commit fb312ac5cc upstream.
I got this crash more times during debugging of PCIe controller and crash
happens somehow at the time when PCIe kernel code started link retraining (as
part of ASPM code) when at the same time PCIe link went down and ath9k probably
executed hw reset procedure.
Currently I'm not able to reproduce this issue as it looks like to be
some race condition between link training, ASPM, link down and reset
path. And as always, race conditions which depends on more input
parameters are hard to reproduce as it depends on precise timings.
But it is clear that pointers are zero in this case and should be
properly filled as same code pattern is used in ath9k_stop() function.
Anyway I was able to reproduce this crash by manually triggering ath
reset worker prior putting card up. I created simple patch to export
reset functionality via debugfs and use it to "simulate" of triggering
reset. s proved that NULL-pointer dereference issue is there.
Function ath9k_hw_reset() is dereferencing chan structure pointer, so it
needs to be non-NULL pointer.
Function ath9k_stop() already contains code which sets ah->curchan to valid
non-NULL pointer prior calling ath9k_hw_reset() function.
Add same code pattern also into ath_reset_internal() function to prevent
kernel NULL pointer dereference in ath9k_hw_reset() function.
This change fixes kernel NULL pointer dereference in ath9k_hw_reset() which
is caused by calling ath9k_hw_reset() from ath_reset_internal() with NULL
chan structure.
[ 45.334305] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008
[ 45.344417] Mem abort info:
[ 45.347301] ESR = 0x96000005
[ 45.350448] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 45.356166] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 45.359350] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 45.362596] Data abort info:
[ 45.365756] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005
[ 45.369735] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 45.372814] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=000000000685d000
[ 45.379663] [0000000000000008] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
[ 45.388856] Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
[ 45.393897] Modules linked in: ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw
[ 45.399574] CPU: 1 PID: 309 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2-dirty #785
[ 45.414746] Workqueue: phy0 ath_reset_work [ath9k]
[ 45.419713] pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
[ 45.425910] pc : ath9k_hw_reset+0xc4/0x1c48 [ath9k_hw]
[ 45.431234] lr : ath9k_hw_reset+0xc0/0x1c48 [ath9k_hw]
[ 45.436548] sp : ffffffc0118dbca0
[ 45.439961] x29: ffffffc0118dbca0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 45.445442] x27: ffffff800dee4080 x26: 0000000000000000
[ 45.450923] x25: ffffff800df9b9d8 x24: 0000000000000000
[ 45.456404] x23: ffffffc0115f6000 x22: ffffffc008d0d408
[ 45.461885] x21: ffffff800dee5080 x20: ffffff800df9b9d8
[ 45.467366] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 45.472846] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 45.478326] x15: 0000000000000010 x14: ffffffffffffffff
[ 45.483807] x13: ffffffc0918db94f x12: ffffffc011498720
[ 45.489289] x11: 0000000000000003 x10: ffffffc0114806e0
[ 45.494770] x9 : ffffffc01014b2ec x8 : 0000000000017fe8
[ 45.500251] x7 : c0000000ffffefff x6 : 0000000000000001
[ 45.505733] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 45.511213] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffff801fece870
[ 45.516693] x1 : ffffffc00eded000 x0 : 000000000000003f
[ 45.522174] Call trace:
[ 45.524695] ath9k_hw_reset+0xc4/0x1c48 [ath9k_hw]
[ 45.529653] ath_reset_internal+0x1a8/0x2b8 [ath9k]
[ 45.534696] ath_reset_work+0x2c/0x40 [ath9k]
[ 45.539198] process_one_work+0x210/0x480
[ 45.543339] worker_thread+0x5c/0x510
[ 45.547115] kthread+0x12c/0x130
[ 45.550445] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x1c
[ 45.554138] Code: 910922c2 9117e021 95ff0398 b4000294 (b9400a61)
[ 45.560430] ---[ end trace 566410ba90b50e8b ]---
[ 45.565193] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 45.572282] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 45.576331] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 45.579924] CPU features: 0x00040002,0000200c
[ 45.584416] Memory Limit: none
[ 45.587564] Rebooting in 3 seconds..
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210402122653.24014-1-pali@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 08a84410a0 upstream.
Stop dmaengine transfer in sci_stop_tx(). Otherwise, the following
message is possible output when system enters suspend and while
transferring data, because clearing TIE bit in SCSCR is not able to
stop any dmaengine transfer.
sh-sci e6550000.serial: ttySC1: Unable to drain transmitter
Note that this driver has already used some #ifdef in the .c file
so that this patch also uses #ifdef to fix the issue. Otherwise,
build errors happens if the CONFIG_SERIAL_SH_SCI_DMA is disabled.
Fixes: 73a19e4c03 ("serial: sh-sci: Add DMA support.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.9+
Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210610110806.277932-1-yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2ac0b029a0 upstream.
The regmap is configured for 8 bit registers, uses a RB-Tree cache and
marks several registers as volatile (i.e. do not cache).
The ALS and PS data registers in the chip are 16 bit wide and spans
two regmap registers. In the current driver only the base register is
marked as volatile, resulting in the upper register only read once.
Further the data sheet notes:
| When the I2C read operation starts, all four ALS data registers are
| locked until the I2C read operation of register 0x8B is completed.
Which results in the registers never update after the 2nd read.
This patch fixes the problem by marking the upper 8 bits of the ALS
and PS registers as volatile, too.
Fixes: 2f2c96338a ("iio: ltr501: Add regmap support.")
Reported-by: Oliver Lang <Oliver.Lang@gossenmetrawatt.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Tested-by: Nikita Travkin <nikita@trvn.ru> # ltr559
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210610134619.2101372-2-mkl@pengutronix.de
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c749d8c018 upstream.
Currently css_wait_for_slow_path() gets called inside the chp->lock.
The path-verification-loop of slowpath inside this lock could lead to
deadlock as reported by the lockdep validator.
The ccw_device_get_chp_desc() during the instance of a device-set-online
would try to acquire the same 'chp->lock' to read the chp->desc.
The instance of this function can get called from multiple scenario,
like probing or setting-device online manually. This could, in some
corner-cases lead to the deadlock.
lockdep validator reported this as,
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&chp->lock);
lock(kn->active#43);
lock(&chp->lock);
lock((wq_completion)cio);
The chp->lock was introduced to serialize the access of struct
channel_path. This lock is not needed for the css_wait_for_slow_path()
function, so invoke the slow-path function outside this lock.
Fixes: b730f3a933 ("[S390] cio: add lock to struct channel_path")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vineeth Vijayan <vneethv@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5483b904bf upstream.
When find a task from wait queue to wake up, a non-privileged task may
be found out, rather than the privileged. This maybe lead a deadlock
same as commit dfe1fe75e0 ("NFSv4: Fix deadlock between nfs4_evict_inode()
and nfs4_opendata_get_inode()"):
Privileged delegreturn task is queued to privileged list because all
the slots are assigned. If there has no enough slot to wake up the
non-privileged batch tasks(session less than 8 slot), then the privileged
delegreturn task maybe lost waked up because the found out task can't
get slot since the session is on draining.
So we should treate the privileged task as the emergency task, and
execute it as for as we can.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 5fcdfacc01 ("NFSv4: Return delegations synchronously in evict_inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fcb170a9d8 upstream.
The 'queue->nr' will wraparound from 0 to 255 when only current
priority queue has tasks. This maybe lead a deadlock same as commit
dfe1fe75e0 ("NFSv4: Fix deadlock between nfs4_evict_inode()
and nfs4_opendata_get_inode()"):
Privileged delegreturn task is queued to privileged list because all
the slots are assigned. When non-privileged task complete and release
the slot, a non-privileged maybe picked out. It maybe allocate slot
failed when the session on draining.
If the 'queue->nr' has wraparound to 255, and no enough slot to
service it, then the privileged delegreturn will lost to wake up.
So we should avoid the wraparound on 'queue->nr'.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 5fcdfacc01 ("NFSv4: Return delegations synchronously in evict_inode")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6819703f5a upstream.
The defrag loop processes leaves in batches and starting transaction for
each. The whole defragmentation on a given root is protected by a bit
but in case the transaction fails, the bit is not cleared
In case the transaction fails the bit would prevent starting
defragmentation again, so make sure it's cleared.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f8f84af5da upstream.
Even though we validate user-provided inputs we then traverse past
validated data when applying the new map. The issue was originally
discovered by Murray McAllister with this simple POC (if the following
is executed by an unprivileged user it will instantly panic the system):
int main(void) {
int fd, ret;
unsigned int buffer[10000];
fd = open("/dev/input/js0", O_RDONLY);
if (fd == -1)
printf("Error opening file\n");
ret = ioctl(fd, JSIOCSBTNMAP & ~IOCSIZE_MASK, &buffer);
printf("%d\n", ret);
}
The solution is to traverse internal buffer which is guaranteed to only
contain valid date when constructing the map.
Fixes: 182d679b22 ("Input: joydev - prevent potential read overflow in ioctl")
Fixes: 999b874f4a ("Input: joydev - validate axis/button maps before clobbering current ones")
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Larkin <avlarkin82@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210620120030.1513655-1-avlarkin82@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4897807753 upstream.
The device (32a7:0000 Heimann Sensor GmbH USB appset demo) claims to be
a CDC-ACM device in its descriptors but in fact is not. If it is run
with echo disabled it returns garbled data, probably due to something
that happens in the TTY layer. And when run with echo enabled (the
default), it will mess up the calibration data of the sensor the first
time any data is sent to the device.
In short, I had a bad time after connecting the sensor and trying to get
it to work. I hope blacklisting it in the cdc-acm driver will save
someone else a bit of trouble.
Signed-off-by: Hannu Hartikainen <hannu@hrtk.in>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210622141454.337948-1-hannu@hrtk.in
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4249d6fbc1 upstream.
when receive eem echo command, it will send a response,
but queue this response to the usb request which allocate
from gadget device endpoint zero,
and transmit the request to IN endpoint of eem interface.
on dwc3 gadget, it will trigger following warning in function
__dwc3_gadget_ep_queue(),
if (WARN(req->dep != dep, "request %pK belongs to '%s'\n",
&req->request, req->dep->name))
return -EINVAL;
fix it by allocating a usb request from IN endpoint of eem interface,
and transmit the usb request to same IN endpoint of eem interface.
Signed-off-by: Linyu Yuan <linyyuan@codeaurora.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210616115142.34075-1-linyyuan@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 41e81022a0 upstream.
The direction of the pipe argument must match the request-type direction
bit or control requests may fail depending on the host-controller-driver
implementation.
Fix the four control requests which erroneously used usb_rcvctrlpipe().
Fixes: 1d3e20236d ("[PATCH] USB: usbtouchscreen: unified USB touchscreen driver")
Fixes: 24ced062a2 ("usbtouchscreen: add support for DMC TSC-10/25 devices")
Fixes: 9e3b25837a ("Input: usbtouchscreen - add support for e2i touchscreen controller")
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.17
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210524092048.4443-1-johan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c680ed46e4 upstream.
syzbot reported WARNING in vmalloc. The problem
was in zero size passed to vmalloc.
The root case was in wrong cxusb_bluebird_lgz201_properties
definition. adapter array has only 1 entry, but num_adapters was
2.
Call Trace:
__vmalloc_node mm/vmalloc.c:2963 [inline]
vmalloc+0x67/0x80 mm/vmalloc.c:2996
dvb_dmx_init+0xe4/0xb90 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c:1251
dvb_usb_adapter_dvb_init+0x564/0x860 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-dvb.c:184
dvb_usb_adapter_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:86 [inline]
dvb_usb_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:184 [inline]
dvb_usb_device_init.cold+0xc94/0x146e drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:308
cxusb_probe+0x159/0x5e0 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/cxusb.c:1634
Fixes: 4d43e13f72 ("V4L/DVB (4643): Multi-input patch for DVB-USB device")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+7336195c02c1bd2f64e1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5fa54346ca upstream.
The system might hang with the following backtrace:
schedule+0x80/0x100
schedule_timeout+0x48/0x138
wait_for_common+0xa4/0x134
wait_for_completion+0x1c/0x2c
kthread_flush_work+0x114/0x1cc
kthread_cancel_work_sync.llvm.16514401384283632983+0xe8/0x144
kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x18/0x2c
xxxx_pm_notify+0xb0/0xd8
blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x80/0x194
pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x28/0x4c
suspend_prepare+0x40/0x260
enter_state+0x80/0x3f4
pm_suspend+0x60/0xdc
state_store+0x108/0x144
kobj_attr_store+0x38/0x88
sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0xc0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x108/0x1d0
vfs_write+0x2f4/0x368
ksys_write+0x7c/0xec
It is caused by the following race between kthread_mod_delayed_work()
and kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync():
CPU0 CPU1
Context: Thread A Context: Thread B
kthread_mod_delayed_work()
spin_lock()
__kthread_cancel_work()
spin_unlock()
del_timer_sync()
kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync()
spin_lock()
__kthread_cancel_work()
spin_unlock()
del_timer_sync()
spin_lock()
work->canceling++
spin_unlock
spin_lock()
queue_delayed_work()
// dwork is put into the worker->delayed_work_list
spin_unlock()
kthread_flush_work()
// flush_work is put at the tail of the dwork
wait_for_completion()
Context: IRQ
kthread_delayed_work_timer_fn()
spin_lock()
list_del_init(&work->node);
spin_unlock()
BANG: flush_work is not longer linked and will never get proceed.
The problem is that kthread_mod_delayed_work() checks work->canceling
flag before canceling the timer.
A simple solution is to (re)check work->canceling after
__kthread_cancel_work(). But then it is not clear what should be
returned when __kthread_cancel_work() removed the work from the queue
(list) and it can't queue it again with the new @delay.
The return value might be used for reference counting. The caller has
to know whether a new work has been queued or an existing one was
replaced.
The proper solution is that kthread_mod_delayed_work() will remove the
work from the queue (list) _only_ when work->canceling is not set. The
flag must be checked after the timer is stopped and the remaining
operations can be done under worker->lock.
Note that kthread_mod_delayed_work() could remove the timer and then
bail out. It is fine. The other canceling caller needs to cancel the
timer as well. The important thing is that the queue (list)
manipulation is done atomically under worker->lock.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210610133051.15337-3-pmladek@suse.com
Fixes: 9a6b06c8d9 ("kthread: allow to modify delayed kthread work")
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reported-by: Martin Liu <liumartin@google.com>
Cc: <jenhaochen@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@google.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit fe19bd3dae ]
If more than one futex is placed on a shmem huge page, it can happen
that waking the second wakes the first instead, and leaves the second
waiting: the key's shared.pgoff is wrong.
When 3.11 commit 13d60f4b6a ("futex: Take hugepages into account when
generating futex_key"), the only shared huge pages came from hugetlbfs,
and the code added to deal with its exceptional page->index was put into
hugetlb source. Then that was missed when 4.8 added shmem huge pages.
page_to_pgoff() is what others use for this nowadays: except that, as
currently written, it gives the right answer on hugetlbfs head, but
nonsense on hugetlbfs tails. Fix that by calling hugetlbfs-specific
hugetlb_basepage_index() on PageHuge tails as well as on head.
Yes, it's unconventional to declare hugetlb_basepage_index() there in
pagemap.h, rather than in hugetlb.h; but I do not expect anything but
page_to_pgoff() ever to need it.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: give hugetlb_basepage_index() prototype the correct scope]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b17d946b-d09-326e-b42a-52884c36df32@google.com
Fixes: 800d8c63b2 ("shmem: add huge pages support")
Reported-by: Neel Natu <neelnatu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Zhang Yi <wetpzy@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Note on stable backport: leave redundant #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
in kernel/futex.c, to avoid conflict over the header files included.
Resolved trivial conflicts in include/linux/hugetlb.h.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 91241681c6 ]
At present the construct
if (VM_WARN(...))
will compile OK with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y and will fail with
CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=n. The reason is that VM_{WARN,BUG}* have always been
special wrt. {WARN/BUG}* and never generate any code when DEBUG_VM is
disabled. So we cannot really use it in conditionals.
We considered changing things so that this construct works in both cases
but that might cause unwanted code generation with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=n.
It is safer and simpler to make the build fail in both cases.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: changelog]
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 4ca070ef0d upstream.
The direction of the pipe argument must match the request-type direction
bit or control requests may fail depending on the host-controller-driver
implementation.
Control transfers without a data stage are treated as OUT requests by
the USB stack and should be using usb_sndctrlpipe(). Failing to do so
will now trigger a warning.
Fix the OSIFI2C_SET_BIT_RATE and OSIFI2C_STOP requests which erroneously
used the osif_usb_read() helper and set the IN direction bit.
Reported-by: syzbot+9d7dadd15b8819d73f41@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 83e53a8f12 ("i2c: Add bus driver for for OSIF USB i2c device.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.14
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit f639634119 ]
As documented in Documentation/networking/driver.rst, the ndo_start_xmit
method must not return NETDEV_TX_BUSY under any normal circumstances, and
as recommended, we simply stop the tx queue in advance, when there is a
risk that the next xmit would cause a NETDEV_TX_BUSY return.
Signed-off-by: Esben Haabendal <esben@geanix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1c200f832e ]
The source (&dcbx_info->operational.params) and dest
(&p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.params) are both struct qed_dcbx_params
(560 bytes), not struct qed_dcbx_admin_params (564 bytes), which is used
as the memcpy() size.
However it seems that struct qed_dcbx_operational_params
(dcbx_info->operational)'s layout matches struct qed_dcbx_admin_params
(p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config)'s 4 byte difference (3 padding, 1 byte
for "valid").
On the assumption that the size is wrong (rather than the source structure
type), adjust the memcpy() size argument to be 4 bytes smaller and add
a BUILD_BUG_ON() to validate any changes to the structure sizes.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit da5ac772cf ]
In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid
intentionally reading across neighboring array fields.
The memcpy() is copying the entire structure, not just the first array.
Adjust the source argument so the compiler can do appropriate bounds
checking.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 224004fbb0 ]
In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid
intentionally reading across neighboring array fields.
The memcpy() is copying the entire structure, not just the first array.
Adjust the source argument so the compiler can do appropriate bounds
checking.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 99718abdc0 ]
In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid
intentionally reading across neighboring array fields.
The memcpy() is copying the entire structure, not just the first array.
Adjust the source argument so the compiler can do appropriate bounds
checking.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e032f7c9c7 ]
Like prior patch, we need to annotate lockless accesses to po->ifindex
For instance, packet_getname() is reading po->ifindex (twice) while
another thread is able to change po->ifindex.
KCSAN reported:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_getname
write to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25573 on cpu 1:
packet_do_bind+0x420/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3191
packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
__sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
__do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
__se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
__x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25578 on cpu 0:
packet_getname+0x5b/0x1a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3525
__sys_getsockname+0x10e/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1887
__do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1902 [inline]
__se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1899 [inline]
__x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1899
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 25578 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c7d2ef5dd4 ]
tpacket_snd(), packet_snd(), packet_getname() and packet_seq_show()
can read po->num without holding a lock. This means other threads
can change po->num at the same time.
KCSAN complained about this known fact [1]
Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to address the issue.
[1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_sendmsg
write to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24714 on cpu 0:
packet_do_bind+0x3ab/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3181
packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
__sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
__do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
__se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
__x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24719 on cpu 1:
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2899 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x317/0x3570 net/packet/af_packet.c:3040
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x1ed/0x270 net/socket.c:2433
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2440 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2440
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x0000 -> 0x1200
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 24719 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 58af3d3d54 ]
Syzbot reported memory leak in tty_init_dev().
The problem was in unputted tty in ldisc_open()
static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
...
ser->tty = tty_kref_get(tty);
...
result = register_netdevice(dev);
if (result) {
rtnl_unlock();
free_netdev(dev);
return -ENODEV;
}
...
}
Ser pointer is netdev private_data, so after free_netdev()
this pointer goes away with unputted tty reference. So, fix
it by adding tty_kref_put() before freeing netdev.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+f303e045423e617d2cad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b71eaed8c0 ]
UDP sendmsg() path can be lockless, it is possible for another
thread to re-connect an change sk->sk_txhash under us.
There is no serious impact, but we can use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE()
pair to document the race.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __ip4_datagram_connect / skb_set_owner_w
write to 0xffff88813397920c of 4 bytes by task 30997 on cpu 1:
sk_set_txhash include/net/sock.h:1937 [inline]
__ip4_datagram_connect+0x69e/0x710 net/ipv4/datagram.c:75
__ip6_datagram_connect+0x551/0x840 net/ipv6/datagram.c:189
ip6_datagram_connect+0x2a/0x40 net/ipv6/datagram.c:272
inet_dgram_connect+0xfd/0x180 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:580
__sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1837 [inline]
__sys_connect+0x245/0x280 net/socket.c:1854
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1864 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1861 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1861
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff88813397920c of 4 bytes by task 31039 on cpu 0:
skb_set_hash_from_sk include/net/sock.h:2211 [inline]
skb_set_owner_w+0x118/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2101
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x452/0x4e0 net/core/sock.c:2359
sock_alloc_send_skb+0x2d/0x40 net/core/sock.c:2373
__ip6_append_data+0x1743/0x21a0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1621
ip6_make_skb+0x258/0x420 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1983
udpv6_sendmsg+0x160a/0x16b0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1527
inet6_sendmsg+0x5f/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:642
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
__sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0xbca3c43d -> 0xfdb309e0
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 31039 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9d44fa3e50 ]
Function 'ping_queue_rcv_skb' not always return success, which will
also return fail. If not check the wrong return value of it, lead to function
`ping_rcv` return success.
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a64b6a25dd ]
If the userland switches back-and-forth between NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB and
NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC via send_msg(NL80211_CMD_SET_INTERFACE), there is a
chance where the cleanup cfg80211_leave_ocb() is not called. This leads
to initialization of in-use memory (e.g. init u.ibss while in-use by
u.ocb) due to a shared struct/union within ieee80211_sub_if_data:
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data {
...
union {
struct ieee80211_if_ap ap;
struct ieee80211_if_vlan vlan;
struct ieee80211_if_managed mgd;
struct ieee80211_if_ibss ibss; // <- shares address
struct ieee80211_if_mesh mesh;
struct ieee80211_if_ocb ocb; // <- shares address
struct ieee80211_if_mntr mntr;
struct ieee80211_if_nan nan;
} u;
...
}
Therefore add handling of otype == NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB, during
cfg80211_change_iface() to perform cleanup when leaving OCB mode.
link to syzkaller bug:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=0612dbfa595bf4b9b680ff7b4948257b8e3732d5
Reported-by: syzbot+105896fac213f26056f9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Du Cheng <ducheng2@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210428063941.105161-1-ducheng2@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
