[ Upstream commit 33e17b3f5a ]
The arg->clone_sources_count is u64 and can trigger a warning when a
huge value is passed from user space and a huge array is allocated.
Limit the allocated memory to 8MiB (can be increased if needed), which
in turn limits the number of clone sources to 8M / sizeof(struct
clone_root) = 8M / 40 = 209715. Real world number of clones is from
tens to hundreds, so this is future proof.
Reported-by: syzbot+4376a9a073770c173269@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fb6df4366f ]
Lockdep reports that acpi_nfit_shutdown() may deadlock against an
opportune acpi_nfit_scrub(). acpi_nfit_scrub () is run from inside a
'work' and therefore has already acquired workqueue-internal locks. It
also acquiires acpi_desc->init_mutex. acpi_nfit_shutdown() first
acquires init_mutex, and was subsequently attempting to cancel any
pending workqueue items. This reversed locking order causes a potential
deadlock:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.2.0-rc3 #116 Tainted: G O N
------------------------------------------------------
libndctl/1958 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888129b461c0 ((work_completion)(&(&acpi_desc->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x43/0x450
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888129b460e8 (&acpi_desc->init_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: acpi_nfit_shutdown+0x87/0xd0 [nfit]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
...
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&acpi_desc->init_mutex);
lock((work_completion)(&(&acpi_desc->dwork)->work));
lock(&acpi_desc->init_mutex);
lock((work_completion)(&(&acpi_desc->dwork)->work));
*** DEADLOCK ***
Since the workqueue manipulation is protected by its own internal locking,
the cancellation of pending work doesn't need to be done under
acpi_desc->init_mutex. Move cancel_delayed_work_sync() outside the
init_mutex to fix the deadlock. Any work that starts after
acpi_nfit_shutdown() drops the lock will see ARS_CANCEL, and the
cancel_delayed_work_sync() will safely flush it out.
Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230112-acpi_nfit_lockdep-v1-1-660be4dd10be@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 29f316a1d7 ]
Make function buttons on ELECOM M-HT1DRBK trackball mouse work. This model
has two devices with different device IDs (010D and 011C). Both of
them misreports the number of buttons as 5 in the report descriptor, even
though they have 8 buttons. hid-elecom overwrites the report to fix them,
but supports only on 010D and does not work on 011C. This patch fixes
011C in the similar way but with specialized position parameters.
In fact, it is sufficient to rewrite only 17th byte (05 -> 08). However I
followed the existing way.
Signed-off-by: Takahiro Fujii <fujii@xaxxi.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b0355dbbf1 ]
This change adds support for nested IPsec tunnels by ensuring that
XFRM-I verifies existing policies before decapsulating a subsequent
policies. Addtionally, this clears the secpath entries after policies
are verified, ensuring that previous tunnels with no-longer-valid
do not pollute subsequent policy checks.
This is necessary especially for nested tunnels, as the IP addresses,
protocol and ports may all change, thus not matching the previous
policies. In order to ensure that packets match the relevant inbound
templates, the xfrm_policy_check should be done before handing off to
the inner XFRM protocol to decrypt and decapsulate.
Notably, raw ESP/AH packets did not perform policy checks inherently,
whereas all other encapsulated packets (UDP, TCP encapsulated) do policy
checks after calling xfrm_input handling in the respective encapsulation
layer.
Test: Verified with additional Android Kernel Unit tests
Signed-off-by: Benedict Wong <benedictwong@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e55f0f5bef ]
The same pre-work code is used before each call to
ionic_rx_fill(), so bring it in and make it a part of
the routine.
Signed-off-by: Neel Patel <neel@pensando.io>
Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <snelson@pensando.io>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit f3dd0c5337 upstream.
Commit 74e19ef0ff ("uaccess: Add speculation barrier to
copy_from_user()") built fine on x86-64 and arm64, and that's the extent
of my local build testing.
It turns out those got the <linux/nospec.h> include incidentally through
other header files (<linux/kvm_host.h> in particular), but that was not
true of other architectures, resulting in build errors
kernel/bpf/core.c: In function ‘___bpf_prog_run’:
kernel/bpf/core.c:1913:3: error: implicit declaration of function ‘barrier_nospec’
so just make sure to explicitly include the proper <linux/nospec.h>
header file to make everybody see it.
Fixes: 74e19ef0ff ("uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user()")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit af7b29b1de upstream.
taprio_attach() has this logic at the end, which should have been
removed with the blamed patch (which is now being reverted):
/* access to the child qdiscs is not needed in offload mode */
if (FULL_OFFLOAD_IS_ENABLED(q->flags)) {
kfree(q->qdiscs);
q->qdiscs = NULL;
}
because otherwise, we make use of q->qdiscs[] even after this array was
deallocated, namely in taprio_leaf(). Therefore, whenever one would try
to attach a valid child qdisc to a fully offloaded taprio root, one
would immediately dereference a NULL pointer.
$ tc qdisc replace dev eno0 handle 8001: parent root taprio \
num_tc 8 \
map 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 \
queues 1@0 1@1 1@2 1@3 1@4 1@5 1@6 1@7 \
max-sdu 0 0 0 0 0 200 0 0 \
base-time 200 \
sched-entry S 80 20000 \
sched-entry S a0 20000 \
sched-entry S 5f 60000 \
flags 2
$ max_frame_size=1500
$ data_rate_kbps=20000
$ port_transmit_rate_kbps=1000000
$ idleslope=$data_rate_kbps
$ sendslope=$(($idleslope - $port_transmit_rate_kbps))
$ locredit=$(($max_frame_size * $sendslope / $port_transmit_rate_kbps))
$ hicredit=$(($max_frame_size * $idleslope / $port_transmit_rate_kbps))
$ tc qdisc replace dev eno0 parent 8001:7 cbs \
idleslope $idleslope \
sendslope $sendslope \
hicredit $hicredit \
locredit $locredit \
offload 0
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000030
pc : taprio_leaf+0x28/0x40
lr : qdisc_leaf+0x3c/0x60
Call trace:
taprio_leaf+0x28/0x40
tc_modify_qdisc+0xf0/0x72c
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x12c/0x390
netlink_rcv_skb+0x5c/0x130
rtnetlink_rcv+0x1c/0x2c
The solution is not as obvious as the problem. The code which deallocates
q->qdiscs[] is in fact copied and pasted from mqprio, which also
deallocates the array in mqprio_attach() and never uses it afterwards.
Therefore, the identical cleanup logic of priv->qdiscs[] that
mqprio_destroy() has is deceptive because it will never take place at
qdisc_destroy() time, but just at raw ops->destroy() time (otherwise
said, priv->qdiscs[] do not last for the entire lifetime of the mqprio
root), but rather, this is just the twisted way in which the Qdisc API
understands error path cleanup should be done (Qdisc_ops :: destroy() is
called even when Qdisc_ops :: init() never succeeded).
Side note, in fact this is also what the comment in mqprio_init() says:
/* pre-allocate qdisc, attachment can't fail */
Or reworded, mqprio's priv->qdiscs[] scheme is only meant to serve as
data passing between Qdisc_ops :: init() and Qdisc_ops :: attach().
[ this comment was also copied and pasted into the initial taprio
commit, even though taprio_attach() came way later ]
The problem is that taprio also makes extensive use of the q->qdiscs[]
array in the software fast path (taprio_enqueue() and taprio_dequeue()),
but it does not keep a reference of its own on q->qdiscs[i] (you'd think
that since it creates these Qdiscs, it holds the reference, but nope,
this is not completely true).
To understand the difference between taprio_destroy() and mqprio_destroy()
one must look before commit 13511704f8 ("net: taprio offload: enforce
qdisc to netdev queue mapping"), because that just muddied the waters.
In the "original" taprio design, taprio always attached itself (the root
Qdisc) to all netdev TX queues, so that dev_qdisc_enqueue() would go
through taprio_enqueue().
It also called qdisc_refcount_inc() on itself for as many times as there
were netdev TX queues, in order to counter-balance what tc_get_qdisc()
does when destroying a Qdisc (simplified for brevity below):
if (n->nlmsg_type == RTM_DELQDISC)
err = qdisc_graft(dev, parent=NULL, new=NULL, q, extack);
qdisc_graft(where "new" is NULL so this deletes the Qdisc):
for (i = 0; i < num_q; i++) {
struct netdev_queue *dev_queue;
dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, i);
old = dev_graft_qdisc(dev_queue, new);
if (new && i > 0)
qdisc_refcount_inc(new);
qdisc_put(old);
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
this decrements taprio's refcount once for each TX queue
}
notify_and_destroy(net, skb, n, classid,
rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc), new);
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
and this finally decrements it to zero,
making qdisc_put() call qdisc_destroy()
The q->qdiscs[] created using qdisc_create_dflt() (or their
replacements, if taprio_graft() was ever to get called) were then
privately freed by taprio_destroy().
This is still what is happening after commit 13511704f8 ("net: taprio
offload: enforce qdisc to netdev queue mapping"), but only for software
mode.
In full offload mode, the per-txq "qdisc_put(old)" calls from
qdisc_graft() now deallocate the child Qdiscs rather than decrement
taprio's refcount. So when notify_and_destroy(taprio) finally calls
taprio_destroy(), the difference is that the child Qdiscs were already
deallocated.
And this is exactly why the taprio_attach() comment "access to the child
qdiscs is not needed in offload mode" is deceptive too. Not only the
q->qdiscs[] array is not needed, but it is also necessary to get rid of
it as soon as possible, because otherwise, we will also call qdisc_put()
on the child Qdiscs in qdisc_destroy() -> taprio_destroy(), and this
will cause a nasty use-after-free/refcount-saturate/whatever.
In short, the problem is that since the blamed commit, taprio_leaf()
needs q->qdiscs[] to not be freed by taprio_attach(), while qdisc_destroy()
-> taprio_destroy() does need q->qdiscs[] to be freed by taprio_attach()
for full offload. Fixing one problem triggers the other.
All of this can be solved by making taprio keep its q->qdiscs[i] with a
refcount elevated at 2 (in offloaded mode where they are attached to the
netdev TX queues), both in taprio_attach() and in taprio_graft(). The
generic qdisc_graft() would just decrement the child qdiscs' refcounts
to 1, and taprio_destroy() would give them the final coup de grace.
However the rabbit hole of changes is getting quite deep, and the
complexity increases. The blamed commit was supposed to be a bug fix in
the first place, and the bug it addressed is not so significant so as to
justify further rework in stable trees. So I'd rather just revert it.
I don't know enough about multi-queue Qdisc design to make a proper
judgement right now regarding what is/isn't idiomatic use of Qdisc
concepts in taprio. I will try to study the problem more and come with a
different solution in net-next.
Fixes: 1461d212ab ("net/sched: taprio: make qdisc_leaf() see the per-netdev-queue pfifo child qdiscs")
Reported-by: Muhammad Husaini Zulkifli <muhammad.husaini.zulkifli@intel.com>
Reported-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221004220100.1650558-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 613fe16923 upstream.
There are a few different places where pahole's version is turned into a
three digit form with the exact same command. Move this command into
scripts/pahole-version.sh to reduce the amount of duplication across the
tree.
Create CONFIG_PAHOLE_VERSION so the version code can be used in Kconfig
to enable and disable configuration options based on the pahole version,
which is already done in a couple of places.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220201205624.652313-3-nathan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Matthias Maennich <maennich@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 118901ad1f upstream.
With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG),
indirect call targets are validated against the expected function
pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate
ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time,
which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed.
ext4_feat_ktype was setting the "release" handler to "kfree", which
doesn't have a matching function prototype. Add a simple wrapper
with the correct prototype.
This was found as a result of Clang's new -Wcast-function-type-strict
flag, which is more sensitive than the simpler -Wcast-function-type,
which only checks for type width mismatches.
Note that this code is only reached when ext4 is a loadable module and
it is being unloaded:
CFI failure at kobject_put+0xbb/0x1b0 (target: kfree+0x0/0x180; expected type: 0x7c4aa698)
...
RIP: 0010:kobject_put+0xbb/0x1b0
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ext4_exit_sysfs+0x14/0x60 [ext4]
cleanup_module+0x67/0xedb [ext4]
Fixes: b99fee58a2 ("ext4: create ext4_feat kobject dynamically")
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Build-tested-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230103234616.never.915-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230104210908.gonna.388-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6c6cd913ac upstream.
We've moved the upstream Linux Kernel audit subsystem discussions to
a new mailing list, this patch updates the MAINTAINERS info with the
new list address.
Marking this for stable inclusion to help speed uptake of the new
list across all of the supported kernel releases. This is a doc only
patch so the risk should be close to nil.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ef38de9217 upstream.
Some android userspace is sending BINDER_TYPE_FDA objects with
num_fds=0. Like the previous patch, this is reproducible when
playing a video.
Before commit 09184ae9b5 BINDER_TYPE_FDA objects with num_fds=0
were 'correctly handled', as in no fixup was performed.
After commit 09184ae9b5 we aggregate fixup and skip regions in
binder_ptr_fixup structs and distinguish between the two by using
the skip_size field: if it's 0, then it's a fixup, otherwise skip.
When processing BINDER_TYPE_FDA objects with num_fds=0 we add a
skip region of skip_size=0, and this causes issues because now
binder_do_deferred_txn_copies will think this was a fixup region.
To address that, return early from binder_translate_fd_array to
avoid adding an empty skip region.
Fixes: 09184ae9b5 ("binder: defer copies of pre-patched txn data")
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alessandro Astone <ales.astone@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220415120015.52684-1-ales.astone@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2d1746e3fd upstream.
When handling BINDER_TYPE_FDA object we are pushing a parent fixup
with a certain skip_size but no scatter-gather copy object, since
the copy is handled standalone.
If BINDER_TYPE_FDA is the last children the scatter-gather copy
loop will never stop to skip it, thus we are left with an item in
the parent fixup list. This will trigger the BUG_ON().
This is reproducible in android when playing a video.
We receive a transaction that looks like this:
obj[0] BINDER_TYPE_PTR, parent
obj[1] BINDER_TYPE_PTR, child
obj[2] BINDER_TYPE_PTR, child
obj[3] BINDER_TYPE_FDA, child
Fixes: 09184ae9b5 ("binder: defer copies of pre-patched txn data")
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alessandro Astone <ales.astone@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220415120015.52684-2-ales.astone@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 09184ae9b5 upstream.
BINDER_TYPE_PTR objects point to memory areas in the
source process to be copied into the target buffer
as part of a transaction. This implements a scatter-
gather model where non-contiguous memory in a source
process is "gathered" into a contiguous region in
the target buffer.
The data can include pointers that must be fixed up
to correctly point to the copied data. To avoid making
source process pointers visible to the target process,
this patch defers the copy until the fixups are known
and then copies and fixeups are done together.
There is a special case of BINDER_TYPE_FDA which applies
the fixup later in the target process context. In this
case the user data is skipped (so no untranslated fds
become visible to the target).
Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130185152.437403-5-tkjos@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 656e01f3ab upstream.
This patch is to prepare for an up coming patch where we read
pre-translated fds from the sender buffer and translate them before
copying them to the target. It does not change run time.
The patch adds two new parameters to binder_translate_fd_array() to
hold the sender buffer and sender buffer parent. These parameters let
us call copy_from_user() directly from the sender instead of using
binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer() to copy from the target. Also the patch
adds some new alignment checks. Previously the alignment checks would
have been done in a different place, but this lets us print more
useful error messages.
Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130185152.437403-4-tkjos@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 74e19ef0ff upstream.
The results of "access_ok()" can be mis-speculated. The result is that
you can end speculatively:
if (access_ok(from, size))
// Right here
even for bad from/size combinations. On first glance, it would be ideal
to just add a speculation barrier to "access_ok()" so that its results
can never be mis-speculated.
But there are lots of system calls just doing access_ok() via
"copy_to_user()" and friends (example: fstat() and friends). Those are
generally not problematic because they do not _consume_ data from
userspace other than the pointer. They are also very quick and common
system calls that should not be needlessly slowed down.
"copy_from_user()" on the other hand uses a user-controller pointer and
is frequently followed up with code that might affect caches. Take
something like this:
if (!copy_from_user(&kernelvar, uptr, size))
do_something_with(kernelvar);
If userspace passes in an evil 'uptr' that *actually* points to a kernel
addresses, and then do_something_with() has cache (or other)
side-effects, it could allow userspace to infer kernel data values.
Add a barrier to the common copy_from_user() code to prevent
mis-speculated values which happen after the copy.
Also add a stub for architectures that do not define barrier_nospec().
This makes the macro usable in generic code.
Since the barrier is now usable in generic code, the x86 #ifdef in the
BPF code can also go away.
Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> # BPF bits
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 111bcb3738 ]
If a relocatable kernel is loaded at a non-zero address and told not to
relocate to zero (kdump or RELOCATABLE_TEST), the mapping of the
interrupt code at zero is left with RWX permissions.
That is a security weakness, and leads to a warning at boot if
CONFIG_DEBUG_WX is enabled:
powerpc/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address 00000000056435bc/0xc000000000000000
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at arch/powerpc/mm/ptdump/ptdump.c:193 note_page+0x484/0x4c0
CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1-00001-g8ae8e98aea82-dirty #175
Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER9 (raw) 0x4e1202 0xf000005 of:SLOF,git-dd0dca hv:linux,kvm pSeries
NIP: c0000000004a1c34 LR: c0000000004a1c30 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c000000003503770 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.2.0-rc1-00001-g8ae8e98aea82-dirty)
MSR: 8000000002029033 <SF,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24000220 XER: 00000000
CFAR: c000000000545a58 IRQMASK: 0
...
NIP note_page+0x484/0x4c0
LR note_page+0x480/0x4c0
Call Trace:
note_page+0x480/0x4c0 (unreliable)
ptdump_pmd_entry+0xc8/0x100
walk_pgd_range+0x618/0xab0
walk_page_range_novma+0x74/0xc0
ptdump_walk_pgd+0x98/0x170
ptdump_check_wx+0x94/0x100
mark_rodata_ro+0x30/0x70
kernel_init+0x78/0x1a0
ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
The fix has two parts. Firstly the pages from zero up to the end of
interrupts need to be marked read-only, so that they are left with R-X
permissions. Secondly the mapping logic needs to be taught to ensure
there is a page boundary at the end of the interrupt region, so that the
permission change only applies to the interrupt text, and not the region
following it.
Fixes: c55d7b5e64 ("powerpc: Remove STRICT_KERNEL_RWX incompatibility with RELOCATABLE")
Reported-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230110124753.1325426-2-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 98d0219e04 ]
If a relocatable kernel is loaded at an address that is not 2MB aligned
and told not to relocate to zero, the kernel can crash due to
mark_rodata_ro() incorrectly changing some read-write data to read-only.
Scenarios where the misalignment can occur are when the kernel is
loaded by kdump or using the RELOCATABLE_TEST config option.
Example crash with the kernel loaded at 5MB:
Run /sbin/init as init process
BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xc000000000452000
Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000005b6730
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1-00011-g349188be4841 #166
Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER9 (raw) 0x4e1202 0xf000005 of:SLOF,git-5b4c5a hv:linux,kvm pSeries
NIP: c0000000005b6730 LR: c000000000ae9ab8 CTR: 0000000000000380
REGS: c000000004503250 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.2.0-rc1-00011-g349188be4841)
MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 44288480 XER: 00000000
CFAR: c0000000005b66ec DAR: c000000000452000 DSISR: 0a000000 IRQMASK: 0
...
NIP memset+0x68/0x104
LR zero_user_segments.constprop.0+0xa8/0xf0
Call Trace:
ext4_mpage_readpages+0x7f8/0x830
ext4_readahead+0x48/0x60
read_pages+0xb8/0x380
page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x19c/0x250
filemap_fault+0x58c/0xae0
__do_fault+0x60/0x100
__handle_mm_fault+0x1230/0x1a40
handle_mm_fault+0x120/0x300
___do_page_fault+0x20c/0xa80
do_page_fault+0x30/0xc0
data_access_common_virt+0x210/0x220
This happens because mark_rodata_ro() tries to change permissions on the
range _stext..__end_rodata, but _stext sits in the middle of the 2MB
page from 4MB to 6MB:
radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000200000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec)
radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000200000-0x0000000000400000 with 2.00 MiB pages
radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000400000-0x0000000002400000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec)
The logic that changes the permissions assumes the linear mapping was
split correctly at boot, so it marks the entire 2MB page read-only. That
leads to the write fault above.
To fix it, the boot time mapping logic needs to consider that if the
kernel is running at a non-zero address then _stext is a boundary where
it must split the mapping.
That leads to the mapping being split correctly, allowing the rodata
permission change to take happen correctly, with no spillover:
radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000200000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec)
radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000200000-0x0000000000400000 with 2.00 MiB pages
radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000500000 with 64.0 KiB pages
radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000500000-0x0000000000600000 with 64.0 KiB pages (exec)
radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000600000-0x0000000002400000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec)
If the kernel is loaded at a 2MB aligned address, the mapping continues
to use 2MB pages as before:
radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000200000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec)
radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000200000-0x0000000000400000 with 2.00 MiB pages
radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000000400000-0x0000000002c00000 with 2.00 MiB pages (exec)
radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000000002c00000-0x0000000100000000 with 2.00 MiB pages
Fixes: c55d7b5e64 ("powerpc: Remove STRICT_KERNEL_RWX incompatibility with RELOCATABLE")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230110124753.1325426-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Stable-dep-of: 111bcb3738 ("powerpc/64s/radix: Fix RWX mapping with relocated kernel")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b150a4d12b ]
Currently __init_begin is used as the boundary for strict RWX between
executable/read-only text and data, and non-executable (after boot) code
and data.
But that's a little subtle, so add an explicit symbol to document that
the SRWX boundary lies there, and add a comment making it clear that
__init_begin must also begin there.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220916131422.318752-2-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Stable-dep-of: 111bcb3738 ("powerpc/64s/radix: Fix RWX mapping with relocated kernel")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f006229135 ]
Debian's gcc-13 [1] throws the following error in
kvaser_usb_hydra_cmd_size():
[1] gcc version 13.0.0 20221214 (experimental) [master r13-4693-g512098a3316] (Debian 13-20221214-1)
| drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb/kvaser_usb_hydra.c:502:65: error:
| array subscript ‘struct kvaser_cmd_ext[0]’ is partly outside array
| bounds of ‘unsigned char[32]’ [-Werror=array-bounds=]
| 502 | ret = le16_to_cpu(((struct kvaser_cmd_ext *)cmd)->len);
kvaser_usb_hydra_cmd_size() returns the size of given command. It
depends on the command number (cmd->header.cmd_no). For extended
commands (cmd->header.cmd_no == CMD_EXTENDED) the above shown code is
executed.
Help gcc to recognize that this code path is not taken in all cases,
by calling kvaser_usb_hydra_cmd_size() directly after assigning the
command number.
Fixes: aec5fb2268 ("can: kvaser_usb: Add support for Kvaser USB hydra family")
Cc: Jimmy Assarsson <extja@kvaser.com>
Cc: Anssi Hannula <anssi.hannula@bitwise.fi>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221219110104.1073881-1-mkl@pengutronix.de
Tested-by: Jimmy Assarsson <extja@kvaser.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2e7eab8142 ]
According to Intel's document on Indirect Branch Restricted
Speculation, "Enabling IBRS does not prevent software from controlling
the predicted targets of indirect branches of unrelated software
executed later at the same predictor mode (for example, between two
different user applications, or two different virtual machines). Such
isolation can be ensured through use of the Indirect Branch Predictor
Barrier (IBPB) command." This applies to both basic and enhanced IBRS.
Since L1 and L2 VMs share hardware predictor modes (guest-user and
guest-kernel), hardware IBRS is not sufficient to virtualize
IBRS. (The way that basic IBRS is implemented on pre-eIBRS parts,
hardware IBRS is actually sufficient in practice, even though it isn't
sufficient architecturally.)
For virtual CPUs that support IBRS, add an indirect branch prediction
barrier on emulated VM-exit, to ensure that the predicted targets of
indirect branches executed in L1 cannot be controlled by software that
was executed in L2.
Since we typically don't intercept guest writes to IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
perform the IBPB at emulated VM-exit regardless of the current
IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS value, even though the IBPB could technically be
deferred until L1 sets IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS, if IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS is
clear at emulated VM-exit.
This is CVE-2022-2196.
Fixes: 5c911beff2 ("KVM: nVMX: Skip IBPB when switching between vmcs01 and vmcs02")
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221019213620.1953281-3-jmattson@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5c30e8101e ]
Skip the WRMSR fastpath in SVM's VM-Exit handler if the next RIP isn't
valid, e.g. because KVM is running with nrips=false. SVM must decode and
emulate to skip the WRMSR if the CPU doesn't provide the next RIP.
Getting the instruction bytes to decode the WRMSR requires reading guest
memory, which in turn means dereferencing memslots, and that isn't safe
because KVM doesn't hold SRCU when the fastpath runs.
Don't bother trying to enable the fastpath for this case, e.g. by doing
only the WRMSR and leaving the "skip" until later. NRIPS is supported on
all modern CPUs (KVM has considered making it mandatory), and the next
RIP will be valid the vast, vast majority of the time.
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.0.0-smp--4e557fcd3d80-skip #13 Tainted: G O
-----------------------------
include/linux/kvm_host.h:954 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by stable/206475:
#0: ffff9d9dfebcc0f0 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x8b/0x620 [kvm]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 152 PID: 206475 Comm: stable Tainted: G O 6.0.0-smp--4e557fcd3d80-skip #13
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 10.48.0 01/27/2022
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xaa
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x11e/0x130
kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x155/0x190 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot+0x18/0x80 [kvm]
paging64_walk_addr_generic+0x183/0x450 [kvm]
paging64_gva_to_gpa+0x63/0xd0 [kvm]
kvm_fetch_guest_virt+0x53/0xc0 [kvm]
__do_insn_fetch_bytes+0x18b/0x1c0 [kvm]
x86_decode_insn+0xf0/0xef0 [kvm]
x86_emulate_instruction+0xba/0x790 [kvm]
kvm_emulate_instruction+0x17/0x20 [kvm]
__svm_skip_emulated_instruction+0x85/0x100 [kvm_amd]
svm_skip_emulated_instruction+0x13/0x20 [kvm_amd]
handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff+0xae/0x180 [kvm]
svm_vcpu_run+0x4b8/0x5a0 [kvm_amd]
vcpu_enter_guest+0x16ca/0x22f0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x39d/0x900 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x538/0x620 [kvm]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x77/0xc0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1d/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Fixes: 404d5d7bff ("KVM: X86: Introduce more exit_fastpath_completion enum values")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220930234031.1732249-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 17122c06b8 ]
Treat any exception during instruction decode for EMULTYPE_SKIP as a
"full" emulation failure, i.e. signal failure instead of queuing the
exception. When decoding purely to skip an instruction, KVM and/or the
CPU has already done some amount of emulation that cannot be unwound,
e.g. on an EPT misconfig VM-Exit KVM has already processeed the emulated
MMIO. KVM already does this if a #UD is encountered, but not for other
exceptions, e.g. if a #PF is encountered during fetch.
In SVM's soft-injection use case, queueing the exception is particularly
problematic as queueing exceptions while injecting events can put KVM
into an infinite loop due to bailing from VM-Enter to service the newly
pending exception. E.g. multiple warnings to detect such behavior fire:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1017 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9873 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1de5/0x20a0 [kvm]
Modules linked in: kvm_amd ccp kvm irqbypass
CPU: 3 PID: 1017 Comm: svm_nested_soft Not tainted 6.0.0-rc1+ #220
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1de5/0x20a0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x223/0x6d0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x85/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1017 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9987 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x12a3/0x20a0 [kvm]
Modules linked in: kvm_amd ccp kvm irqbypass
CPU: 3 PID: 1017 Comm: svm_nested_soft Tainted: G W 6.0.0-rc1+ #220
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x12a3/0x20a0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x223/0x6d0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x85/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fixes: 6ea6e84309 ("KVM: x86: inject exceptions produced by x86_decode_insn")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220930233632.1725475-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d7bf7f3b81 ]
add_latent_entropy() is called every time a process forks, in
kernel_clone(). This in turn calls add_device_randomness() using the
latent entropy global state. add_device_randomness() does two things:
2) Mixes into the input pool the latent entropy argument passed; and
1) Mixes in a cycle counter, a sort of measurement of when the event
took place, the high precision bits of which are presumably
difficult to predict.
(2) is impossible without CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY=y. But (1) is
always possible. However, currently CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY=n
disables both (1) and (2), instead of just (2).
This commit causes the CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY=n case to still
do (1) by passing NULL (len 0) to add_device_randomness() when add_latent_
entropy() is called.
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Fixes: 38addce8b6 ("gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 36926a7d70 ]
On the T208X SoCs, MAC1 and MAC2 support XGMII. Add some new MAC dtsi
fragments, and mark the QMAN ports as 10G.
Fixes: da414bb923 ("powerpc/mpc85xx: Add FSL QorIQ DPAA FMan support to the SoC device tree(s)")
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@seco.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 106ef3bda2 ]
One of the clock entry "dcl" clk has some HW limitations. One is that
its rate can only by changed by changing its parent clk's rate & two is
that HW does not support enable/disable for this clk.
Handle above two limitations by adding relevant flags. Add standard flag
CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT to handle rate change and add driver internal flag
DIV_CLK_NO_MASK to handle enable/disable.
Fixes: d058fd9e89 ("clk: intel: Add CGU clock driver for a new SoC")
Reviewed-by: Yi xin Zhu <yzhu@maxlinear.com>
Signed-off-by: Rahul Tanwar <rtanwar@maxlinear.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a4770e7225f8a0c03c8ab2ba80434a4e8e9afb17.1665642720.git.rtanwar@maxlinear.com
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a5d49bd369 ]
In MxL's LGM SoC, gate clocks can be controlled either from CGU clk driver
i.e. this driver or directly from power management driver/daemon. It is
dependent on the power policy/profile requirements of the end product.
To support such use cases, provide option to override gate clks enable/disable
by adding a flag GATE_CLK_HW which controls if these gate clks are controlled
by HW i.e. this driver or overridden in order to allow it to be controlled
by power profiles instead.
Reviewed-by: Yi xin Zhu <yzhu@maxlinear.com>
Signed-off-by: Rahul Tanwar <rtanwar@maxlinear.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bdc9c89317b5d338a6c4f1d49386b696e947a672.1665642720.git.rtanwar@maxlinear.com
[sboyd@kernel.org: Add braces on many line if-else]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 106ef3bda2 ("clk: mxl: Fix a clk entry by adding relevant flags")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit eaabee88a8 ]
Patch 1/4 of this patch series switches from direct readl/writel
based register access to regmap based register access. Instead
of using direct readl/writel, regmap API's are used to read, write
& read-modify-write clk registers. Regmap API's already use their
own spinlocks to serialize the register accesses across multiple
cores in which case additional driver spinlocks becomes redundant.
Hence, remove redundant spinlocks from driver in this patch 2/4.
Reviewed-by: Yi xin Zhu <yzhu@maxlinear.com>
Signed-off-by: Rahul Tanwar <rtanwar@maxlinear.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a8a02c8773b88924503a9fdaacd37dd2e6488bf3.1665642720.git.rtanwar@maxlinear.com
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 106ef3bda2 ("clk: mxl: Fix a clk entry by adding relevant flags")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 036177310b ]
Earlier version of driver used direct io remapped register read
writes using readl/writel. But we need secure boot access which
is only possible when registers are read & written using regmap.
This is because the security bus/hook is written & coupled only
with regmap layer.
Switch the driver from direct readl/writel based register accesses
to regmap based register accesses.
Additionally, update the license headers to latest status.
Reviewed-by: Yi xin Zhu <yzhu@maxlinear.com>
Signed-off-by: Rahul Tanwar <rtanwar@maxlinear.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2610331918206e0e3bd18babb39393a558fb34f9.1665642720.git.rtanwar@maxlinear.com
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 106ef3bda2 ("clk: mxl: Fix a clk entry by adding relevant flags")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 791082ec0a ]
Re-enable the function rtl8xxxu_gen2_report_connect.
It informs the firmware when connecting to a network. This makes the
firmware enable the rate control, which makes the upload faster.
It also informs the firmware when disconnecting from a network. In the
past this made reconnecting impossible because it was sending the
auth on queue 0x7 (TXDESC_QUEUE_VO) instead of queue 0x12
(TXDESC_QUEUE_MGNT):
wlp0s20f0u3: send auth to 90:55:de:__:__:__ (try 1/3)
wlp0s20f0u3: send auth to 90:55:de:__:__:__ (try 2/3)
wlp0s20f0u3: send auth to 90:55:de:__:__:__ (try 3/3)
wlp0s20f0u3: authentication with 90:55:de:__:__:__ timed out
Probably the firmware disables the unnecessary TX queues when it
knows it's disconnected.
However, this was fixed in commit edd5747aa1 ("wifi: rtl8xxxu: Fix
skb misuse in TX queue selection").
Fixes: c59f13bbea ("rtl8xxxu: Work around issue with 8192eu and 8723bu devices not reconnecting")
Signed-off-by: Bitterblue Smith <rtl8821cerfe2@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/43200afc-0c65-ee72-48f8-231edd1df493@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d37c120b73 ]
While the interface for the MMU mapping takes phys_addr_t to hold a
full 64bit address when necessary and MMUv2 is able to map physical
addresses with up to 40bit, etnaviv_iommu_map() truncates the address
to 32bits. Fix this by using the correct type.
Fixes: 931e97f3af ("drm/etnaviv: mmuv2: support 40 bit phys address")
Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit abce209d18 upstream.
Using the serio subsystem now requires the code to be reachable:
x86_64-linux-ld: drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc.o: in function `amd_pmc_suspend_handler':
pmc.c:(.text+0x86c): undefined reference to `serio_bus'
Add the usual dependency: as other users of serio use 'select'
rather than 'depends on', use the same here.
Fixes: 8e60615e89 ("platform/x86/amd: pmc: Disable IRQ1 wakeup for RN/CZN")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230127093950.2368575-1-arnd@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
