commit 4faa99965e upstream.
If io_destroy() gets to cancelling everything that can be cancelled and
gets to kiocb_cancel() calling the function driver has left in ->ki_cancel,
it becomes vulnerable to a race with IO completion. At that point req
is already taken off the list and aio_complete() does *NOT* spin until
we (in free_ioctx_users()) releases ->ctx_lock. As the result, it proceeds
to kiocb_free(), freing req just it gets passed to ->ki_cancel().
Fix is simple - remove from the list after the call of kiocb_cancel(). All
instances of ->ki_cancel() already have to cope with the being called with
iocb still on list - that's what happens in io_cancel(2).
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 0460fef2a9 "aio: use cancellation list lazily"
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0fde7ad71e upstream.
arch/sparc/kernel/ds.c: In function ‘register_services’:
arch/sparc/kernel/ds.c:912:3: error: ‘strcpy’: writing at least 1 byte
into a region of size 0 overflows the destination
Reported-by: Anatoly Pugachev <matorola@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a840c93ca7 upstream.
When a GID entry is invalid EAGAIN is returned. This is an incorrect error
code, there is nothing that will make this GID entry valid again in
bounded time.
Some user space tools fail incorrectly if EAGAIN is returned here, and
this represents a small ABI change from earlier kernels.
The first patch in the Fixes list makes entries that were valid before
to become invalid, allowing this code to trigger, while the second patch
in the Fixes list introduced the wrong EAGAIN.
Therefore revert the return result to EINVAL which matches the historical
expectations of the ibv_query_gid_type() API of the libibverbs user space
library.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 598ff6bae6 ("IB/core: Refactor GID modify code for RoCE")
Fixes: 03db3a2d81 ("IB/core: Add RoCE GID table management")
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 806e30873f upstream.
Commit b5e2ced9bf ("stm class: Use vmalloc for the master map") caused
a build error on some arches as vmalloc.h was not explicitly included.
Fix that by adding it to the list of includes.
Fixes: b5e2ced9bf ("stm class: Use vmalloc for the master map")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b5e2ced9bf upstream.
Fengguang is running into a warning from the buddy allocator:
> swapper/0: page allocation failure: order:9, mode:0x14040c0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_COMP), nodemask=(null)
> CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc1 #262
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
> Call Trace:
...
> __kmalloc+0x14b/0x180: ____cache_alloc at mm/slab.c:3127
> stm_register_device+0xf3/0x5c0: stm_register_device at drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c:695
...
Which is basically a result of the stm class trying to allocate ~512kB
for the dummy_stm with its default parameters. There's no reason, however,
for it not to be vmalloc()ed instead, which is what this patch does.
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c9ddf73476 upstream.
Since an SRP remote port is attached as a child to shost->shost_gendev
and as the only child, the translation from the shost pointer into an
rport pointer must happen by looking up the shost child that is an
rport. This patch fixes the following KASAN complaint:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in srp_timed_out+0x57/0x110 [scsi_transport_srp]
Read of size 4 at addr ffff880035d3fcc0 by task kworker/1:0H/19
CPU: 1 PID: 19 Comm: kworker/1:0H Not tainted 4.16.0-rc3-dbg+ #1
Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_timeout_work
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x85/0xc7
print_address_description+0x65/0x270
kasan_report+0x231/0x350
srp_timed_out+0x57/0x110 [scsi_transport_srp]
scsi_times_out+0xc7/0x3f0 [scsi_mod]
blk_mq_terminate_expired+0xc2/0x140
bt_iter+0xbc/0xd0
blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x1c7/0x350
blk_mq_timeout_work+0x325/0x3f0
process_one_work+0x441/0xa50
worker_thread+0x76/0x6c0
kthread+0x1b2/0x1d0
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
Fixes: e68ca75200 ("scsi_transport_srp: Reduce failover time")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 28e4213dd3 upstream.
Having PR_FP_MODE_FRE (i.e. Config5.FRE) set without PR_FP_MODE_FR (i.e.
Status.FR) is not supported as the lone purpose of Config5.FRE is to
emulate Status.FR=0 handling on FPU hardware that has Status.FR=1
hardwired[1][2]. Also we do not handle this case elsewhere, and assume
throughout our code that TIF_HYBRID_FPREGS and TIF_32BIT_FPREGS cannot
be set both at once for a task, leading to inconsistent behaviour if
this does happen.
Return unsuccessfully then from prctl(2) PR_SET_FP_MODE calls requesting
PR_FP_MODE_FRE to be set with PR_FP_MODE_FR clear. This corresponds to
modes allowed by `mips_set_personality_fp'.
References:
[1] "MIPS Architecture For Programmers, Vol. III: MIPS32 / microMIPS32
Privileged Resource Architecture", Imagination Technologies,
Document Number: MD00090, Revision 6.02, July 10, 2015, Table 9.69
"Config5 Register Field Descriptions", p. 262
[2] "MIPS Architecture For Programmers, Volume III: MIPS64 / microMIPS64
Privileged Resource Architecture", Imagination Technologies,
Document Number: MD00091, Revision 6.03, December 22, 2015, Table
9.72 "Config5 Register Field Descriptions", p. 288
Fixes: 9791554b45 ("MIPS,prctl: add PR_[GS]ET_FP_MODE prctl options for MIPS")
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.0+
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/19327/
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3d13de4b02 upstream.
Currently, the following causes a kernel OOPS in memcpy:
echo 1073741825 > buffer/length
echo 1 > buffer/enable
Note that using 1073741824 instead of 1073741825 causes "write error:
Cannot allocate memory" but no OOPS.
This is because 1073741824 == 2^30 and 1073741825 == 2^30+1. Since kfifo
rounds up to the nearest power of 2, it will actually call kmalloc with
roundup_pow_of_two(length) * bytes_per_datum.
Using length == 1073741825 and bytes_per_datum == 2, we get:
kmalloc(roundup_pow_of_two(1073741825) * 2
or kmalloc(2147483648 * 2)
or kmalloc(4294967296)
or kmalloc(UINT_MAX + 1)
so this overflows to 0, causing kmalloc to return ZERO_SIZE_PTR and
subsequent memcpy to fail once the device is enabled.
Fix this by checking for overflow prior to allocating a kfifo. With this
check added, the above code returns -EINVAL when enabling the buffer,
rather than causing an OOPS.
Signed-off-by: Martin Kelly <mkelly@xevo.com>
cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Not relevant upstream, therefore no upstream commit. ]
To fix, unmap the page as soon as possible.
When swiotlb is in use, calling dma_unmap_page means that
the original page mapped with dma_map_page must still be valid,
as swiotlb will copy data from its internal cache back to the
originally requested DMA location.
When GRO is enabled, before this patch all references to the
original frag may be put and the page freed before dma_unmap_page
in mlx4_en_free_frag is called.
It is possible there is a path where the use-after-free occurs
even with GRO disabled, but this has not been observed so far.
The bug can be trivially detected by doing the following:
* Compile the kernel with DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
* Run the kernel as a Xen Dom0
* Leave GRO enabled on the interface
* Run a 10 second or more test with iperf over the interface.
This bug was likely introduced in
commit 4cce66cdd1 ("mlx4_en: map entire pages to increase throughput"),
first part of u3.6.
It was incidentally fixed in
commit 34db548bfb ("mlx4: add page recycling in receive path"),
first part of v4.12.
This version applies to the v4.9 series.
Signed-off-by: Sarah Newman <srn@prgmr.com>
Tested-by: Sarah Newman <srn@prgmr.com>
Cc: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Cc: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a048a07d7f upstream.
On some CPUs we can prevent a vulnerability related to store-to-load
forwarding by preventing store forwarding between privilege domains,
by inserting a barrier in kernel entry and exit paths.
This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9
powerpc CPUs.
Barriers must be inserted generally before the first load after moving
to a higher privilege, and after the last store before moving to a
lower privilege, HV and PR privilege transitions must be protected.
Barriers are added as patch sections, with all kernel/hypervisor entry
points patched, and the exit points to lower privilge levels patched
similarly to the RFI flush patching.
Firmware advertisement is not implemented yet, so CPU flush types
are hard coded.
Thanks to Michal Suchánek for bug fixes and review.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 501a78cbc1 upstream.
The recent LPM changes to setup_rfi_flush() are causing some section
mismatch warnings because we removed the __init annotation on
setup_rfi_flush():
The function setup_rfi_flush() references
the function __init ppc64_bolted_size().
the function __init memblock_alloc_base().
The references are actually in init_fallback_flush(), but that is
inlined into setup_rfi_flush().
These references are safe because:
- only pseries calls setup_rfi_flush() at runtime
- pseries always passes L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK at boot
- so the fallback flush area will always be allocated
- so the check in init_fallback_flush() will always return early:
/* Only allocate the fallback flush area once (at boot time). */
if (l1d_flush_fallback_area)
return;
- and therefore we won't actually call the freed init routines.
We should rework the code to make it safer by default rather than
relying on the above, but for now as a quick-fix just add a __ref
annotation to squash the warning.
Fixes: abf110f3e1 ("powerpc/rfi-flush: Make it possible to call setup_rfi_flush() again")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6232774f15 upstream.
After migration the security feature flags might have changed (e.g.,
destination system with unpatched firmware), but some flags are not
set/clear again in init_cpu_char_feature_flags() because it assumes
the security flags to be the defaults.
Additionally, if the H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS hypercall fails then
init_cpu_char_feature_flags() does not run again, which potentially
might leave the system in an insecure or sub-optimal configuration.
So, just restore the security feature flags to the defaults assumed
by init_cpu_char_feature_flags() so it can set/clear them correctly,
and to ensure safe settings are in place in case the hypercall fail.
Fixes: f636c14790 ("powerpc/pseries: Set or clear security feature flags")
Depends-on: 19887d6a28e2 ("powerpc: Move default security feature flags")
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e7347a8683 upstream.
This moves the definition of the default security feature flags
(i.e., enabled by default) closer to the security feature flags.
This can be used to restore current flags to the default flags.
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0f9bdfe3c7 upstream.
The H_CPU_BEHAV_* flags should be checked for in the 'behaviour' field
of 'struct h_cpu_char_result' -- 'character' is for H_CPU_CHAR_*
flags.
Found by playing around with QEMU's implementation of the hypercall:
H_CPU_CHAR=0xf000000000000000
H_CPU_BEHAV=0x0000000000000000
This clears H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY and H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR
so pseries_setup_rfi_flush() disables 'rfi_flush'; and it also
clears H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV flag. So there is no RFI flush
mitigation at all for cpu_show_meltdown() to report; but currently
it does:
Original kernel:
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Mitigation: RFI Flush
Patched kernel:
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Not affected
H_CPU_CHAR=0x0000000000000000
H_CPU_BEHAV=0xf000000000000000
This sets H_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR so cpu_show_spectre_v1() should
report vulnerable; but currently it doesn't:
Original kernel:
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
Not affected
Patched kernel:
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
Vulnerable
Brown-paper-bag-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Fixes: f636c14790 ("powerpc/pseries: Set or clear security feature flags")
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d6fbe1c55c upstream.
Add a definition for cpu_show_spectre_v2() to override the generic
version. This has several permuations, though in practice some may not
occur we cater for any combination.
The most verbose is:
Mitigation: Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only), Indirect
branch cache disabled, ori31 speculation barrier enabled
We don't treat the ori31 speculation barrier as a mitigation on its
own, because it has to be *used* by code in order to be a mitigation
and we don't know if userspace is doing that. So if that's all we see
we say:
Vulnerable, ori31 speculation barrier enabled
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 56986016cb upstream.
Add a definition for cpu_show_spectre_v1() to override the generic
version. Currently this just prints "Not affected" or "Vulnerable"
based on the firmware flag.
Although the kernel does have array_index_nospec() in a few places, we
haven't yet audited all the powerpc code to see where it's necessary,
so for now we don't list that as a mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2e4a16161f upstream.
Now that we have the security flags we can simplify the code in
pseries_setup_rfi_flush() because the security flags have pessimistic
defaults.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 37c0bdd00d upstream.
Now that we have the security flags we can significantly simplify the
code in pnv_setup_rfi_flush(), because we can use the flags instead of
checking device tree properties and because the security flags have
pessimistic defaults.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ff348355e9 upstream.
Now that we have the security feature flags we can make the
information displayed in the "meltdown" file more informative.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8ad3304156 upstream.
This landed in setup_64.c for no good reason other than we had nowhere
else to put it. Now that we have a security-related file, that is a
better place for it so move it.
[mpe: Add extern for rfi_flush to fix bisection break]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 77addf6e95 upstream.
Now that we have feature flags for security related things, set or
clear them based on what we see in the device tree provided by
firmware.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f636c14790 upstream.
Now that we have feature flags for security related things, set or
clear them based on what we receive from the hypercall.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9a868f6343 upstream.
This commit adds security feature flags to reflect the settings we
receive from firmware regarding Spectre/Meltdown mitigations.
The feature names reflect the names we are given by firmware on bare
metal machines. See the hostboot source for details.
Arguably these could be firmware features, but that then requires them
to be read early in boot so they're available prior to asm feature
patching, but we don't actually want to use them for patching. We may
also want to dynamically update them in future, which would be
incompatible with the way firmware features work (at the moment at
least). So for now just make them separate flags.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c4bc36628d upstream.
Add some additional values which have been defined for the
H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS hypercall.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0063d61ccf upstream.
Currently the rfi-flush messages print 'Using <type> flush' for all
enabled_flush_types, but that is not necessarily true -- as now the
fallback flush is always enabled on pseries, but the fixup function
overwrites its nop/branch slot with other flush types, if available.
So, replace the 'Using <type> flush' messages with '<type> flush is
available'.
Also, print the patched flush types in the fixup function, so users
can know what is (not) being used (e.g., the slower, fallback flush,
or no flush type at all if flush is disabled via the debugfs switch).
Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 84749a58b6 upstream.
This ensures the fallback flush area is always allocated on pseries,
so in case a LPAR is migrated from a patched to an unpatched system,
it is possible to enable the fallback flush in the target system.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit abf110f3e1 upstream.
For PowerVM migration we want to be able to call setup_rfi_flush()
again after we've migrated the partition.
To support that we need to check that we're not trying to allocate the
fallback flush area after memblock has gone away (i.e., boot-time only).
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1e2a9fc749 upstream.
rfi_flush_enable() includes a check to see if we're already
enabled (or disabled), and in that case does nothing.
But that means calling setup_rfi_flush() a 2nd time doesn't actually
work, which is a bit confusing.
Move that check into the debugfs code, where it really belongs.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit eb0a2d2620 upstream.
Some versions of firmware will have a setting that can be configured
to disable the RFI flush, add support for it.
Fixes: 6e032b350c ("powerpc/powernv: Check device-tree for RFI flush settings")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 582605a429 upstream.
Some versions of firmware will have a setting that can be configured
to disable the RFI flush, add support for it.
Fixes: 8989d56878 ("powerpc/pseries: Query hypervisor for RFI flush settings")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The backport of the RFI flush support, done by me, has a minor bug in
that the code is inside an #ifdef CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR, which is
incorrect.
This doesn't matter with common configs because we enable
HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR, but with future patches it will break the build.
So fix it.
Fixes: c3b82ebee6 ("powerpc/64s: Add support for RFI flush of L1-D cache")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 63a1e1c95e upstream.
Currently, cpus_set_cap() calls static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(), which
must take the jump_label mutex.
We call cpus_set_cap() in the secondary bringup path, from the idle
thread where interrupts are disabled. Taking a mutex in this path "is a
NONO" regardless of whether it's contended, and something we must avoid.
We didn't spot this until recently, as ___might_sleep() won't warn for
this case until all CPUs have been brought up.
This patch avoids taking the mutex in the secondary bringup path. The
poking of static keys is deferred until enable_cpu_capabilities(), which
runs in a suitable context on the boot CPU. To account for the static
keys being set later, cpus_have_const_cap() is updated to use another
static key to check whether the const cap keys have been initialised,
falling back to the caps bitmap until this is the case.
This means that users of cpus_have_const_cap() gain should only gain a
single additional NOP in the fast path once the const caps are
initialised, but should always see the current cap value.
The hyp code should never dereference the caps array, since the caps are
initialized before we run the module initcall to initialise hyp. A check
is added to the hyp init code to document this requirement.
This change will sidestep a number of issues when the upcoming hotplug
locking rework is merged.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyniger <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Sewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
[4.9: this avoids an IPI before GICv3 is up, preventing a boot time crash]
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [v4.9 backport]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a4023f6827 upstream.
The hypervisor may not have full access to the kernel data structures
and hence cannot safely use cpus_have_cap() helper for checking the
system capability. Add a safe helper for hypervisors to check a constant
system capability, which *doesn't* fall back to checking the bitmap
maintained by the kernel. With this, make the cpus_have_cap() only
check the bitmask and force constant cap checks to use the new API
for quicker checks.
Cc: Robert Ritcher <rritcher@cavium.com>
Cc: Tirumalesh Chalamarla <tchalamarla@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
[4.9: restore cpus_have_const_cap() to previously-backported code]
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [v4.9 backport]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a4b0e8a4e9 upstream.
Since in UFS 2.1 specification some of the descriptor lengths differs
from 2.0 specification and some devices, which are reporting spec
version 2.0 have different descriptor lengths we can not rely on
hardcoded values taken from 2.0 specification. This patch introduces
reading these lengths per each device from descriptor headers at probe
time to ensure their correctness.
Signed-off-by: Michal' Potomski <michalx.potomski@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Subhash Jadavani <subhashj@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
[Wei Li: Slight tweaks to get the cherry-pick to apply,resolved collisions]
Signed-off-by: Li Wei <liwei213@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 93fdd5ac64 upstream.
Pull device descriptor reading out of ufs quirk so it can be used also
for other purposes.
Revamp the fixup setup:
1. Rename ufs_device_info to ufs_dev_desc as very similar name
ufs_dev_info is already in use.
2. Make the handlers static as they are not used out of the ufshdc.c
file.
[mkp: applied by hand]
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Subhash Jadavani <subhashj@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Li Wei <liwei213@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bde44bb665 upstream.
While reading variable size descriptors (like string descriptor), some UFS
devices may report the "LENGTH" (field in "Transaction Specific fields" of
Query Response UPIU) same as what was requested in Query Request UPIU
instead of reporting the actual size of the variable size descriptor.
Although it's safe to ignore the "LENGTH" field for variable size
descriptors as we can always derive the length of the descriptor from
the descriptor header fields. Hence this change impose the length match
check only for fixed size descriptors (for which we always request the
correct size as part of Query Request UPIU).
Reviewed-by: Venkat Gopalakrishnan <venkatg@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Subhash Jadavani <subhashj@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
[Wei Li: Slight tweaks to get the cherry-pick to apply,resolved collisions.]
Signed-off-by: Li Wei <liwei213@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 607065bad9 upstream.
When using large tcp_rmem[2] values (I did tests with 500 MB),
I noticed overflows while computing rcvwin.
Lets fix this before the following patch.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[Backport: sysctl_tcp_rmem is not Namespace-ify'd in older kernels]
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Upstream commit: def9331a12 ("x86/amd:
don't set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen")
When running as Xen pv guest X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS must not be set
on AMD cpus.
This bug/feature bit is kind of special as it will be used very early
when switching threads. Setting the bit and clearing it a little bit
later leaves a critical window where things can go wrong. This time
window has enlarged a little bit by using setup_clear_cpu_cap() instead
of the hypervisor's set_cpu_features callback. It seems this larger
window now makes it rather easy to hit the problem.
The proper solution is to never set the bit in case of Xen.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Upstream commit: 0808e80cb7 ("xen: set
cpu capabilities from xen_start_kernel()")
There is no need to set the same capabilities for each cpu
individually. This can easily be done for all cpus when starting the
kernel.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Revert commit 944e0fc51a ("x86/amd: don't
set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen") as it is lacking
a prerequisite patch and is making things worse.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d3b56c566d upstream.
Pointer request is being assigned but never used, so remove it. Cleans
up the clang warning:
drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_lpc.c:68:2: warning: Value stored to
'request' is never read
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Benson Leung <bleung@chromium.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fb239c1209 upstream.
In _rtl92c_get_txpower_writeval_by_regulatory() the variable writeVal
is assigned to itself in an if ... else statement, apparently only to
document that the branch condition is handled and that a previously read
value should be returned unmodified. The self-assignment causes clang to
raise the following warning:
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8192cu/rf.c:304:13:
error: explicitly assigning value of variable of type 'u32'
(aka 'unsigned int') to itself [-Werror,-Wself-assign]
writeVal = writeVal;
Delete the branch with the self-assignment.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 814596495d upstream.
wiphy names were recently limited to 128 bytes by commit a7cfebcb75
("cfg80211: limit wiphy names to 128 bytes"). As it turns out though,
this isn't sufficient because dev_vprintk_emit() needs the syslog header
string "SUBSYSTEM=ieee80211\0DEVICE=+ieee80211:$devname" to fit into 128
bytes. This triggered the "device/subsystem name too long" WARN when
the device name was >= 90 bytes. As before, this was reproduced by
syzbot by sending an HWSIM_CMD_NEW_RADIO command to the MAC80211_HWSIM
generic netlink family.
Fix it by further limiting wiphy names to 64 bytes.
Reported-by: syzbot+e64565577af34b3768dc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: a7cfebcb75 ("cfg80211: limit wiphy names to 128 bytes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit efe3de79e0 upstream.
Call trace:
[<ffffff9203a8d7a8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x428
[<ffffff9203a8dbf8>] show_stack+0x28/0x38
[<ffffff920409bfb8>] dump_stack+0xd4/0x124
[<ffffff9203d187e8>] print_address_description+0x68/0x258
[<ffffff9203d18c00>] kasan_report.part.2+0x228/0x2f0
[<ffffff9203d1927c>] kasan_report+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffff9203d1776c>] check_memory_region+0x12c/0x1c0
[<ffffff9203d17cdc>] memcpy+0x34/0x68
[<ffffff9203d75348>] xattr_getsecurity+0xe0/0x160
[<ffffff9203d75490>] vfs_getxattr+0xc8/0x120
[<ffffff9203d75d68>] getxattr+0x100/0x2c8
[<ffffff9203d76fb4>] SyS_fgetxattr+0x64/0xa0
[<ffffff9203a83f70>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
If user get root access and calls security.selinux setxattr() with an
embedded NUL on a file and then if some process performs a getxattr()
on that file with a length greater than the actual length of the string,
it would result in a panic.
To fix this, add the actual length of the string to the security context
instead of the length passed by the userspace process.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Grover <sgrover@codeaurora.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
