset_cpu()). Then when reducing
the ringbuffer, and if some reduced pages exist dirty 'entries' data, they
will be added into 'cpu_buffer->overrun' (see rb_remove_pages()), which
cause wrong 'overrun' count and eventually cause the deadloop issue.
To fix it, we need to clear every pages in rb_reset_cpu().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230708225144.3785600-1-zhengyejian1@huawei.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a5fb833172 ("ring-buffer: Fix uninitialized read_stamp")
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6018b585e8 upstream.
Hist triggers can have referenced variables without having direct
variables fields. This can be the case if referenced variables are added
for trigger actions. In this case the newly added references will not
have field variables. Not taking such referenced variables into
consideration can result in a bug where it would be possible to remove
hist trigger with variables being refenced. This will result in a bug
that is easily reproducable like so
$ cd /sys/kernel/tracing
$ echo 'synthetic_sys_enter char[] comm; long id' >> synthetic_events
$ echo 'hist:keys=common_pid.execname,id.syscall:vals=hitcount:comm=common_pid.execname' >> events/raw_syscalls/sys_enter/trigger
$ echo 'hist:keys=common_pid.execname,id.syscall:onmatch(raw_syscalls.sys_enter).synthetic_sys_enter($comm, id)' >> events/raw_syscalls/sys_enter/trigger
$ echo '!hist:keys=common_pid.execname,id.syscall:vals=hitcount:comm=common_pid.execname' >> events/raw_syscalls/sys_enter/trigger
[ 100.263533] ==================================================================
[ 100.264634] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in resolve_var_refs+0xc7/0x180
[ 100.265520] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810375d0f0 by task bash/439
[ 100.266320]
[ 100.266533] CPU: 2 PID: 439 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1 #4
[ 100.267277] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-20220807_005459-localhost 04/01/2014
[ 100.268561] Call Trace:
[ 100.268902] <TASK>
[ 100.269189] dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x70
[ 100.269680] print_report+0xc5/0x600
[ 100.270165] ? resolve_var_refs+0xc7/0x180
[ 100.270697] ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x80/0x1f0
[ 100.271389] ? resolve_var_refs+0xc7/0x180
[ 100.271913] kasan_report+0xbd/0x100
[ 100.272380] ? resolve_var_refs+0xc7/0x180
[ 100.272920] __asan_load8+0x71/0xa0
[ 100.273377] resolve_var_refs+0xc7/0x180
[ 100.273888] event_hist_trigger+0x749/0x860
[ 100.274505] ? kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50
[ 100.275024] ? kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40
[ 100.275536] ? __pfx_event_hist_trigger+0x10/0x10
[ 100.276138] ? ksys_write+0xd1/0x170
[ 100.276607] ? do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90
[ 100.277099] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
[ 100.277771] ? destroy_hist_data+0x446/0x470
[ 100.278324] ? event_hist_trigger_parse+0xa6c/0x3860
[ 100.278962] ? __pfx_event_hist_trigger_parse+0x10/0x10
[ 100.279627] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20
[ 100.280177] ? mutex_unlock+0x85/0xd0
[ 100.280660] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
[ 100.281200] ? kfree+0x7b/0x120
[ 100.281619] ? ____kasan_slab_free+0x15d/0x1d0
[ 100.282197] ? event_trigger_write+0xac/0x100
[ 100.282764] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x16/0x20
[ 100.283293] ? __kmem_cache_free+0x153/0x2f0
[ 100.283844] ? sched_mm_cid_remote_clear+0xb1/0x250
[ 100.284550] ? __pfx_sched_mm_cid_remote_clear+0x10/0x10
[ 100.285221] ? event_trigger_write+0xbc/0x100
[ 100.285781] ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20
[ 100.286321] ? __bitmap_weight+0x66/0xa0
[ 100.286833] ? _find_next_bit+0x46/0xe0
[ 100.287334] ? task_mm_cid_work+0x37f/0x450
[ 100.287872] event_triggers_call+0x84/0x150
[ 100.288408] trace_event_buffer_commit+0x339/0x430
[ 100.289073] ? ring_buffer_event_data+0x3f/0x60
[ 100.292189] trace_event_raw_event_sys_enter+0x8b/0xe0
[ 100.295434] syscall_trace_enter.constprop.0+0x18f/0x1b0
[ 100.298653] syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x32/0x40
[ 100.301808] do_syscall_64+0x1a/0x90
[ 100.304748] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
[ 100.307775] RIP: 0033:0x7f686c75c1cb
[ 100.310617] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 65 3c 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 21 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 35 3c 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 100.317847] RSP: 002b:00007ffc60137a38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000021
[ 100.321200] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055f566469ea0 RCX: 00007f686c75c1cb
[ 100.324631] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 000000000000000a
[ 100.328104] RBP: 00007ffc60137ac0 R08: 00007f686c818460 R09: 000000000000000a
[ 100.331509] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000009
[ 100.334992] R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 000000000000000a R15: 0000000000000007
[ 100.338381] </TASK>
We hit the bug because when second hist trigger has was created
has_hist_vars() returned false because hist trigger did not have
variables. As a result of that save_hist_vars() was not called to add
the trigger to trace_array->hist_vars. Later on when we attempted to
remove the first histogram find_any_var_ref() failed to detect it is
being used because it did not find the second trigger in hist_vars list.
With this change we wait until trigger actions are created so we can take
into consideration if hist trigger has variable references. Also, now we
check the return value of save_hist_vars() and fail trigger creation if
save_hist_vars() fails.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230712223021.636335-1-mkhalfella@purestorage.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 067fe038e7 ("tracing: Add variable reference handling to hist triggers")
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Khalfella <mkhalfella@purestorage.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a82d62f708 upstream.
This reverts commit eb26dfe8aa.
Commit eb26dfe8aa ("8250: add support for ASIX devices with a FIFO
bug") merged on Jul 13, 2012 adds a quirk for PCI_VENDOR_ID_ASIX
(0x9710). But that ID is the same as PCI_VENDOR_ID_NETMOS defined in
1f8b061050c7 ("[PATCH] Netmos parallel/serial/combo support") merged
on Mar 28, 2005. In pci_serial_quirks array, the NetMos entry always
takes precedence over the ASIX entry even since it was initially
merged, code in that commit is always unreachable.
In my tests, adding the FIFO workaround to pci_netmos_init() makes no
difference, and the vendor driver also does not have such workaround.
Given that the code was never used for over a decade, it's safe to
revert it.
Also, the real PCI_VENDOR_ID_ASIX should be 0x125b, which is used on
their newer AX99100 PCIe serial controllers released on 2016. The FIFO
workaround should not be intended for these newer controllers, and it
was never implemented in vendor driver.
Fixes: eb26dfe8aa ("8250: add support for ASIX devices with a FIFO bug")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiaqing Zhao <jiaqing.zhao@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230619155743.827859-1-jiaqing.zhao@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 257e6172ab upstream.
If a client sends out a cap update dropping caps with the prior 'seq'
just before an incoming cap revoke request, then the client may drop
the revoke because it believes it's already released the requested
capabilities.
This causes the MDS to wait indefinitely for the client to respond
to the revoke. It's therefore always a good idea to ack the cap
revoke request with the bumped up 'seq'.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/61782
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Milind Changire <mchangir@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Donnelly <pdonnell@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d744ae7477 upstream.
Fix the timeout that is used for the initialisation and for the self
test. wait_for_completion_timeout expects a timeout in jiffies, but
RNGC_TIMEOUT is in milliseconds. Call msecs_to_jiffies to do the
conversion.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1d5449445b ("hwrng: mx-rngc - add a driver for Freescale RNGC")
Signed-off-by: Martin Kaiser <martin@kaiser.cx>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2bdba9d4a3 upstream.
If we disable vblank when entering self-refresh, vblank APIs (like
DRM_IOCTL_WAIT_VBLANK) no longer work. But user space is not aware when
we enter self-refresh, so this appears to be an API violation -- that
DRM_IOCTL_WAIT_VBLANK fails with EINVAL whenever the display is idle and
enters self-refresh.
The downstream driver used by many of these systems never used to
disable vblank for PSR, and in fact, even upstream, we didn't do that
until radically redesigning the state machine in commit 6c836d965b
("drm/rockchip: Use the helpers for PSR").
Thus, it seems like a reasonable API fix to simply restore that
behavior, and leave vblank enabled.
Note that this appears to potentially unbalance the
drm_crtc_vblank_{off,on}() calls in some cases, but:
(a) drm_crtc_vblank_on() documents this as OK and
(b) if I do the naive balancing, I find state machine issues such that
we're not in sync properly; so it's easier to take advantage of (a).
This issue was exposed by IGT's kms_vblank tests, and reported by
KernelCI. The bug has been around a while (longer than KernelCI
noticed), but was only exposed once self-refresh was bugfixed more
recently, and so KernelCI could properly test it. Some other notes in:
https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/Y6OCg9BPnJvimQLT@google.com/
Re: renesas/master bisection: igt-kms-rockchip.kms_vblank.pipe-A-wait-forked on rk3399-gru-kevin
== Backporting notes: ==
Marking as 'Fixes' commit 6c836d965b ("drm/rockchip: Use the helpers
for PSR"), but it probably depends on commit bed030a49f
("drm/rockchip: Don't fully disable vop on self refresh") as well.
We also need the previous patch ("drm/atomic: Allow vblank-enabled +
self-refresh "disable""), of course.
v3:
* no update
v2:
* skip unnecessary lock/unlock
Fixes: 6c836d965b ("drm/rockchip: Use the helpers for PSR")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: "kernelci.org bot" <bot@kernelci.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/Y5itf0+yNIQa6fU4@sirena.org.uk/
Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230109171809.v3.2.Ic07cba4ab9a7bd3618a9e4258b8f92ea7d10ae5a@changeid
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9d0e3cac35 upstream.
The self-refresh helper framework overloads "disable" to sometimes mean
"go into self-refresh mode," and this mode activates automatically
(e.g., after some period of unchanging display output). In such cases,
the display pipe is still considered "on", and user-space is not aware
that we went into self-refresh mode. Thus, users may expect that
vblank-related features (such as DRM_IOCTL_WAIT_VBLANK) still work
properly.
However, we trigger the WARN_ONCE() here if a CRTC driver tries to leave
vblank enabled.
Add a different expectation: that CRTCs *should* leave vblank enabled
when going into self-refresh.
This patch is preparation for another patch -- "drm/rockchip: vop: Leave
vblank enabled in self-refresh" -- which resolves conflicts between the
above self-refresh behavior and the API tests in IGT's kms_vblank test
module.
== Some alternatives discussed: ==
It's likely that on many display controllers, vblank interrupts will
turn off when the CRTC is disabled, and so in some cases, self-refresh
may not support vblank. To support such cases, we might consider
additions to the generic helpers such that we fire vblank events based
on a timer.
However, there is currently only one driver using the common
self-refresh helpers (i.e., rockchip), and at least as of commit
bed030a49f ("drm/rockchip: Don't fully disable vop on self refresh"),
the CRTC hardware is powered enough to continue to generate vblank
interrupts.
So we chose the simpler option of leaving vblank interrupts enabled. We
can reevaluate this decision and perhaps augment the helpers if/when we
gain a second driver that has different requirements.
v3:
* include discussion summary
v2:
* add 'ret != 0' warning case for self-refresh
* describe failing test case and relation to drm/rockchip patch better
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # dependency for "drm/rockchip: vop: Leave
# vblank enabled in self-refresh"
Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230109171809.v3.1.I3904f697863649eb1be540ecca147a66e42bfad7@changeid
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 92655fbda5 upstream.
The GETLK pid values have all been negated since commit 9d5b86ac13
("fs/locks: Remove fl_nspid and use fs-specific l_pid for remote locks").
Revert this for local pids, and leave in place negative pids for remote
owners.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9d5b86ac13 ("fs/locks: Remove fl_nspid and use fs-specific l_pid for remote locks")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e836007089 upstream.
We've found that using raid0 with the 'original' layout and discard
enabled with different disk sizes (such that at least two zones are
created) can result in data corruption. This is due to the fact that
the discard handling in 'raid0_handle_discard()' assumes the 'alternate'
layout. We've seen this corruption using ext4 but other filesystems are
likely susceptible as well.
More specifically, while multiple zones are necessary to create the
corruption, the corruption may not occur with multiple zones if they
layout in such a way the layout matches what the 'alternate' layout
would have produced. Thus, not all raid0 devices with the 'original'
layout, different size disks and discard enabled will encounter this
corruption.
The 3.14 kernel inadvertently changed the raid0 disk layout for different
size disks. Thus, running a pre-3.14 kernel and post-3.14 kernel on the
same raid0 array could corrupt data. This lead to the creation of the
'original' layout (to match the pre-3.14 layout) and the 'alternate' layout
(to match the post 3.14 layout) in the 5.4 kernel time frame and an option
to tell the kernel which layout to use (since it couldn't be autodetected).
However, when the 'original' layout was added back to 5.4 discard support
for the 'original' layout was not added leading this issue.
I've been able to reliably reproduce the corruption with the following
test case:
1. create raid0 array with different size disks using original layout
2. mkfs
3. mount -o discard
4. create lots of files
5. remove 1/2 the files
6. fstrim -a (or just the mount point for the raid0 array)
7. umount
8. fsck -fn /dev/md0 (spews all sorts of corruptions)
Let's fix this by adding proper discard support to the 'original' layout.
The fix 'maps' the 'original' layout disks to the order in which they are
read/written such that we can compare the disks in the same way that the
current 'alternate' layout does. A 'disk_shift' field is added to
'struct strip_zone'. This could be computed on the fly in
raid0_handle_discard() but by adding this field, we save some computation
in the discard path.
Note we could also potentially fix this by re-ordering the disks in the
zones that follow the first one, and then always read/writing them using
the 'alternate' layout. However, that is seen as a more substantial change,
and we are attempting the least invasive fix at this time to remedy the
corruption.
I've verified the change using the reproducer mentioned above. Typically,
the corruption is seen after less than 3 iterations, while the patch has
run 500+ iterations.
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Fixes: c84a1372df ("md/raid0: avoid RAID0 data corruption due to layout confusion.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230623180523.1901230-1-jbaron@akamai.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fb620ae73b upstream.
The irq_raised completion used to detect the end of a test case is
initialized when the test device is probed, but never reinitialized again
before a test case. As a result, the irq_raised completion synchronization
is effective only for the first ioctl test case executed. Any subsequent
call to wait_for_completion() by another ioctl() call will immediately
return, potentially too early, leading to false positive failures.
Fix this by reinitializing the irq_raised completion before starting a new
ioctl() test command.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230415023542.77601-16-dlemoal@kernel.org
Fixes: 2c156ac71c ("misc: Add host side PCI driver for PCI test function device")
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lpieralisi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <mani@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
