This converts the generic user string functions to use the batched user
access functions.
It makes a big difference on Skylake, which is the first x86
microarchitecture to implement SMAP. The STAC/CLAC instructions are not
very fast, and doing them for each access inside the loop that copies
strings from user space (which is what the pathname handling does for
every pathname the kernel uses, for example) is very inefficient.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Change-Id: Ic39a686b4bb1ad9cd16ad0887bb669beed6fe8aa
(cherry picked from commit 9fd4470ff4)
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
The naming is meant to discourage random use: the helper functions are
not really any more "unsafe" than the traditional double-underscore
functions (which need the address range checking), but they do need even
more infrastructure around them, and should not be used willy-nilly.
In addition to checking the access range, these user access functions
require that you wrap the user access with a "user_acess_{begin,end}()"
around it.
That allows architectures that implement kernel user access control
(x86: SMAP, arm64: PAN) to do the user access control in the wrapping
user_access_begin/end part, and then batch up the actual user space
accesses using the new interfaces.
The main (and hopefully only) use for these are for core generic access
helpers, initially just the generic user string functions
(strnlen_user() and strncpy_from_user()).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Change-Id: Ic64efea41f97171bdbdabe3e531489aebd9b6fac
(cherry picked from commit 5b24a7a2aa)
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb1fceca22)
When tcp_sendmsg() allocates a fresh and empty skb, it puts it at the
tail of the write queue using tcp_add_write_queue_tail()
Then it attempts to copy user data into this fresh skb.
If the copy fails, we undo the work and remove the fresh skb.
Unfortunately, this undo lacks the change done to tp->highest_sack and
we can leave a dangling pointer (to a freed skb)
Later, tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue() can dereference this pointer and
access freed memory. For regular kernels where memory is not unmapped,
this might cause SACK bugs because tcp_highest_sack_seq() is buggy,
returning garbage instead of tp->snd_nxt, but with various debug
features like CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, this can crash the kernel.
This bug was found by Marco Grassi thanks to syzkaller.
Fixes: 6859d49475 ("[TCP]: Abstract tp->highest_sack accessing & point to next skb")
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Change-Id: I58bb02d6e4e399612e8580b9e02d11e661df82f5
Bug: 31183296
Don't need to set SECCOMP_FILTER explicitly since CONFIG_SECCOMP=y will
select that config anyway.
Fixes: a49dcf2e74 ("ANDROID: base-cfg: enable SECCOMP config")
Change-Id: Iff18ed4d2db5a55b9f9480d5ecbeef7b818b3837
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8148a73c99)
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Change-Id: Ia2f58d48c15478ed4b6e237b63e704c70ff21e96
Bug: 30951939
(cherry picked from commit 210bd104c6)
We have to unlock before returning -ENOMEM.
Fixes: 8dfbcc4351 ('[media] xc2028: avoid use after free')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
Change-Id: I7b6ba9fde5c6e29467e6de23d398af2fe56e2547
Bug: 30946097
(cherry picked from commit 77da160530)
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Change-Id: I07b33f4b38341f60a37806cdd45b0a0c3ab4d84d
Bug: 30942273
Enable following seccomp configs
CONFIG_SECCOMP=y
CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER=y
Otherwise we will get mediacode error like this on Android N:
E /system/bin/mediaextractor: libminijail: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER): Invalid argument
Change-Id: I2477b6a2cfdded5c0ebf6ffbb6150b0e5fe2ba12
Signed-off-by: Yongqin Liu <yongqin.liu@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
x86_64:allmodconfig fails to build with the following error.
ERROR: "rcu_sync_lockdep_assert" [kernel/locking/locktorture.ko] undefined!
Introduced by commit 3228c5eb7a ("RFC: FROMLIST: locking/percpu-rwsem:
Optimize readers and reduce global impact"). The applied upstream version
exports the missing symbol, so let's do the same.
Change-Id: If4e516715c3415fe8c82090f287174857561550d
Fixes: 3228c5eb7a ("RFC: FROMLIST: locking/percpu-rwsem: Optimize ...")
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
commit 8835ba4a39 upstream.
An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky
device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel
by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check
to the code path for quirky devices.
BUG: 28242610
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Change-Id: I9a5f7f3c704b65e866335054f470451fcfae9d1c
commit 4ec0ef3a82 upstream.
The iowarrior driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given
malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints,
it will crash in the probe function. Ensure there is at least
one endpoint on the interface before using it.
The full report of this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/87
BUG: 28242610
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Change-Id: If5161c23928e9ef77cb3359cba9b36622b1908df
commit 0b818e3956 upstream.
Attacks that trick drivers into passing a NULL pointer
to usb_driver_claim_interface() using forged descriptors are
known. This thwarts them by sanity checking.
BUG: 28242610
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Change-Id: Ib43ec5edb156985a9db941785a313f6801df092a
commit 4e9a0b0525 upstream.
An attack using the lack of sanity checking in probe is known. This
patch checks for the existence of a second port.
CVE-2016-3136
BUG: 28242610
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
[johan: add error message ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Change-Id: I284ad648c2087c34a098d67e0cc6d948a568413c
The powermate driver expects at least one valid USB endpoint in its
probe function. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for
the number of endpoints, it will crash. Validate the number of
endpoints on the interface before using them.
The full report for this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/85
BUG: 28242610
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Change-Id: I1cb956a35f3bba73324240d5bd0a029f49d3c456
(cherry picked from commit 083ae30828)
The per-socket rate limit for 'challenge acks' was introduced in the
context of limiting ack loops:
commit f2b2c582e8 ("tcp: mitigate ACK loops for connections as tcp_sock")
And I think it can be extended to rate limit all 'challenge acks' on a
per-socket basis.
Since we have the global tcp_challenge_ack_limit, this patch allows for
tcp_challenge_ack_limit to be set to a large value and effectively rely on
the per-socket limit, or set tcp_challenge_ack_limit to a lower value and
still prevents a single connections from consuming the entire challenge ack
quota.
It further moves in the direction of eliminating the global limit at some
point, as Eric Dumazet has suggested. This a follow-up to:
Subject: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Change-Id: I622d5ae96e9387e775a0196c892d8d0e1a5564a7
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem is acquired in read mode during process exit
and fork. It is also grabbed in write mode during
__cgroups_proc_write(). I've recently run into a scenario with lots
of memory pressure and OOM and I am beginning to see
systemd
__switch_to+0x1f8/0x350
__schedule+0x30c/0x990
schedule+0x48/0xc0
percpu_down_write+0x114/0x170
__cgroup_procs_write.isra.12+0xb8/0x3c0
cgroup_file_write+0x74/0x1a0
kernfs_fop_write+0x188/0x200
__vfs_write+0x6c/0xe0
vfs_write+0xc0/0x230
SyS_write+0x6c/0x110
system_call+0x38/0xb4
This thread is waiting on the reader of cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem to
exit. The reader itself is under memory pressure and has gone into
reclaim after fork. There are times the reader also ends up waiting on
oom_lock as well.
__switch_to+0x1f8/0x350
__schedule+0x30c/0x990
schedule+0x48/0xc0
jbd2_log_wait_commit+0xd4/0x180
ext4_evict_inode+0x88/0x5c0
evict+0xf8/0x2a0
dispose_list+0x50/0x80
prune_icache_sb+0x6c/0x90
super_cache_scan+0x190/0x210
shrink_slab.part.15+0x22c/0x4c0
shrink_zone+0x288/0x3c0
do_try_to_free_pages+0x1dc/0x590
try_to_free_pages+0xdc/0x260
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x72c/0xc90
alloc_pages_current+0xb4/0x1a0
page_table_alloc+0xc0/0x170
__pte_alloc+0x58/0x1f0
copy_page_range+0x4ec/0x950
copy_process.isra.5+0x15a0/0x1870
_do_fork+0xa8/0x4b0
ppc_clone+0x8/0xc
In the meanwhile, all processes exiting/forking are blocked almost
stalling the system.
This patch moves the threadgroup_change_begin from before
cgroup_fork() to just before cgroup_canfork(). There is no nee to
worry about threadgroup changes till the task is actually added to the
threadgroup. This avoids having to call reclaim with
cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem held.
tj: Subject and description edits.
Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
[jstultz: Cherry-picked from:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup.git 568ac88821]
Change-Id: Ie8ece84fb613cf6a7b08cea1468473a8df2b9661
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
The current percpu-rwsem read side is entirely free of serializing insns
at the cost of having a synchronize_sched() in the write path.
The latency of the synchronize_sched() is too high for cgroups. The
commit 1ed1328792 talks about the write path being a fairly cold path
but this is not the case for Android which moves task to the foreground
cgroup and back around binder IPC calls from foreground processes to
background processes, so it is significantly hotter than human initiated
operations.
Switch cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem into the slow mode for now to avoid the
problem, hopefully it should not be that slow after another commit
80127a3968 ("locking/percpu-rwsem: Optimize readers and reduce global
impact").
We could just add rcu_sync_enter() into cgroup_init() but we do not want
another synchronize_sched() at boot time, so this patch adds the new helper
which doesn't block but currently can only be called before the first use.
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
[jstultz: backported to 4.4]
Change-Id: I34aa9c394d3052779b56976693e96d861bd255f2
Mailing-list-URL: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/11/557
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Currently the percpu-rwsem switches to (global) atomic ops while a
writer is waiting; which could be quite a while and slows down
releasing the readers.
This patch cures this problem by ordering the reader-state vs
reader-count (see the comments in __percpu_down_read() and
percpu_down_write()). This changes a global atomic op into a full
memory barrier, which doesn't have the global cacheline contention.
This also enables using the percpu-rwsem with rcu_sync disabled in order
to bias the implementation differently, reducing the writer latency by
adding some cost to readers.
Mailing-list-URL: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/9/181
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
[jstultz: Backported to 4.4]
Change-Id: I8ea04b4dca2ec36f1c2469eccafde1423490572f
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
ping_v6_sendmsg does not set flowi6_oif in response to
sin6_scope_id or sk_bound_dev_if, so it is not possible to use
these APIs to ping an IPv6 address on a different interface.
Instead, it sets flowi6_iif, which is incorrect but harmless.
Stop setting flowi6_iif, and support various ways of setting oif
in the same priority order used by udpv6_sendmsg.
[Backport of net 5e45789698]
Bug: 29370996
Change-Id: Ibe1b9434c00ed96f1e30acb110734c6570b087b8
Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/254470/
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
IPv6 ping socket error handler doesn't correctly convert the new 32 bit
mtu to host endianness before using.
[Cherry-pick of net dcb94b88c0]
Bug: 29370996
Change-Id: Iea0ca79f16c2a1366d82b3b0a3097093d18da8b7
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Fixes: 6d0bfe2261 ("net: ipv6: Add IPv6 support to the ping socket.")
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Exports the device mapper callbacks of linear and dm-verity-target
methods.
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Change-Id: I0358be0615c431dce3cc78575aaac4ccfe3aacd7
This patch adds a new sysfs node (latency_hist) and reports IO
(svc time) latency histograms. Disabled by default, can be enabled
by echoing 0 into latency_hist, stats can be cleared by writing 2
into latency_hist.
Bug: 30677035
Change-Id: I625938135ea33e6e87cf6af1fc7edc136d8b4b32
Signed-off-by: Mohan Srinivasan <srmohan@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit a5527dda34)
The unix_dgram_sendmsg routine use the following test
if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
to determine if sk and other are in an n:1 association (either
established via connect or by using sendto to send messages to an
unrelated socket identified by address). This isn't correct as the
specified address could have been bound to the sending socket itself or
because this socket could have been connected to itself by the time of
the unix_peer_get but disconnected before the unix_state_lock(other). In
both cases, the if-block would be entered despite other == sk which
might either block the sender unintentionally or lead to trying to unlock
the same spin lock twice for a non-blocking send. Add a other != sk
check to guard against this.
Fixes: 7d267278a9 ("unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue")
Reported-By: Philipp Hahn <pmhahn@pmhahn.de>
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Tested-by: Philipp Hahn <pmhahn@pmhahn.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Change-Id: I4ebef6a390df3487903b166b837e34c653e01cb2
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit af368027a4)
ALSA timer ioctls have an open race and this may lead to a
use-after-free of timer instance object. A simplistic fix is to make
each ioctl exclusive. We have already tread_sem for controlling the
tread, and extend this as a global mutex to be applied to each ioctl.
The downside is, of course, the worse concurrency. But these ioctls
aren't to be parallel accessible, in anyway, so it should be fine to
serialize there.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Change-Id: I1ac52f1cba5e7408fd88c8fc1c30ca2e83967ebb
Bug: 28694392
(cherry picked from commit 75ff39ccc1)
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Change-Id: Ib46ba66f5e4a5a7c81bfccd7b0aa83c3d9e1b3bb
Bug: 30809774
There may be a race condition if f_fs calls unregister_gadget_item in
ffs_closed() when unregister_gadget is called by UDC store at the same time.
this leads to a kernel NULL pointer dereference:
[ 310.644928] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000004
[ 310.645053] init: Service 'adbd' is being killed...
[ 310.658938] pgd = c9528000
[ 310.662515] [00000004] *pgd=19451831, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000
[ 310.669702] Internal error: Oops: 817 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 310.675211] Modules linked in:
[ 310.678294] CPU: 0 PID: 1537 Comm: ->transport Not tainted 4.1.15-03725-g793404c #2
[ 310.685958] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
[ 310.692493] task: c8e24200 ti: c945e000 task.ti: c945e000
[ 310.697911] PC is at usb_gadget_unregister_driver+0xb4/0xd0
[ 310.703502] LR is at __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10c/0x16c
[ 310.708648] pc : [<c075efc0>] lr : [<c0bfb0bc>] psr: 600f0113
<snip..>
[ 311.565585] [<c075efc0>] (usb_gadget_unregister_driver) from [<c075e2b8>] (unregister_gadget_item+0x1c/0x34)
[ 311.575426] [<c075e2b8>] (unregister_gadget_item) from [<c076fcc8>] (ffs_closed+0x8c/0x9c)
[ 311.583702] [<c076fcc8>] (ffs_closed) from [<c07736b8>] (ffs_data_reset+0xc/0xa0)
[ 311.591194] [<c07736b8>] (ffs_data_reset) from [<c07738ac>] (ffs_data_closed+0x90/0xd0)
[ 311.599208] [<c07738ac>] (ffs_data_closed) from [<c07738f8>] (ffs_ep0_release+0xc/0x14)
[ 311.607224] [<c07738f8>] (ffs_ep0_release) from [<c023e030>] (__fput+0x80/0x1d0)
[ 311.614635] [<c023e030>] (__fput) from [<c014e688>] (task_work_run+0xb0/0xe8)
[ 311.621788] [<c014e688>] (task_work_run) from [<c010afdc>] (do_work_pending+0x7c/0xa4)
[ 311.629718] [<c010afdc>] (do_work_pending) from [<c010770c>] (work_pending+0xc/0x20)
for functions using functionFS, i.e. android adbd will close /dev/usb-ffs/adb/ep0
when usb IO thread fails, but switch adb from on to off also triggers write
"none" > UDC. These 2 operations both call unregister_gadget, which will lead
to the panic above.
add a mutex before calling unregister_gadget for api used in f_fs.
Signed-off-by: Winter Wang <wente.wang@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
v4.4 introduced changes to the callbacks used for
dm-linear and dm-verity-target targets. Move to those headers
in dm-android-verity.
Verified on hikey while having
BOARD_USES_RECOVERY_AS_BOOT := true
BOARD_BUILD_SYSTEM_ROOT_IMAGE := true
BUG: 27339727
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Change-Id: Ic64950c3b55f0a6eaa570bcedc2ace83bbf3005e
(cherry picked from commit 6a480a7842)
First of all, trying to open them r/w is idiocy; it's guaranteed to fail.
Moreover, assigning ->f_pos and assuming that everything will work is
blatantly broken - try that with e.g. tmpfs as underlying layer and watch
the fireworks. There may be a non-trivial amount of state associated with
current IO position, well beyond the numeric offset. Using the single
struct file associated with underlying inode is really not a good idea;
we ought to open one for each ecryptfs directory struct file.
Additionally, file_operations both for directories and non-directories are
full of pointless methods; non-directories should *not* have ->iterate(),
directories should not have ->flush(), ->fasync() and ->splice_read().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Change-Id: I4813ce803f270fdd364758ce1dc108b76eab226e
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit f0fe970df3)
There are legitimate reasons to disallow mmap on certain files, notably
in sysfs or procfs. We shouldn't emulate mmap support on file systems
that don't offer support natively.
CVE-2016-1583
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[tyhicks: clean up f_op check by using ecryptfs_file_to_lower()]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Change-Id: I66e3670771630a25b0608f10019d1584e9ce73a6
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 78c4e17241)
This reverts upstream commit 2f36db7100.
It fixed a local root exploit but also introduced a dependency on
the lower file system implementing an mmap operation just to open a file,
which is a bit of a heavy hammer. The right fix is to have mmap depend
on the existence of the mmap handler instead.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Fixes: Change-Id I0be77c7f8bd3046bc34cd87ef577529792d479bc
("UPSTREAM: ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler")
Change-Id: Ib9bc87099f7f89e4e12dbc1a79e884dcadb1befb
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Fix RTA_UID enum to match it with the Android userspace code which
assumes RTA_UID=18.
With this patch all Android kernel networking unit tests mentioned here
https://source.android.com/devices/tech/config/kernel_network_tests.html
are success.
Without this patch multinetwork_test.py unit test fails.
Change-Id: I3ff36670f7d4e5bf5f01dce584ae9d53deabb3ed
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
The fec_header structure is generated build time and stored on disk.
The fec_header might be build on a 64 bits machine while it is read
per a 32 bits device or the other way around. In such situations, the
fec_header fields are not aligned as expected by the device and it
fails to read the fec_header structure.
This patch makes the fec_header packed.
Change-Id: Idb84453e70cc11abd5ef3a0adfbb16f8b5feaf06
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Compostella <jeremy.compostella@intel.com>
Move header validation logic before reading the verity_table as
an invalid header implies the table is invalid as well.
(Cherry-picked from:
https://partner-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/625203)
BUG: 29940612
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Change-Id: Ib34d25c0854202f3e70df0a6d0ef1d96f0250c8e
adb disable-verity was allowed when the phone is in the
unlocked state. Since the driver is now aware of the build
variant, honor "adb disable-verity" only in userdebug
builds.
(Cherry-picked from
https://partner-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/622117)
BUG: 29276559
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Change-Id: I7ce9f38d8c7a62361392c5a8ccebb288f8a3a2ea
eng builds dont have verity enabled i.e it does even
have verity metadata appended to the parition. Therefore
add rootdev as linear device and map the entire partition
if build variant is "eng".
(Cherry-picked based on
https://partner-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/618690/)
BUG: 29276559
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Change-Id: I8f5c2289b842b820ca04f5773525e5449bb3f355
If the dm-android-verity target does not provide a default
key try using the default public key from the system keyring.
The defualt verity keyid is passed as a kernel command line
argument veritykeyid=.
The order of the dm-android-verity params have been reversed
to facilitate the change.
Old format example:
dm="system none ro,0 1 android-verity Android:#7e4333f9bba00adfe0ede979e28ed1920492b40f /dev/mmcblk0p43"
New formats supported:
dm="system none ro,0 1 android-verity /dev/mmcblk0p43 Android:#7e4333f9bba00adfe0ede979e28ed1920492b40f"
(or)
dm="system none ro,0 1 android-verity /dev/mmcblk0p43"
when veritykeyid= is set in the kernel command line.
BUG: 28384658
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Change-Id: I506c89b053d835ab579e703eef2bc1f8487250de
(cherry picked from commit c5c74d0327729f35b576564976885596c6d0e7fb)
The bug was that the signature verification was only
happening when verity was disabled. It should always
happen when verity is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Change-Id: I2d9354e240d36ea06fc68c2d18d8e87b823a4c2f
(cherry picked from commit 5364b5ca0b1a12a58283b51408e43fc36d4e4fe7)
This patch makes android_verity_ctr() parse its block device string
parameter with name_to_dev_t(). It allows the use of less hardware
related block device reference like PARTUUID for instance.
Change-Id: Idb84453e70cc11abd5ef3a0adfbb16f8b5feaf07
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Compostella <jeremy.compostella@intel.com>
This keeps linear_target as static variable and just exposes
the linear target methods for android-verity
Cherry-picked: https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/212858
Change-Id: I4a377e417b00afd9ecccdb3e605fea31a7df112e
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit a6d1b091f40b25d97849487e29ec097bc5f568dd)
This CL makes android-verity target to be added as linear
dm device if when bootloader is unlocked and verity is disabled.
Bug: 27175947
Change-Id: Ic41ca4b8908fb2777263799cf3a3e25934d70f18
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Following CLs in upstream causes minor changes to dm-android-verity target.
1. keys: change asymmetric keys to use common hash definitions
2. block: Abstract out bvec iterator
Rebase dm-android-verity on top of these changes.
Bug: 27175947
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Change-Id: Icfdc3e7b3ead5de335a059cade1aca70414db415
This device-mapper target is virtually a VERITY target. This
target is setup by reading the metadata contents piggybacked
to the actual data blocks in the block device. The signature
of the metadata contents are verified against the key included
in the system keyring. Upon success, the underlying verity
target is setup.
BUG: 27175947
Change-Id: I7e99644a0960ac8279f02c0158ed20999510ea97
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
