commit 46b5c4fb87 upstream.
If the calls to device_reset() or devm_spi_register_controller() fail on
probe of the MediaTek MT7621 SPI driver, the spi_controller struct is
erroneously not freed. Fix by switching over to the new
devm_spi_alloc_master() helper.
Additionally, there's an ordering issue in mt7621_spi_remove() wherein
the spi_controller is unregistered after disabling the SYS clock.
The correct order is to call spi_unregister_controller() *before* this
teardown step because bus accesses may still be ongoing until that
function returns.
All of these bugs have existed since the driver was first introduced,
so it seems fair to fix them together in a single commit.
Fixes: 1ab7f2a435 ("staging: mt7621-spi: add mt7621 support")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+: 5e844cc37a: spi: Introduce device-managed SPI controller allocation
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/72b680796149f5fcda0b3f530ffb7ee73b04f224.1607286887.git.lukas@wunner.de
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
[lukas: backport to v4.19.192]
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7174dc655e upstream.
If the call to devm_spi_register_master() fails on probe of the GPIO SPI
driver, the spi_master struct is erroneously not freed:
After allocating the spi_master, its reference count is 1. The driver
unconditionally decrements the reference count on unbind using a devm
action. Before calling devm_spi_register_master(), the driver
unconditionally increments the reference count because on success,
that function will decrement the reference count on unbind. However on
failure, devm_spi_register_master() does *not* decrement the reference
count, so the spi_master is leaked.
The issue was introduced by commits 8b797490b4 ("spi: gpio: Make sure
spi_master_put() is called in every error path") and 79567c1a32 ("spi:
gpio: Use devm_spi_register_master()"), which sought to plug leaks
introduced by 9b00bc7b90 ("spi: spi-gpio: Rewrite to use GPIO
descriptors") but missed this remaining leak.
The situation was later aggravated by commit d3b0ffa1d7 ("spi: gpio:
prevent memory leak in spi_gpio_probe"), which introduced a
use-after-free because it releases a reference on the spi_master if
devm_add_action_or_reset() fails even though the function already
does that.
Fix by switching over to the new devm_spi_alloc_master() helper.
Fixes: 9b00bc7b90 ("spi: spi-gpio: Rewrite to use GPIO descriptors")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+: 5e844cc37a: spi: Introduce device-managed SPI controller allocation
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.1-: 8b797490b4: spi: gpio: Make sure spi_master_put() is called in every error path
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.1-: 45beec3519: spi: bitbang: Introduce spi_bitbang_init()
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.1-: 79567c1a32: spi: gpio: Use devm_spi_register_master()
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4-: d3b0ffa1d7: spi: gpio: prevent memory leak in spi_gpio_probe
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+
Cc: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/86eaed27431c3d709e3748eb76ceecbfc790dd37.1607286887.git.lukas@wunner.de
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
[lukas: backport to v4.19.192]
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a703619127 upstream
In 801c6058d1 ("bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under
speculation") we replaced masking logic with direct loads of immediates
if the register is a known constant. Given in this case we do not apply
any masking, there is also no reason for the operation to be truncated
under the speculative domain.
Therefore, there is also zero reason for the verifier to branch-off and
simulate this case, it only needs to do it for unknown but bounded scalars.
As a side-effect, this also enables few test cases that were previously
rejected due to simulation under zero truncation.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bb01a1bba5 upstream
Masking direction as indicated via mask_to_left is considered to be
calculated once and then used to derive pointer limits. Thus, this
needs to be placed into bpf_sanitize_info instead so we can pass it
to sanitize_ptr_alu() call after the pointer move. Piotr noticed a
corner case where the off reg causes masking direction change which
then results in an incorrect final aux->alu_limit.
Fixes: 7fedb63a83 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask")
Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3d0220f686 upstream
Add a container structure struct bpf_sanitize_info which holds
the current aux info, and update call-sites to sanitize_ptr_alu()
to pass it in. This is needed for passing in additional state
later on.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 801c6058d1 upstream.
The current implemented mechanisms to mitigate data disclosure under
speculation mainly address stack and map value oob access from the
speculative domain. However, Piotr discovered that uninitialized BPF
stack is not protected yet, and thus old data from the kernel stack,
potentially including addresses of kernel structures, could still be
extracted from that 512 bytes large window. The BPF stack is special
compared to map values since it's not zero initialized for every
program invocation, whereas map values /are/ zero initialized upon
their initial allocation and thus cannot leak any prior data in either
domain. In the non-speculative domain, the verifier ensures that every
stack slot read must have a prior stack slot write by the BPF program
to avoid such data leaking issue.
However, this is not enough: for example, when the pointer arithmetic
operation moves the stack pointer from the last valid stack offset to
the first valid offset, the sanitation logic allows for any intermediate
offsets during speculative execution, which could then be used to
extract any restricted stack content via side-channel.
Given for unprivileged stack pointer arithmetic the use of unknown
but bounded scalars is generally forbidden, we can simply turn the
register-based arithmetic operation into an immediate-based arithmetic
operation without the need for masking. This also gives the benefit
of reducing the needed instructions for the operation. Given after
the work in 7fedb63a83 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic
mask"), the aux->alu_limit already holds the final immediate value for
the offset register with the known scalar. Thus, a simple mov of the
immediate to AX register with using AX as the source for the original
instruction is sufficient and possible now in this case.
Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d7a5091351 upstream
Update various selftest error messages:
* The 'Rx tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types'
is reworked into more specific/differentiated error messages for better
guidance.
* The change into 'value -4294967168 makes map_value pointer be out of
bounds' is due to moving the mixed bounds check into the speculation
handling and thus occuring slightly later than above mentioned sanity
check.
* The change into 'math between map_value pointer and register with
unbounded min value' is similarly due to register sanity check coming
before the mixed bounds check.
* The case of 'map access: known scalar += value_ptr from different maps'
now loads fine given masks are the same from the different paths (despite
max map value size being different).
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[OP: 4.19 backport, account for split test_verifier and
different / missing tests]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7fedb63a83 upstream.
This work tightens the offset mask we use for unprivileged pointer arithmetic
in order to mitigate a corner case reported by Piotr and Benedict where in
the speculative domain it is possible to advance, for example, the map value
pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of-bounds in order to leak kernel memory
via side-channel to user space.
Before this change, the computed ptr_limit for retrieve_ptr_limit() helper
represents largest valid distance when moving pointer to the right or left
which is then fed as aux->alu_limit to generate masking instructions against
the offset register. After the change, the derived aux->alu_limit represents
the largest potential value of the offset register which we mask against which
is just a narrower subset of the former limit.
For minimal complexity, we call sanitize_ptr_alu() from 2 observation points
in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), that is, before and after the simulated alu
operation. In the first step, we retieve the alu_state and alu_limit before
the operation as well as we branch-off a verifier path and push it to the
verification stack as we did before which checks the dst_reg under truncation,
in other words, when the speculative domain would attempt to move the pointer
out-of-bounds.
In the second step, we retrieve the new alu_limit and calculate the absolute
distance between both. Moreover, we commit the alu_state and final alu_limit
via update_alu_sanitation_state() to the env's instruction aux data, and bail
out from there if there is a mismatch due to coming from different verification
paths with different states.
Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[OP: backport to 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f528819334 upstream.
Add a small sanitize_needed() helper function and move sanitize_val_alu()
out of the main opcode switch. In upcoming work, we'll move sanitize_ptr_alu()
as well out of its opcode switch so this helps to streamline both.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 073815b756 upstream.
Move the bounds check in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() into a small helper named
sanitize_check_bounds() in order to simplify the former a bit.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a6aaece00a upstream
Consolidate all error handling and provide more user-friendly error messages
from sanitize_ptr_alu() and sanitize_val_alu().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 24c109bb15 upstream.
The mixed signed bounds check really belongs into retrieve_ptr_limit()
instead of outside of it in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(). The reason is
that this check is not tied to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE only, but to all pointer
types that we handle in retrieve_ptr_limit() and given errors from the latter
propagate back to adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() and lead to rejection of the
program, it's a better place to reside to avoid anything slipping through
for future types. The reason why we must reject such off_reg is that we
otherwise would not be able to derive a mask, see details in 9d7eceede7
("bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds for unprivileged").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[OP: backport to 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ no upstream commit ]
Switch the comparison, so that is_branch_taken() will recognize that below
branch is never taken:
[...]
17: [...] R1_w=inv0 [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,smax_value=-1,umin_value=18446744071562067968,var_off=(0xffffffff80000000; 0x7fffffff)) [...]
17: (67) r8 <<= 32
18: [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=-4294967296,umin_value=9223372036854775808,umax_value=18446744069414584320,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0x7fffffff00000000)) [...]
18: (c7) r8 s>>= 32
19: [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,smax_value=-1,umin_value=18446744071562067968,var_off=(0xffffffff80000000; 0x7fffffff)) [...]
19: (6d) if r1 s> r8 goto pc+16
[...] R1_w=inv0 [...] R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,smax_value=-1,umin_value=18446744071562067968,var_off=(0xffffffff80000000; 0x7fffffff)) [...]
[...]
Currently we check for is_branch_taken() only if either K is source, or source
is a scalar value that is const. For upstream it would be good to extend this
properly to check whether dst is const and src not.
For the sake of the test_verifier, it is probably not needed here:
# ./test_verifier 101
#101/p bpf_get_stack return R0 within range OK
Summary: 1 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
I haven't seen this issue in test_progs* though, they are passing fine:
# ./test_progs-no_alu32 -t get_stack
Switching to flavor 'no_alu32' subdirectory...
#20 get_stack_raw_tp:OK
Summary: 1/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
# ./test_progs -t get_stack
#20 get_stack_raw_tp:OK
Summary: 1/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[OP: backport to 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9ac26e9973 upstream.
With current ALU32 subreg handling and retval refine fix from last
patches we see an expected failure in test_verifier. With verbose
verifier state being printed at each step for clarity we have the
following relavent lines [I omit register states that are not
necessarily useful to see failure cause],
#101/p bpf_get_stack return R0 within range FAIL
Failed to load prog 'Success'!
[..]
14: (85) call bpf_get_stack#67
R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=48,imm=0)
R3_w=inv48
15:
R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
15: (b7) r1 = 0
16:
R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
R1_w=inv0
16: (bf) r8 = r0
17:
R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
R1_w=inv0
R8_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
17: (67) r8 <<= 32
18:
R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
R1_w=inv0
R8_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=9223372032559808512,
umax_value=18446744069414584320,
var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff00000000),
s32_min_value=0,
s32_max_value=0,
u32_max_value=0,
var32_off=(0x0; 0x0))
18: (c7) r8 s>>= 32
19
R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
R1_w=inv0
R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,
smax_value=2147483647,
var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
19: (cd) if r1 s< r8 goto pc+16
R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
R1_w=inv0
R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,
smax_value=0,
var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
20:
R0=inv(id=0,smax_value=48,var32_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
R1_w=inv0
R8_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-2147483648,
smax_value=0,
R9=inv48
20: (1f) r9 -= r8
21: (bf) r2 = r7
22:
R2_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=48,imm=0)
22: (0f) r2 += r8
value -2147483648 makes map_value pointer be out of bounds
After call bpf_get_stack() on line 14 and some moves we have at line 16
an r8 bound with max_value 48 but an unknown min value. This is to be
expected bpf_get_stack call can only return a max of the input size but
is free to return any negative error in the 32-bit register space. The
C helper is returning an int so will use lower 32-bits.
Lines 17 and 18 clear the top 32 bits with a left/right shift but use
ARSH so we still have worst case min bound before line 19 of -2147483648.
At this point the signed check 'r1 s< r8' meant to protect the addition
on line 22 where dst reg is a map_value pointer may very well return
true with a large negative number. Then the final line 22 will detect
this as an invalid operation and fail the program. What we want to do
is proceed only if r8 is positive non-error. So change 'r1 s< r8' to
'r1 s> r8' so that we jump if r8 is negative.
Next we will throw an error because we access past the end of the map
value. The map value size is 48 and sizeof(struct test_val) is 48 so
we walk off the end of the map value on the second call to
get bpf_get_stack(). Fix this by changing sizeof(struct test_val) to
24 by using 'sizeof(struct test_val) / 2'. After this everything passes
as expected.
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158560426019.10843.3285429543232025187.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[OP: backport to 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fb8d251ee2 upstream
This patch extends is_branch_taken() logic from JMP+K instructions
to JMP+X instructions.
Conditional branches are often done when src and dst registers
contain known scalars. In such case the verifier can follow
the branch that is going to be taken when program executes.
That speeds up the verification and is essential feature to support
bounded loops.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
[OP: drop is_jmp32 parameter from is_branch_taken() calls and
adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0a13e3537e upstream
Fix up test_verifier error messages for the case where the original error
message changed, or for the case where pointer alu errors differ between
privileged and unprivileged tests. Also, add alternative tests for keeping
coverage of the original verifier rejection error message (fp alu), and
newly reject map_ptr += rX where rX == 0 given we now forbid alu on these
types for unprivileged. All test_verifier cases pass after the change. The
test case fixups were kept separate to ease backporting of core changes.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[OP: backport to 4.19, skipping non-existent tests]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
After the backport of the changes to fix CVE 2019-7308, the
selftests also need to be fixed up, as was done originally
in mainline 80c9b2fae8 ("bpf: add various test cases to selftests").
This is a backport of upstream commit 80c9b2fae8 ("bpf: add various test
cases to selftests") adapted to 4.19 in order to fix the
selftests that began to fail after CVE-2019-7308 fixes.
Suggested-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 46a8b29c63 upstream.
Syzbot reported memory leak in smsc75xx_bind().
The problem was is non-freed memory in case of
errors after memory allocation.
backtrace:
[<ffffffff84245b62>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:556 [inline]
[<ffffffff84245b62>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:686 [inline]
[<ffffffff84245b62>] smsc75xx_bind+0x7a/0x334 drivers/net/usb/smsc75xx.c:1460
[<ffffffff82b5b2e6>] usbnet_probe+0x3b6/0xc30 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1728
Fixes: d0cad87170 ("smsc75xx: SMSC LAN75xx USB gigabit ethernet adapter driver")
Cc: stable@kernel.vger.org
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+b558506ba8165425fee2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e752dbc59e upstream.
The usb3_start_pipen() is called by renesas_usb3_ep_queue() and
usb3_request_done_pipen() so that usb3_start_pipen() is possible
to cause a race when getting usb3_first_req like below:
renesas_usb3_ep_queue()
spin_lock_irqsave()
list_add_tail()
spin_unlock_irqrestore()
usb3_start_pipen()
usb3_first_req = usb3_get_request() --- [1]
--- interrupt ---
usb3_irq_dma_int()
usb3_request_done_pipen()
usb3_get_request()
usb3_start_pipen()
usb3_first_req = usb3_get_request()
...
(the req is possible to be finished in the interrupt)
The usb3_first_req [1] above may have been finished after the interrupt
ended so that this driver caused to start a transfer wrongly. To fix this
issue, getting/checking the usb3_first_req are under spin_lock_irqsave()
in the same section.
Fixes: 746bfe63bb ("usb: gadget: renesas_usb3: add support for Renesas USB3.0 peripheral controller")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210524060155.1178724-1-yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 89b1a3d811 upstream.
This adds support for the Startech.com generic serial to USB converter.
It seems to be a bone stock TI_3410. I have been using this patch for
years.
Signed-off-by: Sean MacLennan <seanm@seanm.ca>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2ea2e019c1 upstream.
The Receive FIFO Data Count Trigger field (RTRG[6:0]) in the Receive
FIFO Data Count Trigger Register (HSRTRGR) of HSCIF can only hold values
ranging from 0-127. As the FIFO size is equal to 128 on HSCIF, the user
can write an out-of-range value, touching reserved bits.
Fix this by limiting the trigger value to the FIFO size minus one.
Reverse the order of the checks, to avoid rx_trig becoming zero if the
FIFO size is one.
Note that this change has no impact on other SCIF variants, as their
maximum supported trigger value is lower than the FIFO size anyway, and
the code below takes care of enforcing these limits.
Fixes: a380ed461f ("serial: sh-sci: implement FIFO threshold register setting")
Reported-by: Linh Phung <linh.phung.jy@renesas.com>
Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Reviewed-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli+renesas@fpond.eu>
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5eff320aef92ffb33d00e57979fd3603bbb4a70f.1620648218.git.geert+renesas@glider.be
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 746e4acf87 upstream.
The direction of the pipe argument must match the request-type direction
bit or control requests may fail depending on the host-controller-driver
implementation.
Fix the set-speed request which erroneously used USB_DIR_IN and update
the default timeout argument to match (same value).
Fixes: 5638e4d92e ("USB: add PlayStation 2 Trance Vibrator driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.19
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210521133109.17396-1-johan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 04f5b9f539 upstream.
AD7745 devices don't have the CIN2 pins and therefore can't handle related
channels. Forcing the number of AD7746 channels may lead to enabling more
channels than what the hardware actually supports.
Avoid num_channels being overwritten after first assignment.
Signed-off-by: Lucas Stankus <lucas.p.stankus@gmail.com>
Fixes: 83e416f458 ("staging: iio: adc: Replace, rewrite ad7745 from scratch.")
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b106776080 upstream.
Up to 64 bytes of data can be read from NVM in one go. Read address
must be dword aligned. Data is read into a local buffer.
If caller asks to read data starting at an unaligned address then full
dword is anyway read from NVM into a local buffer. Data is then copied
from the local buffer starting at the unaligned offset to the caller
buffer.
In cases where asked data length + unaligned offset is over 64 bytes
we need to make sure we don't read past the 64 bytes in the local
buffer when copying to caller buffer, and make sure that we don't
skip copying unaligned offset bytes from local buffer anymore after
the first round of 64 byte NVM data read.
Fixes: 3e13676862 ("thunderbolt: Add support for DMA configuration based mailbox")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7e768532b2 upstream.
If an origin target has no snapshots, o->split_boundary is set to 0.
This causes BUG_ON(sectors <= 0) in block/bio.c:bio_split().
Fix this by initializing chunk_size, and in turn split_boundary, to
rounddown_pow_of_two(UINT_MAX) -- the largest power of two that fits
into "unsigned" type.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 62a8ff67eb upstream.
In certain scenarios a normal MSDU can be received as an A-MSDU when
the A-MSDU present bit of a QoS header gets flipped during reception.
Since this bit is unauthenticated, the hardware crypto engine can pass
the frame to the driver without any error indication.
This could result in processing unintended subframes collected in the
A-MSDU list. Hence, validate A-MSDU list by checking if the first frame
has a valid subframe header.
Comparing the non-aggregated MSDU and an A-MSDU, the fields of the first
subframe DA matches the LLC/SNAP header fields of a normal MSDU.
In order to avoid processing such frames, add a validation to
filter such A-MSDU frames where the first subframe header DA matches
with the LLC/SNAP header pattern.
Tested-on: QCA9984 hw1.0 PCI 10.4-3.10-00047
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sriram R <srirrama@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.e6f5eb7b9847.I38a77ae26096862527a5eab73caebd7346af8b66@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3edc6b0d6c upstream.
For some chips/drivers, e.g., QCA6174 with ath10k, the decryption is
done by the hardware, and the Protected bit in the Frame Control field
is cleared in the lower level driver before the frame is passed to
mac80211. In such cases, the condition for ieee80211_has_protected() is
not met in ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() of mac80211 and the new security
validation steps are not executed.
Extend mac80211 to cover the case where the Protected bit has been
cleared, but the frame is indicated as having been decrypted by the
hardware. This extends protection against mixed key and fragment cache
attack for additional drivers/chips. This fixes CVE-2020-24586 and
CVE-2020-24587 for such cases.
Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.037aa5ca0390.I7bb888e2965a0db02a67075fcb5deb50eb7408aa@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a8c4d76a8d upstream.
EAPOL frames are used for authentication and key management between the
AP and each individual STA associated in the BSS. Those frames are not
supposed to be sent by one associated STA to another associated STA
(either unicast for broadcast/multicast).
Similarly, in 802.11 they're supposed to be sent to the authenticator
(AP) address.
Since it is possible for unexpected EAPOL frames to result in misbehavior
in supplicant implementations, it is better for the AP to not allow such
cases to be forwarded to other clients either directly, or indirectly if
the AP interface is part of a bridge.
Accept EAPOL (control port) frames only if they're transmitted to the
own address, or, due to interoperability concerns, to the PAE group
address.
Disable forwarding of EAPOL (or well, the configured control port
protocol) frames back to wireless medium in all cases. Previously, these
frames were accepted from fully authenticated and authorized stations
and also from unauthenticated stations for one of the cases.
Additionally, to avoid forwarding by the bridge, rewrite the PAE group
address case to the local MAC address.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.cb327ed0cabe.Ib7dcffa2a31f0913d660de65ba3c8aca75b1d10f@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3a11ce08c4 upstream.
Prior patches protected against fragmentation cache attacks
by coloring keys, but this shows that it can lead to issues
when multiple stations use the same sequence number. Add a
fragment cache to struct sta_info (in addition to the one in
the interface) to separate fragments for different stations
properly.
This then automatically clear most of the fragment cache when a
station disconnects (or reassociates) from an AP, or when client
interfaces disconnect from the network, etc.
On the way, also fix the comment there since this brings us in line
with the recommendation in 802.11-2016 ("An AP should support ...").
Additionally, remove a useless condition (since there's no problem
purging an already empty list).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.fc35046b0d52.I1ef101e3784d13e8f6600d83de7ec9a3a45bcd52@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 270032a2a9 upstream.
With old ciphers (WEP and TKIP) we shouldn't be using A-MSDUs
since A-MSDUs are only supported if we know that they are, and
the only practical way for that is HT support which doesn't
support old ciphers.
However, we would normally accept them anyway. Since we check
the MMIC before deaggregating A-MSDUs, and the A-MSDU bit in
the QoS header is not protected in TKIP (or WEP), this enables
attacks similar to CVE-2020-24588. To prevent that, drop A-MSDUs
completely with old ciphers.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.076543300172.I548e6e71f1ee9cad4b9a37bf212ae7db723587aa@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2b8a1fee34 upstream.
Mitigate A-MSDU injection attacks (CVE-2020-24588) by detecting if the
destination address of a subframe equals an RFC1042 (i.e., LLC/SNAP)
header, and if so dropping the complete A-MSDU frame. This mitigates
known attacks, although new (unknown) aggregation-based attacks may
remain possible.
This defense works because in A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, a
normal encrypted Wi-Fi frame is turned into an A-MSDU frame. This means
the first 6 bytes of the first A-MSDU subframe correspond to an RFC1042
header. In other words, the destination MAC address of the first A-MSDU
subframe contains the start of an RFC1042 header during an aggregation
attack. We can detect this and thereby prevent this specific attack.
For details, see Section 7.2 of "Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi
Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation".
Note that for kernel 4.9 and above this patch depends on "mac80211:
properly handle A-MSDUs that start with a rfc1042 header". Otherwise
this patch has no impact and attacks will remain possible.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.25d93176ddaf.I9e265b597f2cd23eb44573f35b625947b386a9de@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 94034c40ab upstream.
Simultaneously prevent mixed key attacks (CVE-2020-24587) and fragment
cache attacks (CVE-2020-24586). This is accomplished by assigning a
unique color to every key (per interface) and using this to track which
key was used to decrypt a fragment. When reassembling frames, it is
now checked whether all fragments were decrypted using the same key.
To assure that fragment cache attacks are also prevented, the ID that is
assigned to keys is unique even over (re)associations and (re)connects.
This means fragments separated by a (re)association or (re)connect will
not be reassembled. Because mac80211 now also prevents the reassembly of
mixed encrypted and plaintext fragments, all cache attacks are prevented.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.3f8290e59823.I622a67769ed39257327a362cfc09c812320eb979@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
