[ Upstream commit 892a666faf ]
The for_each_perag*() set of macros are hacky in that some (i.e.
those based on sb_agcount) rely on the assumption that perag
iteration terminates naturally with a NULL perag at the specified
end_agno. Others allow for the final AG to have a valid perag and
require the calling function to clean up any potential leftover
xfs_perag reference on termination of the loop.
Aside from providing a subtly inconsistent interface, the former
variant is racy with growfs because growfs can create discoverable
post-eofs perags before the final superblock update that completes
the grow operation and increases sb_agcount. This leads to the
following assert failure (reproduced by xfs/104) in the perag free
path during unmount:
XFS: Assertion failed: atomic_read(&pag->pag_ref) == 0, file: fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ag.c, line: 195
This occurs because one of the many for_each_perag() loops in the
code that is expected to terminate with a NULL pag (and thus has no
post-loop xfs_perag_put() check) raced with a growfs and found a
non-NULL post-EOFS perag, but terminated naturally based on the
end_agno check without releasing the post-EOFS perag.
Rework the iteration logic to lift the agno check from the main for
loop conditional to the iteration helper function. The for loop now
purely terminates on a NULL pag and xfs_perag_next() avoids taking a
reference to any perag beyond end_agno in the first place.
Fixes: f250eedcf7 ("xfs: make for_each_perag... a first class citizen")
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik <leah.rumancik@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 8ed004eb9d ]
The for_each_perag_from() iteration macro relies on sb_agcount to
process every perag currently within EOFS from a given starting
point. It's perfectly valid to have perag structures beyond
sb_agcount, however, such as if a growfs is in progress. If a perag
loop happens to race with growfs in this manner, it will actually
attempt to process the post-EOFS perag where ->pag_agno ==
sb_agcount. This is reproduced by xfs/104 and manifests as the
following assert failure in superblock write verifier context:
XFS: Assertion failed: agno < mp->m_sb.sb_agcount, file: fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_types.c, line: 22
Update the corresponding macro to only process perags that are
within the current sb_agcount.
Fixes: 58d43a7e32 ("xfs: pass perags around in fsmap data dev functions")
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik <leah.rumancik@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 78e8ec83a4 ]
The btree geometry computation function has an off-by-one error in that
it does not allow maximally tall btrees (nlevels == XFS_BTREE_MAXLEVELS).
This can result in repairs failing unnecessarily on very fragmented
filesystems. Subsequent patches to remove MAXLEVELS usage in favor of
the per-btree type computations will make this a much more likely
occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandan.babu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik <leah.rumancik@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4e90db5e21 upstream.
In case of error, some resources must be freed, as already done above and
below the devm_kmemdup() and __mt7921e_mcu_drv_pmctrl() calls added in the
commit in Fixes:.
Fixes: 602cc0c961 ("mt76: mt7921e: fix possible probe failure after reboot")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 602cc0c961 upstream.
It doesn't guarantee the mt7921e gets started with ASPM L0 after each
machine reboot on every platform.
If mt7921e gets started with not ASPM L0, it would be possible that the
driver encounters time to time failure in mt7921_pci_probe, like a
weird chip identifier is read
[ 215.514503] mt7921e 0000:05:00.0: ASIC revision: feed0000
[ 216.604741] mt7921e: probe of 0000:05:00.0 failed with error -110
or failing to init hardware because the driver is not allowed to access the
register until the device is in ASPM L0 state. So, we call
__mt7921e_mcu_drv_pmctrl in early mt7921_pci_probe to force the device
to bring back to the L0 state for we can safely access registers in any
case.
In the patch, we move all functions from dma.c to pci.c and register mt76
bus operation earilier, that is the __mt7921e_mcu_drv_pmctrl depends on.
Fixes: bf3747ae2e ("mt76: mt7921: enable aspm by default")
Reported-by: Kai-Chuan Hsieh <kaichuan.hsieh@canonical.com>
Co-developed-by: Deren Wu <deren.wu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Deren Wu <deren.wu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Wang <sean.wang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f1e2eef111 upstream.
Use physical address to unify the register access and reorder the
entries in fixed_map table to accelerate the address lookup for
MT7921e. Cosmetics the patch with adding an extra space to make all
entries in the array style consistent.
Tested-by: Deren Wu <deren.wu@mediatek.com>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Wang <sean.wang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit 649178c049 that is the
commit 602cc0c961 upstream.
Because there was mistake in
'649178c0493e ("mt76: mt7921e: fix possible probe failure after reboot")'
that caused WiFi reset cannot work well as the reported issue
"PROBLEM: [Stable v5.15.42+] [mt7921] Wake after suspend locks up system
when mt7921-driver is used on a Lenovo ThinkPad E15 G3" described in
http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-mediatek/2022-June/042668.html
So, we need to revert it before fixing and landing it again on the stable
tree from upstream.
Signed-off-by: Sean Wang <sean.wang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit 663457f421 that is the
commit 44c4237cf3 upstream.
Because there was mistake in
'649178c0493e ("mt76: mt7921e: fix possible probe failure after reboot")'
that caused WiFi reset cannot work well as the reported issue
"PROBLEM: [Stable v5.15.42+] [mt7921] Wake after suspend locks up system
when mt7921-driver is used on a Lenovo ThinkPad E15 G3" described in
http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-mediatek/2022-June/042668.html
So we need to revert the patch first to avoid the conflict of reverting
'649178c0493e ("mt76: mt7921e: fix possible probe failure after reboot")'
and will be applied back later after fixing.
Signed-off-by: Sean Wang <sean.wang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts the stable commit
e65d78b12f ("batman-adv: Use netif_rx().")
The commit message says:
| Since commit
| baebdf48c3 ("net: dev: Makes sure netif_rx() can be invoked in any context.")
|
| the function netif_rx() can be used in preemptible/thread context as
| well as in interrupt context.
This commit (baebdf48c3) has not been backported to the 5.15 stable
series and therefore, the commit which builds upon it, must not be
backported either.
Revert the backport and use netif_rx_any_context() again.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4f532c1e25 upstream.
Functions tty_termios_encode_baud_rate() and uart_update_timeout() should
be called with the baudrate value which was set to hardware. Linux then
report exact values via ioctl(TCGETS2) to userspace.
Change mvebu_uart_baud_rate_set() function to return baudrate value which
was set to hardware and propagate this value to above mentioned functions.
With this change userspace would see precise value in termios c_ospeed
field.
Fixes: 68a0db1d7d ("serial: mvebu-uart: add function to change baudrate")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628100922.10717-1-pali@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a2bad844a6 upstream.
According to Dexuan, the hypervisor folks beleive that multi-msi
allocations are not correct. compose_msi_msg() will allocate multi-msi
one by one. However, multi-msi is a block of related MSIs, with alignment
requirements. In order for the hypervisor to allocate properly aligned
and consecutive entries in the IOMMU Interrupt Remapping Table, there
should be a single mapping request that requests all of the multi-msi
vectors in one shot.
Dexuan suggests detecting the multi-msi case and composing a single
request related to the first MSI. Then for the other MSIs in the same
block, use the cached information. This appears to be viable, so do it.
5.15 backport - add hv_msi_get_int_vector helper function. Fixed merge
conflict due to delivery_mode name change (APIC_DELIVERY_MODE_FIXED
is the value given to DELIVERY_MODE on x86). Removed unused variable
in hv_compose_msi_msg. Fixed reference to msi_desc->pci to point to
the same is_msix variable.
Suggested-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Hugo <quic_jhugo@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1652282599-21643-1-git-send-email-quic_jhugo@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carl Vanderlip <quic_carlv@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b4b77778ec upstream.
Currently if compose_msi_msg() is called multiple times, it will free any
previous IRTE allocation, and generate a new allocation. While nothing
prevents this from occurring, it is extraneous when Linux could just reuse
the existing allocation and avoid a bunch of overhead.
However, when future IRTE allocations operate on blocks of MSIs instead of
a single line, freeing the allocation will impact all of the lines. This
could cause an issue where an allocation of N MSIs occurs, then some of
the lines are retargeted, and finally the allocation is freed/reallocated.
The freeing of the allocation removes all of the configuration for the
entire block, which requires all the lines to be retargeted, which might
not happen since some lines might already be unmasked/active.
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Hugo <quic_jhugo@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1652282582-21595-1-git-send-email-quic_jhugo@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carl Vanderlip <quic_carlv@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 455880dfe2 upstream.
In the multi-MSI case, hv_arch_irq_unmask() will only operate on the first
MSI of the N allocated. This is because only the first msi_desc is cached
and it is shared by all the MSIs of the multi-MSI block. This means that
hv_arch_irq_unmask() gets the correct address, but the wrong data (always
0).
This can break MSIs.
Lets assume MSI0 is vector 34 on CPU0, and MSI1 is vector 33 on CPU0.
hv_arch_irq_unmask() is called on MSI0. It uses a hypercall to configure
the MSI address and data (0) to vector 34 of CPU0. This is correct. Then
hv_arch_irq_unmask is called on MSI1. It uses another hypercall to
configure the MSI address and data (0) to vector 33 of CPU0. This is
wrong, and results in both MSI0 and MSI1 being routed to vector 33. Linux
will observe extra instances of MSI1 and no instances of MSI0 despite the
endpoint device behaving correctly.
For the multi-MSI case, we need unique address and data info for each MSI,
but the cached msi_desc does not provide that. However, that information
can be gotten from the int_desc cached in the chip_data by
compose_msi_msg(). Fix the multi-MSI case to use that cached information
instead. Since hv_set_msi_entry_from_desc() is no longer applicable,
remove it.
5.15 backport - no changes to code, but merge conflict due to refactor.
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Hugo <quic_jhugo@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1651068453-29588-1-git-send-email-quic_jhugo@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carl Vanderlip <quic_carlv@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 08e61e861a upstream.
If the allocation of multiple MSI vectors for multi-MSI fails in the core
PCI framework, the framework will retry the allocation as a single MSI
vector, assuming that meets the min_vecs specified by the requesting
driver.
Hyper-V advertises that multi-MSI is supported, but reuses the VECTOR
domain to implement that for x86. The VECTOR domain does not support
multi-MSI, so the alloc will always fail and fallback to a single MSI
allocation.
In short, Hyper-V advertises a capability it does not implement.
Hyper-V can support multi-MSI because it coordinates with the hypervisor
to map the MSIs in the IOMMU's interrupt remapper, which is something the
VECTOR domain does not have. Therefore the fix is simple - copy what the
x86 IOMMU drivers (AMD/Intel-IR) do by removing
X86_IRQ_ALLOC_CONTIGUOUS_VECTORS after calling the VECTOR domain's
pci_msi_prepare().
5.15 backport - adds the hv_msi_prepare wrapper function
Fixes: 4daace0d8c ("PCI: hv: Add paravirtual PCI front-end for Microsoft Hyper-V VMs")
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Hugo <quic_jhugo@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1649856981-14649-1-git-send-email-quic_jhugo@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carl Vanderlip <quic_carlv@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit e8b9989597.
The upstream commit 9c85a9bae2 ("selftest/vm: verify mmap addr in
mremap_test") was backported as commit a17404fcbf ("selftest/vm:
verify mmap addr in mremap_test"). Repeated backport introduced the
duplicate of function get_mmap_min_addr to the file breakign the vm
selftest build.
Fixes: e8b9989597 ("selftest/vm: verify mmap addr in mremap_test")
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tymoshenko <ovt@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit 0b4e16093e.
The upstream commit 18d609daa5 ("selftest/vm: verify remap destination
address in mremap_test") was backported as commit 2688d967ec
("selftest/vm: verify remap destination address in mremap_test").
Repeated backport introduced the duplicate of function
is_remap_region_valid to the file breakign the vm selftest build.
Fixes: 0b4e16093e ("selftest/vm: verify remap destination address in mremap_test")
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tymoshenko <ovt@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 543ce63b66 upstream.
The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot.
This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI. It can also be
enabled when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. One of lockdown's features
is to prevent kexec from loading untrusted kernels. Lockdown can be
enabled through a bootparam or after the kernel has booted through
securityfs.
If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param,
lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is
disabled or unavailable. IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" from
the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover
cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot.
To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log to
the kernel command line; then:
$ echo "integrity" > /sys/kernel/security/lockdown
$ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" > \
/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
$ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel
Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown
is enabled. This fixes CVE-2022-21505.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 29d3c1c8df ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down")
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e5ec6a2513 upstream.
mlxsw needs to distinguish nexthops with a gateway from connected
nexthops in order to write the former to the adjacency table of the
device. The check used to rely on the fact that nexthops with a gateway
have a 'link' scope whereas connected nexthops have a 'host' scope. This
is no longer correct after commit 747c143072 ("ip: fix dflt addr
selection for connected nexthop").
Fix that by instead checking the address family of the gateway IP. This
is a more direct way and also consistent with the IPv6 counterpart in
mlxsw_sp_rt6_is_gateway().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 747c143072 ("ip: fix dflt addr selection for connected nexthop")
Fixes: 597cfe4fc3 ("nexthop: Add support for IPv4 nexthops")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Cohen <amcohen@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c1f6eff304 upstream.
When trying to load modules built for RISC-V which include assembly files
the kernel loader errors with "unexpected relocation type 'R_RISCV_ALIGN'"
due to R_RISCV_ALIGN relocations being generated by the assembler.
The R_RISCV_ALIGN relocations can be removed at the expense of code space
by adding -mno-relax to gcc and as. In commit 7a8e7da422
("RISC-V: Fixes to module loading") -mno-relax is added to the build
variable KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE. See [1] for more info.
The issue is that when kbuild builds a .S file, it invokes gcc with
the -mno-relax flag, but this is not being passed through to the
assembler. Adding -Wa,-mno-relax to KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE ensures that
the assembler is invoked correctly. This may have now been fixed in
gcc[2] and this addition should not stop newer gcc and as from working.
[1] https://github.com/riscv/riscv-elf-psabi-doc/issues/183
[2] 3b0a7d624e
Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220529152200.609809-1-ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk
Fixes: ab1ef68e54 ("RISC-V: Add sections of PLT and GOT for kernel module")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f098addbdb upstream.
To pick the changes from:
f43b9876e8 ("x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs")
a149180fbc ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
15e67227c4 ("x86: Undo return-thunk damage")
369ae6ffc4 ("x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery")
4ad3278df6 x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior
26aae8ccbc x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO
9756bba284 x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS
3ebc170068 x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb
2dbb887e87 x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation
6b80b59b35 x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability
a149180fbc x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk
15e67227c4 x86: Undo return-thunk damage
a883d624ae x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11
5180218615 x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtQM40VmiLTkPND2@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 91d248c3b9 upstream.
To pick up the changes from these csets:
4ad3278df6 ("x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior")
d7caac991f ("x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken")
That cause no changes to tooling:
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before
$ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
$
Just silences this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtQTm9wsB3hxQWvy@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7962918160 upstream.
Instead of doing complicated calculations to find the size of the subroutines
(which are even more complicated because they need to be stringified into
an asm statement), just hardcode to 16.
It is less dense for a few combinations of IBT/SLS/retbleed, but it has
the advantage of being really simple.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15.x: 84e7051c0b: x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3131ef39fb upstream.
The build on x86_32 currently fails after commit
9bb2ec608a (objtool: Update Retpoline validation)
with:
arch/x86/kernel/../../x86/xen/xen-head.S:35: Error: no such instruction: `annotate_unret_safe'
ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE is defined in nospec-branch.h. And head_32.S is
missing this include. Fix this.
Fixes: 9bb2ec608a ("objtool: Update Retpoline validation")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/63e23f80-033f-f64e-7522-2816debbc367@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The hypercall_page is special and the RETs there should not be changed
into rethunk calls (but can have SLS mitigation). Change the initial
instructions to ret + int3 padding, as was done in upstream commit
5b2fc51576 "x86/ibt,xen: Sprinkle the ENDBR".
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c27c753ea6 upstream.
__static_call_fixup() invokes __static_call_transform() without holding
text_mutex, which causes lockdep to complain in text_poke_bp().
Adding the proper locking cures that, but as this is either used during
early boot or during module finalizing, it's not required to use
text_poke_bp(). Add an argument to __static_call_transform() which tells
it to use text_poke_early() for it.
Fixes: ee88d363d1 ("x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4ad3278df6 upstream.
Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on
RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History
Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI.
Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines,
eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against
such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may
fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target
may get influenced by branch history.
A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback
behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions
from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for
this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2).
For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that
protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set
RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: no X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2259da159f upstream.
There are some VM configurations which have Skylake model but do not
support IBPB. In those cases, when using retbleed=ibpb, userspace is going
to be killed and kernel is going to panic.
If the CPU does not support IBPB, warn and proceed with the auto option. Also,
do not fallback to IBPB on AMD/Hygon systems if it is not supported.
Fixes: 3ebc170068 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2c08b9b38f upstream.
Commit
ee774dac0d ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()")
moved PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry, into its own function, in
part to avoid calling error_entry() for XenPV.
However, commit
7c81c0c921 ("x86/entry: Avoid very early RET")
had to change that because the 'ret' was too early and moved it into
idtentry, bloating the text size, since idtentry is expanded for every
exception vector.
However, with the advent of xen_error_entry() in commit
d147553b64 ("x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET")
it became possible to remove PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS from idtentry, back
into *error_entry().
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: error_entry still does cld]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f43b9876e8 upstream.
Do fine-grained Kconfig for all the various retbleed parts.
NOTE: if your compiler doesn't support return thunks this will
silently 'upgrade' your mitigation to IBPB, you might not like this.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: there is no CONFIG_OBJTOOL]
[cascardo: objtool calling and option parsing has changed]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 26aae8ccbc upstream.
BTC_NO indicates that hardware is not susceptible to Branch Type Confusion.
Zen3 CPUs don't suffer BTC.
Hypervisors are expected to synthesise BTC_NO when it is appropriate
given the migration pool, to prevent kernels using heuristics.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: no X86_FEATURE_BRS]
[cascardo: no X86_FEATURE_CPPC]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7a05bc95ed upstream.
The whole MMIO/RETBLEED enumeration went overboard on steppings. Get
rid of all that and simply use ANY.
If a future stepping of these models would not be affected, it had
better set the relevant ARCH_CAP_$FOO_NO bit in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9756bba284 upstream.
Prevent RSB underflow/poisoning attacks with RSB. While at it, add a
bunch of comments to attempt to document the current state of tribal
knowledge about RSB attacks and what exactly is being mitigated.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fc02735b14 upstream.
On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from
__vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks.
Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately
after the vmexit.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bb06650634 upstream.
Convert __vmx_vcpu_run()'s 'launched' argument to 'flags', in
preparation for doing SPEC_CTRL handling immediately after vmexit, which
will need another flag.
This is much easier than adding a fourth argument, because this code
supports both 32-bit and 64-bit, and the fourth argument on 32-bit would
have to be pushed on the stack.
Note that __vmx_vcpu_run_flags() is called outside of the noinstr
critical section because it will soon start calling potentially
traceable functions.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
