Generic KASAN already selects KASAN_VMALLOC to allow VMAP_STACK to be
selected unconditionally, see commit acc3042d62 ("arm64: Kconfig:
select KASAN_VMALLOC if KANSAN_GENERIC is enabled").
The same change is needed for SW_TAGS KASAN.
HW_TAGS KASAN does not require enabling KASAN_VMALLOC for VMAP_STACK, they
already work together as is. Still, selecting KASAN_VMALLOC still makes
sense to make vmalloc() always protected. In case any bugs in KASAN's
vmalloc() support are discovered, the command line kasan.vmalloc flag can
be used to disable vmalloc() checking.
Select KASAN_VMALLOC for all KASAN modes for arm64.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/99d6b3ebf57fc1930ff71f9a4a71eea19881b270.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
(cherry picked from commit 406e112a59dd26bb50df335d03275f893cbcb5ee
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git akpm)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: Ib3a328e2a90d6ab795ca10feebadc78e2644bc2a
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Besides asking vmalloc memory to be executable via the prot argument of
__vmalloc_node_range() (see the previous patch), the kernel can skip that
bit and instead mark memory as executable via set_memory_x().
Once tag-based KASAN modes start tagging vmalloc allocations, executing
code from such allocations will lead to the PC register getting a tag,
which is not tolerated by the kernel.
Generic kernel code typically allocates memory via module_alloc() if it
intends to mark memory as executable. (On arm64 module_alloc() uses
__vmalloc_node_range() without setting the executable bit).
Thus, reset pointer tags of pointers returned from module_alloc().
However, on arm64 there's an exception: the eBPF subsystem. Instead of
using module_alloc(), it uses vmalloc() (via bpf_jit_alloc_exec()) to
allocate its JIT region.
Thus, reset pointer tags of pointers returned from bpf_jit_alloc_exec().
Resetting tags for these pointers results in untagged pointers being
passed to set_memory_x(). This causes conflicts in arithmetic checks in
change_memory_common(), as vm_struct->addr pointer returned by
find_vm_area() is tagged.
Reset pointer tag of find_vm_area(addr)->addr in change_memory_common().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b7b2595423340cd7d76b770e5d519acf3b72f0ab.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
(cherry picked from commit c9944678742d7377382423d84b7883cc163e663f
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git akpm)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: I19bea2781827cffe5d4a2a0a0a7c36c4e51776f3
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
(Backport: workaround kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow missing
due to 3252b1d830 not backported.)
Add vmalloc tagging support to HW_TAGS KASAN.
The key difference between HW_TAGS and the other two KASAN modes when it
comes to vmalloc: HW_TAGS KASAN can only assign tags to physical memory.
The other two modes have shadow memory covering every mapped virtual
memory region.
Make __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() for HW_TAGS KASAN:
- Skip non-VM_ALLOC mappings as HW_TAGS KASAN can only tag a single
mapping of normal physical memory; see the comment in the function.
- Generate a random tag, tag the returned pointer and the allocation,
and initialize the allocation at the same time.
- Propagate the tag into the page stucts to allow accesses through
page_address(vmalloc_to_page()).
The rest of vmalloc-related KASAN hooks are not needed:
- The shadow-related ones are fully skipped.
- __kasan_poison_vmalloc() is kept as a no-op with a comment.
Poisoning and zeroing of physical pages that are backing vmalloc()
allocations are skipped via __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON and __GFP_SKIP_ZERO:
__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() does that instead.
Enabling CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC with HW_TAGS is not yet allowed.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d19b2e9e59a9abc59d05b72dea8429dcaea739c6.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
(cherry picked from commit c9a950bcf1d67298187050bc3179096e4ef248c1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git akpm)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: I446b0ae074938389ade70bf503784d4d32b5d09b
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
(Backport: adapt the patch to account for added GFP flags and
__GFP_BITS_SHIFT definition changes;
don't try to pack all flags to avoid macro mess.)
Add a new GFP flag __GFP_SKIP_ZERO that allows to skip memory
initialization. The flag is only effective with HW_TAGS KASAN.
This flag will be used by vmalloc code for page_alloc allocations backing
vmalloc() mappings in a following patch. The reason to skip memory
initialization for these pages in page_alloc is because vmalloc code will
be initializing them instead.
With the current implementation, when __GFP_SKIP_ZERO is provided,
__GFP_ZEROTAGS is ignored. This doesn't matter, as these two flags are
never provided at the same time. However, if this is changed in the
future, this particular implementation detail can be changed as well.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0d53efeff345de7d708e0baa0d8829167772521e.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
(cherry picked from commit db88e21f5cce8c45f7973a272c3bd60440f0e1b2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git akpm)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: I617be9a6e1480a204edea41a3627fb6a41733753
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
(Backport: adapt the patch to account for added GFP flags and
__GFP_BITS_SHIFT definition changes;
don't try to pack all flags to avoid macro mess.)
Add a new GFP flag __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_UNPOISON that allows skipping KASAN
poisoning for page_alloc allocations. The flag is only effective with
HW_TAGS KASAN.
This flag will be used by vmalloc code for page_alloc allocations backing
vmalloc() mappings in a following patch. The reason to skip KASAN
poisoning for these pages in page_alloc is because vmalloc code will be
poisoning them instead.
Also reword the comment for __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/35c97d77a704f6ff971dd3bfe4be95855744108e.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
(cherry picked from commit 9a47b06547a9c28d2899b27888bc006422d29554
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git akpm)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: I9c52fa6370c6fd19d23edaed1a082cae946e2ef5
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Make KASAN unpoison vmalloc mappings after they have been mapped in when
it's possible: for vmalloc() (indentified via VM_ALLOC) and vm_map_ram().
The reasons for this are:
- For vmalloc() and vm_map_ram(): pages don't get unpoisoned in case
mapping them fails.
- For vmalloc(): HW_TAGS KASAN needs pages to be mapped to set tags via
kasan_unpoison_vmalloc().
As a part of these changes, the return value of __vmalloc_node_range() is
changed to area->addr. This is a non-functional change, as
__vmalloc_area_node() returns area->addr anyway.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fcb98980e6fcd3c4be6acdcb5d6110898ef28548.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
(cherry picked from commit c86dc782f534bf1cf696d63e23993f0d1b0f04f7
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git akpm)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: Ib64e9792d266d20350fc9f803376dbe06985c6b0
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Add vmalloc tagging support to SW_TAGS KASAN.
- __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() now assigns a random pointer tag, poisons
the virtual mapping accordingly, and embeds the tag into the returned
pointer.
- __get_vm_area_node() (used by vmalloc() and vmap()) and
pcpu_get_vm_areas() save the tagged pointer into vm_struct->addr
(note: not into vmap_area->addr). This requires putting
kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() after setup_vmalloc_vm[_locked]();
otherwise the latter will overwrite the tagged pointer.
The tagged pointer then is naturally propagateed to vmalloc()
and vmap().
- vm_map_ram() returns the tagged pointer directly.
As a result of this change, vm_struct->addr is now tagged.
Enabling KASAN_VMALLOC with SW_TAGS is not yet allowed.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a78f3c064ce905e9070c29733aca1dd254a74f1.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
(cherry picked from commit 93555972485ebcac55b3855205bf154f1ba8478f
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git akpm)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: I1e156582d91c39a3bf3351405ffd82624072b653
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Once tag-based KASAN modes start tagging vmalloc() allocations, kernel
stacks start getting tagged if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is enabled.
Reset the tag of kernel stack pointers after allocation in
arch_alloc_vmap_stack().
For SW_TAGS KASAN, when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is enabled, the instrumentation
can't handle the SP register being tagged.
For HW_TAGS KASAN, there's no instrumentation-related issues. However,
the impact of having a tagged SP register needs to be properly evaluated,
so keep it non-tagged for now.
Note, that the memory for the stack allocation still gets tagged to catch
vmalloc-into-stack out-of-bounds accesses.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/698c5ab21743c796d46c15d075b9481825973e34.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
(cherry picked from commit 54f7bbc3786b67625b02fe067a91478fc3f39caa
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git akpm)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: Ie273a7bbde12a28b26c49d94795733f289a0c150
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Currently, the code responsible for initializing and poisoning memory in
post_alloc_hook() is scattered across two locations: kasan_alloc_pages()
hook for HW_TAGS KASAN and post_alloc_hook() itself. This is confusing.
This and a few following patches combine the code from these two
locations. Along the way, these patches do a step-by-step restructure the
many performed checks to make them easier to follow.
Replace the only caller of kasan_alloc_pages() with its implementation.
As kasan_has_integrated_init() is only true when CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS is
enabled, moving the code does no functional changes.
Also move init and init_tags variables definitions out of
kasan_has_integrated_init() clause in post_alloc_hook(), as they have the
same values regardless of what the if condition evaluates to.
This patch is not useful by itself but makes the simplifications in the
following patches easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5ac7e0b30f5cbb177ec363ddd7878a3141289592.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
(cherry picked from commit 2a10554bf7e83f0613511f6781afe03cebab5a6c
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git akpm)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: Iafd536232d6f9996887f9e7e47b22f6d65e6c28a
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Currently, the code responsible for initializing and poisoning memory in
free_pages_prepare() is scattered across two locations: kasan_free_pages()
for HW_TAGS KASAN and free_pages_prepare() itself. This is confusing.
This and a few following patches combine the code from these two
locations. Along the way, these patches also simplify the performed
checks to make them easier to follow.
Replaces the only caller of kasan_free_pages() with its implementation.
As kasan_has_integrated_init() is only true when CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS is
enabled, moving the code does no functional changes.
This patch is not useful by itself but makes the simplifications in the
following patches easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/303498d15840bb71905852955c6e2390ecc87139.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
(cherry picked from commit c0a6431afea7568de0a427aca260388e6fe5a833
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git akpm)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: Ia88ae7b249cd81375e8f7a4f78f14d7f30e2e038
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Currently, kernel_init_free_pages() serves two purposes: it either only
zeroes memory or zeroes both memory and memory tags via a different code
path. As this function has only two callers, each using only one code
path, this behaviour is confusing.
Pull the code that zeroes both memory and tags out of
kernel_init_free_pages().
As a result of this change, the code in free_pages_prepare() starts to
look complicated, but this is improved in the few following patches.
Those improvements are not integrated into this patch to make diffs easier
to read.
This patch does no functional changes.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7719874e68b23902629c7cf19f966c4fd5f57979.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
(cherry picked from commit 9e21137d76ac5292868f31c50f843fd923e92212
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git akpm)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: Iad847f13d396cf5dc91553ec916fe7ec660ed584
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Patch series "kasan, vmalloc, arm64: add vmalloc tagging support for SW/HW_TAGS", v6.
This patchset adds vmalloc tagging support for SW_TAGS and HW_TAGS
KASAN modes.
About half of patches are cleanups I went for along the way. None of them
seem to be important enough to go through stable, so I decided not to
split them out into separate patches/series.
The patchset is partially based on an early version of the HW_TAGS
patchset by Vincenzo that had vmalloc support. Thus, I added a
Co-developed-by tag into a few patches.
SW_TAGS vmalloc tagging support is straightforward. It reuses all of the
generic KASAN machinery, but uses shadow memory to store tags instead of
magic values. Naturally, vmalloc tagging requires adding a few
kasan_reset_tag() annotations to the vmalloc code.
HW_TAGS vmalloc tagging support stands out. HW_TAGS KASAN is based on Arm
MTE, which can only assigns tags to physical memory. As a result, HW_TAGS
KASAN only tags vmalloc() allocations, which are backed by page_alloc
memory. It ignores vmap() and others.
This patch (of 39):
Currently, should_skip_kasan_poison() has two definitions: one for when
CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is enabled, one for when it's not.
Instead of duplicating the checks, add a deferred_pages_enabled() helper
and use it in a single should_skip_kasan_poison() definition.
Also move should_skip_kasan_poison() closer to its caller and clarify all
conditions in the comment.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/658b79f5fb305edaf7dc16bc52ea870d3220d4a8.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
(cherry picked from commit 64748cf67a6b75dde881e282529dbf6a22979786
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git akpm)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: Ie47a5a877f515e6174a2a5db97f3e5d7a9a3245b
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
With CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE enabled, string functions will also perform
dynamic checks using __builtin_object_size(ptr), which when failed will
panic the kernel.
Because the KASAN test deliberately performs out-of-bounds operations,
the kernel panics with FORTIFY_SOURCE, for example:
| kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:910!
| invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
| CPU: 1 PID: 137 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G B 5.16.0-rc3+ #3
| Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
| RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0x19/0x1b
| ...
| Call Trace:
| kmalloc_oob_in_memset.cold+0x16/0x16
| ...
Fix it by also hiding `ptr` from the optimizer, which will ensure that
__builtin_object_size() does not return a valid size, preventing
fortified string functions from panicking.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124160744.1244685-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reported-by: Nico Pache <npache@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Nico Pache <npache@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 09c6304e38)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: I51ef8a2fc61e4e86916cd4d83c1ca0d2d980a81d
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
The non-interrupt portion of interrupt stack traces before interrupt
entry is usually arbitrary. Therefore, saving stack traces of
interrupts (that include entries before interrupt entry) to stack depot
leads to unbounded stackdepot growth.
As such, use of filter_irq_stacks() is a requirement to ensure
stackdepot can efficiently deduplicate interrupt stacks.
Looking through all current users of stack_depot_save(), none (except
KASAN) pass the stack trace through filter_irq_stacks() before passing
it on to stack_depot_save().
Rather than adding filter_irq_stacks() to all current users of
stack_depot_save(), it became clear that stack_depot_save() should
simply do filter_irq_stacks().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211130095727.2378739-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org>
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: Imran Khan <imran.f.khan@oracle.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit e940066089)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: I3176c61b5a1170096db036f3b7bda081bc6f838e
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
(Backport: adjacent lines changed in kmem_cache_destroy.)
Because mm/slab_common.c is not instrumented with software KASAN modes,
it is not possible to detect use-after-free of the kmem_cache passed
into kmem_cache_destroy(). In particular, because of the s->refcount--
and subsequent early return if non-zero, KASAN would never be able to
see the double-free via kmem_cache_free(kmem_cache, s). To be able to
detect a double-kmem_cache_destroy(), check accessibility of the
kmem_cache, and in case of failure return early.
While KASAN_HW_TAGS is able to detect such bugs, by checking
accessibility and returning early we fail more gracefully and also avoid
corrupting reused objects (where tags mismatch).
A recent case of a double-kmem_cache_destroy() was detected by KFENCE:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0000000000003f654905c168b09d@google.com, which
was not detectable by software KASAN modes.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211119142219.1519617-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit bed0a9b591)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: I6a3cbe5b92ea806c7c1e447a64c5f36abd679593
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Add a test checking that KASAN generic can also detect out-of-bounds
accesses to the left of globals.
Unfortunately it seems that GCC doesn't catch this (tested GCC 10, 11).
The main difference between GCC's globals redzoning and Clang's is that
GCC relies on using increased alignment to producing padding, where
Clang's redzoning implementation actually adds real data after the
global and doesn't rely on alignment to produce padding. I believe this
is the main reason why GCC can't reliably catch globals out-of-bounds in
this case.
Given this is now a known issue, to avoid failing the whole test suite,
skip this test case with GCC.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211117130714.135656-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reported-by: Kaiwan N Billimoria <kaiwan.billimoria@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Kaiwan N Billimoria <kaiwan.billimoria@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit e5f4728767)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: Iba1aee23d8a63bdc68cd219b8fd35e40734d65aa
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
As done in commit d73dad4eb5 ("kasan: test: bypass __alloc_size
checks") for __write_overflow warnings, also silence some more cases
that trip the __read_overflow warnings seen in 5.16-rc1[1]:
In file included from include/linux/string.h:253,
from include/linux/bitmap.h:10,
from include/linux/cpumask.h:12,
from include/linux/mm_types_task.h:14,
from include/linux/mm_types.h:5,
from include/linux/page-flags.h:13,
from arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h:14,
from arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h:12,
from include/linux/pgtable.h:6,
from include/linux/kasan.h:29,
from lib/test_kasan.c:10:
In function 'memcmp',
inlined from 'kasan_memcmp' at lib/test_kasan.c:897:2:
include/linux/fortify-string.h:263:25: error: call to '__read_overflow' declared with attribute error: detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)
263 | __read_overflow();
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In function 'memchr',
inlined from 'kasan_memchr' at lib/test_kasan.c:872:2:
include/linux/fortify-string.h:277:17: error: call to '__read_overflow' declared with attribute error: detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)
277 | __read_overflow();
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
[1] http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/buildresult/14660585/log/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211116004111.3171781-1-keescook@chromium.org
Fixes: d73dad4eb5 ("kasan: test: bypass __alloc_size checks")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit cab71f7495)
Bug: 217222520
Change-Id: I1e521864e42b993ed5f3815c0a640ef86b8818e6
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
