commit c529c3730bd09115684644e26bf01ecbd7e2c2c9 upstream.
A race condition occurs when gs_start_io() calls either gs_start_rx() or
gs_start_tx(), as those functions briefly drop the port_lock for
usb_ep_queue(). This allows gs_close() and gserial_disconnect() to clear
port.tty and port_usb, respectively.
Use the null-safe TTY Port helper function to wake up TTY.
Example
CPU1: CPU2:
gserial_connect() // lock
gs_close() // await lock
gs_start_rx() // unlock
usb_ep_queue()
gs_close() // lock, reset port.tty and unlock
gs_start_rx() // lock
tty_wakeup() // NPE
Fixes: 35f95fd7f2 ("TTY: usb/u_serial, use tty from tty_port")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kuen-Han Tsai <khtsai@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Prashanth K <prashanth.k@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/20240116141801.396398-1-khtsai@google.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250617050844.1848232-2-khtsai@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bd46cece51a36ef088f22ef0416ac13b0a46d5b0 upstream.
Object creation is a careful dance where we must guarantee that the
object is fully constructed before it is visible to other threads, and
GEM buffer objects are no difference.
Final publishing happens by calling drm_gem_handle_create(). After
that the only allowed thing to do is call drm_gem_object_put() because
a concurrent call to the GEM_CLOSE ioctl with a correctly guessed id
(which is trivial since we have a linear allocator) can already tear
down the object again.
Luckily most drivers get this right, the very few exceptions I've
pinged the relevant maintainers for. Unfortunately we also need
drm_gem_handle_create() when creating additional handles for an
already existing object (e.g. GETFB ioctl or the various bo import
ioctl), and hence we cannot have a drm_gem_handle_create_and_put() as
the only exported function to stop these issues from happening.
Now unfortunately the implementation of drm_gem_handle_create() isn't
living up to standards: It does correctly finishe object
initialization at the global level, and hence is safe against a
concurrent tear down. But it also sets up the file-private aspects of
the handle, and that part goes wrong: We fully register the object in
the drm_file.object_idr before calling drm_vma_node_allow() or
obj->funcs->open, which opens up races against concurrent removal of
that handle in drm_gem_handle_delete().
Fix this with the usual two-stage approach of first reserving the
handle id, and then only registering the object after we've completed
the file-private setup.
Jacek reported this with a testcase of concurrently calling GEM_CLOSE
on a freshly-created object (which also destroys the object), but it
should be possible to hit this with just additional handles created
through import or GETFB without completed destroying the underlying
object with the concurrent GEM_CLOSE ioctl calls.
Note that the close-side of this race was fixed in f6cd7daecf ("drm:
Release driver references to handle before making it available
again"), which means a cool 9 years have passed until someone noticed
that we need to make this symmetry or there's still gaps left :-/
Without the 2-stage close approach we'd still have a race, therefore
that's an integral part of this bugfix.
More importantly, this means we can have NULL pointers behind
allocated id in our drm_file.object_idr. We need to check for that
now:
- drm_gem_handle_delete() checks for ERR_OR_NULL already
- drm_gem.c:object_lookup() also chekcs for NULL
- drm_gem_release() should never be called if there's another thread
still existing that could call into an IOCTL that creates a new
handle, so cannot race. For paranoia I added a NULL check to
drm_gem_object_release_handle() though.
- most drivers (etnaviv, i915, msm) are find because they use
idr_find(), which maps both ENOENT and NULL to NULL.
- drivers using idr_for_each_entry() should also be fine, because
idr_get_next does filter out NULL entries and continues the
iteration.
- The same holds for drm_show_memory_stats().
v2: Use drm_WARN_ON (Thomas)
Reported-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <jacek.lawrynowicz@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <jacek.lawrynowicz@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jacek Lawrynowicz <jacek.lawrynowicz@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Cc: Simona Vetter <simona@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Simona Vetter <simona.vetter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Simona Vetter <simona.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20250707151814.603897-1-simona.vetter@ffwll.ch
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8af39ec5cf2be522c8eb43a3d8005ed59e4daaee upstream.
A small race exists between spsc_queue_push and the run-job worker, in
which spsc_queue_push may return not-first while the run-job worker has
already idled due to the job count being zero. If this race occurs, job
scheduling stops, leading to hangs while waiting on the job’s DMA
fences.
Seal this race by incrementing the job count before appending to the
SPSC queue.
This race was observed on a drm-tip 6.16-rc1 build with the Xe driver in
an SVM test case.
Fixes: 1b1f42d8fd ("drm: move amd_gpu_scheduler into common location")
Fixes: 27105db6c6 ("drm/amdgpu: Add SPSC queue to scheduler.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cavitt <jonathan.cavitt@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250613212013.719312-1-matthew.brost@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5307dce878d4126e1b375587318955bd019c3741 upstream.
A GEM handle can be released while the GEM buffer object is attached
to a DRM framebuffer. This leads to the release of the dma-buf backing
the buffer object, if any. [1] Trying to use the framebuffer in further
mode-setting operations leads to a segmentation fault. Most easily
happens with driver that use shadow planes for vmap-ing the dma-buf
during a page flip. An example is shown below.
[ 156.791968] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 156.796830] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2255 at drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c:1527 dma_buf_vmap+0x224/0x430
[...]
[ 156.942028] RIP: 0010:dma_buf_vmap+0x224/0x430
[ 157.043420] Call Trace:
[ 157.045898] <TASK>
[ 157.048030] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1af/0x2c0
[ 157.052436] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1af/0x2c0
[ 157.056836] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1af/0x2c0
[ 157.061253] ? drm_gem_shmem_vmap+0x74/0x710
[ 157.065567] ? dma_buf_vmap+0x224/0x430
[ 157.069446] ? __warn.cold+0x58/0xe4
[ 157.073061] ? dma_buf_vmap+0x224/0x430
[ 157.077111] ? report_bug+0x1dd/0x390
[ 157.080842] ? handle_bug+0x5e/0xa0
[ 157.084389] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x50
[ 157.088291] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 157.092548] ? dma_buf_vmap+0x224/0x430
[ 157.096663] ? dma_resv_get_singleton+0x6d/0x230
[ 157.101341] ? __pfx_dma_buf_vmap+0x10/0x10
[ 157.105588] ? __pfx_dma_resv_get_singleton+0x10/0x10
[ 157.110697] drm_gem_shmem_vmap+0x74/0x710
[ 157.114866] drm_gem_vmap+0xa9/0x1b0
[ 157.118763] drm_gem_vmap_unlocked+0x46/0xa0
[ 157.123086] drm_gem_fb_vmap+0xab/0x300
[ 157.126979] drm_atomic_helper_prepare_planes.part.0+0x487/0xb10
[ 157.133032] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x19d/0x880
[ 157.137701] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x13d/0x2e0
[ 157.142671] ? drm_atomic_nonblocking_commit+0xa0/0x180
[ 157.147988] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x766/0xe40
[...]
[ 157.346424] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Acquiring GEM handles for the framebuffer's GEM buffer objects prevents
this from happening. The framebuffer's cleanup later puts the handle
references.
Commit 1a148af06000 ("drm/gem-shmem: Use dma_buf from GEM object
instance") triggers the segmentation fault easily by using the dma-buf
field more widely. The underlying issue with reference counting has
been present before.
v2:
- acquire the handle instead of the BO (Christian)
- fix comment style (Christian)
- drop the Fixes tag (Christian)
- rename err_ gotos
- add missing Link tag
Suggested-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15/source/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c#L241 # [1]
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: Anusha Srivatsa <asrivats@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: "Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linaro-mm-sig@lists.linaro.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250630084001.293053-1-tzimmermann@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 737bb912ebbe4571195c56eba557c4d7315b26fb upstream.
This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability
for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in
response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can
be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks.
This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU
by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard
MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if
the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If
equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt.
This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that
uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses
are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e.,
when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs
was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and
12-byte Mesh Address Extension field.
It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh
networks keep being detected and prevented.
Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being
implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the
following IEEE 802.11 presentation:
https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdfhttps://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-protection.docx
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616004635.224344-1-Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 93712205ce2f1fb047739494c0399a26ea4f0890 upstream.
On some platforms, the UFS-reset pin has no interrupt logic in TLMM but
is nevertheless registered as a GPIO in the kernel. This enables the
user-space to trigger a BUG() in the pinctrl-msm driver by running, for
example: `gpiomon -c 0 113` on RB2.
The exact culprit is requesting pins whose intr_detection_width setting
is not 1 or 2 for interrupts. This hits a BUG() in
msm_gpio_irq_set_type(). Potentially crashing the kernel due to an
invalid request from user-space is not optimal, so let's go through the
pins and mark those that would fail the check as invalid for the irq chip
as we should not even register them as available irqs.
This function can be extended if we determine that there are more
corner-cases like this.
Fixes: f365be0925 ("pinctrl: Add Qualcomm TLMM driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250612091448.41546-1-brgl@bgdev.pl
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c17fb542dbd1db745c9feac15617056506dd7195 upstream.
The commit message of commit 6ec1f0239485 ("md/md-bitmap: fix stats
collection for external bitmaps") states:
Remove the external bitmap check as the statistics should be
available regardless of bitmap storage location.
Return -EINVAL only for invalid bitmap with no storage (neither in
superblock nor in external file).
But, the code does not adhere to the above, as it does only check for
a valid super-block for "internal" bitmaps. Hence, we observe:
Oops: GPF, probably for non-canonical address 0x1cd66f1f40000028
RIP: 0010:bitmap_get_stats+0x45/0xd0
Call Trace:
seq_read_iter+0x2b9/0x46a
seq_read+0x12f/0x180
proc_reg_read+0x57/0xb0
vfs_read+0xf6/0x380
ksys_read+0x6d/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x8c/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
We fix this by checking the existence of a super-block for both the
internal and external case.
Fixes: 6ec1f0239485 ("md/md-bitmap: fix stats collection for external bitmaps")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Gerald Gibson <gerald.gibson@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-raid/20250702091035.2061312-1-haakon.bugge@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4e914ef063de40397e25a025c70d9737a9e45a8c upstream.
Use addrconf_add_dev() instead of ipv6_find_idev() in
addrconf_gre_config() so that we don't just get the inet6_dev, but also
install the default ff00::/8 multicast route.
Before commit 3e6a0243ff00 ("gre: Fix again IPv6 link-local address
generation."), the multicast route was created at the end of the
function by addrconf_add_mroute(). But this code path is now only taken
in one particular case (gre devices not bound to a local IP address and
in EUI64 mode). For all other cases, the function exits early and
addrconf_add_mroute() is not called anymore.
Using addrconf_add_dev() instead of ipv6_find_idev() in
addrconf_gre_config(), fixes the problem as it will create the default
multicast route for all gre devices. This also brings
addrconf_gre_config() a bit closer to the normal netdevice IPv6
configuration code (addrconf_dev_config()).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3e6a0243ff00 ("gre: Fix again IPv6 link-local address generation.")
Reported-by: Aiden Yang <ling@moedove.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANR=AhRM7YHHXVxJ4DmrTNMeuEOY87K2mLmo9KMed1JMr20p6g@mail.gmail.com/
Reviewed-by: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
Tested-by: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/027a923dcb550ad115e6d93ee8bb7d310378bd01.1752070620.git.gnault@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ecf371f8b02d5e31b9aa1da7f159f1b2107bdb01 upstream.
Reject migration of SEV{-ES} state if either the source or destination VM
is actively creating a vCPU, i.e. if kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() is in the
section between incrementing created_vcpus and online_vcpus. The bulk of
vCPU creation runs _outside_ of kvm->lock to allow creating multiple vCPUs
in parallel, and so sev_info.es_active can get toggled from false=>true in
the destination VM after (or during) svm_vcpu_create(), resulting in an
SEV{-ES} VM effectively having a non-SEV{-ES} vCPU.
The issue manifests most visibly as a crash when trying to free a vCPU's
NULL VMSA page in an SEV-ES VM, but any number of things can go wrong.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffebde00000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 227 UID: 0 PID: 64063 Comm: syz.5.60023 Tainted: G U O 6.15.0-smp-DEV #2 NONE
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.52.0-0 10/28/2024
RIP: 0010:constant_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:206 [inline]
RIP: 0010:arch_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:238 [inline]
RIP: 0010:_test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:142 [inline]
RIP: 0010:PageHead include/linux/page-flags.h:866 [inline]
RIP: 0010:___free_pages+0x3e/0x120 mm/page_alloc.c:5067
Code: <49> f7 06 40 00 00 00 75 05 45 31 ff eb 0c 66 90 4c 89 f0 4c 39 f0
RSP: 0018:ffff8984551978d0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000777f80000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff918aeb98
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffebde00000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffebde00000007 R09: 1ffffd7bc0000000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff97bc0000001 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffff8983e19751a8 R14: ffffebde00000000 R15: 1ffffd7bc0000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89ee661d3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffebde00000000 CR3: 000000793ceaa000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000b5f DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
sev_free_vcpu+0x413/0x630 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:3169
svm_vcpu_free+0x13a/0x2a0 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1515
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x6a/0x1d0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12396
kvm_vcpu_destroy virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:470 [inline]
kvm_destroy_vcpus+0xd1/0x300 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:490
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x636/0x820 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12895
kvm_put_kvm+0xb8e/0xfb0 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1310
kvm_vm_release+0x48/0x60 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1369
__fput+0x3e4/0x9e0 fs/file_table.c:465
task_work_run+0x1a9/0x220 kernel/task_work.c:227
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline]
do_exit+0x7f0/0x25b0 kernel/exit.c:953
do_group_exit+0x203/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1102
get_signal+0x1357/0x1480 kernel/signal.c:3034
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x40/0x690 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline]
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x67/0xb0 kernel/entry/common.c:218
do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x150 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f87a898e969
</TASK>
Modules linked in: gq(O)
gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03
CR2: ffffebde00000000
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Deliberately don't check for a NULL VMSA when freeing the vCPU, as crashing
the host is likely desirable due to the VMSA being consumed by hardware.
E.g. if KVM manages to allow VMRUN on the vCPU, hardware may read/write a
bogus VMSA page. Accessing PFN 0 is "fine"-ish now that it's sequestered
away thanks to L1TF, but panicking in this scenario is preferable to
potentially running with corrupted state.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Fixes: 0b020f5af0 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV-ES intra host migration")
Fixes: b56639318b ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Houghton <jthoughton@google.com>
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: James Houghton <jthoughton@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250602224459.41505-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a7f4dff21fd744d08fa956c243d2b1795f23cbf7 upstream.
To avoid imposing an ordering constraint on userspace, allow 'invalid'
event channel targets to be configured in the IRQ routing table.
This is the same as accepting interrupts targeted at vCPUs which don't
exist yet, which is already the case for both Xen event channels *and*
for MSIs (which don't do any filtering of permitted APIC ID targets at
all).
If userspace actually *triggers* an IRQ with an invalid target, that
will fail cleanly, as kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast() also does the same range
check.
If KVM enforced that the IRQ target must be valid at the time it is
*configured*, that would force userspace to create all vCPUs and do
various other parts of setup (in this case, setting the Xen long_mode)
before restoring the IRQ table.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e489252745ac4b53f1f7f50570b03fb416aa2065.camel@infradead.org
[sean: massage comment]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 30ad231a5029bfa16e46ce868497b1a5cdd3c24d upstream.
CMCI banks are not cleared during shutdown on Intel CPUs. As a side effect,
when a kexec is performed, CPUs coming back online are unable to
rediscover/claim these occupied banks which breaks MCE reporting.
Clear the CPU ownership during shutdown via cmci_clear() so the banks can
be reclaimed and MCE reporting will become functional once more.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Reported-by: Aijay Adams <aijay@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: JP Kobryn <inwardvessel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250627174935.95194-1-inwardvessel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4c113a5b28bfd589e2010b5fc8867578b0135ed7 upstream.
Currently, the MCE subsystem sysfs interface will be removed if the
thresholding sysfs interface fails to be created. A common failure is due to
new MCA bank types that are not recognized and don't have a short name set.
The MCA thresholding feature is optional and should not break the common MCE
sysfs interface. Also, new MCA bank types are occasionally introduced, and
updates will be needed to recognize them. But likewise, this should not break
the common sysfs interface.
Keep the MCE sysfs interface regardless of the status of the thresholding
sysfs interface.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250624-wip-mca-updates-v4-1-236dd74f645f@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5f6e3b720694ad771911f637a51930f511427ce1 upstream.
The MCA threshold limit must be reset after servicing the interrupt.
Currently, the restart function doesn't have an explicit check for this. It
makes some assumptions based on the current limit and what's in the registers.
These assumptions don't always hold, so the limit won't be reset in some
cases.
Make the reset condition explicit. Either an interrupt/overflow has occurred
or the bank is being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250624-wip-mca-updates-v4-4-236dd74f645f@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d66e1e90b16055d2f0ee76e5384e3f119c3c2773 upstream.
Ensure that sysfs init doesn't fail for new/unrecognized bank types or if
a bank has additional blocks available.
Most MCA banks have a single thresholding block, so the block takes the same
name as the bank.
Unified Memory Controllers (UMCs) are a special case where there are two
blocks and each has a unique name.
However, the microarchitecture allows for five blocks. Any new MCA bank types
with more than one block will be missing names for the extra blocks. The MCE
sysfs will fail to initialize in this case.
Fixes: 87a6d4091b ("x86/mce/AMD: Update sysfs bank names for SMCA systems")
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250624-wip-mca-updates-v4-3-236dd74f645f@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fa332f5dc6fc662ad7d3200048772c96b861cf6b upstream.
The "intf" list iterator is an invalid pointer if the correct
"intf->intf_num" is not found. Calling atomic_dec(&intf->nr_users) on
and invalid pointer will lead to memory corruption.
We don't really need to call atomic_dec() if we haven't called
atomic_add_return() so update the if (intf->in_shutdown) path as well.
Fixes: 8e76741c3d ("ipmi: Add a limit on the number of users that may use IPMI")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <aBjMZ8RYrOt6NOgi@stanley.mountain>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <corey@minyard.net>
[ - Dropped change to the `if (intf->in_shutdown)` block since that logic
doesn't exist yet.
- Modified out_unlock to release the srcu lock instead of the mutex
since we don't have the mutex here yet. ]
Signed-off-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 89fb8acc38852116d38d721ad394aad7f2871670 upstream.
Currently, for controllers with extended advertising, the advertising
data is set in the asynchronous response handler for extended
adverstising params. As most advertising settings are performed in a
synchronous context, the (asynchronous) setting of the advertising data
is done too late (after enabling the advertising).
Move setting of adverstising data from asynchronous response handler
into synchronous context to fix ordering of HCI commands.
Signed-off-by: Christian Eggers <ceggers@arri.de>
Fixes: a0fb3726ba ("Bluetooth: Use Set ext adv/scan rsp data if controller supports")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/20250626115209.17839-1-ceggers@arri.de/
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
[ This patch deviates from the upstream version because 3 functions in
hci_sync.c (hci_set_ext_adv_data_sync, hci_set_adv_data_sync and
hci_update_adv_data_sync) had to be moved up within the file. The
content of these functions differs between 6.6 and newer kernels. ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 440cf77625e300e683ca0edc39fbc4b6f3175feb upstream.
On recent Linux distros like Ubuntu Noble and Debian Bookworm, the
'pkg-config-aarch64-linux-gnu' package is missing. As a result, the
aarch64-linux-gnu-pkg-config command is not available, which causes
build failures.
When a build passes the environment variables PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR or
PKG_CONFIG_PATH, like a user uses make command or a build system
(like Yocto, Buildroot, etc) prepares the variables and passes to the
Perf's Makefile, the commit keeps these variables for package
configuration. Otherwise, this commit sets the PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR
variable to use the Multiarch libs for the cross compilation.
Signed-off-by: Leo Yan <leo.yan@arm.com>
Tested-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: amadio@gentoo.org
Cc: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240717082211.524826-2-leo.yan@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexis Lothoré <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 69e4186773c6445b258fb45b6e1df18df831ec45 ]
When userspace is using AF_RXRPC to provide a server, it has to preallocate
incoming calls and assign to them call IDs that will be used to thread
related recvmsg() and sendmsg() together. The preallocated call IDs will
automatically be attached to calls as they come in until the pool is empty.
To the kernel, the call IDs are just arbitrary numbers, but userspace can
use the call ID to hold a pointer to prepared structs. In any case, the
user isn't permitted to create two calls with the same call ID (call IDs
become available again when the call ends) and EBADSLT should result from
sendmsg() if an attempt is made to preallocate a call with an in-use call
ID.
However, the cleanup in the error handling will trigger both assertions in
rxrpc_cleanup_call() because the call isn't marked complete and isn't
marked as having been released.
Fix this by setting the call state in rxrpc_service_prealloc_one() and then
marking it as being released before calling the cleanup function.
Fixes: 00e907127e ("rxrpc: Preallocate peers, conns and calls for incoming service requests")
Reported-by: Junvyyang, Tencent Zhuque Lab <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: LePremierHomme <kwqcheii@proton.me>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250708211506.2699012-2-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 62dba28275a9a3104d4e33595c7b3328d4032d8d ]
ioctl(ATMARP_MKIP) allocates struct clip_vcc and set it to
vcc->user_back.
The code assumes that vcc_destroy_socket() passes NULL skb
to vcc->push() when the socket is close()d, and then clip_push()
frees clip_vcc.
However, ioctl(ATMARPD_CTRL) sets NULL to vcc->push() in
atm_init_atmarp(), resulting in memory leak.
Let's serialise two ioctl() by lock_sock() and check vcc->push()
in atm_init_atmarp() to prevent memleak.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250704062416.1613927-3-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 706cc36477139c1616a9b2b96610a8bb520b7119 ]
atmarpd is protected by RTNL since commit f3a0592b37 ("[ATM]: clip
causes unregister hang").
However, it is not enough because to_atmarpd() is called without RTNL,
especially clip_neigh_solicit() / neigh_ops->solicit() is unsleepable.
Also, there is no RTNL dependency around atmarpd.
Let's use a private mutex and RCU to protect access to atmarpd in
to_atmarpd().
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250704062416.1613927-2-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9dfe110cc0f6ef42af8e81ce52aef34a647d0b8a ]
Force a fixed MDI-X mode when auto-negotiation is disabled to prevent
link instability.
When forcing the link speed and duplex on a LAN9500 PHY (e.g., with
`ethtool -s eth0 autoneg off ...`) while leaving MDI-X control in auto
mode, the PHY fails to establish a stable link. This occurs because the
PHY's Auto-MDIX algorithm is not designed to operate when
auto-negotiation is disabled. In this state, the PHY continuously
toggles the TX/RX signal pairs, which prevents the link partner from
synchronizing.
This patch resolves the issue by detecting when auto-negotiation is
disabled. If the MDI-X control mode is set to 'auto', the driver now
forces a specific, stable mode (ETH_TP_MDI) to prevent the pair
toggling. This choice of a fixed MDI mode mirrors the behavior the
hardware would exhibit if the AUTOMDIX_EN strap were configured for a
fixed MDI connection.
Fixes: 05b35e7eb9 ("smsc95xx: add phylib support")
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Andre Edich <andre.edich@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250703114941.3243890-4-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0713e55533c88a20edb53eea6517dc56786a0078 ]
Override the hardware strap configuration for MDI-X mode to ensure a
predictable initial state for the driver. The initial mode of the LAN87xx
PHY is determined by the AUTOMDIX_EN strap pin, but the driver has no
documented way to read its latched status.
This unpredictability means the driver cannot know if the PHY has
initialized with Auto-MDIX enabled or disabled, preventing it from
providing a reliable interface to the user.
This patch introduces a `config_init` hook that forces the PHY into a
known state by explicitly enabling Auto-MDIX.
Fixes: 05b35e7eb9 ("smsc95xx: add phylib support")
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Andre Edich <andre.edich@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250703114941.3243890-3-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a141af8eb2272ab0f677a7f2653874840bc9b214 ]
Correct the Auto-MDIX configuration to ensure userspace settings are
respected when the feature is disabled by the AUTOMDIX_EN hardware strap.
The LAN9500 PHY allows its default MDI-X mode to be configured via a
hardware strap. If this strap sets the default to "MDI-X off", the
driver was previously unable to enable Auto-MDIX from userspace.
When handling the ETH_TP_MDI_AUTO case, the driver would set the
SPECIAL_CTRL_STS_AMDIX_ENABLE_ bit but neglected to set the required
SPECIAL_CTRL_STS_OVRRD_AMDIX_ bit. Without the override flag, the PHY
falls back to its hardware strap default, ignoring the software request.
This patch corrects the behavior by also setting the override bit when
enabling Auto-MDIX. This ensures that the userspace configuration takes
precedence over the hardware strap, allowing Auto-MDIX to be enabled
correctly in all scenarios.
Fixes: 05b35e7eb9 ("smsc95xx: add phylib support")
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Andre Edich <andre.edich@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxime Chevallier <maxime.chevallier@bootlin.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250703114941.3243890-2-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 78b7920a03351a8402de2f81914c1d2e2bdf24b7 ]
According to the Synopsys Controller IP XGMAC-10G Ethernet MAC Databook
v3.30a (section 2.7.2), when the INTM bit in the DMA_Mode register is set
to 2, the sbd_perch_tx_intr_o[] and sbd_perch_rx_intr_o[] signals operate
in level-triggered mode. However, in this configuration, the DMA does not
assert the XGMAC_NIS status bit for Rx or Tx interrupt events.
This creates a functional regression where the condition
if (likely(intr_status & XGMAC_NIS)) in dwxgmac2_dma_interrupt() will
never evaluate to true, preventing proper interrupt handling for
level-triggered mode. The hardware specification explicitly states that
"The DMA does not assert the NIS status bit for the Rx or Tx interrupt
events" (Synopsys DWC_XGMAC2 Databook v3.30a, sec. 2.7.2).
The fix ensures correct handling of both edge and level-triggered
interrupts while maintaining backward compatibility with existing
configurations. It has been tested on the hardware device (not publicly
available), and it can properly trigger the RX and TX interrupt handling
in both the INTM=0 and INTM=2 configurations.
Fixes: d6ddfacd95 ("net: stmmac: Add DMA related callbacks for XGMAC2")
Tested-by: EricChan <chenchuangyu@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: EricChan <chenchuangyu@xiaomi.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250703020449.105730-1-chenchuangyu@xiaomi.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 687aa0c5581b8d4aa87fd92973e4ee576b550cdf ]
Transport assignment may race with module unload. Protect new_transport
from becoming a stale pointer.
This also takes care of an insecure call in vsock_use_local_transport();
add a lockdep assert.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff8056000
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
RIP: 0010:vsock_assign_transport+0x366/0x600
Call Trace:
vsock_connect+0x59c/0xc40
__sys_connect+0xe8/0x100
__x64_sys_connect+0x6e/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
Fixes: c0cfa2d8a7 ("vsock: add multi-transports support")
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250703-vsock-transports-toctou-v4-2-98f0eb530747@rbox.co
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d3a5f2871adc0c61c61869f37f3e697d97f03d8c ]
Syzkaller reported a bug [1] where sk->sk_forward_alloc can overflow.
When we send data, if an skb exists at the tail of the write queue, the
kernel will attempt to append the new data to that skb. However, the code
that checks for available space in the skb is flawed:
'''
copy = size_goal - skb->len
'''
The types of the variables involved are:
'''
copy: ssize_t (s64 on 64-bit systems)
size_goal: int
skb->len: unsigned int
'''
Due to C's type promotion rules, the signed size_goal is converted to an
unsigned int to match skb->len before the subtraction. The result is an
unsigned int.
When this unsigned int result is then assigned to the s64 copy variable,
it is zero-extended, preserving its non-negative value. Consequently, copy
is always >= 0.
Assume we are sending 2GB of data and size_goal has been adjusted to a
value smaller than skb->len. The subtraction will result in copy holding a
very large positive integer. In the subsequent logic, this large value is
used to update sk->sk_forward_alloc, which can easily cause it to overflow.
The syzkaller reproducer uses TCP_REPAIR to reliably create this
condition. However, this can also occur in real-world scenarios. The
tcp_bound_to_half_wnd() function can also reduce size_goal to a small
value. This would cause the subsequent tcp_wmem_schedule() to set
sk->sk_forward_alloc to a value close to INT_MAX. Further memory
allocation requests would then cause sk_forward_alloc to wrap around and
become negative.
[1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=de6565462ab540f50e47
Reported-by: syzbot+de6565462ab540f50e47@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 270a1c3de4 ("tcp: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250707054112.101081-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 667eeab4999e981c96b447a4df5f20bdf5c26f13 ]
syzbot reported a null-ptr-deref in tipc_conn_close() during netns
dismantle. [0]
tipc_topsrv_stop() iterates tipc_net(net)->topsrv->conn_idr and calls
tipc_conn_close() for each tipc_conn.
The problem is that tipc_conn_close() is called after releasing the
IDR lock.
At the same time, there might be tipc_conn_recv_work() running and it
could call tipc_conn_close() for the same tipc_conn and release its
last ->kref.
Once we release the IDR lock in tipc_topsrv_stop(), there is no
guarantee that the tipc_conn is alive.
Let's hold the ref before releasing the lock and put the ref after
tipc_conn_close() in tipc_topsrv_stop().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tipc_conn_close+0x122/0x140 net/tipc/topsrv.c:165
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888099305a08 by task kworker/u4:3/435
CPU: 0 PID: 435 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 4.19.204-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1fc/0x2ef lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.cold+0x54/0x219 mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error.cold+0x8a/0x1b9 mm/kasan/report.c:354
kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:412 [inline]
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x88/0x90 mm/kasan/report.c:433
tipc_conn_close+0x122/0x140 net/tipc/topsrv.c:165
tipc_topsrv_stop net/tipc/topsrv.c:701 [inline]
tipc_topsrv_exit_net+0x27b/0x5c0 net/tipc/topsrv.c:722
ops_exit_list+0xa5/0x150 net/core/net_namespace.c:153
cleanup_net+0x3b4/0x8b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:553
process_one_work+0x864/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x64c/0x1130 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x33f/0x460 kernel/kthread.c:259
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415
Allocated by task 23:
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12f/0x380 mm/slab.c:3625
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:515 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:709 [inline]
tipc_conn_alloc+0x43/0x4f0 net/tipc/topsrv.c:192
tipc_topsrv_accept+0x1b5/0x280 net/tipc/topsrv.c:470
process_one_work+0x864/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x64c/0x1130 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x33f/0x460 kernel/kthread.c:259
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415
Freed by task 23:
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3503 [inline]
kfree+0xcc/0x210 mm/slab.c:3822
tipc_conn_kref_release net/tipc/topsrv.c:150 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:70 [inline]
conn_put+0x2cd/0x3a0 net/tipc/topsrv.c:155
process_one_work+0x864/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x64c/0x1130 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x33f/0x460 kernel/kthread.c:259
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888099305a00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of
512-byte region [ffff888099305a00, ffff888099305c00)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea000264c140 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88813bff0940 index:0x0
flags: 0xfff00000000100(slab)
raw: 00fff00000000100 ffffea00028b6b88 ffffea0002cd2b08 ffff88813bff0940
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff888099305000 0000000100000006 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888099305900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888099305980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888099305a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888099305a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888099305b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: c5fa7b3cf3 ("tipc: introduce new TIPC server infrastructure")
Reported-by: syzbot+d333febcf8f4bc5f6110@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=27169a847a70550d17be
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen@est.tech>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250702014350.692213-1-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1e3b66e326015f77bc4b36976bebeedc2ac0f588 ]
From commit 634f1a7110 ("vsock: support sockmap"), `struct proto
vsock_proto`, defined in af_vsock.c, is not static anymore, since it's
used by vsock_bpf.c.
If CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL is not defined, `make C=2` will print a warning:
$ make O=build C=2 W=1 net/vmw_vsock/
...
CC [M] net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.o
CHECK ../net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
../net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c:123:14: warning: symbol 'vsock_proto' was not declared. Should it be static?
Declare `vsock_proto` regardless of CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL, since it's defined
in af_vsock.c, which is built regardless of CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL.
Fixes: 634f1a7110 ("vsock: support sockmap")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250703112329.28365-1-sgarzare@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ae8f160e7eb24240a2a79fc4c815c6a0d4ee16cc ]
Netlink has this pattern in some places
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) > sk->sk_rcvbuf)
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &sk->sk_rmem_alloc);
, which has the same problem fixed by commit 5a465a0da13e ("udp:
Fix multiple wraparounds of sk->sk_rmem_alloc.").
For example, if we set INT_MAX to SO_RCVBUFFORCE, the condition
is always false as the two operands are of int.
Then, a single socket can eat as many skb as possible until OOM
happens, and we can see multiple wraparounds of sk->sk_rmem_alloc.
Let's fix it by using atomic_add_return() and comparing the two
variables as unsigned int.
Before:
[root@fedora ~]# ss -f netlink
Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port Peer Address:Port
-1668710080 0 rtnl:nl_wraparound/293 *
After:
[root@fedora ~]# ss -f netlink
Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port Peer Address:Port
2147483072 0 rtnl:nl_wraparound/290 *
^
`--- INT_MAX - 576
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/cover.1750285100.git.jbaron@akamai.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250704054824.1580222-1-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b969f9614885c20f903e1d1f9445611daf161d6d ]
There's one case where ->d_compare() can be called for an in-lookup
dentry; usually that's nothing special from ->d_compare() point of
view, but... proc_sys_compare() is weird.
The thing is, /proc/sys subdirectories can look differently for
different processes. Up to and including having the same name
resolve to different dentries - all of them hashed.
The way it's done is ->d_compare() refusing to admit a match unless
this dentry is supposed to be visible to this caller. The information
needed to discriminate between them is stored in inode; it is set
during proc_sys_lookup() and until it's done d_splice_alias() we really
can't tell who should that dentry be visible for.
Normally there's no negative dentries in /proc/sys; we can run into
a dying dentry in RCU dcache lookup, but those can be safely rejected.
However, ->d_compare() is also called for in-lookup dentries, before
they get positive - or hashed, for that matter. In case of match
we will wait until dentry leaves in-lookup state and repeat ->d_compare()
afterwards. In other words, the right behaviour is to treat the
name match as sufficient for in-lookup dentries; if dentry is not
for us, we'll see that when we recheck once proc_sys_lookup() is
done with it.
While we are at it, fix the misspelled READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE there.
Fixes: d9171b9345 ("parallel lookups machinery, part 4 (and last)")
Reported-by: NeilBrown <neilb@brown.name>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c7349772c268ec3c91d83cbfbbcf63f1bd7c256c ]
Upon receiving HCI_EVT_LE_BIG_SYNC_ESTABLISHED with status 0x00
(success) the corresponding BIS hci_conn state shall be set to
BT_CONNECTED otherwise they will be left with BT_OPEN which is invalid
at that point, also create the debugfs and sysfs entries following the
same logic as the likes of Broadcast Source BIS and CIS connections.
Fixes: f777d88278 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Notify user space about failed bis connections")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ef9675b0ef030d135413e8638989f3a7d1f3217a ]
As the code comments on hci_setup_ext_adv_instance_sync suggests the
advertising instance needs to be disabled in order to update its
parameters, but it was wrongly checking that !adv->pending.
Fixes: cba6b75871 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Make use of hci_cmd_sync_queue set 2")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3b3312f28ee2d9c386602f8521e419cfc69f4823 ]
Return an error from driver probe if the DEVID read from the chip is not
one supported by this driver.
In cs35l56_hw_init() there is a check for valid DEVID, but the invalid
case was returning the value of ret. At this point in the code ret == 0
so the caller would think that cs35l56_hw_init() was successful.
Signed-off-by: Richard Fitzgerald <rf@opensource.cirrus.com>
Fixes: 84851aa055 ("ASoC: cs35l56: Move part of cs35l56_init() to shared library")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250703102521.54204-1-rf@opensource.cirrus.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ba677dbe77af5ffe6204e0f3f547f3ba059c6302 ]
Jann reports that uprobes can be used destructively when used in the
middle of an instruction. The kernel only verifies there is a valid
instruction at the requested offset, but due to variable instruction
length cannot determine if this is an instruction as seen by the
intended execution stream.
Additionally, Mark Rutland notes that on architectures that mix data
in the text segment (like arm64), a similar things can be done if the
data word is 'mistaken' for an instruction.
As such, require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for uprobes.
Fixes: c9e0924e5c ("perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAG48ez1n4520sq0XrWYDHKiKxE_+WCfAK+qt9qkY4ZiBGmL-5g@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7b4c5a37544ba22c6ebe72c0d4ea56c953459fa5 ]
commit 3172fb986666 ("perf/core: Fix WARN in perf_cgroup_switch()") try to
fix a concurrency problem between perf_cgroup_switch and
perf_cgroup_event_disable. But it does not to move the WARN_ON_ONCE into
lock-protected region, so the warning is still be triggered.
Fixes: 3172fb986666 ("perf/core: Fix WARN in perf_cgroup_switch()")
Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250626135403.2454105-1-luogengkun@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit b846350aa272de99bf6fecfa6b08e64ebfb13173 upstream.
If there's support for another console device (such as a TTY serial),
the kernel occasionally panics during boot. The panic message and a
relevant snippet of the call stack is as follows:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000000
Call trace:
drm_crtc_handle_vblank+0x10/0x30 (P)
decon_irq_handler+0x88/0xb4
[...]
Otherwise, the panics don't happen. This indicates that it's some sort
of race condition.
Add a check to validate if the drm device can handle vblanks before
calling drm_crtc_handle_vblank() to avoid this.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 96976c3d9a ("drm/exynos: Add DECON driver")
Signed-off-by: Kaustabh Chakraborty <kauschluss@disroot.org>
Signed-off-by: Inki Dae <inki.dae@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8c2e52ebbe885c7eeaabd3b7ddcdc1246fc400d2 upstream.
Jann Horn points out that epoll is decrementing the ep refcount and then
doing a
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
afterwards. That's very wrong, because it can lead to a use-after-free.
That pattern is actually fine for the very last reference, because the
code in question will delay the actual call to "ep_free(ep)" until after
it has unlocked the mutex.
But it's wrong for the much subtler "next to last" case when somebody
*else* may also be dropping their reference and free the ep while we're
still using the mutex.
Note that this is true even if that other user is also using the same ep
mutex: mutexes, unlike spinlocks, can not be used for object ownership,
even if they guarantee mutual exclusion.
A mutex "unlock" operation is not atomic, and as one user is still
accessing the mutex as part of unlocking it, another user can come in
and get the now released mutex and free the data structure while the
first user is still cleaning up.
See our mutex documentation in Documentation/locking/mutex-design.rst,
in particular the section [1] about semantics:
"mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure even after it has
internally released the lock already - so it's not safe for
another context to acquire the mutex and assume that the
mutex_unlock() context is not using the structure anymore"
So if we drop our ep ref before the mutex unlock, but we weren't the
last one, we may then unlock the mutex, another user comes in, drops
_their_ reference and releases the 'ep' as it now has no users - all
while the mutex_unlock() is still accessing it.
Fix this by simply moving the ep refcount dropping to outside the mutex:
the refcount itself is atomic, and doesn't need mutex protection (that's
the whole _point_ of refcounts: unlike mutexes, they are inherently
about object lifetimes).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://docs.kernel.org/locking/mutex-design.html#semantics [1]
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In order to simplify backports, I resorted to an older version of the
microcode revision checking which didn't pull in the whole struct
x86_cpu_id matching machinery.
My simpler method, however, forgot to add the extended CPU model to the
patch revision, which lead to mismatches when determining whether TSA
mitigation support is present.
So add that forgotten extended model.
This is a stable-only fix and the preference is to do it this way
because it is a lot simpler. Also, the Fixes: tag below points to the
respective stable patch.
Fixes: 90293047df ("x86/bugs: Add a Transient Scheduler Attacks mitigation")
Reported-by: Thomas Voegtle <tv@lio96.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Thomas Voegtle <tv@lio96.de>
Message-ID: <04ea0a8e-edb0-c59e-ce21-5f3d5d167af3@lio96.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
