commit 427215d85e upstream.
Add the following checks from __do_loopback() to clone_private_mount() as
well:
- verify that the mount is in the current namespace
- verify that there are no locked children
Reported-by: Alois Wohlschlager <alois1@gmx-topmail.de>
Fixes: c771d683a6 ("vfs: introduce clone_private_mount()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.18
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3125f26c51 upstream.
When registering new ppp interface via PPPIOCNEWUNIT ioctl then kernel has
to choose interface name as this ioctl API does not support specifying it.
Kernel in this case register new interface with name "ppp<id>" where <id>
is the ppp unit id, which can be obtained via PPPIOCGUNIT ioctl. This
applies also in the case when registering new ppp interface via rtnl
without supplying IFLA_IFNAME.
PPPIOCNEWUNIT ioctl allows to specify own ppp unit id which will kernel
assign to ppp interface, in case this ppp id is not already used by other
ppp interface.
In case user does not specify ppp unit id then kernel choose the first free
ppp unit id. This applies also for case when creating ppp interface via
rtnl method as it does not provide a way for specifying own ppp unit id.
If some network interface (does not have to be ppp) has name "ppp<id>"
with this first free ppp id then PPPIOCNEWUNIT ioctl or rtnl call fails.
And registering new ppp interface is not possible anymore, until interface
which holds conflicting name is renamed. Or when using rtnl method with
custom interface name in IFLA_IFNAME.
As list of allocated / used ppp unit ids is not possible to retrieve from
kernel to userspace, userspace has no idea what happens nor which interface
is doing this conflict.
So change the algorithm how ppp unit id is generated. And choose the first
number which is not neither used as ppp unit id nor in some network
interface with pattern "ppp<id>".
This issue can be simply reproduced by following pppd call when there is no
ppp interface registered and also no interface with name pattern "ppp<id>":
pppd ifname ppp1 +ipv6 noip noauth nolock local nodetach pty "pppd +ipv6 noip noauth nolock local nodetach notty"
Or by creating the one ppp interface (which gets assigned ppp unit id 0),
renaming it to "ppp1" and then trying to create a new ppp interface (which
will always fails as next free ppp unit id is 1, but network interface with
name "ppp1" exists).
This patch fixes above described issue by generating new and new ppp unit
id until some non-conflicting id with network interfaces is generated.
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 26b75952ca upstream.
Kunpeng920's EHCI controller does not have SBRN register.
Reading the SBRN register when the controller driver is
initialized will get 0.
When rebooting the EHCI driver, ehci_shutdown() will be called.
if the sbrn flag is 0, ehci_shutdown() will return directly.
The sbrn flag being 0 will cause the EHCI interrupt signal to
not be turned off after reboot. this interrupt that is not closed
will cause an exception to the device sharing the interrupt.
Therefore, the EHCI controller of Kunpeng920 needs to skip
the read operation of the SBRN register.
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Longfang Liu <liulongfang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1617958081-17999-1-git-send-email-liulongfang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b1bd5cba33 upstream.
When computing the access permissions of a shadow page, use the effective
permissions of the walk up to that point, i.e. the logic AND of its parents'
permissions. Two guest PxE entries that point at the same table gfn need to
be shadowed with different shadow pages if their parents' permissions are
different. KVM currently uses the effective permissions of the last
non-leaf entry for all non-leaf entries. Because all non-leaf SPTEs have
full ("uwx") permissions, and the effective permissions are recorded only
in role.access and merged into the leaves, this can lead to incorrect
reuse of a shadow page and eventually to a missing guest protection page
fault.
For example, here is a shared pagetable:
pgd[] pud[] pmd[] virtual address pointers
/->pmd1(u--)->pte1(uw-)->page1 <- ptr1 (u--)
/->pud1(uw-)--->pmd2(uw-)->pte2(uw-)->page2 <- ptr2 (uw-)
pgd-| (shared pmd[] as above)
\->pud2(u--)--->pmd1(u--)->pte1(uw-)->page1 <- ptr3 (u--)
\->pmd2(uw-)->pte2(uw-)->page2 <- ptr4 (u--)
pud1 and pud2 point to the same pmd table, so:
- ptr1 and ptr3 points to the same page.
- ptr2 and ptr4 points to the same page.
(pud1 and pud2 here are pud entries, while pmd1 and pmd2 here are pmd entries)
- First, the guest reads from ptr1 first and KVM prepares a shadow
page table with role.access=u--, from ptr1's pud1 and ptr1's pmd1.
"u--" comes from the effective permissions of pgd, pud1 and
pmd1, which are stored in pt->access. "u--" is used also to get
the pagetable for pud1, instead of "uw-".
- Then the guest writes to ptr2 and KVM reuses pud1 which is present.
The hypervisor set up a shadow page for ptr2 with pt->access is "uw-"
even though the pud1 pmd (because of the incorrect argument to
kvm_mmu_get_page in the previous step) has role.access="u--".
- Then the guest reads from ptr3. The hypervisor reuses pud1's
shadow pmd for pud2, because both use "u--" for their permissions.
Thus, the shadow pmd already includes entries for both pmd1 and pmd2.
- At last, the guest writes to ptr4. This causes no vmexit or pagefault,
because pud1's shadow page structures included an "uw-" page even though
its role.access was "u--".
Any kind of shared pagetable might have the similar problem when in
virtual machine without TDP enabled if the permissions are different
from different ancestors.
In order to fix the problem, we change pt->access to be an array, and
any access in it will not include permissions ANDed from child ptes.
The test code is: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20210603050537.19605-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com/
Remember to test it with TDP disabled.
The problem had existed long before the commit 41074d07c7 ("KVM: MMU:
Fix inherited permissions for emulated guest pte updates"), and it
is hard to find which is the culprit. So there is no fixes tag here.
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Message-Id: <20210603052455.21023-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: cea0f0e7ea ("[PATCH] KVM: MMU: Shadow page table caching")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[OP: - apply arch/x86/kvm/mmu/* changes to arch/x86/kvm
- apply documentation changes to Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt
- adjusted context in arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 973377ffe8 upstream.
In almost all cases from test_verifier that have been changed in here, we've
had an unreachable path with a load from a register which has an invalid
address on purpose. This was basically to make sure that we never walk this
path and to have the verifier complain if it would otherwise. Change it to
match on the right error for unprivileged given we now test these paths
under speculative execution.
There's one case where we match on exact # of insns_processed. Due to the
extra path, this will of course mismatch on unprivileged. Thus, restrict the
test->insn_processed check to privileged-only.
In one other case, we result in a 'pointer comparison prohibited' error. This
is similarly due to verifying an 'invalid' branch where we end up with a value
pointer on one side of the comparison.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[OP: ignore changes to tests that do not exist in 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9183671af6 upstream.
The verifier only enumerates valid control-flow paths and skips paths that
are unreachable in the non-speculative domain. And so it can miss issues
under speculative execution on mispredicted branches.
For example, a type confusion has been demonstrated with the following
crafted program:
// r0 = pointer to a map array entry
// r6 = pointer to readable stack slot
// r9 = scalar controlled by attacker
1: r0 = *(u64 *)(r0) // cache miss
2: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 4
3: r6 = r9
4: if r0 != 0x1 goto line 6
5: r9 = *(u8 *)(r6)
6: // leak r9
Since line 3 runs iff r0 == 0 and line 5 runs iff r0 == 1, the verifier
concludes that the pointer dereference on line 5 is safe. But: if the
attacker trains both the branches to fall-through, such that the following
is speculatively executed ...
r6 = r9
r9 = *(u8 *)(r6)
// leak r9
... then the program will dereference an attacker-controlled value and could
leak its content under speculative execution via side-channel. This requires
to mistrain the branch predictor, which can be rather tricky, because the
branches are mutually exclusive. However such training can be done at
congruent addresses in user space using different branches that are not
mutually exclusive. That is, by training branches in user space ...
A: if r0 != 0x0 goto line C
B: ...
C: if r0 != 0x0 goto line D
D: ...
... such that addresses A and C collide to the same CPU branch prediction
entries in the PHT (pattern history table) as those of the BPF program's
lines 2 and 4, respectively. A non-privileged attacker could simply brute
force such collisions in the PHT until observing the attack succeeding.
Alternative methods to mistrain the branch predictor are also possible that
avoid brute forcing the collisions in the PHT. A reliable attack has been
demonstrated, for example, using the following crafted program:
// r0 = pointer to a [control] map array entry
// r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0), training/attack phase
// r8 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 8), oob address
// [...]
// r0 = pointer to a [data] map array entry
1: if r7 == 0x3 goto line 3
2: r8 = r0
// crafted sequence of conditional jumps to separate the conditional
// branch in line 193 from the current execution flow
3: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 5
4: if r0 == 0x0 goto exit
5: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 7
6: if r0 == 0x0 goto exit
[...]
187: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 189
188: if r0 == 0x0 goto exit
// load any slowly-loaded value (due to cache miss in phase 3) ...
189: r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0x1200)
// ... and turn it into known zero for verifier, while preserving slowly-
// loaded dependency when executing:
190: r3 &= 1
191: r3 &= 2
// speculatively bypassed phase dependency
192: r7 += r3
193: if r7 == 0x3 goto exit
194: r4 = *(u8 *)(r8 + 0)
// leak r4
As can be seen, in training phase (phase != 0x3), the condition in line 1
turns into false and therefore r8 with the oob address is overridden with
the valid map value address, which in line 194 we can read out without
issues. However, in attack phase, line 2 is skipped, and due to the cache
miss in line 189 where the map value is (zeroed and later) added to the
phase register, the condition in line 193 takes the fall-through path due
to prior branch predictor training, where under speculation, it'll load the
byte at oob address r8 (unknown scalar type at that point) which could then
be leaked via side-channel.
One way to mitigate these is to 'branch off' an unreachable path, meaning,
the current verification path keeps following the is_branch_taken() path
and we push the other branch to the verification stack. Given this is
unreachable from the non-speculative domain, this branch's vstate is
explicitly marked as speculative. This is needed for two reasons: i) if
this path is solely seen from speculative execution, then we later on still
want the dead code elimination to kick in in order to sanitize these
instructions with jmp-1s, and ii) to ensure that paths walked in the
non-speculative domain are not pruned from earlier walks of paths walked in
the speculative domain. Additionally, for robustness, we mark the registers
which have been part of the conditional as unknown in the speculative path
given there should be no assumptions made on their content.
The fix in here mitigates type confusion attacks described earlier due to
i) all code paths in the BPF program being explored and ii) existing
verifier logic already ensuring that given memory access instruction
references one specific data structure.
An alternative to this fix that has also been looked at in this scope was to
mark aux->alu_state at the jump instruction with a BPF_JMP_TAKEN state as
well as direction encoding (always-goto, always-fallthrough, unknown), such
that mixing of different always-* directions themselves as well as mixing of
always-* with unknown directions would cause a program rejection by the
verifier, e.g. programs with constructs like 'if ([...]) { x = 0; } else
{ x = 1; }' with subsequent 'if (x == 1) { [...] }'. For unprivileged, this
would result in only single direction always-* taken paths, and unknown taken
paths being allowed, such that the former could be patched from a conditional
jump to an unconditional jump (ja). Compared to this approach here, it would
have two downsides: i) valid programs that otherwise are not performing any
pointer arithmetic, etc, would potentially be rejected/broken, and ii) we are
required to turn off path pruning for unprivileged, where both can be avoided
in this work through pushing the invalid branch to the verification stack.
The issue was originally discovered by Adam and Ofek, and later independently
discovered and reported as a result of Benedict and Piotr's research work.
Fixes: b2157399cc ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: Adam Morrison <mad@cs.tau.ac.il>
Reported-by: Ofek Kirzner <ofekkir@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[OP: use allow_ptr_leaks instead of bypass_spec_v1]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fe9a5ca7e3 upstream.
... in such circumstances, we do not want to mark the instruction as seen given
the goal is still to jmp-1 rewrite/sanitize dead code, if it is not reachable
from the non-speculative path verification. We do however want to verify it for
safety regardless.
With the patch as-is all the insns that have been marked as seen before the
patch will also be marked as seen after the patch (just with a potentially
different non-zero count). An upcoming patch will also verify paths that are
unreachable in the non-speculative domain, hence this extension is needed.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[OP: - env->pass_cnt is not used in 4.19, so adjust sanitize_mark_insn_seen()
to assign "true" instead
- drop sanitize_insn_aux_data() comment changes, as the function is not
present in 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d203b0fd86 upstream.
Instead of relying on current env->pass_cnt, use the seen count from the
old aux data in adjust_insn_aux_data(), and expand it to the new range of
patched instructions. This change is valid given we always expand 1:n
with n>=1, so what applies to the old/original instruction needs to apply
for the replacement as well.
Not relying on env->pass_cnt is a prerequisite for a later change where we
want to avoid marking an instruction seen when verified under speculative
execution path.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[OP: - declare old_data as bool instead of u32 (struct bpf_insn_aux_data.seen
is bool in 5.4)
- adjusted context for 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 179c6c27bf ]
Use the raw ASID, not ASID-1, when nullifying the last used VMCB when
freeing an SEV ASID. The consumer, pre_sev_run(), indexes the array by
the raw ASID, thus KVM could get a false negative when checking for a
different VMCB if KVM manages to reallocate the same ASID+VMCB combo for
a new VM.
Note, this cannot cause a functional issue _in the current code_, as
pre_sev_run() also checks which pCPU last did VMRUN for the vCPU, and
last_vmentry_cpu is initialized to -1 during vCPU creation, i.e. is
guaranteed to mismatch on the first VMRUN. However, prior to commit
8a14fe4f0c ("kvm: x86: Move last_cpu into kvm_vcpu_arch as
last_vmentry_cpu"), SVM tracked pCPU on its own and zero-initialized the
last_cpu variable. Thus it's theoretically possible that older versions
of KVM could miss a TLB flush if the first VMRUN is on pCPU0 and the ASID
and VMCB exactly match those of a prior VM.
Fixes: 70cd94e60c ("KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled")
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 92766c4628 ]
When calling the 'ql_wait_for_drvr_lock' and 'ql_adapter_reset', the driver
has already acquired the spin lock, so the driver should not call 'ssleep'
in atomic context.
This bug can be fixed by using 'mdelay' instead of 'ssleep'.
Reported-by: Letu Ren <fantasquex@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Letu Ren <fantasquex@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit caace6ca4e ]
This issue was noticed while debugging a shutdown issue where some
secondary CPUs are not being shutdown correctly. A fix for that [1] requires
that secondary cpus be offlined using the cpu_online_mask so that the
stop operation is a no-op if CPU HOTPLUG is disabled. I, like the author in
[1] looked at the architectures and found that alpha is one of two
architectures that executes smp_send_stop() on all possible CPUs.
On alpha, smp_send_stop() sends an IPI to all possible CPUs but only needs
to send them to online CPUs.
Send the stop IPI to only the online CPUs.
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/1/10/250
Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Signed-off-by: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ecef6a9eff ]
Data transfers are not required to be block aligned in memory, so they
span two pages. Fix this by splitting the call to >sff_data_xfer into
two for that case.
This has been broken since the initial libata import before the damn
of git, but was uncovered by the legacy ide driver removal.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210709130237.3730959-1-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit df51fe7ea1 upstream.
If we use "perf record" in an AMD Milan guest, dmesg reports a #GP
warning from an unchecked MSR access error on MSR_F15H_PERF_CTLx:
[] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xc0010200 (tried to write 0x0000020000110076) at rIP: 0xffffffff8106ddb4 (native_write_msr+0x4/0x20)
[] Call Trace:
[] amd_pmu_disable_event+0x22/0x90
[] x86_pmu_stop+0x4c/0xa0
[] x86_pmu_del+0x3a/0x140
The AMD64_EVENTSEL_HOSTONLY bit is defined and used on the host,
while the guest perf driver should avoid such use.
Fixes: 1018faa6cf ("perf/x86/kvm: Fix Host-Only/Guest-Only counting with SVM disabled")
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Tested-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210802070850.35295-1-likexu@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d5aaad6f83 upstream.
Take a signed 'long' instead of an 'unsigned long' for the number of
pages to add/subtract to the total number of pages used by the MMU. This
fixes a zero-extension bug on 32-bit kernels that effectively corrupts
the per-cpu counter used by the shrinker.
Per-cpu counters take a signed 64-bit value on both 32-bit and 64-bit
kernels, whereas kvm_mod_used_mmu_pages() takes an unsigned long and thus
an unsigned 32-bit value on 32-bit kernels. As a result, the value used
to adjust the per-cpu counter is zero-extended (unsigned -> signed), not
sign-extended (signed -> signed), and so KVM's intended -1 gets morphed to
4294967295 and effectively corrupts the counter.
This was found by a staggering amount of sheer dumb luck when running
kvm-unit-tests on a 32-bit KVM build. The shrinker just happened to kick
in while running tests and do_shrink_slab() logged an error about trying
to free a negative number of objects. The truly lucky part is that the
kernel just happened to be a slightly stale build, as the shrinker no
longer yells about negative objects as of commit 18bb473e50 ("mm:
vmscan: shrink deferred objects proportional to priority").
vmscan: shrink_slab: mmu_shrink_scan+0x0/0x210 [kvm] negative objects to delete nr=-858993460
Fixes: bc8a3d8925 ("kvm: mmu: Fix overflow on kvm mmu page limit calculation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210804214609.1096003-1-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fa7a549d32 upstream.
Once an exception has been injected, any side effects related to
the exception (such as setting CR2 or DR6) have been taked place.
Therefore, once KVM sets the VM-entry interruption information
field or the AMD EVENTINJ field, the next VM-entry must deliver that
exception.
Pending interrupts are processed after injected exceptions, so
in theory it would not be a problem to use KVM_INTERRUPT when
an injected exception is present. However, DOSEMU is using
run->ready_for_interrupt_injection to detect interrupt windows
and then using KVM_SET_SREGS/KVM_SET_REGS to inject the
interrupt manually. For this to work, the interrupt window
must be delayed after the completion of the previous event
injection.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp2@yandex.ru>
Tested-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp2@yandex.ru>
Fixes: 71cc849b70 ("KVM: x86: Fix split-irqchip vs interrupt injection window request")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e39cdacf2f upstream.
During the driver loading process, the 'dev' field was not assigned, but
the 'dev' field was referenced in the subsequent 'i82092aa_set_mem_map'
function.
Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
[linux@dominikbrodowski.net: shorten commit message, add Cc to stable]
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9a936d6c3d upstream.
Correct big-endian accesses to the CBUS UART, a Malta on-board discrete
TI16C550C part wired directly to the system controller's device bus, and
do not use byte swapping with the 32-bit accesses to the device.
The CBUS is used for devices such as the boot flash memory needed early
on in system bootstrap even before PCI has been initialised. Therefore
it uses the system controller's device bus, which follows the endianness
set with the CPU, which means no byte-swapping is ever required for data
accesses to CBUS, unlike with PCI.
The CBUS UART uses the UPIO_MEM32 access method, that is the `readl' and
`writel' MMIO accessors, which on the MIPS platform imply byte-swapping
with PCI systems. Consequently the wrong byte lane is accessed with the
big-endian configuration and the UART is not correctly accessed.
As it happens the UPIO_MEM32BE access method makes use of the `ioread32'
and `iowrite32' MMIO accessors, which still use `readl' and `writel'
respectively, however they byte-swap data passed, effectively cancelling
swapping done with the accessors themselves and making it suitable for
the CBUS UART.
Make the CBUS UART switch between UPIO_MEM32 and UPIO_MEM32BE then,
based on the endianness selected. With this change in place the device
is correctly recognised with big-endian Malta at boot, along with the
Super I/O devices behind PCI:
Serial: 8250/16550 driver, 5 ports, IRQ sharing enabled
printk: console [ttyS0] disabled
serial8250.0: ttyS0 at I/O 0x3f8 (irq = 4, base_baud = 115200) is a 16550A
printk: console [ttyS0] enabled
printk: bootconsole [uart8250] disabled
serial8250.0: ttyS1 at I/O 0x2f8 (irq = 3, base_baud = 115200) is a 16550A
serial8250.0: ttyS2 at MMIO 0x1f000900 (irq = 20, base_baud = 230400) is a 16550A
Fixes: e7c4782f92 ("[MIPS] Put an end to <asm/serial.h>'s long and annyoing existence")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.23+
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.2106260524430.37803@angie.orcam.me.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e5227c5109 upstream.
Make sure only actual 8 bits of the IIR register are used in determining
the port type in `autoconfig'.
The `serial_in' port accessor returns the `unsigned int' type, meaning
that with UPIO_AU, UPIO_MEM16, UPIO_MEM32, and UPIO_MEM32BE access types
more than 8 bits of data are returned, of which the high order bits will
often come from bus lines that are left floating in the data phase. For
example with the MIPS Malta board's CBUS UART, where the registers are
aligned on 8-byte boundaries and which uses 32-bit accesses, data as
follows is returned:
YAMON> dump -32 0xbf000900 0x40
BF000900: 1F000942 1F000942 1F000900 1F000900 ...B...B........
BF000910: 1F000901 1F000901 1F000900 1F000900 ................
BF000920: 1F000900 1F000900 1F000960 1F000960 ...........`...`
BF000930: 1F000900 1F000900 1F0009FF 1F0009FF ................
YAMON>
Evidently high-order 24 bits return values previously driven in the
address phase (the 3 highest order address bits used with the command
above are masked out in the simple virtual address mapping used here and
come out at zeros on the external bus), a common scenario with bus lines
left floating, due to bus capacitance.
Consequently when the value of IIR, mapped at 0x1f000910, is retrieved
in `autoconfig', it comes out at 0x1f0009c1 and when it is right-shifted
by 6 and then assigned to 8-bit `scratch' variable, the value calculated
is 0x27, not one of 0, 1, 2, 3 expected in port type determination.
Fix the issue then, by assigning the value returned from `serial_in' to
`scratch' first, which masks out 24 high-order bits retrieved, and only
then right-shift the resulting 8-bit data quantity, producing the value
of 3 in this case, as expected. Fix the same issue in `serial_dl_read'.
The problem first appeared with Linux 2.6.9-rc3 which predates our repo
history, but the origin could be identified with the old MIPS/Linux repo
also at: <git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ralf/linux.git>
as commit e0d2356c0777 ("Merge with Linux 2.6.9-rc3."), where code in
`serial_in' was updated with this case:
+ case UPIO_MEM32:
+ return readl(up->port.membase + offset);
+
which made it produce results outside the unsigned 8-bit range for the
first time, though obviously it is system dependent what actual values
appear in the high order bits retrieved and it may well have been zeros
in the relevant positions with the system the change originally was
intended for. It is at that point that code in `autoconf' should have
been updated accordingly, but clearly it was overlooked.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.12+
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.2106260516220.37803@angie.orcam.me.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 877ba3f729 upstream.
Commit b5776e7524 ("ext4: fix potential htree index checksum
corruption) removed a required restart when multiple levels of index
nodes need to be split. Fix this to avoid directory htree corruptions
when using the large_dir feature.
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v5.11
Cc: Благодаренко Артём <artem.blagodarenko@gmail.com>
Fixes: b5776e7524 ("ext4: fix potential htree index checksum corruption)
Reported-by: Denis <denis@voxelsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 76f22c93b2 upstream.
The direction of the pipe argument must match the request-type direction
bit or control requests may fail depending on the host-controller-driver
implementation.
Control transfers without a data stage are treated as OUT requests by
the USB stack and should be using usb_sndctrlpipe(). Failing to do so
will now trigger a warning.
The driver uses a zero-length i2c-read request for type detection so
update the control-request code to use usb_sndctrlpipe() in this case.
Note that actually trying to read the i2c register in question does not
work as the register might not exist (e.g. depending on the demodulator)
as reported by Eero Lehtinen <debiangamer2@gmail.com>.
Reported-by: syzbot+faf11bbadc5a372564da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Eero Lehtinen <debiangamer2@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Eero Lehtinen <debiangamer2@gmail.com>
Fixes: d0f232e823 ("[media] rtl28xxu: add heuristic to detect chip type")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.0
Cc: Antti Palosaari <crope@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b5c10dd04b upstream.
The shm cache could contain invalid addresses if
optee_disable_shm_cache() was not called from the .shutdown hook of the
previous kernel before a kexec. These addresses could be unmapped or
they could point to mapped but unintended locations in memory.
Clear the shared memory cache, while being careful to not translate the
addresses returned from OPTEE_SMC_DISABLE_SHM_CACHE, during driver
initialization. Once all pre-cache shm objects are removed, proceed with
enabling the cache so that we know that we can handle cached shm objects
with confidence later in the .shutdown hook.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1e3bac71c5 upstream.
Currently the histogram logic allows the user to write "cpu" in as an
event field, and it will record the CPU that the event happened on.
The problem with this is that there's a lot of events that have "cpu"
as a real field, and using "cpu" as the CPU it ran on, makes it
impossible to run histograms on the "cpu" field of events.
For example, if I want to have a histogram on the count of the
workqueue_queue_work event on its cpu field, running:
># echo 'hist:keys=cpu' > events/workqueue/workqueue_queue_work/trigger
Gives a misleading and wrong result.
Change the command to "common_cpu" as no event should have "common_*"
fields as that's a reserved name for fields used by all events. And
this makes sense here as common_cpu would be a field used by all events.
Now we can even do:
># echo 'hist:keys=common_cpu,cpu if cpu < 100' > events/workqueue/workqueue_queue_work/trigger
># cat events/workqueue/workqueue_queue_work/hist
# event histogram
#
# trigger info: hist:keys=common_cpu,cpu:vals=hitcount:sort=hitcount:size=2048 if cpu < 100 [active]
#
{ common_cpu: 0, cpu: 2 } hitcount: 1
{ common_cpu: 0, cpu: 4 } hitcount: 1
{ common_cpu: 7, cpu: 7 } hitcount: 1
{ common_cpu: 0, cpu: 7 } hitcount: 1
{ common_cpu: 0, cpu: 1 } hitcount: 1
{ common_cpu: 0, cpu: 6 } hitcount: 2
{ common_cpu: 0, cpu: 5 } hitcount: 2
{ common_cpu: 1, cpu: 1 } hitcount: 4
{ common_cpu: 6, cpu: 6 } hitcount: 4
{ common_cpu: 5, cpu: 5 } hitcount: 14
{ common_cpu: 4, cpu: 4 } hitcount: 26
{ common_cpu: 0, cpu: 0 } hitcount: 39
{ common_cpu: 2, cpu: 2 } hitcount: 184
Now for backward compatibility, I added a trick. If "cpu" is used, and
the field is not found, it will fall back to "common_cpu" and work as
it did before. This way, it will still work for old programs that use
"cpu" to get the actual CPU, but if the event has a "cpu" as a field, it
will get that event's "cpu" field, which is probably what it wants
anyway.
I updated the tracefs/README to include documentation about both the
common_timestamp and the common_cpu. This way, if that text is present in
the README, then an application can know that common_cpu is supported over
just plain "cpu".
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210721110053.26b4f641@oasis.local.home
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8b7622bf94 ("tracing: Add cpu field for hist triggers")
Reviewed-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2c05caa7ba upstream.
When working on my user space applications, I found a bug in the synthetic
event code where the automated synthetic event field was not matching the
event field calculation it was attached to. Looking deeper into it, it was
because the calculation hist_field was not given a size.
The synthetic event fields are matched to their hist_fields either by
having the field have an identical string type, or if that does not match,
then the size and signed values are used to match the fields.
The problem arose when I tried to match a calculation where the fields
were "unsigned int". My tool created a synthetic event of type "u32". But
it failed to match. The string was:
diff=field1-field2:onmatch(event).trace(synth,$diff)
Adding debugging into the kernel, I found that the size of "diff" was 0.
And since it was given "unsigned int" as a type, the histogram fallback
code used size and signed. The signed matched, but the size of u32 (4) did
not match zero, and the event failed to be created.
This can be worse if the field you want to match is not one of the
acceptable fields for a synthetic event. As event fields can have any type
that is supported in Linux, this can cause an issue. For example, if a
type is an enum. Then there's no way to use that with any calculations.
Have the calculation field simply take on the size of what it is
calculating.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210730171951.59c7743f@oasis.local.home
Cc: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 100719dcef ("tracing: Add simple expression support to hist triggers")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bf88fef0b6 upstream.
The HNP work can be re-scheduled while it's still in-fly. This results in
re-initialization of the busy work, resetting the hrtimer's list node of
the work and crashing kernel with null dereference within kernel/timer
once work's timer is expired. It's very easy to trigger this problem by
re-plugging USB cable quickly. Initialize HNP work only once to fix this
trouble.
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000126)
...
PC is at __run_timers.part.0+0x150/0x228
LR is at __next_timer_interrupt+0x51/0x9c
...
(__run_timers.part.0) from [<c0187a2b>] (run_timer_softirq+0x2f/0x50)
(run_timer_softirq) from [<c01013ad>] (__do_softirq+0xd5/0x2f0)
(__do_softirq) from [<c012589b>] (irq_exit+0xab/0xb8)
(irq_exit) from [<c0170341>] (handle_domain_irq+0x45/0x60)
(handle_domain_irq) from [<c04c4a43>] (gic_handle_irq+0x6b/0x7c)
(gic_handle_irq) from [<c0100b65>] (__irq_svc+0x65/0xac)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210717182134.30262-6-digetx@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit afcff6dc69 upstream.
The USB HID standard declares mandatory support for GET_IDLE and SET_IDLE
requests for Boot Keyboard. Most hosts can handle their absence, but others
like some old/strange UEFIs and BIOSes consider this a critical error
and refuse to work with f_hid.
This primitive implementation of saving and returning idle is sufficient
to meet the requirements of the standard and these devices.
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Devaev <mdevaev@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210721180351.129450-1-mdevaev@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 75d95e2e39 upstream.
This use-after-free happens when a fw_priv object has been freed but
hasn't been removed from the pending list (pending_fw_head). The next
time fw_load_sysfs_fallback tries to insert into the list, it ends up
accessing the pending_list member of the previously freed fw_priv.
The root cause here is that all code paths that abort the fw load
don't delete it from the pending list. For example:
_request_firmware()
-> fw_abort_batch_reqs()
-> fw_state_aborted()
To fix this, delete the fw_priv from the list in __fw_set_state() if
the new state is DONE or ABORTED. This way, all aborts will remove
the fw_priv from the list. Accordingly, remove calls to list_del_init
that were being made before calling fw_state_(aborted|done).
Also, in fw_load_sysfs_fallback, don't add the fw_priv to the pending
list if it is already aborted. Instead, just jump out and return early.
Fixes: bcfbd3523f ("firmware: fix a double abort case with fw_load_sysfs_fallback")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+de271708674e2093097b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+de271708674e2093097b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anirudh Rayabharam <mail@anirudhrb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210728085107.4141-3-mail@anirudhrb.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0d6434e10b upstream.
The only motivation for using -EAGAIN in commit 0542ad88fb
("firmware loader: Fix _request_firmware_load() return val for fw load
abort") was to distinguish the error from -ENOMEM, and so there is no
real reason in keeping it. -EAGAIN is typically used to tell the
userspace to try something again and in this case re-using the sysfs
loading interface cannot be retried when a timeout happens, so the
return value is also bogus.
-ETIMEDOUT is received when the wait times out and returning that
is much more telling of what the reason for the failure was. So, just
propagate that instead of returning -EAGAIN.
Suggested-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anirudh Rayabharam <mail@anirudhrb.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210728085107.4141-2-mail@anirudhrb.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3c18e9baee upstream.
The chip supports high transfer rates, but with the small default buffers
(64 bytes read), some entire blocks are regularly lost. This typically
happens at 1.5 Mbps (which is the default speed on Rockchip devices) when
used as a console to access U-Boot where the output of the "help" command
misses many lines and where "printenv" mangles the environment.
The FTDI driver doesn't suffer at all from this. One difference is that
it uses 512 bytes rx buffers and 256 bytes tx buffers. Adopting these
values completely resolved the issue, even the output of "dmesg" is
reliable. I preferred to leave the Tx value unchanged as it is not
involved in this issue, while a change could increase the risk of
triggering the same issue with other devices having too small buffers.
I verified that it backports well (and works) at least to 5.4. It's of
low importance enough to be dropped where it doesn't trivially apply
anymore.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210724152739.18726-1-w@1wt.eu
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 30fad76ce4 upstream.
rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt self-detected stall on CPU
rcu: 1-...!: (2 ticks this GP) idle=d92/1/0x4000000000000000
softirq=25390/25392 fqs=3
(t=12164 jiffies g=31645 q=43226)
rcu: rcu_preempt kthread starved for 12162 jiffies! g31645 f0x0
RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=0x0 ->cpu=0
rcu: Unless rcu_preempt kthread gets sufficient CPU time,
OOM is now expected behavior.
rcu: RCU grace-period kthread stack dump:
task:rcu_preempt state:R running task
...........
usbtmc 3-1:0.0: unknown status received: -71
usbtmc 3-1:0.0: unknown status received: -71
usbtmc 3-1:0.0: unknown status received: -71
usbtmc 3-1:0.0: unknown status received: -71
usbtmc 3-1:0.0: unknown status received: -71
usbtmc 3-1:0.0: unknown status received: -71
usbtmc 3-1:0.0: unknown status received: -71
usbtmc 3-1:0.0: unknown status received: -71
usbtmc 3-1:0.0: usb_submit_urb failed: -19
The function usbtmc_interrupt() resubmits urbs when the error status
of an urb is -EPROTO. In systems using the dummy_hcd usb controller
this can result in endless interrupt loops when the usbtmc device is
disconnected from the host system.
Since host controller drivers already try to recover from transmission
errors, there is no need to resubmit the urb or try other solutions
to repair the error situation.
In case of errors the INT pipe just stops to wait for further packets.
Fixes: dbf3e7f654 ("Implement an ioctl to support the USMTMC-USB488 READ_STATUS_BYTE operation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+e2eae5639e7203360018@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Qiang.zhang <qiang.zhang@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Guido Kiener <guido.kiener@rohde-schwarz.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210723004334.458930-1-qiang.zhang@windriver.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e04480920d ]
syzbot is hitting might_sleep() warning at hci_sock_dev_event() due to
calling lock_sock() with rw spinlock held [1].
It seems that history of this locking problem is a trial and error.
Commit b40df5743e ("[PATCH] bluetooth: fix socket locking in
hci_sock_dev_event()") in 2.6.21-rc4 changed bh_lock_sock() to
lock_sock() as an attempt to fix lockdep warning.
Then, commit 4ce61d1c7a ("[BLUETOOTH]: Fix locking in
hci_sock_dev_event().") in 2.6.22-rc2 changed lock_sock() to
local_bh_disable() + bh_lock_sock_nested() as an attempt to fix the
sleep in atomic context warning.
Then, commit 4b5dd696f8 ("Bluetooth: Remove local_bh_disable() from
hci_sock.c") in 3.3-rc1 removed local_bh_disable().
Then, commit e305509e67 ("Bluetooth: use correct lock to prevent UAF
of hdev object") in 5.13-rc5 again changed bh_lock_sock_nested() to
lock_sock() as an attempt to fix CVE-2021-3573.
This difficulty comes from current implementation that
hci_sock_dev_event(HCI_DEV_UNREG) is responsible for dropping all
references from sockets because hci_unregister_dev() immediately
reclaims resources as soon as returning from
hci_sock_dev_event(HCI_DEV_UNREG).
But the history suggests that hci_sock_dev_event(HCI_DEV_UNREG) was not
doing what it should do.
Therefore, instead of trying to detach sockets from device, let's accept
not detaching sockets from device at hci_sock_dev_event(HCI_DEV_UNREG),
by moving actual cleanup of resources from hci_unregister_dev() to
hci_cleanup_dev() which is called by bt_host_release() when all
references to this unregistered device (which is a kobject) are gone.
Since hci_sock_dev_event(HCI_DEV_UNREG) no longer resets
hci_pi(sk)->hdev, we need to check whether this device was unregistered
and return an error based on HCI_UNREGISTER flag. There might be subtle
behavioral difference in "monitor the hdev" functionality; please report
if you found something went wrong due to this patch.
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a5df189917e79d5e59c9 [1]
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+a5df189917e79d5e59c9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Fixes: e305509e67 ("Bluetooth: use correct lock to prevent UAF of hdev object")
Acked-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8d75d0eff6 ]
If queue is dying while iolatency_set_limit() is in progress,
blk_get_queue() won't increment the refcount of the queue. However,
blk_put_queue() will still decrement the refcount later, which will
cause the refcout to be unbalanced.
Thus error out in such case to fix the problem.
Fixes: 8c772a9bfc ("blk-iolatency: fix IO hang due to negative inflight counter")
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210805124645.543797-1-yukuai3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 942e560a3d ]
Smatch says:
drivers/net/ethernet/neterion/vxge/vxge-main.c:3518 vxge_device_unregister() error: Using vdev after free_{netdev,candev}(dev);
drivers/net/ethernet/neterion/vxge/vxge-main.c:3518 vxge_device_unregister() error: Using vdev after free_{netdev,candev}(dev);
drivers/net/ethernet/neterion/vxge/vxge-main.c:3520 vxge_device_unregister() error: Using vdev after free_{netdev,candev}(dev);
drivers/net/ethernet/neterion/vxge/vxge-main.c:3520 vxge_device_unregister() error: Using vdev after free_{netdev,candev}(dev);
Since vdev pointer is netdev private data accessing it after free_netdev()
call can cause use-after-free bug. Fix it by moving free_netdev() call at
the end of the function
Fixes: 6cca200362 ("vxge: cleanup probe error paths")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 44712965bf ]
Smatch says:
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c:3994 fec_drv_remove() error: Using fep after free_{netdev,candev}(ndev);
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c:3995 fec_drv_remove() error: Using fep after free_{netdev,candev}(ndev);
Since fep pointer is netdev private data, accessing it after free_netdev()
call can cause use-after-free bug. Fix it by moving free_netdev() call at
the end of the function
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: a31eda65ba ("net: fec: fix clock count mis-match")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joakim Zhang <qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit af35fc3735 ]
Syzbot reported uninit value pegasus_probe(). The problem was in missing
error handling.
get_interrupt_interval() internally calls read_eprom_word() which can
fail in some cases. For example: failed to receive usb control message.
These cases should be handled to prevent uninit value bug, since
read_eprom_word() will not initialize passed stack variable in case of
internal failure.
Fail log:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in get_interrupt_interval drivers/net/usb/pegasus.c:746 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in pegasus_probe+0x10e7/0x4080 drivers/net/usb/pegasus.c:1152
CPU: 1 PID: 825 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
...
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0x24c/0x2e0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
kmsan_report+0xfb/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:118
__msan_warning+0x5c/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:197
get_interrupt_interval drivers/net/usb/pegasus.c:746 [inline]
pegasus_probe+0x10e7/0x4080 drivers/net/usb/pegasus.c:1152
....
Local variable ----data.i@pegasus_probe created at:
get_interrupt_interval drivers/net/usb/pegasus.c:1151 [inline]
pegasus_probe+0xe57/0x4080 drivers/net/usb/pegasus.c:1152
get_interrupt_interval drivers/net/usb/pegasus.c:1151 [inline]
pegasus_probe+0xe57/0x4080 drivers/net/usb/pegasus.c:1152
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+02c9f70f3afae308464a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210804143005.439-1-paskripkin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fb653827c7 ]
Set the error code if bnx2x_alloc_fw_stats_mem() fails. The current
code returns success.
Fixes: ad5afc8936 ("bnx2x: Separate VF and PF logic")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
