commit 6f8a394aa952257575910d57cf0a63627fa949a2 upstream.
Fix regression in mounts to e.g. onedrive shares.
Generally, reparse points are processed by the SMB server during the
SMB OPEN request, but there are few reparse points which do not have
OPEN-like meaning for the SMB server and has to be processed by the SMB
client. Those are symlinks and special files (fifo, socket, block, char).
For Linux SMB client, it is required to process also name surrogate reparse
points as they represent another entity on the SMB server system. Linux
client will mark them as separate mount points. Examples of name surrogate
reparse points are NTFS junction points (e.g. created by the "mklink" tool
on Windows servers).
So after processing the name surrogate reparse points, clear the
-EOPNOTSUPP error code returned from the parse_reparse_point() to let SMB
server to process reparse points.
And remove printing misleading error message "unhandled reparse tag:" as
reparse points are handled by SMB server and hence unhandled fact is normal
operation.
Fixes: cad3fc0a4c8c ("cifs: Throw -EOPNOTSUPP error on unsupported reparse point type from parse_reparse_point()")
Fixes: b587fd128660 ("cifs: Treat unhandled directory name surrogate reparse points as mount directory nodes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Junwen Sun <sunjw8888@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Junwen Sun <sunjw8888@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2510859475d7f46ed7940db0853f3342bf1b65ee upstream.
The echo_interval is not limited in any way during mounting,
which makes it possible to write a large number to it. This can
cause an overflow when multiplying ctx->echo_interval by HZ in
match_server().
Add constraints for echo_interval to smb3_fs_context_parse_param().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace.
Fixes: adfeb3e00e ("cifs: Make echo interval tunable")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b4885bd5935bb26f0a414ad55679a372e53f9b9b upstream.
cifs_server_dbg() implies server to be non-NULL so
move call under condition to avoid NULL pointer dereference.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes: e79b0332ae ("cifs: ignore cached share root handle closing errors")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexandra Diupina <adiupina@astralinux.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fe4cdc2c4e248f48de23bc778870fd71e772a274 upstream.
This patch should fix a possible userfaultfd release() hang during
concurrent GUP.
This problem was initially reported by Dimitris Siakavaras in July 2023
[1] in a firecracker use case. Firecracker has a separate process
handling page faults remotely, and when the process releases the
userfaultfd it can race with a concurrent GUP from KVM trying to fault in
a guest page during the secondary MMU page fault process.
A similar problem was reported recently again by Jinjiang Tu in March 2025
[2], even though the race happened this time with a mlockall() operation,
which does GUP in a similar fashion.
In 2017, commit 656710a60e ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: closing the
uffd without triggering SIGBUS") was trying to fix this issue. AFAIU,
that fixes well the fault paths but may not work yet for GUP. In GUP, the
issue is NOPAGE will be almost treated the same as "page fault resolved"
in faultin_page(), then the GUP will follow page again, seeing page
missing, and it'll keep going into a live lock situation as reported.
This change makes core mm return RETRY instead of NOPAGE for both the GUP
and fault paths, proactively releasing the mmap read lock. This should
guarantee the other release thread make progress on taking the write lock
and avoid the live lock even for GUP.
When at it, rearrange the comments to make sure it's uptodate.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/79375b71-db2e-3e66-346b-254c90d915e2@cslab.ece.ntua.gr
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250307072133.3522652-1-tujinjiang@huawei.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250312145131.1143062-1-peterx@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Dimitris Siakavaras <jimsiak@cslab.ece.ntua.gr>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 35fec1089ebb5617f85884d3fa6a699ce6337a75 upstream.
If do_zone_finish() is called with a filesystem that has missing devices
(e.g. a RAID file system mounted in degraded mode) it is accessing the
btrfs_device::zone_info pointer, which will not be set if the device
in question is missing.
Check if the device is present (by checking if it has a valid block device
pointer associated) and if not, skip zone finishing for it.
Fixes: 4dcbb8ab31 ("btrfs: zoned: make zone finishing multi stripe capable")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2bbc4a45e5eb6b868357c1045bf6f38f6ba576e0 upstream.
If btrfs_zone_activate() is called with a filesystem that has missing
devices (e.g. a RAID file system mounted in degraded mode) it is accessing
the btrfs_device::zone_info pointer, which will not be set if the device in
question is missing.
Check if the device is present (by checking if it has a valid block
device pointer associated) and if not, skip zone activation for it.
Fixes: f9a912a3c4 ("btrfs: zoned: make zone activation multi stripe capable")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4c782247b89376a83fa132f7d45d6977edae0629 upstream.
At close_ctree() after we have ran delayed iputs either through explicitly
calling btrfs_run_delayed_iputs() or later during the call to
btrfs_commit_super() or btrfs_error_commit_super(), we assert that the
delayed iputs list is empty.
When we have compressed writes this assertion may fail because delayed
iputs may have been added to the list after we last ran delayed iputs.
This happens like this:
1) We have a compressed write bio executing;
2) We enter close_ctree() and flush the fs_info->endio_write_workers
queue which is the queue used for running ordered extent completion;
3) The compressed write bio finishes and enters
btrfs_finish_compressed_write_work(), where it calls
btrfs_finish_ordered_extent() which in turn calls
btrfs_queue_ordered_fn(), which queues a work item in the
fs_info->endio_write_workers queue that we have flushed before;
4) At close_ctree() we proceed, run all existing delayed iputs and
call btrfs_commit_super() (which also runs delayed iputs), but before
we run the following assertion below:
ASSERT(list_empty(&fs_info->delayed_iputs))
A delayed iput is added by the step below...
5) The ordered extent completion job queued in step 3 runs and results in
creating a delayed iput when dropping the last reference of the ordered
extent (a call to btrfs_put_ordered_extent() made from
btrfs_finish_one_ordered());
6) At this point the delayed iputs list is not empty, so the assertion at
close_ctree() fails.
Fix this by flushing the fs_info->compressed_write_workers queue at
close_ctree() before flushing the fs_info->endio_write_workers queue,
respecting the queue dependency as the later is responsible for the
execution of ordered extent completion.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b365b9d404b7376c60c91cd079218bfef11b7822 upstream.
When mounting the same share twice, once with the "linux" mount parameter
(or equivalently "posix") and then once without (or e.g. with "nolinux"),
we were incorrectly reusing the same tree connection for both mounts.
This meant that the first mount of the share on the client, would
cause subsequent mounts of that same share on the same client to
ignore that mount parm ("linux" vs. "nolinux") and incorrectly reuse
the same tcon.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6afdc60ec30b0a9390d11b7cebed79c857ce82aa upstream.
Smatch noticed that inode_getblk() can return 1 on successful mapping of
a block instead of expected 0 after commit b405c1e58b73 ("udf: refactor
udf_next_aext() to handle error"). This could confuse some of the
callers and lead to strange failures (although the one reported by
Smatch in udf_mkdir() is impossible to trigger in practice). Fix the
return value of inode_getblk().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cb514af7-bbe0-435b-934f-dd1d7a16d2cd@stanley.mountain
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Fixes: b405c1e58b73 ("udf: refactor udf_next_aext() to handle error")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f098aeba04c9328571567dca45159358a250240c upstream.
In the case of the following call stack for an atomic file,
FI_DIRTY_INODE is set, but FI_ATOMIC_DIRTIED is not subsequently set.
f2fs_file_write_iter
f2fs_map_blocks
f2fs_reserve_new_blocks
inc_valid_block_count
__mark_inode_dirty(dquot)
f2fs_dirty_inode
If FI_ATOMIC_DIRTIED is not set, atomic file can encounter corruption
due to a mismatch between old file size and new data.
To resolve this issue, I changed to set FI_ATOMIC_DIRTIED when
FI_DIRTY_INODE is set. This ensures that FI_DIRTY_INODE, which was
previously cleared by the Writeback thread during the commit atomic, is
set and i_size is updated.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: fccaa81de87e ("f2fs: prevent atomic file from being dirtied before commit")
Reviewed-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Sunmin Jeong <s_min.jeong@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Yeongjin Gil <youngjin.gil@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Daeho Jeong <daehojeong@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 94824ac9a8aaf2fb3c54b4bdde842db80ffa555d upstream.
Syzkaller detected a use-after-free issue in ext4_insert_dentry that was
caused by out-of-bounds access due to incorrect splitting in do_split.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_insert_dentry+0x36a/0x6d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2109
Write of size 251 at addr ffff888074572f14 by task syz-executor335/5847
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5847 Comm: syz-executor335 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-syzkaller-00318-ga9cda7c0ffed #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
__asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:106
ext4_insert_dentry+0x36a/0x6d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2109
add_dirent_to_buf+0x3d9/0x750 fs/ext4/namei.c:2154
make_indexed_dir+0xf98/0x1600 fs/ext4/namei.c:2351
ext4_add_entry+0x222a/0x25d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2455
ext4_add_nondir+0x8d/0x290 fs/ext4/namei.c:2796
ext4_symlink+0x920/0xb50 fs/ext4/namei.c:3431
vfs_symlink+0x137/0x2e0 fs/namei.c:4615
do_symlinkat+0x222/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4641
__do_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4662 [inline]
__se_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4660 [inline]
__x64_sys_symlink+0x7a/0x90 fs/namei.c:4660
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
The following loop is located right above 'if' statement.
for (i = count-1; i >= 0; i--) {
/* is more than half of this entry in 2nd half of the block? */
if (size + map[i].size/2 > blocksize/2)
break;
size += map[i].size;
move++;
}
'i' in this case could go down to -1, in which case sum of active entries
wouldn't exceed half the block size, but previous behaviour would also do
split in half if sum would exceed at the very last block, which in case of
having too many long name files in a single block could lead to
out-of-bounds access and following use-after-free.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5872331b3d ("ext4: fix potential negative array index in do_split()")
Signed-off-by: Artem Sadovnikov <a.sadovnikov@ispras.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250404082804.2567-3-a.sadovnikov@ispras.ru
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 642335f3ea2b3fd6dba03e57e01fa9587843a497 ]
A file handle that userspace provides to open_by_handle_at() can
legitimately contain an outdated inode number that has since been reused
for another purpose - that's why the file handle also contains a generation
number.
But if the inode number has been reused for an ea_inode, check_igot_inode()
will notice, __ext4_iget() will go through ext4_error_inode(), and if the
inode was newly created, it will also be marked as bad by iget_failed().
This all happens before the point where the inode generation is checked.
ext4_error_inode() is supposed to only be used on filesystem corruption; it
should not be used when userspace just got unlucky with a stale file
handle. So when this happens, let __ext4_iget() just return an error.
Fixes: b3e6bcb945 ("ext4: add EA_INODE checking to ext4_iget()")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241129-ext4-ignore-ea-fhandle-v1-1-e532c0d1cee0@google.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 19426c4988aa85298c1b4caf2889d37ec5c80fea ]
This reverts commit 94c821fb28.
It reports that there is potential corruption in node footer,
the most suspious feature is nat_bits, let's revert recovery
related code.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 530fea29ef82e169cd7fe048c2b7baaeb85a0028 ]
Protect ext4_release_dquot against freezing so that we
don't try to start a transaction when FS is frozen, leading
to warnings.
Further, avoid taking the freeze protection if a transaction
is already running so that we don't need end up in a deadlock
as described in
46e294efc3 ext4: fix deadlock with fs freezing and EA inodes
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241121123855.645335-3-ojaswin@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e6494977bd4a83862118a05f57a8df40256951c0 ]
syzbot reports an UBSAN issue as below:
------------[ cut here ]------------
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/f2fs/node.h:381:10
index 18446744073709550692 is out of range for type '__le32[5]' (aka 'unsigned int[5]')
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5318 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00060-g6537cfb395f3 #0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:231 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x121/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:429
get_nid fs/f2fs/node.h:381 [inline]
f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks+0xa5e/0xf60 fs/f2fs/node.c:1181
f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x782/0x1030 fs/f2fs/file.c:808
f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x10d/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:836
f2fs_truncate+0x417/0x720 fs/f2fs/file.c:886
f2fs_file_write_iter+0x1bdb/0x2550 fs/f2fs/file.c:5093
aio_write+0x56b/0x7c0 fs/aio.c:1633
io_submit_one+0x8a7/0x18a0 fs/aio.c:2052
__do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2111 [inline]
__se_sys_io_submit+0x171/0x2e0 fs/aio.c:2081
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f238798cde9
index 18446744073709550692 (decimal, unsigned long long)
= 0xfffffffffffffc64 (hexadecimal, unsigned long long)
= -924 (decimal, long long)
In f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks(), UBSAN detects that get_nid() tries to
access .i_nid[-924], it means both offset[0] and level should zero.
The possible case should be in f2fs_do_truncate_blocks(), we try to
truncate inode size to zero, however, dn.ofs_in_node is zero and
dn.node_page is not an inode page, so it fails to truncate inode page,
and then pass zeroed free_from to f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks(), result
in this issue.
if (dn.ofs_in_node || IS_INODE(dn.node_page)) {
f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range(&dn, count);
free_from += count;
}
I guess the reason why dn.node_page is not an inode page could be: there
are multiple nat entries share the same node block address, once the node
block address was reused, f2fs_get_node_page() may load a non-inode block.
Let's add a sanity check for such condition to avoid out-of-bounds access
issue.
Reported-by: syzbot+6653f10281a1badc749e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/66fdcdf3.050a0220.40bef.0025.GAE@google.com
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b61e69bb1c049cf507e3c654fa3dc1568231bd07 ]
syzbot report a deadlock in diFree. [1]
When calling "ioctl$LOOP_SET_STATUS64", the offset value passed in is 4,
which does not match the mounted loop device, causing the mapping of the
mounted loop device to be invalidated.
When creating the directory and creating the inode of iag in diReadSpecial(),
read the page of fixed disk inode (AIT) in raw mode in read_metapage(), the
metapage data it returns is corrupted, which causes the nlink value of 0 to be
assigned to the iag inode when executing copy_from_dinode(), which ultimately
causes a deadlock when entering diFree().
To avoid this, first check the nlink value of dinode before setting iag inode.
[1]
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz-executor301/5309 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index]));
lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index]));
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
5 locks held by syz-executor301/5309:
#0: ffff8880422a4420 (sb_writers#9){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x3f/0x90 fs/namespace.c:515
#1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:850 [inline]
#1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: filename_create+0x260/0x540 fs/namei.c:4026
#2: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630
#3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2460 [inline]
#3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline]
#3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x4b7/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669
#4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2477 [inline]
#4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline]
#4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x869/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5309 Comm: syz-executor301 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_deadlock_bug+0x483/0x620 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3037
check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3089 [inline]
validate_chain+0x15e2/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3891
__lock_acquire+0x1384/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5202
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889
jfs_evict_inode+0x32d/0x440 fs/jfs/inode.c:156
evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:725
diFreeSpecial fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:552 [inline]
duplicateIXtree+0x3c6/0x550 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:3022
diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2597 [inline]
diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline]
diAllocAG+0x17dc/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669
diAlloc+0x1d2/0x1630 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1590
ialloc+0x8f/0x900 fs/jfs/jfs_inode.c:56
jfs_mkdir+0x1c5/0xba0 fs/jfs/namei.c:225
vfs_mkdir+0x2f9/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:4257
do_mkdirat+0x264/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4280
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4295 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4293 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x87/0xa0 fs/namei.c:4293
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Reported-by: syzbot+355da3b3a74881008e8f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=355da3b3a74881008e8f
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7fcbf789629cdb9fbf4e2172ce31136cfed11e5e ]
The JFS filesystem calculates allocation group (AG) size using 1 <<
l2agsize in dbExtendFS(). When l2agsize exceeds 31 (possible with >2TB
aggregates on 32-bit systems), this 32-bit shift operation causes undefined
behavior and improper AG sizing.
On 32-bit architectures:
- Left-shifting 1 by 32+ bits results in 0 due to integer overflow
- This creates invalid AG sizes (0 or garbage values) in
sbi->bmap->db_agsize
- Subsequent block allocations would reference invalid AG structures
- Could lead to:
- Filesystem corruption during extend operations
- Kernel crashes due to invalid memory accesses
- Security vulnerabilities via malformed on-disk structures
Fix by casting to s64 before shifting:
bmp->db_agsize = (s64)1 << l2agsize;
This ensures 64-bit arithmetic even on 32-bit architectures. The cast
matches the data type of db_agsize (s64) and follows similar patterns in
JFS block calculation code.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Signed-off-by: Rand Deeb <rand.sec96@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 70ca3246ad201b53a9f09380b3f29d8bac320383 ]
The expression "inactags << bmp->db_agl2size" in the function
dbFinalizeBmap() is computed using int operands. Although the
values (inactags and db_agl2size) are derived from filesystem
parameters and are usually small, there is a theoretical risk that
the shift could overflow a 32-bit int if extreme values occur.
According to the C standard, shifting a signed 32-bit int can lead
to undefined behavior if the result exceeds its range. In our
case, an overflow could miscalculate free blocks, potentially
leading to erroneous filesystem accounting.
To ensure the arithmetic is performed in 64-bit space, we cast
"inactags" to s64 before shifting. This defensive fix prevents any
risk of overflow and complies with kernel coding best practices.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Signed-off-by: Rand Deeb <rand.sec96@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9629d7d66c621671d9a47afe27ca9336bfc8a9ea ]
syzbot reports that hex_dump_to_buffer is using uninit-value:
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hex_dump_to_buffer+0x888/0x1100 lib/hexdump.c:171
hex_dump_to_buffer+0x888/0x1100 lib/hexdump.c:171
print_hex_dump+0x13d/0x3e0 lib/hexdump.c:276
diFree+0x5ba/0x4350 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:876
jfs_evict_inode+0x510/0x550 fs/jfs/inode.c:156
evict+0x723/0xd10 fs/inode.c:796
iput_final fs/inode.c:1946 [inline]
iput+0x97b/0xdb0 fs/inode.c:1972
txUpdateMap+0xf3e/0x1150 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2367
txLazyCommit fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2664 [inline]
jfs_lazycommit+0x627/0x11d0 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2733
kthread+0x6b9/0xef0 kernel/kthread.c:464
ret_from_fork+0x6d/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4121 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4164 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x8e3/0xdf0 mm/slub.c:4320
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:901 [inline]
diMount+0x61/0x7f0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:105
jfs_mount+0xa8e/0x11d0 fs/jfs/jfs_mount.c:176
jfs_fill_super+0xa47/0x17c0 fs/jfs/super.c:523
get_tree_bdev_flags+0x6ec/0x910 fs/super.c:1636
get_tree_bdev+0x37/0x50 fs/super.c:1659
jfs_get_tree+0x34/0x40 fs/jfs/super.c:635
vfs_get_tree+0xb1/0x5a0 fs/super.c:1814
do_new_mount+0x71f/0x15e0 fs/namespace.c:3560
path_mount+0x742/0x1f10 fs/namespace.c:3887
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3900 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4111 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x71f/0x800 fs/namespace.c:4088
__x64_sys_mount+0xe4/0x150 fs/namespace.c:4088
x64_sys_call+0x39bf/0x3c30 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:166
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
=====================================================
The reason is that imap is not properly initialized after memory
allocation. It will cause the snprintf() function to write uninitialized
data into linebuf within hex_dump_to_buffer().
Fix this by using kzalloc instead of kmalloc to clear its content at the
beginning in diMount().
Signed-off-by: Zhongqiu Han <quic_zhonhan@quicinc.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+df6cdcb35904203d2b6d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/67b5d07e.050a0220.14d86d.00e6.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f381640e1bd4f2de7ccafbfe8703d33c3718aad9 ]
... except when the table is known to be only used by one thread.
A file pointer can get installed at any moment despite the ->file_lock
being held since the following:
8a81252b77 ("fs/file.c: don't acquire files->file_lock in fd_install()")
Accesses subject to such a race can in principle suffer load tearing.
While here redo the comment in dup_fd -- it only covered a race against
files showing up, still assuming fd_install() takes the lock.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250313135725.1320914-1-mjguzik@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 8a388c1fabeb6606e16467b23242416c0dbeffad upstream.
NFSD sends CB_RECALL_ANY to clients when the server is low on
memory or that client has a large number of delegations outstanding.
We've seen cases where NFSD attempts to send CB_RECALL_ANY requests
to disconnected clients, and gets confused. These calls never go
anywhere if a backchannel transport to the target client isn't
available. Before the server can send any backchannel operation, the
client has to connect first and then do a BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION.
This patch doesn't address the root cause of the confusion, but
there's no need to queue up these optional operations if they can't
go anywhere.
Fixes: 44df6f439a ("NFSD: add delegation reaper to react to low memory condition")
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 230ca758453c63bd38e4d9f4a21db698f7abada8 upstream.
Before calling nfsd4_run_cb to queue dl_recall to the callback_wq, we
increment the reference count of dl_stid.
We expect that after the corresponding work_struct is processed, the
reference count of dl_stid will be decremented through the callback
function nfsd4_cb_recall_release.
However, if the call to nfsd4_run_cb fails, the incremented reference
count of dl_stid will not be decremented correspondingly, leading to the
following nfs4_stid leak:
unreferenced object 0xffff88812067b578 (size 344):
comm "nfsd", pid 2761, jiffies 4295044002 (age 5541.241s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 6b 6b 6b 6b b8 02 c0 e2 81 88 ff ff ....kkkk........
00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de .kkkkkkk.....N..
backtrace:
kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b9/0x700
nfsd4_process_open1+0x34/0x300
nfsd4_open+0x2d1/0x9d0
nfsd4_proc_compound+0x7a2/0xe30
nfsd_dispatch+0x241/0x3e0
svc_process_common+0x5d3/0xcc0
svc_process+0x2a3/0x320
nfsd+0x180/0x2e0
kthread+0x199/0x1d0
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
unreferenced object 0xffff8881499f4d28 (size 368):
comm "nfsd", pid 2761, jiffies 4295044005 (age 5541.239s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 4d 9f 49 81 88 ff ff ........0M.I....
30 4d 9f 49 81 88 ff ff 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 0M.I.... .......
backtrace:
kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b9/0x700
nfs4_alloc_stid+0x29/0x210
alloc_init_deleg+0x92/0x2e0
nfs4_set_delegation+0x284/0xc00
nfs4_open_delegation+0x216/0x3f0
nfsd4_process_open2+0x2b3/0xee0
nfsd4_open+0x770/0x9d0
nfsd4_proc_compound+0x7a2/0xe30
nfsd_dispatch+0x241/0x3e0
svc_process_common+0x5d3/0xcc0
svc_process+0x2a3/0x320
nfsd+0x180/0x2e0
kthread+0x199/0x1d0
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
Fix it by checking the result of nfsd4_run_cb and call nfs4_put_stid if
fail to queue dl_recall.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a8dfb2168906944ea61acfc87846b816eeab882d upstream.
If the file system is corrupted, the header.stblindex variable
may become greater than 127. Because of this, an array access out
of bounds may occur:
------------[ cut here ]------------
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3096:10
index 237 is out of range for type 'struct dtslot[128]'
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5822 Comm: syz-executor740 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00110-g4099a71718b0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:231 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x121/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:429
dtReadFirst+0x622/0xc50 fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3096
dtReadNext fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3147 [inline]
jfs_readdir+0x9aa/0x3c50 fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:2862
wrap_directory_iterator+0x91/0xd0 fs/readdir.c:65
iterate_dir+0x571/0x800 fs/readdir.c:108
__do_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:403 [inline]
__se_sys_getdents64+0x1e2/0x4b0 fs/readdir.c:389
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
---[ end trace ]---
Add a stblindex check for corruption.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+9120834fc227768625ba@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9120834fc227768625ba
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fdf480da5837c23b146c4743c18de97202fcab37 upstream.
During the "size_check" label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended
attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs
"ea_get: invalid extended attribute" and calls print_hex_dump().
Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds
INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped:
int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper
limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads
"size" to wrap around and become negative (-184549328).
The "size" is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called "len" in
print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned
type), this is then stored inside a variable called
"int remaining", which is then assigned to "int linelen" which
is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump()
the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is
18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer()
on each iteration:
for (i = 0; i < len; i += rowsize) {
linelen = min(remaining, rowsize);
remaining -= rowsize;
hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize,
linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii);
...
}
The expected stopping condition (i < len) is effectively broken
since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to
the "ptr+i" being passed to hex_dump_to_buffer() to get closer
to the end of the actual bounds of "ptr", eventually an out of
bounds access is done in hex_dump_to_buffer() in the following
for loop:
for (j = 0; j < len; j++) {
if (linebuflen < lx + 2)
goto overflow2;
ch = ptr[j];
...
}
To fix this we should validate "EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)"
before it is utilised.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+4e6e7e4279d046613bc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+4e6e7e4279d046613bc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e6e7e4279d046613bc5
Fixes: d9f9d96136cb ("jfs: xattr: check invalid xattr size more strictly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Qasim Ijaz <qasdev00@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d5e206778e96e8667d3bde695ad372c296dc9353 upstream.
Mounting a corrupted filesystem with directory which contains '.' dir
entry with rec_len == block size results in out-of-bounds read (later
on, when the corrupted directory is removed).
ext4_empty_dir() assumes every ext4 directory contains at least '.'
and '..' as directory entries in the first data block. It first loads
the '.' dir entry, performs sanity checks by calling ext4_check_dir_entry()
and then uses its rec_len member to compute the location of '..' dir
entry (in ext4_next_entry). It assumes the '..' dir entry fits into the
same data block.
If the rec_len of '.' is precisely one block (4KB), it slips through the
sanity checks (it is considered the last directory entry in the data
block) and leaves "struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de" point exactly past the
memory slot allocated to the data block. The following call to
ext4_check_dir_entry() on new value of de then dereferences this pointer
which results in out-of-bounds mem access.
Fix this by extending __ext4_check_dir_entry() to check for '.' dir
entries that reach the end of data block. Make sure to ignore the phony
dir entries for checksum (by checking name_len for non-zero).
Note: This is reported by KASAN as use-after-free in case another
structure was recently freed from the slot past the bound, but it is
really an OOB read.
This issue was found by syzkaller tool.
Call Trace:
[ 38.594108] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[ 38.594649] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88802b41a004 by task syz-executor/5375
[ 38.595158]
[ 38.595288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5375 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7 #1
[ 38.595298] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 38.595304] Call Trace:
[ 38.595308] <TASK>
[ 38.595311] dump_stack_lvl+0xa7/0xd0
[ 38.595325] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3f0
[ 38.595339] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[ 38.595349] print_report+0xaa/0x250
[ 38.595359] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[ 38.595368] ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x9/0x90
[ 38.595378] kasan_report+0xab/0xe0
[ 38.595389] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[ 38.595400] __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[ 38.595410] ext4_empty_dir+0x465/0x990
[ 38.595421] ? __pfx_ext4_empty_dir+0x10/0x10
[ 38.595432] ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x29a/0xd10
[ 38.595441] ? __dquot_initialize+0x2a7/0xbf0
[ 38.595455] ? __pfx_ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x10/0x10
[ 38.595464] ? __pfx___dquot_initialize+0x10/0x10
[ 38.595478] ? down_write+0xdb/0x140
[ 38.595487] ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10
[ 38.595497] ext4_rmdir+0xee/0x140
[ 38.595506] vfs_rmdir+0x209/0x670
[ 38.595517] ? lookup_one_qstr_excl+0x3b/0x190
[ 38.595529] do_rmdir+0x363/0x3c0
[ 38.595537] ? __pfx_do_rmdir+0x10/0x10
[ 38.595544] ? strncpy_from_user+0x1ff/0x2e0
[ 38.595561] __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xf0/0x130
[ 38.595570] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
[ 38.595583] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Fixes: ac27a0ec11 ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <acsjakub@amazon.de>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mahmoud Adam <mngyadam@amazon.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/b3ae36a6794c4a01944c7d70b403db5b@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f87d3af7419307ae26e705a2b2db36140db367a2 upstream.
This fixes an analogus bug that was fixed in xfs in commit
4b8d867ca6e2 ("xfs: don't over-report free space or inodes in
statvfs") where statfs can report misleading / incorrect information
where project quota is enabled, and the free space is less than the
remaining quota.
This commit will resolve a test failure in generic/762 which tests for
this bug.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 689c958cbe ("ext4: add project quota support")
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bf21e29d78cd2c2371023953d9c82dfef82ebb36 upstream.
Access psid->sub_auth[psid->num_subauth - 1] without checking
if num_subauth is non-zero leads to an out-of-bounds read.
This patch adds a validation step to ensure num_subauth != 0
before sub_auth is accessed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fa4cdb8cbca7d6cb6aa13e4d8d83d1103f6345db upstream.
There is a race condition between session setup and
ksmbd_sessions_deregister. The session can be freed before the connection
is added to channel list of session.
This patch check reference count of session before freeing it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Sean Heelan <seanheelan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 15a9605f8d69dc85005b1a00c31a050b8625e1aa upstream.
In multichannel mode, UAF issue can occur in session_deregister
when the second channel sets up a session through the connection of
the first channel. session that is freed through the global session
table can be accessed again through ->sessions of connection.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Tested-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit aa2a739a75ab6f24ef72fb3fdb9192c081eacf06 ]
parse_dcal() validate num_aces to allocate ace array.
f (num_aces > ULONG_MAX / sizeof(struct smb_ace *))
It is an incorrect validation that we can create an array of size ULONG_MAX.
smb_acl has ->size field to calculate actual number of aces in response buffer
size. Use this to check invalid num_aces.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 011ea742a25a77bac3d995f457886a67d178c6f0 ]
If a data sector on an OFS floppy contains a value > 0x1e8 (the
largest amount of data that fits in the sector after its header), then
an Amiga reading the file can return corrupt data, by taking the
overlarge size at its word and reading past the end of the buffer it
read the disk sector into!
The cause: when affs_write_end_ofs() writes data to an OFS filesystem,
the new size field for a data block was computed by adding the amount
of data currently being written (into the block) to the existing value
of the size field. This is correct if you're extending the file at the
end, but if you seek backwards in the file and overwrite _existing_
data, it can lead to the size field being larger than the maximum
legal value.
This commit changes the calculation so that it sets the size field to
the max of its previous size and the position within the block that we
just wrote up to.
Signed-off-by: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e4cf8ec4de4e13f156c1d61977d282d90c221085 ]
If I write a file to an OFS floppy image, and try to read it back on
an emulated Amiga running Workbench 1.3, the Amiga reports a disk
error trying to read the file. (That is, it's unable to read it _at
all_, even to copy it to the NIL: device. It isn't a matter of getting
the wrong data and being unable to parse the file format.)
This is because the 'sequence number' field in the OFS data block
header is supposed to be based at 1, but affs writes it based at 0.
All three locations changed by this patch were setting the sequence
number to a variable 'bidx' which was previously obtained by dividing
a file position by bsize, so bidx will naturally use 0 for the first
block. Therefore all three should add 1 to that value before writing
it into the sequence number field.
With this change, the Amiga successfully reads the file.
For data block reference: https://wiki.osdev.org/FFS_(Amiga)
Signed-off-by: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ddb7ea36ba7129c2ed107e2186591128618864e1 ]
r_count is only increased when there is an oplock break wait,
so r_count inc/decrement are not paired. This can cause r_count
to become negative, which can lead to a problem where the ksmbd
thread does not terminate.
Fixes: 3aa660c05924 ("ksmbd: prevent connection release during oplock break notification")
Reported-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Tested-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c1883049aa9b2b7dffd3a68c5fc67fa92c174bd9 ]
ksmbd check that the session of second channel is in the session list of
first connection. If it is in session list, multichannel connection
should not be allowed.
Fixes: b95629435b84 ("ksmbd: fix racy issue from session lookup and expire")
Reported-by: Sean Heelan <seanheelan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6171063e9d046ffa46f51579b2ca4a43caef581a ]
Use aead_request_free() instead of kfree() to properly free memory
allocated by aead_request_alloc(). This ensures sensitive crypto data
is zeroed before being freed.
Fixes: e2f34481b2 ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4e7f1644f2ac6d01dc584f6301c3b1d5aac4eaef ]
Commit ef7134c7fc48 ("smb: client: Fix use-after-free of network
namespace.") attempted to fix a netns use-after-free issue by manually
adjusting reference counts via sk->sk_net_refcnt and sock_inuse_add().
However, a later commit e9f2517a3e18 ("smb: client: fix TCP timers deadlock
after rmmod") pointed out that the approach of manually setting
sk->sk_net_refcnt in the first commit was technically incorrect, as
sk->sk_net_refcnt should only be set for user sockets. It led to issues
like TCP timers not being cleared properly on close. The second commit
moved to a model of just holding an extra netns reference for
server->ssocket using get_net(), and dropping it when the server is torn
down.
But there remain some gaps in the get_net()/put_net() balancing added by
these commits. The incomplete reference handling in these fixes results
in two issues:
1. Netns refcount leaks[1]
The problem process is as follows:
```
mount.cifs cifsd
cifs_do_mount
cifs_mount
cifs_mount_get_session
cifs_get_tcp_session
get_net() /* First get net. */
ip_connect
generic_ip_connect /* Try port 445 */
get_net()
->connect() /* Failed */
put_net()
generic_ip_connect /* Try port 139 */
get_net() /* Missing matching put_net() for this get_net().*/
cifs_get_smb_ses
cifs_negotiate_protocol
smb2_negotiate
SMB2_negotiate
cifs_send_recv
wait_for_response
cifs_demultiplex_thread
cifs_read_from_socket
cifs_readv_from_socket
cifs_reconnect
cifs_abort_connection
sock_release();
server->ssocket = NULL;
/* Missing put_net() here. */
generic_ip_connect
get_net()
->connect() /* Failed */
put_net()
sock_release();
server->ssocket = NULL;
free_rsp_buf
...
clean_demultiplex_info
/* It's only called once here. */
put_net()
```
When cifs_reconnect() is triggered, the server->ssocket is released
without a corresponding put_net() for the reference acquired in
generic_ip_connect() before. it ends up calling generic_ip_connect()
again to retry get_net(). After that, server->ssocket is set to NULL
in the error path of generic_ip_connect(), and the net count cannot be
released in the final clean_demultiplex_info() function.
2. Potential use-after-free
The current refcounting scheme can lead to a potential use-after-free issue
in the following scenario:
```
cifs_do_mount
cifs_mount
cifs_mount_get_session
cifs_get_tcp_session
get_net() /* First get net */
ip_connect
generic_ip_connect
get_net()
bind_socket
kernel_bind /* failed */
put_net()
/* after out_err_crypto_release label */
put_net()
/* after out_err label */
put_net()
```
In the exception handling process where binding the socket fails, the
get_net() and put_net() calls are unbalanced, which may cause the
server->net reference count to drop to zero and be prematurely released.
To address both issues, this patch ties the netns reference counting to
the server->ssocket and server lifecycles. The extra reference is now
acquired when the server or socket is created, and released when the
socket is destroyed or the server is torn down.
[1]: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219792
Fixes: ef7134c7fc48 ("smb: client: Fix use-after-free of network namespace.")
Fixes: e9f2517a3e18 ("smb: client: fix TCP timers deadlock after rmmod")
Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2d3e998a0bc7fe26a724f87a8ce217848040520e ]
The nfs_client manages state for all the superblocks in the
"cl_superblocks" list, so it must not be shut down until all of them are
gone.
Fixes: 7d3e26a054 ("NFS: Cancel all existing RPC tasks when shutdown")
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0bc754d1e31f40f4a343b692096d9e092ccc0370 ]
Some file systems (e.g. ext4) may reuse inode numbers once the inode is
not in use anymore. Usually hostfs will keep an FD open for each inode,
but this is not always the case. In the case of sockets, this cannot
even be done properly.
As such, the following sequence of events was possible:
* application creates and deletes a socket
* hostfs creates/deletes the socket on the host
* inode is still in the hostfs cache
* hostfs creates a new file
* ext4 on the outside reuses the inode number
* hostfs finds the socket inode for the newly created file
* application receives -ENXIO when opening the file
As mentioned, this can only happen if the deleted file is a special file
that is never opened on the host (i.e. no .open fop).
As such, to prevent issues, it is sufficient to check that the inode
has the expected type. That said, also add a check for the inode birth
time, just to be on the safe side.
Fixes: 74ce793bcb ("hostfs: Fix ephemeral inodes")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Berg <benjamin.berg@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Tested-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250214092822.1241575-1-benjamin@sipsolutions.net
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
