commit eb307d09fe upstream.
racy issue is triggered the bug by racing between closing a connection
and rmmod. In ksmbd, rcu_barrier() is not called at module unload time,
so nothing prevents ksmbd from getting unloaded while it still has RCU
callbacks pending. It leads to trigger unintended execution of kernel
code locally and use to defeat protections such as Kernel Lockdown
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-20477
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2ed90cb093 upstream.
Read mmu_invalidate_seq before dropping the mmap_lock so that KVM can
detect if the results of vma_lookup() (e.g. vma_shift) become stale
before it acquires kvm->mmu_lock. This fixes a theoretical bug where a
VMA could be changed by userspace after vma_lookup() and before KVM
reads the mmu_invalidate_seq, causing KVM to install page table entries
based on a (possibly) no-longer-valid vma_shift.
Re-order the MMU cache top-up to earlier in user_mem_abort() so that it
is not done after KVM has read mmu_invalidate_seq (i.e. so as to avoid
inducing spurious fault retries).
It's unlikely that any sane userspace currently modifies VMAs in such a
way as to trigger this race. And even with directed testing I was unable
to reproduce it. But a sufficiently motivated host userspace might be
able to exploit this race.
Note KVM/ARM had the same bug and was fixed in a separate, near
identical patch (see Link).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20230313235454.2964067-1-dmatlack@google.com/
Fixes: 9955371cc0 ("RISC-V: KVM: Implement MMU notifiers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Tested-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 13b90cf900 ]
Currently, there are issues with enabling PSR-SU + DSC. This stems from
the fact that DSC imposes a slice height on transmitted video data and
we are not conforming to that slice height in PSR-SU regions. So, pass
slice_height into su_y_granularity to feed the DSC slice height into
PSR-SU code.
Acked-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Hamza Mahfooz <hamza.mahfooz@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Stable-dep-of: 0b5dfe1275 ("drm/amd/display: fix a divided-by-zero error")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1e994cc095 ]
[Why]
1. It could hit bandwidth limitdation under single dimm
memory when connecting 8K external monitor.
2. IsSupportedVidPn got validation failed with
2K240Hz eDP + 8K24Hz external monitor.
3. It's better to filter out such combination in
EnumVidPnCofuncModality
4. For short term, filter out in dc bandwidth validation.
[How]
Force 2K@240Hz+8K@24Hz timing validation false in dc.
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Kazlauskas <Nicholas.Kazlauskas@amd.com>
Acked-by: Qingqing Zhuo <qingqing.zhuo@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Miess <Daniel.Miess@amd.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 71c4ca2d3b ]
[why]
Newer ASICs such as DCN314 needs to allow for both self refresh and mem
clk switching rather than just self refresh only. Otherwise, we can see
some p-state hangs on ASICs that do support mem clk switching.
[how]
Added an allow_self_refresh_only flag for dcn30_internal_validate_bw
and created a validate_bw method for DCN314 with the allow_self_refresh_only
flag set to false (to support mem clk switching).
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Kazlauskas <Nicholas.Kazlauskas@amd.com>
Acked-by: Qingqing Zhuo <qingqing.zhuo@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Nasir Osman <nasir.osman@amd.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Stable-dep-of: 1e994cc095 ("drm/amd/display: limit timing for single dimm memory")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 43ec16f145 upstream.
There is a crash in relay_file_read, as the var from
point to the end of last subbuf.
The oops looks something like:
pc : __arch_copy_to_user+0x180/0x310
lr : relay_file_read+0x20c/0x2c8
Call trace:
__arch_copy_to_user+0x180/0x310
full_proxy_read+0x68/0x98
vfs_read+0xb0/0x1d0
ksys_read+0x6c/0xf0
__arm64_sys_read+0x20/0x28
el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0x84/0x108
do_el0_svc+0x74/0x90
el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
el0_sync_handler+0x88/0xb0
el0_sync+0x148/0x180
We get the condition by analyzing the vmcore:
1). The last produced byte and last consumed byte
both at the end of the last subbuf
2). A softirq calls function(e.g __blk_add_trace)
to write relay buffer occurs when an program is calling
relay_file_read_avail().
relay_file_read
relay_file_read_avail
relay_file_read_consume(buf, 0, 0);
//interrupted by softirq who will write subbuf
....
return 1;
//read_start point to the end of the last subbuf
read_start = relay_file_read_start_pos
//avail is equal to subsize
avail = relay_file_read_subbuf_avail
//from points to an invalid memory address
from = buf->start + read_start
//system is crashed
copy_to_user(buffer, from, avail)
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230419040203.37676-1-zhang.zhengming@h3c.com
Fixes: 8d62fdebda ("relay file read: start-pos fix")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Zhengming <zhang.zhengming@h3c.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhao Lei <zhao_lei1@hoperun.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhou Kete <zhou.kete@h3c.com>
Reviewed-by: Pengcheng Yang <yangpc@wangsu.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 49e5d16b6f upstream.
commit f003277311 ("KVM: arm64: Use config_lock to protect vgic
state") was meant to rectify a longstanding lock ordering issue in KVM
where the kvm->lock is taken while holding vcpu->mutex. As it so
happens, the aforementioned commit introduced yet another locking issue
by acquiring the its_lock before acquiring the config lock.
This is obviously wrong, especially considering that the lock ordering
is well documented in vgic.c. Reshuffle the locks once more to take the
config_lock before the its_lock. While at it, sprinkle in the lockdep
hinting that has become popular as of late to keep lockdep apprised of
our ordering.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f003277311 ("KVM: arm64: Use config_lock to protect vgic state")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230412062733.988229-1-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f003277311 upstream.
Almost all of the vgic state is VM-scoped but accessed from the context
of a vCPU. These accesses were serialized on the kvm->lock which cannot
be nested within a vcpu->mutex critical section.
Move over the vgic state to using the config_lock. Tweak the lock
ordering where necessary to ensure that the config_lock is acquired
after the vcpu->mutex. Acquire the config_lock in kvm_vgic_create() to
avoid a race between the converted flows and GIC creation. Where
necessary, continue to acquire kvm->lock to avoid a race with vCPU
creation (i.e. flows that use lock_all_vcpus()).
Finally, promote the locking expectations in comments to lockdep
assertions and update the locking documentation for the config_lock as
well as vcpu->mutex.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230327164747.2466958-5-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4bba7f7def upstream.
There are various bits of VM-scoped data that can only be configured
before the first call to KVM_RUN, such as the hypercall bitmaps and
the PMU. As these fields are protected by the kvm->lock and accessed
while holding vcpu->mutex, this is yet another example of lock
inversion.
Change out the kvm->lock for kvm->arch.config_lock in all of these
instances. Opportunistically simplify the locking mechanics of the
PMU configuration by holding the config_lock for the entirety of
kvm_arm_pmu_v3_set_attr().
Note that this also addresses a couple of bugs. There is an unguarded
read of the PMU version in KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3_FILTER which could race
with KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3_SET_PMU. Additionally, until now writes to the
per-vCPU vPMU irq were not serialized VM-wide, meaning concurrent calls
to KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3_IRQ could lead to a false positive in
pmu_irq_is_valid().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230327164747.2466958-4-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c43120afb5 upstream.
kvm->lock must be taken outside of the vcpu->mutex. Of course, the
locking documentation for KVM makes this abundantly clear. Nonetheless,
the locking order in KVM/arm64 has been wrong for quite a while; we
acquire the kvm->lock while holding the vcpu->mutex all over the shop.
All was seemingly fine until commit 42a90008f8 ("KVM: Ensure lockdep
knows about kvm->lock vs. vcpu->mutex ordering rule") caught us with our
pants down, leading to lockdep barfing:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.2.0-rc7+ #19 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
qemu-system-aar/859 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff5aa69269eba0 (&host_kvm->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_reset_vcpu+0x34/0x274
but task is already holding lock:
ffff5aa68768c0b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x8c/0xba0
which lock already depends on the new lock.
Add a dedicated lock to serialize writes to VM-scoped configuration from
the context of a vCPU. Protect the register width flags with the new
lock, thus avoiding the need to grab the kvm->lock while holding
vcpu->mutex in kvm_reset_vcpu().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/f6452cdd-65ff-34b8-bab0-5c06416da5f6@arm.com/
Tested-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230327164747.2466958-3-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0acc7239c2 upstream.
KVM/arm64 had the lock ordering backwards on vcpu->mutex and kvm->lock
from the very beginning. One such example is the way vCPU resets are
handled: the kvm->lock is acquired while handling a guest CPU_ON PSCI
call.
Add a dedicated lock to serialize writes to kvm_vcpu_arch::{mp_state,
reset_state}. Promote all accessors of mp_state to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE()
as readers do not acquire the mp_state_lock. While at it, plug yet
another race by taking the mp_state_lock in the KVM_SET_MP_STATE ioctl
handler.
As changes to MP state are now guarded with a dedicated lock, drop the
kvm->lock acquisition from the PSCI CPU_ON path. Similarly, move the
reader of reset_state outside of the kvm->lock and instead protect it
with the mp_state_lock. Note that writes to reset_state::reset have been
demoted to regular stores as both readers and writers acquire the
mp_state_lock.
While the kvm->lock inversion still exists in kvm_reset_vcpu(), at least
now PSCI CPU_ON no longer depends on it for serializing vCPU reset.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230327164747.2466958-2-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4984563823 upstream.
Extend VMX's nested intercept logic for emulated instructions to handle
"pause" interception, in quotes because KVM's emulator doesn't filter out
NOPs when checking for nested intercepts. Failure to allow emulation of
NOPs results in KVM injecting a #UD into L2 on any NOP that collides with
the emulator's definition of PAUSE, i.e. on all single-byte NOPs.
For PAUSE itself, honor L1's PAUSE-exiting control, but ignore PLE to
avoid unnecessarily injecting a #UD into L2. Per the SDM, the first
execution of PAUSE after VM-Entry is treated as the beginning of a new
loop, i.e. will never trigger a PLE VM-Exit, and so L1 can't expect any
given execution of PAUSE to deterministically exit.
... the processor considers this execution to be the first execution of
PAUSE in a loop. (It also does so for the first execution of PAUSE at
CPL 0 after VM entry.)
All that said, the PLE side of things is currently a moot point, as KVM
doesn't expose PLE to L1.
Note, vmx_check_intercept() is still wildly broken when L1 wants to
intercept an instruction, as KVM injects a #UD instead of synthesizing a
nested VM-Exit. That issue extends far beyond NOP/PAUSE and needs far
more effort to fix, i.e. is a problem for the future.
Fixes: 07721feee4 ("KVM: nVMX: Don't emulate instructions in guest mode")
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230405002359.418138-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d82dcd9e21 upstream.
Reiserfs sets a security xattr at inode creation time in two stages: first,
it calls reiserfs_security_init() to obtain the xattr from active LSMs;
then, it calls reiserfs_security_write() to actually write that xattr.
Unfortunately, it seems there is a wrong expectation that LSMs provide the
full xattr name in the form 'security.<suffix>'. However, LSMs always
provided just the suffix, causing reiserfs to not write the xattr at all
(if the suffix is shorter than the prefix), or to write an xattr with the
wrong name.
Add a temporary buffer in reiserfs_security_write(), and write to it the
full xattr name, before passing it to reiserfs_xattr_set_handle().
Also replace the name length check with a check that the full xattr name is
not larger than XATTR_NAME_MAX.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.x
Fixes: 57fe60df62 ("reiserfs: add atomic addition of selinux attributes during inode creation")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 47446d7cd4 upstream.
aesbs_ecb_encrypt(), aesbs_ecb_decrypt(), aesbs_xts_encrypt(), and
aesbs_xts_decrypt() are called via indirect function calls. Therefore
they need to use SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START instead of SYM_FUNC_START to cause
their type hashes to be emitted when the kernel is built with
CONFIG_CFI_CLANG=y. Otherwise, the code crashes with a CFI failure if
the compiler doesn't happen to optimize out the indirect calls.
Fixes: c50d32859e ("arm64: Add types to indirect called assembly functions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a543ada7db upstream.
The crypto_unregister_alg() function expects callers to ensure that any
algorithm that is unregistered has a refcnt of exactly 1, and issues a
BUG_ON() if this is not the case. However, there are in fact drivers that
will call crypto_unregister_alg() without ensuring that the refcnt has been
lowered first, most notably on system shutdown. This causes the BUG_ON() to
trigger, which prevents a clean shutdown and hangs the system.
To avoid such hangs on shutdown, demote the BUG_ON() in
crypto_unregister_alg() to a WARN_ON() with early return. Cc stable because
this problem was observed on a 6.2 kernel, cf the link below.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87r0tyq8ph.fsf@toke.dk
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 675751bb20 upstream.
If something was written to the buffer just before destruction,
it may be possible (maybe not in a real system, but it did
happen in ARCH=um with time-travel) to destroy the ringbuffer
before the IRQ work ran, leading this KASAN report (or a crash
without KASAN):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in irq_work_run_list+0x11a/0x13a
Read of size 8 at addr 000000006d640a48 by task swapper/0
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Tainted: G W O 6.3.0-rc1 #7
Stack:
60c4f20f 0c203d48 41b58ab3 60f224fc
600477fa 60f35687 60c4f20f 601273dd
00000008 6101eb00 6101eab0 615be548
Call Trace:
[<60047a58>] show_stack+0x25e/0x282
[<60c609e0>] dump_stack_lvl+0x96/0xfd
[<60c50d4c>] print_report+0x1a7/0x5a8
[<603078d3>] kasan_report+0xc1/0xe9
[<60308950>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x1b/0x1d
[<60232844>] irq_work_run_list+0x11a/0x13a
[<602328b4>] irq_work_tick+0x24/0x34
[<6017f9dc>] update_process_times+0x162/0x196
[<6019f335>] tick_sched_handle+0x1a4/0x1c3
[<6019fd9e>] tick_sched_timer+0x79/0x10c
[<601812b9>] __hrtimer_run_queues.constprop.0+0x425/0x695
[<60182913>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x16c/0x2c4
[<600486a3>] um_timer+0x164/0x183
[...]
Allocated by task 411:
save_stack_trace+0x99/0xb5
stack_trace_save+0x81/0x9b
kasan_save_stack+0x2d/0x54
kasan_set_track+0x34/0x3e
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x28
____kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x97
__kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x12
__kmalloc+0xb2/0xe8
load_elf_phdrs+0xee/0x182
[...]
The buggy address belongs to the object at 000000006d640800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 584 bytes inside of
freed 1024-byte region [000000006d640800, 000000006d640c00)
Add the appropriate irq_work_sync() so the work finishes before
the buffers are destroyed.
Prior to the commit in the Fixes tag below, there was only a
single global IRQ work, so this issue didn't exist.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230427175920.a76159263122.I8295e405c44362a86c995e9c2c37e3e03810aa56@changeid
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Fixes: 15693458c4 ("tracing/ring-buffer: Move poll wake ups into ring buffer code")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7c339fb4d8 upstream.
In ring_buffer_reset_online_cpus, the buffer_size_kb write operation
may permanently fail if the cpu_online_mask changes between two
for_each_online_buffer_cpu loops. The number of increases and decreases
on both cpu_buffer->resize_disabled and cpu_buffer->record_disabled may be
inconsistent, causing some CPUs to have non-zero values for these atomic
variables after the function returns.
This issue can be reproduced by "echo 0 > trace" while hotplugging cpu.
After reproducing success, we can find out buffer_size_kb will not be
functional anymore.
To prevent leaving 'resize_disabled' and 'record_disabled' non-zero after
ring_buffer_reset_online_cpus returns, we ensure that each atomic variable
has been set up before atomic_sub() to it.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230426062027.17451-1-Tze-nan.Wu@mediatek.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: npiggin@gmail.com
Fixes: b23d7a5f4a ("ring-buffer: speed up buffer resets by avoiding synchronize_rcu for each CPU")
Reviewed-by: Cheng-Jui Wang <cheng-jui.wang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Tze-nan Wu <Tze-nan.Wu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit eb411c0cf5 upstream.
This fix is basically the same as 9bce02ef0d ("pwm: meson: Fix the
G12A AO clock parents order"). Vendor driver referenced there has
xtal as first parent also for axg ao. In addition fix the name
of the aoclk81 clock. Apparently name aoclk81 as used by the vendor
driver was changed when mainlining the axg clock driver.
Fixes: bccaa3f917 ("pwm: meson: Add clock source configuration for Meson-AXG")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5b8ccdfb94 upstream.
According to the documentation, ieee80211_rx_list must not run concurrently
with ieee80211_tx_status (or its variants).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 88046b2c9f ("mt76: add support for reporting tx status with skb")
Reported-by: Brian Coverstone <brian@mainsequence.net>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6d2555cde2 upstream.
The ipmi communication is not restored after a specific version of BMC is
upgraded on our server.
The ipmi driver does not respond after printing the following log:
ipmi_ssif: Invalid response getting flags: 1c 1
I found that after entering this branch, ssif_info->ssif_state always
holds SSIF_GETTING_FLAGS and never return to IDLE.
As a result, the driver cannot be loaded, because the driver status is
checked during the unload process and must be IDLE in shutdown_ssif():
while (ssif_info->ssif_state != SSIF_IDLE)
schedule_timeout(1);
The process trigger this problem is:
1. One msg timeout and next msg start send, and call
ssif_set_need_watch().
2. ssif_set_need_watch()->watch_timeout()->start_flag_fetch() change
ssif_state to SSIF_GETTING_FLAGS.
3. In msg_done_handler() ssif_state == SSIF_GETTING_FLAGS, if an error
message is received, the second branch does not modify the ssif_state.
4. All retry action need IS_SSIF_IDLE() == True. Include retry action in
watch_timeout(), msg_done_handler(). Sending msg does not work either.
SSIF_IDLE is also checked in start_next_msg().
5. The only thing that can be triggered in the SSIF driver is
watch_timeout(), after destory_user(), this timer will stop too.
So, if enter this branch, the ssif_state will remain SSIF_GETTING_FLAGS
and can't send msg, no timer started, can't unload.
We did a comparative test before and after adding this patch, and the
result is effective.
Fixes: 259307074b ("ipmi: Add SMBus interface driver (SSIF)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuchen <zhangyuchen.lcr@bytedance.com>
Message-Id: <20230412074907.80046-1-zhangyuchen.lcr@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e3184de9d4 upstream.
'obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctls.o' must be moved after "obj-y :=",
or it won't be built as it is overwrited.
Note that there is nothing that is going to break by linking
sysctl.o later, we were just being way to cautious and patches
have been updated to reflect these considerations and sent for
stable as well with the whole "base" stuff needing to be linked
prior to child sysctl tables that use that directory. All of
the kernel sysctl APIs always share the same directory, and races
against using it should end up re-using the same single created
directory.
And so something we can do eventually is do away with all the base stuff.
For now it's fine, it's not creating an issue. It is just a bit pedantic
and careful.
Fixes: ab171b952c ("fs: move namespace sysctls and declare fs base directory")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.17
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
[mcgrof: enhanced commit log for stable criteria and clarify base stuff ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 58d7668242 upstream.
For CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL systems, the tick_do_timer_cpu cannot be offlined.
However, cpu_is_hotpluggable() still returns true for those CPUs. This causes
torture tests that do offlining to end up trying to offline this CPU causing
test failures. Such failure happens on all architectures.
Fix the repeated error messages thrown by this (even if the hotplug errors are
harmless) by asking the opinion of the nohz subsystem on whether the CPU can be
hotplugged.
[ Apply Frederic Weisbecker feedback on refactoring tick_nohz_cpu_down(). ]
For drivers/base/ portion:
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Zhouyi Zhou <zhouzhouyi@gmail.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: rcu <rcu@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2987557f52 ("driver-core/cpu: Expose hotpluggability to the rest of the kernel")
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3f42b142ea upstream.
After upgrading from 5.16 to 6.1, our board with a MAX14830 started
producing lots of garbage data over UART. Bisection pointed out commit
285e76fc04 as the culprit. That patch tried to replace hand-written
code which I added in 2b4bac48c1 ("serial: max310x: Use batched reads
when reasonably safe") with the generic regmap infrastructure for
batched operations.
Unfortunately, the `regmap_raw_read` and `regmap_raw_write` which were
used are actually functions which perform IO over *multiple* registers.
That's not what is needed for accessing these Tx/Rx FIFOs; the
appropriate functions are the `_noinc_` versions, not the `_raw_` ones.
Fix this regression by using `regmap_noinc_read()` and
`regmap_noinc_write()` along with the necessary `regmap_config` setup;
with this patch in place, our board communicates happily again. Since
our board uses SPI for talking to this chip, the I2C part is completely
untested.
Fixes: 285e76fc04 ("serial: max310x: use regmap methods for SPI batch operations")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kundrát <jan.kundrat@cesnet.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/79db8e82aadb0e174bc82b9996423c3503c8fb37.1680732084.git.jan.kundrat@cesnet.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 146a37e05d upstream.
There's a potential race before THRE/TEMT deasserts when DMA Tx is
starting up (or the next batch of continuous Tx is being submitted).
This can lead to misdetecting Tx empty condition.
It is entirely normal for THRE/TEMT to be set for some time after the
DMA Tx had been setup in serial8250_tx_dma(). As Tx side is definitely
not empty at that point, it seems incorrect for serial8250_tx_empty()
claim Tx is empty.
Fix the race by also checking in serial8250_tx_empty() whether there's
DMA Tx active.
Note: This fix only addresses in-kernel race mainly to make using
TCSADRAIN/FLUSH robust. Userspace can still cause other races but they
seem userspace concurrency control problems.
Fixes: 9ee4b83e51 ("serial: 8250: Add support for dmaengine")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230317113318.31327-3-ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 094fb49a2d upstream.
If userspace races tcsetattr() with a write, the drained condition
might not be guaranteed by the kernel. There is a race window after
checking Tx is empty before tty_set_termios() takes termios_rwsem for
write. During that race window, more characters can be queued by a
racing writer.
Any ongoing transmission might produce garbage during HW's
->set_termios() call. The intent of TCSADRAIN/FLUSH seems to be
preventing such a character corruption. If those flags are set, take
tty's write lock to stop any writer before performing the lower layer
Tx empty check and wait for the pending characters to be sent (if any).
The initial wait for all-writers-done must be placed outside of tty's
write lock to avoid deadlock which makes it impossible to use
tty_wait_until_sent(). The write lock is retried if a racing write is
detected.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230317113318.31327-2-ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5c7cb94452 upstream.
If blk_crypto_evict_key() sees that the key is still in-use (due to a
bug) or that ->keyslot_evict failed, it currently just returns while
leaving the key linked into the keyslot management structures.
However, blk_crypto_evict_key() is only called in contexts such as inode
eviction where failure is not an option. So actually the caller
proceeds with freeing the blk_crypto_key regardless of the return value
of blk_crypto_evict_key().
These two assumptions don't match, and the result is that there can be a
use-after-free in blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys() after one of these
errors occurs. (Note, these errors *shouldn't* happen; we're just
talking about what happens if they do anyway.)
Fix this by making blk_crypto_evict_key() unlink the key from the
keyslot management structures even on failure.
Also improve some comments.
Fixes: 1b26283970 ("block: Keyslot Manager for Inline Encryption")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230315183907.53675-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9cd1e56667 upstream.
Once all I/O using a blk_crypto_key has completed, filesystems can call
blk_crypto_evict_key(). However, the block layer currently doesn't call
blk_crypto_put_keyslot() until the request is being freed, which happens
after upper layers have been told (via bio_endio()) the I/O has
completed. This causes a race condition where blk_crypto_evict_key()
can see 'slot_refs != 0' without there being an actual bug.
This makes __blk_crypto_evict_key() hit the
'WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&slot->slot_refs) != 0)' and return without
doing anything, eventually causing a use-after-free in
blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys(). (This is a very rare bug and has only
been seen when per-file keys are being used with fscrypt.)
There are two options to fix this: either release the keyslot before
bio_endio() is called on the request's last bio, or make
__blk_crypto_evict_key() ignore slot_refs. Let's go with the first
solution, since it preserves the ability to report bugs (via
WARN_ON_ONCE) where a key is evicted while still in-use.
Fixes: a892c8d52c ("block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Nathan Huckleberry <nhuck@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230315183907.53675-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 20de765f6d upstream.
We need to set QUEUE_FLAG_STATS for two cases:
1. blk_stat_enable_accounting()
2. blk_stat_add_callback()
So we should clear it only when ((q->stats->accounting == 0) &&
list_empty(&q->stats->callbacks)).
blk_stat_disable_accounting() only check if q->stats->accounting
is 0 before clear the flag, this patch fix it.
Also add list_empty(&q->stats->callbacks)) check when enable, or
the flag is already set.
The bug can be reproduced on kernel without BLK_DEV_THROTTLING
(since it unconditionally enable accounting, see the next patch).
# cat /sys/block/sr0/queue/scheduler
none mq-deadline [bfq]
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/block/sr0/state
SAME_COMP|IO_STAT|INIT_DONE|STATS|REGISTERED|NOWAIT|30
# echo none > /sys/block/sr0/queue/scheduler
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/block/sr0/state
SAME_COMP|IO_STAT|INIT_DONE|REGISTERED|NOWAIT
# cat /sys/block/sr0/queue/wbt_lat_usec
75000
We can see that after changing elevator from "bfq" to "none",
"STATS" flag is lost even though WBT callback still need it.
Fixes: 68497092bd ("block: make queue stat accounting a reference")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.17+
Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230413062805.2081970-1-chengming.zhou@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
