commit bddac7c1e0 upstream.
This reverts commit aa6f8dcbab.
It turns out this breaks at least the ath9k wireless driver, and
possibly others.
What the ath9k driver does on packet receive is to set up the DMA
transfer with:
int ath_rx_init(..)
..
bf->bf_buf_addr = dma_map_single(sc->dev, skb->data,
common->rx_bufsize,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
and then the receive logic (through ath_rx_tasklet()) will fetch
incoming packets
static bool ath_edma_get_buffers(..)
..
dma_sync_single_for_cpu(sc->dev, bf->bf_buf_addr,
common->rx_bufsize, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
ret = ath9k_hw_process_rxdesc_edma(ah, rs, skb->data);
if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
/*let device gain the buffer again*/
dma_sync_single_for_device(sc->dev, bf->bf_buf_addr,
common->rx_bufsize, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
return false;
}
and it's worth noting how that first DMA sync:
dma_sync_single_for_cpu(..DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
is there to make sure the CPU can read the DMA buffer (possibly by
copying it from the bounce buffer area, or by doing some cache flush).
The iommu correctly turns that into a "copy from bounce bufer" so that
the driver can look at the state of the packets.
In the meantime, the device may continue to write to the DMA buffer, but
we at least have a snapshot of the state due to that first DMA sync.
But that _second_ DMA sync:
dma_sync_single_for_device(..DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
is telling the DMA mapping that the CPU wasn't interested in the area
because the packet wasn't there. In the case of a DMA bounce buffer,
that is a no-op.
Note how it's not a sync for the CPU (the "for_device()" part), and it's
not a sync for data written by the CPU (the "DMA_FROM_DEVICE" part).
Or rather, it _should_ be a no-op. That's what commit aa6f8dcbab
broke: it made the code bounce the buffer unconditionally, and changed
the DMA_FROM_DEVICE to just unconditionally and illogically be
DMA_TO_DEVICE.
[ Side note: purely within the confines of the swiotlb driver it wasn't
entirely illogical: The reason it did that odd DMA_FROM_DEVICE ->
DMA_TO_DEVICE conversion thing is because inside the swiotlb driver,
it uses just a swiotlb_bounce() helper that doesn't care about the
whole distinction of who the sync is for - only which direction to
bounce.
So it took the "sync for device" to mean that the CPU must have been
the one writing, and thought it meant DMA_TO_DEVICE. ]
Also note how the commentary in that commit was wrong, probably due to
that whole confusion, claiming that the commit makes the swiotlb code
"bounce unconditionally (that is, also
when dir == DMA_TO_DEVICE) in order do avoid synchronising back stale
data from the swiotlb buffer"
which is nonsensical for two reasons:
- that "also when dir == DMA_TO_DEVICE" is nonsensical, as that was
exactly when it always did - and should do - the bounce.
- since this is a sync for the device (not for the CPU), we're clearly
fundamentally not coping back stale data from the bounce buffers at
all, because we'd be copying *to* the bounce buffers.
So that commit was just very confused. It confused the direction of the
synchronization (to the device, not the cpu) with the direction of the
DMA (from the device).
Reported-and-bisected-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Reported-by: Olha Cherevyk <olha.cherevyk@gmail.com>
Cc: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk>
Cc: Maxime Bizon <mbizon@freebox.fr>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8926d88ced upstream.
The get_user()/put_user() functions are meant to check for
access_ok(), while the __get_user()/__put_user() functions
don't.
This broke in 4.19 for nds32, when it gained an extraneous
check in __get_user(), but lost the check it needs in
__put_user().
Fixes: 487913ab18 ("nds32: Extract the checking and getting pointer to a macro")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org @ v4.19+
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 26509034be upstream.
While most m68k platforms use separate address spaces for user
and kernel space, at least coldfire does not, and the other
ones have a TASK_SIZE that is less than the entire 4GB address
range.
Using the default implementation of __access_ok() stops coldfire
user space from trivially accessing kernel memory.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fb5abce6b2 upstream.
As part of the series conversion to remove nested TPM operations:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20190205224723.19671-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com/
exposure of the chip->tpm_mutex was removed from much of the upper
level code. In this conversion, tpm2_del_space() was missed. This
didn't matter much because it's usually called closely after a
converted operation, so there's only a very tiny race window where the
chip can be removed before the space flushing is done which causes a
NULL deref on the mutex. However, there are reports of this window
being hit in practice, so fix this by converting tpm2_del_space() to
use tpm_try_get_ops(), which performs all the teardown checks before
acquring the mutex.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4.x
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4a2d4496e1 upstream.
While commit 6a01afcf84 ("mac80211: mesh: Free ie data when leaving
mesh") fixed a memory leak on mesh leave / teardown it introduced a
potential memory corruption caused by a double free when rejoining the
mesh:
ieee80211_leave_mesh()
-> kfree(sdata->u.mesh.ie);
...
ieee80211_join_mesh()
-> copy_mesh_setup()
-> old_ie = ifmsh->ie;
-> kfree(old_ie);
This double free / kernel panics can be reproduced by using wpa_supplicant
with an encrypted mesh (if set up without encryption via "iw" then
ifmsh->ie is always NULL, which avoids this issue). And then calling:
$ iw dev mesh0 mesh leave
$ iw dev mesh0 mesh join my-mesh
Note that typically these commands are not used / working when using
wpa_supplicant. And it seems that wpa_supplicant or wpa_cli are going
through a NETDEV_DOWN/NETDEV_UP cycle between a mesh leave and mesh join
where the NETDEV_UP resets the mesh.ie to NULL via a memcpy of
default_mesh_setup in cfg80211_netdev_notifier_call, which then avoids
the memory corruption, too.
The issue was first observed in an application which was not using
wpa_supplicant but "Senf" instead, which implements its own calls to
nl80211.
Fixing the issue by removing the kfree()'ing of the mesh IE in the mesh
join function and leaving it solely up to the mesh leave to free the
mesh IE.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6a01afcf84 ("mac80211: mesh: Free ie data when leaving mesh")
Reported-by: Matthias Kretschmer <mathias.kretschmer@fit.fraunhofer.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <ll@simonwunderlich.de>
Tested-by: Mathias Kretschmer <mathias.kretschmer@fit.fraunhofer.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220310183513.28589-1-linus.luessing@c0d3.blue
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 222ca305c9 upstream.
Three architectures check the end of a user access against the
address limit without taking a possible overflow into account.
Passing a negative length or another overflow in here returns
success when it should not.
Use the most common correct implementation here, which optimizes
for a constant 'size' argument, and turns the common case into a
single comparison.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: da55128194 ("csky: User access")
Fixes: f663b60f52 ("microblaze: Fix uaccess_ok macro")
Fixes: 7567746e1c ("Hexagon: Add user access functions")
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 10c5357874 upstream.
Currently rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_irqrestore() releases rnp->boost_mtx
before reporting the expedited quiescent state. Under heavy real-time
load, this can result in this function being preempted before the
quiescent state is reported, which can in turn prevent the expedited grace
period from completing. Tim Murray reports that the resulting expedited
grace periods can take hundreds of milliseconds and even more than one
second, when they should normally complete in less than a millisecond.
This was fine given that there were no particular response-time
constraints for synchronize_rcu_expedited(), as it was designed
for throughput rather than latency. However, some users now need
sub-100-millisecond response-time constratints.
This patch therefore follows Neeraj's suggestion (seconded by Tim and
by Uladzislau Rezki) of simply reversing the two operations.
Reported-by: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Reported-by: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
Reported-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <quic_neeraju@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <quic_neeraju@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4.x
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8893d27ffc upstream.
The implementations of aead and skcipher in the QAT driver do not
support properly requests with the CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG flag set.
If the HW queue is full, the driver returns -EBUSY but does not enqueue
the request.
This can result in applications like dm-crypt waiting indefinitely for a
completion of a request that was never submitted to the hardware.
To avoid this problem, disable the registration of all crypto algorithms
in the QAT driver by setting the number of crypto instances to 0 at
configuration time.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c844d22fe0 upstream.
Clevo NL5xRU and NL5xNU/TUXEDO Aura 15 Gen1 and Gen2 have both a working
native and video interface. However the default detection mechanism first
registers the video interface before unregistering it again and switching
to the native interface during boot. This results in a dangling SBIOS
request for backlight change for some reason, causing the backlight to
switch to ~2% once per boot on the first power cord connect or disconnect
event. Setting the native interface explicitly circumvents this buggy
behaviour by avoiding the unregistering process.
Signed-off-by: Werner Sembach <wse@tuxedocomputers.com>
Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7dacee0b9e upstream.
For some reason, the Microsoft Surface Go 3 uses the standard ACPI
interface for battery information, but does not use the standard PNP0C0A
HID. Instead it uses MSHW0146 as identifier. Add that ID to the driver
as this seems to work well.
Additionally, the power state is not updated immediately after the AC
has been (un-)plugged, so add the respective quirk for that.
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Luz <luzmaximilian@gmail.com>
Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e702196bf8 upstream.
On this board the ACPI RSDP structure points to both a RSDT and an XSDT,
but the XSDT points to a truncated FADT. This causes all sorts of trouble
and usually a complete failure to boot after the following error occurs:
ACPI Error: Unsupported address space: 0x20 (*/hwregs-*)
ACPI Error: AE_SUPPORT, Unable to initialize fixed events (*/evevent-*)
ACPI: Unable to start ACPI Interpreter
This leaves the ACPI implementation in such a broken state that subsequent
kernel subsystem initialisations go wrong, resulting in among others
mismapped PCI memory, SATA and USB enumeration failures, and freezes.
As this is an older embedded platform that will likely never see any BIOS
updates to address this issue and its default shipping OS only complies to
ACPI 1.0, work around this by forcing `acpi=rsdt`. This patch, applied on
top of Linux 5.10.102, was confirmed on real hardware to fix the issue.
Signed-off-by: Mark Cilissen <mark@yotsuba.nl>
Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6e1acfa387 upstream.
Bail out in case userspace uses unsupported registers.
Fixes: 49499c3e6e ("netfilter: nf_tables: switch registers to 32 bit addressing")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e9e6faeafa upstream.
All packets on ingress (except for jumbo) are terminated with a 4-bytes
CRC checksum. It's the responsability of the driver to strip those 4
bytes. Unfortunately a change dating back to March 2017 re-shuffled some
code and made the CRC stripping code effectively dead.
This change re-orders that part a bit such that the datalen is
immediately altered if needed.
Fixes: 4902a92270 ("drivers: net: xgene: Add workaround for errata 10GE_8/ENET_11")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
Tested-by: Stephane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322224205.752795-1-stgraber@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 17aaf01933 upstream.
Tests 72 and 78 for ALSA in kselftest fail due to reading
inconsistent values from some devices on a VirtualBox
Virtual Machine using the snd_intel8x0 driver for the AC'97
Audio Controller device.
Taking for example test number 72, this is what the test reports:
"Surround Playback Volume.0 expected 1 but read 0, is_volatile 0"
"Surround Playback Volume.1 expected 0 but read 1, is_volatile 0"
These errors repeat for each value from 0 to 31.
Taking a look at these error messages it is possible to notice
that the written values are read back swapped.
When the write is performed, these values are initially stored in
an array used to sanity-check them and write them in the pcmreg
array. To write them, the two one-byte values are packed together
in a two-byte variable through bitwise operations: the first
value is shifted left by one byte and the second value is stored in the
right byte through a bitwise OR. When reading the values back,
right shifts are performed to retrieve the previously stored
bytes. These shifts are executed in the wrong order, thus
reporting the values swapped as shown above.
This patch fixes this mistake by reversing the read
operations' order.
Signed-off-by: Giacomo Guiduzzi <guiduzzi.giacomo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Valente <paolo.valente@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322200653.15862-1-guiduzzi.giacomo@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3c3201f8c7 upstream.
Like the previous fixes to hw_params and hw_free ioctl races, we need
to paper over the concurrent prepare ioctl calls against hw_params and
hw_free, too.
This patch implements the locking with the existing
runtime->buffer_mutex for prepare ioctls. Unlike the previous case
for snd_pcm_hw_hw_params() and snd_pcm_hw_free(), snd_pcm_prepare() is
performed to the linked streams, hence the lock can't be applied
simply on the top. For tracking the lock in each linked substream, we
modify snd_pcm_action_group() slightly and apply the buffer_mutex for
the case stream_lock=false (formerly there was no lock applied)
there.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322170720.3529-4-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dca947d4d2 upstream.
In the current PCM design, the read/write syscalls (as well as the
equivalent ioctls) are allowed before the PCM stream is running, that
is, at PCM PREPARED state. Meanwhile, we also allow to re-issue
hw_params and hw_free ioctl calls at the PREPARED state that may
change or free the buffers, too. The problem is that there is no
protection against those mix-ups.
This patch applies the previously introduced runtime->buffer_mutex to
the read/write operations so that the concurrent hw_params or hw_free
call can no longer interfere during the operation. The mutex is
unlocked before scheduling, so we don't take it too long.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322170720.3529-3-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 92ee3c60ec upstream.
Currently we have neither proper check nor protection against the
concurrent calls of PCM hw_params and hw_free ioctls, which may result
in a UAF. Since the existing PCM stream lock can't be used for
protecting the whole ioctl operations, we need a new mutex to protect
those racy calls.
This patch introduced a new mutex, runtime->buffer_mutex, and applies
it to both hw_params and hw_free ioctl code paths. Along with it, the
both functions are slightly modified (the mmap_count check is moved
into the state-check block) for code simplicity.
Reported-by: Hu Jiahui <kirin.say@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322170720.3529-2-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit cd94df1795 upstream.
New device id for Corsair Virtuoso SE RGB Wireless that currently is not
in the mixer_map. This entry in the mixer_map is necessary in order to
label its mixer appropriately and allow userspace to pick the correct
volume controls. For instance, my own Corsair Virtuoso SE RGB Wireless
headset has this new ID and consequently, the sidetone and volume are not
working correctly without this change.
> sudo lsusb -v | grep -i corsair
Bus 007 Device 011: ID 1b1c:0a40 Corsair CORSAIR VIRTUOSO SE Wireless Gam
idVendor 0x1b1c Corsair
iManufacturer 1 Corsair
iProduct 2 CORSAIR VIRTUOSO SE Wireless Gaming Headset
Signed-off-by: Reza Jahanbakhshi <reza.jahanbakhshi@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220304212303.195949-1-reza.jahanbakhshi@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit efb6402c3c upstream.
We've got syzbot reports hitting INT_MAX overflow at vmalloc()
allocation that is called from snd_pcm_plug_alloc(). Although we
apply the restrictions to input parameters, it's based only on the
hw_params of the underlying PCM device. Since the PCM OSS layer
allocates a temporary buffer for the data conversion, the size may
become unexpectedly large when more channels or higher rates is given;
in the reported case, it went over INT_MAX, hence it hits WARN_ON().
This patch is an attempt to avoid such an overflow and an allocation
for too large buffers. First off, it adds the limit of 1MB as the
upper bound for period bytes. This must be large enough for all use
cases, and we really don't want to handle a larger temporary buffer
than this size. The size check is performed at two places, where the
original period bytes is calculated and where the plugin buffer size
is calculated.
In addition, the driver uses array_size() and array3_size() for
multiplications to catch overflows for the converted period size and
buffer bytes.
Reported-by: syzbot+72732c532ac1454eeee9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/00000000000085b1b305da5a66f3@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220318082036.29699-1-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2e8e4c8f66 upstream.
When an invalid (non existing) handle is used in a TPM command,
that uses the resource manager interface (/dev/tpmrm0) the resource
manager tries to load it from its internal cache, but fails and
the tpm_dev_transmit returns an -EINVAL error to the caller.
The existing async handler doesn't handle these error cases
currently and the condition in the poll handler never returns
mask with EPOLLIN set.
The result is that the poll call blocks and the application gets stuck
until the user_read_timer wakes it up after 120 sec.
Change the tpm_dev_async_work function to handle error conditions
returned from tpm_dev_transmit they are also reflected in the poll mask
and a correct error code could passed back to the caller.
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 9e1b74a63f ("tpm: add support for nonblocking operation")
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen<jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tstruk@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 40cdc50987 upstream.
After the recent changes made by commit c2e3930529 ("btrfs: clear
extent buffer uptodate when we fail to write it") and its followup fix,
commit 651740a502 ("btrfs: check WRITE_ERR when trying to read an
extent buffer"), we can now end up not cleaning up space reservations of
log tree extent buffers after a transaction abort happens, as well as not
cleaning up still dirty extent buffers.
This happens because if writeback for a log tree extent buffer failed,
then we have cleared the bit EXTENT_BUFFER_UPTODATE from the extent buffer
and we have also set the bit EXTENT_BUFFER_WRITE_ERR on it. Later on,
when trying to free the log tree with free_log_tree(), which iterates
over the tree, we can end up getting an -EIO error when trying to read
a node or a leaf, since read_extent_buffer_pages() returns -EIO if an
extent buffer does not have EXTENT_BUFFER_UPTODATE set and has the
EXTENT_BUFFER_WRITE_ERR bit set. Getting that -EIO means that we return
immediately as we can not iterate over the entire tree.
In that case we never update the reserved space for an extent buffer in
the respective block group and space_info object.
When this happens we get the following traces when unmounting the fs:
[174957.284509] BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in cleanup_transaction:1913: errno=-5 IO failure
[174957.286497] BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in free_log_tree:3420: errno=-5 IO failure
[174957.399379] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[174957.402497] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3206883 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:127 btrfs_put_block_group+0x77/0xb0 [btrfs]
[174957.407523] Modules linked in: btrfs overlay dm_zero (...)
[174957.424917] CPU: 2 PID: 3206883 Comm: umount Tainted: G W 5.16.0-rc5-btrfs-next-109 #1
[174957.426689] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[174957.428716] RIP: 0010:btrfs_put_block_group+0x77/0xb0 [btrfs]
[174957.429717] Code: 21 48 8b bd (...)
[174957.432867] RSP: 0018:ffffb70d41cffdd0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[174957.433632] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff8b09c3848000 RCX: ffff8b0758edd1c8
[174957.434689] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffc0b467e7 RDI: ffff8b0758edd000
[174957.436068] RBP: ffff8b0758edd000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[174957.437114] R10: 0000000000000246 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8b09c3848148
[174957.438140] R13: ffff8b09c3848198 R14: ffff8b0758edd188 R15: dead000000000100
[174957.439317] FS: 00007f328fb82800(0000) GS:ffff8b0a2d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[174957.440402] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[174957.441164] CR2: 00007fff13563e98 CR3: 0000000404f4e005 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[174957.442117] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[174957.443076] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[174957.443948] Call Trace:
[174957.444264] <TASK>
[174957.444538] btrfs_free_block_groups+0x255/0x3c0 [btrfs]
[174957.445238] close_ctree+0x301/0x357 [btrfs]
[174957.445803] ? call_rcu+0x16c/0x290
[174957.446250] generic_shutdown_super+0x74/0x120
[174957.446832] kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30
[174957.447305] btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs]
[174957.447890] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0xa0
[174957.448440] cleanup_mnt+0x147/0x1c0
[174957.448888] task_work_run+0x5c/0xa0
[174957.449336] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e5/0x1f0
[174957.449934] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x16/0x40
[174957.450512] do_syscall_64+0x48/0xc0
[174957.450980] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[174957.451605] RIP: 0033:0x7f328fdc4a97
[174957.452059] Code: 03 0c 00 f7 (...)
[174957.454320] RSP: 002b:00007fff13564ec8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[174957.455262] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f328feea264 RCX: 00007f328fdc4a97
[174957.456131] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000560b8ae51dd0
[174957.457118] RBP: 0000560b8ae51ba0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fff13563c40
[174957.458005] R10: 00007f328fe49fc0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[174957.459113] R13: 0000560b8ae51dd0 R14: 0000560b8ae51cb0 R15: 0000000000000000
[174957.460193] </TASK>
[174957.460534] irq event stamp: 0
[174957.461003] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[174957.461947] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffffb0e94214>] copy_process+0x934/0x2040
[174957.463147] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffffb0e94214>] copy_process+0x934/0x2040
[174957.465116] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[174957.466323] ---[ end trace bc7ee0c490bce3af ]---
[174957.467282] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[174957.468184] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3206883 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:3976 btrfs_free_block_groups+0x330/0x3c0 [btrfs]
[174957.470066] Modules linked in: btrfs overlay dm_zero (...)
[174957.483137] CPU: 2 PID: 3206883 Comm: umount Tainted: G W 5.16.0-rc5-btrfs-next-109 #1
[174957.484691] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[174957.486853] RIP: 0010:btrfs_free_block_groups+0x330/0x3c0 [btrfs]
[174957.488050] Code: 00 00 00 ad de (...)
[174957.491479] RSP: 0018:ffffb70d41cffde0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[174957.492520] RAX: ffff8b08d79310b0 RBX: ffff8b09c3848000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[174957.493868] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: fffff443055ee600 RDI: ffffffffb1131846
[174957.495183] RBP: ffff8b08d79310b0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[174957.496580] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8b08d7931000
[174957.498027] R13: ffff8b09c38492b0 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100
[174957.499438] FS: 00007f328fb82800(0000) GS:ffff8b0a2d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[174957.500990] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[174957.502117] CR2: 00007fff13563e98 CR3: 0000000404f4e005 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[174957.503513] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[174957.504864] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[174957.506167] Call Trace:
[174957.506654] <TASK>
[174957.507047] close_ctree+0x301/0x357 [btrfs]
[174957.507867] ? call_rcu+0x16c/0x290
[174957.508567] generic_shutdown_super+0x74/0x120
[174957.509447] kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30
[174957.510194] btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs]
[174957.511123] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0xa0
[174957.511976] cleanup_mnt+0x147/0x1c0
[174957.512610] task_work_run+0x5c/0xa0
[174957.513309] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e5/0x1f0
[174957.514231] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x16/0x40
[174957.515069] do_syscall_64+0x48/0xc0
[174957.515718] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[174957.516688] RIP: 0033:0x7f328fdc4a97
[174957.517413] Code: 03 0c 00 f7 d8 (...)
[174957.521052] RSP: 002b:00007fff13564ec8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[174957.522514] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f328feea264 RCX: 00007f328fdc4a97
[174957.523950] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000560b8ae51dd0
[174957.525375] RBP: 0000560b8ae51ba0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fff13563c40
[174957.526763] R10: 00007f328fe49fc0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[174957.528058] R13: 0000560b8ae51dd0 R14: 0000560b8ae51cb0 R15: 0000000000000000
[174957.529404] </TASK>
[174957.529843] irq event stamp: 0
[174957.530256] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[174957.531061] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffffb0e94214>] copy_process+0x934/0x2040
[174957.532075] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffffb0e94214>] copy_process+0x934/0x2040
[174957.533083] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[174957.533865] ---[ end trace bc7ee0c490bce3b0 ]---
[174957.534452] BTRFS info (device dm-0): space_info 4 has 1070841856 free, is not full
[174957.535404] BTRFS info (device dm-0): space_info total=1073741824, used=2785280, pinned=0, reserved=49152, may_use=0, readonly=65536 zone_unusable=0
[174957.537029] BTRFS info (device dm-0): global_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
[174957.537859] BTRFS info (device dm-0): trans_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
[174957.538697] BTRFS info (device dm-0): chunk_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
[174957.539552] BTRFS info (device dm-0): delayed_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
[174957.540403] BTRFS info (device dm-0): delayed_refs_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
This also means that in case we have log tree extent buffers that are
still dirty, we can end up not cleaning them up in case we find an
extent buffer with EXTENT_BUFFER_WRITE_ERR set on it, as in that case
we have no way for iterating over the rest of the tree.
This issue is very often triggered with test cases generic/475 and
generic/648 from fstests.
The issue could almost be fixed by iterating over the io tree attached to
each log root which keeps tracks of the range of allocated extent buffers,
log_root->dirty_log_pages, however that does not work and has some
inconveniences:
1) After we sync the log, we clear the range of the extent buffers from
the io tree, so we can't find them after writeback. We could keep the
ranges in the io tree, with a separate bit to signal they represent
extent buffers already written, but that means we need to hold into
more memory until the transaction commits.
How much more memory is used depends a lot on whether we are able to
allocate contiguous extent buffers on disk (and how often) for a log
tree - if we are able to, then a single extent state record can
represent multiple extent buffers, otherwise we need multiple extent
state record structures to track each extent buffer.
In fact, my earlier approach did that:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/3aae7c6728257c7ce2279d6660ee2797e5e34bbd.1641300250.git.fdmanana@suse.com/
However that can cause a very significant negative impact on
performance, not only due to the extra memory usage but also because
we get a larger and deeper dirty_log_pages io tree.
We got a report that, on beefy machines at least, we can get such
performance drop with fsmark for example:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20220117082426.GE32491@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/
2) We would be doing it only to deal with an unexpected and exceptional
case, which is basically failure to read an extent buffer from disk
due to IO failures. On a healthy system we don't expect transaction
aborts to happen after all;
3) Instead of relying on iterating the log tree or tracking the ranges
of extent buffers in the dirty_log_pages io tree, using the radix
tree that tracks extent buffers (fs_info->buffer_radix) to find all
log tree extent buffers is not reliable either, because after writeback
of an extent buffer it can be evicted from memory by the release page
callback of the btree inode (btree_releasepage()).
Since there's no way to be able to properly cleanup a log tree without
being able to read its extent buffers from disk and without using more
memory to track the logical ranges of the allocated extent buffers do
the following:
1) When we fail to cleanup a log tree, setup a flag that indicates that
failure;
2) Trigger writeback of all log tree extent buffers that are still dirty,
and wait for the writeback to complete. This is just to cleanup their
state, page states, page leaks, etc;
3) When unmounting the fs, ignore if the number of bytes reserved in a
block group and in a space_info is not 0 if, and only if, we failed to
cleanup a log tree. Also ignore only for metadata block groups and the
metadata space_info object.
This is far from a perfect solution, but it serves to silence test
failures such as those from generic/475 and generic/648. However having
a non-zero value for the reserved bytes counters on unmount after a
transaction abort, is not such a terrible thing and it's completely
harmless, it does not affect the filesystem integrity in any way.
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3cf6a32f3f upstream.
Before this patch, the symbol end address fixup to be called, needed two
conditions being met:
if (prev->end == prev->start && prev->end != curr->start)
Where
"prev->end == prev->start" means that prev is zero-long
(and thus needs a fixup)
and
"prev->end != curr->start" means that fixup hasn't been applied yet
However, this logic is incorrect in the following situation:
*curr = {rb_node = {__rb_parent_color = 278218928,
rb_right = 0x0, rb_left = 0x0},
start = 0xc000000000062354,
end = 0xc000000000062354, namelen = 40, type = 2 '\002',
binding = 0 '\000', idle = 0 '\000', ignore = 0 '\000',
inlined = 0 '\000', arch_sym = 0 '\000', annotate2 = false,
name = 0x1159739e "kprobe_optinsn_page\t[__builtin__kprobes]"}
*prev = {rb_node = {__rb_parent_color = 278219041,
rb_right = 0x109548b0, rb_left = 0x109547c0},
start = 0xc000000000062354,
end = 0xc000000000062354, namelen = 12, type = 2 '\002',
binding = 1 '\001', idle = 0 '\000', ignore = 0 '\000',
inlined = 0 '\000', arch_sym = 0 '\000', annotate2 = false,
name = 0x1095486e "optinsn_slot"}
In this case, prev->start == prev->end == curr->start == curr->end,
thus the condition above thinks that "we need a fixup due to zero
length of prev symbol, but it has been probably done, since the
prev->end == curr->start", which is wrong.
After the patch, the execution path proceeds to arch__symbols__fixup_end
function which fixes up the size of prev symbol by adding page_size to
its end offset.
Fixes: 3b01a413c1 ("perf symbols: Improve kallsyms symbol end addr calculation")
Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Cc: Athira Jajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220317135536.805-1-mpetlan@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5600f69866 upstream.
Syzbot reported warning in usb_submit_urb() which is caused by wrong
endpoint type. There was a check for the number of endpoints, but not
for the type of endpoint.
Fix it by replacing old desc.bNumEndpoints check with
usb_find_common_endpoints() helper for finding endpoints
Fail log:
usb 5-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 1 != type 3
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 48 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:502 usb_submit_urb+0xed2/0x18a0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:502
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 48 Comm: kworker/2:2 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc6-syzkaller-00226-g07ebd38a0da2 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
aiptek_open+0xd5/0x130 drivers/input/tablet/aiptek.c:830
input_open_device+0x1bb/0x320 drivers/input/input.c:629
kbd_connect+0xfe/0x160 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1593
Fixes: 8e20cf2bce ("Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+75cccf2b7da87fb6f84b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308194328.26220-1-paskripkin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
