commit 5b9554dc5b upstream.
If s_reserved_gdt_blocks is extremely large, it's possible for
ext4_init_block_bitmap(), which is called when ext4 sets up an
uninitialized block bitmap, to corrupt random kernel memory. Add the
same checks which e2fsck has --- it must never be larger than
blocksize / sizeof(__u32) --- and then add a backup check in
ext4_init_block_bitmap() in case the superblock gets modified after
the file system is mounted.
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6a7fd522a7 upstream.
If ext4_fill_super() fails early, it's possible for ext4_evict_inode()
to call ext4_should_journal_data() before superblock options and flags
are fully set up. In that case, the iput() on the journal inode can
end up causing a BUG().
Work around this problem by reordering the tests so we only call
ext4_should_journal_data() after we know it's not the journal inode.
Fixes: 2d859db3e4 ("ext4: fix data corruption in inodes with journalled data")
Fixes: 2b405bfa84 ("ext4: fix data=journal fast mount/umount hang")
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 646caa9c8e upstream.
Commit 06bd3c36a7 (ext4: fix data exposure after a crash) uncovered a
deadlock in ext4_writepages() which was previously much harder to hit.
After this commit xfstest generic/130 reproduces the deadlock on small
filesystems.
The problem happens when ext4_do_update_inode() sets LARGE_FILE feature
and marks current inode handle as synchronous. That subsequently results
in ext4_journal_stop() called from ext4_writepages() to block waiting for
transaction commit while still holding page locks, reference to io_end,
and some prepared bio in mpd structure each of which can possibly block
transaction commit from completing and thus results in deadlock.
Fix the problem by releasing page locks, io_end reference, and
submitting prepared bio before calling ext4_journal_stop().
[ Changed to defer the call to ext4_journal_stop() only if the handle
is synchronous. --tytso ]
Reported-and-tested-by: Eryu Guan <eguan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f70749ca42 upstream.
An extent with lblock = 4294967295 and len = 1 will pass the
ext4_valid_extent() test:
ext4_lblk_t last = lblock + len - 1;
if (len == 0 || lblock > last)
return 0;
since last = 4294967295 + 1 - 1 = 4294967295. This would later trigger
the BUG_ON(es->es_lblk + es->es_len < es->es_lblk) in ext4_es_end().
We can simplify it by removing the - 1 altogether and changing the test
to use lblock + len <= lblock, since now if len = 0, then lblock + 0 ==
lblock and it fails, and if len > 0 then lblock + len > lblock in order
to pass (i.e. it doesn't overflow).
Fixes: 5946d0893 ("ext4: check for overlapping extents in ext4_valid_extent_entries()")
Fixes: 2f974865f ("ext4: check for zero length extent explicitly")
Cc: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5f070e81be upstream.
When there is more data to be processed, the current test in
scatterwalk_done may prevent us from calling pagedone even when
we should.
In particular, if we're on an SG entry spanning multiple pages
where the last page is not a full page, we will incorrectly skip
calling pagedone on the second last page.
This patch fixes this by adding a separate test for whether we've
reached the end of a page.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b30bdfa864 upstream.
As it is if you ask for a sync gcm you may actually end up with
an async one because it does not filter out async implementations
of ghash.
This patch fixes this by adding the necessary filter when looking
for ghash.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 47be61845c upstream.
We triggered soft-lockup under stress test which
open/access/write/close one file concurrently on more than
five different CPUs:
WARN: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 11s! [who:30631]
...
[<ffffffc0003986f8>] dput+0x100/0x298
[<ffffffc00038c2dc>] terminate_walk+0x4c/0x60
[<ffffffc00038f56c>] path_lookupat+0x5cc/0x7a8
[<ffffffc00038f780>] filename_lookup+0x38/0xf0
[<ffffffc000391180>] user_path_at_empty+0x78/0xd0
[<ffffffc0003911f4>] user_path_at+0x1c/0x28
[<ffffffc00037d4fc>] SyS_faccessat+0xb4/0x230
->d_lock trylock may failed many times because of concurrently
operations, and dput() may execute a long time.
Fix this by replacing cpu_relax() with cond_resched().
dput() used to be sleepable, so make it sleepable again
should be safe.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9ebce595f6 upstream.
fuse_flush() calls write_inode_now() that triggers writeback, but actual
writeback will happen later, on fuse_sync_writes(). If an error happens,
fuse_writepage_end() will set error bit in mapping->flags. So, we have to
check mapping->flags after fuse_sync_writes().
Signed-off-by: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 4d99ff8f12 ("fuse: Turn writeback cache on")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ac7f052b9e upstream.
Due to implementation of fuse writeback filemap_write_and_wait_range() does
not catch errors. We have to do this directly after fuse_sync_writes()
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 4d99ff8f12 ("fuse: Turn writeback cache on")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1886297ce0 upstream.
The following BUG_ON() crash was reported on QEMU/i386:
kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:79!
Call Trace:
phys_mem_access_prot_allowed
mmap_mem
? mmap_region
mmap_region
do_mmap
vm_mmap_pgoff
SyS_mmap_pgoff
do_int80_syscall_32
entry_INT80_32
after commit:
edfe63ec97 ("x86/mtrr: Fix Xorg crashes in Qemu sessions")
PAT is now set to disabled state when MTRRs are disabled.
Thus, reactivating the __pa(high_memory) check in
phys_mem_access_prot_allowed().
When CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL is set, __pa() calls __phys_addr(),
which in turn calls slow_virt_to_phys() for 'high_memory'.
Because 'high_memory' is set to (the max direct mapped virt
addr + 1), it is not a valid virtual address. Hence,
slow_virt_to_phys() returns 0 and hit the BUG_ON. Using
__pa_nodebug() instead of __pa() will fix this BUG_ON.
However, this code block, originally written for Pentiums and
earlier, is no longer adequate since a 32-bit Xen guest has
MTRRs disabled and supports ZONE_HIGHMEM. In this setup,
this code sets UC attribute for accessing RAM in high memory
range.
Delete this code block as it has been unused for a long time.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <ying.huang@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1460403360-25441-1-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/4/1/608
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit edfe63ec97 upstream.
A Xorg failure on qemu32 was reported as a regression [1] caused by
commit 9cd25aac1f ("x86/mm/pat: Emulate PAT when it is disabled").
This patch fixes the Xorg crash.
Negative effects of this regression were the following two failures [2]
in Xorg on QEMU with QEMU CPU model "qemu32" (-cpu qemu32), which were
triggered by the fact that its virtual CPU does not support MTRRs.
#1. copy_process() failed in the check in reserve_pfn_range()
copy_process
copy_mm
dup_mm
dup_mmap
copy_page_range
track_pfn_copy
reserve_pfn_range
A WC map request was tracked as WC in memtype, which set a PTE as
UC (pgprot) per __cachemode2pte_tbl[]. This led to this error in
reserve_pfn_range() called from track_pfn_copy(), which obtained
a pgprot from a PTE. It converts pgprot to page_cache_mode, which
does not necessarily result in the original page_cache_mode since
__cachemode2pte_tbl[] redirects multiple types to UC.
#2. error path in copy_process() then hit WARN_ON_ONCE in
untrack_pfn().
x86/PAT: Xorg:509 map pfn expected mapping type uncached-
minus for [mem 0xfd000000-0xfdffffff], got write-combining
Call Trace:
dump_stack
warn_slowpath_common
? untrack_pfn
? untrack_pfn
warn_slowpath_null
untrack_pfn
? __kunmap_atomic
unmap_single_vma
? pagevec_move_tail_fn
unmap_vmas
exit_mmap
mmput
copy_process.part.47
_do_fork
SyS_clone
do_syscall_32_irqs_on
entry_INT80_32
These negative effects are caused by two separate bugs, but they
can be addressed in separate patches. Fixing the pat_init() issue
described below addresses the root cause, and avoids Xorg to hit
these cases.
When the CPU does not support MTRRs, MTRR does not call pat_init(),
which leaves PAT enabled without initializing PAT. This pat_init()
issue is a long-standing issue, but manifested as issue #1 (and then
hit issue #2) with the above-mentioned commit because the memtype
now tracks cache attribute with 'page_cache_mode'.
This pat_init() issue existed before the commit, but we used pgprot
in memtype. Hence, we did not have issue #1 before. But WC request
resulted in WT in effect because WC pgrot is actually WT when PAT
is not initialized. This is not how it was designed to work. When
PAT is set to disable properly, WC is converted to UC. The use of
WT can result in a system crash if the target range does not support
WT. Fortunately, nobody ran into such issue before.
To fix this pat_init() issue, PAT code has been enhanced to provide
pat_disable() interface. Call this interface when MTRRs are disabled.
By setting PAT to disable properly, PAT bypasses the memtype check,
and avoids issue #1.
[1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/3/3/828
[2]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/3/4/775
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: elliott@hpe.com
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1458769323-24491-5-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 67245ff332 upstream.
This gets rid of the horrible notion of having that
struct inode *ptmx_inode
be the linchpin of the interface between the pty code and devpts.
By de-emphasizing the ptmx inode, a lot of things actually get cleaner,
and we will have a much saner way forward. In particular, this will
allow us to associate with any particular devpts instance at open-time,
and not be artificially tied to one particular ptmx inode.
The patch itself is actually fairly straightforward, and apart from some
locking and return path cleanups it's pretty mechanical:
- the interfaces that devpts exposes all take "struct pts_fs_info *"
instead of "struct inode *ptmx_inode" now.
NOTE! The "struct pts_fs_info" thing is a completely opaque structure
as far as the pty driver is concerned: it's still declared entirely
internally to devpts. So the pty code can't actually access it in any
way, just pass it as a "cookie" to the devpts code.
- the "look up the pts fs info" is now a single clear operation, that
also does the reference count increment on the pts superblock.
So "devpts_add/del_ref()" is gone, and replaced by a "lookup and get
ref" operation (devpts_get_ref(inode)), along with a "put ref" op
(devpts_put_ref()).
- the pty master "tty->driver_data" field now contains the pts_fs_info,
not the ptmx inode.
- because we don't care about the ptmx inode any more as some kind of
base index, the ref counting can now drop the inode games - it just
gets the ref on the superblock.
- the pts_fs_info now has a back-pointer to the super_block. That's so
that we can easily look up the information we actually need. Although
quite often, the pts fs info was actually all we wanted, and not having
to look it up based on some magical inode makes things more
straightforward.
In particular, now that "devpts_get_ref(inode)" operation should really
be the *only* place we need to look up what devpts instance we're
associated with, and we do it exactly once, at ptmx_open() time.
The other side of this is that one ptmx node could now be associated
with multiple different devpts instances - you could have a single
/dev/ptmx node, and then have multiple mount namespaces with their own
instances of devpts mounted on /dev/pts/. And that's all perfectly sane
in a model where we just look up the pts instance at open time.
This will eventually allow us to get rid of our odd single-vs-multiple
pts instance model, but this patch in itself changes no semantics, only
an internal binding model.
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@arista.com>
Cc: "Herton R. Krzesinski" <herton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 86a574de45 upstream.
Don't allow RNDADDTOENTCNT or RNDADDENTROPY to accept a negative
entropy value. It doesn't make any sense to subtract from the entropy
counter, and it can trigger a warning:
random: negative entropy/overflow: pool input count -40000
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 6828 at drivers/char/random.c:670[< none
>] credit_entropy_bits+0x21e/0xad0 drivers/char/random.c:670
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 6828 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.7.0-rc4+ #4
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
ffffffff880b58e0 ffff88005dd9fcb0 ffffffff82cc838f ffffffff87158b40
fffffbfff1016b1c 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff87158b40
ffffffff83283dae 0000000000000009 ffff88005dd9fcf8 ffffffff8136d27f
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff82cc838f>] dump_stack+0x12e/0x18f lib/dump_stack.c:51
[<ffffffff8136d27f>] __warn+0x19f/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:516
[<ffffffff8136d48c>] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:551
[<ffffffff83283dae>] credit_entropy_bits+0x21e/0xad0 drivers/char/random.c:670
[< inline >] credit_entropy_bits_safe drivers/char/random.c:734
[<ffffffff8328785d>] random_ioctl+0x21d/0x250 drivers/char/random.c:1546
[< inline >] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[<ffffffff8185316c>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0xff0 fs/ioctl.c:674
[< inline >] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:689
[<ffffffff8185405f>] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:680
[<ffffffff86a995c0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc1
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:207
---[ end trace 5d4902b2ba842f1f ]---
This was triggered using the test program:
// autogenerated by syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller)
int main() {
int fd = open("/dev/random", O_RDWR);
int val = -5000;
ioctl(fd, RNDADDTOENTCNT, &val);
return 0;
}
It's harmless in that (a) only root can trigger it, and (b) after
complaining the code never does let the entropy count go negative, but
it's better to simply not allow this userspace from passing in a
negative entropy value altogether.
Google-Bug-Id: #29575089
Reported-By: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5419447e21 upstream.
This reverts commit 852ffd0f4e.
There are use cases where an intermediate boot kernel (1) uses kexec
to boot the final production kernel (2). For this scenario we should
provide the original boot information to the production kernel (2).
Therefore clearing the boot information during kexec() should not
be done.
Reported-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4d06dd537f upstream.
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae87 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a7ae81952c upstream.
Many Intel systems the BIOS declares a SystemIO OpRegion below the SMBus
PCI device as can be seen in ACPI DSDT table from Lenovo Yoga 900:
Device (SBUS)
{
OperationRegion (SMBI, SystemIO, (SBAR << 0x05), 0x10)
Field (SMBI, ByteAcc, NoLock, Preserve)
{
HSTS, 8,
Offset (0x02),
HCON, 8,
HCOM, 8,
TXSA, 8,
DAT0, 8,
DAT1, 8,
HBDR, 8,
PECR, 8,
RXSA, 8,
SDAT, 16
}
There are also bunch of AML methods that that the BIOS can use to access
these fields. Most of the systems in question AML methods accessing the
SMBI OpRegion are never used.
Now, because of this SMBI OpRegion many systems fail to load the SMBus
driver with an error looking like one below:
ACPI Warning: SystemIO range 0x0000000000003040-0x000000000000305F
conflicts with OpRegion 0x0000000000003040-0x000000000000304F
(\_SB.PCI0.SBUS.SMBI) (20160108/utaddress-255)
ACPI: If an ACPI driver is available for this device, you should use
it instead of the native driver
The reason is that this SMBI OpRegion conflicts with the PCI BAR used by
the SMBus driver.
It turns out that we can install a custom SystemIO address space handler
for the SMBus device to intercept all accesses through that OpRegion. This
allows us to share the PCI BAR with the AML code if it for some reason is
using it. We do not expect that this OpRegion handler will ever be called
but if it is we print a warning and prevent all access from the SMBus
driver itself.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=110041
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Pali Rohár <pali.rohar@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Pali Rohár <pali.rohar@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8b8addf891 upstream.
Currently on i386 and on X86_64 when emulating X86_32 in legacy mode, only
the stack and the executable are randomized but not other mmapped files
(libraries, vDSO, etc.). This patch enables randomization for the
libraries, vDSO and mmap requests on i386 and in X86_32 in legacy mode.
By default on i386 there are 8 bits for the randomization of the libraries,
vDSO and mmaps which only uses 1MB of VA.
This patch preserves the original randomness, using 1MB of VA out of 3GB or
4GB. We think that 1MB out of 3GB is not a big cost for having the ASLR.
The first obvious security benefit is that all objects are randomized (not
only the stack and the executable) in legacy mode which highly increases
the ASLR effectiveness, otherwise the attackers may use these
non-randomized areas. But also sensitive setuid/setgid applications are
more secure because currently, attackers can disable the randomization of
these applications by setting the ulimit stack to "unlimited". This is a
very old and widely known trick to disable the ASLR in i386 which has been
allowed for too long.
Another trick used to disable the ASLR was to set the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE
personality flag, but fortunately this doesn't work on setuid/setgid
applications because there is security checks which clear Security-relevant
flags.
This patch always randomizes the mmap_legacy_base address, removing the
possibility to disable the ASLR by setting the stack to "unlimited".
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Acked-by: Ismael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1457639460-5242-1-git-send-email-hecmargi@upv.es
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 19f4c2ba86 upstream.
When setting the operational mode, some third party (Speedlink Strike-FX)
gamepads refuse the output report. Failing here means we refuse to
initialize the gamepad while this should be harmless.
The weird part is that the initial commit that added this: a7de9b8
("HID: sony: Enable Gasia third-party PS3 controllers") mentions this
very same controller as one requiring this output report.
Anyway, it's broken for one user at least, so let's change it.
We will report an error, but at least the controller should work.
And no, these devices present themselves as legacy Sony controllers
(VID:PID of 054C:0268, as in the official ones) so there are no ways
of discriminating them from the official ones.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1255325
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Fedotov <thesourcehim@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ed1f0eeeba upstream.
Add device ID 0x0a04 for Haswell-ULT to the list of devices with MCH
problems.
From a Lenovo ThinkPad T440S:
[ 0.188604] pnp: PnP ACPI init
[ 0.189044] system 00:00: [mem 0x00000000-0x0009ffff] could not be reserved
[ 0.189048] system 00:00: [mem 0x000c0000-0x000c3fff] could not be reserved
[ 0.189050] system 00:00: [mem 0x000c4000-0x000c7fff] could not be reserved
[ 0.189052] system 00:00: [mem 0x000c8000-0x000cbfff] could not be reserved
[ 0.189054] system 00:00: [mem 0x000cc000-0x000cffff] could not be reserved
[ 0.189056] system 00:00: [mem 0x000d0000-0x000d3fff] has been reserved
[ 0.189058] system 00:00: [mem 0x000d4000-0x000d7fff] has been reserved
[ 0.189060] system 00:00: [mem 0x000d8000-0x000dbfff] has been reserved
[ 0.189061] system 00:00: [mem 0x000dc000-0x000dffff] has been reserved
[ 0.189063] system 00:00: [mem 0x000e0000-0x000e3fff] could not be reserved
[ 0.189065] system 00:00: [mem 0x000e4000-0x000e7fff] could not be reserved
[ 0.189067] system 00:00: [mem 0x000e8000-0x000ebfff] could not be reserved
[ 0.189069] system 00:00: [mem 0x000ec000-0x000effff] could not be reserved
[ 0.189071] system 00:00: [mem 0x000f0000-0x000fffff] could not be reserved
[ 0.189073] system 00:00: [mem 0x00100000-0xdf9fffff] could not be reserved
[ 0.189075] system 00:00: [mem 0xfec00000-0xfed3ffff] could not be reserved
[ 0.189078] system 00:00: [mem 0xfed4c000-0xffffffff] could not be reserved
[ 0.189082] system 00:00: Plug and Play ACPI device, IDs PNP0c01 (active)
[ 0.189216] system 00:01: [io 0x1800-0x189f] could not be reserved
[ 0.189220] system 00:01: [io 0x0800-0x087f] has been reserved
[ 0.189222] system 00:01: [io 0x0880-0x08ff] has been reserved
[ 0.189224] system 00:01: [io 0x0900-0x097f] has been reserved
[ 0.189226] system 00:01: [io 0x0980-0x09ff] has been reserved
[ 0.189229] system 00:01: [io 0x0a00-0x0a7f] has been reserved
[ 0.189231] system 00:01: [io 0x0a80-0x0aff] has been reserved
[ 0.189233] system 00:01: [io 0x0b00-0x0b7f] has been reserved
[ 0.189235] system 00:01: [io 0x0b80-0x0bff] has been reserved
[ 0.189238] system 00:01: [io 0x15e0-0x15ef] has been reserved
[ 0.189240] system 00:01: [io 0x1600-0x167f] has been reserved
[ 0.189242] system 00:01: [io 0x1640-0x165f] has been reserved
[ 0.189246] system 00:01: [mem 0xf8000000-0xfbffffff] could not be reserved
[ 0.189249] system 00:01: [mem 0x00000000-0x00000fff] could not be reserved
[ 0.189251] system 00:01: [mem 0xfed1c000-0xfed1ffff] has been reserved
[ 0.189254] system 00:01: [mem 0xfed10000-0xfed13fff] has been reserved
[ 0.189256] system 00:01: [mem 0xfed18000-0xfed18fff] has been reserved
[ 0.189258] system 00:01: [mem 0xfed19000-0xfed19fff] has been reserved
[ 0.189261] system 00:01: [mem 0xfed45000-0xfed4bfff] has been reserved
[ 0.189264] system 00:01: Plug and Play ACPI device, IDs PNP0c02 (active)
[....]
[ 0.583653] resource sanity check: requesting [mem 0xfed10000-0xfed15fff], which spans more than pnp 00:01 [mem 0xfed10000-0xfed13fff]
[ 0.583654] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 0.583660] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:198 __ioremap_caller+0x2c5/0x380()
[ 0.583661] Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.
[ 0.583662] Modules linked in:
[ 0.583666] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.3.3-303.fc23.x86_64 #1
[ 0.583668] Hardware name: LENOVO 20AR001GXS/20AR001GXS, BIOS GJET86WW (2.36 ) 12/04/2015
[ 0.583670] 0000000000000000 0000000014cf7e59 ffff880214a1baf8 ffffffff813a625f
[ 0.583673] ffff880214a1bb40 ffff880214a1bb30 ffffffff810a07c2 00000000fed10000
[ 0.583675] ffffc90000cb8000 0000000000006000 0000000000000000 ffff8800d6381040
[ 0.583678] Call Trace:
[ 0.583683] [<ffffffff813a625f>] dump_stack+0x44/0x55
[ 0.583686] [<ffffffff810a07c2>] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xc0
[ 0.583688] [<ffffffff810a085c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0x80
[ 0.583692] [<ffffffff810a6fba>] ? iomem_map_sanity_check+0xba/0xd0
[ 0.583695] [<ffffffff81065835>] __ioremap_caller+0x2c5/0x380
[ 0.583698] [<ffffffff81065907>] ioremap_nocache+0x17/0x20
[ 0.583701] [<ffffffff8103a119>] snb_uncore_imc_init_box+0x79/0xb0
[ 0.583705] [<ffffffff81038900>] uncore_pci_probe+0xd0/0x1b0
[ 0.583707] [<ffffffff813efda5>] local_pci_probe+0x45/0xa0
[ 0.583710] [<ffffffff813f118d>] pci_device_probe+0xfd/0x140
[ 0.583713] [<ffffffff814d9b52>] driver_probe_device+0x222/0x480
[ 0.583715] [<ffffffff814d9e34>] __driver_attach+0x84/0x90
[ 0.583717] [<ffffffff814d9db0>] ? driver_probe_device+0x480/0x480
[ 0.583720] [<ffffffff814d762c>] bus_for_each_dev+0x6c/0xc0
[ 0.583722] [<ffffffff814d930e>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20
[ 0.583724] [<ffffffff814d8e4b>] bus_add_driver+0x1eb/0x280
[ 0.583727] [<ffffffff81d6af1a>] ? uncore_cpu_setup+0x12/0x12
[ 0.583729] [<ffffffff814da680>] driver_register+0x60/0xe0
[ 0.583733] [<ffffffff813ef78c>] __pci_register_driver+0x4c/0x50
[ 0.583736] [<ffffffff81d6affc>] intel_uncore_init+0xe2/0x2e6
[ 0.583738] [<ffffffff81d6af1a>] ? uncore_cpu_setup+0x12/0x12
[ 0.583741] [<ffffffff81002123>] do_one_initcall+0xb3/0x200
[ 0.583745] [<ffffffff810be500>] ? parse_args+0x1a0/0x4a0
[ 0.583749] [<ffffffff81d5c1c8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x223
[ 0.583752] [<ffffffff81775c40>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
[ 0.583754] [<ffffffff81775c4e>] kernel_init+0xe/0xe0
[ 0.583758] [<ffffffff81781adf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 0.583760] [<ffffffff81775c40>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
[ 0.583765] ---[ end trace 077c426a39e018aa ]---
00:00.0 Host bridge [0600]: Intel Corporation Haswell-ULT DRAM Controller [8086:0a04] (rev 0b)
Subsystem: Lenovo Device [17aa:220c]
Control: I/O- Mem+ BusMaster+ SpecCycle- MemWINV- VGASnoop- ParErr- Stepping- SERR- FastB2B- DisINTx-
Status: Cap+ 66MHz- UDF- FastB2B+ ParErr- DEVSEL=fast >TAbort- <TAbort- <MAbort+ >SERR- <PERR- INTx-
Latency: 0
Capabilities: <access denied>
Kernel driver in use: hsw_uncore
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1300955
Tested-by: <robo@tcp.sk>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 221255aee6 upstream.
device handler initialisation might fail due to a number of
reasons. But as device_handlers are optional this shouldn't
cause us to disable the device entirely.
So just ignore errors from scsi_dh_add_device().
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit e6bd18f57a ("IB/security: Restrict use of the write()
interface") fixed a security problem with various write()
implementations in the Infiniband subsystem. In older kernel versions
the ipath_write() function has the same problem and needs the same
restriction. (The ipath driver has been completely removed upstream.)
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit f626300a3e ]
tcp_select_initial_window() intends to advertise a window
scaling for the maximum possible window size. To do so,
it considers the maximum of net.ipv4.tcp_rmem[2] and
net.core.rmem_max as the only possible upper-bounds.
However, users with CAP_NET_ADMIN can use SO_RCVBUFFORCE
to set the socket's receive buffer size to values
larger than net.ipv4.tcp_rmem[2] and net.core.rmem_max.
Thus, SO_RCVBUFFORCE is effectively ignored by
tcp_select_initial_window().
To fix this, consider the maximum of net.ipv4.tcp_rmem[2],
net.core.rmem_max and socket's initial buffer space.
Fixes: b0573dea1f ("[NET]: Introduce SO_{SND,RCV}BUFFORCE socket options")
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Suggested-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e86663c475 ]
Nothing is decrementing the index "i" while we are cleaning up the
fragments we could not successful transmit.
Fixes: 9cde94506e ("bgmac: implement scatter/gather support")
Reported-by: coverity (CID 1352048)
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 005db31d5f ]
Commit e826eafa65 ("bonding: Call netif_carrier_off after
register_netdevice") moved netif_carrier_off() from bond_init() to
bond_create(), but the latter is called only for initial default
devices and ones created through sysfs:
$ modprobe bonding
$ echo +bond1 > /sys/class/net/bonding_masters
$ ip link add bond2 type bond
$ grep "MII Status" /proc/net/bonding/*
/proc/net/bonding/bond0:MII Status: down
/proc/net/bonding/bond1:MII Status: down
/proc/net/bonding/bond2:MII Status: up
Ensure that carrier is initially off also for devices created through
netlink.
Signed-off-by: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 80610229ef ]
Vegard Nossum is reporting for a crash in fib_dump_info
when nh_dev = NULL and fib_nhs == 1:
Pid: 50, comm: netlink.exe Not tainted 4.7.0-rc5+
RIP: 0033:[<00000000602b3d18>]
RSP: 0000000062623890 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000006261b800 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000024 RDI: 000000006245ba00
RBP: 00000000626238f0 R08: 000000000000029c R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000062468038 R11: 000000006245ba00 R12: 000000006245ba00
R13: 00000000625f96c0 R14: 00000000601e16f0 R15: 0000000000000000
Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel mode fault at addr 0x2e0, ip 0x602b3d18
CPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: netlink.exe Not tainted 4.7.0-rc5+ #581
Stack:
626238f0 960226a02 00000400 000000fe
62623910 600afca7 62623970 62623a48
62468038 00000018 00000000 00000000
Call Trace:
[<602b3e93>] rtmsg_fib+0xd3/0x190
[<602b6680>] fib_table_insert+0x260/0x500
[<602b0e5d>] inet_rtm_newroute+0x4d/0x60
[<60250def>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x8f/0x270
[<60267079>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xc9/0xe0
[<60250d4b>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x3b/0x50
[<60265400>] netlink_unicast+0x1a0/0x2c0
[<60265e47>] netlink_sendmsg+0x3f7/0x470
[<6021dc9a>] sock_sendmsg+0x3a/0x90
[<6021e0d0>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x300/0x360
[<6021fa64>] __sys_sendmsg+0x54/0xa0
[<6021fac0>] SyS_sendmsg+0x10/0x20
[<6001ea68>] handle_syscall+0x88/0x90
[<600295fd>] userspace+0x3fd/0x500
[<6001ac55>] fork_handler+0x85/0x90
$ addr2line -e vmlinux -i 0x602b3d18
include/linux/inetdevice.h:222
net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1264
Problem happens when RTNH_F_LINKDOWN is provided from user space
when creating routes that do not use the flag, catched with
netlink fuzzer.
Currently, the kernel allows user space to set both flags
to nh_flags and fib_flags but this is not intentional, the
assumption was that they are not set. Fix this by rejecting
both flags with EINVAL.
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Fixes: 0eeb075fad ("net: ipv4 sysctl option to ignore routes when nexthop link is down")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Cc: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@cumulusnetworks.com>
Cc: Dinesh Dutt <ddutt@cumulusnetworks.com>
Cc: Scott Feldman <sfeldma@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 083ae30828 ]
The per-socket rate limit for 'challenge acks' was introduced in the
context of limiting ack loops:
commit f2b2c582e8 ("tcp: mitigate ACK loops for connections as tcp_sock")
And I think it can be extended to rate limit all 'challenge acks' on a
per-socket basis.
Since we have the global tcp_challenge_ack_limit, this patch allows for
tcp_challenge_ack_limit to be set to a large value and effectively rely on
the per-socket limit, or set tcp_challenge_ack_limit to a lower value and
still prevents a single connections from consuming the entire challenge ack
quota.
It further moves in the direction of eliminating the global limit at some
point, as Eric Dumazet has suggested. This a follow-up to:
Subject: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 75ff39ccc1 ]
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c1892c3776 upstream.
file_remove_privs() is called with inode lock on file_inode(), which
proceeds to calling notify_change() on file->f_path.dentry. Which triggers
the WARN_ON_ONCE(!inode_is_locked(inode)) in addition to deadlocking later
when ovl_setattr tries to lock the underlying inode again.
Fix this mess by not mixing the layers, but doing everything on underlying
dentry/inode.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 07a2daab49 ("ovl: Copy up underlying inode's ->i_mode to overlay inode")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a36aa80f3c upstream.
Driver initialization tries to request a hub (GTH) driver module from
its probe callback, resulting in a deadlock.
This patch solves the problem by adding a deferred work for requesting
the hub module.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 06708f8152 upstream.
Commit aebea2ba0f ("net: mvneta: fix Tx interrupt delay") intended to
set coalescing threshold to a value guaranteeing interrupt generation
per each sent packet, so that buffers can be released with no delay.
In fact setting threshold to '1' was wrong, because it causes interrupt
every two packets. According to the documentation a reason behind it is
following - interrupt occurs once sent buffers counter reaches a value,
which is higher than one specified in MVNETA_TXQ_SIZE_REG(q). This
behavior was confirmed during tests. Also when testing the SoC working
as a NAS device, better performance was observed with int-per-packet,
as it strongly depends on the fact that all transmitted packets are
released immediately.
This commit enables NETA controller work in interrupt per sent packet mode
by setting coalescing threshold to 0.
Signed-off-by: Dmitri Epshtein <dima@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcin Wojtas <mw@semihalf.com>
Fixes aebea2ba0f ("net: mvneta: fix Tx interrupt delay")
Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 930c532869 upstream.
Currently, osd_weight and osd_state fields are updated in the encoding
order. This is wrong, because an incremental map may look like e.g.
new_up_client: { osd=6, addr=... } # set osd_state and addr
new_state: { osd=6, xorstate=EXISTS } # clear osd_state
Suppose osd6's current osd_state is EXISTS (i.e. osd6 is down). After
applying new_up_client, osd_state is changed to EXISTS | UP. Carrying
on with the new_state update, we flip EXISTS and leave osd6 in a weird
"!EXISTS but UP" state. A non-existent OSD is considered down by the
mapping code
2087 for (i = 0; i < pg->pg_temp.len; i++) {
2088 if (ceph_osd_is_down(osdmap, pg->pg_temp.osds[i])) {
2089 if (ceph_can_shift_osds(pi))
2090 continue;
2091
2092 temp->osds[temp->size++] = CRUSH_ITEM_NONE;
and so requests get directed to the second OSD in the set instead of
the first, resulting in OSD-side errors like:
[WRN] : client.4239 192.168.122.21:0/2444980242 misdirected client.4239.1:2827 pg 2.5df899f2 to osd.4 not [1,4,6] in e680/680
and hung rbds on the client:
[ 493.566367] rbd: rbd0: write 400000 at 11cc00000 (0)
[ 493.566805] rbd: rbd0: result -6 xferred 400000
[ 493.567011] blk_update_request: I/O error, dev rbd0, sector 9330688
The fix is to decouple application from the decoding and:
- apply new_weight first
- apply new_state before new_up_client
- twiddle osd_state flags if marking in
- clear out some of the state if osd is destroyed
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/14901
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Durgin <jdurgin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
