[ Upstream commit ed9be0e6c8 ]
If in tpm_tis_probe_irq_single() an error occurs after the original
interrupt vector has been read, restore the interrupts before the error is
returned.
Since the caller does not check the error value, return -1 in any case that
the TPM_CHIP_FLAG_IRQ flag is not set. Since the return value of function
tpm_tis_gen_interrupt() is not longer used, make it a void function.
Fixes: 1107d065fd ("tpm_tis: Introduce intermediate layer for TPM access")
Signed-off-by: Lino Sanfilippo <l.sanfilippo@kunbus.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4ce1f694eb ]
The Makefile rule responsible for building flask.h and
av_permissions.h only lists flask.h as a target which means that
av_permissions.h is only generated when flask.h needs to be
generated. This patch fixes this by adding av_permissions.h as a
target to the rule.
Fixes: 8753f6bec3 ("selinux: generate flask headers during kernel build")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bcab1adeaa ]
Make the flask.h target depend on the genheaders binary instead of
classmap.h to ensure that it is rebuilt if any of the dependencies of
genheaders are changed.
Notably this fixes flask.h not being rebuilt when
initial_sid_to_string.h is modified.
Fixes: 8753f6bec3 ("selinux: generate flask headers during kernel build")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 22a8be2803 ]
malloc_and_init_memory() in fill_buf isn't checking if memalign()
successfully allocated memory or not before accessing the memory.
Check the return value of memalign() and return NULL if allocating
aligned memory fails.
Fixes: a2561b12fe ("selftests/resctrl: Add built in benchmark")
Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit d46e04ccd4 upstream.
Always run the entire init sequence (rtl8xxxu_init_device()) for
RTL8192EU. It's what the vendor driver does too.
This fixes a bug where the device is unable to connect after
rebooting:
wlp3s0f3u2: send auth to ... (try 1/3)
wlp3s0f3u2: send auth to ... (try 2/3)
wlp3s0f3u2: send auth to ... (try 3/3)
wlp3s0f3u2: authentication with ... timed out
Rebooting leaves the device powered on (partially? at least the
firmware is still running), but not really in a working state.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bitterblue Smith <rtl8821cerfe2@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@trained-monkey.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4eb111a9-d4c4-37d0-b376-4e202de7153c@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a405c6f022 upstream.
init_resync() inits mempool and sets conf->have_replacemnt at the beginning
of sync, close_sync() frees the mempool when sync is completed.
After [1] recovery might be skipped and init_resync() is called but
close_sync() is not. null-ptr-deref occurs with r10bio->dev[i].repl_bio.
The following is one way to reproduce the issue.
1) create a array, wait for resync to complete, mddev->recovery_cp is set
to MaxSector.
2) recovery is woken and it is skipped. conf->have_replacement is set to
0 in init_resync(). close_sync() not called.
3) some io errors and rdev A is set to WantReplacement.
4) a new device is added and set to A's replacement.
5) recovery is woken, A have replacement, but conf->have_replacemnt is
0. r10bio->dev[i].repl_bio will not be alloced and null-ptr-deref
occurs.
Fix it by not calling init_resync() if recovery skipped.
[1] commit 7e83ccbecd ("md/raid10: Allow skipping recovery when clean arrays are assembled")
Fixes: 7e83ccbecd ("md/raid10: Allow skipping recovery when clean arrays are assembled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230222041000.3341651-3-linan666@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 28a65b49eb upstream.
According to syzbot's report, mark_buffer_dirty() called from
nilfs_segctor_do_construct() outputs a warning with some patterns after
nilfs2 detects metadata corruption and degrades to read-only mode.
After such read-only degeneration, page cache data may be cleared through
nilfs_clear_dirty_page() which may also clear the uptodate flag for their
buffer heads. However, even after the degeneration, log writes are still
performed by unmount processing etc., which causes mark_buffer_dirty() to
be called for buffer heads without the "uptodate" flag and causes the
warning.
Since any writes should not be done to a read-only file system in the
first place, this fixes the warning in mark_buffer_dirty() by letting
nilfs_segctor_do_construct() abort early if in read-only mode.
This also changes the retry check of nilfs_segctor_write_out() to avoid
unnecessary log write retries if it detects -EROFS that
nilfs_segctor_do_construct() returned.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230427011526.13457-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+2af3bc9585be7f23f290@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2af3bc9585be7f23f290
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6e3220ba33 upstream.
Fix the argument pointer (ap) to point to real-mode memory
instead of virtual memory.
It's interesting that this issue hasn't shown up earlier, as this could
have happened with any 64-bit PDC ROM code.
I just noticed it because I suddenly faced a HPMC while trying to execute
the 64-bit STI ROM code of an Visualize-FXe graphics card for the STI
text console.
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1fb815b38b upstream.
When opening a ubifs tmpfile on an encrypted directory, function
fscrypt_setup_filename allocates memory for the name that is to be
stored in the directory entry, but after the name has been copied to the
directory entry inode, the memory is not freed.
When running kmemleak on it we see that it is registered as a leak. The
report below is triggered by a simple program 'tmpfile' just opening a
tmpfile:
unreferenced object 0xffff88810178f380 (size 32):
comm "tmpfile", pid 509, jiffies 4294934744 (age 1524.742s)
backtrace:
__kmem_cache_alloc_node
__kmalloc
fscrypt_setup_filename
ubifs_tmpfile
vfs_tmpfile
path_openat
Free this memory after it has been copied to the inode.
Signed-off-by: Mårten Lindahl <marten.lindahl@axis.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 31a149d5c1 upstream.
The commit 2d78aee426 ("UBI: simplify LEB write and atomic LEB change code")
adds helper function, try_write_vid_and_data(), to simplify the code, but this
helper function has bug, it will return 0 (success) when ubi_io_write_vid_hdr()
or the ubi_io_write_data() return error number (-EIO, etc), because the return
value of ubi_wl_put_peb() will overwrite the original return value.
This issue will cause unexpected data loss issue, because the caller of this
function and UBIFS willn't know the data is lost.
Fixes: 2d78aee426 ("UBI: simplify LEB write and atomic LEB change code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b5fda08ef2 upstream.
Following process will cause a memleak for copied up znode:
dirty_cow_znode
zn = copy_znode(c, znode);
err = insert_old_idx(c, zbr->lnum, zbr->offs);
if (unlikely(err))
return ERR_PTR(err); // No one refers to zn.
Fetch a reproducer in [Link].
Function copy_znode() is split into 2 parts: resource allocation
and znode replacement, insert_old_idx() is split in similar way,
so resource cleanup could be done in error handling path without
corrupting metadata(mem & disk).
It's okay that old index inserting is put behind of add_idx_dirt(),
old index is used in layout_leb_in_gaps(), so the two processes do
not depend on each other.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216705
Fixes: 1e51764a3c ("UBIFS: add new flash file system")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7d01cb27f6 upstream.
This reverts commit 122deabfe1 (ubifs: dirty_cow_znode: Fix memleak
in error handling path).
After commit 122deabfe1 applied, if insert_old_idx() failed, old
index neither exists in TNC nor in old-index tree. Which means that
old index node could be overwritten in layout_leb_in_gaps(), then
ubifs image will be corrupted in power-cut.
Fixes: 122deabfe1 (ubifs: dirty_cow_znode: Fix memleak ... path)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ccc62b8277 upstream.
commit b9c6ff94e4 ("iommu/amd: Re-factor guest virtual APIC
(de-)activation code") while refactoring guest virtual APIC
activation/de-activation code, stored information for activate/de-activate
in "struct amd_ir_data". It used 32-bit integer data type for storing the
"Guest Virtual APIC Table Root Pointer" (ga_root_ptr), though the
"ga_root_ptr" is actually a 40-bit field in IRTE (Interrupt Remapping
Table Entry).
This causes interrupts from PCIe devices to not reach the guest in the case
of PCIe passthrough with SME (Secure Memory Encryption) enabled as _SME_
bit in the "ga_root_ptr" is lost before writing it to the IRTE.
Fix it by using 64-bit data type for storing the "ga_root_ptr". While at
that also change the data type of "ga_tag" to u32 in order to match
the IOMMU spec.
Fixes: b9c6ff94e4 ("iommu/amd: Re-factor guest virtual APIC (de-)activation code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+
Reported-by: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230405130317.9351-1-kvijayab@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c770657bd2 upstream.
Using standard mode, rare false ACK responses were appearing with
i2cdetect tool. This was happening due to NACK interrupt triggering
ISR thread before register access interrupt was ready. Removing the
NACK interrupt's ability to trigger ISR thread lets register access
ready interrupt do this instead.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Fixes: 3b2f8f82da ("i2c: omap: switch to threaded IRQ support")
Signed-off-by: Reid Tonking <reidt@ti.com>
Acked-by: Vignesh Raghavendra <vigneshr@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 1ba1199ec5 ]
KASAN report null-ptr-deref:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in bdi_split_work_to_wbs+0x5c5/0x7b0
Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000000 by task sync/943
CPU: 5 PID: 943 Comm: sync Tainted: 6.3.0-rc5-next-20230406-dirty #461
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0xc0
print_report+0x2ba/0x340
kasan_report+0xc4/0x120
kasan_check_range+0x1b7/0x2e0
__kasan_check_write+0x24/0x40
bdi_split_work_to_wbs+0x5c5/0x7b0
sync_inodes_sb+0x195/0x630
sync_inodes_one_sb+0x3a/0x50
iterate_supers+0x106/0x1b0
ksys_sync+0x98/0x160
[...]
==================================================================
The race that causes the above issue is as follows:
cpu1 cpu2
-------------------------|-------------------------
inode_switch_wbs
INIT_WORK(&isw->work, inode_switch_wbs_work_fn)
queue_rcu_work(isw_wq, &isw->work)
// queue_work async
inode_switch_wbs_work_fn
wb_put_many(old_wb, nr_switched)
percpu_ref_put_many
ref->data->release(ref)
cgwb_release
queue_work(cgwb_release_wq, &wb->release_work)
// queue_work async
&wb->release_work
cgwb_release_workfn
ksys_sync
iterate_supers
sync_inodes_one_sb
sync_inodes_sb
bdi_split_work_to_wbs
kmalloc(sizeof(*work), GFP_ATOMIC)
// alloc memory failed
percpu_ref_exit
ref->data = NULL
kfree(data)
wb_get(wb)
percpu_ref_get(&wb->refcnt)
percpu_ref_get_many(ref, 1)
atomic_long_add(nr, &ref->data->count)
atomic64_add(i, v)
// trigger null-ptr-deref
bdi_split_work_to_wbs() traverses &bdi->wb_list to split work into all
wbs. If the allocation of new work fails, the on-stack fallback will be
used and the reference count of the current wb is increased afterwards.
If cgroup writeback membership switches occur before getting the reference
count and the current wb is released as old_wd, then calling wb_get() or
wb_put() will trigger the null pointer dereference above.
This issue was introduced in v4.3-rc7 (see fix tag1). Both
sync_inodes_sb() and __writeback_inodes_sb_nr() calls to
bdi_split_work_to_wbs() can trigger this issue. For scenarios called via
sync_inodes_sb(), originally commit 7fc5854f8c ("writeback: synchronize
sync(2) against cgroup writeback membership switches") reduced the
possibility of the issue by adding wb_switch_rwsem, but in v5.14-rc1 (see
fix tag2) removed the "inode_io_list_del_locked(inode, old_wb)" from
inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() so that wb->state contains WB_has_dirty_io,
thus old_wb is not skipped when traversing wbs in bdi_split_work_to_wbs(),
and the issue becomes easily reproducible again.
To solve this problem, percpu_ref_exit() is called under RCU protection to
avoid race between cgwb_release_workfn() and bdi_split_work_to_wbs().
Moreover, replace wb_get() with wb_tryget() in bdi_split_work_to_wbs(),
and skip the current wb if wb_tryget() fails because the wb has already
been shutdown.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230410130826.1492525-1-libaokun1@huawei.com
Fixes: b817525a4a ("writeback: bdi_writeback iteration must not skip dying ones")
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
Cc: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Cc: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Cc: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 43ec16f145 upstream.
There is a crash in relay_file_read, as the var from
point to the end of last subbuf.
The oops looks something like:
pc : __arch_copy_to_user+0x180/0x310
lr : relay_file_read+0x20c/0x2c8
Call trace:
__arch_copy_to_user+0x180/0x310
full_proxy_read+0x68/0x98
vfs_read+0xb0/0x1d0
ksys_read+0x6c/0xf0
__arm64_sys_read+0x20/0x28
el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0x84/0x108
do_el0_svc+0x74/0x90
el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
el0_sync_handler+0x88/0xb0
el0_sync+0x148/0x180
We get the condition by analyzing the vmcore:
1). The last produced byte and last consumed byte
both at the end of the last subbuf
2). A softirq calls function(e.g __blk_add_trace)
to write relay buffer occurs when an program is calling
relay_file_read_avail().
relay_file_read
relay_file_read_avail
relay_file_read_consume(buf, 0, 0);
//interrupted by softirq who will write subbuf
....
return 1;
//read_start point to the end of the last subbuf
read_start = relay_file_read_start_pos
//avail is equal to subsize
avail = relay_file_read_subbuf_avail
//from points to an invalid memory address
from = buf->start + read_start
//system is crashed
copy_to_user(buffer, from, avail)
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230419040203.37676-1-zhang.zhengming@h3c.com
Fixes: 8d62fdebda ("relay file read: start-pos fix")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Zhengming <zhang.zhengming@h3c.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhao Lei <zhao_lei1@hoperun.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhou Kete <zhou.kete@h3c.com>
Reviewed-by: Pengcheng Yang <yangpc@wangsu.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4984563823 upstream.
Extend VMX's nested intercept logic for emulated instructions to handle
"pause" interception, in quotes because KVM's emulator doesn't filter out
NOPs when checking for nested intercepts. Failure to allow emulation of
NOPs results in KVM injecting a #UD into L2 on any NOP that collides with
the emulator's definition of PAUSE, i.e. on all single-byte NOPs.
For PAUSE itself, honor L1's PAUSE-exiting control, but ignore PLE to
avoid unnecessarily injecting a #UD into L2. Per the SDM, the first
execution of PAUSE after VM-Entry is treated as the beginning of a new
loop, i.e. will never trigger a PLE VM-Exit, and so L1 can't expect any
given execution of PAUSE to deterministically exit.
... the processor considers this execution to be the first execution of
PAUSE in a loop. (It also does so for the first execution of PAUSE at
CPL 0 after VM entry.)
All that said, the PLE side of things is currently a moot point, as KVM
doesn't expose PLE to L1.
Note, vmx_check_intercept() is still wildly broken when L1 wants to
intercept an instruction, as KVM injects a #UD instead of synthesizing a
nested VM-Exit. That issue extends far beyond NOP/PAUSE and needs far
more effort to fix, i.e. is a problem for the future.
Fixes: 07721feee4 ("KVM: nVMX: Don't emulate instructions in guest mode")
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230405002359.418138-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d82dcd9e21 upstream.
Reiserfs sets a security xattr at inode creation time in two stages: first,
it calls reiserfs_security_init() to obtain the xattr from active LSMs;
then, it calls reiserfs_security_write() to actually write that xattr.
Unfortunately, it seems there is a wrong expectation that LSMs provide the
full xattr name in the form 'security.<suffix>'. However, LSMs always
provided just the suffix, causing reiserfs to not write the xattr at all
(if the suffix is shorter than the prefix), or to write an xattr with the
wrong name.
Add a temporary buffer in reiserfs_security_write(), and write to it the
full xattr name, before passing it to reiserfs_xattr_set_handle().
Also replace the name length check with a check that the full xattr name is
not larger than XATTR_NAME_MAX.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.x
Fixes: 57fe60df62 ("reiserfs: add atomic addition of selinux attributes during inode creation")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a543ada7db upstream.
The crypto_unregister_alg() function expects callers to ensure that any
algorithm that is unregistered has a refcnt of exactly 1, and issues a
BUG_ON() if this is not the case. However, there are in fact drivers that
will call crypto_unregister_alg() without ensuring that the refcnt has been
lowered first, most notably on system shutdown. This causes the BUG_ON() to
trigger, which prevents a clean shutdown and hangs the system.
To avoid such hangs on shutdown, demote the BUG_ON() in
crypto_unregister_alg() to a WARN_ON() with early return. Cc stable because
this problem was observed on a 6.2 kernel, cf the link below.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87r0tyq8ph.fsf@toke.dk
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 675751bb20 upstream.
If something was written to the buffer just before destruction,
it may be possible (maybe not in a real system, but it did
happen in ARCH=um with time-travel) to destroy the ringbuffer
before the IRQ work ran, leading this KASAN report (or a crash
without KASAN):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in irq_work_run_list+0x11a/0x13a
Read of size 8 at addr 000000006d640a48 by task swapper/0
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Tainted: G W O 6.3.0-rc1 #7
Stack:
60c4f20f 0c203d48 41b58ab3 60f224fc
600477fa 60f35687 60c4f20f 601273dd
00000008 6101eb00 6101eab0 615be548
Call Trace:
[<60047a58>] show_stack+0x25e/0x282
[<60c609e0>] dump_stack_lvl+0x96/0xfd
[<60c50d4c>] print_report+0x1a7/0x5a8
[<603078d3>] kasan_report+0xc1/0xe9
[<60308950>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x1b/0x1d
[<60232844>] irq_work_run_list+0x11a/0x13a
[<602328b4>] irq_work_tick+0x24/0x34
[<6017f9dc>] update_process_times+0x162/0x196
[<6019f335>] tick_sched_handle+0x1a4/0x1c3
[<6019fd9e>] tick_sched_timer+0x79/0x10c
[<601812b9>] __hrtimer_run_queues.constprop.0+0x425/0x695
[<60182913>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x16c/0x2c4
[<600486a3>] um_timer+0x164/0x183
[...]
Allocated by task 411:
save_stack_trace+0x99/0xb5
stack_trace_save+0x81/0x9b
kasan_save_stack+0x2d/0x54
kasan_set_track+0x34/0x3e
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x28
____kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x97
__kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x12
__kmalloc+0xb2/0xe8
load_elf_phdrs+0xee/0x182
[...]
The buggy address belongs to the object at 000000006d640800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 584 bytes inside of
freed 1024-byte region [000000006d640800, 000000006d640c00)
Add the appropriate irq_work_sync() so the work finishes before
the buffers are destroyed.
Prior to the commit in the Fixes tag below, there was only a
single global IRQ work, so this issue didn't exist.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230427175920.a76159263122.I8295e405c44362a86c995e9c2c37e3e03810aa56@changeid
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Fixes: 15693458c4 ("tracing/ring-buffer: Move poll wake ups into ring buffer code")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit eb411c0cf5 upstream.
This fix is basically the same as 9bce02ef0d ("pwm: meson: Fix the
G12A AO clock parents order"). Vendor driver referenced there has
xtal as first parent also for axg ao. In addition fix the name
of the aoclk81 clock. Apparently name aoclk81 as used by the vendor
driver was changed when mainlining the axg clock driver.
Fixes: bccaa3f917 ("pwm: meson: Add clock source configuration for Meson-AXG")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6d2555cde2 upstream.
The ipmi communication is not restored after a specific version of BMC is
upgraded on our server.
The ipmi driver does not respond after printing the following log:
ipmi_ssif: Invalid response getting flags: 1c 1
I found that after entering this branch, ssif_info->ssif_state always
holds SSIF_GETTING_FLAGS and never return to IDLE.
As a result, the driver cannot be loaded, because the driver status is
checked during the unload process and must be IDLE in shutdown_ssif():
while (ssif_info->ssif_state != SSIF_IDLE)
schedule_timeout(1);
The process trigger this problem is:
1. One msg timeout and next msg start send, and call
ssif_set_need_watch().
2. ssif_set_need_watch()->watch_timeout()->start_flag_fetch() change
ssif_state to SSIF_GETTING_FLAGS.
3. In msg_done_handler() ssif_state == SSIF_GETTING_FLAGS, if an error
message is received, the second branch does not modify the ssif_state.
4. All retry action need IS_SSIF_IDLE() == True. Include retry action in
watch_timeout(), msg_done_handler(). Sending msg does not work either.
SSIF_IDLE is also checked in start_next_msg().
5. The only thing that can be triggered in the SSIF driver is
watch_timeout(), after destory_user(), this timer will stop too.
So, if enter this branch, the ssif_state will remain SSIF_GETTING_FLAGS
and can't send msg, no timer started, can't unload.
We did a comparative test before and after adding this patch, and the
result is effective.
Fixes: 259307074b ("ipmi: Add SMBus interface driver (SSIF)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuchen <zhangyuchen.lcr@bytedance.com>
Message-Id: <20230412074907.80046-1-zhangyuchen.lcr@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 58d7668242 upstream.
For CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL systems, the tick_do_timer_cpu cannot be offlined.
However, cpu_is_hotpluggable() still returns true for those CPUs. This causes
torture tests that do offlining to end up trying to offline this CPU causing
test failures. Such failure happens on all architectures.
Fix the repeated error messages thrown by this (even if the hotplug errors are
harmless) by asking the opinion of the nohz subsystem on whether the CPU can be
hotplugged.
[ Apply Frederic Weisbecker feedback on refactoring tick_nohz_cpu_down(). ]
For drivers/base/ portion:
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Zhouyi Zhou <zhouzhouyi@gmail.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: rcu <rcu@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2987557f52 ("driver-core/cpu: Expose hotpluggability to the rest of the kernel")
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2729cfdcfa upstream.
This patch drops all calls to ext4_fc_start_update() and
ext4_fc_stop_update(). To ensure that there are no ongoing journal
updates during fast commit, we also make jbd2_fc_begin_commit() lock
journal for updates. This way we don't have to maintain two different
transaction start stop APIs for fast commit and full commit. This
patch doesn't remove the functions altogether since in future we want
to have inode level locking for fast commits.
Signed-off-by: Harshad Shirwadkar <harshadshirwadkar@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211223202140.2061101-2-harshads@google.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5c7cb94452 upstream.
If blk_crypto_evict_key() sees that the key is still in-use (due to a
bug) or that ->keyslot_evict failed, it currently just returns while
leaving the key linked into the keyslot management structures.
However, blk_crypto_evict_key() is only called in contexts such as inode
eviction where failure is not an option. So actually the caller
proceeds with freeing the blk_crypto_key regardless of the return value
of blk_crypto_evict_key().
These two assumptions don't match, and the result is that there can be a
use-after-free in blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys() after one of these
errors occurs. (Note, these errors *shouldn't* happen; we're just
talking about what happens if they do anyway.)
Fix this by making blk_crypto_evict_key() unlink the key from the
keyslot management structures even on failure.
Also improve some comments.
Fixes: 1b26283970 ("block: Keyslot Manager for Inline Encryption")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230315183907.53675-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9cd1e56667 upstream.
Once all I/O using a blk_crypto_key has completed, filesystems can call
blk_crypto_evict_key(). However, the block layer currently doesn't call
blk_crypto_put_keyslot() until the request is being freed, which happens
after upper layers have been told (via bio_endio()) the I/O has
completed. This causes a race condition where blk_crypto_evict_key()
can see 'slot_refs != 0' without there being an actual bug.
This makes __blk_crypto_evict_key() hit the
'WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&slot->slot_refs) != 0)' and return without
doing anything, eventually causing a use-after-free in
blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys(). (This is a very rare bug and has only
been seen when per-file keys are being used with fscrypt.)
There are two options to fix this: either release the keyslot before
bio_endio() is called on the request's last bio, or make
__blk_crypto_evict_key() ignore slot_refs. Let's go with the first
solution, since it preserves the ability to report bugs (via
WARN_ON_ONCE) where a key is evicted while still in-use.
Fixes: a892c8d52c ("block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Nathan Huckleberry <nhuck@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230315183907.53675-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d08c84e01a upstream.
In fedora rawhide the PTHREAD_STACK_MIN define may end up expanded to a
sysconf() call, and that will return 'long int', breaking the build:
45 fedora:rawhide : FAIL gcc version 11.1.1 20210623 (Red Hat 11.1.1-6) (GCC)
builtin-sched.c: In function 'create_tasks':
/git/perf-5.14.0-rc1/tools/include/linux/kernel.h:43:24: error: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast [-Werror]
43 | (void) (&_max1 == &_max2); \
| ^~
builtin-sched.c:673:34: note: in expansion of macro 'max'
673 | (size_t) max(16 * 1024, PTHREAD_STACK_MIN));
| ^~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
$ grep __sysconf /usr/include/*/*.h
/usr/include/bits/pthread_stack_min-dynamic.h:extern long int __sysconf (int __name) __THROW;
/usr/include/bits/pthread_stack_min-dynamic.h:# define PTHREAD_STACK_MIN __sysconf (__SC_THREAD_STACK_MIN_VALUE)
/usr/include/bits/time.h:extern long int __sysconf (int);
/usr/include/bits/time.h:# define CLK_TCK ((__clock_t) __sysconf (2)) /* 2 is _SC_CLK_TCK */
$
So cast it to int to cope with that.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f7abf14f00 upstream.
For some unknown reason the introduction of the timer_wait_running callback
missed to fixup posix CPU timers, which went unnoticed for almost four years.
Marco reported recently that the WARN_ON() in timer_wait_running()
triggers with a posix CPU timer test case.
Posix CPU timers have two execution models for expiring timers depending on
CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK:
1) If not enabled, the expiry happens in hard interrupt context so
spin waiting on the remote CPU is reasonably time bound.
Implement an empty stub function for that case.
2) If enabled, the expiry happens in task work before returning to user
space or guest mode. The expired timers are marked as firing and moved
from the timer queue to a local list head with sighand lock held. Once
the timers are moved, sighand lock is dropped and the expiry happens in
fully preemptible context. That means the expiring task can be scheduled
out, migrated, interrupted etc. So spin waiting on it is more than
suboptimal.
The timer wheel has a timer_wait_running() mechanism for RT, which uses
a per CPU timer-base expiry lock which is held by the expiry code and the
task waiting for the timer function to complete blocks on that lock.
This does not work in the same way for posix CPU timers as there is no
timer base and expiry for process wide timers can run on any task
belonging to that process, but the concept of waiting on an expiry lock
can be used too in a slightly different way:
- Add a mutex to struct posix_cputimers_work. This struct is per task
and used to schedule the expiry task work from the timer interrupt.
- Add a task_struct pointer to struct cpu_timer which is used to store
a the task which runs the expiry. That's filled in when the task
moves the expired timers to the local expiry list. That's not
affecting the size of the k_itimer union as there are bigger union
members already
- Let the task take the expiry mutex around the expiry function
- Let the waiter acquire a task reference with rcu_read_lock() held and
block on the expiry mutex
This avoids spin-waiting on a task which might not even be on a CPU and
works nicely for RT too.
Fixes: ec8f954a40 ("posix-timers: Use a callback for cancel synchronization on PREEMPT_RT")
Reported-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Tested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87zg764ojw.ffs@tglx
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f5eff5591b upstream.
In 2013, commits
2e35afaefe ("PCI: pciehp: Add reset_slot() method")
608c388122 ("PCI: Add slot reset option to pci_dev_reset()")
amended PCIe hotplug to mask Presence Detect Changed events during a
Secondary Bus Reset. The reset thus no longer causes gratuitous slot
bringdown and bringup.
However the commits neglected to serialize reset with code paths reading
slot registers. For instance, a slot bringup due to an earlier hotplug
event may see the Presence Detect State bit cleared during a concurrent
Secondary Bus Reset.
In 2018, commit
5b3f7b7d06 ("PCI: pciehp: Avoid slot access during reset")
retrofitted the missing locking. It introduced a reset_lock which
serializes a Secondary Bus Reset with other parts of pciehp.
Unfortunately the locking turns out to be overzealous: reset_lock is
held for the entire enumeration and de-enumeration of hotplugged devices,
including driver binding and unbinding.
Driver binding and unbinding acquires device_lock while the reset_lock
of the ancestral hotplug port is held. A concurrent Secondary Bus Reset
acquires the ancestral reset_lock while already holding the device_lock.
The asymmetric locking order in the two code paths can lead to AB-BA
deadlocks.
Michael Haeuptle reports such deadlocks on simultaneous hot-removal and
vfio release (the latter implies a Secondary Bus Reset):
pciehp_ist() # down_read(reset_lock)
pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change()
pciehp_disable_slot()
__pciehp_disable_slot()
remove_board()
pciehp_unconfigure_device()
pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device()
pci_stop_bus_device()
pci_stop_dev()
device_release_driver()
device_release_driver_internal()
__device_driver_lock() # device_lock()
SYS_munmap()
vfio_device_fops_release()
vfio_device_group_close()
vfio_device_close()
vfio_device_last_close()
vfio_pci_core_close_device()
vfio_pci_core_disable() # device_lock()
__pci_reset_function_locked()
pci_reset_bus_function()
pci_dev_reset_slot_function()
pci_reset_hotplug_slot()
pciehp_reset_slot() # down_write(reset_lock)
Ian May reports the same deadlock on simultaneous hot-removal and an
AER-induced Secondary Bus Reset:
aer_recover_work_func()
pcie_do_recovery()
aer_root_reset()
pci_bus_error_reset()
pci_slot_reset()
pci_slot_lock() # device_lock()
pci_reset_hotplug_slot()
pciehp_reset_slot() # down_write(reset_lock)
Fix by releasing the reset_lock during driver binding and unbinding,
thereby splitting and shrinking the critical section.
Driver binding and unbinding is protected by the device_lock() and thus
serialized with a Secondary Bus Reset. There's no need to additionally
protect it with the reset_lock. However, pciehp does not bind and
unbind devices directly, but rather invokes PCI core functions which
also perform certain enumeration and de-enumeration steps.
The reset_lock's purpose is to protect slot registers, not enumeration
and de-enumeration of hotplugged devices. That would arguably be the
job of the PCI core, not the PCIe hotplug driver. After all, an
AER-induced Secondary Bus Reset may as well happen during boot-time
enumeration of the PCI hierarchy and there's no locking to prevent that
either.
Exempting *de-enumeration* from the reset_lock is relatively harmless:
A concurrent Secondary Bus Reset may foil config space accesses such as
PME interrupt disablement. But if the device is physically gone, those
accesses are pointless anyway. If the device is physically present and
only logically removed through an Attention Button press or the sysfs
"power" attribute, PME interrupts as well as DMA cannot come through
because pciehp_unconfigure_device() disables INTx and Bus Master bits.
That's still protected by the reset_lock in the present commit.
Exempting *enumeration* from the reset_lock also has limited impact:
The exempted call to pci_bus_add_device() may perform device accesses
through pcibios_bus_add_device() and pci_fixup_device() which are now
no longer protected from a concurrent Secondary Bus Reset. Otherwise
there should be no impact.
In essence, the present commit seeks to fix the AB-BA deadlocks while
still retaining a best-effort reset protection for enumeration and
de-enumeration of hotplugged devices -- until a general solution is
implemented in the PCI core.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/CS1PR8401MB0728FC6FDAB8A35C22BD90EC95F10@CS1PR8401MB0728.NAMPRD84.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/20200615143250.438252-1-ian.may@canonical.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/ce878dab-c0c4-5bd0-a725-9805a075682d@amd.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/ed831249-384a-6d35-0831-70af191e9bce@huawei.com
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215590
Fixes: 5b3f7b7d06 ("PCI: pciehp: Avoid slot access during reset")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fef2b2e9edf245c049a8c5b94743c0f74ff5008a.1681191902.git.lukas@wunner.de
Reported-by: Michael Haeuptle <michael.haeuptle@hpe.com>
Reported-by: Ian May <ian.may@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey2805@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Rahul Kumar <rahul.kumar1@amd.com>
Reported-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Anatoli Antonovitch <Anatoli.Antonovitch@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
Cc: Dan Stein <dstein@hpe.com>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Cc: Alex Michon <amichon@kalrayinc.com>
Cc: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com>
Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Cc: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
