commit 8ccc99362b upstream.
The referenced commit changed the error code returned by the kernel
when preventing a non-established socket from attaching the ktls
ULP. Before to such a commit, the user-space got ENOTCONN instead
of EINVAL.
The existing self-tests depend on such error code, and the change
caused a failure:
RUN global.non_established ...
tls.c:1673:non_established:Expected errno (22) == ENOTCONN (107)
non_established: Test failed at step #3
FAIL global.non_established
In the unlikely event existing applications do the same, address
the issue by restoring the prior error code in the above scenario.
Note that the only other ULP performing similar checks at init
time - smc_ulp_ops - also fails with ENOTCONN when trying to attach
the ULP to a non-established socket.
Reported-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Fixes: 2c02d41d71 ("net/ulp: prevent ULP without clone op from entering the LISTEN status")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7bb199e7a93317fb6f8bf8b9b2dc71c18f337cde.1674042685.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 55228db269 upstream.
WG14 N2350 specifies that it is an undefined behavior to have type
definitions within offsetof", see
https://www.open-std.org/jtc1/sc22/wg14/www/docs/n2350.htm
This specification is also part of C23.
Therefore, replace the TYPE_ALIGN macro with the _Alignof builtin to
avoid undefined behavior. (_Alignof itself is C11 and the kernel is
built with -gnu11).
ISO C11 _Alignof is subtly different from the GNU C extension
__alignof__. Latter is the preferred alignment and _Alignof the
minimal alignment. For long long on x86 these are 8 and 4
respectively.
The macro TYPE_ALIGN's behavior matches _Alignof rather than
__alignof__.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: YingChi Long <me@inclyc.cn>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220925153151.2467884-1-me@inclyc.cn
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d4ccd54d28 upstream.
Many Linux systems are configured to not panic on oops; but allowing an
attacker to oops the system **really** often can make even bugs that look
completely unexploitable exploitable (like NULL dereferences and such) if
each crash elevates a refcount by one or a lock is taken in read mode, and
this causes a counter to eventually overflow.
The most interesting counters for this are 32 bits wide (like open-coded
refcounts that don't use refcount_t). (The ldsem reader count on 32-bit
platforms is just 16 bits, but probably nobody cares about 32-bit platforms
that much nowadays.)
So let's panic the system if the kernel is constantly oopsing.
The speed of oopsing 2^32 times probably depends on several factors, like
how long the stack trace is and which unwinder you're using; an empirically
important one is whether your console is showing a graphical environment or
a text console that oopses will be printed to.
In a quick single-threaded benchmark, it looks like oopsing in a vfork()
child with a very short stack trace only takes ~510 microseconds per run
when a graphical console is active; but switching to a text console that
oopses are printed to slows it down around 87x, to ~45 milliseconds per
run.
(Adding more threads makes this faster, but the actual oops printing
happens under &die_lock on x86, so you can maybe speed this up by a factor
of around 2 and then any further improvement gets eaten up by lock
contention.)
It looks like it would take around 8-12 days to overflow a 32-bit counter
with repeated oopsing on a multi-core X86 system running a graphical
environment; both me (in an X86 VM) and Seth (with a distro kernel on
normal hardware in a standard configuration) got numbers in that ballpark.
12 days aren't *that* short on a desktop system, and you'd likely need much
longer on a typical server system (assuming that people don't run graphical
desktop environments on their servers), and this is a *very* noisy and
violent approach to exploiting the kernel; and it also seems to take orders
of magnitude longer on some machines, probably because stuff like EFI
pstore will slow it down a ton if that's active.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221107201317.324457-1-jannh@google.com
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 18bba1843f upstream.
Add the missing #include of asm/assembler.h, which is where the ldr_l
macro is defined.
Fixes: ff7a167961 ("arm64: efi: Execute runtime services from a dedicated stack")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ff7a167961 upstream.
With the introduction of PRMT in the ACPI subsystem, the EFI rts
workqueue is no longer the only caller of efi_call_virt_pointer() in the
kernel. This means the EFI runtime services lock is no longer sufficient
to manage concurrent calls into firmware, but also that firmware calls
may occur that are not marshalled via the workqueue mechanism, but
originate directly from the caller context.
For added robustness, and to ensure that the runtime services have 8 KiB
of stack space available as per the EFI spec, introduce a spinlock
protected EFI runtime stack of 8 KiB, where the spinlock also ensures
serialization between the EFI rts workqueue (which itself serializes EFI
runtime calls) and other callers of efi_call_virt_pointer().
While at it, use the stack pivot to avoid reloading the shadow call
stack pointer from the ordinary stack, as doing so could produce a
gadget to defeat it.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6d5c9e79b7 upstream.
The bug occours due to a misuse of `attr` variable instead of `attr_b`.
`attr` is being initialized as NULL, then being derenfernced
as `attr->res.data_size`.
This bug causes a crash of the ntfs3 driver itself,
If compiled directly to the kernel, it crashes the whole system.
Signed-off-by: Alon Zahavi <zahavi.alon@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Tal Lossos <tallossos@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tal Lossos <tallossos@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c877ce47e1 upstream.
To work around some Window servers that return
STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID on query infos under DFS namespaces that
contain non-ASCII characters, we started checking for -ENOENT on every
file open, and if so, then send additional requests to figure out
whether it is a DFS link or not. It means that all those requests
will be sent to every non-existing file.
So, in order to reduce the number of roundtrips, check earlier whether
status code is STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID and tcon supports dfs, and
if so, then map -ENOENT to -EREMOTE so mount or automount will take
care of chasing the DFS link -- if it isn't an DFS link, then -ENOENT
will be returned appropriately.
Before patch
SMB2 438 Create Request File: ada.test\dfs\foo;GetInfo Request...
SMB2 310 Create Response, Error: STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND;...
SMB2 228 Ioctl Request FSCTL_DFS_GET_REFERRALS, File: \ada.test\dfs\foo
SMB2 143 Ioctl Response, Error: STATUS_OBJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND
SMB2 438 Create Request File: ada.test\dfs\foo;GetInfo Request...
SMB2 310 Create Response, Error: STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND;...
SMB2 228 Ioctl Request FSCTL_DFS_GET_REFERRALS, File: \ada.test\dfs\foo
SMB2 143 Ioctl Response, Error: STATUS_OBJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND
After patch
SMB2 438 Create Request File: ada.test\dfs\foo;GetInfo Request...
SMB2 310 Create Response, Error: STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND;...
SMB2 438 Create Request File: ada.test\dfs\foo;GetInfo Request...
SMB2 310 Create Response, Error: STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND;...
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 973a9c810c upstream.
The YCC conversion matrix for RGB -> COLOR_SPACE_YCBCR2020_TYPE is
missing the values for the fourth column of the matrix.
The fourth column of the matrix is essentially just a value that is
added given that the color is 3 components in size.
These values are needed to bias the chroma from the [-1, 1] -> [0, 1]
range.
This fixes color being very green when using Gamescope HDR on HDMI
output which prefers YCC 4:4:4.
Fixes: 40df2f809e ("drm/amd/display: color space ycbcr709 support")
Reviewed-by: Melissa Wen <mwen@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Ashton <joshua@froggi.es>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 79601b8948 upstream.
Code in get_output_color_space depends on knowing the pixel encoding to
determine whether to pick between eg. COLOR_SPACE_SRGB or
COLOR_SPACE_YCBCR709 for transparent RGB -> YCbCr 4:4:4 in the driver.
v2: Fixed patch being accidentally based on a personal feature branch, oops!
Fixes: ea117312ea ("drm/amd/display: Reduce HDMI pixel encoding if max clock is exceeded")
Reviewed-by: Melissa Wen <mwen@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Ashton <joshua@froggi.es>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
