This patchset implements SLAB support for KASAN
Unlike SLUB, SLAB doesn't store allocation/deallocation stacks for heap
objects, therefore we reimplement this feature in mm/kasan/stackdepot.c.
The intention is to ultimately switch SLUB to use this implementation as
well, which will save a lot of memory (right now SLUB bloats each object
by 256 bytes to store the allocation/deallocation stacks).
Also neither SLUB nor SLAB delay the reuse of freed memory chunks, which
is necessary for better detection of use-after-free errors. We
introduce memory quarantine (mm/kasan/quarantine.c), which allows
delayed reuse of deallocated memory.
This patch (of 7):
Rename kmalloc_large_oob_right() to kmalloc_pagealloc_oob_right(), as
the test only checks the page allocator functionality. Also reimplement
kmalloc_large_oob_right() so that the test allocates a large enough
chunk of memory that still does not trigger the page allocator fallback.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from e6e8379c87)
Change-Id: Id711a46b1d85d84784bc599295d109f8f0c7f272
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
KASAN uses stackdepot to memorize stacks for all kmalloc/kfree calls.
Current stackdepot capacity is 16MB (1024 top level entries x 4 pages on
second level). Size of each stack is (num_frames + 3) * sizeof(long).
Which gives us ~84K stacks. This capacity was chosen empirically and it
is enough to run kernel normally.
However, when lots of configs are enabled and a fuzzer tries to maximize
code coverage, it easily hits the limit within tens of minutes. I've
tested for long a time with number of top level entries bumped 4x
(4096). And I think I've seen overflow only once. But I don't have all
configs enabled and code coverage has not reached maximum yet. So bump
it 8x to 8192.
Since we have two-level table, memory cost of this is very moderate --
currently the top-level table is 8KB, with this patch it is 64KB, which
is negligible under KASAN.
Here is some approx math.
128MB allows us to memorize ~670K stacks (assuming stack is ~200b).
I've grepped kernel for kmalloc|kfree|kmem_cache_alloc|kmem_cache_free|
kzalloc|kstrdup|kstrndup|kmemdup and it gives ~60K matches. Most of
alloc/free call sites are reachable with only one stack. But some
utility functions can have large fanout. Assuming average fanout is 5x,
total number of alloc/free stacks is ~300K.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1476458416-122131-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from 02754e0a48)
Change-Id: Ia08e608741a7e6dda059f0d6aa30dfdf8f52ef25
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Kernel style prefers a single string over split strings when the string is
'user-visible'.
Miscellanea:
- Add a missing newline
- Realign arguments
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> [percpu]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from 756a025f00)
Change-Id: I377fb1542980c15d2f306924656227ad17b02b5e
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
The state of object currently tracked in two places - shadow memory, and
the ->state field in struct kasan_alloc_meta. We can get rid of the
latter. The will save us a little bit of memory. Also, this allow us
to move free stack into struct kasan_alloc_meta, without increasing
memory consumption. So now we should always know when the last time the
object was freed. This may be useful for long delayed use-after-free
bugs.
As a side effect this fixes following UBSAN warning:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in mm/kasan/quarantine.c:102:13
member access within misaligned address ffff88000d1efebc for type 'struct qlist_node'
which requires 8 byte alignment
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-5-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Reported-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from b3cbd9bf77)
Change-Id: Iaa4959a78ffd2e49f9060099df1fb32483df3085
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Size of slab object already stored in cache->object_size.
Note, that kmalloc() internally rounds up size of allocation, so
object_size may be not equal to alloc_size, but, usually we don't need
to know the exact size of allocated object. In case if we need that
information, we still can figure it out from the report. The dump of
shadow memory allows to identify the end of allocated memory, and
thereby the exact allocation size.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-4-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from 47b5c2a0f0)
Change-Id: I76b555f9a8469f685607ca50f6c51b2e0ad1b4ab
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Currently we call quarantine_reduce() for ___GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM (implied
by __GFP_RECLAIM) allocation. So, basically we call it on almost every
allocation. quarantine_reduce() sometimes is heavy operation, and
calling it with disabled interrupts may trigger hard LOCKUP:
NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 2irq event stamp: 1411258
Call Trace:
<NMI> dump_stack+0x68/0x96
watchdog_overflow_callback+0x15b/0x190
__perf_event_overflow+0x1b1/0x540
perf_event_overflow+0x14/0x20
intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x36a/0xad0
perf_event_nmi_handler+0x2c/0x50
nmi_handle+0x128/0x480
default_do_nmi+0xb2/0x210
do_nmi+0x1aa/0x220
end_repeat_nmi+0x1a/0x1e
<<EOE>> __kernel_text_address+0x86/0xb0
print_context_stack+0x7b/0x100
dump_trace+0x12b/0x350
save_stack_trace+0x2b/0x50
set_track+0x83/0x140
free_debug_processing+0x1aa/0x420
__slab_free+0x1d6/0x2e0
___cache_free+0xb6/0xd0
qlist_free_all+0x83/0x100
quarantine_reduce+0x177/0x1b0
kasan_kmalloc+0xf3/0x100
Reduce the quarantine_reduce iff direct reclaim is allowed.
Fixes: 55834c59098d("mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-2-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from 4b3ec5a3f4)
Change-Id: I7e6ad29acabc2091f98a8aac54ed041b574b5e7e
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Once an object is put into quarantine, we no longer own it, i.e. object
could leave the quarantine and be reallocated. So having set_track()
call after the quarantine_put() may corrupt slab objects.
BUG kmalloc-4096 (Not tainted): Poison overwritten
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: 0xffff8804540de850-0xffff8804540de857. First byte 0xb5 instead of 0x6b
...
INFO: Freed in qlist_free_all+0x42/0x100 age=75 cpu=3 pid=24492
__slab_free+0x1d6/0x2e0
___cache_free+0xb6/0xd0
qlist_free_all+0x83/0x100
quarantine_reduce+0x177/0x1b0
kasan_kmalloc+0xf3/0x100
kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
kmem_cache_alloc+0x109/0x3e0
mmap_region+0x53e/0xe40
do_mmap+0x70f/0xa50
vm_mmap_pgoff+0x147/0x1b0
SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x2c7/0x5b0
SyS_mmap+0x1b/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x1a0/0x4e0
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0011503600 objects=7 used=7 fp=0x (null) flags=0x8000000000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff8804540de848 @offset=26696 fp=0xffff8804540dc588
Redzone ffff8804540de840: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........
Object ffff8804540de848: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b b5 52 00 00 f2 01 60 cc kkkkkkkk.R....`.
Similarly, poisoning after the quarantine_put() leads to false positive
use-after-free reports:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in anon_vma_interval_tree_insert+0x304/0x430 at addr ffff880405c540a0
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c0/3036
CPU: 0 PID: 3036 Comm: trinity-c0 Not tainted 4.7.0-think+ #9
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x68/0x96
kasan_report_error+0x222/0x600
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x61/0x70
anon_vma_interval_tree_insert+0x304/0x430
anon_vma_chain_link+0x91/0xd0
anon_vma_clone+0x136/0x3f0
anon_vma_fork+0x81/0x4c0
copy_process.part.47+0x2c43/0x5b20
_do_fork+0x16d/0xbd0
SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x1a0/0x4e0
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Fix this by putting an object in the quarantine after all other
operations.
Fixes: 80a9201a59 ("mm, kasan: switch SLUB to stackdepot, enable memory quarantine for SLUB")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from 4a3d308d66)
Change-Id: Iaa699c447b97f8cb04afdd2d6a5f572bea439185
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
There are two bugs on qlist_move_cache(). One is that qlist's tail
isn't set properly. curr->next can be NULL since it is singly linked
list and NULL value on tail is invalid if there is one item on qlist.
Another one is that if cache is matched, qlist_put() is called and it
will set curr->next to NULL. It would cause to stop the loop
prematurely.
These problems come from complicated implementation so I'd like to
re-implement it completely. Implementation in this patch is really
simple. Iterate all qlist_nodes and put them to appropriate list.
Unfortunately, I got this bug sometime ago and lose oops message. But,
the bug looks trivial and no need to attach oops.
Fixes: 55834c5909 ("mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1467766348-22419-1-git-send-email-iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kuthonuzo Luruo <poll.stdin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from 0ab686d8c8)
Change-Id: Ifca87bd938c74ff18e7fc2680afb15070cc7019f
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Currently we may put reserved by mempool elements into quarantine via
kasan_kfree(). This is totally wrong since quarantine may really free
these objects. So when mempool will try to use such element,
use-after-free will happen. Or mempool may decide that it no longer
need that element and double-free it.
So don't put object into quarantine in kasan_kfree(), just poison it.
Rename kasan_kfree() to kasan_poison_kfree() to respect that.
Also, we shouldn't use kasan_slab_alloc()/kasan_krealloc() in
kasan_unpoison_element() because those functions may update allocation
stacktrace. This would be wrong for the most of the remove_element call
sites.
(The only call site where we may want to update alloc stacktrace is
in mempool_alloc(). Kmemleak solves this by calling
kmemleak_update_trace(), so we could make something like that too.
But this is out of scope of this patch).
Fixes: 55834c5909 ("mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/575977C3.1010905@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Kuthonuzo Luruo <kuthonuzo.luruo@hpe.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from 9b75a867cc)
Change-Id: Idb6c152dae8f8f2975dbe6acb7165315be8b465b
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.
When the object is freed, its state changes from KASAN_STATE_ALLOC to
KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE. The object is poisoned and put into quarantine
instead of being returned to the allocator, therefore every subsequent
access to that object triggers a KASAN error, and the error handler is
able to say where the object has been allocated and deallocated.
When it's time for the object to leave quarantine, its state becomes
KASAN_STATE_FREE and it's returned to the allocator. From now on the
allocator may reuse it for another allocation. Before that happens,
it's still possible to detect a use-after free on that object (it
retains the allocation/deallocation stacks).
When the allocator reuses this object, the shadow is unpoisoned and old
allocation/deallocation stacks are wiped. Therefore a use of this
object, even an incorrect one, won't trigger ASan warning.
Without the quarantine, it's not guaranteed that the objects aren't
reused immediately, that's why the probability of catching a
use-after-free is lower than with quarantine in place.
Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.
Freed objects are first added to per-cpu quarantine queues. When a
cache is destroyed or memory shrinking is requested, the objects are
moved into the global quarantine queue. Whenever a kmalloc call allows
memory reclaiming, the oldest objects are popped out of the global queue
until the total size of objects in quarantine is less than 3/4 of the
maximum quarantine size (which is a fraction of installed physical
memory).
As long as an object remains in the quarantine, KASAN is able to report
accesses to it, so the chance of reporting a use-after-free is
increased. Once the object leaves quarantine, the allocator may reuse
it, in which case the object is unpoisoned and KASAN can't detect
incorrect accesses to it.
Right now quarantine support is only enabled in SLAB allocator.
Unification of KASAN features in SLAB and SLUB will be done later.
This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: quarantine" patch originally
prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. A number of improvements have been
suggested by Andrey Ryabinin.
[glider@google.com: v9]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462987130-144092-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from 55834c5909)
Change-Id: Ib808d72a40f2e5137961d93dad540e85f8bbd2c4
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Recently, we allow to save the stacktrace whose hashed value is 0. It
causes the problem that stackdepot could return 0 even if in success.
User of stackdepot cannot distinguish whether it is success or not so we
need to solve this problem. In this patch, 1 bit are added to handle
and make valid handle none 0 by setting this bit. After that, valid
handle will not be 0 and 0 handle will represent failure correctly.
Fixes: 33334e2576 ("lib/stackdepot.c: allow the stack trace hash to be zero")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462252403-1106-1-git-send-email-iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from 7c31190bcf)
Change-Id: Ibfb0eb8439225e03e72ed714570d8efac47188a0
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Do not bail out from depot_save_stack() if the stack trace has zero hash.
Initially depot_save_stack() silently dropped stack traces with zero
hashes, however there's actually no point in reserving this zero value.
Reported-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from 33334e2576)
Change-Id: I44c9c5a881e2f4176c3946905b8f11b26f45bc00
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Implement the stack depot and provide CONFIG_STACKDEPOT. Stack depot
will allow KASAN store allocation/deallocation stack traces for memory
chunks. The stack traces are stored in a hash table and referenced by
handles which reside in the kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta
structures in the allocated memory chunks.
IRQ stack traces are cut below the IRQ entry point to avoid unnecessary
duplication.
Right now stackdepot support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Once
KASAN features in SLAB are on par with those in SLUB we can switch SLUB
to stackdepot as well, thus removing the dependency on SLUB stack
bookkeeping, which wastes a lot of memory.
This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: stack depots" patch originally
prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.
Joonsoo has said that he plans to reuse the stackdepot code for the
mm/page_owner.c debugging facility.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depot_stack_handle/depot_stack_handle_t]
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: comment style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from cd11016e5f)
Change-Id: Ic804318410823b95d84e264a6334e018f21ef943
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Finding suitable OFF_SLAB candidate is more related to aligned cache
size rather than original size. Same reasoning can be applied to the
debug pagealloc candidate. So, this patch moves up alignment fixup to
proper position. From that point, size is aligned so we can remove some
alignment fixups.
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from 832a15d209)
Change-Id: I8338d647da4a6eb6402c6fe4e2402b7db45ea5a5
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
cache_init_objs() will be changed in following patch and current form
doesn't fit well for that change. So, before doing it, this patch
separates debugging initialization. This would cause two loop iteration
when debugging is enabled, but, this overhead seems too light than debug
feature itself so effect may not be visible. This patch will greatly
simplify changes in cache_init_objs() in following patch.
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from 10b2e9e8e8)
Change-Id: I9904974a674f17fc7d57daf0fe351742db67c006
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
DEBUG_SLAB_LEAK is a debug option. It's current implementation requires
status buffer so we need more memory to use it. And, it cause
kmem_cache initialization step more complex.
To remove this extra memory usage and to simplify initialization step,
this patch implement this feature with another way.
When user requests to get slab object owner information, it marks that
getting information is started. And then, all free objects in caches
are flushed to corresponding slab page. Now, we can distinguish all
freed object so we can know all allocated objects, too. After
collecting slab object owner information on allocated objects, mark is
checked that there is no free during the processing. If true, we can be
sure that our information is correct so information is returned to user.
Although this way is rather complex, it has two important benefits
mentioned above. So, I think it is worth changing.
There is one drawback that it takes more time to get slab object owner
information but it is just a debug option so it doesn't matter at all.
To help review, this patch implements new way only. Following patch
will remove useless code.
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from d31676dfde)
Change-Id: I204ea0dd5553577d17c93f32f0d5a797ba0304af
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
For upmigrating misfit running task case, the currently running
task's util has been counted into cpu_util(). Thus currently
__cpu_overutilized() which add task's uitl twice is overestimated.
Signed-off-by: Ke Wang <ke.wang@spreadtrum.com>
'cached_raw_freq' is used to get the next frequency quickly but should
always be in sync with sg_policy->next_freq. There are cases where it is
not and in such cases it should be reset to avoid switching to incorrect
frequencies.
Consider this case for example:
- policy->cur is 1.2 GHz (Max)
- New request comes for 780 MHz and we store that in cached_raw_freq.
- Based on 780 MHz, we calculate the effective frequency as 800 MHz.
- We then decide not to update the frequency as
sugov_up_down_rate_limit() return true.
- Here cached_raw_freq is 780 MHz and sg_policy->next_freq is 1.2 GHz.
- Now if the utilization doesn't change in next request, then the next
target frequency will still be 780 MHz and it will match with
cached_raw_freq and so we will directly return 1.2 GHz instead of 800
MHz.
BACKPORT of upstream commit 07458f6a51 ("cpufreq: schedutil: Reset
cached_raw_freq when not in sync with next_freq").
This also updates sugov_update_commit() for handling up/down tunables, which
aren't present in mainline.
Change-Id: I70bca2c5dfdb545a0471d1c9e4c5addb30ab5494
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Functions which the compiler has instrumented for ASAN place poison on
the stack shadow upon entry and remove this poison prior to returning.
In some cases (e.g. hotplug and idle), CPUs may exit the kernel a
number of levels deep in C code. If there are any instrumented
functions on this critical path, these will leave portions of the idle
thread stack shadow poisoned.
If a CPU returns to the kernel via a different path (e.g. a cold
entry), then depending on stack frame layout subsequent calls to
instrumented functions may use regions of the stack with stale poison,
resulting in (spurious) KASAN splats to the console.
Contemporary GCCs always add stack shadow poisoning when ASAN is
enabled, even when asked to not instrument a function [1], so we can't
simply annotate functions on the critical path to avoid poisoning.
Instead, this series explicitly removes any stale poison before it can
be hit. In the common hotplug case we clear the entire stack shadow in
common code, before a CPU is brought online.
On architectures which perform a cold return as part of cpu idle may
retain an architecture-specific amount of stack contents. To retain the
poison for this retained context, the arch code must call the core KASAN
code, passing a "watermark" stack pointer value beyond which shadow will
be cleared. Architectures which don't perform a cold return as part of
idle do not need any additional code.
This patch (of 3):
Functions which the compiler has instrumented for KASAN place poison on
the stack shadow upon entry and remove this poision prior to returning.
In some cases (e.g. hotplug and idle), CPUs may exit the kernel a number
of levels deep in C code. If there are any instrumented functions on this
critical path, these will leave portions of the stack shadow poisoned.
If a CPU returns to the kernel via a different path (e.g. a cold entry),
then depending on stack frame layout subsequent calls to instrumented
functions may use regions of the stack with stale poison, resulting in
(spurious) KASAN splats to the console.
To avoid this, we must clear stale poison from the stack prior to
instrumented functions being called. This patch adds functions to the
KASAN core for removing poison from (portions of) a task's stack. These
will be used by subsequent patches to avoid problems with hotplug and
idle.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 64145065
(cherry-picked from e3ae116339)
Change-Id: I9be31b714d5bdaec94a2dad3f0e468c094fe5fa2
Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Memory allocated for initrd would not be reclaimed if initializing ramfs
was skipped.
Bug: 69901741
Test: "grep MemTotal /proc/meminfo" increases by a few MB on an Android
device with a/b boot.
Change-Id: Ifbe094d303ed12cfd6de6aa004a8a19137a2f58a
Signed-off-by: Nick Bray <ncbray@google.com>
Currently it is possible to add or update socket policies, but
not clear them. Therefore, once a socket policy has been applied,
the socket cannot be used for unencrypted traffic.
This patch allows (privileged) users to clear socket policies by
passing in a NULL pointer and zero length argument to the
{IP,IPV6}_{IPSEC,XFRM}_POLICY setsockopts. This results in both
the incoming and outgoing policies being cleared.
The simple approach taken in this patch cannot clear socket
policies in only one direction. If desired this could be added
in the future, for example by continuing to pass in a length of
zero (which currently is guaranteed to return EMSGSIZE) and
making the policy be a pointer to an integer that contains one
of the XFRM_POLICY_{IN,OUT} enum values.
An alternative would have been to interpret the length as a
signed integer and use XFRM_POLICY_IN (i.e., 0) to clear the
input policy and -XFRM_POLICY_OUT (i.e., -1) to clear the output
policy.
Bug: 65857891
Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/539816
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
(cherry pick from commit 3d88d56c58)
Due to how the MONOTONIC_RAW accumulation logic was handled,
there is the potential for a 1ns discontinuity when we do
accumulations. This small discontinuity has for the most part
gone un-noticed, but since ARM64 enabled CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW
in their vDSO clock_gettime implementation, we've seen failures
with the inconsistency-check test in kselftest.
This patch addresses the issue by using the same sub-ns
accumulation handling that CLOCK_MONOTONIC uses, which avoids
the issue for in-kernel users.
Since the ARM64 vDSO implementation has its own clock_gettime
calculation logic, this patch reduces the frequency of errors,
but failures are still seen. The ARM64 vDSO will need to be
updated to include the sub-nanosecond xtime_nsec values in its
calculation for this issue to be completely fixed.
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Daniel Mentz <danielmentz@google.com>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <stephen.boyd@linaro.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: "stable #4 . 8+" <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496965462-20003-3-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Bug: 20045882
Bug: 63737556
Change-Id: I6c55dd7685f6bd212c6af9d09c527528e1dd5fa1
(cherry pick from commit c80ed088a5)
The vdso tries to check for a NULL res pointer in __kernel_clock_getres,
but only checks the lower 32 bits as is uses CBZ on the W register the
res pointer is held in.
Thus, if the res pointer happened to be aligned to a 4GiB boundary, we'd
spuriously skip storing the timespec to it, while returning a zero error code
to the caller.
Prevent this by checking the whole pointer, using CBZ on the X register
the res pointer is held in.
Fixes: 9031fefde6 ("arm64: VDSO support")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reported-by: Andrew Pinski <apinski@cavium.com>
Reported-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Bug: 20045882
Bug: 63737556
Change-Id: Iab5449d8515f9d655e792e3d7ce43a8f016fa2a0
Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim:
"In this round, we introduce sysfile-based quota support which is
required for Android by default. In addition, we allow that users are
able to reserve some blocks in runtime to mitigate performance drops
in low free space.
Enhancements:
- assign proper data segments according to write_hints given by user
- issue cache_flush on dirty devices only among multiple devices
- exploit cp_error flag and add more faults to enhance fault
injection test
- conduct more readaheads during f2fs_readdir
- add a range for discard commands
Bug fixes:
- fix zero stat->st_blocks when inline_data is set
- drop crypto key and free stale memory pointer while evict_inode is
failing
- fix some corner cases in free space and segment management
- fix wrong last_disk_size
This series includes lots of clean-ups and code enhancement in terms
of xattr operations, discard/flush command control. In addition, it
adds versatile debugfs entries to monitor f2fs status"
Cherry-picked from origin/upstream-f2fs-stable-linux-4.4.y:
56a07b0705 f2fs: deny accessing encryption policy if encryption is off
c394842e26 f2fs: inject fault in inc_valid_node_count
9262922510 f2fs: fix to clear FI_NO_PREALLOC
e6cfc5de2d f2fs: expose quota information in debugfs
c4cd2efe83 f2fs: separate nat entry mem alloc from nat_tree_lock
48c72b4c8c f2fs: validate before set/clear free nat bitmap
baf9275a4b f2fs: avoid opened loop codes in __add_ino_entry
47af6c72d9 f2fs: apply write hints to select the type of segments for buffered write
ac98191605 f2fs: introduce scan_curseg_cache for cleanup
ca28e9670e f2fs: optimize the way of traversing free_nid_bitmap
460688b59e f2fs: keep scanning until enough free nids are acquired
0186182c0c f2fs: trace checkpoint reason in fsync()
5d4b6efcfd f2fs: keep isize once block is reserved cross EOF
3c8f767e13 f2fs: avoid race in between GC and block exchange
4423778adf f2fs: save a multiplication for last_nid calculation
3e3b405575 f2fs: fix summary info corruption
44889e4879 f2fs: remove dead code in update_meta_page
55c7b9595b f2fs: remove unneeded semicolon
8b92814117 f2fs: don't bother with inode->i_version
42c7c71824 f2fs: check curseg space before foreground GC
c5470498e5 f2fs: use rw_semaphore to protect SIT cache
82750d346a f2fs: support quota sys files
26dfec49b2 f2fs: add quota_ino feature infra
ddb8e2ae98 f2fs: optimize __update_nat_bits
f46ae958c7 f2fs: modify for accurate fggc node io stat
c713fdb5a2 Revert "f2fs: handle dirty segments inside refresh_sit_entry"
873ec505cb f2fs: add a function to move nid
ae66786296 f2fs: export SSR allocation threshold
90c28a18d2 f2fs: give correct trimmed blocks in fstrim
5612922fb0 f2fs: support bio allocation error injection
583b7a274c f2fs: support get_page error injection
09a073cc8c f2fs: add missing sysfs description
e945474a9c f2fs: support soft block reservation
b7b2e629b6 f2fs: handle error case when adding xattr entry
7368e30495 f2fs: support flexible inline xattr size
ada4061e19 f2fs: show current cp state
5b8ff1301a f2fs: add missing quota_initialize
46d4a691f0 f2fs: show # of dirty segments via sysfs
fc13f9d7ce f2fs: stop all the operations by cp_error flag
91bea0c391 f2fs: remove several redundant assignments
807486c795 f2fs: avoid using timespec
03b1cb0bb4 f2fs: fix to correct no_fggc_candidate
5c15033cea Revert "f2fs: return wrong error number on f2fs_quota_write"
5f5f593222 f2fs: remove obsolete pointer for truncate_xattr_node
032a690682 f2fs: retry ENOMEM for quota_read|write
171b638fc4 f2fs: limit # of inmemory pages
83ed7a615f f2fs: update ctx->pos correctly when hitting hole in directory
4d6e68be25 f2fs: relocate readahead codes in readdir()
c8be47b540 f2fs: allow readdir() to be interrupted
2b903fe94c f2fs: trace f2fs_readdir
bb0db666d4 f2fs: trace f2fs_lookup
40d6250f04 f2fs: skip searching non-exist range in truncate_hole
8e84f379df f2fs: expose some sectors to user in inline data or dentry case
cb98f70dea f2fs: avoid stale fi->gdirty_list pointer
5562a3c539 f2fs/crypto: drop crypto key at evict_inode only
85853e7e38 f2fs: fix to avoid race when accessing last_disk_size
0c47a892d5 f2fs: Fix bool initialization/comparison
68e801abc5 f2fs: give up CP_TRIMMED_FLAG if it drops discards
df74eacb20 f2fs: trace f2fs_remove_discard
bd502c6e3e f2fs: reduce cmd_lock coverage in __issue_discard_cmd
a34ab5ca4f f2fs: split discard policy
1e65afd14d f2fs: wrap discard policy
684447dad1 f2fs: support issuing/waiting discard in range
27eaad0938 f2fs: fix to flush multiple device in checkpoint
08bb9d68d5 f2fs: enhance multiple device flush
9c2526ac2e f2fs: fix to show ino management cache size correctly
814b463d26 f2fs: drop FI_UPDATE_WRITE tag after f2fs_issue_flush
f555b0a117 f2fs: obsolete ALLOC_NID_LIST list
75d3164ae1 f2fs: convert inline data for direct I/O & FI_NO_PREALLOC
4de0ceb6b7 f2fs: allow readpages with NULL file pointer
322a45d172 f2fs: show flush list status in sysfs
6d625a93b4 f2fs: introduce read_xattr_block
8ea6e1c327 f2fs: introduce read_inline_xattr
dbce11e9ee Revert "f2fs: reuse nids more aggressively"
131bc9f6b7 Revert "f2fs: node segment is prior to data segment selected victim"
Change-Id: I93b9cd867b859a667a448b39299ff44a2b841b8c
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@google.com>
Allowing binder to expose the 64-bit API on 32-bit kernels caused a
build warning:
drivers/android/binder.c: In function 'binder_transaction_buffer_release':
drivers/android/binder.c:2220:15: error: cast to pointer from integer of different size [-Werror=int-to-pointer-cast]
fd_array = (u32 *)(parent_buffer + fda->parent_offset);
^
drivers/android/binder.c: In function 'binder_translate_fd_array':
drivers/android/binder.c:2445:13: error: cast to pointer from integer of different size [-Werror=int-to-pointer-cast]
fd_array = (u32 *)(parent_buffer + fda->parent_offset);
^
drivers/android/binder.c: In function 'binder_fixup_parent':
drivers/android/binder.c:2511:18: error: cast to pointer from integer of different size [-Werror=int-to-pointer-cast]
This adds extra type casts to avoid the warning.
However, there is another problem with the Kconfig option: turning
it on or off creates two incompatible ABI versions, a kernel that
has this enabled cannot run user space that was built without it
or vice versa. A better solution might be to leave the option hidden
until the binder code is fixed to deal with both ABI versions.
Fixes: e8d2ed7db7 ("Revert "staging: Fix build issues with new binder API"")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1c363eaece)
Change-Id: Id09185a6f86905926699e92a2b30201b8a5e83e5
(cherry-pick from commit 2077be6783)
__pa_symbol is technically the marcro that should be used for kernel
symbols. Switch to this as a pre-requisite for DEBUG_VIRTUAL which
will do bounds checking.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Bug: 20045882
Bug: 63737556
Change-Id: Ibef89e5935c9562fa69e946778c705636c1ca61e
[AmitP: Fixed cherry-pick conflicts on lsk-v4.4-android]
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
(cherry-pick from commit 568c5fe5a5)
Certain architectures may have the kernel image mapped separately to
alias the linear map. Introduce a macro lm_alias to translate a kernel
image symbol into its linear alias. This is used in part with work to
add CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL support for arm64.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Bug: 20045882
Bug: 63737556
Change-Id: I93ba4ef8df77f7e52717ab6e208d06122ac3a72b
