Commit Graph

641311 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Dan Williams
579ef9ea20 array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references
(cherry picked from commit f380420330)

array_index_nospec() is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate
against Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary
checks via speculative execution. The array_index_nospec()
implementation is expected to be safe for current generation CPUs across
multiple architectures (ARM, x86).

Based on an original implementation by Linus Torvalds, tweaked to remove
speculative flows by Alexei Starovoitov, and tweaked again by Linus to
introduce an x86 assembly implementation for the mask generation.

Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@lynx.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414229.33451.18411580953862676575.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:59 +01:00
Mark Rutland
899ab2cf91 Documentation: Document array_index_nospec
(cherry picked from commit f84a56f73d)

Document the rationale and usage of the new array_index_nospec() helper.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727413645.33451.15878817161436755393.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:59 +01:00
Andy Lutomirski
f03d00ba0b x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info
(cherry picked from commit 37a8f7c383)

The TS_COMPAT bit is very hot and is accessed from code paths that mostly
also touch thread_info::flags.  Move it into struct thread_info to improve
cache locality.

The only reason it was in thread_struct is that there was a brief period
during which arch-specific fields were not allowed in struct thread_info.

Linus suggested further changing:

  ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED);

to:

  if (unlikely(ti->status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)))
          ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED);

on the theory that frequently dirtying the cacheline even in pure 64-bit
code that never needs to modify status hurts performance.  That could be a
reasonable followup patch, but I suspect it matters less on top of this
patch.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/03148bcc1b217100e6e8ecf6a5468c45cf4304b6.1517164461.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:59 +01:00
Andy Lutomirski
572e509178 x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away
(cherry picked from commit d1f7732009)

With the fast path removed there is no point in splitting the push of the
normal and the extra register set. Just push the extra regs right away.

[ tglx: Split out from 'x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path' ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/462dff8d4d64dfbfc851fbf3130641809d980ecd.1517164461.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:59 +01:00
Andy Lutomirski
d7f8d17406 x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path
(cherry picked from commit 21d375b6b3)

The SYCALLL64 fast path was a nice, if small, optimization back in the good
old days when syscalls were actually reasonably fast.  Now there is PTI to
slow everything down, and indirect branches are verboten, making everything
messier.  The retpoline code in the fast path is particularly nasty.

Just get rid of the fast path. The slow path is barely slower.

[ tglx: Split out the 'push all extra regs' part ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/462dff8d4d64dfbfc851fbf3130641809d980ecd.1517164461.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:59 +01:00
Dou Liyang
9eedeb72c4 x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser
(cherry picked from commit 9471eee918)

The spectre_v2 option 'auto' does not check whether CONFIG_RETPOLINE is
enabled. As a consequence it fails to emit the appropriate warning and sets
feature flags which have no effect at all.

Add the missing IS_ENABLED() check.

Fixes: da28512156 ("x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f5892721-7528-3647-08fb-f8d10e65ad87@cn.fujitsu.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:59 +01:00
Borislav Petkov
77d1424d2f x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()
(cherry picked from commit 1dde7415e9)

Simplify it to call an asm-function instead of pasting 41 insn bytes at
every call site. Also, add alignment to the macro as suggested here:

  https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886

[dwmw2: Clean up comments, let it clobber %ebx and just tell the compiler]

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:59 +01:00
David Woodhouse
77b3b3ee23 x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags
(cherry picked from commit 2961298efe)

We want to expose the hardware features simply in /proc/cpuinfo as "ibrs",
"ibpb" and "stibp". Since AMD has separate CPUID bits for those, use them
as the user-visible bits.

When the Intel SPEC_CTRL bit is set which indicates both IBRS and IBPB
capability, set those (AMD) bits accordingly. Likewise if the Intel STIBP
bit is set, set the AMD STIBP that's used for the generic hardware
capability.

Hide the rest from /proc/cpuinfo by putting "" in the comments. Including
RETPOLINE and RETPOLINE_AMD which shouldn't be visible there. There are
patches to make the sysfs vulnerabilities information non-readable by
non-root, and the same should apply to all information about which
mitigations are actually in use. Those *shouldn't* appear in /proc/cpuinfo.

The feature bit for whether IBPB is actually used, which is needed for
ALTERNATIVEs, is renamed to X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB.

Originally-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:59 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
98911226d5 x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional
(cherry picked from commit e383095c7f)

If sysfs is disabled and RETPOLINE not defined:

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:97:13: warning: ‘spectre_v2_bad_module’ defined but not used
[-Wunused-variable]
 static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;

Hide it.

Fixes: caf7501a1b ("module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module")
Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:59 +01:00
Borislav Petkov
557cbfa222 x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg
(cherry picked from commit 55fa19d3e5)

Make

[    0.031118] Spectre V2 mitigation: Mitigation: Full generic retpoline

into

[    0.031118] Spectre V2: Mitigation: Full generic retpoline

to reduce the mitigation mitigations strings.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: riel@redhat.com
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: jikos@kernel.org
Cc: luto@amacapital.net
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: pjt@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180126121139.31959-5-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:58 +01:00
Borislav Petkov
18bc71dff6 x86/nospec: Fix header guards names
(cherry picked from commit 7a32fc51ca)

... to adhere to the _ASM_X86_ naming scheme.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: riel@redhat.com
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: jikos@kernel.org
Cc: luto@amacapital.net
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Cc: pjt@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180126121139.31959-3-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:58 +01:00
David Woodhouse
31fd9eda7f x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support
(cherry picked from commit 20ffa1caec)

Expose indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() for use in subsequent patches.

[ tglx: Add IBPB status to spectre_v2 sysfs file ]

Co-developed-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-8-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:58 +01:00
David Woodhouse
6c5e49150a x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes
(cherry picked from commit a5b2966364)

This doesn't refuse to load the affected microcodes; it just refuses to
use the Spectre v2 mitigation features if they're detected, by clearing
the appropriate feature bits.

The AMD CPUID bits are handled here too, because hypervisors *may* have
been exposing those bits even on Intel chips, for fine-grained control
of what's available.

It is non-trivial to use x86_match_cpu() for this table because that
doesn't handle steppings. And the approach taken in commit bd9240a18
almost made me lose my lunch.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:58 +01:00
David Woodhouse
a8799fd14d x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
(cherry picked from commit fec9434a12)

Also, for CPUs which don't speculate at all, don't report that they're
vulnerable to the Spectre variants either.

Leave the cpu_no_meltdown[] match table with just X86_VENDOR_AMD in it
for now, even though that could be done with a simple comparison, on the
assumption that we'll have more to add.

Based on suggestions from Dave Hansen and Alan Cox.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-6-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:58 +01:00
David Woodhouse
af57d43c90 x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs
(cherry picked from commit 1e340c60d0)

Add MSR and bit definitions for SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD and ARCH_CAPABILITIES.

See Intel's 336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:58 +01:00
David Woodhouse
c26a6bea26 x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control
(cherry picked from commit 5d10cbc91d)

AMD exposes the PRED_CMD/SPEC_CTRL MSRs slightly differently to Intel.
See http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2b3e25cc-286d-8bd0-aeaf-9ac4aae39de8@amd.com

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:58 +01:00
David Woodhouse
40532f65cc x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control
(cherry picked from commit fc67dd70ad)

Add three feature bits exposed by new microcode on Intel CPUs for
speculation control.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:58 +01:00
David Woodhouse
d3eba77440 x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf
(cherry picked from commit 95ca0ee863)

This is a pure feature bits leaf. There are two AVX512 feature bits in it
already which were handled as scattered bits, and three more from this leaf
are going to be added for speculation control features.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:58 +01:00
Andi Kleen
a1745ad92f module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module
(cherry picked from commit caf7501a1b)

There's a risk that a kernel which has full retpoline mitigations becomes
vulnerable when a module gets loaded that hasn't been compiled with the
right compiler or the right option.

To enable detection of that mismatch at module load time, add a module info
string "retpoline" at build time when the module was compiled with
retpoline support. This only covers compiled C source, but assembler source
or prebuilt object files are not checked.

If a retpoline enabled kernel detects a non retpoline protected module at
load time, print a warning and report it in the sysfs vulnerability file.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: jeyu@kernel.org
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125235028.31211-1-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:58 +01:00
Peter Zijlstra
ec86a1dad0 KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe
(cherry picked from commit c940a3fb1e)

Replace indirect call with CALL_NOSPEC.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: rga@amazon.de
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125095843.645776917@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:57 +01:00
Peter Zijlstra
fea3c9a540 KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe
(cherry picked from commit 1a29b5b7f3)

Replace the indirect calls with CALL_NOSPEC.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: rga@amazon.de
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125095843.595615683@infradead.org
[dwmw2: Use ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT like upstream, now we have it]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:57 +01:00
Waiman Long
734e687d1d x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk
(cherry picked from commit 1df37383a8)

It doesn't make sense to have an indirect call thunk with esp/rsp as
retpoline code won't work correctly with the stack pointer register.
Removing it will help compiler writers to catch error in case such
a thunk call is emitted incorrectly.

Fixes: 76b043848f ("x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support")
Suggested-by: Jeff Law <law@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516658974-27852-1-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers
9692602ab8 KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()
commit 794b4bc292 upstream.

With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a
data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected,
e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'.  When validating such a
master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end
of the buffer.  Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp().  [Also
clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.]

Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:57 +01:00
Takashi Iwai
0a01ecbd23 b43: Add missing MODULE_FIRMWARE()
commit 3c89a72ad8 upstream.

Some firmware entries were forgotten to be added via MODULE_FIRMWARE(), which
may result in the non-functional state when the driver is loaded in initrd.

Link: http://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1037344
Fixes: 15be8e89cd ("b43: add more bcma cores")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:57 +01:00
Jesse Chan
113d22965c media: soc_camera: soc_scale_crop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE
commit 5331aec1bf upstream.

This change resolves a new compile-time warning
when built as a loadable module:

WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_LICENSE() in drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.o
see include/linux/module.h for more information

This adds the license as "GPL", which matches the header of the file.

MODULE_DESCRIPTION and MODULE_AUTHOR are also added.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Chan <jc@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:57 +01:00
Borislav Petkov
dd7b14c3e0 x86/microcode/AMD: Do not load when running on a hypervisor
commit a15a753539 upstream.

Doing so is completely void of sense for multiple reasons so prevent
it. Set dis_ucode_ldr to true and thus disable the microcode loader by
default to address xen pv guests which execute the AP path but not the
BSP path.

By having it turned off by default, the APs won't run into the loader
either.

Also, check CPUID(1).ECX[31] which hypervisors set. Well almost, not the
xen pv one. That one gets the aforementioned "fix".

Also, improve the detection method by caching the final decision whether
to continue loading in dis_ucode_ldr and do it once on the BSP. The APs
then simply test that value.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161218164414.9649-4-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Rolf Neugebauer <rolf.neugebauer@docker.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:57 +01:00
Josh Poimboeuf
0a9b2dec6c x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4
commit 520a13c530 upstream.

The kernel test bot (run by Xiaolong Ye) reported that the following commit:

  f5caf621ee ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")

is causing double faults in a kernel compiled with GCC 4.4.

Linus subsequently diagnosed the crash pattern and the buggy commit and found that
the issue is with this code:

  register unsigned int __asm_call_sp asm("esp");
  #define ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT "+r" (__asm_call_sp)

Even on a 64-bit kernel, it's using ESP instead of RSP.  That causes GCC
to produce the following bogus code:

  ffffffff8147461d:       89 e0                   mov    %esp,%eax
  ffffffff8147461f:       4c 89 f7                mov    %r14,%rdi
  ffffffff81474622:       4c 89 fe                mov    %r15,%rsi
  ffffffff81474625:       ba 20 00 00 00          mov    $0x20,%edx
  ffffffff8147462a:       89 c4                   mov    %eax,%esp
  ffffffff8147462c:       e8 bf 52 05 00          callq  ffffffff814c98f0 <copy_user_generic_unrolled>

Despite the absurdity of it backing up and restoring the stack pointer
for no reason, the bug is actually the fact that it's only backing up
and restoring the lower 32 bits of the stack pointer.  The upper 32 bits
are getting cleared out, corrupting the stack pointer.

So change the '__asm_call_sp' register variable to be associated with
the actual full-size stack pointer.

This also requires changing the __ASM_SEL() macro to be based on the
actual compiled arch size, rather than the CONFIG value, because
CONFIG_X86_64 compiles some files with '-m32' (e.g., realmode and vdso).
Otherwise Clang fails to build the kernel because it complains about the
use of a 64-bit register (RSP) in a 32-bit file.

Reported-and-Bisected-and-Tested-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
Diagnosed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: LKP <lkp@01.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: f5caf621ee ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170928215826.6sdpmwtkiydiytim@treble
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:57 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
b671f40419 soreuseport: fix mem leak in reuseport_add_sock()
[ Upstream commit 4db428a7c9 ]

reuseport_add_sock() needs to deal with attaching a socket having
its own sk_reuseport_cb, after a prior
setsockopt(SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_?BPF)

Without this fix, not only a WARN_ONCE() was issued, but we were also
leaking memory.

Thanks to sysbot and Eric Biggers for providing us nice C repros.

------------[ cut here ]------------
socket already in reuseport group
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3496 at net/core/sock_reuseport.c:119  
reuseport_add_sock+0x742/0x9b0 net/core/sock_reuseport.c:117
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...

CPU: 0 PID: 3496 Comm: syzkaller869503 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc6+ #245
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
BIOS  
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
  panic+0x1e4/0x41c kernel/panic.c:183
  __warn+0x1dc/0x200 kernel/panic.c:547
  report_bug+0x211/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:184
  fixup_bug.part.11+0x37/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178
  fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:247 [inline]
  do_error_trap+0x2d7/0x3e0 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:296
  do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:315
  invalid_op+0x22/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1079

Fixes: ef456144da ("soreuseport: define reuseport groups")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+c0ea2226f77a42936bf7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com>

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:57 +01:00
Martin KaFai Lau
5771415d24 ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only
[ Upstream commit 7ece54a60e ]

If a sk_v6_rcv_saddr is !IPV6_ADDR_ANY and !IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED, it
implicitly implies it is an ipv6only socket.  However, in inet6_bind(),
this addr_type checking and setting sk->sk_ipv6only to 1 are only done
after sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum) has been completed successfully.

This inconsistency between sk_v6_rcv_saddr and sk_ipv6only confuses
the 'get_port()'.

In particular, when binding SO_REUSEPORT UDP sockets,
udp_reuseport_add_sock(sk,...) is called.  udp_reuseport_add_sock()
checks "ipv6_only_sock(sk2) == ipv6_only_sock(sk)" before adding sk to
sk2->sk_reuseport_cb.  In this case, ipv6_only_sock(sk2) could be
1 while ipv6_only_sock(sk) is still 0 here.  The end result is,
reuseport_alloc(sk) is called instead of adding sk to the existing
sk2->sk_reuseport_cb.

It can be reproduced by binding two SO_REUSEPORT UDP sockets on an
IPv6 address (!ANY and !MAPPED).  Only one of the socket will
receive packet.

The fix is to set the implicit sk_ipv6only before calling get_port().
The original sk_ipv6only has to be saved such that it can be restored
in case get_port() failed.  The situation is similar to the
inet_reset_saddr(sk) after get_port() has failed.

Thanks to Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com> who created an easy
reproduction which leads to a fix.

Fixes: e32ea7e747 ("soreuseport: fast reuseport UDP socket selection")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:57 +01:00
Paolo Abeni
fa46d1437f cls_u32: add missing RCU annotation.
[ Upstream commit 058a6c0334 ]

In a couple of points of the control path, n->ht_down is currently
accessed without the required RCU annotation. The accesses are
safe, but sparse complaints. Since we already held the
rtnl lock, let use rtnl_dereference().

Fixes: a1b7c5fd7f ("net: sched: add cls_u32 offload hooks for netdevs")
Fixes: de5df63228 ("net: sched: cls_u32 changes to knode must appear atomic to readers")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:56 +01:00
Neal Cardwell
b980f718f5 tcp_bbr: fix pacing_gain to always be unity when using lt_bw
[ Upstream commit 3aff3b4b98 ]

This commit fixes the pacing_gain to remain at BBR_UNIT (1.0) when
using lt_bw and returning from the PROBE_RTT state to PROBE_BW.

Previously, when using lt_bw, upon exiting PROBE_RTT and entering
PROBE_BW the bbr_reset_probe_bw_mode() code could sometimes randomly
end up with a cycle_idx of 0 and hence have bbr_advance_cycle_phase()
set a pacing gain above 1.0. In such cases this would result in a
pacing rate that is 1.25x higher than intended, potentially resulting
in a high loss rate for a little while until we stop using the lt_bw a
bit later.

This commit is a stable candidate for kernels back as far as 4.9.

Fixes: 0f8782ea14 ("tcp_bbr: add BBR congestion control")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reported-by: Beyers Cronje <bcronje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:56 +01:00
Jason Wang
73adb3b74e vhost_net: stop device during reset owner
[ Upstream commit 4cd879515d ]

We don't stop device before reset owner, this means we could try to
serve any virtqueue kick before reset dev->worker. This will result a
warn since the work was pending at llist during owner resetting. Fix
this by stopping device during owner reset.

Reported-by: syzbot+eb17c6162478cc50632c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 3a4d5c94e9 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server")
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:56 +01:00
Li RongQing
ee46a86142 tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect
[ Upstream commit 9b42d55a66 ]

socket can be disconnected and gets transformed back to a listening
socket, if sk_frag.page is not released, which will be cloned into
a new socket by sk_clone_lock, but the reference count of this page
is increased, lead to a use after free or double free issue

Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:56 +01:00
Chunhao Lin
5db5cabbf0 r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization.
[ Upstream commit 086ca23d03 ]

Driver check the wrong register bit in rtl_ocp_tx_cond() that keep driver
waiting until timeout.

Fix this by waiting for the right register bit.

Signed-off-by: Chunhao Lin <hau@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:56 +01:00
Kristian Evensen
9f2f873d5a qmi_wwan: Add support for Quectel EP06
[ Upstream commit c0b91a56a2 ]

The Quectel EP06 is a Cat. 6 LTE modem. It uses the same interface as
the EC20/EC25 for QMI, and requires the same "set DTR"-quirk to work.

Signed-off-by: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:56 +01:00
Junxiao Bi
97fe899816 qlcnic: fix deadlock bug
[ Upstream commit 233ac38916 ]

The following soft lockup was caught. This is a deadlock caused by
recusive locking.

Process kworker/u40:1:28016 was holding spin lock "mbx->queue_lock" in
qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker(), while a softirq came in and ask the same spin
lock in qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(). This lock should be hold by disable
bh..

[161846.962125] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 22s! [kworker/u40:1:28016]
[161846.962367] Modules linked in: tun ocfs2 xen_netback xen_blkback xen_gntalloc xen_gntdev xen_evtchn xenfs xen_privcmd autofs4 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs bnx2fc fcoe libfcoe libfc sunrpc 8021q mrp garp bridge stp llc bonding dm_round_robin dm_multipath iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support pcspkr sb_edac edac_core i2c_i801 shpchp lpc_ich mfd_core ioatdma ipmi_devintf ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler sg ext4 jbd2 mbcache2 sr_mod cdrom sd_mod igb i2c_algo_bit i2c_core ahci libahci megaraid_sas ixgbe dca ptp pps_core vxlan udp_tunnel ip6_udp_tunnel qla2xxx scsi_transport_fc qlcnic crc32c_intel be2iscsi bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi ipv6 cxgb3 mdio libiscsi_tcp qla4xxx iscsi_boot_sysfs libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[161846.962454]
[161846.962460] CPU: 1 PID: 28016 Comm: kworker/u40:1 Not tainted 4.1.12-94.5.9.el6uek.x86_64 #2
[161846.962463] Hardware name: Oracle Corporation SUN SERVER X4-2L      /ASSY,MB,X4-2L         , BIOS 26050100 09/19/2017
[161846.962489] Workqueue: qlcnic_mailbox qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker [qlcnic]
[161846.962493] task: ffff8801f2e34600 ti: ffff88004ca5c000 task.ti: ffff88004ca5c000
[161846.962496] RIP: e030:[<ffffffff810013aa>]  [<ffffffff810013aa>] xen_hypercall_sched_op+0xa/0x20
[161846.962506] RSP: e02b:ffff880202e43388  EFLAGS: 00000206
[161846.962509] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f6996b70 RCX: ffffffff810013aa
[161846.962511] RDX: ffff880202e433cc RSI: ffff880202e433b0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[161846.962513] RBP: ffff880202e433d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8801fe893200
[161846.962516] R10: ffff8801fe400538 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: ffff880202e4b000
[161846.962518] R13: 0000000000000050 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000000000000020d
[161846.962528] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880202e40000(0000) knlGS:ffff880202e40000
[161846.962531] CS:  e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[161846.962533] CR2: 0000000002612640 CR3: 00000001bb796000 CR4: 0000000000042660
[161846.962536] Stack:
[161846.962538]  ffff880202e43608 0000000000000000 ffffffff813f0442 ffff880202e433b0
[161846.962543]  0000000000000000 ffff880202e433cc ffffffff00000001 0000000000000000
[161846.962547]  00000009813f03d6 ffff880202e433e0 ffffffff813f0460 ffff880202e43440
[161846.962552] Call Trace:
[161846.962555]  <IRQ>
[161846.962565]  [<ffffffff813f0442>] ? xen_poll_irq_timeout+0x42/0x50
[161846.962570]  [<ffffffff813f0460>] xen_poll_irq+0x10/0x20
[161846.962578]  [<ffffffff81014222>] xen_lock_spinning+0xe2/0x110
[161846.962583]  [<ffffffff81013f01>] __raw_callee_save_xen_lock_spinning+0x11/0x20
[161846.962592]  [<ffffffff816e5c57>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x57/0x80
[161846.962609]  [<ffffffffa028acfc>] qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd+0x7c/0xe0 [qlcnic]
[161846.962623]  [<ffffffffa028e008>] qlcnic_83xx_issue_cmd+0x58/0x210 [qlcnic]
[161846.962636]  [<ffffffffa028caf2>] qlcnic_83xx_sre_macaddr_change+0x162/0x1d0 [qlcnic]
[161846.962649]  [<ffffffffa028cb8b>] qlcnic_83xx_change_l2_filter+0x2b/0x30 [qlcnic]
[161846.962657]  [<ffffffff8160248b>] ? __skb_flow_dissect+0x18b/0x650
[161846.962670]  [<ffffffffa02856e5>] qlcnic_send_filter+0x205/0x250 [qlcnic]
[161846.962682]  [<ffffffffa0285c77>] qlcnic_xmit_frame+0x547/0x7b0 [qlcnic]
[161846.962691]  [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0
[161846.962696]  [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0
[161846.962701]  [<ffffffff81630112>] sch_direct_xmit+0x112/0x220
[161846.962706]  [<ffffffff8160b80f>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1df/0x5e0
[161846.962710]  [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20
[161846.962721]  [<ffffffffa0575bd5>] bond_dev_queue_xmit+0x35/0x80 [bonding]
[161846.962729]  [<ffffffffa05769fb>] __bond_start_xmit+0x1cb/0x210 [bonding]
[161846.962736]  [<ffffffffa0576a71>] bond_start_xmit+0x31/0x60 [bonding]
[161846.962740]  [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0
[161846.962745]  [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0
[161846.962749]  [<ffffffff8160bb1e>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x4ee/0x5e0
[161846.962754]  [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20
[161846.962760]  [<ffffffffa05cfa72>] vlan_dev_hard_start_xmit+0xb2/0x150 [8021q]
[161846.962764]  [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0
[161846.962769]  [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0
[161846.962773]  [<ffffffff8160bb1e>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x4ee/0x5e0
[161846.962777]  [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20
[161846.962789]  [<ffffffffa05adf74>] br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x54/0xa0 [bridge]
[161846.962797]  [<ffffffffa05ae4ff>] br_forward_finish+0x2f/0x90 [bridge]
[161846.962807]  [<ffffffff810b0dad>] ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x1d/0x100
[161846.962811]  [<ffffffff815f929b>] ? __alloc_skb+0x8b/0x1f0
[161846.962818]  [<ffffffffa05ae04d>] __br_forward+0x8d/0x120 [bridge]
[161846.962822]  [<ffffffff815f613b>] ? __kmalloc_reserve+0x3b/0xa0
[161846.962829]  [<ffffffff810be55e>] ? update_rq_runnable_avg+0xee/0x230
[161846.962836]  [<ffffffffa05ae176>] br_forward+0x96/0xb0 [bridge]
[161846.962845]  [<ffffffffa05af85e>] br_handle_frame_finish+0x1ae/0x420 [bridge]
[161846.962853]  [<ffffffffa05afc4f>] br_handle_frame+0x17f/0x260 [bridge]
[161846.962862]  [<ffffffffa05afad0>] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x420/0x420 [bridge]
[161846.962867]  [<ffffffff8160d057>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1f7/0x870
[161846.962872]  [<ffffffff8160d6f2>] __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x70
[161846.962877]  [<ffffffff8160d913>] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x23/0x90
[161846.962884]  [<ffffffffa07512ea>] ? xenvif_idx_release+0xea/0x100 [xen_netback]
[161846.962889]  [<ffffffff816e5a10>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x20/0x50
[161846.962893]  [<ffffffff8160e624>] netif_receive_skb_sk+0x24/0x90
[161846.962899]  [<ffffffffa075269a>] xenvif_tx_submit+0x2ca/0x3f0 [xen_netback]
[161846.962906]  [<ffffffffa0753f0c>] xenvif_tx_action+0x9c/0xd0 [xen_netback]
[161846.962915]  [<ffffffffa07567f5>] xenvif_poll+0x35/0x70 [xen_netback]
[161846.962920]  [<ffffffff8160e01b>] napi_poll+0xcb/0x1e0
[161846.962925]  [<ffffffff8160e1c0>] net_rx_action+0x90/0x1c0
[161846.962931]  [<ffffffff8108aaba>] __do_softirq+0x10a/0x350
[161846.962938]  [<ffffffff8108ae75>] irq_exit+0x125/0x130
[161846.962943]  [<ffffffff813f03a9>] xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x39/0x50
[161846.962950]  [<ffffffff816e7ffe>] xen_do_hypervisor_callback+0x1e/0x40
[161846.962952]  <EOI>
[161846.962959]  [<ffffffff816e5c4a>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x4a/0x80
[161846.962964]  [<ffffffff816e5b1e>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1e/0xa0
[161846.962978]  [<ffffffffa028e279>] ? qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker+0xb9/0x2a0 [qlcnic]
[161846.962991]  [<ffffffff810a14e1>] ? process_one_work+0x151/0x4b0
[161846.962995]  [<ffffffff8100c3f2>] ? check_events+0x12/0x20
[161846.963001]  [<ffffffff810a1960>] ? worker_thread+0x120/0x480
[161846.963005]  [<ffffffff816e187b>] ? __schedule+0x30b/0x890
[161846.963010]  [<ffffffff810a1840>] ? process_one_work+0x4b0/0x4b0
[161846.963015]  [<ffffffff810a1840>] ? process_one_work+0x4b0/0x4b0
[161846.963021]  [<ffffffff810a6b3e>] ? kthread+0xce/0xf0
[161846.963025]  [<ffffffff810a6a70>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70
[161846.963031]  [<ffffffff816e6522>] ? ret_from_fork+0x42/0x70
[161846.963035]  [<ffffffff810a6a70>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70
[161846.963037] Code: cc 51 41 53 b8 1c 00 00 00 0f 05 41 5b 59 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 51 41 53 b8 1d 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 5b 59 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc

Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:56 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
ce43c07fce net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section
[ Upstream commit e7aadb27a5 ]

Newly added igmpv3_get_srcaddr() needs to be called under rcu lock.

Timer callbacks do not ensure this locking.

=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
4.15.0+ #200 Not tainted
-----------------------------
./include/linux/inetdevice.h:216 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
3 locks held by syzkaller616973/4074:
 #0:  (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bfce669e>] __do_page_fault+0x32d/0xc90 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1355
 #1:  ((&im->timer)){+.-.}, at: [<00000000619d2f71>] lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:178 [inline]
 #1:  ((&im->timer)){+.-.}, at: [<00000000619d2f71>] call_timer_fn+0x1c6/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1316
 #2:  (&(&im->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000005f833c5c>] spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:315 [inline]
 #2:  (&(&im->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000005f833c5c>] igmpv3_send_report+0x98/0x5b0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:600

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 4074 Comm: syzkaller616973 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #200
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4592
 __in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:216 [inline]
 igmpv3_get_srcaddr net/ipv4/igmp.c:329 [inline]
 igmpv3_newpack+0xeef/0x12e0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:389
 add_grhead.isra.27+0x235/0x300 net/ipv4/igmp.c:432
 add_grec+0xbd3/0x1170 net/ipv4/igmp.c:565
 igmpv3_send_report+0xd5/0x5b0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:605
 igmp_send_report+0xc43/0x1050 net/ipv4/igmp.c:722
 igmp_timer_expire+0x322/0x5c0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:831
 call_timer_fn+0x228/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1326
 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline]
 __run_timers+0x7ee/0xb70 kernel/time/timer.c:1666
 run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692
 __do_softirq+0x2d7/0xb85 kernel/softirq.c:285
 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline]
 irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405
 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:541 [inline]
 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16b/0x700 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052
 apic_timer_interrupt+0xa9/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:938

Fixes: a46182b002 ("net: igmp: Use correct source address on IGMPv3 reports")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:56 +01:00
Nikolay Aleksandrov
7d3d60ef22 ip6mr: fix stale iterator
[ Upstream commit 4adfa79fc2 ]

When we dump the ip6mr mfc entries via proc, we initialize an iterator
with the table to dump but we don't clear the cache pointer which might
be initialized from a prior read on the same descriptor that ended. This
can result in lock imbalance (an unnecessary unlock) leading to other
crashes and hangs. Clear the cache pointer like ipmr does to fix the issue.
Thanks for the reliable reproducer.

Here's syzbot's trace:
 WARNING: bad unlock balance detected!
 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Not tainted
 syzkaller971460/3195 is trying to release lock (mrt_lock) at:
 [<000000006898068d>] ipmr_mfc_seq_stop+0xe1/0x130 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:553
 but there are no more locks to release!

 other info that might help us debug this:
 1 lock held by syzkaller971460/3195:
  #0:  (&p->lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000744a6565>] seq_read+0xd5/0x13d0
 fs/seq_file.c:165

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 1 PID: 3195 Comm: syzkaller971460 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc3+ #128
 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
 Google 01/01/2011
 Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
  print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x12f/0x140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3561
  __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3775 [inline]
  lock_release+0x5f9/0xda0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4023
  __raw_read_unlock include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:225 [inline]
  _raw_read_unlock+0x1a/0x30 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:255
  ipmr_mfc_seq_stop+0xe1/0x130 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:553
  traverse+0x3bc/0xa00 fs/seq_file.c:135
  seq_read+0x96a/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:189
  proc_reg_read+0xef/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:217
  do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:673 [inline]
  do_iter_read+0x3db/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:897
  compat_readv+0x1bf/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1140
  do_compat_preadv64+0xdc/0x100 fs/read_write.c:1189
  C_SYSC_preadv fs/read_write.c:1209 [inline]
  compat_SyS_preadv+0x3b/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1203
  do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline]
  do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389
  entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x51/0x60 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:125
 RIP: 0023:0xf7f73c79
 RSP: 002b:00000000e574a15c EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000014d
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000f RCX: 0000000020a3afb0
 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000067 RDI: 0000000000000000
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at lib/usercopy.c:25
 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 3195, name: syzkaller971460
 INFO: lockdep is turned off.
 CPU: 1 PID: 3195 Comm: syzkaller971460 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc3+ #128
 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
 Google 01/01/2011
 Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
  ___might_sleep+0x2b2/0x470 kernel/sched/core.c:6060
  __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6013
  __might_fault+0xab/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4525
  _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25
  copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline]
  seq_read+0xcb4/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:279
  proc_reg_read+0xef/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:217
  do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:673 [inline]
  do_iter_read+0x3db/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:897
  compat_readv+0x1bf/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1140
  do_compat_preadv64+0xdc/0x100 fs/read_write.c:1189
  C_SYSC_preadv fs/read_write.c:1209 [inline]
  compat_SyS_preadv+0x3b/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1203
  do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline]
  do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389
  entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x51/0x60 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:125
 RIP: 0023:0xf7f73c79
 RSP: 002b:00000000e574a15c EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000014d
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000f RCX: 0000000020a3afb0
 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000067 RDI: 0000000000000000
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3195 at lib/usercopy.c:26 _copy_to_user+0xb5/0xc0
 lib/usercopy.c:26

Reported-by: syzbot <bot+eceb3204562c41a438fa1f2335e0fe4f6886d669@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:56 +01:00
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
ffcf167d34 serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change
commit 44117a1d17 upstream.

setserial changes the IRQ via uart_set_info(). It invokes
uart_shutdown() which free the current used IRQ and clear
TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED. It will then update the IRQ number and invoke
uart_startup() before returning to the caller leaving
TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED cleared.

The next open will crash with
|  list_add double add: new=ffffffff839fcc98, prev=ffffffff839fcc98, next=ffffffff839fcc98.
since the close from the IOCTL won't free the IRQ (and clean the list)
due to the TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED check in uart_shutdown().

There is same pattern in uart_do_autoconfig() and I *think* it also
needs to set TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED there.
Is there a reason why uart_startup() does not set the flag by itself
after the IRQ has been acquired (since it is cleared in uart_shutdown)?

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:56 +01:00
Hugh Dickins
400d3c8b0c kaiser: allocate pgd with order 0 when pti=off
The 4.9.77 version of "x86/pti/efi: broken conversion from efi to kernel
page table" looked nicer than the 4.4.112 version, but was suboptimal on
machines booted with "pti=off" (or on AMD machines): it allocated pgd
with an order 1 page whatever the setting of kaiser_enabled.

Fix that by moving the definition of PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER from
asm/pgalloc.h to asm/pgtable.h, which already defines kaiser_enabled.

Fixes: 1b92c48a2e ("x86/pti/efi: broken conversion from efi to kernel page table")
Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:55 +01:00
Dave Hansen
ae1fc8de51 x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real
commit 445b69e3b7 upstream

The inital fix for trusted boot and PTI potentially misses the pgd clearing
if pud_alloc() sets a PGD.  It probably works in *practice* because for two
adjacent calls to map_tboot_page() that share a PGD entry, the first will
clear NX, *then* allocate and set the PGD (without NX clear).  The second
call will *not* allocate but will clear the NX bit.

Defer the NX clearing to a point after it is known that all top-level
allocations have occurred.  Add a comment to clarify why.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

[ hughd notes: I have not tested tboot, but this looks to me as necessary
and as safe in old-Kaiser backports as it is upstream; I'm not submitting
the commit-to-be-fixed 262b6b3008, since it was undone by 445b69e3b7,
and makes conflict trouble because of 5-level's p4d versus 4-level's pgd.]

Fixes: 262b6b3008 ("x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled")
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: ning.sun@intel.com
Cc: tboot-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: andi@firstfloor.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: law@redhat.com
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Cc: dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Cc: nickc@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110224939.2695CD47@viggo.jf.intel.com
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:55 +01:00
Hugh Dickins
0a61cd6cae kaiser: fix intel_bts perf crashes
Vince reported perf_fuzzer quickly locks up on 4.15-rc7 with PTI;
Robert reported Bad RIP with KPTI and Intel BTS also on 4.15-rc7:
honggfuzz -f /tmp/somedirectorywithatleastonefile \
          --linux_perf_bts_edge -s -- /bin/true
(honggfuzz from https://github.com/google/honggfuzz) crashed with
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff9d3215100000
(then narrowed it down to
perf record --per-thread -e intel_bts//u -- /bin/ls).

The intel_bts driver does not use the 'normal' BTS buffer which is
exposed through kaiser_add_mapping(), but instead uses the memory
allocated for the perf AUX buffer.

This obviously comes apart when using PTI, because then the kernel
mapping, which includes that AUX buffer memory, disappears while
switched to user page tables.

Easily fixed in old-Kaiser backports, by applying kaiser_add_mapping()
to those pages; perhaps not so easy for upstream, where 4.15-rc8 commit
99a9dc98ba ("x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI") disables for now.

Slightly reorganized surrounding code in bts_buffer_setup_aux(),
so it can better match bts_buffer_free_aux(): free_aux with an #ifdef
to avoid the loop when PTI is off, but setup_aux needs to loop anyway
(and kaiser_add_mapping() is cheap when PTI config is off or "pti=off").

Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Reported-by: Robert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net>
Analyzed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Analyzed-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vince@deater.net>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:55 +01:00
Jesse Chan
374c84de94 ASoC: pcm512x: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE
commit 0cab20cec0 upstream.

This change resolves a new compile-time warning
when built as a loadable module:

WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_LICENSE() in sound/soc/codecs/snd-soc-pcm512x-spi.o
see include/linux/module.h for more information

This adds the license as "GPL v2", which matches the header of the file.

MODULE_DESCRIPTION and MODULE_AUTHOR are also added.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Chan <jc@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:55 +01:00
Jesse Chan
0ee4f5e7bb pinctrl: pxa: pxa2xx: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE
commit 0b9335cbd3 upstream.

This change resolves a new compile-time warning
when built as a loadable module:

WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_LICENSE() in drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.o
see include/linux/module.h for more information

This adds the license as "GPL v2", which matches the header of the file.

MODULE_DESCRIPTION and MODULE_AUTHOR are also added.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Chan <jc@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:55 +01:00
Jesse Chan
781a2d6831 auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE
commit 09c479f7f1 upstream.

This change resolves a new compile-time warning
when built as a loadable module:

WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_LICENSE() in drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.o
see include/linux/module.h for more information

This adds the license as "GPL", which matches the header of the file.

MODULE_DESCRIPTION and MODULE_AUTHOR are also added.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Chan <jc@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:55 +01:00
Michael Ellerman
9fed3978c3 powerpc/64s: Allow control of RFI flush via debugfs
commit 236003e6b5 upstream.

Expose the state of the RFI flush (enabled/disabled) via debugfs, and
allow it to be enabled/disabled at runtime.

eg: $ cat /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/rfi_flush
    1
    $ echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/rfi_flush
    $ cat /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/rfi_flush
    0

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:55 +01:00
Michael Ellerman
1f0c936f43 powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_meltdown()
commit fd6e440f20 upstream.

The recent commit 87590ce6e3 ("sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder")
added a generic folder and set of files for reporting information on
CPU vulnerabilities. One of those was for meltdown:

  /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown

This commit wires up that file for 64-bit Book3S powerpc.

For now we default to "Vulnerable" unless the RFI flush is enabled.
That may not actually be true on all hardware, further patches will
refine the reporting based on the CPU/platform etc. But for now we
default to being pessimists.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:55 +01:00
Oliver O'Halloran
6aec12e186 powerpc/powernv: Check device-tree for RFI flush settings
commit 6e032b350c upstream.

New device-tree properties are available which tell the hypervisor
settings related to the RFI flush. Use them to determine the
appropriate flush instruction to use, and whether the flush is
required.

Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:55 +01:00
Michael Neuling
7db0fff62f powerpc/pseries: Query hypervisor for RFI flush settings
commit 8989d56878 upstream.

A new hypervisor call is available which tells the guest settings
related to the RFI flush. Use it to query the appropriate flush
instruction(s), and whether the flush is required.

Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:55 +01:00
Michael Ellerman
0ef9f8289e powerpc/64s: Support disabling RFI flush with no_rfi_flush and nopti
commit bc9c9304a4 upstream.

Because there may be some performance overhead of the RFI flush, add
kernel command line options to disable it.

We add a sensibly named 'no_rfi_flush' option, but we also hijack the
x86 option 'nopti'. The RFI flush is not the same as KPTI, but if we
see 'nopti' we can guess that the user is trying to avoid any overhead
of Meltdown mitigations, and it means we don't have to educate every
one about a different command line option.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 12:35:54 +01:00