The previous rework of the early exit code to provide an EC-based
decoding tree missed the fact that we have two trap paths for
ptrauth: the instructions (EC_PAC) and the sysregs (EC_SYS64).
Rework the handlers to call the ptrauth handling code on both
paths.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211013120346.2926621-2-maz@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit 8a049862c3)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I4c0637e413db9a5798e7739289b246553b1c1c52
Inspired by commit 254272ce65 ("kvm: x86: Add memcg accounting to KVM
allocations"), it would be better to make arm64 KVM consistent with
common kvm codes.
The memory allocations of VM scope should be charged into VM process
cgroup, hence change GFP_KERNEL to GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT.
There remain a few cases since these allocations are global, not in VM
scope.
Signed-off-by: Jia He <justin.he@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210907123112.10232-3-justin.he@arm.com
(cherry picked from commit 115bae923a)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I54f9a681446a07e0f0319ed8a07fb641ce1c7dcc
Inspired by commit 254272ce65 ("kvm: x86: Add memcg accounting to KVM
allocations"), it would be better to make arm64 vgic consistent with
common kvm codes.
The memory allocations of VM scope should be charged into VM process
cgroup, hence change GFP_KERNEL to GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT.
There remain a few cases since these allocations are global, not in VM
scope.
Signed-off-by: Jia He <justin.he@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210907123112.10232-2-justin.he@arm.com
(cherry picked from commit 3ef231670b)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: Id635a38791f61c7c04a9a1d255f0418e7da2bac8
Having realised that a virtual LPI does transition through an active
state that does not exist on bare metal, align the CPU interface
emulation with the behaviour specified in the architecture pseudocode.
The LPIs now transition to active on IAR read, and to inactive on
EOI write. Special care is taken not to increment the EOIcount for
an LPI that isn't present in the LRs.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211010150910.2911495-6-maz@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit 9d449c71bd)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I93a517888cbcd56560920cb2cb9d671542591d7e
On systems that advertise ICH_VTR_EL2.SEIS, we trap all GICv3 sysreg
accesses from the guest. From a performance perspective, this is OK
as long as the guest doesn't hammer the GICv3 CPU interface.
In most cases, this is fine, unless the guest actively uses
priorities and switches PMR_EL1 very often. Which is exactly what
happens when a Linux guest runs with irqchip.gicv3_pseudo_nmi=1.
In these condition, the performance plumets as we hit PMR each time
we mask/unmask interrupts. Not good.
There is however an opportunity for improvement. Careful reading
of the architecture specification indicates that the only GICv3
sysreg belonging to the common group (which contains the SGI
registers, PMR, DIR, CTLR and RPR) that is allowed to generate
a SError is DIR. Everything else is safe.
It is thus possible to substitute the trapping of all the common
group with just that of DIR if it supported by the implementation.
Yes, that's yet another optional bit of the architecture.
So let's just do that, as it leads to some impressive result on
the M1:
Without this change:
bash-5.1# /host/home/maz/hackbench 100 process 1000
Running with 100*40 (== 4000) tasks.
Time: 56.596
With this change:
bash-5.1# /host/home/maz/hackbench 100 process 1000
Running with 100*40 (== 4000) tasks.
Time: 8.649
which is a pretty convincing result.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211010150910.2911495-4-maz@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit 0924729b21)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I93eeac29ea47f1f03d0dc4dd97efe9e2ec18db58
The infamous M1 has a feature nobody else ever implemented,
in the form of the "GIC locally generated SError interrupts",
also known as SEIS for short.
These SErrors are generated when a guest does something that violates
the GIC state machine. It would have been simpler to just *ignore*
the damned thing, but that's not what this HW does. Oh well.
This part of of the architecture is also amazingly under-specified.
There is a whole 10 lines that describe the feature in a spec that
is 930 pages long, and some of these lines are factually wrong.
Oh, and it is deprecated, so the insentive to clarify it is low.
Now, the spec says that this should be a *virtual* SError when
HCR_EL2.AMO is set. As it turns out, that's not always the case
on this CPU, and the SError sometimes fires on the host as a
physical SError. Goodbye, cruel world. This clearly is a HW bug,
and it means that a guest can easily take the host down, on demand.
Thankfully, we have seen systems that were just as broken in the
past, and we have the perfect vaccine for it.
Apple M1, please meet the Cavium ThunderX workaround. All your
GIC accesses will be trapped, sanitised, and emulated. Only the
signalling aspect of the HW will be used. It won't be super speedy,
but it will at least be safe. You're most welcome.
Given that this has only ever been seen on this single implementation,
that the spec is unclear at best and that we cannot trust it to ever
be implemented correctly, gate the workaround solely on ICH_VTR_EL2.SEIS
being set.
Tested-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211010150910.2911495-3-maz@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit df652bcf11)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: Icee1ac199b1e6850d6d487d386f2e6e6929c19ca
Until now, we always let ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.GIC reflect the value
visible on the host, even if we were running a GICv2-enabled VM
on a GICv3+compat host.
That's fine, but we also now have the case of a host that does not
expose ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.GIC==1 despite having a vGIC. Yes, this is
confusing. Thank you M1.
Let's go back to first principles and expose ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.GIC=1
when a GICv3 is exposed to the guest. This also hides a GICv4.1
CPU interface from the guest which has no business knowing about
the v4.1 extension.
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211010150910.2911495-2-maz@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit 562e530fd7)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: Iffb0a1fcd962413e7048f48efb5129c723ebaddc
We currently check SCTLR_EL1.EE when computing the address of
a faulting guest access. However, the fault could have occured at
EL0, in which case the right bit to check would be SCTLR_EL1.E0E.
This is pretty unlikely to cause any issue in practice: You'd have
to have a guest with a LE EL1 and a BE EL0 (or the other way around),
and have mapped a device into the EL0 page tables.
Good luck with that!
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211012112312.1247467-1-maz@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit 69adec18e9)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I63c040ceb6aeabb9bc70a51f43f2136ebf381a41
Recent changes to KVM for arm64 has made it impossible for the host to
hibernate or use kexec when protected mode is enabled via the kernel
command line.
There are people who rely on kexec (for example, developers who use kexec
as a quick way to test a new kernel), let's document this change in
behaviour, so it doesn't catch them by surprise and we have a place to
point people to if it does.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211011153835.291147-1-alexandru.elisei@arm.com
(cherry picked from commit 53e8ce137f)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I674520b73423e9a7c705788853ad7d9e8f1be2e2
Protected KVM does not support protected AArch32 guests. However,
it is possible for the guest to force run AArch32, potentially
causing problems. Add an extra check so that if the hypervisor
catches the guest doing that, it can prevent the guest from
running again by resetting vcpu->arch.target and returning
ARM_EXCEPTION_IL.
If this were to happen, The VMM can try and fix it by re-
initializing the vcpu with KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT, however, this is
likely not possible for protected VMs.
Adapted from commit 22f553842b ("KVM: arm64: Handle Asymmetric
AArch32 systems")
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211010145636.1950948-12-tabba@google.com
(cherry picked from commit 5f39efc420)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I0bf557b32ef0a6bae510e4a97fbdb2ed0359355d
Trap accesses to restricted features for VMs running in protected
mode.
Access to feature registers are emulated, and only supported
features are exposed to protected VMs.
Accesses to restricted registers as well as restricted
instructions are trapped, and an undefined exception is injected
into the protected guests, i.e., with EC = 0x0 (unknown reason).
This EC is the one used, according to the Arm Architecture
Reference Manual, for unallocated or undefined system registers
or instructions.
Only affects the functionality of protected VMs. Otherwise,
should not affect non-protected VMs when KVM is running in
protected mode.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211010145636.1950948-11-tabba@google.com
(cherry picked from commit 1423afcb41)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I380d0b748414254a2ae25eb3a10a5c2a34a7c6a9
Protected VMs have more restricted features that need to be
trapped. Moreover, the host should not be trusted to set the
appropriate trapping registers and their values.
Initialize the trapping registers, i.e., hcr_el2, mdcr_el2, and
cptr_el2 at EL2 for protected guests, based on the values of the
guest's feature id registers.
No functional change intended as trap handlers introduced in the
previous patch are still not hooked in to the guest exit
handlers.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211010145636.1950948-9-tabba@google.com
(cherry picked from commit 2a0c343386)
[willdeacon@: Resolve conflict with hypercall definitions moving to an enum]
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I16390fa00dbbd8c08e4c84a6a718f8b743212b95
Add system register handlers for protected VMs. These cover Sys64
registers (including feature id registers), and debug.
No functional change intended as these are not hooked in yet to
the guest exit handlers introduced earlier. So when trapping is
triggered, the exit handlers let the host handle it, as before.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211010145636.1950948-8-tabba@google.com
(cherry picked from commit 6c30bfb18d)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I6b1f89f181739383c2354dab88f7f8044551febf
Simplify the early exception handling by slicing the gigantic decoding
tree into a more manageable set of functions, similar to what we have
in handle_exit.c.
This will also make the structure reusable for pKVM's own early exit
handling.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211010145636.1950948-4-tabba@google.com
(cherry picked from commit 8fb2046180)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I73dea0f33208fa7ac41a945b46a09b5d4dfcf969
PMSWINC_EL0 is a write-only register and was initially part of the VCPU
register state, but was later removed in commit 7a3ba3095a ("KVM:
arm64: Remove PMSWINC_EL0 shadow register"). To prevent regressions, the
register was kept accessible from userspace as Read-As-Zero (RAZ).
The read function that is used to handle userspace reads of this
register is get_raz_id_reg(), which, while technically correct, as it
returns 0, it is not semantically correct, as PMSWINC_EL0 is not an ID
register as the function name suggests.
Add a new function, get_raz_reg(), to use it as the accessor for
PMSWINC_EL0, as to not conflate get_raz_id_reg() to handle other types
of registers.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211011105840.155815-3-alexandru.elisei@arm.com
(cherry picked from commit 5a43097623)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I6e64f10097c1f1e6094ea0c4c48b03c69fa7053b
If read_id_reg() is called for an ID register which is Read-As-Zero (RAZ),
it initializes the return value to zero, then goes through a list of
registers which require special handling before returning the final value.
By not returning as soon as it checks that the register should be RAZ, the
function creates the opportunity for bugs, if, for example, a patch changes
a register to RAZ (like has happened with PMSWINC_EL0 in commit
11663111cd), but doesn't remove the special handling from read_id_reg();
or if a register is RAZ in certain situations, but readable in others.
Return early to make it impossible for a RAZ register to be anything other
than zero.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211011105840.155815-2-alexandru.elisei@arm.com
(cherry picked from commit 00d5101b25)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I048ae4c92f29e617326807536de760a4e3536f83
Select HAVE_KVM at all times on arm64, as the OF requirement is
always there (even in the case of an ACPI system, we still depend
on some of the OF infrastructure), and won't fo away.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
[maz: Drop the "HAVE_KVM if OF" dependency, as OF is always there on arm64,
new commit message]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210921222231.518092-3-seanjc@google.com
(cherry picked from commit e26bb75aa2)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I64236d409454463bf0f2b0a2efb2e5a00d8f3deb
Unconditionally "source" the generic KVM Kconfig instead of wrapping it
with KVM=y. A future patch will select HAVE_KVM so that referencing
HAVE_KVM in common kernel code doesn't break, and because KVM=y and
HAVE_KVM=n is weird. Source the generic KVM Kconfig unconditionally so
that HAVE_KVM and KVM don't end up with a circular dependency.
Note, all but one of generic KVM's "configs" are of the HAVE_XYZ nature,
and the one outlier correctly takes a dependency on CONFIG_KVM, i.e. the
generic Kconfig is intended to be included unconditionally.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[maz: made NVHE_EL2_DEBUG depend on KVM]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210921222231.518092-2-seanjc@google.com
(cherry picked from commit c8f1e96734)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I94e4a0666f5da3ff17ebfa0068eec5a9358556f3
Although KVM can be compiled out of the kernel, it cannot be disabled
at runtime. Allow this possibility by introducing a new mode that
will prevent KVM from initialising.
This is useful in the (limited) circumstances where you don't want
KVM to be available (what is wrong with you?), or when you want
to install another hypervisor instead (good luck with that).
Reviewed-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211001170553.3062988-1-maz@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit b6a68b97af)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: Ie796c716fc7cece906a8cded0ae4652a828988bb
Verify that the GICv2 CPU interface does not extend beyond the
VM-specified IPA range (phys_size).
base + size > phys_size AND base < phys_size
Add the missing check into kvm_vgic_addr() which is called when setting
the region. This patch also enables some superfluous checks for the
distributor (vgic_check_ioaddr was enough as alignment == size for the
distributors).
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211005011921.437353-4-ricarkol@google.com
(cherry picked from commit c56a87da0a)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: Ib462da73c1f819152ee799507f037126db02ebbe
Verify that the redistributor regions do not extend beyond the
VM-specified IPA range (phys_size). This can happen when using
KVM_VGIC_V3_ADDR_TYPE_REDIST or KVM_VGIC_V3_ADDR_TYPE_REDIST_REGIONS
with:
base + size > phys_size AND base < phys_size
Add the missing check into vgic_v3_alloc_redist_region() which is called
when setting the regions, and into vgic_v3_check_base() which is called
when attempting the first vcpu-run. The vcpu-run check does not apply to
KVM_VGIC_V3_ADDR_TYPE_REDIST_REGIONS because the regions size is known
before the first vcpu-run. Note that using the REDIST_REGIONS API
results in a different check, which already exists, at first vcpu run:
that the number of redist regions is enough for all vcpus.
Finally, this patch also enables some extra tests in
vgic_v3_alloc_redist_region() by calculating "size" early for the legacy
redist api: like checking that the REDIST region can fit all the already
created vcpus.
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211005011921.437353-3-ricarkol@google.com
(cherry picked from commit 4612d98f58)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I9c5877cb305621d206e36250aa970a55926d4b5e
Add the new vgic_check_iorange helper that checks that an iorange is
sane: the start address and size have valid alignments, the range is
within the addressable PA range, start+size doesn't overflow, and the
start wasn't already defined.
No functional change.
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211005011921.437353-2-ricarkol@google.com
(cherry picked from commit f25c5e4daf)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: Ic702fe5c28dc1c7a7bc5975703acee084b8a7b6b
After pKVM has been 'finalised' using the __pkvm_prot_finalize hypercall,
the calling CPU will have a Stage-2 translation enabled to prevent access
to memory pages owned by EL2.
Although this forms a significant part of the process to deprivilege the
host kernel, we also need to ensure that the hypercall interface is
reduced so that the EL2 code cannot, for example, be re-initialised using
a new set of vectors.
Re-order the hypercalls so that only a suffix remains available after
finalisation of pKVM.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211008135839.1193-7-will@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit 057bed206f)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I61e57c7bff456d40866acd01475b2e9ace1e1bd6
__pkvm_prot_finalize() completes the deprivilege of the host when pKVM
is in use by installing a stage-2 translation table for the calling CPU.
Issuing the hypercall multiple times for a given CPU makes little sense,
but in such a case just return early with -EPERM rather than go through
the whole page-table dance again.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211008135839.1193-6-will@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit 07036cffe1)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I79dc15319bd3dc09233d95cfaa07d020e8a57973
If the __pkvm_prot_finalize hypercall returns an error, we WARN but fail
to propagate the failure code back to kvm_arch_init().
Pass a pointer to a zero-initialised return variable so that failure
to finalise the pKVM protections on a host CPU can be reported back to
KVM.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211008135839.1193-5-will@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit 2f2e1a5069)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I83610a95046341a7429e09ead03ed08b87e0873a
The stub hypercalls provide mechanisms to reset and replace the EL2 code,
so uninstall them once pKVM has been initialised in order to ensure the
integrity of the hypervisor code.
To ensure pKVM initialisation remains functional, split cpu_hyp_reinit()
into two helper functions to separate usage of the stub from usage of
pkvm hypercalls either side of __pkvm_init on the boot CPU.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211008135839.1193-4-will@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit 8579a185ba)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I6ad3affee8119fb312be91c2e6555103d12089cd
When pKVM is enabled, the hypervisor code at EL2 and its data structures
are inaccessible to the host kernel and cannot be torn down or replaced
as this would defeat the integrity properies which pKVM aims to provide.
Furthermore, the ABI between the host and EL2 is flexible and private to
whatever the current implementation of KVM requires and so booting a new
kernel with an old EL2 component is very likely to end in disaster.
In preparation for uninstalling the hyp stub calls which are relied upon
to reset EL2, disable kexec and hibernation in the host when protected
KVM is enabled.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211008135839.1193-3-will@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit 8f4566f18d)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: Ib85048668b185268dc95374f74b0b5bfa65fc33f
__KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC_* is a royal pain, as there is a fair amount
of churn around these #defines, and we avoid making it an enum
only for the sake of the early init, low level code that requires
__KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___kvm_hyp_init to be usable from assembly.
Let's be brave and turn everything but this symbol into an enum,
using a bit of arithmetic to avoid any overlap.
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/877depq9gw.wl-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211008135839.1193-2-will@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit a78738ed1d)
Bug: 204960018
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <willdeacon@google.com>
Change-Id: I4cad5753673fb3959ce230e0a8cb9f5e3ab16877
Vendor architectures may contain CPUs running on the same clock line
which contain different capacities. Add a tracehook in this path to
allow vendor modules to skip implicit check to prevent crashes.
Bug: 206602617
Change-Id: Ica01a214689607b8d79b370c20bc9a8c44ca2117
Signed-off-by: Shaleen Agrawal <shalagra@codeaurora.org>
GKI required the KMI_GENERATION to be added to the kernel version
string, but this only makes sense for GKI kernels, for non-GKI kernels
we don't need it. Leave all the other stuff we added, though, as it
seems useful.
Bug: 205897686
Change-Id: I2e7b3cb7ed5529f1e5e7c9d79a1f7ce4a1b6ee1f
Signed-off-by: Alistair Delva <adelva@google.com>
This reverts commit 77dfeaa02d.
Throttling can now be done using hist triggers and synthetic events
Bug: 145972256
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Change-Id: I39c284040e2fdb815cda980f3a40ef188e59287c
Using old_creds as an indication that we are not overriding the
credentials, bypass call to inode_owner_or_capable. This solves
a problem with all execv calls being blocked when using the caller's
credentials.
Bug: 204981027
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211117015806.2192263-5-dvander@google.com
Change-Id: Ifa966dabda7413873614d1da24629dc8054db131
Signed-off-by: David Anderson <dvander@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the
recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are
checked against the caller's credentials.
If the principles of least privilege are applied, the mounter's
credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's when
accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a lower
DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the generally
higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector.
We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all
subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the
caller's credentials. The module boolean parameter and mount option
override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature",
existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/override_creds.
It was not always this way. Circa 4.6 there was no recorded mounter's
credentials, instead privileged access to upper or work directories
were temporarily increased to perform the operations. The MAC
(selinux) policies were caller's in all cases. override_creds=off
partially returns us to this older access model minus the insecure
temporary credential increases. This is to permit use in a system
with non-overlapping security models for each executable including
the agent that mounts the overlayfs filesystem. In Android
this is the case since init, which performs the mount operations,
has a minimal MAC set of privileges to reduce any attack surface,
and services that use the content have a different set of MAC
privileges (eg: read, for vendor labelled configuration, execute for
vendor libraries and modules). The caveats are not a problem in
the Android usage model, however they should be fixed for
completeness and for general use in time.
Bug: 204981027
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211117015806.2192263-4-dvander@google.com
Change-Id: I46e6c74ff634eb064cf9d714017432171a898890
Signed-off-by: David Anderson <dvander@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
__vfs_getxattr({dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY}) ->
handler->get({dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY}) ->
__vfs_getxattr({realdentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY}) ->
lower_handler->get({realdentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY}) which
would report back through the chain data and success as expected,
the logging security layer at the top would have the data to
determine the access permissions and report back to the logs and
the caller that the target context was blocked.
For selinux this would solve the cosmetic issue of the selinux log
and allow audit2allow to correctly report the rule needed to address
the access problem.
Check impure, opaque, origin & meta xattr with no sepolicy audit
(using __vfs_getxattr) since these operations are internal to
overlayfs operations and do not disclose any data. This became
an issue for credential override off since sys_admin would have
been required by the caller; whereas would have been inherently
present for the creator since it performed the mount.
This is a change in operations since we do not check in the new
ovl_do_getxattr function if the credential override is off or not.
Reasoning is that the sepolicy check is unnecessary overhead,
especially since the check can be expensive.
Because for override credentials off, this affects _everyone_ that
underneath performs private xattr calls without the appropriate
sepolicy permissions and sys_admin capability. Providing blanket
support for sys_admin would be bad for all possible callers.
For the override credentials on, this will affect only the mounter,
should it lack sepolicy permissions. Not considered a security
problem since mounting by definition has sys_admin capabilities,
but sepolicy contexts would still need to be crafted.
It should be noted that there is precedence, __vfs_getxattr is used
in other filesystems for their own internal trusted xattr management.
Change-Id: I0b8fe9f1fe6c763fbd27a09c6de8209d1dc9d2f7
Signed-off-by: David Anderson <dvander@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211117015806.2192263-3-dvander@google.com
Bug: 204981027
Add a flag option to get xattr method that could have a bit flag of
XATTR_NOSECURITY passed to it. XATTR_NOSECURITY is generally then
set in the __vfs_getxattr path when called by security
infrastructure.
This handles the case of a union filesystem driver that is being
requested by the security layer to report back the xattr data.
For the use case where access is to be blocked by the security layer.
The path then could be security(dentry) ->
__vfs_getxattr(dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) ->
handler->get(dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) ->
__vfs_getxattr(lower_dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) ->
lower_handler->get(lower_dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY)
which would report back through the chain data and success as
expected, the logging security layer at the top would have the
data to determine the access permissions and report back the target
context that was blocked.
Without the get handler flag, the path on a union filesystem would be
the errant security(dentry) -> __vfs_getxattr(dentry) ->
handler->get(dentry) -> vfs_getxattr(lower_dentry) -> nested ->
security(lower_dentry, log off) -> lower_handler->get(lower_dentry)
which would report back through the chain no data, and -EACCES.
For selinux for both cases, this would translate to a correctly
determined blocked access. In the first case with this change a correct avc
log would be reported, in the second legacy case an incorrect avc log
would be reported against an uninitialized u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
context making the logs cosmetically useless for audit2allow.
This patch series is inert and is the wide-spread addition of the
flags option for xattr functions, and a replacement of __vfs_getxattr
with __vfs_getxattr(...XATTR_NOSECURITY).
Bug: 204981027
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211117015806.2192263-2-dvander@google.com
Change-Id: Id2c6fa6eeb2b5cca5a11e0cd02a3fbf2a5fcbef4
Signed-off-by: David Anderson <dvander@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
If a binary operation is detected while parsing an expression string,
the operand strings are deduced by splitting the experssion string at
the position of the detected binary operator. Both operand strings are
sub-strings (can be empty string) of the expression string but will
never be NULL.
Currently a NULL check is used for missing operands, fix this by
checking for empty strings instead.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112191324.1302505-1-kaleshsingh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Fixes: 9710b2f341 ("tracing: Fix operator precedence for hist triggers expression")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1cab6bce42)
Bug: 146055070
Bug: 145972256
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Change-Id: Ic19c0ac55ea3519756aacd3cf92b0fbed0ad5304
commit a44f9d6f9d upstream.
There is a wrong comparison of the total size of the loaded firmware
css->fw->size with the size of a pointer to struct imgu_fw_header.
Turn binary_header into a flexible-array member[1][2], use the
struct_size() helper and fix the wrong size comparison. Notice
that the loaded firmware needs to contain at least one 'struct
imgu_fw_info' item in the binary_header[] array.
It's also worth mentioning that
"css->fw->size < struct_size(css->fwp, binary_header, 1)"
with binary_header declared as a flexible-array member is equivalent
to
"css->fw->size < sizeof(struct imgu_fw_header)"
with binary_header declared as a one-element array (as in the original
code).
The replacement of the one-element array with a flexible-array member
also helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Warray-bounds
and get us closer to being able to tighten the FORTIFY_SOURCE routines
on memcpy().
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.10/process/deprecated.html#zero-length-and-one-element-arrays
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/79
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/109
Fixes: 09d290f0ba ("media: staging/intel-ipu3: css: Add support for firmware management")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
