commit 1ca67aba8d upstream.
Up until now, amdgpu was silently degrading to vsync when
user-space requested an async flip but the hardware didn't support
it.
The hardware doesn't support immediate flips when the update changes
the FB pitch, the DCC state, the rotation, enables or disables CRTCs
or planes, etc. This is reflected in the dm_crtc_state.update_type
field: UPDATE_TYPE_FAST means that immediate flip is supported.
Silently degrading async flips to vsync is not the expected behavior
from a uAPI point-of-view. Xorg expects async flips to fail if
unsupported, to be able to fall back to a blit. i915 already behaves
this way.
This patch aligns amdgpu with uAPI expectations and returns a failure
when an async flip is not possible.
Signed-off-by: Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr>
Reviewed-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Hamza Mahfooz <hamza.mahfooz@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2329cc7a10 upstream.
When a new mode is set to modeset->mode, the previous mode should be freed.
This fixes the following kmemleak report:
drm_mode_duplicate+0x45/0x220 [drm]
drm_client_modeset_probe+0x944/0xf50 [drm]
__drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0xb4/0x2c0 [drm_kms_helper]
drm_fbdev_client_hotplug+0x2bc/0x4d0 [drm_kms_helper]
drm_client_register+0x169/0x240 [drm]
ast_pci_probe+0x142/0x190 [ast]
local_pci_probe+0xdc/0x180
work_for_cpu_fn+0x4e/0xa0
process_one_work+0x8b7/0x1540
worker_thread+0x70a/0xed0
kthread+0x29f/0x340
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Zhang Yi <yizhan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jocelyn Falempe <jfalempe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230711092203.68157-3-jfalempe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b42ae87a7b upstream.
In below thousands of screen rotation loop tests with virtual display
enabled, a CPU hard lockup issue may happen, leading system to unresponsive
and crash.
do {
xrandr --output Virtual --rotate inverted
xrandr --output Virtual --rotate right
xrandr --output Virtual --rotate left
xrandr --output Virtual --rotate normal
} while (1);
NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1
? hrtimer_run_softirq+0x140/0x140
? store_vblank+0xe0/0xe0 [drm]
hrtimer_cancel+0x15/0x30
amdgpu_vkms_disable_vblank+0x15/0x30 [amdgpu]
drm_vblank_disable_and_save+0x185/0x1f0 [drm]
drm_crtc_vblank_off+0x159/0x4c0 [drm]
? record_print_text.cold+0x11/0x11
? wait_for_completion_timeout+0x232/0x280
? drm_crtc_wait_one_vblank+0x40/0x40 [drm]
? bit_wait_io_timeout+0xe0/0xe0
? wait_for_completion_interruptible+0x1d7/0x320
? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0
amdgpu_vkms_crtc_atomic_disable
It's caused by a stuck in lock dependency in such scenario on different
CPUs.
CPU1 CPU2
drm_crtc_vblank_off hrtimer_interrupt
grab event_lock (irq disabled) __hrtimer_run_queues
grab vbl_lock/vblank_time_block amdgpu_vkms_vblank_simulate
amdgpu_vkms_disable_vblank drm_handle_vblank
hrtimer_cancel grab dev->event_lock
So CPU1 stucks in hrtimer_cancel as timer callback is running endless on
current clock base, as that timer queue on CPU2 has no chance to finish it
because of failing to hold the lock. So NMI watchdog will throw the errors
after its threshold, and all later CPUs are impacted/blocked.
So use hrtimer_try_to_cancel to fix this, as disable_vblank callback
does not need to wait the handler to finish. And also it's not necessary
to check the return value of hrtimer_try_to_cancel, because even if it's
-1 which means current timer callback is running, it will be reprogrammed
in hrtimer_start with calling enable_vblank to make it works.
v2: only re-arm timer when vblank is enabled (Christian) and add a Fixes
tag as well
v3: drop warn printing (Christian)
v4: drop superfluous check of blank->enabled in timer function, as it's
guaranteed in drm_handle_vblank (Christian)
Fixes: 84ec374bd5 ("drm/amdgpu: create amdgpu_vkms (v4)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Guchun Chen <guchun.chen@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2603be9e81 upstream.
The gs_usb driver handles USB devices with more than 1 CAN channel.
The RX path for all channels share the same bulk endpoint (the
transmitted bulk data encodes the channel number). These per-device
resources are allocated and submitted by the first opened channel.
During this allocation, the resources are either released immediately
in case of a failure or the URBs are anchored. All anchored URBs are
finally killed with gs_usb_disconnect().
Currently, gs_can_open() returns with an error if the allocation of a
URB or a buffer fails. However, if usb_submit_urb() fails, the driver
continues with the URBs submitted so far, even if no URBs were
successfully submitted.
Treat every error as fatal and free all allocated resources
immediately.
Switch to goto-style error handling, to prepare the driver for more
per-device resource allocation.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: John Whittington <git@jbrengineering.co.uk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230716-gs_usb-fix-time-stamp-counter-v1-1-9017cefcd9d5@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9efa1a5407 upstream.
The mcp251xfd controller needs an idle bus to enter 'Normal CAN 2.0
mode' or . The maximum length of a CAN frame is 736 bits (64 data
bytes, CAN-FD, EFF mode, worst case bit stuffing and interframe
spacing). For low bit rates like 10 kbit/s the arbitrarily chosen
MCP251XFD_POLL_TIMEOUT_US of 1 ms is too small.
Otherwise during polling for the CAN controller to enter 'Normal CAN
2.0 mode' the timeout limit is exceeded and the configuration fails
with:
| $ ip link set dev can1 up type can bitrate 10000
| [ 731.911072] mcp251xfd spi2.1 can1: Controller failed to enter mode CAN 2.0 Mode (6) and stays in Configuration Mode (4) (con=0x068b0760, osc=0x00000468).
| [ 731.927192] mcp251xfd spi2.1 can1: CRC read error at address 0x0e0c (length=4, data=00 00 00 00, CRC=0x0000) retrying.
| [ 731.938101] A link change request failed with some changes committed already. Interface can1 may have been left with an inconsistent configuration, please check.
| RTNETLINK answers: Connection timed out
Make MCP251XFD_POLL_TIMEOUT_US timeout calculation dynamic. Use
maximum of 1ms and bit time of 1 full 64 data bytes CAN-FD frame in
EFF mode, worst case bit stuffing and interframe spacing at the
current bit rate.
For easier backporting define the macro MCP251XFD_FRAME_LEN_MAX_BITS
that holds the max frame length in bits, which is 736. This can be
replaced by can_frame_bits(true, true, true, true, CANFD_MAX_DLEN) in
a cleanup patch later.
Fixes: 55e5b97f00 ("can: mcp25xxfd: add driver for Microchip MCP25xxFD SPI CAN")
Signed-off-by: Fedor Ross <fedor.ross@ifm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230717-mcp251xfd-fix-increase-poll-timeout-v5-1-06600f34c684@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d4d5be94a8 upstream.
When we reconfigure the SVE vector length we discard the backing storage
for the SVE vectors and then reallocate on next SVE use, leaving the SME
specific state alone. This means that we do not enable SME traps if they
were already disabled. That means that userspace code can enter streaming
mode without trapping, putting the task in a state where if we try to save
the state of the task we will fault.
Since the ABI does not specify that changing the SVE vector length disturbs
SME state, and since SVE code may not be aware of SME code in the process,
we shouldn't simply discard any ZA state. Instead immediately reallocate
the storage for SVE, and disable SME if we change the SVE vector length
while there is no SME state active.
Disabling SME traps on SVE vector length changes would make the overall
code more complex since we would have a state where we have valid SME state
stored but might get a SME trap.
Fixes: 9e4ab6c891 ("arm64/sme: Implement vector length configuration prctl()s")
Reported-by: David Spickett <David.Spickett@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230720-arm64-fix-sve-sme-vl-change-v2-1-8eea06b82d57@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0c9d2eb5e9 upstream.
The SMBus I2C buses have limits on the size of transfers they can do but
do not factor in the register length meaning we may try to do a transfer
longer than our length limit, the core will not take care of this.
Future changes will factor this out into the core but there are a number
of users that assume current behaviour so let's just do something
conservative here.
This does not take account padding bits but practically speaking these
are very rarely if ever used on I2C buses given that they generally run
slowly enough to mean there's no issue.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230712-regmap-max-transfer-v1-2-80e2aed22e83@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bc64734825 upstream.
When problems were noticed with the register address not being taken
into account when limiting raw transfers with I2C devices we fixed this
in the core. Unfortunately it has subsequently been realised that a lot
of buses were relying on the prior behaviour, partly due to unclear
documentation not making it obvious what was intended in the core. This
is all more involved to fix than is sensible for a fix commit so let's
just drop the original fixes, a separate commit will fix the originally
observed problem in an I2C specific way
Fixes: 3981514180 ("regmap: Account for register length when chunking")
Fixes: c8e796895e ("regmap: spi-avmm: Fix regmap_bus max_raw_write")
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230712-regmap-max-transfer-v1-1-80e2aed22e83@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b19c98f237 upstream.
Syzbot reported a panic that looks like this:
assertion failed: fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE_PAUSED, in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:465
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/messages.c:259!
RIP: 0010:btrfs_assertfail+0x2c/0x30 fs/btrfs/messages.c:259
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btrfs_exclop_balance fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:465 [inline]
btrfs_ioctl_balance fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3564 [inline]
btrfs_ioctl+0x531e/0x5b30 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4632
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:856
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The reproducer is running a balance and a cancel or pause in parallel.
The way balance finishes is a bit wonky, if we were paused we need to
save the balance_ctl in the fs_info, but clear it otherwise and cleanup.
However we rely on the return values being specific errors, or having a
cancel request or no pause request. If balance completes and returns 0,
but we have a pause or cancel request we won't do the appropriate
cleanup, and then the next time we try to start a balance we'll trip
this ASSERT.
The error handling is just wrong here, we always want to clean up,
unless we got -ECANCELLED and we set the appropriate pause flag in the
exclusive op. With this patch the reproducer ran for an hour without
tripping, previously it would trip in less than a few minutes.
Reported-by: syzbot+c0f3acf145cb465426d5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f1a07c2b4e upstream.
At exclude_super_stripes(), if we happen to find a block group that has
super blocks mapped to it and we are on a zoned filesystem, we error out
as this is not supposed to happen, indicating either a bug or maybe some
memory corruption for example. However we are exiting the function without
freeing the memory allocated for the logical address of the super blocks.
Fix this by freeing the logical address.
Fixes: 12659251ca ("btrfs: implement log-structured superblock for ZONED mode")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 17b17fcd6d upstream.
While trying to get the subpage blocksize tests running, I hit the
following panic on generic/476
assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) && page->private, in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 1453 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7+ #12
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20230301gitf80f052277c8-26.fc38 03/01/2023
pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
lr : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
Call trace:
btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
btrfs_subpage_clear_checked+0x38/0xc0
btrfs_page_clear_checked+0x48/0x98
btrfs_truncate_block+0x5d0/0x6a8
btrfs_cont_expand+0x5c/0x528
btrfs_write_check.isra.0+0xf8/0x150
btrfs_buffered_write+0xb4/0x760
btrfs_do_write_iter+0x2f8/0x4b0
btrfs_file_write_iter+0x1c/0x30
do_iter_readv_writev+0xc8/0x158
do_iter_write+0x9c/0x210
vfs_iter_write+0x24/0x40
iter_file_splice_write+0x224/0x390
direct_splice_actor+0x38/0x68
splice_direct_to_actor+0x12c/0x260
do_splice_direct+0x90/0xe8
generic_copy_file_range+0x50/0x90
vfs_copy_file_range+0x29c/0x470
__arm64_sys_copy_file_range+0xcc/0x498
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x80/0xd8
do_el0_svc+0x6c/0x168
el0_svc+0x50/0x1b0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x114/0x120
el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198
This happens because during btrfs_cont_expand we'll get a page, set it
as mapped, and if it's not Uptodate we'll read it. However between the
read and re-locking the page we could have called release_folio() on the
page, but left the page in the file mapping. release_folio() can clear
the page private, and thus further down we blow up when we go to modify
the subpage bits.
Fix this by putting the set_page_extent_mapped() after the read. This
is safe because read_folio() will call set_page_extent_mapped() before
it does the read, and then if we clear page private but leave it on the
mapping we're completely safe re-setting set_page_extent_mapped(). With
this patch I can now run generic/476 without panicing.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3066ff9347 upstream.
This is just a safety precaution to avoid checking flags on memory that was
initialized on the user space side. libfuse zeroes struct fuse_init_out
outarg, but this is not guranteed to be done in all implementations.
Better is to act on flags and to only apply flags2 when FUSE_INIT_EXT is
set.
There is a risk with this change, though - it might break existing user
space libraries, which are already using flags2 without setting
FUSE_INIT_EXT.
The corresponding libfuse patch is here
https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/pull/662
Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert <bschubert@ddn.com>
Fixes: 53db28933e ("fuse: extend init flags")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.17
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d55901522f upstream.
When making a DNS query inside the kernel using dns_query(), the request
code can in rare cases end up creating a duplicate index key in the
assoc_array of the destination keyring. It is eventually found by
a BUG_ON() check in the assoc_array implementation and results in
a crash.
Example report:
[2158499.700025] kernel BUG at ../lib/assoc_array.c:652!
[2158499.700039] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[2158499.700065] CPU: 3 PID: 31985 Comm: kworker/3:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.3.18-150300.59.90-default #1 SLE15-SP3
[2158499.700096] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
[2158499.700351] Workqueue: cifsiod cifs_resolve_server [cifs]
[2158499.700380] RIP: 0010:assoc_array_insert+0x85f/0xa40
[2158499.700401] Code: ff 74 2b 48 8b 3b 49 8b 45 18 4c 89 e6 48 83 e7 fe e8 95 ec 74 00 3b 45 88 7d db 85 c0 79 d4 0f 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b e8 41 f2 be ff <0f> 0b 0f 0b 81 7d 88 ff ff ff 7f 4c 89 eb 4c 8b ad 58 ff ff ff 0f
[2158499.700448] RSP: 0018:ffffc0bd6187faf0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[2158499.700470] RAX: ffff9f1ea7da2fe8 RBX: ffff9f1ea7da2fc1 RCX: 0000000000000005
[2158499.700492] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000000
[2158499.700515] RBP: ffffc0bd6187fbb0 R08: ffff9f185faf1100 R09: 0000000000000000
[2158499.700538] R10: ffff9f1ea7da2cc0 R11: 000000005ed8cec8 R12: ffffc0bd6187fc28
[2158499.700561] R13: ffff9f15feb8d000 R14: ffff9f1ea7da2fc0 R15: ffff9f168dc0d740
[2158499.700585] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f185fac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[2158499.700610] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[2158499.700630] CR2: 00007fdd94fca238 CR3: 0000000809d8c006 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[2158499.700702] Call Trace:
[2158499.700741] ? key_alloc+0x447/0x4b0
[2158499.700768] ? __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0
[2158499.700790] __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0
[2158499.700814] request_key_and_link+0x2c7/0x730
[2158499.700847] ? dns_resolver_read+0x20/0x20 [dns_resolver]
[2158499.700873] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
[2158499.700898] request_key_tag+0x43/0xa0
[2158499.700926] dns_query+0x114/0x2ca [dns_resolver]
[2158499.701127] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x194/0x310 [cifs]
[2158499.701164] ? scnprintf+0x49/0x90
[2158499.701190] ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
[2158499.701211] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
[2158499.701405] reconn_set_ipaddr_from_hostname+0x81/0x2a0 [cifs]
[2158499.701603] cifs_resolve_server+0x4b/0xd0 [cifs]
[2158499.701632] process_one_work+0x1f8/0x3e0
[2158499.701658] worker_thread+0x2d/0x3f0
[2158499.701682] ? process_one_work+0x3e0/0x3e0
[2158499.701703] kthread+0x10d/0x130
[2158499.701723] ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0
[2158499.701746] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
The situation occurs as follows:
* Some kernel facility invokes dns_query() to resolve a hostname, for
example, "abcdef". The function registers its global DNS resolver
cache as current->cred.thread_keyring and passes the query to
request_key_net() -> request_key_tag() -> request_key_and_link().
* Function request_key_and_link() creates a keyring_search_context
object. Its match_data.cmp method gets set via a call to
type->match_preparse() (resolves to dns_resolver_match_preparse()) to
dns_resolver_cmp().
* Function request_key_and_link() continues and invokes
search_process_keyrings_rcu() which returns that a given key was not
found. The control is then passed to request_key_and_link() ->
construct_alloc_key().
* Concurrently to that, a second task similarly makes a DNS query for
"abcdef." and its result gets inserted into the DNS resolver cache.
* Back on the first task, function construct_alloc_key() first runs
__key_link_begin() to determine an assoc_array_edit operation to
insert a new key. Index keys in the array are compared exactly as-is,
using keyring_compare_object(). The operation finds that "abcdef" is
not yet present in the destination keyring.
* Function construct_alloc_key() continues and checks if a given key is
already present on some keyring by again calling
search_process_keyrings_rcu(). This search is done using
dns_resolver_cmp() and "abcdef" gets matched with now present key
"abcdef.".
* The found key is linked on the destination keyring by calling
__key_link() and using the previously calculated assoc_array_edit
operation. This inserts the "abcdef." key in the array but creates
a duplicity because the same index key is already present.
Fix the problem by postponing __key_link_begin() in
construct_alloc_key() until an actual key which should be linked into
the destination keyring is determined.
[jarkko@kernel.org: added a fixes tag and cc to stable]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3+
Fixes: df593ee23e ("keys: Hoist locking out of __key_link_begin()")
Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joey Lee <jlee@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Upstream commit: 522b1d6921
Add a fix for the Zen2 VZEROUPPER data corruption bug where under
certain circumstances executing VZEROUPPER can cause register
corruption or leak data.
The optimal fix is through microcode but in the case the proper
microcode revision has not been applied, enable a fallback fix using
a chicken bit.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 790071347a upstream.
Change ndo_set_mac_address to dev_set_mac_address because
dev_set_mac_address provides a way to notify network layer about MAC
change. In other case, services may not aware about MAC change and keep
using old one which set from network adapter driver.
As example, DHCP client from systemd do not update MAC address without
notification from net subsystem which leads to the problem with acquiring
the right address from DHCP server.
Fixes: cb10c7c0df ("net/ncsi: Add NCSI Broadcom OEM command")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.0+ 2f38e84 net/ncsi: make one oem_gma function for all mfr id
Signed-off-by: Paul Fertser <fercerpav@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ivan Mikhaylov <fr0st61te@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4e076c73e4 upstream.
This requires a bit of background. Properly done a modeset driver's
unload/remove sequence should be
drm_dev_unplug();
drm_atomic_helper_shutdown();
drm_dev_put();
The trouble is that the drm_dev_unplugged() checks are by design racy,
they do not synchronize against all outstanding ioctl. This is because
those ioctl could block forever (both for modeset and for driver
specific ioctls), leading to deadlocks in hotunplug. Instead the code
sections that touch the hardware need to be annotated with
drm_dev_enter/exit, to avoid accessing hardware resources after the
unload/remove has finished.
To avoid use-after-free issues all the involved userspace visible
objects are supposed to hold a reference on the underlying drm_device,
like drm_file does.
The issue now is that we missed one, the atomic modeset ioctl can be run
in a nonblocking fashion, and in that case it cannot rely on the implied
drm_device reference provided by the ioctl calling context. This can
result in a use-after-free if an nonblocking atomic commit is carefully
raced against a driver unload.
Fix this by unconditionally grabbing a drm_device reference for any
drm_atomic_state structures. Strictly speaking this isn't required for
blocking commits and TEST_ONLY calls, but it's the simpler approach.
Thanks to shanzhulig for the initial idea of grabbing an unconditional
reference, I just added comments, a condensed commit message and fixed a
minor potential issue in where exactly we drop the final reference.
Reported-by: shanzhulig <shanzhulig@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: shanzhulig <shanzhulig@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 158810b261 upstream.
25369891fc deletes a check for the case where no 'lmax' is
specified which 3037933448 previously fixed as 'lmax'
could be set to the device's MTU without any bound checking
for QFQ_LMAX_MIN and QFQ_LMAX_MAX. Therefore, reintroduce the check.
Fixes: 25369891fc ("net/sched: sch_qfq: refactor parsing of netlink parameters")
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9b07d27d0f upstream.
swiotlb_memblock_alloc() calls memblock_alloc(), which calls
(__init) memblock_alloc_try_nid(). However, swiotlb_membloc_alloc()
can be marked as __init since it is only called by swiotlb_init_remap(),
which is already marked as __init. This prevents a modpost build
warning/error:
WARNING: modpost: vmlinux.o: section mismatch in reference: swiotlb_memblock_alloc (section: .text) -> memblock_alloc_try_nid (section: .init.text)
WARNING: modpost: vmlinux.o: section mismatch in reference: swiotlb_memblock_alloc (section: .text) -> memblock_alloc_try_nid (section: .init.text)
This fixes the build warning/error seen on ARM64, PPC64, S390, i386,
and x86_64.
Fixes: 8d58aa4849 ("swiotlb: reduce the swiotlb buffer size on allocation failure")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: iommu@lists.linux.dev
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
