commit da34a8484d upstream.
Charge moving mode in cgroup1 allows memory to follow tasks as they
migrate between cgroups. This is, and always has been, a questionable
thing to do - for several reasons.
First, it's expensive. Pages need to be identified, locked and isolated
from various MM operations, and reassigned, one by one.
Second, it's unreliable. Once pages are charged to a cgroup, there isn't
always a clear owner task anymore. Cache isn't moved at all, for example.
Mapped memory is moved - but if trylocking or isolating a page fails,
it's arbitrarily left behind. Frequent moving between domains may leave a
task's memory scattered all over the place.
Third, it isn't really needed. Launcher tasks can kick off workload tasks
directly in their target cgroup. Using dedicated per-workload groups
allows fine-grained policy adjustments - no need to move tasks and their
physical pages between control domains. The feature was never
forward-ported to cgroup2, and it hasn't been missed.
Despite it being a niche usecase, the maintenance overhead of supporting
it is enormous. Because pages are moved while they are live and subject
to various MM operations, the synchronization rules are complicated.
There are lock_page_memcg() in MM and FS code, which non-cgroup people
don't understand. In some cases we've been able to shift code and cgroup
API calls around such that we can rely on native locking as much as
possible. But that's fragile, and sometimes we need to hold MM locks for
longer than we otherwise would (pte lock e.g.).
Mark the feature deprecated. Hopefully we can remove it soon.
And backport into -stable kernels so that people who develop against
earlier kernels are warned about this deprecation as early as possible.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix memory.rst underlining]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Y5COd+qXwk/S+n8N@cmpxchg.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e46ceea314 upstream.
Clocks are properly reference counted and do not need to be inside the
lock range.
Right now this triggers a false-positive lockdep warning on MT8192 based
Chromebooks, through a combination of mtk-scp that has a cros-ec-rpmsg
sub-device, the (actual) cros-ec I2C adapter registration, I2C client
(not on cros-ec) probe doing i2c transfers and enabling clocks.
This is a false positive because the cros-ec-rpmsg under mtk-scp does
not have an I2C adapter, and also each I2C adapter and cros-ec instance
have their own mutex.
Move the clk operations outside of the send_lock range.
Fixes: 63c13d61ea ("remoteproc/mediatek: add SCP support for mt8183")
Signed-off-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <wenst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230104083110.736377-1-wenst@chromium.org
[Fixed "Fixes:" tag line]
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e686c32590 upstream.
While experimenting with CXL region removal the following corruption of
/proc/iomem appeared.
Before:
f010000000-f04fffffff : CXL Window 0
f010000000-f02fffffff : region4
f010000000-f02fffffff : dax4.0
f010000000-f02fffffff : System RAM (kmem)
After (modprobe -r cxl_test):
f010000000-f02fffffff : **redacted binary garbage**
f010000000-f02fffffff : System RAM (kmem)
...and testing further the same is visible with persistent memory
assigned to kmem:
Before:
480000000-243fffffff : Persistent Memory
480000000-57e1fffff : namespace3.0
580000000-243fffffff : dax3.0
580000000-243fffffff : System RAM (kmem)
After (ndctl disable-region all):
480000000-243fffffff : Persistent Memory
580000000-243fffffff : ***redacted binary garbage***
580000000-243fffffff : System RAM (kmem)
The corrupted data is from a use-after-free of the "dax4.0" and "dax3.0"
resources, and it also shows that the "System RAM (kmem)" resource is
not being removed. The bug does not appear after "modprobe -r kmem", it
requires the parent of "dax4.0" and "dax3.0" to be removed which
re-parents the leaked "System RAM (kmem)" instances. Those in turn
reference the freed resource as a parent.
First up for the fix is release_mem_region_adjustable() needs to
reliably delete the resource inserted by add_memory_driver_managed().
That is thwarted by a check for IORESOURCE_SYSRAM that predates the
dax/kmem driver, from commit:
65c7878413 ("kernel, resource: check for IORESOURCE_SYSRAM in release_mem_region_adjustable")
That appears to be working around the behavior of HMM's
"MEMORY_DEVICE_PUBLIC" facility that has since been deleted. With that
check removed the "System RAM (kmem)" resource gets removed, but
corruption still occurs occasionally because the "dax" resource is not
reliably removed.
The dax range information is freed before the device is unregistered, so
the driver can not reliably recall (another use after free) what it is
meant to release. Lastly if that use after free got lucky, the driver
was covering up the leak of "System RAM (kmem)" due to its use of
release_resource() which detaches, but does not free, child resources.
The switch to remove_resource() forces remove_memory() to be responsible
for the deletion of the resource added by add_memory_driver_managed().
Fixes: c2f3011ee6 ("device-dax: add an allocation interface for device-dax instances")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Reviewed-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/167653656244.3147810.5705900882794040229.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 977a300954 upstream.
Type 3 instruction fault (FPU insn with FPU disabled) is handled
by quietly enabling FPU and returning. Which is fine, except that
we need to do that both for fault in userland and in the kernel;
the latter *can* legitimately happen - all it takes is this:
.global _start
_start:
call_pal 0xae
lda $0, 0
ldq $0, 0($0)
- call_pal CLRFEN to clear "FPU enabled" flag and arrange for
a signal delivery (SIGSEGV in this case).
Fixed by moving the handling of type 3 into the common part of
do_entIF(), before we check for kernel vs. user mode.
Incidentally, the check for kernel mode is unidiomatic; the normal
way to do that is !user_mode(regs). The difference is that
the open-coded variant treats any of bits 63..3 of regs->ps being
set as "it's user mode" while the normal approach is to check just
the bit 3. PS is a 4-bit register and regs->ps always will have
bits 63..4 clear, so the open-coded variant here is actually equivalent
to !user_mode(regs). Harder to follow, though...
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f7c4d9b133 upstream.
If getting an ID or setting up a work queue in rbd_dev_create() fails,
use-after-free on rbd_dev->rbd_client, rbd_dev->spec and rbd_dev->opts
is triggered in do_rbd_add(). The root cause is that the ownership of
these structures is transfered to rbd_dev prematurely and they all end
up getting freed when rbd_dev_create() calls rbd_dev_free() prior to
returning to do_rbd_add().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE, an
incomplete patch submitted by Natalia Petrova <n.petrova@fintech.ru>.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1643dfa4c2 ("rbd: introduce a per-device ordered workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2e3d0e20d8 upstream.
TMU node uses 0 as thermal-sensor-cells, thus thermal zone referencing
it must not have an argument to phandle. This was not critical before,
but since rework of thermal Devicetree initialization in the
commit 3fd6d6e2b4 ("thermal/of: Rework the thermal device tree
initialization"), this leads to errors registering thermal zones other
than first one:
thermal_sys: cpu0-thermal: Failed to read thermal-sensors cells: -2
thermal_sys: Failed to find thermal zone for tmu id=0
exynos-tmu 10064000.tmu: Failed to register sensor: -2
exynos-tmu: probe of 10064000.tmu failed with error -2
Fixes: 1ac49427b5 ("ARM: dts: exynos: Add support for Hardkernel's Odroid HC1 board")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230209105841.779596-5-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a3583e92d1 upstream.
TMU node uses 0 as thermal-sensor-cells, thus thermal zone referencing
it must not have an argument to phandle. This was not critical before,
but since rework of thermal Devicetree initialization in the
commit 3fd6d6e2b4 ("thermal/of: Rework the thermal device tree
initialization"), this leads to errors registering thermal zones other
than first one:
thermal_sys: cpu0-thermal: Failed to read thermal-sensors cells: -2
thermal_sys: Failed to find thermal zone for tmu id=0
exynos-tmu 10064000.tmu: Failed to register sensor: -2
exynos-tmu: probe of 10064000.tmu failed with error -2
Fixes: f1722d7dd8 ("ARM: dts: Define default thermal-zones for exynos5422")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230209105841.779596-6-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f50714b57a upstream.
When we need to zero some range on a block device, the function
__blkdev_issue_zero_pages submits a write bio with the bio vector pointing
to the zero page. If we use dm-flakey with corrupt bio writes option, it
will corrupt the content of the zero page which results in crashes of
various userspace programs. Glibc assumes that memory returned by mmap is
zeroed and it uses it for calloc implementation; if the newly mapped
memory is not zeroed, calloc will return non-zeroed memory.
Fix this bug by testing if the page is equal to ZERO_PAGE(0) and
avoiding the corruption in this case.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a00f5276e2 ("dm flakey: Properly corrupt multi-page bios.")
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit aa56b9b759 upstream.
If "corrupt_bio_byte" is set to corrupt reads and corrupt_bio_flags is
used, dm-flakey would erroneously return all writes as errors. Likewise,
if "corrupt_bio_byte" is set to corrupt writes, dm-flakey would return
errors for all reads.
Fix the logic so that if fc->corrupt_bio_byte is non-zero, dm-flakey
will not abort reads on writes with an error.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8e47363588 upstream.
The powerclamp cooling device cur_state shows actual idle observed by
package C-state idle counters. But the implementation is not sufficient
for multi package or multi die system. The cur_state value is incorrect.
On these systems, these counters must be read from each package/die and
somehow aggregate them. But there is no good method for aggregation.
It was not a problem when explicit CPU model addition was required to
enable intel powerclamp. In this way certain CPU models could have
been avoided. But with the removal of CPU model check with the
availability of Package C-state counters, the driver is loaded on most
of the recent systems.
For multi package/die systems, just show the actual target idle state,
the system is trying to achieve. In powerclamp this is the user set
state minus one.
Also there is no use of starting a worker thread for polling package
C-state counters and applying any compensation for multiple package
or multiple die systems.
Fixes: b721ca0d19 ("thermal/powerclamp: remove cpu whitelist")
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>
Cc: 4.14+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2a86aa9a18 upstream.
The Realtek rate control algorithm goes back and forth a lot between
the highest and the lowest rate it's allowed to use. This is due to
a lot of frames being dropped because the retry limits set by
IEEE80211_CONF_CHANGE_RETRY_LIMITS are too low. (Experimentally, they
are 4 for long frames and 7 for short frames.)
The vendor drivers hardcode the value 48 for both retry limits (for
station mode), which makes dropped frames very rare and thus the rate
control is more stable.
Because most Realtek chips handle the rate control in the firmware,
which can't be modified, ignore the limits set by
IEEE80211_CONF_CHANGE_RETRY_LIMITS and use the value 48 (set during
chip initialisation), same as the vendor drivers.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bitterblue Smith <rtl8821cerfe2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/477d745b-6bac-111d-403c-487fc19aa30d@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f0f0cfdc3a upstream.
spi_nor_set_erase_type() was used either to set or to mask out an erase
type. When we used it to mask out an erase type a shift-out-of-bounds
was hit:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/mtd/spi-nor/core.c:2237:24
shift exponent 4294967295 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
The setting of the size_{shift, mask} and of the opcode are unnecessary
when the erase size is zero, as throughout the code just the erase size
is considered to determine whether an erase type is supported or not.
Setting the opcode to 0xFF was wrong too as nobody guarantees that 0xFF
is an unused opcode. Thus when masking out an erase type, just set the
erase size to zero. This will fix the shift-out-of-bounds.
Fixes: 5390a8df76 ("mtd: spi-nor: add support to non-uniform SFDP SPI NOR flash memories")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Alexander Stein <Alexander.Stein@tq-group.com>
Signed-off-by: Louis Rannou <lrannou@baylibre.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Stein <Alexander.Stein@tq-group.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230203070754.50677-1-tudor.ambarus@linaro.org
[ta: refine changes, new commit message, fix compilation error]
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e6b9bd7290 upstream.
Following process will make data lost and could lead to a filesystem
corrupted problem:
1. jh(bh) is inserted into T1->t_checkpoint_list, bh is dirty, and
jh->b_transaction = NULL
2. T1 is added into journal->j_checkpoint_transactions.
3. Get bh prepare to write while doing checkpoing:
PA PB
do_get_write_access jbd2_log_do_checkpoint
spin_lock(&jh->b_state_lock)
if (buffer_dirty(bh))
clear_buffer_dirty(bh) // clear buffer dirty
set_buffer_jbddirty(bh)
transaction =
journal->j_checkpoint_transactions
jh = transaction->t_checkpoint_list
if (!buffer_dirty(bh))
__jbd2_journal_remove_checkpoint(jh)
// bh won't be flushed
jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail
__jbd2_journal_file_buffer(jh, transaction, BJ_Reserved)
4. Aborting journal/Power-cut before writing latest bh on journal area.
In this way we get a corrupted filesystem with bh's data lost.
Fix it by moving the clearing of buffer_dirty bit just before the call
to __jbd2_journal_file_buffer(), both bit clearing and jh->b_transaction
assignment are under journal->j_list_lock locked, so that
jbd2_log_do_checkpoint() will wait until jh's new transaction fininshed
even bh is currently not dirty. And journal_shrink_one_cp_list() won't
remove jh from checkpoint list if the buffer head is reused in
do_get_write_access().
Fetch a reproducer in [Link].
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216898
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: zhanchengbin <zhanchengbin1@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230110015327.1181863-1-chengzhihao1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 951606a14a upstream.
If snd_ctl_add() fails in aureon_add_controls(), it immediately returns
and leaves ice->gpio_mutex locked. ice->gpio_mutex locks in
snd_ice1712_save_gpio_status and unlocks in
snd_ice1712_restore_gpio_status(ice).
It seems that the mutex is required only for aureon_cs8415_get(),
so snd_ice1712_restore_gpio_status(ice) can be placed
just after that. Compile tested only.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fomin <fomindmitriyfoma@mail.ru>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230225184322.6286-1-fomindmitriyfoma@mail.ru
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c16bda3759 upstream.
If we get woken spuriously when polling and fail the operation with
-EAGAIN again, then we generally only allow polling again if data
had been transferred at some point. This is indicated with
REQ_F_PARTIAL_IO. However, if the spurious poll triggers when the socket
was originally empty, then we haven't transferred data yet and we will
fail the poll re-arm. This either punts the socket to io-wq if it's
blocking, or it fails the request with -EAGAIN if not. Neither condition
is desirable, as the former will slow things down, while the latter
will make the application confused.
We want to ensure that a repeated poll trigger doesn't lead to infinite
work making no progress, that's what the REQ_F_PARTIAL_IO check was
for. But it doesn't protect against a loop post the first receive, and
it's unnecessarily strict if we started out with an empty socket.
Add a somewhat random retry count, just to put an upper limit on the
potential number of retries that will be done. This should be high enough
that we won't really hit it in practice, unless something needs to be
aborted anyway.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Link: https://github.com/axboe/liburing/issues/364
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit edd4782696 upstream.
If two or more mappings go back to back to each other they can be passed
into io_uring to be registered as a single registered buffer. That would
even work if mappings came from different sources, e.g. it's possible to
mix in this way anon pages and pages from shmem or hugetlb. That is not
a problem but it'd rather be less prone if we forbid such mixing.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2f2bb1ffc9 upstream.
Just like for task_work, set the task mode to TASK_RUNNING before doing
potential resume work. We're not holding any locks at this point,
but we may have already set the task state to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE in
preparation for going to sleep waiting for events. Ensure that we set it
back to TASK_RUNNING if we have work to process, to avoid warnings on
calling blocking operations with !TASK_RUNNING.
Fixes: b5d3ae202f ("io_uring: handle TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME when checking for task_work")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202302062208.24d3e563-oliver.sang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b5d3ae202f upstream.
If TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME is set, then we need to call resume_user_mode_work()
for PF_IO_WORKER threads. They never return to usermode, hence never get
a chance to process any items that are marked by this flag. Most notably
this includes the final put of files, but also any throttling markers set
by block cgroups.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4971c268b8 upstream.
Commit 98de59bfe4 ("take calculation of final prot in
security_mmap_file() into a helper") moved the code to update prot, to be
the actual protections applied to the kernel, to a new helper called
mmap_prot().
However, while without the helper ima_file_mmap() was getting the updated
prot, with the helper ima_file_mmap() gets the original prot, which
contains the protections requested by the application.
A possible consequence of this change is that, if an application calls
mmap() with only PROT_READ, and the kernel applies PROT_EXEC in addition,
that application would have access to executable memory without having this
event recorded in the IMA measurement list. This situation would occur for
example if the application, before mmap(), calls the personality() system
call with READ_IMPLIES_EXEC as the first argument.
Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with those of the mmap_file LSM hook, so
that IMA can receive both the requested prot and the final prot. Since the
requested protections are stored in a new variable, and the final
protections are stored in the existing variable, this effectively restores
the original behavior of the MMAP_CHECK hook.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 98de59bfe4 ("take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit db0ccc44a2 upstream.
It currently returns a page, but callers just check for NULL/page to
gauge success. Clean this up and return the appropriate error directly
instead.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6921ed9049 upstream.
When plain IBRS is enabled (not enhanced IBRS), the logic in
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() determines that STIBP is not needed.
The IBRS bit implicitly protects against cross-thread branch target
injection. However, with legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on
returning to userspace for performance reasons which leaves userspace
threads vulnerable to cross-thread branch target injection against which
STIBP protects.
Exclude IBRS from the spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() check to allow for
enabling STIBP (through seccomp/prctl() by default or always-on, if
selected by spectre_v2_user kernel cmdline parameter).
[ bp: Massage. ]
Fixes: 7c693f54c8 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS")
Reported-by: José Oliveira <joseloliveira11@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo@kernelhacking.com>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220120127.1975241-1-kpsingh@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230221184908.2349578-1-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7ff6edf4fe upstream.
The AMD side of the loader has always claimed to support mixed
steppings. But somewhere along the way, it broke that by assuming that
the cached patch blob is a single one instead of it being one per
*node*.
So turn it into a per-node one so that each node can stash the blob
relevant for it.
[ NB: Fixes tag is not really the exactly correct one but it is good
enough. ]
Fixes: fe055896c0 ("x86/microcode: Merge the early microcode loader")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # 2355370cd9 ("x86/microcode/amd: Remove load_microcode_amd()'s bsp parameter")
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # a5ad92134b ("x86/microcode/AMD: Add a @cpu parameter to the reloading functions")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230130161709.11615-4-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f1c97a1b4e upstream.
When arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe calculating jump destination address,
it copies original instructions from jmp-optimized kprobe (see
__recover_optprobed_insn), and calculated based on length of original
instruction.
arch_check_optimized_kprobe does not check KPROBE_FLAG_OPTIMATED when
checking whether jmp-optimized kprobe exists.
As a result, setup_detour_execution may jump to a range that has been
overwritten by jump destination address, resulting in an inval opcode error.
For example, assume that register two kprobes whose addresses are
<func+9> and <func+11> in "func" function.
The original code of "func" function is as follows:
0xffffffff816cb5e9 <+9>: push %r12
0xffffffff816cb5eb <+11>: xor %r12d,%r12d
0xffffffff816cb5ee <+14>: test %rdi,%rdi
0xffffffff816cb5f1 <+17>: setne %r12b
0xffffffff816cb5f5 <+21>: push %rbp
1.Register the kprobe for <func+11>, assume that is kp1, corresponding optimized_kprobe is op1.
After the optimization, "func" code changes to:
0xffffffff816cc079 <+9>: push %r12
0xffffffff816cc07b <+11>: jmp 0xffffffffa0210000
0xffffffff816cc080 <+16>: incl 0xf(%rcx)
0xffffffff816cc083 <+19>: xchg %eax,%ebp
0xffffffff816cc084 <+20>: (bad)
0xffffffff816cc085 <+21>: push %rbp
Now op1->flags == KPROBE_FLAG_OPTIMATED;
2. Register the kprobe for <func+9>, assume that is kp2, corresponding optimized_kprobe is op2.
register_kprobe(kp2)
register_aggr_kprobe
alloc_aggr_kprobe
__prepare_optimized_kprobe
arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe
__recover_optprobed_insn // copy original bytes from kp1->optinsn.copied_insn,
// jump address = <func+14>
3. disable kp1:
disable_kprobe(kp1)
__disable_kprobe
...
if (p == orig_p || aggr_kprobe_disabled(orig_p)) {
ret = disarm_kprobe(orig_p, true) // add op1 in unoptimizing_list, not unoptimized
orig_p->flags |= KPROBE_FLAG_DISABLED; // op1->flags == KPROBE_FLAG_OPTIMATED | KPROBE_FLAG_DISABLED
...
4. unregister kp2
__unregister_kprobe_top
...
if (!kprobe_disabled(ap) && !kprobes_all_disarmed) {
optimize_kprobe(op)
...
if (arch_check_optimized_kprobe(op) < 0) // because op1 has KPROBE_FLAG_DISABLED, here not return
return;
p->kp.flags |= KPROBE_FLAG_OPTIMIZED; // now op2 has KPROBE_FLAG_OPTIMIZED
}
"func" code now is:
0xffffffff816cc079 <+9>: int3
0xffffffff816cc07a <+10>: push %rsp
0xffffffff816cc07b <+11>: jmp 0xffffffffa0210000
0xffffffff816cc080 <+16>: incl 0xf(%rcx)
0xffffffff816cc083 <+19>: xchg %eax,%ebp
0xffffffff816cc084 <+20>: (bad)
0xffffffff816cc085 <+21>: push %rbp
5. if call "func", int3 handler call setup_detour_execution:
if (p->flags & KPROBE_FLAG_OPTIMIZED) {
...
regs->ip = (unsigned long)op->optinsn.insn + TMPL_END_IDX;
...
}
The code for the destination address is
0xffffffffa021072c: push %r12
0xffffffffa021072e: xor %r12d,%r12d
0xffffffffa0210731: jmp 0xffffffff816cb5ee <func+14>
However, <func+14> is not a valid start instruction address. As a result, an error occurs.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230216034247.32348-3-yangjihong1@huawei.com/
Fixes: f66c0447cc ("kprobes: Set unoptimized flag after unoptimizing code")
Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 868a6fc0ca upstream.
Since the following commit:
commit f66c0447cc ("kprobes: Set unoptimized flag after unoptimizing code")
modified the update timing of the KPROBE_FLAG_OPTIMIZED, a optimized_kprobe
may be in the optimizing or unoptimizing state when op.kp->flags
has KPROBE_FLAG_OPTIMIZED and op->list is not empty.
The __recover_optprobed_insn check logic is incorrect, a kprobe in the
unoptimizing state may be incorrectly determined as unoptimizing.
As a result, incorrect instructions are copied.
The optprobe_queued_unopt function needs to be exported for invoking in
arch directory.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230216034247.32348-2-yangjihong1@huawei.com/
Fixes: f66c0447cc ("kprobes: Set unoptimized flag after unoptimizing code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a2b07fa7b9 upstream.
Disable SVM and more importantly force GIF=1 when halting a CPU or
rebooting the machine. Similar to VMX, SVM allows software to block
INITs via CLGI, and thus can be problematic for a crash/reboot. The
window for failure is smaller with SVM as INIT is only blocked while
GIF=0, i.e. between CLGI and STGI, but the window does exist.
Fixes: fba4f472b3 ("x86/reboot: Turn off KVM when halting a CPU")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130233650.1404148-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 26044aff37 upstream.
Disable virtualization in crash_nmi_callback() and rework the
emergency_vmx_disable_all() path to do an NMI shootdown if and only if a
shootdown has not already occurred. NMI crash shootdown fundamentally
can't support multiple invocations as responding CPUs are deliberately
put into halt state without unblocking NMIs. But, the emergency reboot
path doesn't have any work of its own, it simply cares about disabling
virtualization, i.e. so long as a shootdown occurred, emergency reboot
doesn't care who initiated the shootdown, or when.
If "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" is specified on the kernel command line,
panic() will invoke crash_smp_send_stop() and result in a second call to
nmi_shootdown_cpus() during native_machine_emergency_restart().
Invoke the callback _before_ disabling virtualization, as the current
VMCS needs to be cleared before doing VMXOFF. Note, this results in a
subtle change in ordering between disabling virtualization and stopping
Intel PT on the responding CPUs. While VMX and Intel PT do interact,
VMXOFF and writes to MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL do not induce faults between one
another, which is all that matters when panicking.
Harden nmi_shootdown_cpus() against multiple invocations to try and
capture any such kernel bugs via a WARN instead of hanging the system
during a crash/dump, e.g. prior to the recent hardening of
register_nmi_handler(), re-registering the NMI handler would trigger a
double list_add() and hang the system if CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=y.
list_add double add: new=ffffffff82220800, prev=ffffffff8221cfe8, next=ffffffff82220800.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1319 at lib/list_debug.c:29 __list_add_valid+0x67/0x70
Call Trace:
__register_nmi_handler+0xcf/0x130
nmi_shootdown_cpus+0x39/0x90
native_machine_emergency_restart+0x1c9/0x1d0
panic+0x237/0x29b
Extract the disabling logic to a common helper to deduplicate code, and
to prepare for doing the shootdown in the emergency reboot path if SVM
is supported.
Note, prior to commit ed72736183 ("x86/reboot: Force all cpus to exit
VMX root if VMX is supported"), nmi_shootdown_cpus() was subtly protected
against a second invocation by a cpu_vmx_enabled() check as the kdump
handler would disable VMX if it ran first.
Fixes: ed72736183 ("x86/reboot: Force all cpus to exit VMX root if VMX is supported")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220427224924.592546-2-gpiccoli@igalia.com
Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130233650.1404148-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f2d3155e2a upstream.
Migration mode is a VM attribute which enables tracking of changes in
storage attributes (PGSTE). It assumes dirty tracking is enabled on all
memslots to keep a dirty bitmap of pages with changed storage attributes.
When enabling migration mode, we currently check that dirty tracking is
enabled for all memslots. However, userspace can disable dirty tracking
without disabling migration mode.
Since migration mode is pointless with dirty tracking disabled, disable
migration mode whenever userspace disables dirty tracking on any slot.
Also update the documentation to clarify that dirty tracking must be
enabled when enabling migration mode, which is already enforced by the
code in kvm_s390_vm_start_migration().
Also highlight in the documentation for KVM_S390_GET_CMMA_BITS that it
can now fail with -EINVAL when dirty tracking is disabled while
migration mode is on. Move all the error codes to a table so this stays
readable.
To disable migration mode, slots_lock should be held, which is taken
in kvm_set_memory_region() and thus held in
kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region().
Restructure the prepare code a bit so all the sanity checking is done
before disabling migration mode. This ensures migration mode isn't
disabled when some sanity check fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 190df4a212 ("KVM: s390: CMMA tracking, ESSA emulation, migration mode")
Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230127140532.230651-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com
Message-Id: <20230127140532.230651-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com>
[frankja@linux.ibm.com: fixed commit message typo, moved api.rst error table upwards]
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
