[ Upstream commit 5f1d1d14db7dabce9c815e7d7cd351f8d58b8585 ]
The variable ret in icss_iep_extts_enable() was incorrectly declared
as u32, while the function returns int and may return negative error
codes. This will cause sign extension issues and incorrect error
propagation. Update ret to be int to fix error handling.
This change corrects the declaration to avoid potential type mismatch.
Fixes: c1e0230eea ("net: ti: icss-iep: Add IEP driver")
Signed-off-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250805142323.1949406-1-alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit de788b2e6227462b6dcd0e07474e72c089008f74 ]
There is a reference count leak in ctnetlink_dump_table():
if (res < 0) {
nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general); // HERE
cb->args[1] = (unsigned long)ct;
...
While its very unlikely, its possible that ct == last.
If this happens, then the refcount of ct was already incremented.
This 2nd increment is never undone.
This prevents the conntrack object from being released, which in turn
keeps prevents cnet->count from dropping back to 0.
This will then block the netns dismantle (or conntrack rmmod) as
nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list() will wait forever.
This can be reproduced by running conntrack_resize.sh selftest in a loop.
It takes ~20 minutes for me on a preemptible kernel on average before
I see a runaway kworker spinning in nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list.
One fix would to change this to:
if (res < 0) {
if (ct != last)
nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general);
But this reference counting isn't needed in the first place.
We can just store a cookie value instead.
A followup patch will do the same for ctnetlink_exp_dump_table,
it looks to me as if this has the same problem and like
ctnetlink_dump_table, we only need a 'skip hint', not the actual
object so we can apply the same cookie strategy there as well.
Fixes: d205dc4079 ("[NETFILTER]: ctnetlink: fix deadlock in table dumping")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1118aaa3b35157777890fffab91d8c1da841b20b ]
Commit b40c5f4fde ("udp: disable inner UDP checksum offloads in
IPsec case") tried to fix checksumming in UFO when the packets are
going through IPsec, so that we can't rely on offloads because the UDP
header and payload will be encrypted.
But when doing a TCP test over VXLAN going through IPsec transport
mode with GSO enabled (esp4_offload module loaded), I'm seeing broken
UDP checksums on the encap after successful decryption.
The skbs get to udp4_ufo_fragment/__skb_udp_tunnel_segment via
__dev_queue_xmit -> validate_xmit_skb -> skb_gso_segment and at this
point we've already dropped the dst (unless the device sets
IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE, which is not common), so need_ipsec is false and
we proceed with checksum offload.
Make need_ipsec also check the secpath, which is not dropped on this
callpath.
Fixes: b40c5f4fde ("udp: disable inner UDP checksum offloads in IPsec case")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6b1dd26544d045f6a79e8c73572c0c0db3ef3c1a ]
Set/clear DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_IN_SMM in GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL based on the
host's pre-VM-Enter value, i.e. preserve the host's FREEZE_IN_SMM setting
while running the guest. When running with the "default treatment of SMIs"
in effect (the only mode KVM supports), SMIs do not generate a VM-Exit that
is visible to host (non-SMM) software, and instead transitions directly
from VMX non-root to SMM. And critically, DEBUGCTL isn't context switched
by hardware on SMI or RSM, i.e. SMM will run with whatever value was
resident in hardware at the time of the SMI.
Failure to preserve FREEZE_IN_SMM results in the PMU unexpectedly counting
events while the CPU is executing in SMM, which can pollute profiling and
potentially leak information into the guest.
Check for changes in FREEZE_IN_SMM prior to every entry into KVM's inner
run loop, as the bit can be toggled in IRQ context via IPI callback (SMP
function call), by way of /sys/devices/cpu/freeze_on_smi.
Add a field in kvm_x86_ops to communicate which DEBUGCTL bits need to be
preserved, as FREEZE_IN_SMM is only supported and defined for Intel CPUs,
i.e. explicitly checking FREEZE_IN_SMM in common x86 is at best weird, and
at worst could lead to undesirable behavior in the future if AMD CPUs ever
happened to pick up a collision with the bit.
Exempt TDX vCPUs, i.e. protected guests, from the check, as the TDX Module
owns and controls GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL.
WARN in SVM if KVM_RUN_LOAD_DEBUGCTL is set, mostly to document that the
lack of handling isn't a KVM bug (TDX already WARNs on any run_flag).
Lastly, explicitly reload GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL on a VM-Fail that is missed
by KVM but detected by hardware, i.e. in nested_vmx_restore_host_state().
Doing so avoids the need to track host_debugctl on a per-VMCS basis, as
GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL is unconditionally written by prepare_vmcs02() and
load_vmcs12_host_state(). For the VM-Fail case, even though KVM won't
have actually entered the guest, vcpu_enter_guest() will have run with
vmcs02 active and thus could result in vmcs01 being run with a stale value.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-9-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: move vmx/main.c change to vmx/vmx.c]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7d0cce6cbe71af6e9c1831bff101a2b9c249c4a2 ]
Introduce vmx_guest_debugctl_{read,write}() to handle all accesses to
vmcs.GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL. This will allow stuffing FREEZE_IN_SMM into
GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL based on the host setting without bleeding the state
into the guest, and without needing to copy+paste the FREEZE_IN_SMM
logic into every patch that accesses GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL.
No functional change intended.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
[sean: massage changelog, make inline, use in all prepare_vmcs02() cases]
Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-8-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 095686e6fcb4150f0a55b1a25987fad3d8af58d6 ]
Add a consistency check for L2's guest_ia32_debugctl, as KVM only supports
a subset of hardware functionality, i.e. KVM can't rely on hardware to
detect illegal/unsupported values. Failure to check the vmcs12 value
would allow the guest to load any harware-supported value while running L2.
Take care to exempt BTF and LBR from the validity check in order to match
KVM's behavior for writes via WRMSR, but without clobbering vmcs12. Even
if VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS is set in vmcs12, L1 can reasonably expect
that vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl will not be modified if writes to the MSR
are being intercepted.
Arguably, KVM _should_ update vmcs12 if VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS is set
*and* writes to MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR are not being intercepted by L1, but
that would incur non-trivial complexity and wouldn't change the fact that
KVM's handling of DEBUGCTL is blatantly broken. I.e. the extra complexity
is not worth carrying.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-7-seanjc@google.com
Stable-dep-of: 7d0cce6cbe71 ("KVM: VMX: Wrap all accesses to IA32_DEBUGCTL with getter/setter APIs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8a4351ac302cd8c19729ba2636acfd0467c22ae8 ]
Move VMX's logic to check DEBUGCTL values into a standalone helper so that
the code can be used by nested VM-Enter to apply the same logic to the
value being loaded from vmcs12.
KVM needs to explicitly check vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl on nested
VM-Enter, as hardware may support features that KVM does not, i.e. relying
on hardware to detect invalid guest state will result in false negatives.
Unfortunately, that means applying KVM's funky suppression of BTF and LBR
to vmcs12 so as not to break existing guests.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-6-seanjc@google.com
Stable-dep-of: 7d0cce6cbe71 ("KVM: VMX: Wrap all accesses to IA32_DEBUGCTL with getter/setter APIs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 17ec2f965344ee3fd6620bef7ef68792f4ac3af0 ]
Let the guest set DEBUGCTL.RTM_DEBUG if RTM is supported according to the
guest CPUID model, as debug support is supposed to be available if RTM is
supported, and there are no known downsides to letting the guest debug RTM
aborts.
Note, there are no known bug reports related to RTM_DEBUG, the primary
motivation is to reduce the probability of breaking existing guests when a
future change adds a missing consistency check on vmcs12.GUEST_DEBUGCTL
(KVM currently lets L2 run with whatever hardware supports; whoops).
Note #2, KVM already emulates DR6.RTM, and doesn't restrict access to
DR7.RTM.
Fixes: 83c529151a ("KVM: x86: expose Intel cpu new features (HLE, RTM) to guest")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 80c64c7afea1da6a93ebe88d3d29d8a60377ef80 ]
Instruct vendor code to load the guest's DR6 into hardware via a new
KVM_RUN flag, and remove kvm_x86_ops.set_dr6(), whose sole purpose was to
load vcpu->arch.dr6 into hardware when DR6 can be read/written directly
by the guest.
Note, TDX already WARNs on any run_flag being set, i.e. will yell if KVM
thinks DR6 needs to be reloaded. TDX vCPUs force KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH
and never clear the flag, i.e. should never observe KVM_RUN_LOAD_GUEST_DR6.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: account for lack of vmx/main.c]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2478b1b220c49d25cb1c3f061ec4f9b351d9a131 ]
Convert kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_run()'s "force_immediate_exit" boolean parameter
into an a generic bitmap so that similar "take action" information can be
passed to vendor code without creating a pile of boolean parameters.
This will allow dropping kvm_x86_ops.set_dr6() in favor of a new flag, and
will also allow for adding similar functionality for re-loading debugctl
in the active VMCS.
Opportunistically massage the TDX WARN and comment to prepare for adding
more run_flags, all of which are expected to be mutually exclusive with
TDX, i.e. should be WARNed on.
No functional change intended.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: drop TDX crud, account for lack of kvm_x86_call()]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0ec3d6d1f169baa7fc512ae4b78d17e7c94b7763 ]
Now that vmx->req_immediate_exit is used only in the scope of
vmx_vcpu_run(), use force_immediate_exit to detect that KVM should usurp
the VMX preemption to force a VM-Exit and let vendor code fully handle
forcing a VM-Exit.
Opportunsitically drop __kvm_request_immediate_exit() and just have
vendor code call smp_send_reschedule() directly. SVM already does this
when injecting an event while also trying to single-step an IRET, i.e.
it's not exactly secret knowledge that KVM uses a reschedule IPI to force
an exit.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110012705.506918-7-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: resolve absurd conflict due to funky kvm_x86_ops.sched_in prototype]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7b3d1bbf8d68d76fb21210932a5e8ed8ea80dbcc ]
Eat VMX treemption timer exits in the fastpath regardless of whether L1 or
L2 is active. The VM-Exit is 100% KVM-induced, i.e. there is nothing
directly related to the exit that KVM needs to do on behalf of the guest,
thus there is no reason to wait until the slow path to do nothing.
Opportunistically add comments explaining why preemption timer exits for
emulating the guest's APIC timer need to go down the slow path.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110012705.506918-6-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bf1a49436ea37b98dd2f37c57608951d0e28eecc ]
Let the fastpath code decide which exits can/can't be handled in the
fastpath when L2 is active, e.g. when KVM generates a VMX preemption
timer exit to forcefully regain control, there is no "work" to be done and
so such exits can be handled in the fastpath regardless of whether L1 or
L2 is active.
Moving the is_guest_mode() check into the fastpath code also makes it
easier to see that L2 isn't allowed to use the fastpath in most cases,
e.g. it's not immediately obvious why handle_fastpath_preemption_timer()
is called from the fastpath and the normal path.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110012705.506918-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 11776aa0cfa7d007ad1799b1553bdcbd830e5010 ]
Handle VMX preemption timer VM-Exits due to KVM forcing an exit in the
exit fastpath, i.e. avoid calling back into handle_preemption_timer() for
the same exit. There is no work to be done for forced exits, as the name
suggests the goal is purely to get control back in KVM.
In addition to shaving a few cycles, this will allow cleanly separating
handle_fastpath_preemption_timer() from handle_preemption_timer(), e.g.
it's not immediately obvious why _apparently_ calling
handle_fastpath_preemption_timer() twice on a "slow" exit is necessary:
the "slow" call is necessary to handle exits from L2, which are excluded
from the fastpath by vmx_vcpu_run().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110012705.506918-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e6b5d16bbd2d4c8259ad76aa33de80d561aba5f9 ]
Re-enter the guest in the fast path if VMX preeemption timer VM-Exit was
"spurious", i.e. if KVM "soft disabled" the timer by writing -1u and by
some miracle the timer expired before any other VM-Exit occurred. This is
just an intermediate step to cleaning up the preemption timer handling,
optimizing these types of spurious VM-Exits is not interesting as they are
extremely rare/infrequent.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110012705.506918-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9c9025ea003a03f967affd690f39b4ef3452c0f5 ]
Annotate the kvm_entry() tracepoint with "immediate exit" when KVM is
forcing a VM-Exit immediately after VM-Enter, e.g. when KVM wants to
inject an event but needs to first complete some other operation.
Knowing that KVM is (or isn't) forcing an exit is useful information when
debugging issues related to event injection.
Suggested-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110012705.506918-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 189ecdb3e112da703ac0699f4ec76aa78122f911 ]
Snapshot the host's DEBUGCTL after disabling IRQs, as perf can toggle
debugctl bits from IRQ context, e.g. when enabling/disabling events via
smp_call_function_single(). Taking the snapshot (long) before IRQs are
disabled could result in KVM effectively clobbering DEBUGCTL due to using
a stale snapshot.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227222411.3490595-6-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fb71c795935652fa20eaf9517ca9547f5af99a76 ]
Move KVM's snapshot of DEBUGCTL to kvm_vcpu_arch and take the snapshot in
common x86, so that SVM can also use the snapshot.
Opportunistically change the field to a u64. While bits 63:32 are reserved
on AMD, not mentioned at all in Intel's SDM, and managed as an "unsigned
long" by the kernel, DEBUGCTL is an MSR and therefore a 64-bit value.
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227222411.3490595-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: resolve minor syntatic conflict in vmx_vcpu_load()]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 04bc93cf49d16d01753b95ddb5d4f230b809a991 ]
If KVM emulates an EOI for L1's virtual APIC while L2 is active, defer
updating GUEST_INTERUPT_STATUS.SVI, i.e. the VMCS's cache of the highest
in-service IRQ, until L1 is active, as vmcs01, not vmcs02, needs to track
vISR. The missed SVI update for vmcs01 can result in L1 interrupts being
incorrectly blocked, e.g. if there is a pending interrupt with lower
priority than the interrupt that was EOI'd.
This bug only affects use cases where L1's vAPIC is effectively passed
through to L2, e.g. in a pKVM scenario where L2 is L1's depriveleged host,
as KVM will only emulate an EOI for L1's vAPIC if Virtual Interrupt
Delivery (VID) is disabled in vmc12, and L1 isn't intercepting L2 accesses
to its (virtual) APIC page (or if x2APIC is enabled, the EOI MSR).
WARN() if KVM updates L1's ISR while L2 is active with VID enabled, as an
EOI from L2 is supposed to affect L2's vAPIC, but still defer the update,
to try to keep L1 alive. Specifically, KVM forwards all APICv-related
VM-Exits to L1 via nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit():
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS:
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED:
/*
* The controls for "virtualize APIC accesses," "APIC-
* register virtualization," and "virtual-interrupt
* delivery" only come from vmcs12.
*/
return true;
Fixes: c7c9c56ca2 ("x86, apicv: add virtual interrupt delivery support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20230312180048.1778187-1-jason.cj.chen@intel.com
Reported-by: Markku Ahvenjärvi <mankku@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240920080012.74405-1-mankku@gmail.com
Cc: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
[sean: drop request, handle in VMX, write changelog]
Tested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241128000010.4051275-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: resolve minor syntactic conflict in lapic.h, account for lack of
kvm_x86_call(), drop sanity check due to lack of wants_to_run]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 76bce9f10162cd4b36ac0b7889649b22baf70ebd ]
Pass the target vCPU to the hwapic_isr_update() vendor hook so that VMX
can defer the update until after nested VM-Exit if an EOI for L1's vAPIC
occurs while L2 is active.
Note, commit d39850f57d ("KVM: x86: Drop @vcpu parameter from
kvm_x86_ops.hwapic_isr_update()") removed the parameter with the
justification that doing so "allows for a decent amount of (future)
cleanup in the APIC code", but it's not at all clear what cleanup was
intended, or if it was ever realized.
No functional change intended.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241128000010.4051275-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: account for lack of kvm_x86_call(), drop vmx/x86_ops.h change]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit be45bc4eff33d9a7dae84a2150f242a91a617402 ]
Enable/disable local IRQs, i.e. set/clear RFLAGS.IF, in the common
svm_vcpu_enter_exit() just after/before guest_state_{enter,exit}_irqoff()
so that VMRUN is not executed in an STI shadow. AMD CPUs have a quirk
(some would say "bug"), where the STI shadow bleeds into the guest's
intr_state field if a #VMEXIT occurs during injection of an event, i.e. if
the VMRUN doesn't complete before the subsequent #VMEXIT.
The spurious "interrupts masked" state is relatively benign, as it only
occurs during event injection and is transient. Because KVM is already
injecting an event, the guest can't be in HLT, and if KVM is querying IRQ
blocking for injection, then KVM would need to force an immediate exit
anyways since injecting multiple events is impossible.
However, because KVM copies int_state verbatim from vmcb02 to vmcb12, the
spurious STI shadow is visible to L1 when running a nested VM, which can
trip sanity checks, e.g. in VMware's VMM.
Hoist the STI+CLI all the way to C code, as the aforementioned calls to
guest_state_{enter,exit}_irqoff() already inform lockdep that IRQs are
enabled/disabled, and taking a fault on VMRUN with RFLAGS.IF=1 is already
possible. I.e. if there's kernel code that is confused by running with
RFLAGS.IF=1, then it's already a problem. In practice, since GIF=0 also
blocks NMIs, the only change in exposure to non-KVM code (relative to
surrounding VMRUN with STI+CLI) is exception handling code, and except for
the kvm_rebooting=1 case, all exception in the core VM-Enter/VM-Exit path
are fatal.
Use the "raw" variants to enable/disable IRQs to avoid tracing in the
"no instrumentation" code; the guest state helpers also take care of
tracing IRQ state.
Oppurtunstically document why KVM needs to do STI in the first place.
Reported-by: Doug Covelli <doug.covelli@broadcom.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CADH9ctBs1YPmE4aCfGPNBwA10cA8RuAk2gO7542DjMZgs4uzJQ@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: f14eec0a32 ("KVM: SVM: move more vmentry code to assembly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250224165442.2338294-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: resolve minor syntatic conflict in __svm_sev_es_vcpu_run()]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fa787ac07b3ceb56dd88a62d1866038498e96230 ]
In KVM guests with Hyper-V hypercalls enabled, the hypercalls
HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST and HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX
allow a guest to request invalidation of portions of a virtual TLB.
For this, the hypercall parameter includes a list of GVAs that are supposed
to be invalidated.
However, when non-canonical GVAs are passed, there is currently no
filtering in place and they are eventually passed to checked invocations of
INVVPID on Intel / INVLPGA on AMD. While AMD's INVLPGA silently ignores
non-canonical addresses (effectively a no-op), Intel's INVVPID explicitly
signals VM-Fail and ultimately triggers the WARN_ONCE in invvpid_error():
invvpid failed: ext=0x0 vpid=1 gva=0xaaaaaaaaaaaaa000
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 326 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:482
invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel]
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm 9pnet_virtio irqbypass fuse
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 326 Comm: kvm-vm Not tainted 6.15.0 #14 PREEMPT(voluntary)
RIP: 0010:invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel]
Call Trace:
vmx_flush_tlb_gva+0x320/0x490 [kvm_intel]
kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb+0x24f/0x4f0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3013/0x5810 [kvm]
Hyper-V documents that invalid GVAs (those that are beyond a partition's
GVA space) are to be ignored. While not completely clear whether this
ruling also applies to non-canonical GVAs, it is likely fine to make that
assumption, and manual testing on Azure confirms "real" Hyper-V interprets
the specification in the same way.
Skip non-canonical GVAs when processing the list of address to avoid
tripping the INVVPID failure. Alternatively, KVM could filter out "bad"
GVAs before inserting into the FIFO, but practically speaking the only
downside of pushing validation to the final processing is that doing so
is suboptimal for the guest, and no well-behaved guest will request TLB
flushes for non-canonical addresses.
Fixes: 260970862c ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: Handle HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST{,EX} calls gently")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Manuel Andreas <manuel.andreas@tum.de>
Suggested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c090efb3-ef82-499f-a5e0-360fc8420fb7@tum.de
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: use plain is_noncanonical_address()]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 8c48e1c7520321cc87ff651e96093e2f412785fb upstream.
We already called ib_drain_qp() before and that makes sure
send_done() was called with IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR, but
didn't called atomic_dec_and_test(&sc->send_io.pending.count)
So we may never reach the info->send_pending == 0 condition.
Cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Cc: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org
Fixes: 5349ae5e05fa ("smb: client: let send_done() cleanup before calling smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection()")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d405ec23df13e6df599f5bd965a55d13420366b8 upstream.
Commit d33bd88ac0eb ("ACPI: processor: perflib: Fix initial _PPC limit
application") added a pr->performance check that prevents the frequency
QoS request from being added when the given processor has no performance
object. Unfortunately, this causes a WARN() in freq_qos_remove_request()
to trigger on an attempt to take the given CPU offline later because the
frequency QoS object has not been added for it due to the missing
performance object.
Address this by moving the pr->performance check before calling
acpi_processor_get_platform_limit() so it only prevents a limit from
being set for the CPU if the performance object is not present. This
way, the frequency QoS request is added as it was before the above
commit and it is present all the time along with the CPU's cpufreq
policy regardless of whether or not the CPU is online.
Fixes: d33bd88ac0eb ("ACPI: processor: perflib: Fix initial _PPC limit application")
Tested-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: 5.4+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2801421.mvXUDI8C0e@rafael.j.wysocki
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d33bd88ac0ebb49e7f7c8f29a8c7ee9eae85d765 upstream.
If the BIOS sets a _PPC frequency limit upfront, it will fail to take
effect due to a call ordering issue. Namely, freq_qos_update_request()
is called before freq_qos_add_request() for the given request causing
the constraint update to be ignored. The call sequence in question is
as follows:
cpufreq_policy_online()
acpi_cpufreq_cpu_init()
acpi_processor_register_performance()
acpi_processor_get_performance_info()
acpi_processor_get_platform_limit()
freq_qos_update_request(&perflib_req) <- inactive QoS request
blocking_notifier_call_chain(&cpufreq_policy_notifier_list,
CPUFREQ_CREATE_POLICY)
acpi_processor_notifier()
acpi_processor_ppc_init()
freq_qos_add_request(&perflib_req) <- QoS request activation
Address this by adding an acpi_processor_get_platform_limit() call
to acpi_processor_ppc_init(), after the perflib_req activation via
freq_qos_add_request(), which causes the initial _PPC limit to be
picked up as appropriate. However, also ensure that the _PPC limit
will not be picked up in the cases when the cpufreq driver does not
call acpi_processor_register_performance() by adding a pr->performance
check to the related_cpus loop in acpi_processor_ppc_init().
Fixes: d15ce41273 ("ACPI: cpufreq: Switch to QoS requests instead of cpufreq notifier")
Signed-off-by: Jiayi Li <lijiayi@kylinos.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250721032606.3459369-1-lijiayi@kylinos.cn
[ rjw: Consolidate pr-related checks in acpi_processor_ppc_init() ]
[ rjw: Subject and changelog adjustments ]
Cc: 5.4+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4+: 2d8b39a62a ACPI: processor: Avoid NULL pointer dereferences at init time
Cc: 5.4+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4+: 3000ce3c52 cpufreq: Use per-policy frequency QoS
Cc: 5.4+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4+: a1bb46c36c ACPI: processor: Add QoS requests for all CPUs
Cc: 5.4+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e65cb011349e653ded541dddd6469c2ca813edcf upstream.
The _CRS resources in many cases want to have ResourceSource field
to be a type of ACPI String. This means that to compile properly
we need to enclosure the name path into double quotes. This will
in practice defer the interpretation to a run-time stage, However,
this may be interpreted differently on different OSes and ACPI
interpreter implementations. In particular ACPICA might not correctly
recognize the leading '^' (caret) character and will not resolve
the relative name path properly. On top of that, this piece may be
used in SSDTs which are loaded after the DSDT and on itself may also
not resolve relative name paths outside of their own scopes.
With this all said, fix documentation to use fully-qualified name
paths always to avoid any misinterpretations, which is proven to
work.
Fixes: 8eb5c87a92 ("i2c: add ACPI support for I2C mux ports")
Reported-by: Yevhen Kondrashyn <e.kondrashyn@gmail.com>
Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250710170225.961303-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f2e467a48287c868818085aa35389a224d226732 upstream.
Ensure that epoll instances can never form a graph deeper than
EP_MAX_NESTS+1 links.
Currently, ep_loop_check_proc() ensures that the graph is loop-free and
does some recursion depth checks, but those recursion depth checks don't
limit the depth of the resulting tree for two reasons:
- They don't look upwards in the tree.
- If there are multiple downwards paths of different lengths, only one of
the paths is actually considered for the depth check since commit
28d82dc1c4 ("epoll: limit paths").
Essentially, the current recursion depth check in ep_loop_check_proc() just
serves to prevent it from recursing too deeply while checking for loops.
A more thorough check is done in reverse_path_check() after the new graph
edge has already been created; this checks, among other things, that no
paths going upwards from any non-epoll file with a length of more than 5
edges exist. However, this check does not apply to non-epoll files.
As a result, it is possible to recurse to a depth of at least roughly 500,
tested on v6.15. (I am unsure if deeper recursion is possible; and this may
have changed with commit 8c44dac8add7 ("eventpoll: Fix priority inversion
problem").)
To fix it:
1. In ep_loop_check_proc(), note the subtree depth of each visited node,
and use subtree depths for the total depth calculation even when a subtree
has already been visited.
2. Add ep_get_upwards_depth_proc() for similarly determining the maximum
depth of an upwards walk.
3. In ep_loop_check(), use these values to limit the total path length
between epoll nodes to EP_MAX_NESTS edges.
Fixes: 22bacca48a ("epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250711-epoll-recursion-fix-v1-1-fb2457c33292@google.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 04a2c4b4511d186b0fce685da21085a5d4acd370 upstream.
When sysctl_nr_open is set to a very high value (for example, 1073741816
as set by systemd), processes attempting to use file descriptors near
the limit can trigger massive memory allocation attempts that exceed
INT_MAX, resulting in a WARNING in mm/slub.c:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 44 at mm/slub.c:5027 __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x21a/0x288
This happens because kvmalloc_array() and kvmalloc() check if the
requested size exceeds INT_MAX and emit a warning when the allocation is
not flagged with __GFP_NOWARN.
Specifically, when nr_open is set to 1073741816 (0x3ffffff8) and a
process calls dup2(oldfd, 1073741880), the kernel attempts to allocate:
- File descriptor array: 1073741880 * 8 bytes = 8,589,935,040 bytes
- Multiple bitmaps: ~400MB
- Total allocation size: > 8GB (exceeding INT_MAX = 2,147,483,647)
Reproducer:
1. Set /proc/sys/fs/nr_open to 1073741816:
# echo 1073741816 > /proc/sys/fs/nr_open
2. Run a program that uses a high file descriptor:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
int main() {
struct rlimit rlim = {1073741824, 1073741824};
setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim);
dup2(2, 1073741880); // Triggers the warning
return 0;
}
3. Observe WARNING in dmesg at mm/slub.c:5027
systemd commit a8b627a introduced automatic bumping of fs.nr_open to the
maximum possible value. The rationale was that systems with memory
control groups (memcg) no longer need separate file descriptor limits
since memory is properly accounted. However, this change overlooked
that:
1. The kernel's allocation functions still enforce INT_MAX as a maximum
size regardless of memcg accounting
2. Programs and tests that legitimately test file descriptor limits can
inadvertently trigger massive allocations
3. The resulting allocations (>8GB) are impractical and will always fail
systemd's algorithm starts with INT_MAX and keeps halving the value
until the kernel accepts it. On most systems, this results in nr_open
being set to 1073741816 (0x3ffffff8), which is just under 1GB of file
descriptors.
While processes rarely use file descriptors near this limit in normal
operation, certain selftests (like
tools/testing/selftests/core/unshare_test.c) and programs that test file
descriptor limits can trigger this issue.
Fix this by adding a check in alloc_fdtable() to ensure the requested
allocation size does not exceed INT_MAX. This causes the operation to
fail with -EMFILE instead of triggering a kernel warning and avoids the
impractical >8GB memory allocation request.
Fixes: 9cfe015aa4 ("get rid of NR_OPEN and introduce a sysctl_nr_open")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250629074021.1038845-1-sashal@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 63ce53724637e2e7ba51fe3a4f78351715049905 upstream.
Using device_find_child() to locate a probed virtual-device-port node
causes a device refcount imbalance, as device_find_child() internally
calls get_device() to increment the device’s reference count before
returning its pointer. vdc_port_mpgroup_check() directly returns true
upon finding a matching device without releasing the reference via
put_device(). We should call put_device() to decrement refcount.
As comment of device_find_child() says, 'NOTE: you will need to drop
the reference with put_device() after use'.
Found by code review.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3ee70591d6 ("sunvdc: prevent sunvdc panic when mpgroup disk added to guest domain")
Signed-off-by: Ma Ke <make24@iscas.ac.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250719075856.3447953-1-make24@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a02fd05661d73a8507dd70dd820e9b984490c545 upstream.
Like s390 and the jailhouse hypervisor, LoongArch's PCI architecture allows
passing isolated PCI functions to a guest OS instance. So it is possible
that there is a multi-function device without function 0 for the host or
guest.
Allow probing such functions by adding a IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOONGARCH) case
in the hypervisor_isolated_pci_functions() helper.
This is similar to commit 189c6c33ff ("PCI: Extend isolated function
probing to s390").
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250624062927.4037734-1-chenhuacai@loongson.cn
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b01f21cacde9f2878492cf318fee61bf4ccad323 upstream.
Capabilities cannot be inherited when we cross into a new filesystem.
They need to be reset to the minimal defaults, and then probed for
again.
Fixes: 54ceac4515 ("NFS: Share NFS superblocks per-protocol per-server per-FSID")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9c65001c57164033ad08b654c8b5ae35512ddf4a upstream.
When the client sends an OPEN with claim type CLAIM_DELEG_CUR_FH or
CLAIM_DELEGATION_CUR, the delegation stateid and the file handle
must belong to the same file, otherwise return NFS4ERR_INVAL.
Note that RFC8881, section 8.2.4, mandates the server to return
NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID if the selected table entry does not match the
current filehandle. However returning NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID in the
OPEN causes the client to retry the operation and therefor get the
client into a loop. To avoid this situation we return NFS4ERR_INVAL
instead.
Reported-by: Petro Pavlov <petro.pavlov@vastdata.com>
Fixes: c44c5eeb2c ("[PATCH] nfsd4: add open state code for CLAIM_DELEGATE_CUR")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 908e4ead7f757504d8b345452730636e298cbf68 upstream.
Lei Lu recently reported that nfsd4_setclientid_confirm() did not check
the return value from get_client_locked(). a SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM could
race with a confirmed client expiring and fail to get a reference. That
could later lead to a UAF.
Fix this by getting a reference early in the case where there is an
extant confirmed client. If that fails then treat it as if there were no
confirmed client found at all.
In the case where the unconfirmed client is expiring, just fail and
return the result from get_client_locked().
Reported-by: lei lu <llfamsec@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/CAEBF3_b=UvqzNKdnfD_52L05Mqrqui9vZ2eFamgAbV0WG+FNWQ@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: d20c11d86d ("nfsd: Protect session creation and client confirm using client_lock")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit 41b70df5b38bc80967d2e0ed55cc3c3896bba781 upstream.
Ring provided buffers are potentially only valid within the single
execution context in which they were acquired. io_uring deals with this
and invalidates them on retry. But on the networking side, if
MSG_WAITALL is set, or if the socket is of the streaming type and too
little was processed, then it will hang on to the buffer rather than
recycle or commit it. This is problematic for two reasons:
1) If someone unregisters the provided buffer ring before a later retry,
then the req->buf_list will no longer be valid.
2) If multiple sockers are using the same buffer group, then multiple
receives can consume the same memory. This can cause data corruption
in the application, as either receive could land in the same
userspace buffer.
Fix this by disallowing partial retries from pinning a provided buffer
across multiple executions, if ring provided buffers are used.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: pt x <superman.xpt@gmail.com>
Fixes: c56e022c0a ("io_uring: add support for user mapped provided buffer ring")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4faff70959d51078f9ee8372f8cff0d7045e4114 upstream.
Without setting phy_mask for ax88772 mdio bus, current driver may create
at most 32 mdio phy devices with phy address range from 0x00 ~ 0x1f.
DLink DUB-E100 H/W Ver B1 is such a device. However, only one main phy
device will bind to net phy driver. This is creating issue during system
suspend/resume since phy_polling_mode() in phy_state_machine() will
directly deference member of phydev->drv for non-main phy devices. Then
NULL pointer dereference issue will occur. Due to only external phy or
internal phy is necessary, add phy_mask for ax88772 mdio bus to workarnoud
the issue.
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250806082931.3289134-1-xu.yang_2@nxp.com
Fixes: e532a096be ("net: usb: asix: ax88772: add phylib support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Xu Yang <xu.yang_2@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250811092931.860333-1-xu.yang_2@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e05c54974a05ab19658433545d6ced88d9075cf0 upstream.
Make sure to drop the references to the IEP OF node and device taken by
of_parse_phandle() and of_find_device_by_node() when looking up IEP
devices during probe.
Drop the bogus additional reference taken on successful lookup so that
the device is released correctly by icss_iep_put().
Fixes: c1e0230eea ("net: ti: icss-iep: Add IEP driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.6
Cc: Roger Quadros <rogerq@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250725171213.880-6-johan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 49db61c27c4bbd24364086dc0892bd3e14c1502e upstream.
Commit 21b688dabe ("net: phy: micrel: Cable Diag feature for lan8814
phy") introduced cable_test support for the LAN8814 that reuses parts of
the KSZ886x logic and introduced the cable_diag_reg and pair_mask
parameters to account for differences between those chips.
However, it did not update the ksz8081_type struct, so those members are
now 0, causing no pairs to be tested in ksz886x_cable_test_get_status
and ksz886x_cable_test_wait_for_completion to poll the wrong register
for the affected PHYs (Basic Control/Reset, which is 0 in normal
operation) and exit immediately.
Fix this by setting both struct members accordingly.
Fixes: 21b688dabe ("net: phy: micrel: Cable Diag feature for lan8814 phy")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Florian Larysch <fl@n621.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250723222250.13960-1-fl@n621.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 759dfc7d04bab1b0b86113f1164dc1fec192b859 upstream.
netlink_attachskb() checks for the socket's read memory allocation
constraints. Firstly, it has:
rmem < READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf)
to check if the just increased rmem value fits into the socket's receive
buffer. If not, it proceeds and tries to wait for the memory under:
rmem + skb->truesize > READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf)
The checks don't cover the case when skb->truesize + sk->sk_rmem_alloc is
equal to sk->sk_rcvbuf. Thus the function neither successfully accepts
these conditions, nor manages to reschedule the task - and is called in
retry loop for indefinite time which is caught as:
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
rcu: 0-....: (25999 ticks this GP) idle=ef2/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=262269/262269 fqs=6212
(t=26000 jiffies g=230833 q=259957)
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 PID: 22 Comm: kauditd Not tainted 5.10.240 #68
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc42 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:120
nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold lib/nmi_backtrace.c:105
nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace lib/nmi_backtrace.c:62
rcu_dump_cpu_stacks kernel/rcu/tree_stall.h:335
rcu_sched_clock_irq.cold kernel/rcu/tree.c:2590
update_process_times kernel/time/timer.c:1953
tick_sched_handle kernel/time/tick-sched.c:227
tick_sched_timer kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1399
__hrtimer_run_queues kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1652
hrtimer_interrupt kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1717
__sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1113
asm_call_irq_on_stack arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:808
</IRQ>
netlink_attachskb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1234
netlink_unicast net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1349
kauditd_send_queue kernel/audit.c:776
kauditd_thread kernel/audit.c:897
kthread kernel/kthread.c:328
ret_from_fork arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304
Restore the original behavior of the check which commit in Fixes
accidentally missed when restructuring the code.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).
Fixes: ae8f160e7eb2 ("netlink: Fix wraparounds of sk->sk_rmem_alloc.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250728080727.255138-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
