commit cecbc0c7eb upstream.
Looks like our VBIOS/GOP generally fail to turn the DP dual mode adater
TMDS output buffers back on after a reboot. This leads to a black screen
after reboot if we turned the TMDS output buffers off prior to reboot.
And if i915 decides to do a fastboot the black screen will persist even
after i915 takes over.
Apparently this has been a problem ever since commit b2ccb822d3 ("drm/i915:
Enable/disable TMDS output buffers in DP++ adaptor as needed") if one
rebooted while the display was turned off. And things became worse with
commit fe0f1e3bfd ("drm/i915: Shut down displays gracefully on reboot")
since now we always turn the display off before a reboot.
This was reported on a RKL, but I confirmed the same behaviour on my
SNB as well. So looks pretty universal.
Let's fix this by explicitly turning the TMDS output buffers back on
in the encoder->shutdown() hook. Note that this gets called after irqs
have been disabled, so the i2c communication with the DP dual mode
adapter has to be performed via polling (which the gmbus code is
perfectly happy to do for us).
We also need a bit of care in handling DDI encoders which may or may
not be set up for HDMI output. Specifically ddc_pin will not be
populated for a DP only DDI encoder, in which case we don't want to
call intel_gmbus_get_adapter(). We can handle that by simply doing
the dual mode adapter type check before calling
intel_gmbus_get_adapter().
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.11+
Fixes: fe0f1e3bfd ("drm/i915: Shut down displays gracefully on reboot")
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/4371
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20211029191802.18448-2-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Stanislav Lisovskiy <stanislav.lisovskiy@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 49c55f7b03)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit cdccc03a8a upstream.
There were few lockdep warnings because btrfs_show_devname() was using
device_list_mutex as recorded in the commits:
0ccd05285e ("btrfs: fix a possible umount deadlock")
779bf3fefa ("btrfs: fix lock dep warning, move scratch dev out of device_list_mutex and uuid_mutex")
And finally, commit 88c14590cd ("btrfs: use RCU in btrfs_show_devname
for device list traversal") removed the device_list_mutex from
btrfs_show_devname for performance reasons.
This patch removes a stale comment about the function
btrfs_show_devname and device_list_mutex.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit 6605fd2f39 upstream.
The test case btrfs/238 reports the warning below:
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 481 at fs/btrfs/super.c:2509 btrfs_show_devname+0x104/0x1e8 [btrfs]
CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G W O 5.14.0-rc1-custom #72
Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call trace:
btrfs_show_devname+0x108/0x1b4 [btrfs]
show_mountinfo+0x234/0x2c4
m_show+0x28/0x34
seq_read_iter+0x12c/0x3c4
vfs_read+0x29c/0x2c8
ksys_read+0x80/0xec
__arm64_sys_read+0x28/0x34
invoke_syscall+0x50/0xf8
do_el0_svc+0x88/0x138
el0_svc+0x2c/0x8c
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xe4
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
Reason:
While btrfs_prepare_sprout() moves the fs_devices::devices into
fs_devices::seed_list, the btrfs_show_devname() searches for the devices
and found none, leading to the warning as in above.
Fix:
latest_dev is updated according to the changes to the device list.
That means we could use the latest_dev->name to show the device name in
/proc/self/mounts, the pointer will be always valid as it's assigned
before the device is deleted from the list in remove or replace.
The RCU protection is sufficient as the device structure is freed after
synchronization.
Reported-by: Su Yue <l@damenly.su>
Tested-by: Su Yue <l@damenly.su>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit d24fa5c1da upstream.
In preparation to fix a bug in btrfs_show_devname().
Convert fs_devices::latest_bdev type from struct block_device to struct
btrfs_device and, rename the member to fs_devices::latest_dev.
So that btrfs_show_devname() can use fs_devices::latest_dev::name.
Tested-by: Su Yue <l@damenly.su>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f4b3ee3c85 upstream.
If the audit daemon were ever to get stuck in a stopped state the
kernel's kauditd_thread() could get blocked attempting to send audit
records to the userspace audit daemon. With the kernel thread
blocked it is possible that the audit queue could grow unbounded as
certain audit record generating events must be exempt from the queue
limits else the system enter a deadlock state.
This patch resolves this problem by lowering the kernel thread's
socket sending timeout from MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT to HZ/10 and tweaks
the kauditd_send_queue() function to better manage the various audit
queues when connection problems occur between the kernel and the
audit daemon. With this patch, the backlog may temporarily grow
beyond the defined limits when the audit daemon is stopped and the
system is under heavy audit pressure, but kauditd_thread() will
continue to make progress and drain the queues as it would for other
connection problems. For example, with the audit daemon put into a
stopped state and the system configured to audit every syscall it
was still possible to shutdown the system without a kernel panic,
deadlock, etc.; granted, the system was slow to shutdown but that is
to be expected given the extreme pressure of recording every syscall.
The timeout value of HZ/10 was chosen primarily through
experimentation and this developer's "gut feeling". There is likely
no one perfect value, but as this scenario is limited in scope (root
privileges would be needed to send SIGSTOP to the audit daemon), it
is likely not worth exposing this as a tunable at present. This can
always be done at a later date if it proves necessary.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5b52330bbf ("audit: fix auditd/kernel connection state tracking")
Reported-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fd84bfdddd upstream.
Ceph always inherits the SGID bit if it is set on the parent inode,
while the generic inode_init_owner does not do this in a few cases where
it can create a possible security problem (cf. [1]).
Update ceph to strip the SGID bit just as inode_init_owner would.
This bug was detected by the mapped mount testsuite in [3]. The
testsuite tests all core VFS functionality and semantics with and
without mapped mounts. That is to say it functions as a generic VFS
testsuite in addition to a mapped mount testsuite. While working on
mapped mount support for ceph, SIGD inheritance was the only failing
test for ceph after the port.
The same bug was detected by the mapped mount testsuite in XFS in
January 2021 (cf. [2]).
[1]: commit 0fa3ecd878 ("Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories")
[2]: commit 01ea173e10 ("xfs: fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories")
[3]: https://git.kernel.org/fs/xfs/xfstests-dev.git
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c88c5e4619 upstream.
gpio-keys already 'inherits' the interrupts from the controller
of the specified GPIO, so having another declaration is redundant.
On >=v5.15 this started causing an oops under gpio_keys_probe as
the IRQ was already claimed.
Signed-off-by: Mathew McBride <matt@traverse.com.au>
Fixes: 418962eea3 ("arm64: dts: add device tree for Traverse Ten64 (LS1088A)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c9b12b59e2 upstream.
In the current code, when exiting from idle, rcu_irq_enter() is
called twice during irq entry:
irq_entry_enter()-> rcu_irq_enter()
irq_enter() -> rcu_irq_enter()
This may lead to wrong results from rcu_is_cpu_rrupt_from_idle()
because of a wrong dynticks nmi nesting count. Fix this by only
calling irq_enter_rcu().
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.12+
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Fixes: 56e62a7370 ("s390: convert to generic entry")
Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 817fc978b5 upstream.
virtio_max_dma_size() returns the maximum DMA mapping size of the virtio
device by querying dma_max_mapping_size() for the device when the DMA
API is in use for the vring. Unfortunately, the device passed is
initialised by register_virtio_device() and does not inherit the DMA
configuration from its parent, resulting in SWIOTLB errors when bouncing
is enabled and the default 256K mapping limit (IO_TLB_SEGSIZE) is not
respected:
| virtio-pci 0000:00:01.0: swiotlb buffer is full (sz: 294912 bytes), total 1024 (slots), used 725 (slots)
Follow the pattern used elsewhere in the virtio_ring code when calling
into the DMA layer and pass the parent device to dma_max_mapping_size()
instead.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211201112018.25276-1-will@kernel.org
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Fixes: e6d6dd6c87 ("virtio: Introduce virtio_max_dma_size()")
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dc1db0060c upstream.
This condition checks "len" but it does not check "offset" and that
could result in an out of bounds read if "offset > dev->config_size".
The problem is that since both variables are unsigned the
"dev->config_size - offset" subtraction would result in a very high
unsigned value.
I think these checks might not be necessary because "len" and "offset"
are supposed to already have been validated using the
vhost_vdpa_config_validate() function. But I do not know the code
perfectly, and I like to be safe.
Fixes: c8a6153b6c ("vduse: Introduce VDUSE - vDPA Device in Userspace")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211208150956.GA29160@kili
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ff9f9c6e74 upstream.
The "config.offset" comes from the user. There needs to a check to
prevent it being out of bounds. The "config.offset" and
"dev->config_size" variables are both type u32. So if the offset if
out of bounds then the "dev->config_size - config.offset" subtraction
results in a very high u32 value. The out of bounds offset can result
in memory corruption.
Fixes: c8a6153b6c ("vduse: Introduce VDUSE - vDPA Device in Userspace")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211208103307.GA3778@kili
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e523102cb7 upstream.
Fix up unprivileged test case results for 'Dest pointer in r0' verifier tests
given they now need to reject R0 containing a pointer value, and add a couple
of new related ones with 32bit cmpxchg as well.
root@foo:~/bpf/tools/testing/selftests/bpf# ./test_verifier
#0/u invalid and of negative number OK
#0/p invalid and of negative number OK
[...]
#1268/p XDP pkt read, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data, bad access 1 OK
#1269/p XDP pkt read, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data, bad access 2 OK
#1270/p XDP pkt read, pkt_data <= pkt_meta', good access OK
#1271/p XDP pkt read, pkt_data <= pkt_meta', bad access 1 OK
#1272/p XDP pkt read, pkt_data <= pkt_meta', bad access 2 OK
Summary: 1900 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
Acked-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a82fe085f3 upstream.
The implementation of BPF_CMPXCHG on a high level has the following parameters:
.-[old-val] .-[new-val]
BPF_R0 = cmpxchg{32,64}(DST_REG + insn->off, BPF_R0, SRC_REG)
`-[mem-loc] `-[old-val]
Given a BPF insn can only have two registers (dst, src), the R0 is fixed and
used as an auxilliary register for input (old value) as well as output (returning
old value from memory location). While the verifier performs a number of safety
checks, it misses to reject unprivileged programs where R0 contains a pointer as
old value.
Through brute-forcing it takes about ~16sec on my machine to leak a kernel pointer
with BPF_CMPXCHG. The PoC is basically probing for kernel addresses by storing the
guessed address into the map slot as a scalar, and using the map value pointer as
R0 while SRC_REG has a canary value to detect a matching address.
Fix it by checking R0 for pointers, and reject if that's the case for unprivileged
programs.
Fixes: 5ffa25502b ("bpf: Add instructions for atomic_[cmp]xchg")
Reported-by: Ryota Shiga (Flatt Security)
Acked-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e572ff80f0 upstream.
Make the bounds propagation in __reg_assign_32_into_64() slightly more
robust and readable by aligning it similarly as we did back in the
__reg_combine_64_into_32() counterpart. Meaning, only propagate or
pessimize them as a smin/smax pair.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3cf2b61eb0 upstream.
For the case where both s32_{min,max}_value bounds are positive, the
__reg_assign_32_into_64() directly propagates them to their 64 bit
counterparts, otherwise it pessimises them into [0,u32_max] universe and
tries to refine them later on by learning through the tnum as per comment
in mentioned function. However, that does not always happen, for example,
in mov32 operation we call zext_32_to_64(dst_reg) which invokes the
__reg_assign_32_into_64() as is without subsequent bounds update as
elsewhere thus no refinement based on tnum takes place.
Thus, not calling into the __update_reg_bounds() / __reg_deduce_bounds() /
__reg_bound_offset() triplet as we do, for example, in case of ALU ops via
adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(), will lead to more pessimistic bounds when
dumping the full register state:
Before fix:
0: (b4) w0 = -1
1: R0_w=invP4294967295
(id=0,imm=ffffffff,
smin_value=4294967295,smax_value=4294967295,
umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295,
var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0),
s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1,
u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1)
1: (bc) w0 = w0
2: R0_w=invP4294967295
(id=0,imm=ffffffff,
smin_value=0,smax_value=4294967295,
umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295,
var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0),
s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1,
u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1)
Technically, the smin_value=0 and smax_value=4294967295 bounds are not
incorrect, but given the register is still a constant, they break assumptions
about const scalars that smin_value == smax_value and umin_value == umax_value.
After fix:
0: (b4) w0 = -1
1: R0_w=invP4294967295
(id=0,imm=ffffffff,
smin_value=4294967295,smax_value=4294967295,
umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295,
var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0),
s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1,
u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1)
1: (bc) w0 = w0
2: R0_w=invP4294967295
(id=0,imm=ffffffff,
smin_value=4294967295,smax_value=4294967295,
umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295,
var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0),
s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1,
u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1)
Without the smin_value == smax_value and umin_value == umax_value invariant
being intact for const scalars, it is possible to leak out kernel pointers
from unprivileged user space if the latter is enabled. For example, when such
registers are involved in pointer arithmtics, then adjust_ptr_min_max_vals()
will taint the destination register into an unknown scalar, and the latter
can be exported and stored e.g. into a BPF map value.
Fixes: 3f50f132d8 ("bpf: Verifier, do explicit ALU32 bounds tracking")
Reported-by: Kuee K1r0a <liulin063@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 180486b430 upstream.
Test whether unprivileged would be able to leak the spilled pointer either
by exporting the returned value from the atomic{32,64} operation or by reading
and exporting the value from the stack after the atomic operation took place.
Note that for unprivileged, the below atomic cmpxchg test case named "Dest
pointer in r0 - succeed" is failing. The reason is that in the dst memory
location (r10 -8) there is the spilled register r10:
0: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
0: (bf) r0 = r10
1: R0_w=fp0 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r0
2: R0_w=fp0 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=fp
2: (b7) r1 = 0
3: R0_w=fp0 R1_w=invP0 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=fp
3: (db) r0 = atomic64_cmpxchg((u64 *)(r10 -8), r0, r1)
4: R0_w=fp0 R1_w=invP0 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm
4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r0 -8)
5: R0_w=fp0 R1_w=invP(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm
5: (b7) r0 = 0
6: R0_w=invP0 R1_w=invP(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm
6: (95) exit
However, allowing this case for unprivileged is a bit useless given an
update with a new pointer will fail anyway:
0: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
0: (bf) r0 = r10
1: R0_w=fp0 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r0
2: R0_w=fp0 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=fp
2: (db) r0 = atomic64_cmpxchg((u64 *)(r10 -8), r0, r10)
R10 leaks addr into mem
Acked-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[only backport one test for 5.15.y - gregkh]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7d3baf0afa upstream.
The change in commit 37086bfdc7 ("bpf: Propagate stack bounds to registers
in atomics w/ BPF_FETCH") around check_mem_access() handling is buggy since
this would allow for unprivileged users to leak kernel pointers. For example,
an atomic fetch/and with -1 on a stack destination which holds a spilled
pointer will migrate the spilled register type into a scalar, which can then
be exported out of the program (since scalar != pointer) by dumping it into
a map value.
The original implementation of XADD was preventing this situation by using
a double call to check_mem_access() one with BPF_READ and a subsequent one
with BPF_WRITE, in both cases passing -1 as a placeholder value instead of
register as per XADD semantics since it didn't contain a value fetch. The
BPF_READ also included a check in check_stack_read_fixed_off() which rejects
the program if the stack slot is of __is_pointer_value() if dst_regno < 0.
The latter is to distinguish whether we're dealing with a regular stack spill/
fill or some arithmetical operation which is disallowed on non-scalars, see
also 6e7e63cbb0 ("bpf: Forbid XADD on spilled pointers for unprivileged
users") for more context on check_mem_access() and its handling of placeholder
value -1.
One minimally intrusive option to fix the leak is for the BPF_FETCH case to
initially check the BPF_READ case via check_mem_access() with -1 as register,
followed by the actual load case with non-negative load_reg to propagate
stack bounds to registers.
Fixes: 37086bfdc7 ("bpf: Propagate stack bounds to registers in atomics w/ BPF_FETCH")
Reported-by: <n4ke4mry@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1fe98f5690 upstream.
Sending them out on a different queue can cause a race condition where a
number of packets in the queue may be discarded by the receiver, because
the ADDBA request is sent too early.
This affects any driver with software A-MPDU setup which does not allocate
packet seqno in hardware on tx, regardless of whether iTXQ is used or not.
The only driver I've seen that explicitly deals with this issue internally
is mwl8k.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211202124533.80388-1-nbd@nbd.name
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e45e9e3998 ]
The KVM doesn't know whether any TLB for a specific pcid is cached in
the CPU when tdp is enabled. So it is better to flush all the guest
TLB when invalidating any single PCID context.
The case is very rare or even impossible since KVM generally doesn't
intercept CR3 write or INVPCID instructions when tdp is enabled, so the
fix is mostly for the sake of overall robustness.
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Message-Id: <20211019110154.4091-2-jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5f25e71e31 ]
This is not an unrecoverable situation. Users of kvm_read_guest_offset_cached
and kvm_write_guest_offset_cached must expect the read/write to fail, and
therefore it is possible to just return early with an error value.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 908fa88e42 ]
With the elevated 'KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS' value kvm_create_max_vcpus test
may hit RLIMIT_NOFILE limits:
# ./kvm_create_max_vcpus
KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID: 4096
KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS: 1024
Testing creating 1024 vCPUs, with IDs 0...1023.
/dev/kvm not available (errno: 24), skipping test
Adjust RLIMIT_NOFILE limits to make sure KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS fds can be
opened. Note, raising hard limit ('rlim_max') requires CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
capability which is generally not needed to run kvm selftests (but without
raising the limit the test is doomed to fail anyway).
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211123135953.667434-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
[Skip the test if the hard limit can be raised. - Paolo]
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Tested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e90e51d5f0 ]
There is nothing to synchronize if APICv is disabled, since neither
other vCPUs nor assigned devices can set PIR.ON.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 69125b4b94 upstream.
Commit c045ceb5a1 ("reset: tegra-bpmp: Handle errors in BPMP
response") fixed an issue in the Tegra BPMP error handling but has
exposed an issue in the Tegra194 HDA driver and now resetting the
Tegra194 HDA controller is failing. For now revert the commit
c045ceb5a1 ("reset: tegra-bpmp: Handle errors in BPMP response")
while a fix for the Tegra HDA driver is created.
Fixes: c045ceb5a1 ("reset: tegra-bpmp: Handle errors in BPMP response")
Signed-off-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211112112712.21587-1-jonathanh@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c29d979260 upstream.
The space allowed for new attributes can be too small if existing header
information is large. That can happen, for example, if there are very
many CPUs, due to having an event ID per CPU per event being stored in the
header information.
Fix by adding the existing header.data_offset. Also increase the extra
space allowed to 8KiB and align to a 4KiB boundary for neatness.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211125071457.2066863-1-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
[Adrian: Backport to v5.15]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5c791fe1e2 upstream.
In writeback cache mode mtime/ctime updates are cached, and flushed to the
server using the ->write_inode() callback.
Closing the file will result in a dirty inode being immediately written,
but in other cases the inode can remain dirty after all references are
dropped. This result in the inode being written back from reclaim, which
can deadlock on a regular allocation while the request is being served.
The usual mechanisms (GFP_NOFS/PF_MEMALLOC*) don't work for FUSE, because
serving a request involves unrelated userspace process(es).
Instead do the same as for dirty pages: make sure the inode is written
before the last reference is gone.
- fallocate(2)/copy_file_range(2): these call file_update_time() or
file_modified(), so flush the inode before returning from the call
- unlink(2), link(2) and rename(2): these call fuse_update_ctime(), so
flush the ctime directly from this helper
Reported-by: chenguanyou <chenguanyou@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: Ed Tsai <ed.tsai@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d445aa402d upstream.
Commit 723de0f917 ("staging: most: remove device from interface
structure") moved registration of driver-provided struct device to
the most subsystem. This updated dim2 driver as well.
However, struct device passed to register_device() becomes refcounted,
and must not be explicitly deallocated, but must provide release method
instead. Which is incompatible with managing it via devres.
This patch makes the device structure allocated without devres, adds
device release method, and moves device destruction there.
Fixes: 723de0f917 ("staging: most: remove device from interface structure")
Signed-off-by: Nikita Yushchenko <nikita.yoush@cogentembedded.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211005143448.8660-2-nikita.yoush@cogentembedded.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 3abfe30d80 ]
process_info->lock is used to protect kfd_bo_list, vm_list_head, n_vms
and userptr valid/inval list, svm_range_restore_work and
svm_range_set_attr don't access those, so do not need to take
process_info lock. This will avoid potential circular locking issue.
Signed-off-by: Philip Yang <Philip.Yang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 494f2e42ce ]
drm_gem_object_put calls release_notify callback to free the mem
structure and unreserve_mem_limit, move it down after the last access
of mem and make it conditional call.
Signed-off-by: Philip Yang <Philip.Yang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5ceaebcda9 ]
[WHY]
It seems like after a series of plug/unplugs we end up in a situation
where tiled display doesnt support Audio.
[HOW]
The issue seems to be related to when we check streams changed after an
HPD, we should be checking the audio_struct as well to see if any of its
values changed.
Reviewed-by: Jun Lei <Jun.Lei@amd.com>
Acked-by: Bhawanpreet Lakha <Bhawanpreet.Lakha@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mustapha Ghaddar <mustapha.ghaddar@amd.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
